Opinion

Kuhbanani v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr.

  • 2013 Ohio 4855
Court
Ohio Court of Claims
Filed
Jun 21, 2013
Status
Published
On the bench
Renick
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.2%

The opinion

[Cite as Kuhbanani v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr., 2013-Ohio-4855.]

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center

65 South Front Street, Third Floor

Columbus, OH 43215

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263

www.cco.state.oh.us

NEWSHA KUHBANANI, et al.

Plaintiffs

v.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, et al.

Defendants

Case No. 2011-08547

Magistrate Anderson M. Renick

DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE

{¶ 1} An evidentiary hearing was conducted in this matter to determine whether

Sarah Artman, M.D., is entitled to civil immunity pursuant to R.C. 2743.02(F) and 9.86.1

Dr. Artman is an obstetrician who delivered plaintiff Sooshyance Gharibshahi on May

15, 2008, at the Ohio State University Medical Center (OSUMC) after admitting her

mother, plaintiff Newsha Kuhbanani, as an inpatient to the labor and delivery

department. R.C. 2743.02(F) states, in part:

{¶ 2} “A civil action against an officer or employee, as defined in section 109.36

of the Revised Code, that alleges that the officer’s or employee’s conduct was

manifestly outside the scope of the officer’s or employee’s employment or official

responsibilities, or that the officer or employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad

faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner shall first be filed against the state in the court

of claims, which has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine, initially, whether the

officer or employee is entitled to personal immunity under section 9.86 of the Revised

Code and whether the courts of common pleas have jurisdiction over the civil action.”

{¶ 3} R.C. 9.86 states, in part:

Case No. 2011-08547 -2- DECISION

{¶ 4} “[N]o officer or employee [of the state] shall be liable in any civil action that

arises under the law of this state for damage or injury caused in the performance of his

duties, unless the officer’s or employee’s actions were manifestly outside the scope of

his employment or official responsibilities, or unless the officer or employee acted with

malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.”

{¶ 5} “[I]n an action to determine whether a physician or other health-care

practitioner is entitled to personal immunity from liability pursuant to R.C. 9.86 and

2743.02(A)(2), the Court of Claims must initially determine whether the practitioner is a

state employee. If there is no express contract of employment, the court may require

other evidence to substantiate an employment relationship, such as financial and

corporate documents, W-2 forms, invoices, and other billing practices. If the court

determines that the practitioner is not a state employee, the analysis is completed and

R.C. 9.86 does not apply.” Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 111 Ohio St.3d 541, 2006-

Ohio-6208, ¶ 30.

{¶ 6} Dr. Artman argues that she was a state “officer or employee” pursuant to

the statutory definition set forth in R.C. 109.36(A)(1), and consequently, that she is

entitled to civil immunity pursuant to R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02(F).

{¶ 7} Dr. Artman testified that at the time of the Kuhbanani birth, she was an

employee of Artman and Turner M.D.s, Inc., a private obstetrician gynecologist

(OB/GYN) practice group, of which Drs. Artman and Turner were the sole shareholders.

Dr. Artman also held a clinical appointment as an unpaid auxiliary faculty member with

the title of Clinical Assistant Professor, which obligated her to teach residents during her

clinical practice, including performing patient examinations and labor and delivery.

Although Dr. Artman estimated that teaching residents doubled the amount of time

required to complete her clinical rounds, she benefitted by having residents monitor her

patients while she was away from the hospital.

1

Defendants’ May 21, 2013 motion for leave to file a reply brief is GRANTED.

Case No. 2011-08547 -3- DECISION

{¶ 8} Defendants presented two witnesses by way of deposition. Robert

Bornstein, Ph.D., Vice Dean for Academic Affairs for The Ohio State University (OSU)

College of Medicine, is responsible for appointment, promotions, and recruitment of

faculty members. Dr. Bornstein testified that full-time faculty members are paid

employees and that OSU controls “everything about their practice,” including where,

when, and in what areas they practice. Dr. Bornstein explained that, in contrast to the

duties of regular faculty, unpaid auxiliary faculty members are not obligated to

participate in didactic teaching, contribute to medical literature, or participate on hospital

committees. Dr. Bornstein testified that all services provided by full-time faculty are

billed through a university entity, OSU Physicians, Inc., whereas unpaid auxiliary faculty

members are responsible to bill for their own services.

{¶ 9} Philip Samuels, M.D., the director of the OSUMC OB/GYN residency

program, testified that he is familiar with the obligations of both full-time staff members

and unpaid auxiliary staff. Dr. Samuels testified that full-time medical staff have duties

that differ from the responsibilities of unpaid auxiliary staff. Specifically, Dr. Samuels

testified that full-time staff are obligated to “be on call,” teach both residents and medical

students, care for indigent patients, supervise numerous clinics, participate in didactic

lectures, and contribute to medical literature. According to Dr. Samuels, there were no

set expectations for unpaid auxiliary staff, other than to teach residents and students by

involving them in the treatment of patients. Dr. Samuels testified that unpaid physicians

are not obligated to admit a certain number of patients, nor are they required to deliver a

certain number of babies at the hospital.

{¶ 10} Both plaintiffs and defendants contend that Dr. Artman was not a state

employee for the purposes of R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02. The parties maintain that, in

every relevant way, Dr. Artman’s relationship with OSUMC mirrors the doctor-institution

relationship addressed in Phillips v. The Ohio State University Medical Center, 10th

Dist. No. 12AP-414, 2013-Ohio-464, wherein the Tenth District Court of Appeals

Case No. 2011-08547 -4- DECISION

determined that the physician was not a state “officer or employee,” and therefore, not

entitled to personal immunity pursuant to R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02(A)(2).

