Columbus Bar Assn. v. Peden

[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Peden, 134 Ohio St.3d 579, 2012-Ohio-5766.]

COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. PEDEN.

[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Peden, 134 Ohio St.3d 579, 2012-Ohio-5766.]

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct,

including failing to maintain client funds in a separate account, not

disclosing to client attorney’s failure to carry professional-liability

insurance, and failing to provide competent representation or to act with

reasonable diligence in representing a client—Indefinite suspension.

(No. 2012-0318—Submitted May 23, 2012—Decided December 7, 2012.)

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 10-094.

_________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, John Joseph Peden of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney

Registration No. 0021233, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1983. The Board of

Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommends that we indefinitely

suspend Peden’s license to practice law, based on findings that Peden engaged in

a pattern of misconduct involving multiple violations of the Rules of Professional

Conduct. The board also recommends that we require Peden to meet certain

conditions prior to reinstatement of his law license. We adopt the findings of

professional misconduct, the recommended sanction, and the reinstatement

conditions.

Background

{¶ 2} In May 2008, we ordered a six-month stayed suspension of

Peden’s license for repeatedly overdrawing his client trust account, not

maintaining a trust account for a period of time, depositing unearned client funds

into his office operating account, failing to immediately refund an unearned fee,

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and failing to cooperate in the initial stages of the disciplinary investigation.

Columbus Bar Assn. v. Peden, 118 Ohio St.3d 244, 2008-Ohio-2237, 887 N.E.2d

1183, ¶ 3-4. Peden’s stayed suspension included one year of monitored

probation, with a specific focus on his client trust account. Peden was also

diagnosed with a mental disability at this time, and we ordered that he provide

periodic reports from his psychologist on his ability to competently and ethically

practice law and that he remain in compliance with his contract with the Ohio

Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”), which required his continued treatment.

Id. at ¶ 5-8.

{¶ 3} On June 15, 2009, we found Peden in contempt and imposed an

actual suspension for not paying the board costs from his disciplinary proceeding.

Peden was reinstated on September 15, 2009, subject to the conditions of his

stayed suspension. Peden’s monitored probation has remained in effect since that

time.

{¶ 4} On December 6, 2010, relator, the Columbus Bar Association,

filed a three-count complaint charging Peden with professional misconduct. The

complaint alleged that Peden (1) mismanaged his client trust account, (2) failed to

return unearned fees, (3) failed to keep clients reasonably informed of their case

status, (4) failed to provide competent and diligent representation, (5) failed to

notify clients that his malpractice insurance had lapsed, (6) failed to notify clients

of his suspension from the practice of law, (7) failed to provide reasonable notice

of withdrawal of representation and to protect clients’ interests following

withdrawal, and (8) failed to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation.

{¶ 5} Relator filed an amended complaint on March 18, 2011, adding

four more counts charging Peden with similar misconduct.1 Relator’s amended

1. Relator elected not to proceed on count six of the amended complaint, and it is dismissed.

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complaint also alleged for the first time that Peden had engaged in misconduct

involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation.

{¶ 6} A panel of the board conducted a hearing. The panel heard the

testimony of eight witnesses, including Peden, and admitted 77 exhibits, 70 of

which were submitted by relator. The panel issued a report finding that Peden

had violated 12 different Rules of Professional Conduct. The panel recommended

that Peden receive an indefinite suspension from the practice of law. The panel

also recommended that Peden fulfill several specific conditions prior to being

reinstated.

{¶ 7} The board adopted the panel’s findings of misconduct, the

indefinite suspension, and the reinstatement conditions.

Misconduct

Count Three—Trust-Account Overdrafts

{¶ 8} On May 11, 2009, Peden overdrew his client trust account at Fifth

Third Bank by $200. Four days later, on May 15, he again overdrew his trust

account, this time by $133. On January 6, 2010, Peden overdrew this account a

third time, by the sum of $19.81. During the time of these overdrafts, Peden was

under monitored probation by the relator. Peden, however, did not contact his

monitor during this time period.

