Opinion

Hursey v. Ohio State Univ.

  • 2012 Ohio 6352
Court
Ohio Court of Claims
Filed
Oct 31, 2012
Status
Published
On the bench
Crawford
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.2%

The opinion

[Cite as Hursey v. Ohio State Univ., 2012-Ohio-6352.]

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center

65 South Front Street, Third Floor

Columbus, OH 43215

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263

www.cco.state.oh.us

DEBORA HURSEY, et al.

Plaintiffs

v.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

Defendant

Case No. 2011-02140

Judge Dale A. Crawford

DECISION

{¶ 1} Debora Hursey, hereinafter “plaintiff,” brought this action alleging medical

negligence against The Ohio State University Medical Center (OSU). Her husband,

John Hursey, asserts a claim for loss of consortium. The issues of liability and

damages were bifurcated and the case was tried to the court on the issue of liability.

{¶ 2} John Hursey is a long-distance truck driver and plaintiff often travels with

him across the country. On July 17, 2009, plaintiff and her husband, who are residents

of Ohio, were in Billings, Montana, traveling in John Hursey’s truck. It was plaintiff’s

birthday and plaintiff and her husband decided to spend the night at a hotel. Plaintiff

was unable to sleep and on July 18, 2009, plaintiff presented at Billings Clinic Hospital

(Billings) with complaints of shortness of breath and discoloration of her feet.

{¶ 3} On July 18, 2009, plaintiff underwent an echocardiogram (echo) at Billings

and a report from the echo was prepared by Barbara Dudczak, M.D. Contained in the

report are several conclusions, including: “1. Visual estimation of EF [ejection fraction] is

<20% * * * 5. Moderate fixed thrombus on the apical wall of the left ventricle.” (Joint

Case No. 2011-02140 -2- DECISION

Exhibit A 000391.) The report further states: “Left Ventricle: Visual estimation of EF is

<20%. There is a moderate apical left ventricular thrombus, which is flat (mural) in

shape, solid in texture, and which is fixed.” A thrombus is commonly known as a blood

clot and if it embolizes it can cause life-threatening conditions. Plaintiff was treated with

the anticoagulants Heparin and Coumadin while at Billings due to the indication of a left

ventricle thrombus.

{¶ 4} On July 19, 2009, a heart catheterization was performed on plaintiff at

Billings. The test found that plaintiff had three blood vessels to the heart that were

severely damaged and depressed. Plaintiff underwent a second echo at Billings on July

23, 2009. The report, prepared by Brian Rah, M.D., contained several conclusions,

including: “Visual estimation of EF is 20-25%” and “Cannot rule out LV [left ventricle]

thrombus mentioned on previous study. Would consider Definity contrast if indicated.”

(Joint Exhibit A 000389.) The report also notes that plaintiff had moderate mitral valve

regurgitation.

{¶ 5} Billings did not have the proper facilities for plaintiff to undergo heart

surgery so it was decided that plaintiff would receive further treatment from defendant,

OSU. On July 27, 2009, plaintiff was transferred to OSU via medical flight. At OSU,

plaintiff was treated by Louis B. Louis, IV, M.D., a cardiothoracic surgeon. Throughout

plaintiff’s treatment and care Dr. Louis was an employee of defendant as a

cardiothoracic surgeon and as an assistant professor of surgery.

{¶ 6} On July 28, 2009, Dr. Louis completed plaintiff’s patient history. In his

report, Dr. Louis wrote, “I personally reviewed her echocardiogram.” (Joint Exhibit B

000059.) Dr. Louis testified that he cannot recall which image he reviewed, but his

common practice is to look at the latest study performed. After compiling plaintiff’s

history, Dr. Louis determined that plaintiff had severe coronary artery disease and

congestive heart failure. On July 27, 2009, Dr. Louis placed her on Heparin for

anticoagulation. (Joint Exhibit B 000786.) Dr. Louis explained that the reason for the

Case No. 2011-02140 -3- DECISION

anticoagulant was because of plaintiff’s acute coronary syndrome and the possibility of

a left ventricle thrombus.