{¶ 11} In Phillips, the plaintiff alleged that Carol Greco, M.D., an OB/GYN, was

negligent during surgery that was performed on one of her private practice patients at

OSUMC. Dr. Greco held a clinical appointment with the OSU College of Medicine

which included hospital privileges and required her to teach residents in her clinical

practice at OSUMC. Dr. Greco did not receive any monetary compensation or

malpractice insurance coverage from OSUMC for serving as an unpaid auxiliary faculty

member. The court of appeals noted that Dr. Greco was not responsible for treating

patients in the clinic or the labor and delivery unit.

{¶ 12} In determining whether Dr. Greco was a state employee for the purpose of

immunity, the Tenth District Court of Appeals weighed several factors which were set

forth in Engel v. Univ. of Toledo College of Med., 130 Ohio St. 3d 263, 2011-Ohio-3375.

Although the factors applied in Engel comprise “a non-exhaustive list,” the court held

that the factors were relevant in analyzing whether a volunteer clinical instructor of a

state university qualified as a state employee pursuant to R.C. 109.36(A)(1). In Engel,

the Supreme Court of Ohio considered the existence of a contractual relationship

between the state and the physician, the degree of control the university had over the

physician’s actions, and payment by the university for the physician’s services. Id. at ¶

10. In both Engel and Phillips, the court determined that the physician was not a state

employee, and thus not entitled to immunity, based upon the findings that there was no

employment contract, that no monetary compensation was paid, and that there was no

exercise of state control over the physician. Id. at ¶ 16, Phillips, supra at ¶ 10.

{¶ 13} With regard to the existence of an employment contract, Dr. Artman

concedes that there was no express contract of employment with either OSU or

OSUMC and that she did not receive monetary compensation from defendants.

However, Dr. Artman argues that her unpaid auxiliary faculty appointment was

Case No. 2011-08547 -5- DECISION

contractual inasmuch as she was “legally required” to instruct OSU residents and, in

exchange for her services, she received hospital privileges at OSUMC. The court notes

that the court of appeals rejected this argument in Phillips. Phillips, ¶ 11. Furthermore,

in Phillips, the evidence showed that, in addition to hospital privileges at OSUMC, Dr.

Greco received parking privileges and access to football tickets; Dr. Artman did not

receive even these minimal benefits. Dr. Artman also contends that she had a “binding

contract” with OSU based upon benefits that defendants received as a result of the

support unpaid auxiliary faculty members provide to the residency program, including

Medicare or Medicaid payments and accreditation of the OB/GYN residency program.

However, even if the court were to accept Dr. Artman’s “argument that her arrangement

with OSUMC was contractual, it did not necessarily equate to a contract of

employment.” Id. at ¶ 12. Accordingly, the court finds that Dr. Artman did not have a

contract of employment with defendants.

{¶ 14} Furthermore, the evidence presented did not establish that defendants

either held or exercised a significant degree of control over Dr. Artman’s medical

practice. Neither OSUMC nor OSU restricted Dr. Artman’s private practice.

Specifically, defendants did not control which patients Dr. Artman treated in her office,

when patient appointments were scheduled, how much she charged for her services, or

how her professional fees were bill and collected. Unlike OSUMC’s full-time faculty, Dr.

Artman did not practice through the university’s practice plan. As stated above, Dr.

Artman was not required to perform didactic teaching or lectures, contribute to medical

literature, provide medical care to defendants’ indigent patients, participate in resident

clinics, or provide written evaluations for the residents she taught.

{¶ 15} Dr. Artman also alleges that she is entitled to civil immunity pursuant to

R.C. 109.36(A)(1)(a) inasmuch as she was serving in an “elected or appointed position”

with the state. However, the evidence does not support a finding that Dr. Artman was

holding an elected office or position, or that she “possessed any sovereign functions of

government to be exercised by [her] for the benefit of the public either of an executive,

Case No. 2011-08547 -6- DECISION

legislative, or judicial character.” Engel, supra, ¶ 19; Phillips at ¶ 17. Furthermore, Dr.

Artman was not rendering medical services pursuant to a personal services contract or

a purchased service contract necessary to establish an employment relationship

pursuant to 109.36(A)(1)(b) or (c).

{¶ 16} For the reasons stated above, the magistrate finds that Dr. Artman was not

an officer or employee of the state of Ohio as defined in R.C. 109.36. Therefore, the

magistrate recommends that Sarah Artman, M.D., is not entitled to immunity pursuant to

R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02(F), and that the courts of common pleas have jurisdiction over

any civil actions that may be filed against her based upon the allegations in this case.

{¶ 17} A party may file written objections to the magistrate’s decision within 14

days of the filing of the decision, whether or not the court has adopted the decision

during that 14-day period as permitted by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i). If any party timely files

objections, any other party may also file objections not later than ten days after the first

objections are filed. A party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of

any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a

finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely

and specifically objects to that factual finding or legal conclusion within 14 days of the

filing of the decision, as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).

_____________________________________

ANDERSON M. RENICK

Magistrate

cc:

Ellen M. McCarthy Jeffrey L. Maloon

1370 Ontario Street, Suite 100 Assistant Attorney General

Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1792 150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130

Case No. 2011-08547 -7- DECISION

Julia A. Turner Mark L. Schumacher

Special Counsel to Attorney General Sandra R. McIntosh

1 South Main Street, Suite 1800 Special Counsel to Attorney General

Dayton, Ohio 45402-2017 Capitol Square Office Building

65 East State Street, Suite 800

Columbus, Ohio 43215-4247

004

Filed June 21, 2013

To S.C. Reporter October 31, 2013

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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