Flynn v. Fairview Village Retirement Community, Ltd.

[Cite as Flynn v. Fairview Village Retirement Community, Ltd., 132 Ohio St.3d 199, 2012-

Ohio-2582.]

FLYNN ET AL., APPELLEES, v. FAIRVIEW VILLAGE RETIREMENT

COMMUNITY, LTD. ET AL., APPELLANTS, ET AL.

[Cite as Flynn v. Fairview Village Retirement Community, Ltd.,

132 Ohio St.3d 199, 2012-Ohio-2582.]

Appellate procedure—Final orders—Denial of motion to bifurcate trial pursuant

to R.C. 2315.21(B)—R.C. 2505.02(B)(6).

(No. 2010-1881—Submitted October 4, 2011—Decided June 14, 2012.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 95695.

__________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Appellants, defendants in a tort action instituted by appellees,

executors of a decedent’s estate, appeal from a judgment of the court of appeals

dismissing their appeal from a judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of

Common Pleas denying their motions to bifurcate the trial pursuant to R.C.

2315.21(B), for lack of a final, appealable order. Because the court of appeals

erred in dismissing the appeal, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals

and remand the cause for application of Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 131 Ohio St.3d

235, 2012-Ohio-552, 963 N.E.2d 1270.

Facts

{¶ 2} In January 2010, appellees, John T. Flynn and Judy Gordon,

executors of the estate of Gladys F. Feran, deceased, filed a complaint in the

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas against appellants, Fairview Village

Retirement Community, Ltd., d.b.a. Lakewood Village Retirement Community,

Saber Healthcare Group, L.L.C., and Saber Management, Inc., as well as Michael

Francus and several unknown entities and individuals. Appellees’ complaint

alleged negligence, violation of the Ohio Nursing Home Patients’ Bill of Rights,

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

violation of federal law under C.F.R. Title 42, wrongful death, and falsification of

medical records. Appellees demanded compensatory and punitive damages.

{¶ 3} Appellants filed motions to bifurcate the trial to separate appellees’

claims for compensatory damages from their claims for punitive damages,

pursuant to R.C. 2315.21(B)(1). The common pleas court denied the motions.

{¶ 4} Appellants appealed the common pleas court’s denial of their

motions to bifurcate, and the court of appeals sua sponte dismissed their appeal

for lack of a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02. The court of appeals

cited Finley v. First Realty Property Mgt., Ltd., 9th Dist. No. 23355, 2007-Ohio-

2888. We accepted appellants’ appeal from that judgment, 127 Ohio St.3d 1531,

2011-Ohio-376, 940 N.E.2d 985, and the parties submitted briefs and oral

argument.

Legal Analysis

{¶ 5} Article IV, Section 3(B)(2) of the Ohio Constitution establishes

that courts of appeals “shall have such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to

review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of

record inferior to the court of appeals within the district.” (Emphasis added.) See

State ex rel. Bates v. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Appellate Dist., 130 Ohio

St.3d 326, 2011-Ohio-5456, 958 N.E.2d 162, ¶ 14. “R.C. 2505.03(A) limits the

appellate jurisdiction of courts of appeals to the review of final orders, judgments,

or decrees.” State ex rel. Bd. of State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Davis,

113 Ohio St.3d 410, 2007-Ohio-2205, 865 N.E.2d 1289, ¶ 44. An order must

satisfy the criteria of R.C. 2505.02 to constitute a final, appealable order. Gehm v.

Timberline Post & Frame, 112 Ohio St.3d 514, 2007-Ohio-607, 861 N.E.2d 519,

¶ 15.

{¶ 6} Under R.C. 2505.02(B)(6), an order is a final, appealable order if it

is “[a]n order determining the constitutionality of * * * any changes made by

Sub.S.B. 80 of the 125th general assembly, including the amendment of section[]

2

January Term, 2012

* * * 2315.21 of the Revised Code.” Am.Sub.S.B. No. 80, 150 Ohio Laws, Part

V, 7915, 7969 (“S.B. 80”), amended R.C. 2315.21(B) in 2004 to require a trial

court, on motion of any party, to bifurcate a tort action to allow presentation of

the claims for compensatory and punitive damages in separate stages. Havel, 131

Ohio St.3d 235, 2012-Ohio-552, 963 N.E.2d 1270, ¶ 13. By contrast, Civ.R.

42(B) vests discretion in a trial court to order a separate trial of any claims or

issues in civil actions. Id. at ¶ 14.

{¶ 7} By denying appellants’ motions to bifurcate under R.C.

2315.21(B), the trial court implicitly determined that the S.B. 80 amendment to

the statutory provision is unconstitutional, i.e., that Civ.R. 42(B) prevails over the

conflicting statutory provision. See Hanners v. Ho Wah Genting Wire & Cable

SDN BHD, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-361, 2009-Ohio-6481, ¶ 13; Havel v. Villa St.

Joseph, 8th Dist. No. 94677, 2010-Ohio-5251, ¶ 19, reversed on other grounds,

131 Ohio St.3d 235, 2012-Ohio-552, 963 N.E.2d 1270; Myers v. Brown, 192 Ohio

App.3d 670, 2011-Ohio-892, 950 N.E.2d 213 (5th Dist.), ¶ 6-10, reversed on

other grounds, 132 Ohio St.3d 17, 2012-Ohio-1577, 967 N.E.2d 1212. Notably,

the court of appeals’ lone case citation in support of its dismissal was a case that

discussed whether an order to bifurcate a civil trial pursuant to Civ.R. 42(B)

constituted a final, appealable order and did not consider the applicability of R.C.

2505.02(B)(6). Finley, 2007-Ohio-2888, at ¶ 11-12.

{¶ 8} Therefore, consistent with the foregoing precedent, we hold that

the trial court’s order denying appellants’ motions under R.C. 2315.21(B) to

bifurcate the trial into separate stages for appellees’ claims for compensatory

damages and punitive damages constituted a final, appealable order pursuant to

R.C. 2505.02(B)(6).

Conclusion

{¶ 9} The court of appeals erred in dismissing the appeal for lack of a

final, appealable order. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the

3

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

cause is remanded to the court of appeals for application of Havel, 131 Ohio St.3d

235, 2012-Ohio-552, 963 N.E.2d 1270.

Judgment reversed

and cause remanded.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER,

CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur.

PFEIFER, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of

appeals.

__________________

Seaman Garson, L.L.C., David H. Krause, and Joyce E. Carlozzi, for

appellees.

Poling & Petrello, Brant E. Poling, and Paul-Michael La Fayette, for

appellants.

Elk & Elk Co., L.P.A., Peter D. Traska, and Ryan M. Harrell, urging

affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor

General, and Elisabeth A. Long, Deputy Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus

curiae the state of Ohio.

Chester, Willcox & Saxbe, L.L.P., Geoffrey E. Webster, and Gerhardt A.

Gosnell II, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes,

Inc.

Rolf & Goffman Co., L.P.A., Robert C. Pivonka, and Christopher G.

Kuhn, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Health Care Association.

______________________

4