The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HEIDI PETERSON,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 14-1053 (UNA)
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on review of pro se Plaintiff Heidi Peterson’s
application to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court will grant the application, but dismiss the
Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff has not established standing to
sue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring court to dismiss an action “at any time” if it
determines that subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking); Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (“[T]he defect of standing is a defect in subject matter jurisdiction.”).
I. Background
Plaintiff Heidi Peterson alleges that the “Federal Reserves [sic] is accused of artificially
holding up housing prices through their quantitative easing policies.” Compl. at 2. According to
Plaintiff, this leads to “homelessness” and “contribut[es] to the change in birth rate and racial
demographic of the country[.]” Id. at 4. Plaintiff has explained how the policies had an effect on
her and her family:
I was not able to live in what America offered me as affordable
housing for my safety and safety of my child and I was not able to
afford a home in a white community where I would probably not
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of been a target of attack and discrimination because me like many
others can’t enter the higher end housing market [sic].
Id. at 2.
Plaintiff refers to a specific attack that she was subjected to when “[t]he police refused to
take police reports or investigate or send . . . prosecutors” when a gang took over Plaintiff’s
house. Id. She claims that she needed to live in Detroit, “due to the fact it was one of the only
places [she] had access to affordable housing, as [she] most likely could not get a loan.” Id. The
gang purportedly took over her home because she could not live there while pregnant or with a
child because there was lead-paint toxin. See id.
Plaintiff requests that this Court stop the “Federal Reserve[’]s Quantitative Easing
program,” order the sale of mortgage-backed securities in the open market, and direct the Federal
Reserve to “[r]epay the disenfranchised people . . . treble damages . . . by possibly placing them
in homes they have been unable to buy or rent due to the artificial price fixing” among other
relief. Id. at 7-8.
II. Analysis
Article III of the Constitution limits the power of the federal judiciary to the resolution of
“Cases” and “Controversies.” Because “standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-
or-controversy requirement of Article III,” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992), finding that a plaintiff has standing is a necessary “predicate to any exercise of [the
Court’s] jurisdiction.” Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see
also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (discussing case-or-controversy requirement).
“This limitation is no mere formality: it ‘defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of
separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded.’” Dominguez v. UAL Corp.,
666 F.3d 1359, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 750).
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The doctrine of standing “requires federal courts to satisfy themselves that ‘the plaintiff
has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant [her] invocation
of federal-court jurisdiction.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (citing
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)). “To establish Article III standing, an injury must
be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
redressable by a favorable ruling.’” Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147
(2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2747 (2010)).
While Plaintiff’s situation may be unfortunate, her claim fails to satisfy the last two
elements of standing. It is unclear how the Federal Reserve’s policies caused Plaintiff the harm
she alleges, and it is even more speculative to assume that a favorable decision by this Court will
provide her the relief she desires.
Assuming Plaintiff’s loss of her home is a “concrete and particularized” injury, “the line
of causation between [the Federal Reserve’s] conduct” and her injuries “is attenuated at best.”
See Allen, 468 U.S. at 757; see also Vardon v. Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 11-1565, 2011 WL
3847168, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2011) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim against Federal Reserve
because Plaintiff’s financial losses were not fairly traceable to Federal Reserve’s allegedly failed
policies), aff’d, 448 Fed. App’x 77 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Plaintiff claims that she had
to live in Detroit because “she most likely could not get a loan.” See Compl. at 2. Then she
alleges that because she had to live in Detroit, there was lead paint; when she became pregnant,
she needed to move out. See id. After this, a gang took over and the police did not investigate.
See id. The injury to Plaintiff is “highly indirect and ‘results from the independent action of
[multiple] third part[ies] not before the court.’” See Allen, 468 U.S. at 758 (quoting Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42 (1976)). Therefore, even if the Federal
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Reserve’s policy adversely affected the housing market, it is entirely speculative to assume that
Plaintiff’s harms were “fairly traceable” to Defendant’s conduct because there are too many links
in the chain of causation. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 759 (“The links in the chain of causation
between the challenged Government conduct and the asserted injury are far too weak for the
chain as a whole to sustain respondents’ standing.”).
Similarly, any inquiry into whether Plaintiff’s injuries are redressable by this Court
would involve substantial guesswork. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 614 (1989)
(opinion of Kennedy, J.) (“[I]t is pure speculation whether the lawsuit would result in any actual
tax relief for respondents.”). If this Court were to order the Federal Reserve to stop its
Quantitative Easing Program or order the sale of mortgaged-backed securities, the possible effect
on the housing market would be entirely unclear. But even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff’s
proposed policies would be beneficial to the United States economy, it is “pure speculation” to
assume that this would fix Plaintiff’s problem of not being able to live in her desired house in her
desired neighborhood.
The Court, accordingly, will an issue an Order dismissing the case without prejudice.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
Date: June 20, 2014
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