Opinion

Keegan v. Univ. of Toledo College of Medicine

  • 2013 Ohio 3641
Court
Ohio Court of Claims
Filed
Apr 24, 2013
Status
Published
On the bench
Van Schoyck
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.2%

The opinion

[Cite as Keegan v. Univ. of Toledo College of Medicine, 2013-Ohio-3641.]

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center

65 South Front Street, Third Floor

Columbus, OH 43215

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263

www.cco.state.oh.us

MICHAEL J. KEEGAN, Exec.

Plaintiff

v.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO COLLEGE OF MEDICINE

Defendant

Case No. 2012-04413

Magistrate Robert Van Schoyck

DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE

{¶ 1} This matter came before the court for an evidentiary hearing to determine

whether Daniel J. Kosinski, M.D. is entitled to civil immunity pursuant to R.C. 2743.02(F)

and 9.86. As an initial matter, the court hereby makes the following rulings as to the

evidentiary objections set forth in the deposition transcript of Jeffrey P. Gold, M.D.,

which was admitted into evidence in lieu of live testimony as Defendant’s Exhibit J: the

objections on pages 25, 27, 28, 31, 34, and 39 are OVERRULED; the objections on

pages 22 and 30 are SUSTAINED.

{¶ 2} Plaintiff brings this action for wrongful death. The case arises, in part, from

medical treatment that Dr. Kosinski rendered to plaintiff’s decedent in June 2010. There

is no dispute that Dr. Kosinski was an employee of defendant during the relevant time

period. Plaintiff alleges, though, that the actions of Dr. Kosinski which are at issue in

this case were performed manifestly outside the scope of his employment or official

responsibilities as a state employee such that he may be personally liable in a civil

action. Defendant and Dr. Kosinski assert that his actions were performed in the course

of his state employment and that he is therefore immune from personal liability.

Case No. 2012-04413 -2- DECISION

{¶ 3} Dr. Kosinski, who is board-certified in cardiology and nuclear medicine, was

at all times relevant employed by defendant in the full-time position of Associate

Professor of Medicine in the Division of Cardiology. According to his faculty

appointment agreement, Dr. Kosinski was bound by the University of Toledo “Bylaws,

Faculty Rules and Regulations, and policies and procedures of the University * * *.”

(Defendant’s Exhibit B.) The Faculty Rules and Regulations provide, in part, that all

faculty members shall perform “[a]ll duties established by their respective college,

department and/or division” and that full-time faculty members are to “devote one

hundred (100%) percent of their professional time and effort to official programs and

approved activities of The University of Toledo * * *.” (Defendant’s Exhibit C, pp. 3, 4.)

{¶ 4} Dr. Kosinski testified that the duties established for him by the College of

Medicine and Division of Cardiology included providing both clinical and didactic training

to medical residents and fellows, and also providing clinical care to patients. Dr.

Kosinski stated that because of the multi-faceted nature of the medical training

programs, on occasion there were no residents or fellows rotating through for training in

his particular medical specialty, and he related that he is not aware of any evidence that

would show he was engaged in such training during the times relevant to this case. Dr.

Kosinski further stated, however, that he was responsible for rendering clinical care to

patients in clinics operated by defendant regardless of whether or not he was training a

resident or fellow.

{¶ 5} Dr. Kosinski testified that his primary work location was the University of

Toledo Medical Center, where the Division of Cardiology maintained its offices and main

clinic, but that he was directed at times to work at one of the smaller cardiology clinics

that defendant operated at satellite locations in the communities of Bellevue,

Perrysburg, and Wauseon, Ohio. Dr. Kosinski explained that the satellite clinics were

generally staffed each weekday by one faculty physician, on a rotating schedule, along

with any fellows or residents. The medical treatment at issue in this case occurred at

Case No. 2012-04413 -3- DECISION

the satellite clinic in Bellevue Hospital, which operated pursuant to a “Clinical Education

Agreement” between the University of Toledo and Bellevue Hospital. (Defendant’s

Exhibit E.)

{¶ 6} Dr. Kosinski stated that the Chief of the Division of Cardiology, Dr. Chris

Cooper, prepared a schedule every month to assign the work locations for each of the

division’s faculty physicians. According to plaintiff’s complaint, the decedent underwent

a stress test at the Bellevue Hospital satellite clinic on June 3, 2010, and Dr. Kosinski

authenticated the test on June 10, 2010. The Division of Cardiology schedule for June

2010 shows that Dr. Kosinski had been directed to work at the Bellevue Hospital

satellite clinic on those dates. (Defendant’s Exhibit I.) Dr. Kosinski testified that the

satellite clinic had the words “University of Toledo” printed above the door, that he

always wore a lab coat bearing those words, and that he was required by defendant to

always wear a University of Toledo identification badge regardless of his work location.

He acknowledged, though, that Bellevue Hospital scheduled patients for the clinic, kept

patient charts, provided consent forms and other documents, and furnished the

equipment in the clinic.

{¶ 7} Dr. Kosinski testified that he was paid a fixed amount of compensation (e.g.,

not tied to the volume of patients he treated), and that this amount was set by

defendant’s administration but was paid to him by both the University of Toledo and

University of Toledo Physicians, L.L.C. (UTP), which he understood to be a practice

plan that performs billing and other administrative functions associated with patient

care. Dr. Kosinski stated that he does not know why his compensation was paid in this

manner and that he had no involvement in the billing or other business aspects of

patient care, but he related that he was required to maintain employment with UTP as a

condition of his faculty appointment.

