BROYLES v. OKLAHOMA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION

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BROYLES v. OKLAHOMA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION

2014 OK CIV APP 53

Case Number: 111197

Decided: 05/06/2014

Mandate Issued: 05/28/2014

DIVISION IV

THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, DIVISION IV

Cite as: 2014 OK CIV APP 53 , __ P.3d __

JEFFREY A. BROYLES, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

OKLAHOMA

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION, Defendant/Appellant,

and

HOWARD GM, INC.,

Defendant/Counter-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA

HONORABLE DANA L. KUEHN, TRIAL JUDGE

REVERSED

Steven A. Novick, SMOLEN, SMOLEN & ROYTMAN, PLLC, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for

Plaintiff/Appellee

Michael P. Royal, FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP, Dallas,

Texas, for Defendant/Counter-Appellant Howard GM, Inc.

and Robert C. Newark,

III, OKLAHOMA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for

Defendant/Appellant Oklahoma Employment Security Commission

JANE P. WISEMAN, PRESIDING JUDGE:

¶1 Oklahoma Employment Security Commission (OESC) and Howard GM, Inc.

(Employer) appeal from the trial court's order reversing the decision of OESC,

the Appeal Tribunal, and the Board of Review finding that Jeffrey A. Broyles 1 was ineligible

for unemployment benefits due to misconduct. Based on our review of the facts

and relevant law, we reverse the order of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Broyles worked for Employer, which operates South Pointe Chevrolet and

South Pointe Chrysler-Jeep-Dodge, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, from October 2007 to March

2012. In January 2011, Broyles was promoted to one of three used car managers.

He testified that the general manager Chris Anderson knew he suffered from

multiple sclerosis and was made aware of his physical limitations. Broyles

claims that from the time he was promoted to used car manager, Derek Ellis,

general sales manager, and other employees "engaged in a pattern of

disability-based harassment against him" including a failure or refusal "to

accommodate the limitations of his disability." After Broyles was terminated on

March 10, 2012, for misconduct, he applied for unemployment benefits, which OESC

denied based on misconduct.

¶3 When Broyles appealed the denial of unemployment benefits to the OESC

Appeal Tribunal, the Appeal Tribunal conducted a telephone hearing regarding the

incident leading up to Broyles' termination on March 10, 2012. The testimony was

conflicting regarding what occurred on the day of the incident. Ellis testified

that a customer asked Broyles for help looking at a vehicle on the lot and the

following occurred:

And when he asked that, nobody kind of reacted. Then he said it again.

And [Broyles] looked up, and, in a put-out attitude with a big sigh, said,

yes. He put his food aside. And then was being negative to the customer.

The guy asked him, hey, if you, you know, I don't want to interrupt your

lunch. If I need to come back, I can. He said, no, I'll find somebody; don't

worry about it.

And so he ran around the office, got on the paging system, paged for a

sales person to come to the office in a negative tone. Now, this was

happening in a negative tone with a put-out attitude. I mean, he did not

want to help the customer.

Finally, a sales person came into the office from next door, and we gave

the customer to that sales person.

When he got done and he went to sit down, I told him to watch his

attitude with the customers and the sales people. And he mumbled some things

under his breath, which I didn't hear what he said, which didn't matter to

me at that point.

I told him again he needs to be respectful to the customers, and that's

the reason we were here. We are here to run a business.

And, at that point, he just got, you know, started being, what I call

insubordinate.

Said something under his breath again. I told him if he didn't want to be

here and he didn't want to change his attitude, then he could go home.

. . . .

He said, I'm tired of you being a total and complete fucking dick. And he

grabbed his stuff. And he said, gladly. And he grabbed his stuff and

left.

Ellis testified that when he arrived at work Monday morning, Broyles was

there working, so he met with general manager Chris Anderson to inform him of

the incident. Anderson advised Ellis to terminate Broyles' employment. Ellis

testified that this was the sole reason Broyles was fired.

¶4 Broyles testified as to his recollection of the incident:

I had just sat down to eat my lunch at my desk. And a customer walked

through the door and said he needed some help. And I pushed my plate aside

and said, absolutely, and stood up and tried to find a sales person for him,

but I couldn't find one.

So I came back into the office and paged an available sales person to the

sales desk. And no one came. And then that's when Mr. Ellis told me that he

was tired of me being such a dick to his customers.