{¶ 9} Peden acknowledged during the board hearing that he had not

maintained a client trust account for several months in 2009. He reopened a trust

account with Chase Bank in June 2010. But on March 29, 2011, less than four

months before the board hearing, Peden overdrew this trust account by $88.

{¶ 10} Based on the foregoing evidence, the board found that Peden had

violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to safeguard client funds in an

interest-bearing client trust account, separate from the lawyer’s own funds) and

8.4(h) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to

practice law). We adopt these findings of fact and misconduct.

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Count One—Willmore/Plaisted

{¶ 11} On April 1, 2009, Peden agreed to represent Erin Willmore in a

custody dispute involving her infant daughter. Willmore was also a victim of

domestic violence, and she wanted Peden to obtain a civil protection order on her

behalf. Peden and Willmore entered into a written fee agreement that required a

$2,500 retainer and a rate of $225 per hour.

{¶ 12} Willmore’s mother, Karen Plaisted, paid the fees on her behalf.

During April 2009, Plaisted made five payments to Peden for attorney fees and

costs totaling $2,178. Peden deposited this money into his office operating

account instead of his client trust account, even though some of this money had

not yet been earned or paid out as case expenses. The money received by Peden

included $175 that was to be used to hire a process server. Peden did not hire the

process server and never repaid this money to Plaisted.

{¶ 13} Peden only partially performed the services he was paid for. Peden

issued one billing statement to Plaisted, dated April 10, 2009, reflecting that he

had earned attorney fees in the amount of $1,260 based on 5.6 hours of work on

the case. Plaisted made several requests for additional billing statements, but

Peden never sent a further accounting. He also failed to return repeated phone

calls from Willmore and Plaisted, and he did not inform them of any work he

might have done after April 10, 2009. And Peden never returned any unearned

money to Plaisted, despite promising that he would.

{¶ 14} In June 2009, Peden was found in contempt for not paying the

board costs from his disciplinary proceeding and was suspended from the practice

of law. Peden never informed Willmore of his suspension and made no attempt to

return Willmore’s case file or to have her case transferred to another attorney.

And once he was reinstated in September 2009, Peden did not contact Willmore

about the status of her case.

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{¶ 15} In addition, Peden’s malpractice insurance lapsed during his

suspension and was not renewed after he was readmitted in September 2009.

Peden, however, failed to notify Willmore that he did not have malpractice

insurance.

{¶ 16} Based on the foregoing conduct, the board found that Peden

violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide competent

representation), 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in

representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably

informed of the status of a matter), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to respond to a

client’s reasonable request for information), 1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer to notify

clients that malpractice insurance had lapsed), 1.15(d) (requiring a lawyer to

render an accounting of funds upon request of a client), 1.16(e) (requiring a

lawyer who withdraws from employment to promptly return unearned fees),

1.16(d) (withdrawing from representation without taking reasonable steps to

protect the client’s interest), 1.15(a), and 8.4(h).2 We adopt these findings of fact

and misconduct.

Count Two—Culwell

{¶ 17} In November 2008, Peden agreed to represent James C. Culwell in

a divorce case. No written fee agreement exists in the record, but according to

Peden, the agreed rate was $225 per hour. Between November 2008 and June

2009, Peden requested and received from Culwell a total of $4,925 in attorney

fees and expenses. Peden deposited all of this money into his office account,

instead of keeping it in his client trust account until earned or paid out as

expenses.

2. The board and panel reports cite Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d) and 1.6(d). Likewise, the amended

complaint cites Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d). After reading the parenthetical descriptions following the

citation of these rules, it is evident that the intended references were to Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(d) and

1.16(d).

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{¶ 18} In January 2009, Peden filed a complaint for divorce on Culwell’s

behalf. Culwell had paid Peden $179 specifically to cover the filing fee. Despite

this, Peden’s check to the trial court for the filing fee was returned for insufficient

funds. Peden never told Culwell that the check was dishonored, and Culwell did

not learn of this until the trial court contacted him. Because the filing fee

remained unpaid, Culwell had to issue his own check to cover the fee. Peden has

never refunded the filing fee to Peden, and in the end, Culwell paid the filing fee

twice: once to Peden and once to the court.