{¶ 7} Plaintiff underwent an echo at OSU on July 28, 2009. The conclusions

contained in the report from this echo state: “There is diffuse global hypokinesis of the

left ventricle. The calculated ejection is 35% by bi-plane Simpson’s Method.” (Joint

Exhibit B 001233.) Plaintiff also had a cardiac MRI performed on July 28, 2009. The

report from the MRI, prepared by Subha Raman, M.D., indicates that plaintiff’s “final

diagnosis” was coronary artery disease. (Joint Exhibit B 001236.) Neither the July 28,

2009 echo nor the July 28, 2009 MRI mention a left ventricle thrombus. After reviewing

these studies, Dr. Louis prepared plaintiff for coronary artery bypass grafting and mitral

valve repair surgery with a left ventricle assist device (LVAD) backup. (Joint Exhibit B

000778.)

{¶ 8} Plaintiff underwent dental extractions on July 30, 2009, and after the

procedure, Heparin treatment resumed and she remained on Heparin until it was

stopped on August 4, 2009, in preparation for surgery. (Joint Exhibit B 000792,

000803.) Dr. Louis explained the reason for this was solely for her acute coronary

syndrome because the diagnosis of the left ventricle thrombus had been eliminated.

{¶ 9} On July 31, 2009, prior to surgery, Dr. Louis discussed with plaintiff and her

husband the risks, benefits, and alternatives of performing coronary artery bypass

grafting and mitral valve repair with an LVAD backup. Dr. Louis stated in a progress

note that plaintiff agreed to undergo the procedure and that he informed her of the risks

of the surgery including a stroke. (Joint Exhibit B 000777.) Further, both Dr. Louis and

plaintiff signed an informed consent form. In his own handwriting, Dr. Louis wrote that a

stroke was a risk of the surgical procedure. (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 4.)

{¶ 10} On August 5, 2009, Dr. Louis performed surgery on plaintiff. She

underwent a coronary artery bypass graft, mitral valve repair, and ligation of the left

atrial appendage. (Joint Exhibit B 000841.) Dr. Louis testified that in preparing for

Case No. 2011-02140 -4- DECISION

surgery he had an LVAD prepared to use, if needed, in the mitral valve repair. A cloth

ring was placed around the mitral valve in the heart in order to stop the mitral valve

regurgitation. Immediately prior to surgery, a transesophageal echo (TEE) was

performed by the anesthesiologist in the operating room. (Joint Exhibit B 000851-

000852.) The report notes that plaintiff’s ejection fraction was 35-40%. There is no

reference to a left ventricle thrombus in the report. Dr. Louis testified that during the

surgery he did not see a left ventricle thrombus. No complications arose during the

surgery and a LVAD did not need to be implanted.

{¶ 11} After surgery on August 6, 2009, plaintiff was administered Heparin to

prevent deep venous thrombosis (Joint Exhibit B 000813). Dr. Louis testified that

plaintiff did quite well after the surgery. On August 11, 2009, she underwent a post-

operative echo. One of the conclusions contained in the report from that echo states,

“Not all LV segments well visualized” and the report also notes that the ejection fraction

was 55-60%. (Joint Exhibit B 001231). There was no finding of a left ventricle

thrombus.

{¶ 12} Plaintiff was discharged from OSU on August 11, 2009. She was not

prescribed Coumadin or any other anticoagulant. However, both plaintiff and her

husband recalled watching a video at OSU about Coumadin. John Hursey also testified

that when he realized that plaintiff was not prescribed Coumadin, he called OSU and

was informed that Dr. Louis did not think plaintiff needed to be on Coumadin.

{¶ 13} On August 14, 2009, plaintiff woke up and noticed that something was

wrong. She went to Southeastern Ohio Regional Medical Center (Southeastern) in

Cambridge, Ohio, where she learned that she had suffered a stroke. Plaintiff suffered a

second stroke while at Southeastern at which time she became unable to speak. She

was then transferred to OSU and was treated by Dr. Louis.

{¶ 14} A neurological examination was performed upon plaintiff at OSU, and it is

noted in the report that plaintiff “has had a shower of emboli most likely from a cardiac

Case No. 2011-02140 -5- DECISION

source.” (Joint Exhibit B 000104.) On August 18, 2009, plaintiff had a TEE. The report

conclusions state, in part, “No obvious source of cardiac embolus identified. * * * No LV

thrombus noted.” (Joint Exhibit B 000619.) Dr. Louis placed plaintiff on Coumadin, with

the indication being an embolic stroke. After plaintiff was discharged from OSU, she

underwent rehabilitation at OSU’s Dodd Hall. Plaintiff has been prescribed and has

taken Coumadin up until the time of trial.