I went back out of the office, still trying to find a sales person, but I

quickly returned back into the office. And I told Mr. Ellis that I was tired

of him being such a dick to me. And that's when he told me to go

home.

Broyles denied using the phrase "fucking dick" when referring to Ellis.

Broyles testified he did not believe he had been fired that day when Ellis sent

him home. Employer witnesses Chris Cox and Tim Markland, who were present during

the incident, also testified they only heard Broyles use the word "dick."

¶5 Broyles further testified it was common for Ellis to swear a lot when

talking to Broyles or the other managers and for that reason he didn't think

calling Ellis a "dick" would jeopardize his job. Broyles testified he witnessed

another employee calling Ellis the same or similar names and nothing happened to

that employee.

¶6 Testimony further revealed that swearing at work was common among the

employees. Ellis testified:

Mr. Novick: Is swearing among the workers at [GM] a common

occurrence?

. . . .

Mr. Ellis: I suppose it happens now and then.

Mr. Novick: You use that word "fucking" a lot, don't you?

Mr. Ellis: I've probably used it a few times, yeah. So do a lot of

people, I guess. As did [Broyles], as well. He did--a very common

practice.

Employer witness Markland agreed that cursing at work is "normal" including

the use of words like "fuck" and "shit."

¶7 On May 21, 2012, the Appeal Tribunal issued its Order of Decision

affirming OESC's decision denying Broyles unemployment benefits. In its order,

the Appeal Tribunal stated Broyles had never been formally warned for similar

behavior before this incident. However, Broyles had been "involved in similar

altercations with the same member of management, during which he had not called

this member of management a curse word directly, before the final incident." The

Appeal Tribunal further stated that his "work environment was extremely

difficult to work in at times and cursing in speech of workers was a common

occurrence during [Broyles'] employment." The Appeal Tribunal further found:

[Broyles] was discharged for misconduct connected to work. [Broyles]

argued that personal illness and the related fatigue of this illness along

with a hostile work environment, in which cursing was the norm, was what

caused his behavior in the final incident. However, [Broyles] had confronted

this manager before while employed but never before cursed directly at him

indicating that he knew, as would be commonly known by all, that calling a

member of management a curse word to their face could result in immediate

termination. In addition, [Broyles] had shown the ability to control his

behavior in similar circumstances in the same environment while dealing with

the same illness and fatigue before the final incident. [Broyles'] choice to

allow himself to react in an extremely disrespectful manner towards

management, while having to be aware this could cost his job, demonstrates a

deliberate disregard of the standard of behavior that the employer has the

right to expect of its employees as required to find misconduct. In

addition, some behaviors, such as this and instances of theft, are so

extreme and detrimental to the employer's interests that they cannot be

allowed to continue after the first occurrence. Benefits are

disallowed.

Pursuant to 40 O.S. § 2-406,

the Appeal Tribunal disallowed benefits based on Broyles' misconduct and

affirmed the Commission's determination. Broyles appealed this decision to the

Board of Review.

¶8 On July 5, 2012, the Board of Review issued an order affirming the

decision of the Appeal Tribunal. Broyles then appealed to the Tulsa County

District Court.

¶9 After review of the record and relevant law, the trial court overruled the

decision of the Commission, the Appeal Tribunal and the Board of Review. Relying

on an Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals' opinion, Vogle v. Oklahoma Employment

Security Commission , 1991 OK CIV

APP 84 , 817 P.2d 268 , the

trial court considered this case to be similar to the facts in Vogle

finding as follows:

In a similar case, Vogle v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Com'n , 817 P.2d 268 (Okla. Civ. App.

1991), the employee had taken perfume samples without following protocol and

it was considered theft. She was denied benefits. However, the Court of

Civil Appeals found that the act of taking the samples was "common

practice." As in this case, cussing at each other was "common practice."

Also in Vogle , the claimant had never been formally reprimanded or

broken the rule before when she had taken samples. In our case, [Broyles]

was never formally reprimanded and had never cussed before at his boss.

The Vogle Court found that the "claimant may not have used good

judgment in the matter . . ." and "misconduct has been proven." However, the

Court found that the "misconduct was not detrimental to her employer's

interest." It was determined to be an instance of ordinary negligence giving

grounds for dismissal, but not a necessary denial of benefits.