{¶ 19} On June 15, 2009, this court suspended Peden for contempt and

ordered him to notify his clients in writing of the suspension. Peden, however,

did not send written notice of his suspension to Culwell at that time. A hearing

was scheduled in Culwell’s divorce case for June 24, 2009. Culwell expected that

Peden would contact him to discuss strategy for the hearing, and he made

repeated calls to Peden’s office, which were not returned. Peden finally called

Culwell the evening before the hearing and told him for the first time that he had

been suspended from the practice of law and could not attend the hearing. Peden

told Culwell that he had obtained a continuance of the hearing, but Peden never

responded to further inquiries from Culwell and did not contact Culwell after his

reinstatement to find out about the status of his case. In fact, Peden did no work

for Culwell after June 15, 2009, and Culwell had to hire another attorney to

complete the case at a cost of $5,000. Culwell’s new counsel entered an

appearance in July 2009 and completed the case by November 2009.

{¶ 20} Peden provided two billing statements for work performed on

Culwell’s case: one dated February 19, 2009, and the other April 3, 2009. The

bills reflect a total of $1,898.75 in attorney fees and other costs charged to

Culwell. Peden was unable to explain why the money Culwell paid him

($4,925.00) and the amount billed for services and expenses ($1,898.75) differed

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by $3,026.25. Culwell sent two requests to Peden for a final accounting of his

bill. Culwell received neither a response nor a refund.

{¶ 21} In addition, Peden testified that he had no malpractice insurance

while he represented Culwell. Yet Peden did not inform Culwell about his lack of

coverage.

{¶ 22} The board found in regard to Culwell’s case that Peden violated

Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 1.4(c), 1.15(a), 1.15(d), 1.16(e),

1.16(d), and 8.4(h). We adopt these findings of fact and misconduct.

Count Four—Nessley

{¶ 23} During the first week of November 2009, Rose and Nick Nessley

hired Peden to represent them in an adoption proceeding. Peden neglected,

however, to tell the Nessleys that he did not have malpractice insurance when

they retained him.

{¶ 24} The Nessleys paid Peden a flat fee of $750 to complete the case

and an additional $400 for filing fees. Peden deposited both sums into his office

account instead of his client trust account.

{¶ 25} During their initial meeting, Peden told the Nessleys that he would

have the adoption paperwork completed and ready to be filed by the end of

November 2009. After their initial consultation with Peden, the Nessleys made

numerous attempts to contact him. Peden did not respond to these inquiries until

January 2010, when he asked for the $400 filing fee. Mr. Nessley wrote a check

to Peden on January 27, 2010, but Peden did not submit the adoption petition to

the probate court until March 2010.

{¶ 26} Between the end of January—when Peden received the $400 filing

fee—and early March, the Nessleys made several more unsuccessful attempts to

contact Peden. In May 2010, the probate court contacted Mrs. Nessley to tell her

that Peden’s $400 check for the filing fee had been returned for insufficient funds.

Mrs. Nessley contacted Peden, and he promised to refund $800. Peden has never

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refunded the $800, nor has he made restitution to the Nessleys or the court for the

$400 filing fee. As a result of Peden’s neglect, the Nessleys were forced to hire

new counsel to complete the adoption at additional cost.

{¶ 27} The board found, and we agree, that in representing the Nessleys,

Peden violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 1.4(c), 1.15(a), 1.16(e),

and 8.4(h).

Count Five–Petrovski

{¶ 28} In March 2009, Verka Petrovski hired Peden to represent her in

divorce proceedings. The written fee agreement was for an hourly rate of $225.

Between April 2009 and November 2010, Petrovski made installment payments

to Peden totaling $6,260 for attorney fees and costs.

