Opinion

Leetaru v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

2014 IL App (4th) 130465

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
Filed: Apr 1, 2014
Status: Published
Cited by: 2 cases
Authority: More cited than 46.5%

The opinion

Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Leetaru v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois,

2014 IL App (4th) 130465

Appellate Court KALEV LEETARU, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF

Caption TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, a Public

Corporation; and HOWARD R. GUENTHER, Associate Vice

Chancellor for Research, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,

in His Official Capacity Only, Defendants-Appellees.

District & No. Fourth District

Docket No. 4-13-0465

Filed February 14, 2014

Held Plaintiff graduate student’s action seeking injunctive relief against

(Note: This syllabus defendant university’s investigation into his alleged research

constitutes no part of the misconduct was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,

opinion of the court but notwithstanding plaintiff’s contentions that he was only seeking

has been prepared by the prospective injunctive relief, not monetary relief or enforcement of a

Reporter of Decisions present claim, since his complaint involved a present claim based on

for the convenience of alleged procedural errors by defendants in connection with their

the reader.) investigation, the Court of Claims had jurisdiction, plaintiff sought to

control defendants’ authorized actions with regard to the

investigation, a governmental function, and the University of Illinois

Act did not provide the trial court with jurisdiction.

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign County, No. 13-CH-70;

Review the Hon. Michael Q. Jones, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on James A. Martinkus (argued), of Erwin, Martinkus & Cole, Ltd., of

Appeal Champaign, for appellant.

William J. Brinkmann (argued) and Kenneth D. Reifsteck, both of

Thomas, Mamer & Haughey, LLP, of Champaign, for appellees.

Panel JUSTICE POPE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Knecht and Turner concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 On May 6, 2013, the trial court dismissed plaintiff Kalev Leetaru’s complaint for a

preliminary and permanent injunction against defendants, the Board of Trustees (Board) of the

University of Illinois (University) and Howard R. Guenther in his official capacity as the

associate vice chancellor for research at the University. Plaintiff appeals, arguing the court

erred in dismissing his complaint. We affirm.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 On February 22, 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants, seeking both a

preliminary and a permanent injunction to halt an ongoing University investigation into

plaintiff’s alleged research misconduct. Realizing the jurisdiction of the trial court would be in

question, plaintiff alleged the court had jurisdiction because he is only seeking prospective

injunctive relief to enjoin defendants from taking further action in excess of their delegated

authority. According to the allegations in the complaint, neither the State Lawsuit Immunity

Act (745 ILCS 5/1 to 1.5 (West 2012)) nor the Court of Claims Act (705 ILCS 505/1 to 29

(West 2012)) applied to plaintiff’s claim because he was seeking neither monetary damages

nor the enforcement of a present claim.

¶4 Plaintiff also alleged the trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to section 1 of the University

of Illinois Act (110 ILCS 305/1 (West 2012)), which states:

“The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois shall be a body corporate and

politic, and by that name and style shall have perpetual succession, have power to

contract and be contracted with, to sue and be sued, provided that any suit against the

Board based upon a claim sounding in tort must be filed in the Court of Claims, to plead

and be impleaded, to acquire, hold, and convey real and personal property; to have and

use a common seal, and to alter the same at pleasure; to make and establish by-laws,

and to alter or repeal the same as they shall deem necessary, for the management or

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government, in all its various departments and relations, of the University of Illinois,

for the organization and endowment of which provision is made by this act.” 110 ILCS

305/1 (West 2012).

According to plaintiff, “[b]ecause the nature of Plaintiff’s claim does not ‘sound in tort’ and is

not otherwise required to be brought in the Court of Claims, this Court has jurisdiction.”

¶5 Plaintiff claims defendants, in conducting their investigation, exceeded their delegated

authority, acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and abused their discretion, resulting in the denial

of his due process rights. Plaintiff alleges defendants violated their own policies and

procedures by (1) failing to make a timely determination to proceed with an inquiry, (2) failing

to consult with him regarding any variance to the required time limit to proceed with the

inquiry, (3) attempting to exclude a graduate student from the inquiry team, (4) instructing the

inquiry team not to communicate with or contact plaintiff, (5) failing to allow the inquiry team

to draft the inquiry report, (6) failing to sequester and preserve evidence that would permit

plaintiff to defend himself against the allegations of misconduct, and (7) failing to timely

notify plaintiff whether an investigation would go forward.

¶6 Plaintiff alleged judicial action is needed because he has a “clearly ascertainable right in

need of protection to have the investigation stopped and the University enjoined from

continuing the process against him.” According to his complaint:

“101. In the absence of an Injunction, Leetaru will suffer irreparable harm in the

loss of his ability to continue his doctoral studies, write and defend his dissertation, and

be awarded a Ph.D., the loss of additional research grants beyond those already lost, the

loss of his reputation and stature in the community in his field to such extent that

[plaintiff] could not be fully compensated by money damages.”

As a result, plaintiff requested an injunction restraining defendants from proceeding with their

investigation against him.