[Broyles] did act inappropriately and misconduct is found to have been

proven. This Court cannot find that his choice of a cuss word, which is

frequently used by his boss, is anything but a negligent choice of words

that in no way is detrimental to the employer. Not one customer heard the

argument, but only other co-workers who also cuss and who were in on giving

[Broyles] a hard time at work. [Broyles] made a poor decision and should

have never spoken to his boss in that manner. However, a denial of benefits

is not appropriate under the law.

OESC and Employer appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 On appeal, "the findings of the Board of Review as to the facts, if

supported by evidence, shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of the court

shall be confined to questions of law." 40 O.S.2011 § 2-610(A). "This

Court's standard of review on appeal is the same as that of the trial court."

Gilchrist v. Board of Review of the Oklahoma Emp't Sec. Comm'n , 2004 OK 47, ¶ 6 , 94 P.3d 72 . "Further, the question

of what constitutes 'misconduct' sufficient to deprive a terminated employee of

entitlement to unemployment benefits is a question of law." Id .

¶11 Furthermore, "[s]tatutory construction presents a question of law which

we review de novo ." Curry v. Streater , 2009 OK 5, ¶ 8 , 213 P.3d 550 .

PROCEDURAL ISSUE

¶12 As a procedural matter, Broyles filed a motion to dismiss Employer's

appeal arguing that it should "be dismissed on grounds of waiver and

abandonment, and that its Brief in Chief be stricken." Broyles asserts that

because Employer did not enter an appearance or file an answer in the action for

judicial review before the trial court, it has waived or abandoned its right to

appeal the trial court's decision. Broyles appears to be arguing that Employer

has no standing to appeal the trial court's decision because it did not

participate in the trial court proceedings. Broyles did not cite any legal

authority to support this argument. "A proposition which is unsupported by

citation to authority will not be considered on appeal." Hough v. Hough ,

2004 OK 45, ¶ 16 , 92 P.3d 695 ; see also

Oklahoma Supreme Court Rule 1.11(k)(1), 12 O.S.2011 ch. 15, app. 1 ("Argument

without supporting authority will not be considered.").

¶13 Despite this omission, we conclude Employer has standing to appeal the

trial court's decision. Title 40, section 2-610(C) states in part that "[a]n

appeal may be taken from the decision of the district court to the Supreme Court

of this state in the same manner as is provided in other civil cases." 40 O.S.2011 § 2-610(c). Oklahoma

Supreme Court Rule 1.27(a), 12 O.S.2011 ch. 15, app. 1, provides in relevant

part:

If a petition in error has been timely filed to commence an appeal from

an appealable decision, then a party aggrieved by the same decision

may file a petition in error within forty (40) days of the date the judgment

was filed with the district court clerk.

(Emphasis added.)

¶14 OESC filed a petition in error to commence an appeal of the trial court's

October 5, 2012, order. Soon thereafter, Employer as an "aggrieved party" timely

filed a petition in error pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 1.27(a). Employer

argues that it has been aggrieved by the trial court's order allowing

unemployment benefits because it "could be assessed wage charges which would

adversely affect its ongoing unemployment rate" pursuant to " 40 O.S. 2001 § 3-107." OESC also

states that "[t]he Commission uses benefit wage charges as a factor in the

determination of unemployment tax rates for employer" and the trial court's

decision "would allow for a benefit wage charge to be assessed against

[Employer]." Employer may proceed with its appeal.

ANALYSIS

I. 75 O.S. § 321 .

¶15 OESC argues the trial court erred by failing to allow oral argument and

briefing as permitted by 75 O.S. §

321. This provision states:

The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be

confined to the record, except that in cases of alleged irregularities in

procedure before the agency, not shown in the record, testimony thereon may

be taken in the court. The court, upon request, shall hear oral argument

and receive written briefs .

75 O.S.2011 § 321 (emphasis

added). OESC asserts that because Broyles requested a "briefing schedule and

[to] set a date for oral argument" in his Petition for Judicial Review and

because OESC reserved "the right to submit a brief in this matter pursuant to 75 O.S. § 321," the trial court was

statutorily required to receive written briefs and hear oral argument in the

matter.

¶16 In Walker v. Oklahoma Department of Human Services , 2001 OK CIV APP 107 , 32 P.3d 881 , a case relied on by

OESC, appellant complained the trial court failed to hear oral argument despite

her request set forth in the "Certificate of Appeal." Id . ¶¶ 6, 8. The

Court of Civil Appeals found as follows:

The prayer in Appellant's "Certificate of Appeal" in the district court

contained a request for a hearing, and we find it was a sufficient request

for oral argument. The district court erred in issuing its order determining

the appeal without oral argument.

