HOUSE v. VANCE FORD-LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC.

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HOUSE v. VANCE FORD-LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC.

2014 OK CIV APP 36

Case Number: 109314

Decided: 03/31/2014

Mandate Issued: 04/29/2014

DIVISION I

THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, DIVISION I

Cite as: 2014 OK CIV APP 36 , __ P.3d __

BRENDA HOUSE, an individual resident of Ottawa County, Oklahoma,

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

VANCE FORD-LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC., an Oklahoma

Corporation; and FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, L.L.C., a foreign limited liability

company, Defendants/Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF

OTTAWA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA

HONORABLE ROBERT G. HANEY, TRIAL JUDGE

AFFIRMED

James W. Dunham, Jr., JAMES W. DUNHAM, JR., P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for

Plaintiff/Appellant,

Chris Harper, Phillip P. Owens, II, CHRIS HARPER, INC.,

Edmond, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee, Vance Ford-Lincoln-Mercury,

Inc.,

Harvey D. Ellis, Jr., John M. Thompson, CROWE & DUNLEVY, P.C.,

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee Ford Motor Credit Company,

L.L.C.

Wm. C. Hetherington, Jr., Vice-Chief Judge:

¶1 Brenda House (House) appeals a trial court order denying her motion to

vacate an arbitration award and granting counter motions by Vance

Ford-Lincoln-Mercury Inc. (Vance) and Ford Motor Credit Company, LLC (Ford) to

confirm the arbitration award. She also appeals the trial court's order which

sent the parties' controversy to arbitration, claiming she was denied due

process by the trial court's refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The

orders of the trial court ordering the controversy to arbitration and affirming

the arbitrator's award are AFFIRMED.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

¶2 House purchased a 2008 Ford F-150 crew cab with a Harley Davidson limited

edition package, from Vance on May 18, 2009. She executed an Oklahoma Simple

Interest Vehicle Retail Installment Contract (the Contract), note and security

agreement, all of which are held by Ford. The Contract lists the vehicle as new

but also states its mileage as 21,421 at the time of her purchase. The cash

price for the 2008 truck was $43,630.00. As part of the transaction, House

received $6,200 credit for a 1998 Ford F-150 trade-in and a $500 rebate was

applied as a part of the down payment. She received "new car" 1.9% financing

with Ford and a check from Vance for $500 for "TT&L" (tag, title, and lien

entry expenses).

¶3 The first page of the Contract contains the following statement: " YOU

ACKNOWLEDGE THAT YOU HAVE READ AND AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THE ARBITRATION

PROVISION ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS CONTRACT ." (Emphasis in original.) The

arbitration provision on the reverse of the contract lists, inter alia ,

various rights given up, such as the right to trial, 1 and others not given up, including the

right to request a court to review whether an arbitrator "exceeded its

authority," and advises it is subject to "the Federal Arbitration Act ( 9

U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. ) and the Federal Rules of Evidence." (Underlining in

original.)

¶4 House filed suit against Vance and Ford (collectively, Appellees) on

December 7, 2010, and amended her petition on December 10, 2010, raising claims

for breach of contract, common law fraud, statutory fraud, deceit, and Oklahoma

Consumer Protection Act violations. All of her claims are premised, in whole or

in part, on the classification of the truck as "new" or used, representations

the truck's mileage was the result of its use as a demonstration vehicle and by

a sales manager, and the non-disclosure of a prior sale to another consumer.

¶5 Following motions to compel arbitration by Appellees, House responded,

arguing fraud was a threshold issue for resolution prior to arbitration. The

trial court entered a March 4, 2011 Order compelling arbitration and staying the

trial court proceedings until the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings.