¶7 On March 27, 2013, defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the

Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2012)). The motion noted plaintiff’s

claim was based on defendants’ actions, which were allegedly in excess of their delegated

authority resulting in “ ‘gross injustice and denial of due process.’ ” Defendants argued the

Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims “because Plaintiff seeks to

control a [S]tate officer’s conduct in governmental matters with respect to which he has been

granted discretionary authority and a judgment for Plaintiff could operate to control the actions

of the State.”

¶8 On March 27, 2013, plaintiff filed a petition for a temporary restraining order. The petition

for a temporary restraining order restated the allegations in his complaint for a preliminary and

permanent injunction. Plaintiff alleged a temporary restraining order was needed to maintain

the status quo and keep defendants from proceeding with an investigation until a court could

determine the merits of the dispute.

¶9 That same day, plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to defendants’ motion to

dismiss. Plaintiff argued the trial court had jurisdiction over his claim because he was only

seeking prospective injunctive relief.

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¶ 10 On April 29, 2013, defendants filed a reply to plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition to

defendants’ motion to dismiss. According to defendants’ memorandum:

“Specifically, Plaintiff argues that allegations in the Complaint of failure to follow

rules and regulations of the University by Guenther mean that he is acting outside of his

official capacity. Plaintiff fails to distinguish between an employee acting in a

wrongful manner from an employee acting beyond the scope of authority.

Here, it is clear that, as Vice Chancellor for Research and as Campus Research

Integrity Officer, HOWARD R. GUENTHER is authorized to conduct investigations

into charges involving research integrity complaints (see, Complaint Exhibits E, K).

Thus, Guenther’s conduct involves matters ordinarily within his normal and official

functions of the State. Wrongfully performing those functions, as alleged, does not

confer subject matter jurisdiction on the Circuit Court.”

¶ 11 On April 29, 2013, this court issued its order in plaintiff’s first appeal, finding the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s petition for a temporary restraining

order against defendants. Leetaru v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 2013 IL

App (4th) 130290-U.

¶ 12 On May 16, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court

inquired about plaintiff’s argument the court had jurisdiction where only injunctive relief is

sought, noting defendants did not respond to this argument in their “written materials.”

¶ 13 In response, defendants argued this case involves conduct that occurred back in 2010 and

2011 and has been the source of an ongoing investigation since December 2011 with respect to

plaintiff’s employment with the University and February 2012 with respect to plaintiff’s status

as a graduate student. Defendants argued plaintiff was trying to halt that investigation and they

were immune from such litigation.

¶ 14 Plaintiff argued the immunity provision did not apply to his claim because he was not

attempting to enforce a present claim against the State but was only trying to enjoin defendants

from taking future actions in excess of their delegated authority. Plaintiff also pointed the trial

court to section 1 of the University of Illinois Act (110 ILCS 305/1 (West 2012)) as giving the

court jurisdiction of his claim.

¶ 15 As to whether Guenther was acting within his authority, plaintiff argued Guenther’s

authority is set forth in the University’s policies and procedures. Plaintiff argued the

University’s policies and procedures limit Guenther’s authority but Guenther has ignored these

limits in numerous ways. Plaintiff’s counsel told the court:

“Mr. Guenther has exceeded his delegated authority. He didn’t secure and

sequester the records. He won’t permit my client to respond with documents that the

University has and are questioning him about. He has no access to them. These are

fundamental things.

You have the series of different things that I also allege, all the dates and all that,

and ‘shall’, the university shall meet with him if they are going to change them.

But then also you have other things. The inquiry team shall prepare a written report.

Not Mr. Guenther. Mr. Guenther prepares the written report on the inquiry team.”

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¶ 16 In ruling on defendants’ motion to dismiss, the trial court found the language in the

University of Illinois Act stating tort lawsuits against the University had to be filed in the Court

of Claims does not mean only tort lawsuits against the University have to be pursued in the

Court of Claims. The trial court found “the allegations of the complaint are allegations that are

contemplated in the Court of Claims Act, that is, they are laws of the State of Illinois or

regulations adopted thereunder by an executive or administrative officer or agency.”

¶ 17 The trial court also agreed with defendants that plaintiff was asking the defendants to stop

what they had already begun. According to the court:

“This is not a situation where the plaintiff fears that they may commence some

investigation of him in the future and that he thinks doing so violates various policies,

bylaws, or regulations. But it is clearly a situation where the plaintiff is saying [‘]I think

your ongoing investigation of me is improper and I believe, therefore, it should be

stopped and it shouldn’t carry forth.[’] ”

The court was also concerned its ruling could subject the State to monetary damages in the

future. The court stated:

“To be awarded injunctive relief, among other things, this court would have to

conclude that the plaintiff had a clearly ascertainable right and all the other

requirements for injunctive relief.

I would essentially have to conduct an inquiry and conclude that the plaintiff was

correct in his allegations of Mr. Guenther’s violating due process rights and

essentially–I think this is the key–harming of the plaintiff.

***

*** But if I did conduct such an investigation and did conclude that he was correct,

would I not be then giving support for a lawsuit for money damages which he could file

in the future which would subject the University of Illinois to liability? The answer

there is I think that I would be.