. . . .

We do not reach the merits of this appeal, as we hold Appellant was

entitled to oral argument before the district court. We do not decide

whether Appellant's allegations of improper admission of evidence are

meritorious. However, Appellant had a statutory right to present such

allegations, and the trial court shall decide at that time if further

testimony is warranted.

Id . ¶¶ 8, 10.

¶17 The language contained in § 321 plainly states that upon request, the

trial court shall allow the parties to submit written briefs and present oral

argument. "Courts will give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary

meaning, unless a contrary intention plainly appears." Redmond v.

Cauthen , 2009 OK CIV APP 46,

¶ 5 , 211 P.3d 233 . "When the

words of a statute are plain and unambiguous, no occasion exists to employ the

rules of construction." Id .

¶18 OESC never requested the right to submit a brief triggering the mandates

of the statute. OESC merely "reserved" its right to make such a request at a

later date. OESC filed its answer on August 31, 2012, and the trial court issued

its order on October 5, 2012. Although it had ample opportunity to request

submission of a brief for consideration by the court, OESC never made such a

request and cannot now be heard to complain that § 321 was not complied

with.

¶19 We further conclude that although Broyles requested a briefing schedule

and oral argument in his Petition for Judicial Review, he elected not to advance

this statutory right. If Broyles elected not to advance this right, OESC cannot

base its entitlement to briefing and oral argument upon Broyles' request in his

Petition for Judicial Review. We conclude the trial court did not violate the

mandates of 75 O.S.2011 § 321 as

it applies to submission of briefs and presentation of oral argument.

II. Misconduct

¶20 OESC and Employer both argue the trial court erred in reversing the Board

of Review's order denying unemployment benefits due to misconduct. Title 40 O.S.2011 § 2-406 states that an

employee "shall be disqualified for benefits if he has been discharged for

misconduct connected with his last work, if so found by the Commission."

Misconduct has been defined as:

"conduct evincing such wilful or wanton disregard of an employer's

interests as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of

behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or in

carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal

culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and

substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's

duties and obligations to his employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency,

unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of

inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated

instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be

deemed "misconduct" within the meaning of the

statute."

Vester v. Board of Review of Oklahoma Emp't Sec. Comm'n , 1985 OK 21, ¶ 12 , 697 P.2d 533 (quoting Boynton Cab

Co. v. Neubeck , 296 N.W. 636, 640 (Wis. 1941)).

¶21 "Subsequent to Vester's establishment of a working definition of

misconduct, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that under this standard an

element of deliberate behavior must exist to establish misconduct

sufficient to deny unemployment compensation." Kakkanatt v. Oklahoma Emp't

Sec. Comm'n , 2008 OK CIV APP

38, ¶ 12 , 183 P.3d 1032

(citing Farm Fresh Dairy, Inc. v. Blackburn , 1992 OK 148, ¶ 11 , 841 P.2d 1150 ).

[T]he misconduct standard contemplates both the nature of the act

undertaken by the employee and the employee's state of mind at the time the

event(s) occurred. As has been succinctly stated by the Washington Court of

Appeals under a misconduct standard similar to our own: "(I)intentional

misconduct is disqualifying; a single instance of ordinary

work-related negligence is not disqualifying; and repeated instances

of ordinary work-related negligence may be disqualifying." (Emphasis

in Original.) Johnson v. Employment Security Department , 64

Wash.App., 311 [,] 824 P.2d 505, 507 (1992), citing Macey v. Department of

Employment Security , 110 Wash.2d 308 , 752 P.2d 377 -378

(1988).

Id . ¶ 14.

¶22 On the other hand, "[c]onduct exempted from the foregoing definition is

'mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the

result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in

isolated instances, or good faith error in judgment or discretion.'" Vogle v.

Oklahoma Emp't Sec. Comm'n , 1991

OK CIV APP 84, ¶ 13 , 817 P.2d

268 (quoting Vester v. Board of Review of Oklahoma Emp't Sec. Comm'n,

1985 OK 21, ¶ 12 , 697 P.2d 533 ).

¶23 In the present case, the Board of Review's findings of fact, which it

adopted from the Appeal Tribunal, are supported by the evidence. 2 Pursuant to 40 O.S.2011 § 2-610, these findings

shall be treated as conclusive. Thus, the trial court's only duty was to

determine if those facts supported the legal conclusion that Broyles had engaged

in the type of misconduct to deny him unemployment benefits.

