Opinion

Liu v. Ohio Univ.

  • 2010 Ohio 4581
Court
Ohio Court of Claims
Filed
May 14, 2010
Status
Published
On the bench
Borchert
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.2%

The opinion

[Cite as Liu v. Ohio Univ., 2010-Ohio-4581.]

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center

65 South Front Street, Third Floor

Columbus, OH 43215

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263

www.cco.state.oh.us

XI LIU

Plaintiff

v.

OHIO UNIVERSITY

Defendant

Case No. 2009-08829-AD

Deputy Clerk Daniel R. Borchert

MEMORANDUM DECISION

{¶ 1} Plaintiff, Xi Liu, filed this action against defendant, Ohio University (OU),

alleging the windshield on her Pontiac Sunfire was broken as a proximate cause of

negligence on the part of OU in maintaining a hazardous condition on its premises.

Plaintiff described the specific damage incident noting, “I just stopped my car in Lot 143

of Ohio University then a field hockey ball flied out of the field hockey field (No. 138 on

campus map) and cracked my windshield.” Plaintiff recalled the particular damage

incident occurred on October 22, 2009 at approximately 3:00 p.m. Plaintiff seeks

recovery of damages in the amount of $197.00, the stated cost of a replacement

windshield. The $25.00 filing fee was paid and plaintiff requested reimbursement of that

cost along with her damage claim.

{¶ 2} Defendant confirmed the windshield on plaintiff’s vehicle was damaged

when an errant ball from the OU field hockey site left the playing field and struck

plaintiff’s car parked in Lot 143. However, defendant advised plaintiff mistakenly

claimed the errant ball came from field 138 “which is across Shafer Street from Parking

Lot 143.” Defendant explained parking lot 143 is located adjacent to Howard Park, a

site used for field hockey and the ball that struck plaintiff’s car actually came from field

106 where field hockey is played. Defendant related, “Lot 143, is directly adjacent to

the north of this facility (Field 106).” According to information contained in a police

report, (copy submitted) filed incident to plaintiff’s damage occurrence, plaintiff was

sitting in her parked car at the time the field hockey ball struck her windshield.

{¶ 3} Defendant denied liability in this matter based on the contention that

plaintiff assumed the risk of harm when she knowingly parked her car in a lot adjacent

to an athletic field when a field hockey game or practice was in progress. Defendant

stated, “[f]ield hockey is a vibrant sport involving, at times, a rapidly moving ball which

can do damage.” Defendant argued, “[a] reasonable person who decides to park a

vehicle near a field in which this sport (field hockey) is taking place assumes the risk

associated with this decision.” Defendant further argued plaintiff was well aware of the

risks involved in parking her car adjacent to a field where athletic activity involving balls

struck with sticks was in progress. Seemingly, defendant asserted plaintiff had a duty to

protect her property from the known dangers associated with parking her vehicle next to

an athletic site where it was common knowledge that balls could at any time be

propelled from the field of play onto Lot 143.

{¶ 4} Primary assumption of the risk is a defense generally applied in cases

where there is a lack of duty owed by the defendant to plaintiff and is a complete bar to

recovery. Anderson v. Ceccardi (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 114, 6 OBR 170, 45 N.E. 2d

780. “In that form, while there is a knowledge of the danger and acquiescence in it on

the part of the plaintiff, there is no duty owed by defendant to plaintiff.” Willoughby v.

Harrison Radiator, Div. of General Motors Corp. (May 11, 1989), Montgomery App. No.

11225. This type of assumption of the risk is typified by the baseball cases where a

plaintiff is injured when a baseball is hit into the stands. Anderson, at 114, citing

Cincinnati Baseball Club Co. v. Eno (1925), 112 Ohio St. 175, 147 N.E. 86.