{¶ 15} “[I]n order to establish medical [negligence], it must be shown by a

preponderance of the evidence that the injury complained of was caused by the doing of

some particular thing or things that a physician or surgeon of ordinary skill, care and

diligence would not have done under like or similar conditions or circumstances, or by

the failure or omission to do some particular thing or things that such a physician or

surgeon would have done under like or similar conditions or circumstances, and that the

injury complained of was the direct result of such doing or failing to do some one or

more of such particular things.” Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St.2d 127, 131 (1976).

{¶ 16} To the extent that plaintiffs allege a claim of lack of informed consent, the

Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[t]he tort of lack of informed consent is

established when:

{¶ 17} “(a) The physician fails to disclose to the patient and discuss the material

risks and dangers inherently and potentially involved with respect to the proposed

therapy, if any;

{¶ 18} “(b) the unrevealed risks and dangers which should have been disclosed

by the physician actually materialize and are the proximate cause of the injury to the

patient; and

{¶ 19} “(c) a reasonable person in the position of the patient would have decided

against the therapy had the material risks and dangers inherent and incidental to

treatment been disclosed to him or her prior to the therapy. In applying this test, Ohio

Case No. 2011-02140 -6- DECISION

adopted the reasonable-patient standard.” Nickell v. Gonzalez, 17 Ohio St.3d 136, 139

(1985).

{¶ 20} Plaintiff presented the expert testimony of Christopher Stone, M.D., a

board certified cardiothoracic surgeon practicing medicine in Kenosha, Wisconsin.

Reviewing the July 18, 2009 echo from Billings, Dr. Stone testified that a left ventricle

thrombus existed in the apex of the heart. Dr. Stone opined that there was a thrombus

and its existence was never ruled out by OSU and that it should have been ruled out

before ending plaintiff’s treatment at OSU. He admitted that he could not see a

thrombus on either the July 23, 2009 echo from Billings or the July 28, 2009 echo from

OSU. Also, he could not see a thrombus on the TEE performed during plaintiff’s

surgery. He testified that the August 11, 2009 echo was extremely limited and that he

could not see the area where the thrombus was located. He opined that a left ventricle

thrombus existed and that the echos at OSU were insufficient to rule out such thrombus.

{¶ 21} Dr. Stone had no criticism of OSU’s treatment of plaintiff up until the time

of her discharge. Dr. Stone opined that the standard of care required Dr. Louis to

prescribe Coumadin to plaintiff upon discharge due to the indicators of a left ventricle

thrombus and the mitral valve repair. He explained that the thrombus, which he opined

was never ruled out by OSU, was an “absolute” indicator to prescribe Coumadin while

the mitral valve repair was a “relative” indicator. He testified that “many doctors” would

anticoagulate a patient after mitral valve repair while others would not. Dr. Stone

explained that the introduction of a foreign body from the mitral valve repair along with

plaintiff’s low ejection fraction was a reason to anticoagulate plaintiff.

{¶ 22} Dr. Stone further opined that plaintiff had a left ventricle thrombus at

Billings and that the subsequent studies performed at OSU were insufficient to “rule out”

the thrombus. He opined that plaintiff should have been prescribed Coumadin upon her

discharge or Dr. Louis should have discussed with plaintiff why Coumadin was not

Case No. 2011-02140 -7- DECISION

prescribed. Dr. Stone testified that Dr. Louis breached the standard of care by failing to

do this.

{¶ 23} Regarding the cause of plaintiff’s August 14, 2009 stroke, Dr. Stone

testified that based on the description of a “shower of emboli” contained in the August

14, 2009 neurological consultation, a clot in plaintiff’s heart had embolized and caused

the stroke. Dr. Stone explained three possible causes of the embolic stroke: a blood

clot forming around the mitral valve ring; Dr. Louis’ failure to completely oversew the left

atrial appendage; and the left ventricle thrombus. If plaintiff had been taking Coumadin,

he opined that this would have prevented the stroke.