¶24 In its order, the Appeal Tribunal found that Broyles "was terminated for

calling a member of management a 'dick' directly to his face." The Appeal

Tribunal found Broyles had never been "formally warned for similar behavior

before the final incident." Broyles had also had other "altercations with the

same member of management" before this incident but had never called him a

derogatory name. The Appeal Tribunal further recognized that the "work

environment was extremely difficult to work in at times and cursing in speech of

workers was a common occurrence" during Broyles' employment.

¶25 Based on these facts, the Appeal Tribunal concluded that Broyles' "choice

to allow himself to react in an extremely disrespectful manner towards

management, while having to be aware this could cost his job, demonstrates a

deliberate disregard of the standard of behavior that the employer has the right

to expect of its employees as required to find misconduct."

¶26 Because our research reveals no similar Oklahoma cases addressing whether

offensive language directed toward a supervisor constitutes misconduct so as to

deny unemployment benefits, we look to other jurisdictions having a similar

definition of misconduct.

¶27 In Michigan, the courts adopted the same definition of misconduct set

forth in Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck , 296 N.W. 636 (Wis. 1941), and when

applying this definition to the use of profane language stated as follows:

In looking at the use of vulgar or abusive language, we conclude that the

use of such language can constitute employee misconduct. Certainly such

conduct is wilful and deliberate since the employee can choose which words

to use and, we believe, it violates the standards of behavior that an

employer can reasonably expect from his employees. That is, we believe an

employer has the right to expect his employees to act with a certain amount

of civility towards management personnel and, for that matter, fellow

employees. Of course, every use of a vulgar epithet does not necessarily

constitute misconduct. Rather, the totality of the circumstances of the case

must be considered in determining if the use of vulgar or abusive language

constitutes misconduct. Thus, we must look to the words used and the context

in which the words are spoken in determining whether an employee has engaged

in misconduct. In looking at the totality of the circumstances, various

considerations should be taken into account. Whether the use of vulgar or

abusive language constitutes misconduct depends upon a variety of factors,

including considerations such as whether the words were directed at a fellow

employee, a supervisor, or a customer, whether the tone and context suggests

an abusive intent or friendly badgering, whether the comments were made in a

private conversation or in the presence of others, and whether such conduct

has been condoned in the past.

Broyles v. Aeroquip Corp., 438 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Mich. Ct. App.

1989).

¶28 In Iowa, the administrative code definition of misconduct is similar and

when applying this definition to the use of offensive language stated as

follows:

This court recognizes an employer's right to expect decency and civility

from its employees. . . . The use of profanity or offensive language in a

confrontational, disrespectful, or name-calling context, may be recognized

as misconduct, even in the case of isolated incidents or situations in which

the target of abusive name-calling is not present when the vulgar statements

are initially made. The question of whether the use of improper language in

the workplace is misconduct is nearly always a fact question. It must be

considered with other relevant factors, including the context in which it is

said, and the general work environment. Therefore, whether the event is

misconduct is most generally a decision for the

agency.

Myers v. Employment Appeal Bd., 462 N.W.2d 734, 738 (Iowa Ct. App.

1990).

¶29 In Minnesota, the courts have also adopted a similar definition of

misconduct. In Cavalier v. C. Machine Co., Inc ., 404 N.W.2d 391 (Minn.

Ct. App. 1987), the appellate court found that an employee's series of actions

on a particular day amounted to misconduct disqualifying him from receiving

unemployment benefits. These actions included using a work computer to do

homework twice in one day without permission, lying about the use of the

computer, and the employee's refusal to "read and acknowledge the warning notice

which [his boss] attempted to hand him," instead stating to his manager, "F***

you. Stick it up your a**, Whiskey Breath." Id . at 392-94. The appellate

court held that "[w]hile, by itself, we might have characterized [employee's]

language as a single hotheaded incident, in fact that language was the last

incident in a series of conduct evidencing a disregard for the employer's

interests." Id . at 394. The appellate court concluded that the profane

language was the "last straw," rather than a "single hotheaded incident" and

affirmed the denial of benefits. Id .

¶30 Even though the definition of "misconduct" in Kansas is a more relaxed

standard than that used in Oklahoma, we may consider the same factors to

determine whether it meets Oklahoma's definition of misconduct. In Siler v.

