Opinion

Preston v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr.

  • 2011 Ohio 3898
Court
Ohio Court of Claims
Filed
Jul 1, 2011
Status
Published
On the bench
Weaver
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.2%

The opinion

[Cite as Preston v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr., 2011-Ohio-3898.]

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center

65 South Front Street, Third Floor

Columbus, OH 43215

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263

www.cco.state.oh.us

CYNTHIA D. PRESTON

Plaintiff

v.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER

Defendant

Case No. 2010-05676

Judge Clark B. Weaver Sr.

DECISION

{¶ 1} This case is sua sponte assigned to Judge Clark B. Weaver Sr. to conduct

all proceedings necessary for decision in this matter.

{¶ 2} On April 11, 2011, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment

pursuant to Civ.R. 56. Plaintiff did not file a response. The motion is now before the

court for a non-oral hearing. See Civ.R. 56 and L.C.C.R. 4.

{¶ 3} Civ.R. 56(C) states, in part, as follows:

{¶ 4} “Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of

evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as

stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from

the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable

minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party

against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to

have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.” See also

Gilbert v. Summit County, 104 Ohio St.3d 660, 2004-Ohio-7108, citing Temple v. Wean

United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317.

{¶ 5} On April 1, 2008, plaintiff was admitted to defendant’s hospital for treatment

of the condition of preeclampsia, which is high blood pressure during pregnancy. On

April 3, 2008, plaintiff took a bath in Room 692 of the hospital. While attempting to exit

the bathtub, plaintiff reached for the railing, which came loose from the wall, causing her

to fall. Plaintiff alleges that she sustained permanent injuries to her head, neck, back,

and legs as a result of defendant’s negligent maintenance of its premises. Plaintiff

further alleges that as a result of defendant’s negligence, she gave birth to a premature

baby with permanent disabilities on April 4, 2008.

{¶ 6} In order for plaintiff to prevail upon her claim of negligence, she must prove

by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant owed her a duty, that defendant’s

acts or omissions resulted in a breach of that duty, and that the breach proximately

caused her injuries. Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 99 Ohio St.3d 79, 81, 2003-Ohio-

2573, citing Menifee v. Ohio Welding Products, Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 75, 77.

Under Ohio law, the duty owed by an owner or occupier of premises generally depends

on whether the injured person is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Gladon v. Greater

Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 312, 315, 1996-Ohio-137. Plaintiff was

on defendant’s premises for purposes that would classify her as an invitee, defined as a

person who comes “upon the premises of another, by invitation, express or implied, for

some purpose which is beneficial to the owner.” Baldauf v. Kent State Univ. (1988), 49

Ohio App.3d 46, 47. An owner or occupier of premises owes its invitees “a duty of

ordinary care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition * * *.”

Armstrong, supra, at 80.

{¶ 7} “The duty of ordinary care includes maintaining the premises in a

reasonably safe condition and inspecting the premises to discover hidden or latent

dangers. Perry v. Eastgreen Realty Co. (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 51, 52. The owner of

premises is liable to an invitee for injuries caused by latent defects when the owner

knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, about the hazard for a

time sufficient to correct the defect. Presley v. Norwood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 29, 31;

see, also, Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965) 215, Section 343.” Tarkany v.

Board of Trustees of Ohio State Univ. (June 4, 1991), Franklin App. No. 90AP-1398.

The distinction between actual and constructive notice is in the manner in which notice

is obtained rather than in the amount of information obtained. Whenever the trier of fact

is entitled to find from competent evidence that information was personally

communicated to or received by the party, the notice is actual. Constructive notice is

that notice which the law regards as sufficient to give notice and is regarded as a

substitute for actual notice. In re Estate of Fahle (1950), 90 Ohio App. 195, 197.

{¶ 8} In support of its motion, defendant submitted the affidavit of Paul Willis, who

avers as follows:

{¶ 9} “1. I am currently employed as a full time employee by The Ohio State

University Medical Center (‘OSUMC’) as a Zone Technician 3 in the facilities services

department. During April 2008, I worked this same position;

{¶ 10} “2. I have personal knowledge, and I am competent to testify to the facts

contained in this Affidavit;

{¶ 11} “3. During April, 2008, my assignment included the 6th Floor of Doan Hall,

which included room 692. Neither I nor my department had notice of the bathtub railing

being loose in Doan Hall Room 692 prior to Cynthia Preston’s alleged fall on April 3,

2008;

{¶ 12} “4. The OSUMC maintenance department regularly conducts inspections

of its bathtub railings, like the one in Doan Hall, Room 692, whenever doing other

maintenance projects in the bathrooms. In addition, the cleaning staff and nursing staff

are frequently cleaning or preparing the bathtubs for patient use. Whenever a

maintenance problem is discovered, the cleaning staff or nursing staff is to notify the

maintenance staff. I am not aware of any evidence that someone on the cleaning or

nursing staffs saw the loose railing but never notified the maintenance department;

{¶ 13} “5. On April 4, 2008, I responded to the maintenance request and fixed

the loose railing on [sic] in Room 692. The bathtub railings are attached to the wall with

four anchors. I discovered that one anchor was loose, and that part of the railing did

move a couple of inches. However, the rest of the railing did not budge from the wall.”

{¶ 14} In addition, defendant submitted the affidavits of Karen Stone, patient care

assistant, Darla Miller, R.N., and Karen Phelps, R.N., who all aver that they were

assigned to care for plaintiff at various times during her stay at defendant’s hospital from

April 3-4, 2008, but did not have notice that the bathtub railing in Doan Hall Room 692

may have been loose prior to plaintiff’s fall.

{¶ 15} Civ.R. 56(E) states, in part: “When a motion for summary judgment is

made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the

mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings, but the party’s response, by

affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if

appropriate, shall be entered against the party.”

{¶ 16} Plaintiff did not file a response to defendant’s motion. Construing the

evidence most strongly in plaintiff’s favor, the court finds that defendant had neither

constructive nor actual notice of the defective condition of the bathtub railing prior to

plaintiff’s fall. Therefore, the court finds that there exists no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Inasmuch as

the court has found that defendant did not commit a breach of its duty of care owed to

plaintiff, the issue of proximate cause of injury to either plaintiff or to her baby is not

before the court. Based upon the foregoing, defendant’s motion for summary judgment

shall be granted and judgment shall be rendered in favor of defendant.

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center

65 South Front Street, Third Floor

Columbus, OH 43215

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263

www.cco.state.oh.us

CYNTHIA D. PRESTON

Plaintiff

v.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER

Defendant

Case No. 2010-05676

Judge Clark B. Weaver Sr.

JUDGMENT ENTRY

A non-oral hearing was conducted in this case upon defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. For the reasons set forth in the decision filed concurrently

herewith, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and judgment is

rendered in favor of defendant. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff. The clerk

shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.

_____________________________________

CLARK B. WEAVER SR.

Judge

cc:

Daniel R. Forsythe Cynthia D. Preston

Karl W. Schedler 3117 Easthaven Drive South

Assistant Attorneys General Columbus, Ohio 43232

150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130

HTS/cmd

Filed July 1, 2011

To S.C. reporter August 2, 2011

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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