¶6 House filed a Petition in Error on April 1, 2011, in which she argued she

was denied due process by the trial court's refusal to afford her an evidentiary

hearing on fraud in the inducement and questioning whether Appellees' motions to

compel arbitration were sufficient. In a notarized Narrative Statement filed

April 5, 2011, House states, inter alia , that at a regularly scheduled

Motion Docket on March 4, 2011, after the trial court stated the parties were

going to arbitration, she requested an evidentiary hearing on the issue of fraud

in the inducement and asked the trial court's leave to present argument, and the

trial court "stated that counsel was free to do so, but that it would 'not make

any difference.'" Her counsel then cited Hai v. Baptist Healthcare of

Oklahoma, Inc. , 2010 OK CIV APP

3 , 230 P.3d 914 , described

the case as holding "where fraud in the inducement is properly pled, a plaintiff

is entitled to an evidentiary hearing of that issue before being compelled to

arbitrate," and reiterated she moved for such a hearing. The trial court stated,

"You are going to arbitration," and concluded the hearing.

¶7 House filed an Application for Stay of Arbitration Pending Appeal and for

Expedited Ruling on Hearing with the Oklahoma Supreme Court on April 11, 2011.

The Court issued an April 12, 2011 order advising her the motion would not be

considered until she had presented the motion to the trial court and the trial

court had ruled upon it. House filed a motion in the trial court on April 12,

2011, seeking to stay the arbitration pending appeal or for an expedited ruling

or hearing. An April 13, 2011 Order of the trial court denies that motion.

¶8 The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted House's Application for an Emergency

Stay of the arbitration process in an April 14, 2011 Order. Appellees filed a

joint response to the motion to stay, arguing Appellant failed to meet the

criteria under Okla.Sup.Ct. R. 1.15(c)(2) for such a stay. After denying a

request by Appellant to file a reply, the Oklahoma Supreme Court denied

Appellant's request for a stay pending appeal, citing Rule 1.15, on May 4, 2011.

The Court then issued a May 9, 2011 Order memorializing the denial of the

application and, citing Rogers v. Dell Computer Corporation , 2005 OK 51 , 138 P.3d 826 and 12 O.S.Supp.2006 § 1857(c), stating

the "April 14, 2011 stay order is dissolved."

¶9 An arbitration award was entered in December of 2011. The trial court

denied House's motion to vacate the award and granted separate motions by

Appellees to confirm the award in an April 6, 2012 Order. The 7-page arbitration

award, signed on December 6, 2011, is attached as Exhibit A to the April 6, 2012

Order. The arbitrator finds the evidence did not support a conclusion House was

injured by Vance's non-disclosure of the prior transaction, there was no

evidence of misuse of the truck prior to the sale to House, and she had no

problems with the truck during the approximately 30 months she had used the

truck. 2 In the

award, the arbitrator finds in favor of Vance and Ford, grants no relief or

award to House, orders the parties to bear their own respective attorney fees

and costs, and assesses $1,275.00 in American Arbitration Association fees and

expenses and $9,463.80 for arbitrator compensation and expenses.

¶10 House filed an April 11, 2012 Supplemental Petition in Error in which she

alleges the trial court erred by refusing to vacate the arbitrator's award

because it fails to comply with the parties' arbitration agreement, the award

exceeds the arbitrator's powers, and the award disregards Oklahoma law. She

raises arguments going to the merits of the underlying transaction, such as

Vance's claims regarding what it asserted were a failed sale, the truck's status

as new or used, and the non-disclosure of earlier transaction. House argues the

arbitration award does not qualify as the required "reasoned award," it contains

"bare" conclusions, and it therefore is impermissible and outside of the

arbitrator's powers. She further claims the award manifestly disregards

applicable law and is subject to vacatur under the Federal Arbitration

Act (FAA).

¶11 In an April 13, 2012 Order addressing deficiencies in the record, the

Oklahoma Supreme Court notes briefing was previously completed in the appeal and

House had filed a Supplemental Petition in Error. Among other things, the

Court's order sets dates for various filings, and directs Appellees to respond

to the Supplemental Petition in Error, directs House to "file a supplemental

brief in chief, limited to the issues raised by the April 6, 2012 order,"

directs "Appellee" to file a supplemental answer brief, and allows House to file

a reply brief. House, Vance, and Ford each filed supplemental appellate briefs

within the time limits set by the Court's order.

THE APPEAL

¶12 We first address House's allegations regarding the trial court order

compelling arbitration. She argues the parties' contract is governed by Oklahoma

law and it was error to fail to conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether the

contract was induced by fraud. She further contends the trial court failed to

follow "proper procedure" in considering Ford's Motion to Compel Arbitration.