Kansas Employment Security Board of Review , 77 P.3d 1002 (Kan. Ct. App.

2003), the Kansas Appeals Court considered the following to determine whether

the offensive language amounted to misconduct disqualifying the employee from

unemployment benefits:

(i) severity of the language used; (ii) quantity of the language used;

(iii) whether the language was spoken in the presence of customers, clients,

or other employees; (iv) whether the employee has a record of such

misconduct; (v) whether prior warnings were given; (vi) whether the language

was provoked by the employer; (vii) whether the language was accompanied by

threat of violence; and (viii) whether the language was accompanied by

material and substantial disobedience.

Id . at 1006.

¶31 Clearly, the issue of whether the use of offensive language in the

workplace constitutes misconduct for purposes of allowing or disallowing

unemployment compensation benefits has been litigated extensively in other

jurisdictions, and these cases provide helpful analyses. In most cases, the

surrounding circumstances determine whether the employee's offensive language

constitutes disqualifying misconduct. This requires the consideration of several

factors including, but not limited to, those identified in the above cases.

¶32 The undisputed facts demonstrate that Broyles had never been formally

warned for similar behavior in the past and had never cursed directly at his

supervisor before this incident. Additionally, cursing was common in the

workplace during his employment. However, when Broyles cursed at his supervisor

during the incident at issue, he was overheard by two employees, and the

language used was not in the context of "friendly badgering" but was used in a

confrontational and disrespectful manner.

¶33 The Board of Review could reasonably determine that Broyles' conduct was

a deliberate disregard of the standards of behavior Employer has a right to

expect from its employees because an employer has a right to expect employees

will not be disrespectful and use profanity directed toward a supervisor.

Broyles' conduct can reasonably be considered to be deliberate because he chose

the words to use when confronting his supervisor. We therefore cannot conclude,

as did the trial court, that Broyles' conduct is merely "a negligent choice of

words that in no way is detrimental to the employer." For this reason, we

conclude it was error to reverse the Board of Review's decision. Accordingly, we

must reverse the trial court's order and reinstate the Board of Review's

decision.

CONCLUSION

¶34 The order of the trial court reversing the Board of Review's decision is

reversed, and the Board of Review's decision is reinstated.

¶35 REVERSED.

BARNES, C.J. and GOODMAN, J., concur.

FOOTNOTES

1 Broyles

is incorrectly referred to in some appellate filings as "Jerry."

2 In his

appellate brief, Broyles states "[a]s did the district court, Broyles accepts

the findings of fact of the agency, but argues that the conclusions made by the

agency based upon those facts are simply not supported by competent substantial

evidence and are clearly erroneous."

Citationizer © Summary of Documents Citing This Document Cite

Name

Level

None Found.

Citationizer: Table of Authority Cite

Name

Level

Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals Cases

Cite Name Level

1991 OK CIV APP 84 , 817 P.2d 268 , 62 OBJ 3139, Vogle v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Com'n Discussed at Length

2001 OK CIV APP 107 , 32 P.3d 881 , 72 OBJ 2759, WALKER v. OKLAHOMA DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES Discussed

2008 OK CIV APP 38 , 183 P.3d 1032 , KAKKANATT v. OKLAHOMA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION Discussed

2009 OK CIV APP 46 , 211 P.3d 233 , REDMOND v. CAUTHEN Discussed

Oklahoma Supreme Court Cases

Cite Name Level

1992 OK 148 , 841 P.2d 1150 , 63 OBJ 3187, Farm Fresh Dairy, Inc. v. Blackburn Discussed

2004 OK 45 , 92 P.3d 695 , HOUGH v. HOUGH Discussed

2004 OK 47 , 94 P.3d 72 , GILCHRIST v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE OKLA. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION Discussed

2009 OK 5 , 213 P.3d 550 , CURRY v. STREATER Discussed

1985 OK 21 , 697 P.2d 533 , Vester v. Board of Review of Oklahoma Employment Sec. Com'n Discussed at Length

Title 40. Labor

Cite Name Level

40 O.S. 2 -406, Discharge for Misconduct Discussed

40 O.S. 2 -610, Judicial Review Discussed at Length

40 O.S. 3 -107, Benefit Wage Ratio Cited

Title 75. Statutes and Reports

Cite Name Level

75 O.S. 321 , Review Without Jury - Additional Testimony. Discussed at Length