{¶ 24} Defendant presented the expert testimony of Michael Argenziano, M.D., a

board certified cardiothoracic surgeon practicing at Columbia University in New York

City. He explained that even though a left ventricle thrombus was diagnosed at Billings,

later diagnostic tests performed at OSU did not show that a left ventricle thrombus

existed. While he believes there was no left ventricle thrombus while plaintiff was at

Billings, Dr. Argenziano explained that whether there was a thrombus in Billings was

irrelevant because the echos were repeated at OSU and showed no thrombus.

{¶ 25} Further, Dr. Argenziano opined that plaintiff did not have a left ventricle

thrombus when she was discharged from OSU on August 11, 2009. Reviewing the

echos, MRI, and TEE performed at OSU, he saw no left ventricle thrombus. He also did

not see a left ventricle thrombus on plaintiff’s August 18, 2009 echo, which was after her

stroke. He admitted that if plaintiff did have a left ventricle thrombus, she should have

been prescribed Coumadin.

{¶ 26} Dr. Argenziano opined that defendant’s conduct, including the discharge

plan, was within the standard of care. He explained that Dr. Louis’ decision not to

prescribe Coumadin to plaintiff upon her discharge from OSU on August 11, 2009, was

within the standard of care because there was no indication that an anticoagulant

should be prescribed. He testified that a mitral valve repair is not an indicator to

Case No. 2011-02140 -8- DECISION

prescribe Coumadin. He testified that if plaintiff did have a left ventricle thrombus, then

Coumadin should have been prescribed. Further, he opined that while plaintiff had a

low ejection fraction when she presented at OSU, her ejection fraction had raised to the

normal range after surgery.

{¶ 27} Regarding the cause of plaintiff’s stroke, he admitted that plaintiff suffered

a stroke, but that the post-stroke echo and other studies do not show the source of the

embolism.

{¶ 28} All experts opined that had plaintiff been discharged from OSU with the

anticoagulant Coumadin her stroke probably would not have occurred. This is a

retrospective view of this case. Dr. Louis’ treatment cannot be judged based upon after-

acquired knowledge. See Grabill v. Worthington Indus., 98 Ohio App.3d 739, 744 (10th

Dist.1994). The issue before the court is whether Dr. Louis’ decision to discharge

plaintiff without placing her on Coumadin was within the standard of care based upon

the knowledge and information Dr. Louis had at the time of her discharge on August 11,

2009. The court was presented with two eminently qualified cardiothoracic

surgeons, Drs. Christopher Stone and Michael Argenziano.1 While the doctors

disagreed as to whether a thrombus existed on July 18, 2009, when plaintiff was first

admitted to Billings, the court finds that the evidence supports a finding that a left

ventricle thrombus, as seen and read on the July 18, 2009 echo, existed in plaintiff’s

heart. With this finding of direct evidence of the thrombus, plaintiff would have the court

make an inference that the thrombus existed when plaintiff was admitted to OSU on

July 27, 2009; make a further inference that the thrombus existed at the time of her

surgery on August 5, 2009; make a further inference that the thrombus existed on

August 11, 2009, when she was discharged from OSU; and, make a final inference that

1

The court did not consider Dr. Jeffrey Breall’s opinions regarding the existence of the thrombus

at the time of plaintiff’s admission in Billings because he was not timely identified regarding this subject

matter as required by L.C.C.R. 7(E).

Case No. 2011-02140 -9- DECISION

the thrombus found in Billings on July 18, 2009, was the proximate cause of her stroke

on August 14, 2009. The court cannot make these findings. When plaintiff arrived at

OSU she was given two tests which should have had the ability to diagnose a thrombus:

an MRI and an echo. Neither test detected a thrombus. On the day of her surgery,

August 5, 2009, plaintiff was given a TEE in the operating room which also did not

detect a thrombus. Further, on the date of her initial discharge from OSU, August 11,

2009, plaintiff underwent another echo which did not detect a thrombus. Finally, when

she returned to OSU after her stroke, on August 18, 2009, she was given a third OSU

echo which did not produce evidence of a thrombus. Thus, the court finds that there is

not sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence to support plaintiff’s claim that she had a

left ventricle thrombus at anytime while she was treated at OSU.