Appellees argue factual concessions by House obviated the need for such a

hearing.

¶13 House cites Shaffer v. Jeffrey , 1996 OK 47 , 915 P.2d 910 , as rejecting the

severability doctrine of Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood Conklin

Manufacturing Company , 388 U.S. 395, 404 , 87 S. Ct. 1801 (1967) and as

granting her a "clear right" to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of fraud in

the inducement. Under that doctrine, fraud regarding the arbitration clause may

be severed and considered separately from the remainder of a contract. We read

Shaffer , which addressed an initial construction of § 802(A) of the

Oklahoma Arbitration Act, 15 O.S. 1991 § 801- § 818, in light of subsequently

developed law. In Rogers v. Dell Computer Corporation , 2005 OK 51 , ¶ 13 - ¶ 14, 138 P.3d 826, 830 , the Oklahoma

Supreme Court states:

In considering whether an arbitration provision is binding on the

parties, it is severed from the rest of the contract. A.T. Cross v. Royal

Selangor(s) PYE, Ltd ., 217 F.Supp.2d 229, 233 (D.R.I. 2002).

The court's role is to determine whether there is a valid, enforceable

agreement to arbitrate the dispute. Wilkinson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,

Inc. , 1997 OK 20, ¶ 9 , 933 P.2d 878, 880 (citing

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc ., 473 U.S.

614, 626 (1985)); Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc ., 262 F.3d 677,

680 (8th Cir. 2001). The existence of an arbitration agreement is governed

by principles of state law. Wilkinson , 1997 OK 20 at ¶ 9 , 933 P.2d at

880 . Because under the FAA this court cannot examine the validity of the

contract as a whole, Prima Paint , 3 388 U.S. at 404 , we must treat

the contract as valid when analyzing an arbitration provision . (Emphasis

added.)

In Hai , 2010 OK CIV APP

3, ¶17 , 230 P.3d at 919 , the Court clearly states that "[u]nder the FAA, the

question of the validity of the arbitration provision must be severed and

considered separately. Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.

Co. , 388 U.S. 395, 404 , 87 S.Ct. 1801 , [1806], 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967);

Rogers , 2005 OK 51 , ¶14,

138 P.3d at 830 ." The severability doctrine applies.

¶14 House concedes the transaction affects interstate commerce and the FAA

applies. Under both the express terms of the arbitration clause in the contract

and House's admission, this dispute falls under the purview of the FAA. House's

contentions she was fraudulently induced to make the contract by the fraud all

relate to the truck itself, i.e. , fraud as to the contract in

toto , not fraud regarding the arbitration clause. Under the FAA, "attacks on

the validity of the contract, as distinct from attacks on the validity of the

arbitration clause itself, are to be resolved 'by the arbitrator in the first

instance, not by a federal or state court.' Preston v. Ferrer , 552 U.S.

346, 349 (2008); see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.

Co. , 388 U.S. 395 (1967)." Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. v. Howard,

568 U.S. __ , 133 S.Ct. 500 , 184 L.Ed.2d 328 (2012).

¶15 Whether the parties entered into a valid enforceable agreement to

arbitrate their claims presents a question of law reviewed by a de novo

standard. Rogers v. Dell Computer Corporation , 2005 OK 51 , 138 P.3d 826 . Review of a trial

court's legal rulings is made without deference to the lower court. Gladstone

v. Bartlesville Independent School District No. 30 (I-30) , 2003 OK 30, ¶ 5 , 66 P.3d 442, 446 . The arbitration

provision states it applies to claims "in contract, tort, regulatory or

otherwise," "regarding the interpretation, scope, or validity of this clause, or

arbitrability of any issue," "between you and us, your/our employees, agents,

successors, assigns, subsidiaries, or affiliates," and "arising out of or

relating to your application for credit, this contract, or any resulting

transaction or relationship, including that with the dealer, or any such

relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract." The terms of the

arbitration clause cover disputes of the nature presented in this dispute and

House challenges its applicability only on broad grounds as to the entire

contract. Having considered separately the arbitration clause, we find it

binding. Consequently, we discern no legal error in the trial court's order

sending the parties' dispute to arbitration.

