Opinion

Harvey v. Univ. of Cincinnati

  • 2009 Ohio 7029
Court
Ohio Court of Claims
Filed
Nov 24, 2009
Status
Published
On the bench
Travis
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 52.8%

The opinion

[Cite as Harvey v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2009-Ohio-7029.]

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center

65 South Front Street, Third Floor

Columbus, OH 43215

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263

www.cco.state.oh.us

ROBERT HARVEY, Co-Admr., etc.,

et al.

Plaintiffs

v.

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

Defendant

Case No. 2009-03517

Judge Alan C. Travis

DECISION

{¶ 1} On August 5, 2009, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing to

determine whether William Naber, M.D. is entitled to civil immunity pursuant to

R.C.2743.02(F) and 9.86. The parties also filed post-hearing briefs and replies. Upon

review of the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, as well as the

memoranda filed by the parties, the court makes the following determination.

{¶ 2} R.C. 2743.02(F) states, in part:

{¶ 3} “A civil action against an officer or employee, as defined in section 109.36

of the Revised Code, that alleges that the officer’s or employee’s conduct was

manifestly outside the scope of the officer’s or employee’s employment or official

responsibilities, or that the officer or employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad

faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner shall first be filed against the state in the court

of claims, which has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine, initially, whether the

officer or employee is entitled to personal immunity under section 9.86 of the Revised

Code and whether the courts of common pleas have jurisdiction over the civil action.”

{¶ 4} R.C. 9.86 states, in part:

{¶ 5} “[N]o officer or employee [of the state] shall be liable in any civil action that

arises under the law of this state for damage or injury caused in the performance of his

duties, unless the officer’s or employee’s actions were manifestly outside the scope of

his employment or official responsibilities or unless the officer or employee acted with

malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.”

{¶ 6} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “in an action to determine

whether a physician or other health-care practitioner is entitled to personal immunity

from liability pursuant to R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02[F], the Court of Claims must initially

determine whether the practitioner is a state employee. If there is no express contract

of employment, the court may require other evidence to substantiate an employment

relationship, such as financial and corporate documents, W-2 forms, invoices, and

other billing practices. If the court determines that the practitioner is not a state

employee, the analysis is completed and R.C. 9.86 does not apply.

{¶ 7} “If the court determines that the practitioner is a state employee, the court

must next determine whether the practitioner was acting on behalf of the state when the

patient was alleged to have been injured. If not, then the practitioner was acting

‘manifestly outside the scope of employment' for purposes of R.C. 9.86. If there is

evidence that the practitioner's duties include the education of students and residents,

the court must determine whether the practitioner was in fact educating a student or

resident when the alleged negligence occurred.” Theobald v. University of Cincinnati,

111 Ohio St.3d 541, 2006-Ohio-6208, ¶30-31. (Emphasis added.)

{¶ 8} At all times relevant, Dr. Naber was employed as an Assistant Professor

of Clinical Emergency Medicine in the College of Medicine at the University of Cincinnati

(UC). He also provided clinical care to patients at the Christ Hospital through his private

practice group, University Emergency Physicians, Inc. dba Vanguard Medical

(Vanguard). Dr. Naber stated that he received income both from UC and Vanguard,

with the largest portion coming from the clinical practice. He also stated that he taught

at UC approximately one to three hours per year, usually in the form of a lecture during

orientation for new physicians.

{¶ 9} Plaintiffs’ decedent, Brandi Harvey, was brought to the emergency room of

Christ Hospital on April 12, 2007, at approximately noon where she was interviewed by

a triage nurse. Brandi complained that she was “stressed out” but she refused to

elaborate or to explain why she felt that way. The triage nurse noted “unsure if SI

[suicidal ideation] or HI [homicidal ideation]. (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1.) Dr. Naber stated that

he spoke with Brandi and her parents and he attempted to elicit some information from

Brandi. After much coaxing, Brandi alluded to relationship problems and her fear that

she may have contracted an infectious disease. Sometime prior to 2:00 p.m., Dr. Naber

received a telephone call and stepped away from Brandi and her parents. The nursing

notes document that at 2:00 p.m., Brandi was “seen running out of room [with] mother

chasing out into waiting room.” (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1.)

{¶ 10} Eventually, Brandi was located at the base of the outer wall of the parking

garage where she landed after she allegedly leapt or fell over a wall on an upper floor of

the garage. Brandi was barely alive and she was transported back to the emergency

room suffering from devastating head injuries. Brandi succumbed to those injuries a

short while later.

{¶ 11} Plaintiffs allege that Dr. Naber was negligent in his failure to properly

triage, diagnose, treat, medicate, restrain, and protect Brandi prior to her flight from the

hospital. According to plaintiffs, the alleged negligence occurred between noon and just

prior to 2:00 p.m.

{¶ 12} Initially, the court finds that Dr. Naber’s position as an assistant professor

at UC clearly qualifies as state employment.1 Thus, the issue before the court is

whether Dr. Naber was acting on behalf of the state at the time when the alleged

negligence occurred and because the evidence establishes that Dr. Naber’s duties

included the education of residents, whether he was in fact educating a resident at the

time of the alleged negligence.