{¶ 8} Jeffrey P. Gold, M.D. serves as the Chancellor and Executive Vice

President of Health Affairs for the University of Toledo, Executive Dean of the College of

Medicine for the University of Toledo, and Chairman of the University of Toledo Clinical

Case No. 2012-04413 -4- DECISION

Faculty, Inc. (UTCF). Dr. Gold testified that UTP is a subsidiary of UTCF and that these

nonprofit corporations serve as the official practice plan that administers billing,

collections, credentialing, compliance, contract management, and other business

services for the faculty physicians who render clinical care. Dr. Gold stated that while

the compensation models vary, the full-time faculty physicians who render clinical care

are generally paid by both the University of Toledo and the practice plan and are

required to maintain a contractual relationship with the practice plan.

{¶ 9} Dr. Gold explained that defendant, in accordance with the Faculty Rules

and Regulations, requires that all professional activities performed by its full-time faculty

physicians, including clinical care, be performed on behalf of the University of Toledo.

Dr. Gold described defendant as having a four-prong mission consisting of education,

scholarship and research, clinical care, and community outreach, and he explained that

faculty members are assigned duties within those areas, with some faculty focusing on

certain areas more than others. According to Dr. Gold, Dr. Kosinski’s duties included

education and clinical care, which he explained to be interrelated in that, in order to

provide medical education, defendant must have functioning clinics and practicing

clinicians. Dr. Gold also explained that Dr. Kosinski’s responsibilities relative to the

satellite clinics benefitted defendant’s community outreach efforts.

{¶ 10} R.C. 9.86 states, in part:

{¶ 11} “Except for civil actions that arise out of the operation of a motor vehicle

and civil actions in which the state is the plaintiff, no officer or employee shall be liable

in any civil action that arises under the law of this state for damage or injury caused in

the performance of his duties, unless the officer’s or employee’s actions were manifestly

outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities, or unless the officer or

employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless

manner.”

{¶ 12} R.C. 2743.02(F) states, in part:

Case No. 2012-04413 -5- DECISION

{¶ 13} “A civil action against an officer or employee, as defined in section 109.36

of the Revised Code, that alleges that the officer’s or employee’s conduct was

manifestly outside the scope of the officer’s or employee’s employment or official

responsibilities, or that the officer or employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad

faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner shall first be filed against the state in the court

of claims that has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine, initially, whether the

officer or employee is entitled to personal immunity under section 9.86 of the Revised

Code and whether the courts of common pleas have jurisdiction over the civil action.

The officer or employee may participate in the immunity determination proceeding

before the court of claims to determine whether the officer or employee is entitled to

personal immunity under section 9.86 of the Revised Code.”

{¶ 14} “[I]n an action to determine whether a physician or other health-care

practitioner is entitled to personal immunity from liability pursuant to R.C. 9.86 and

2743.02(A)(2), the Court of Claims must initially determine whether the practitioner is a

state employee. * * * If the court determines that the practitioner is a state employee, the

court must next determine whether the practitioner was acting on behalf of the state

when the patient was alleged to have been injured. If not, then the practitioner was

acting ‘manifestly outside the scope of employment’ for purposes of R.C. 9.86.”

Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 111 Ohio St.3d 541, 2006-Ohio-6208, ¶ 30-31; see also

Engel v. Univ. of Toledo College of Med., 130 Ohio St.3d 263, 2011-Ohio-3375, ¶ 6.

“[T]he question of scope of employment must turn on what the practitioner’s duties are

as a state employee and whether the practitioner was engaged in those duties at the

time of an injury.” Theobald at ¶ 23. “If there is evidence that the practitioner’s duties

include the education of students and residents, the court must determine whether the

practitioner was in fact educating a student or resident when the alleged negligence

occurred.” Id. at ¶ 31.

{¶ 15} Upon review, the court finds that the duties and responsibilities of Dr.

Kosinski’s employment with defendant included both the education of medical residents

Case No. 2012-04413 -6- DECISION

and fellows, and the rendering of patient care at cardiology clinics operated by

defendant. The court finds that although the evidence does not show that Dr. Kosinski

was educating a resident or fellow when the alleged negligence occurred, the evidence

does show that he was engaged in his clinical care duties at the time. The court further

finds that Dr. Kosinski received payment from and was employed or otherwise

associated with UTP, but that such facts do not remove his responsibilities to defendant.

See Ries v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1004, 2012-Ohio-1766, ¶

12-13; see also Allgood v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr., Ct. of Cl. No. 2010-04394, 2011-

Ohio-1428; Schoewe v. Univ. of Toledo, Ct. of Cl. No. 2009-07369 (Oct. 24, 2011).

{¶ 16} Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Dr. Kosinski was acting within

the scope of his state employment at all times pertinent hereto. Consequently, it is

therefore recommended that the court issue a determination that Dr. Kosinski is entitled

to civil immunity pursuant to R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02(F) and that the courts of common

pleas do not have jurisdiction over any civil actions that may be filed against him based

upon the allegations in this case.

{¶ 17} A party may file written objections to the magistrate’s decision within 14

days of the filing of the decision, whether or not the court has adopted the decision

during that 14-day period as permitted by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i). If any party timely files

objections, any other party may also file objections not later than ten days after the first

objections are filed. A party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of

any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a

finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely

and specifically objects to that factual finding or legal conclusion within 14 days of the

filing of the decision, as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).

_____________________________________

ROBERT VAN SCHOYCK

Magistrate

Case No. 2012-04413 -7- DECISION

cc:

Anne B. Strait Charles M. Murray

Ashley L. Oliker Michael J. Stewart

Assistant Attorneys General 111 East Shoreline Drive

150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor Sandusky, Ohio 44870

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130

001

Filed April 24, 2013

To S.C. Reporter August 22, 2013

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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