¶16 House also alleges that because the parties' agreement requires

application of Oklahoma law, she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under

Oklahoma's Arbitration Act. To adopt the approach suggested by House would be to

allow a state arbitration act to supercede and essentially nullify the FAA's

limitations with respect to judicial review of an underlying contract. The

suggested analysis recently was expressly rejected in Nitro-Lift as in

contravention of prior United States Supreme Court decisions declaring the

national policy favoring arbitration and as in contravention of U.S. Const.,

art. VI, cl. 2, because the FAA is "the supreme Law of the Land," 133 S.Ct. at

503-504 . In Hai , 2010 OK CIV

APP 3, ¶ 17 , 230 P.3d at 919 , the Court notes:

The United State Supreme Court when analyzing the law developed

subsequent to Prima , explicitly declared it had "rejected the view

that state law could bar enforcement of § 2, even in the context of

state-law claims brought in state court." Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.

Cardegna , 546 U.S. 440, 445 , 126 S.Ct. 1204, 1209 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1038

(2006). The OUAA may not be applied here to negate application of the FAA,

including application of substantive law requiring severance of

consideration of the arbitration provision, as opposed to consideration of

the parties' entire agreement, in the face of allegations of fraud in the

inducement.

¶17 Further, as the Oklahoma Supreme Court reiterates in Harris v. David

Stanley Chevrolet, Inc. , 2012 OK ¶ 5, 273 P.3d at 878, although it may be a

better policy to conduct such an evidentiary hearing "if the existence of an

agreement to arbitrate is controverted," nevertheless, whether to grant an

evidentiary hearing is within the trial court's discretion and its ruling "will

not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." 4 "A court should permit arbitration

'unless the court can say with 'positive assurance' the dispute is not covered

by the arbitration clause.' City of Muskogee v. Martin , 1990 OK 70, ¶8 , 796 P.2d 337, 340 ." Harris v.

David Stanley Chevrolet, Inc., 2012 OK 9, ¶ 6 , 273 P.3d 877, 879 .

¶18 No abuse of discretion is demonstrated here and the parties' dispute is

within the scope of the disputes covered by the arbitration clause. The trial

court's order sending the dispute to arbitration will not be disturbed on

appeal.

¶19 House alleges the trial court erred by failing to follow proper

procedures under district court rules when handling the motion to compel

arbitration and failing to grant her an evidentiary hearing. Appellees argue the

motions seeking arbitration did not fail to comply with the district court

rules 5 because

no fact issues needing a verification were at issue and House effectively

admitted the facts she contends required verification. The disputed facts she

argues were "'core' issues for the trial court's determination" under Oklahoma

law all concern fraud as to the contract as a whole and present issues

for the arbitrator under the FAA, i.e ., what she was told about the

vehicle, was it represented as new or used, did she rely on representations,

were representations true, and how the contract describes the truck. For the

reasons previously stated, the analysis regarding an evidentiary hearing fails

on this basis as well.

¶20 In the first proposition of her supplemental appellate brief, House

argues the paper trail for the truck shows it was not new because it had been

sold to and repossessed from another person. This alleged error speaks solely to

the underlying factual dispute and merits of the arbitration award. House

essentially invites re-adjudication of the facts during reviewing of the trial

court's order.

¶21 In an arbitration, a party "trades the procedures and opportunity for

review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of

arbitration." Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth ,

473 U.S. 614, 628 , 105 S.Ct. 3346, 3354 (1985). 6 "In reviewing an arbitrator's

decision, the trial court must give the arbitrator great deference and 'cannot

review the merits of the award, including any of the factual or legal findings.'

Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 142 v. City of Perkins , 2006 OK CIV APP 122, ¶ 4 , 146 P.3d 829, 830 (citing City

of Yukon v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 2055 , 1990 OK 48, ¶ 8 , 792 P.2d 1176, 1179 )." City

College, Inc. v. Moore Sorrento, LLC , 2010 OK CIV APP 127, ¶ 10 , 246 P.3d 726, 730 . The review House

requests is beyond the scope of the applicable "highly deferential" standard of

appellate review under the FAA, a standard which is "among the narrowest known

to the law." ARW Exploration Corporation v. Aguirre , 45 F.3d 1455 , 1462

(10th Cir.1995). "'Thinly veiled attempts to obtain appellate review of an

arbitrator's decision' . . . are not permitted under the FAA." Flexible

Manufacturing Systems Pty., Ltd. v. Super Products Corporation , 86 F.3d 96,

100 (C.A.7 (Wisc.) 1996) (quoting Gingiss International, In. v. Bormet ,

58 F.3d 328, 333 (C.A.7 (Ill.) 1995). We will not conduct the fact inquiry

proposed in Proposition I of House's supplemental brief.

¶22 House argues the arbitration award should be vacated because it is not

the "reasoned award" required under the parties' contract. She contends the

award merely contains bare conclusions without any supporting legal authority,

the award is in manifest disregard of applicable law, and, consequently, its

rendering exceeds the authority of the arbitrator.

¶23 The FAA imposes a heavy presumption in favor of confirming an award, and

provides for vacation in narrow circumstances. Wachovia Securities, LLC v.

Vogel , 918 So.2d 1004, 1007 (Fla.App. 2 Dist., Jan 20, 2006); e.g.,

First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan , 514 U.S. 938, 942 , 115 S.Ct.

1920,1923 , 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995) (vacatur should occur only in "very unusual

circumstances"); Brabham v. A.G. Edwards & Sons Inc. , 376 F.3d 377,

380 (5th Cir.2004) (vacatur permitted only on narrow grounds); 9 U.S.C. §

10 .

¶24 "[A] reasoned award is something short of findings and conclusions but

more than a simple result." Holden v. Deloitte & Touche LLP , 390

F.Supp.2d 752, 780 (N.D.Ill.2005) (internal citations omitted). Sarofim v.

Trust Company of The West , 440 F.3d 213, 215, n. 1 (C.A.5 (Tex.), 2006). In

seven pages containing 27 numbered paragraphs, the arbitrator recites the

history of the dispute, recounts facts elicited during hearing, describes the

parties' contentions, finds a case cited by House distinguishable, and explains

the rationale for the conclusions reached, including that House had not

sustained damages. Although the award was more minimal than House would prefer,

it nonetheless fulfills the terms of the parties' contract calling for a

"reasoned award."

¶25 House also claims the award is subject to vacatur due to the arbitrator's

"manifest disregard of the law," a non-statutory ground recognized by some

jurisdictions in addition to the four grounds stated in the FAA. 7 In Advest v. McCarthy ,

914 F.2d 6, 9, n. 5 (1st Cir. 1990), the federal court explains that the origin

of this ground "derives directly from dicta employed by the Court in Wilko v.

Swan , 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 , 74 S.Ct. 182, 187-88 , 98 L.Ed. 168 (1953)," 8 and is

judicially created.

¶26 As the federal court explains in Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy , 914

F.2d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1990), reversal based on the ground of "manifest disregard

of the law" requires a challenger to show

that the award is "(1) unfounded in reason and fact; (2) based on

reasoning so palpably faulty that no judge, or group of judges, ever could

conceivably have made such a ruling; or (3) mistakenly based on a crucial

assumption that is concededly a non-fact." Local 1445, United Food and

Commercial Workers v. Stop & Shop Cos ., 776 F.2d 19, 21 (1st

Cir.1985); Bettencourt [ v. Boston Edison Co ., 560 F.2d 1045 ,

(1st Cir. (Mass.) 1977)], 560 F.2d at 1050 .

¶27 The ground "manifest disregard of the law" is narrowly construed.

Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner , 72 F.3d 234 , 237-38 (1st Cir.

1995). "The hurdle is a high one, especially since there is nothing talismanic

about the phrase 'manifest disregard.'" 914 F.2d at 10 . The Courts "do not sit

to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court

does in reviewing decisions of lower courts." United Paperworkers

International Union v. Misco, Inc. , 484 U.S. 29, 38 , 108 S.Ct. 364, 371 , 98

L.Ed.2d 286 (1987). In Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co. , 254 F.3d 925 , (10th

Cir. 2001), the Court explains:

We have interpreted manifest disregard of the law to mean "willful

inattentiveness to the governing law." ARW Exploration Corp ., 45 F.3d

at 1463 9

(internal quotation marks omitted). Requiring more than error or

misunderstanding of the law, id. , a finding of manifest disregard

means the record will show the arbitrators knew the law and explicitly

disregarded it, Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner , 72 F.3d 234 ,

240 (1st Cir.1995). (Footnote added.)