{¶ 5} Also, it has been determined, under the doctrine of primary assumption of

the risk, that an individual injured while engaged in a recreational activity is generally

barred from recovery because she is presumed to have assumed the ordinary risks of

that activity unless it can be proved another individual acted recklessly or intentionally in

causing the injury claimed. Marchetti v. Kalish (1990), 53 Ohio St. 3d 95, 559 N.E. 2d

699; Gentry v. Craycraft, 101 Ohio St. 3d 141, 2004-Ohio-379. The doctrine of primary

assumption of the risk serves to remove liability for mere negligence under

circumstances involving recreational activity injuries. The trial court applied a three-part

test for primary assumption of the risk set forth in Gallagher v. Cleveland Browns

Football Co. Inc. (1994), 93 Ohio App. 3d 449, 638 N.E. 2d 1082, reversed on other

grounds, 74 Ohio St. 3d 427, 1996-Ohio-320, 659 N.E. 2d 1232. The test requires that:

1) the danger is ordinary to the game; 2) it is common knowledge that the danger exists;

and 3) the injury occurs as a result of the danger during the course of the game.

{¶ 6} It is well settled that spectators attending baseball games who are injured

by batted balls flying into the stands are denied recovery based on the primary

assumption of the risk doctrine. The following standard was enunciated in Cincinnati

Baseball Club Co., 112 Ohio St. 175, 147 N.E. 86, in regard to the spectators

assumption of the risk at a baseball game. “The consensus of *** opinions is to the

effect that it is common knowledge that in baseball games hard balls are thrown and

batted with great swiftness, that they are liable to be thrown or batted outside the limits

of the diamond, and that spectators in positions which may be reached by such balls

assume the risk thereof” at 180-181. Furthermore, in Borchers v. Winzler Excavating

Co. (1992), 83 Ohio App. 3d 268, 273, 614 N.E. 2d 1065, the court stated: “In baseball

games, management performs its duty towards spectators when it provides screened

seats in the grandstand and gives spectators the opportunity of occupying them.

Cincinnati Baseball Club (cite omitted).”

{¶ 7} “The nature of the sporting activity is highly relevant in defining the duty of

care owed by a particular defendant: ‘What constitutes an unreasonable risk under the

circumstances of a sporting event must be delineated with reference to the way the

particular game is played, i.e. the rules and customs that shape the participant’s ideas

of foreseeable conduct in the course of a game.’” Bundschu v. Naffah, 147 Ohio App

3d 105, 2002-Ohio-607, ¶36. Any analysis of primary assumption of the risk turns on

whether or not the injured spectator was subjected to risk or hazards that a reasonable

participant would or would not expect to encounter in the particular sporting activity.

{¶ 8} Despite the fact plaintiff was not a spectator at the field hockey event on

October 22, 2009 and the representative injury occurred in a parking lot removed from

the playing field, defendant argued the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk with

the consequential no duty rule should apply to the outcome of the instant claim.

Furthermore, defendant seemingly contended the doctrine of assumption of the risk is

applicable to injuries resulting from errant balls leaving the playing area in field hockey

contests as well as more commonly accepted venues such as baseball games. This

court has previously held the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk was applicable

to a property damage situation resulting from a baseball leaving the playing field and

damaging the car of a non-spectator parked in an adjacent parking lot. See Cheney v.

Cleveland State Univ. (2006), 2006-04113-AD. In the instant claim, the court concludes

the primary assumption of the risk doctrine is applicable to situations where non-

spectator plaintiffs have suffered damage to property from errant balls leaving the field

of play at a field hockey area. Consequently, plaintiff assumed the risk of damage to

her property from field hockey play and because the risk was foreseeable, no duty of

care was owed to plaintiff by defendant. Therefore, this claim is denied.

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center

65 South Front Street, Third Floor

Columbus, OH 43215

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263

www.cco.state.oh.us

XI LIU

Plaintiff

v.

OHIO UNIVERSITY

Defendant

Case No. 2009-08829-AD

Deputy Clerk Daniel R. Borchert

ENTRY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION

Having considered all the evidence in the claim file and, for the reasons set forth

in the memorandum decision filed concurrently herewith, judgment is rendered in favor

of defendant. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff.

________________________________

DANIEL R. BORCHERT

Deputy Clerk

Entry cc:

Xi Liu George T. Wendt, Risk Manager

300 W. State Street Ohio University

Apt. J4 160 Union Street

Athens, Ohio 45701 HDL Center 166H

Athens, Ohio 45701

RDK/laa

Filed 5/14/10

Sent to S.C. reporter 9/17/10

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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