{¶ 29} Peden deposited the initial payment of $1,675 into his client trust

account on April 23, 2009. Peden’s billing records for April 2009 indicate that he

had worked a total of 4.25 hours on Petrovski’s case and, based on his charged

rate of $225 an hour, that he had earned fees of $956.25. Peden did no other work

on her case until August 2010, so his client trust account should have contained

$718.75 in unearned funds belonging to Petrovski. Yet at the end of April 2009,

Peden’s trust account showed an ending balance of $192.14. By the end of May

2009, the balance was $2.14.

{¶ 30} As to the remaining installment payments made by Petrovski, none

were deposited into Peden’s client trust account or otherwise maintained in trust

until earned as fees or paid out for case expenses. Peden provided one billing

statement to Petrovski on November 8, 2010, reflecting that she had made

payments of $4,950 instead of the $6,260 that she had actually paid, a discrepancy

of $1,310. The billing statement also indicated that Petrovski owed Peden $45,

which was based on the difference between the fees Peden claimed to have earned

($4,995) and the money that Peden claimed to have received from Petrovski

($4,950). Peden did not provide a final accounting to Petrovski, and he could not

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explain what happened to the $1,310 in unearned funds that was not reflected on

the billing statement or maintained in his client trust account.

{¶ 31} Peden also failed to keep Petrovski informed of the status of her

case, but he repeatedly demanded more and more money from her. According to

Petrovski, every payday Peden would call her and ask for money to perform

certain tasks. Even though Peden continued to ask Petrovski to pay for work he

supposedly had performed, he did little work on her case beyond filing her

divorce action on August 24, 2010. Petrovski was subsequently forced to hire

other counsel to complete her case, at an additional cost of $7,000. Petrovski

demanded a refund from Peden, but he has not returned any money to her.

{¶ 32} Peden was suspended from the practice of law during his

representation of Petrovski, yet he did not inform her of his suspension. Peden’s

malpractice insurance also lapsed during this time, but he did not provide this

information to Petrovski.

{¶ 33} In regard to Petrovski’s case, the board found that Peden had

violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 1.4(c), 1.15(a), 1.15(d),

1.16(e), 8.4(h), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, or

misrepresentation). We agree with the board’s findings of fact and misconduct.

Count Seven—King

{¶ 34} Peden agreed to represent Theresa King in obtaining a dissolution

of her marriage. King paid Peden a $1,000 retainer on June 23, 2010. Peden

deposited this money into his office account and did not maintain the funds in

trust until earned or paid out as case expenses.

{¶ 35} Peden represented King from June 2010 until April 2011. Peden

had no malpractice insurance for the first eight months that he represented King,

but he never advised her of his lack of coverage.

{¶ 36} On September 2, 2010, Peden called King and urgently requested

that she pay him $300 for filing fees. She asked if it could wait until the next day,

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but Peden said he needed it that afternoon. She wrote Peden a $300 money order,

and Peden immediately deposited the money into his office account instead of his

client trust account. Moreover, Peden did not file King’s dissolution petition until

March 2011, six months later.

{¶ 37} From the time she retained Peden in June until the end of

September 2010, King repeatedly attempted to contact Peden to ascertain the

status of her case. Peden did not promptly return her calls or provide any update

on the status of her case. On September 29, 2010, King sent Peden a letter asking

for a refund of her $1,300. Peden did not refund King’s money. Peden eventually

completed King’s case—seven months after receiving her letter—and she is no

longer seeking a refund.

{¶ 38} The board found that in representing King, Peden violated

Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 1.4(c), and 1.15(a). The board also found that

relator did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that Peden had violated

Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.15(d), 1.16(e), and 8.4(h). We adopt these findings of

fact and misconduct with two exceptions.

{¶ 39} King’s dissolution was not a complicated matter. King’s husband

did not contest the matter, and there were no children, no property, and no

financial issues involved. Even Peden agreed that this was a simple, uncontested

case. Yet it took nine months for Peden to file King’s petition for dissolution.

Peden, in fact, admitted during the panel hearing that he did not work diligently

on King’s case.