{¶ 13} In the present case, there is no documentary evidence of a resident being

present in the emergency room of Christ Hospital prior to 2:00 p.m. According to the

emergency department rotation schedule, Dr. Laura Heitsch was the only resident

scheduled to work April 12, 2007, from 2:00 p.m. through 12:00 a.m. Dr. Naber

explained that it was normal procedure for a resident to arrive some time prior to the

start of the shift but that in this instance he did not recall seeing Dr. Heitsch prior to the

time when he was attempting to resuscitate Brandi at the parking garage. He

specifically recalled that Dr. Heitsch was present when Brandi was transported back to

the emergency department. In addition, Dr. Naber maintains that the resident

participated fully in the resuscitation efforts and that he subsequently used the

circumstances of the entire incident when he taught and trained other residents.

{¶ 14} Plaintiffs contend that they are not alleging any claims of negligence

against Dr. Naber with regard to the care and treatment of Brandi after she was located

at the base of the parking garage.

{¶ 15} Upon review of the testimony, evidence, and arguments of counsel, the

court is not persuaded that a resident was present for the purpose of education during

the period of time that the alleged negligence occurred. The court further finds that Dr.

Naber was not furthering the interests of the state during the time that he interviewed

Brandi and managed her care prior to her fleeing the premises. Dr. Naber admitted that

Dr. Heitsch did not assist him in interviewing or assessing Brandi prior to her escape. In

addition, Dr. Naber testified that he did not specifically recall when Dr. Heitsch was first

present, except that he recalled seeing her upon his return to the emergency room with

Brandi on the gurney.

{¶ 16} Defendant presented no documentation specifying when Dr. Heitsch

arrived at the emergency room or whether she was present in the emergency room prior

to Brandi’s flight from the hospital. As stated in Theobold, supra, “‘[i]n many instances,

the line between [the physician’s] roles (practicing and teaching) is blurred because the

practitioner may be teaching by simply providing the student or resident an opportunity

to observe while the practitioner treats a patient.’” Id. at ¶16 quoting Theobald v. Univ.

of Cincinnati, 160 Ohio App.3d 342, 2005-Ohio-1510, ¶34. In affirming the holding of

the Tenth District Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court agreed that “the question of

scope of employment must turn on what the practitioner’s duties are as a state

employee and whether the practitioner was engaged in those duties at the time of an

injury.” Id. at ¶23. Dr. Naber’s duties as a state-employed professor of medicine

1

Plaintiffs have not asserted that Dr. Naber’s conduct was wanton and reckless and, therefore,

required him to train and educate residents who rotated through the emergency room of

Christ Hospital. The Court of Appeals had explained that “anytime a clinical faculty

member furthers a student or resident’s education, he promotes the state’s interest.

Because the state’s interest is promoted no matter how the education of the student or

resident occurs, a practitioner is acting within the scope of his employment if he

educates a student or resident by direct instruction, demonstration, supervision, or

simple involvement of the student or resident in the patient’s care.” Theobald, supra,

160 Ohio App.3d 342, 2005-Ohio-1510, ¶47.

{¶ 17} Based upon the totality of the evidence presented, the court concludes

that none of those methods of instruction occurred during the time period from noon

until Brandi had fled and Dr. Naber was summoned from the cubicle. Certainly,

education of students and residents may be accomplished by either direct instruction or

simple observation of medical procedures. Here, neither of those occurred between Dr.

Naber and Dr. Heitsch prior to Brandi’s flight. This court has previously determined that

the holding in Theobald does not restrict physician immunity to situations where a

resident or student was physically present or assisting in the care of a patient. See

Clevenger v. Univ. of Cincinnati Coll. of Med., Ct. of Cl. No. 2008-10323, 2009-Ohio-

2829. Nonetheless, the court finds that the resident must be available to receive such

instruction.2 As noted by plaintiffs in their brief, the emphasis is placed upon the

temporal nexus between the alleged negligent acts and the instruction of students or

residents for the purpose of medical training. As such, the court finds that Dr. Naber

was not educating Dr. Heitsch at the time of the alleged negligence. Therefore, the

court concludes that Dr. Naber was not acting within the scope of his state employment

with UC at the time that the alleged negligence occurred.

{¶ 18} Consequently, the court concludes that Dr. Naber is not entitled to civil

immunity pursuant to R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02(F). Therefore, the courts of common pleas

have jurisdiction over any civil actions that may be filed against him based upon the

allegations in this case.

outside the scope of his state employment.

2

In Theobald, the Supreme Court referenced the holding of Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati,

Franklin App. No. 04AP-926, 2005-Ohio-2203, wherein the physicians were found to be outside the scope

of their state employment, inasmuch as they were not supervising residents or students at the time the

alleged negligence occurred.

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center

65 South Front Street, Third Floor

Columbus, OH 43215

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263

www.cco.state.oh.us

ROBERT HARVEY, Co-Admr., etc.,

et al.

Plaintiffs

v.

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

Defendant

Case No. 2009-03517

Judge Alan C. Travis

JUDGMENT ENTRY

The court held an evidentiary hearing to determine civil immunity pursuant to

R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02(F). Upon hearing all the evidence and for the reasons set forth

in the decision filed concurrently herewith, the court finds that William Naber, M.D. is not

entitled to immunity pursuant to R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02(F) and that the courts of

common pleas have jurisdiction over any civil actions that may be filed against him

based upon the allegations in this case.

_____________________________________

ALAN C. TRAVIS

Judge

cc:

Brian M. Kneafsey Jr. Bruce B. Whitman

Assistant Attorney General 3536 Edwards Road, Suite 100

150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor Cincinnati, Ohio 45208

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130

SJM/cmd

Filed November 24, 2009

To S.C. reporter December 29, 2009

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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