Accord, Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. v. Carte Blanche

Intern., Ltd. , (C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1989), 888 F.2d 260 ("manifest disregard of the

law" refers to error which is obvious and capable of being readily and instantly

perceived by the average person qualified to serve as arbitrator and implies the

arbitrator appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but

decided to ignore it); Sheet Metal Workers' Intern. Ass'n, Local 15 AFL-CIO

v. Law Fabrication, LLC , 459 F.Supp.2d 1236 , (M.D.Fla. 2006),

affirmed , 237 Fed.Appx. 543 , 2007 WL 1821022 (manifest disregard of the

law requires clear evidence that arbitrator was conscious of the law and

deliberately ignored it and a showing that the arbitrator merely misinterpreted,

misstated, or misapplied the law is insufficient); and U.S. ex rel. Watkins

v. AIT Worldwide Logistics, Inc ., 441 F.Supp.2d 762 (E.D.Va. 2006) (Party

seeking to vacate based on manifest disregard of law is required to show that

arbitrators were aware of law, understood it correctly, found it applicable to

case before them, and yet chose to ignore it).

¶28 House's arguments premised on statutory definitions of "new" and "used"

vehicles require a determination the statutes apply and were ignored. The

arbitrator recounted Appellees' arguments the prior transaction had failed and

found inapplicable statutes House contends were ignored. Vacatur is denied

premised on the doctrine of manifest disregard of applicable law. 10

CONCLUSION

¶29 The trial court's order sending the parties' dispute to arbitration is

AFFIRMED. House's claimed errors which are premised upon re-adjudication of the

underlying issues will not be entertained, she has failed to demonstrate

entitlement to vacatur of the arbitrator's award upon other grounds alleged, and

she has not shown the trial court abused its discretion or erred as to the law.

The order confirming the arbitrator's award is AFFIRMED.

BUETTNER, Acting P.J., and GOREE, J. (sitting by designation),

concur.

FOOTNOTES

1 The

arbitration provision states (emphasis in the original):

RIGHTS YOU AND WE AGREE TO GIVE UP

If either you or we choose to arbitrate a Claim, then you and we agree to

waive the following rights;

RIGHT TO TRIAL, WHETHER BY A JUDGE OR JURY

RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A CLASS REPRESENTATIVE OR A CLASS MEMBER IN ANY

CLASS CLAIM YOU MAY HAVE AGAINST US WHETHER IN COURT OR IN ARBITRATION

BROAD RIGHTS TO DISCOVERY AS ARE AVAILABLE IN A LAWSUIT

RIGHT TO APPEAL THE DECISION OF AN ARBITRATOR

OTHER RIGHTS THAT ARE AVAILABLE IN A LAWSUIT

2 At the

arbitration hearing, Appellees claimed the prior transaction was not completed

because of problems with vehicles tendered by Texas resident Neal Quigley as

trade-ins and a "bounced" down-payment check, which, they argue, resulted in him

never legally owning the truck. The arbitrator notes designation of the truck as

"new" was necessary for House to obtain "new car" financing interest rates so as

to meet her monthly payment goal, and the mileage was disclosed and acknowledged

by House.

3

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Company , 388 U.S.

395, 404 (1967).

4 House

overstates the analysis in Hai by citing it as holding the trial court

must grant her an evidentiary hearing. In Hai , the Court states,

2010 OK CIV APP 3, ¶ 10 , 230 P.3d 914 , 918:

Whether the district court should conduct an evidentiary hearing relating to

the existence of a valid enforceable arbitration agreement before referring the

controversy to arbitration is a procedural question left to the discretion of

the district court, and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the

absence of clear abuse of that discretion. Oklahoma Oncology & Hematology

P.C. v. US Oncology, Inc. , 2007

OK 12 , 160 P.3d 936 . An

abuse of discretion occurs when the court bases its decision on an erroneous

conclusion of law or when there is no rational basis in the evidence for a

ruling. Fent v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Company , 2001 OK 35 , 27 P.3d 477 . "In order to determine

whether there was an abuse of discretion, a review of the facts and the law is

essential." Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma v. National Collegiate

Athletic Association , 1977 OK

17 , ¶3, 561 P.2d 499,

502 .