{¶ 40} The board, however, found that in light of King’s testimony, the

evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Peden had failed to diligently

pursue her case. But King’s testimony reflects that she was clearly frustrated with

the time it took for Peden to file her case and that this was a basis for filing her

grievance. King testified that she repeatedly called Peden between June and

September 2010 to find out why her case was taking so long. During one call,

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King asked for a refund so she could hire another attorney. As mentioned

previously, when Peden finally contacted King on September 2, he insisted that

she immediately pay him $300 for filing fees. King gave Peden the money that

afternoon, but Peden did not file her case until six months later. On September

29, 2010, King sent Peden a letter requesting a refund because she was upset that

there had been no activity on her case. King even threatened to file a disciplinary

grievance because of the delay, which she did in February 2011.

{¶ 41} Accordingly, we find that the relator has proven that Peden failed

to act with reasonable diligence in representing King, in violation of Prof.Cond.R.

1.3. Moreover, we find that Peden has engaged in conduct that adversely reflects

on his fitness to practice law based on his failure to diligently pursue King’s case,

respond to her inquiries, update her on her case status, notify her about his lack of

malpractice insurance, and hold her money in trust, in violation of Prof.Cond.R.

8.4(h).

Failure to Cooperate in Disciplinary Investigation

{¶ 42} Relator served Peden with each client grievance and requested that

he respond to the allegations. Relator also served Peden with an investigative

inquiry regarding the overdrafts of his client trust account. Despite these requests,

Peden did not respond or otherwise cooperate in the disciplinary investigation.

Peden did submit to a deposition after being subpoenaed by relator. But Peden

failed to provide relator with various documents and information, despite his

promises to do so.

{¶ 43} Because Peden repeatedly ignored the relator’s investigative

inquiries, we agree with the board that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b) (requiring

a lawyer to cooperate in an investigation of professional misconduct).

Sanction

{¶ 44} In recommending a sanction, the board considered the aggravating

and mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10.

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{¶ 45} In aggravation, the board found that Peden had (1) acted with a

dishonest or selfish motive, (2) engaged in a pattern of misconduct, (3) committed

multiple offenses, (4) failed to cooperate in the disciplinary process, (5) failed to

make restitution, (6) committed prior disciplinary offenses, and (7) caused harm

to vulnerable clients. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (h), and

(i).

{¶ 46} As to mitigating factors, the board noted that Peden’s mental state

loomed large over his case and his future. In his prior disciplinary case, we found

that Peden’s diagnosed mental disorder qualified as a mitigating factor under

BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(i) through (iv). Columbus Bar Assn. v. Peden, 118

Ohio St.3d 244, 2008-Ohio-2237, 887 N.E.2d 1183, ¶ 5-9. In the instant case,

however, the board found that Peden submitted no evidence that his mental-health

difficulties qualified as a mitigating factor. The board found no other mitigating

factors. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2).

{¶ 47} The board recommended that Peden receive an indefinite

suspension from the practice of law.

{¶ 48} The board also recommended that prior to reinstatement, Peden

fulfill the following conditions: (1) provide proof of continuing and successful

mental-health counseling and that he is fully competent to return to the practice of

law, (2) demonstrate that he fully complied with his OLAP contract during his

suspension, (3) attend a rigorous and comprehensive course in law-office

management approved by relator, with renewed emphasis on client-trust-account

management, (4) comply with all mandatory continuing-legal-education

requirements imposed by this court, (5) pay the costs of this action as required by

the court, (6) make full restitution, (7) comply with his suspension order in all

respects, and (8) upon reinstatement, submit to a two-year probationary period

during which he must (a) provide proof every six months that he is mentally

competent to practice law, (b) be monitored by relator, (c) delegate the

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management of his client trust account to an independent professional trained to

manage trust accounts, and (d) permit relator to monitor his trust account.

Analysis

{¶ 49} Peden objects to the board’s recommendation of an indefinite

suspension. He challenges the board’s findings of misconduct in each count,

except count four (Nessley). Peden argues that his conduct warrants either

probation or a six-month suspension.

