Opinion

Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.

  • 2012 Ohio 6331
Court
Ohio Court of Claims
Filed
Sep 12, 2012
Status
Published
On the bench
Clark
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.2%

The opinion

[Cite as Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2012-Ohio-6331.]

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center

65 South Front Street, Third Floor

Columbus, OH 43215

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263

www.cco.state.oh.us

PAUL RISNER, Co-Admr., et al.

Plaintiffs

v.

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Defendant

Case No. 2011-03332

Judge Joseph T. Clark

ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

{¶ 1} On August 8, 2012, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment

pursuant to Civ.R. 56(B). On August 31, 2012, plaintiffs filed a response. The motion is

now before the court for a non-oral hearing.

{¶ 2} Civ.R. 56(C) states, in part, as follows:

{¶ 3} “Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of

evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as

stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from

the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable

minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party

against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to

have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.” See also

Gilbert v. Summit Cty., 104 Ohio St.3d 660, 2004-Ohio-7108, citing Temple v. Wean

United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317 (1977).

Case No. 2011-03332 -2- ENTRY

{¶ 4} Plaintiffs bring this action for wrongful death and survivorship arising out of

an automobile collision that caused the death of plaintiffs’ decedent, Amber N. Risner.

The accident occurred in the early morning of September 12, 2009, at the intersection of

Germany Road and State Route 32 in Pike County. The intersection was configured

such that motorists on Germany Road were required to stop for a stop sign and an

overhead flashing red light before crossing or turning onto State Route 32, a four-lane

divided highway. Motorists on State Route 32 were not required to stop, but were

warned of the intersection by way of advance warning signs and an overhead flashing

yellow light. The driver of the car in which Risner was a passenger approached the

intersection via northbound Germany Road and attempted to proceed across State

Route 32, whereupon the car was struck by a tractor-trailer traveling in the westbound

lanes of State Route 32.

{¶ 5} In their complaint, plaintiffs claim that defendant was negligent in its design

and maintenance of the intersection, specifically with respect to the alleged lack of sight

distance available to motorists approaching the intersection from northbound Germany

Road, as well as the use of an overhead flashing light at the intersection rather than a

four-way stop-and-go light. On May 8, 2012, the court granted partial summary

judgment in favor of defendant as to the decisions it made concerning what traffic

control devices to install at the intersection. As to the claim of insufficient sight distance,

the court determined that issues of material fact remained; defendant addresses those

issues in its present motion.

{¶ 6} In order for plaintiffs to prevail upon their claim of negligence, they must

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant owed the decedent a duty,

that defendant’s acts or omissions resulted in a breach of that duty, and that the breach

proximately caused the decedent’s injuries. Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 99 Ohio

St.3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573, ¶ 8, citing Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods., Inc., 15 Ohio

St.3d 75, 77 (1984).

Case No. 2011-03332 -3- ENTRY

{¶ 7} “The duty element of a negligence claim may be established by common

law, legislative enactment, or the particular circumstances of a given case.” Estate of

Morgan v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 10th Dist. Nos. 10AP-362 & 10AP-382, 2010-Ohio-

5969, ¶ 10. “Pursuant to R.C. 5501.11, ODOT has the responsibility to construct and

maintain highways in a safe and reasonable manner. However, the state is not an

insurer of the safety of its highways.” Rhodus v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 67 Ohio App.3d

723, 729-730 (10th Dist.1990).

{¶ 8} When acting in the course of its highway construction responsibilities,

defendant’s duty of care is to adhere to “the current written standards in effect at the

time of the planning, approval or construction of the site * * *.” Longfellow v. State, 10th

Dist. No. 92AP-549 (Dec. 24, 1992), citing Lunar v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 61 Ohio

App.3d 143, 146 (10th Dist.1989) and Lopez v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 37 Ohio App.3d

69, 71 (10th Dist.1987). “When there are no guidelines in place at the time of the act,

the proper standard of care is that of a reasonable engineer using accepted practices at

the time of the act.” Hurier v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 10th Dist. No. 01AP-1362, 2002-

Ohio-4499, ¶ 25.

{¶ 9} In support of its motion, defendant submitted the affidavit of Kathleen A.