5

Specifically, House contends a verified statement was required by Rules for

District Courts of Oklahoma, Rule 4(c), which provides: "Motions raising fact

issues shall be verified by a person having knowledge of the facts, if possible;

otherwise, a verified statement by counsel of what the proof will show will

suffice until a hearing or stipulation can be provided."

6 See

generally Wilbanks Securities, Inc. v. McFarland , 2010 OK CIV APP 17, ¶ 9 , 231 P.3d 714, 719 , citing Brown

v. Coleman Co. , 220 F.3d 1180, 1182 (10th Cir.2000), quoting Gilmer v.

Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation , 500 U.S. 20, 31 , 111 S.Ct. 1647, 1654 ,

114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991), quoting Mitsubishi for this precept.

7 The

four statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award found at 9 U.S.C. §

10 (a) are:

(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;

(2)

where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either

of them;

(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to

postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear

evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior

by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or

(4) where the

arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a

mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not

made.

8

Wilco is overruled on other grounds by Rodríguez de Quijas v.

Shearson/American Express, Inc ., 490 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 109 S.Ct. 1917,

1921-22 , 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989).

9 ARW

Exploration Corporation v. Aguirre , 45 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir.1995).

10

House did not show a right to vacatur on this judicially-created ground.

Consequently, we need not determine if the judicially-created exception survived

in the wake of Hall Street Associates LLC v. Mattel, Inc. , 552 U.S. 576 ,

128 S.Ct. 1396, 1403 , 170 L.Ed.2d 254 (2008), in which the Supreme Court held

the grounds set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 10 are the exclusive means to vacate an

arbitration award.

Citationizer © Summary of Documents Citing This Document Cite

Name

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None Found.

Citationizer: Table of Authority Cite

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2006 OK CIV APP 122 , 146 P.3d 829 , FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE v. CITY OF PERKINS Discussed

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2010 OK CIV APP 17 , 231 P.3d 714 , WILBANKS SECURITIES, INC. v. MCFARLAND Discussed

2010 OK CIV APP 127 , 246 P.3d 726 , CITY COLLEGE, INC. v. MOORE SORRENTO, LLC Discussed

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Cite Name Level

1990 OK 48 , 792 P.2d 1176 , 61 OBJ 1473, City of Yukon v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 2055 Discussed

1990 OK 70 , 796 P.2d 337 , 61 OBJ 1928, City of Muskogee v. Martin Discussed

1997 OK 20 , 933 P.2d 878 , 68 OBJ 786, Wilkinson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. Discussed at Length

2001 OK 35 , 27 P.3d 477 , 72 OBJ 1185, FENT v. OKLAHOMA NATURAL GAS, CO. Discussed

2003 OK 30 , 66 P.3d 442 , GLADSTONE v. BARTLESVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 30 Discussed

2005 OK 51 , 138 P.3d 826 , ROGERS v. DELL COMPUTER CORPORATION Discussed at Length

1996 OK 47 , 915 P.2d 910 , 67 OBJ 1193, Shaffer v. Jeffery Discussed

2007 OK 12 , 160 P.3d 936 , OKLAHOMA ONCOLOGY & HEMATOLOGY P.C. v. US ONCOLOGY, INC. Discussed

2012 OK 9 , 273 P.3d 877 , HARRIS v. DAVID STANLEY CHEVROLET, INC. Discussed

1977 OK 17 , 561 P.2d 499 , BD. OF REGENTS, ETC. v. NAT. COLLEGIATE ATH. ASS'N Discussed

Title 12. Civil Procedure

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12 O.S. 1857 , Enforceability, Interpretation of Arbitration Agreements - Arbitration Proceeding During Dispute Over Agreement Cited