{¶ 50} Peden specifically contends that he did not neglect his clients’

legal matters, mismanage his client trust accounts, or misappropriate client funds.

He also asserts that the overdrafts of his client trust accounts were inadvertent and

did not involve client money. And Peden disputes the board’s findings regarding

his failure to notify clients about his suspension from the practice of law.

{¶ 51} Peden, however, has offered no evidence to support any of his

claims. This alone is sufficient grounds to reject his objections. Moreover, Peden

raised many of these same defenses before the board. As here, Peden’s claims

before the board were undercut by his failure to produce trust-account records,

billing statements, or other financial documents that would account for the work

performed for each grievant. In contrast, the relator has submitted overwhelming

evidence that Peden repeatedly failed to (1) safeguard client funds, (2) perform

work diligently and competently, (3) return calls and update clients about their

cases, (4) maintain malpractice insurance and notify clients about the lack of

coverage, (5) disclose his disciplinary suspension, (6) cooperate in the grievance

investigations, and (7) make restitution to clients harmed by his misconduct.

{¶ 52} In addition to his lack of evidence, Peden has not cited a single

legal authority that would justify a lesser sanction. In other cases involving the

same misconduct as that committed by Peden, we have imposed indefinite

suspensions. Indeed, we imposed an indefinite suspension in Columbus Bar Assn.

v. Boggs, 129 Ohio St.3d 190, 2011-Ohio-2637, 951 N.E.2d 65, under strikingly

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similar circumstances. The misconduct in Boggs involved a pattern of

misconduct involving several clients and multiple offenses, and included

mishandling of a client trust account, improper accounting of trust-account funds,

neglect of clients’ cases, failure to notify clients about lack of malpractice

insurance, and a failure to make restitution. And Boggs, like Peden, had a prior

disciplinary record. Unlike Peden, Boggs cooperated in the disciplinary process.

Id. at ¶ 22-24.

{¶ 53} Likewise, in Columbus Bar Assn. v. Van Sickle, 128 Ohio St.3d

376, 2011-Ohio-774, 944 N.E.2d 677, we imposed an indefinite suspension on an

attorney who had a prior disciplinary record and who engaged in a pattern of

misconduct involving multiple offenses, including neglecting entrusted legal

matters and failing to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation.

Moreover, Van Sickle and Peden are similar in that both suffered from a

diagnosed mental condition but did not submit evidence establishing that their

condition qualified as a mitigating factor. Id. at ¶ 14.

{¶ 54} Accordingly, we adopt the board’s recommendation and

indefinitely suspend Peden from the practice of law. Moreover, we order that

before Peden is reinstated to the practice of law, he shall (1) provide proof of

continuing and successful mental-health counseling and that he is fully competent

to return to the practice of law, (2) demonstrate that he fully complied with his

OLAP contract during his suspension, (3) comply with all mandatory continuing-

legal-education requirements imposed by this court, (4) as part of the general

continuing-legal-education requirements under Gov.Bar R. X(3)(G), attend a

rigorous and comprehensive course in law-office management approved by

relator, with renewed emphasis on client-trust-account management, (5) pay the

costs of this action, (6) make restitution in the amount of $1,018 to Ms. Plaisted,

$3,026.25 to Mr. Culwell, $1,150 to the Nessleys, and $1,330 to Ms. Petrovski, all

within 30 days of this order, (7) comply with his suspension order in all respects,

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and (8) upon reinstatement, submit to a two-year probationary period during

which he must (a) provide proof every six months that he is mentally competent

to practice law, (b) be monitored by relator, (c) delegate management of his client

trust account to an independent professional trained to manage trust accounts, and

(d) permit relator to monitor his trust account. Costs are taxed to Peden.

Judgment accordingly.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL,

LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur.

__________________

Lisa Pierce Reisz; and Bruce A. Campbell, Bar Counsel, and A. Alysha

Clous, Assistant Bar Counsel, for relator.

John Joseph Peden, pro se.

______________________

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