King, P.E., who is employed by defendant as a Geometrics Engineer. King avers that

when defendant constructed the intersection, the applicable written standards that it

was required to follow were set forth in the July 30, 1993 edition of its Location and

Design Manual, portions of which are attached to the affidavit and authenticated therein.

See Rahman v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-439, 2006-Ohio-3013, ¶ 38

(Recognizing that the Location and Design Manual “establishes policies and standards

to follow when designing and maintaining highways in a reasonably safe condition.”).

{¶ 10} King explains that the Location and Design Manual establishes standards

for both “intersection sight distance,” which is “the distance a motorist should be able to

see other traffic operating on the intersected highway so that the motorist can enter and

cross the highway safely,” and “stopping sight distance,” which is “the distance a

Case No. 2011-03332 -4- ENTRY

motorist should be able to see ahead so that he will be able to stop from a given design

speed.” In the present case, the sight distance relevant to the driver of the car in which

Risner was riding was intersection sight distance, whereas the sight distance relevant to

the driver of the tractor-trailer was stopping sight distance.

{¶ 11} As King explains in her affidavit, although the Location and Design Manual

includes tables that set forth minimum sight distance values, the manual does not

impose a mandatory requirement to meet those minimum values. In regard to

intersection sight distance, however, section 201.3 states the following: “In those cases

where the table values from Figure 201-3 cannot reasonably be obtained, the minimum

sight distance available to the driver of the waiting vehicle should not be less than the

stopping sight distance for the design speed of the through roadway. * * * If the

minimum sight distance outlined above cannot be provided, additional safety measures

must be taken. These may include, but are not limited to, advance warning signs and

flashers and/or reduced speed limit zones in the vicinity of the intersection.”

{¶ 12} Although there is some discrepancy in the sight distance measurements

calculated by King and plaintiffs’ expert, Daren E. Marceau, P.E., there is no dispute

that the relevant intersection sight distance is less than the applicable table value from

Figure 201-3. However, there is also no dispute that the relevant intersection sight

distance was not less than the relevant stopping sight distance. As such, the design of

the intersection conformed to the minimum sight distance standards set forth in the

Location and Design Manual.

{¶ 13} Even though the Location and Design Manual only requires that additional

safety measures be taken at intersections where the minimum sight distance standards

cannot be provided, there is no dispute that additional safety measures (e.g., an

overhead flashing light and advance warning signs) were put in place in the interim

period between the construction of the intersection and the September 12, 2009

accident. Plaintiffs argue that when those devices were installed, defendant “had a duty

Case No. 2011-03332 -5- ENTRY

to upgrade the subject intersection to current design standards” set forth in later editions

of the manual that prescribed greater sight distance.

{¶ 14} As previously stated, “[t]he state has a duty to maintain its highways in a

reasonably safe condition. * * * However, ‘[the state’s] duty to maintain state highways is

distinguishable from a duty to redesign or reconstruct.’ * * * ‘Maintenance involves only

the preservation of existing highway facilities, rather than the initiation of substantial

improvements.’” Galay v. Dept. of Transp., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-383, 2006-Ohio-4113, ¶

58, quoting Wiebelt v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 10th Dist. No. 93AP-117 (June 24, 1993).

“Accordingly, ODOT does not have a duty to upgrade highways to current design

standards when acting in the course of maintenance.” Estate of Morgan at ¶ 12.

{¶ 15} Reasonable minds can only conclude that the installation of an overhead

flashing light and advance warning signs constituted highway maintenance, not highway

construction. Accordingly, because defendant acted in the course of maintenance in

performing those functions, it was under no duty to upgrade the intersection to current

design standards.

{¶ 16} Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that there are no genuine

issues of material fact and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and judgment is

rendered in favor of defendant. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot and all

previously scheduled events are VACATED. Court costs are assessed against

plaintiffs. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of

entry upon the journal.

_____________________________________

JOSEPH T. CLARK

Judge

cc:

Case No. 2011-03332 -6- ENTRY

Amy S. Brown Douglas J. Blue

William C. Becker Kaitlin L. Madigan

Assistant Attorneys General 471 East Broad Street, Suite 1100

150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor Columbus, Ohio 43215

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130

001

Filed September 12, 2012

To S.C. Reporter January 28, 2013

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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