{¶ 29} Plaintiff claims that Dr. Louis breached the standard of care by not

prescribing Coumadin upon her discharge and/or by not obtaining informed consent

regarding his decision not to prescribe Coumadin. Plaintiff asserts that the following

factors required Dr. Louis to prescribe Coumadin: (1) some doctors always prescribe

Coumadin for 60 days after performing a coronary artery bypass with a mitral valve

repair; (2) Dr. Louis did not fully oversew the atrial appendage; (3) there existed a left

ventricle thrombus upon discharge; and (4) plaintiff’s low ejection fraction. The court

has previously found that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of a left

ventricle thrombus at OSU which appears to be dispositive of this issue. However, in

dealing with the other three claims, there is no evidence that the oversew surgical

procedure fell below the standard of care; there is no evidence to support a finding that

failing to prescribe Coumadin after a coronary artery bypass with a mitral valve repair

falls below the standard of care; and, plaintiff’s ejection fraction had improved post-

operatively and there is no expert testimony that a failure to prescribe Coumadin for a

low ejection fraction was a breach of the standard of care. The fact that some doctors

may use a method or treatment different from that used by Dr. Louis does not, by itself,

Case No. 2011-02140 - 10 - DECISION

prove Dr. Louis was negligent. See Pesek v. Univ. Neurologists Assoc., 87 Ohio St.3d

495 (2000)

{¶ 30} The court is sympathetic to the severe injury plaintiff suffered. However,

the fact that Dr. Louis’ treatment resulted in a bad result does not by itself prove that he

was negligent. See Ault v. Hall, 119 Ohio St. 422 (1928). The court finds no negligence

attributed to Dr. Louis in his care and treatment of plaintiff while she was a patient at

OSU and finds that he had no duty to inform plaintiff of a treatment that was not called

for and, based upon the information he had at the time of her discharge, was not a

material risk beyond which was discussed prior to surgery. A stroke is always a risk

after open heart surgery and it was noted on the written informed consent document.2

(Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 4.) The court will further note that it appears that plaintiff has several

theories of negligence on the part of Dr. Louis. However, she is unable to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence which theory, if proved, was the proximate cause of her

stroke. No doctor was able to opine, by a reasonable degree of medical certainty,

where the thrombus came from that caused the stroke. The conventional theory was

that it came from the heart; but where in the heart and whether it came from the original

thrombus, a new thrombus or something else would be speculation.

{¶ 31} Given that the court finds that plaintiffs have failed to prove their claim of

medical negligence, the derivative claim for loss of consortium must also fail. Bowen v.

Kil-Kare, Inc., 63 Ohio St.3d 84, 93 (1992).

{¶ 32} Based on the foregoing, judgment shall be rendered in favor of defendant.

2

Plaintiff did not assert a claim of a lack of informed consent in the complaint. However, since the

plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Stone testified, without objection, that Dr. Louis fell below the standard of care by not

obtaining plaintiff’s informed consent upon discharge, the court has discussed and resolved the issue.

Case No. 2011-02140 - 11 - DECISION

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center

65 South Front Street, Third Floor

Columbus, OH 43215

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263

www.cco.state.oh.us

DEBORA HURSEY, et al.

Plaintiffs

v.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

Defendant

Case No. 2011-02140

Judge Dale A. Crawford

JUDGMENT ENTRY

{¶ 33} This case was tried to the court on the issue of liability. The court has

considered the evidence and, for the reasons set forth in the decision filed concurrently

herewith, judgment is rendered in favor of defendant. Court costs are assessed against

plaintiffs. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of

entry upon the journal.

_____________________________________

DALE A. CRAWFORD

Judge

cc:

Case No. 2011-02140 - 12 - DECISION

Adam S. Davis Daniel R. Forsythe

Marc K. Erickson Karl W. Schedler

4740 Grand Avenue, Suite 300 Assistant Attorneys General

Kansas City, Missouri 64112 150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130

John K. Fitch

580 South High Street, Suite 100

Columbus, Ohio 43215

004

Filed October 31, 2012

Sent to S.C. Reporter February 28, 2013

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.