I think that, first of all, this would be enforcing a present claim because this is an

investigation that has been going on for quite a while and I think that it potentially, if

resolved successfully in the plaintiff’s favor, could subject the University of Illinois, an

arm of the state, to liability. For those reasons, I believe jurisdiction lies in the Court of

Claims.”

¶ 18 This appeal followed.

¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 20 The question before this court is whether the trial court erred in finding it lacked

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim. We review the trial court’s dismissal de novo. Block v.

Office of the Illinois Secretary of State, 2013 IL App (5th) 120157, ¶ 8, 988 N.E.2d 718.

¶ 21 “Because this matter comes before us in the context of a dismissal under section 2-619 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, we must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff’s

complaint and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn in the plaintiff’s favor.” Ferguson

v. City of Chicago, 213 Ill. 2d 94, 96-97, 820 N.E.2d 455, 457 (2004). Plaintiff’s complaint

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seeks injunctive relief from further action by defendants because defendants allegedly are

conducting a research misconduct investigation against him improperly. However, plaintiff is

not claiming defendants have no authority to investigate allegations of research misconduct.

Indeed, plaintiff points to numerous written policies and procedures which govern the conduct

of such investigations.

¶ 22 Plaintiff raises two arguments to support his claim the trial court has jurisdiction of this

action. First, plaintiff argues his case falls within an exception to the State Lawsuit Immunity

Act (745 ILCS 5/1 to 1.5 (West 2012)) and the Court of Claims Act (705 ILCS 505/1 to 29

(West 2012)) because he seeks only prospective injunctive relief against defendants, not

monetary relief or the enforcement of a present claim. Second, he argues section 1 of the

University of Illinois Act (110 ILCS 305/1 (West 2012)) permits the case to be brought in the

circuit court.

¶ 23 Plaintiff has skillfully attempted to plead and argue his way around sovereign immunity.

Plaintiff is asking the trial court to stop a research misconduct investigation midstream because

defendants did not follow all of their own internal rules and procedures in conducting the

investigation. He does not allege defendants have no authority to conduct the investigation. By

obtaining injunctive relief, plaintiff could not only avoid being punished for his alleged

misconduct, he could also halt the investigation into his alleged misconduct.

¶ 24 It is difficult to categorize this as anything other than a “present claim,” considering the

basis for the claim is alleged misconduct by University officials that has already occurred

during the investigation. While plaintiff argues his case does not present a “present claim”

because he only seeks to stop defendants from doing anything further, his claim is based on

purported procedural errors he alleges were already committed against him by the defendants.

As a result, we hold this is a “present claim” against the State, over which the Court of Claims

has jurisdiction, rather than the circuit court.

¶ 25 Even if we held this was not a “present claim” against defendants, we would still find the

circuit court lacks jurisdiction because plaintiff’s claim seeks to control defendants’ authorized

actions, i.e., a research misconduct investigation. Our supreme court recently stated:

“The doctrine of sovereign immunity ‘protects the State from interference in its

performance of the functions of government and preserves its control over State

coffers.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State Building Venture v. O’Donnell, 239

Ill. 2d 151, 159[, 940 N.E.2d 1122, 1128] (2010). The Illinois Constitution of 1970

abolished sovereign immunity ‘[e]xcept as the General Assembly may provide by law.’

Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 4. Pursuant to this constitutional authorization, the General

Assembly subsequently reestablished sovereign immunity by enacting the State

Lawsuit Immunity Act, which provides that ‘the State of Illinois shall not be named a

defendant or party in any court,’ except as provided in the Court of Claims Act (705

ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2008)) and in several other statutes not pertinent here. 745

ILCS 5/1 (West 2008). The Court of Claims Act, in turn, established the Court of

Claims as the exclusive forum for litigants to pursue claims against the State. 705 ILCS

505/8 (West 2008).” Township of Jubilee v. State of Illinois, 2011 IL 111447, ¶ 22, 960

N.E.2d 550.

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Moreover, efforts to defend itself in an action brought in the circuit court do not result in

waiver or forfeiture of the State’s statutory immunity “because only the legislature itself can

determine where and when claims against the State will be allowed.” Id. ¶ 25, 960 N.E.2d 550.

“The purpose of the statutory provisions establishing sovereign immunity is to protect the State

from interference with the performance of governmental functions and to *** protect State

funds.” Id. ¶ 35, 960 N.E.2d 550.

¶ 26 Plaintiff’s claim is clearly an attempt to interfere with the performance of a governmental

function–an investigation into his alleged research misconduct. The fact he is not seeking

monetary damages is irrelevant. Because an injunction would interfere with the performance

of an authorized governmental function, this case does not fall within an exception to the State

Lawsuit Immunity Act.

¶ 27 In City of Chicago v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 293 Ill. App. 3d 897,

900, 689 N.E.2d 125, 127 (1997), the First District stated: “Sovereign immunity exists where

(1) the defendant is an arm of the state, (2) the plaintiff’s action constitutes a ‘present claim’

with the potential to subject the state to liability, and (3) no exceptions to the application of the

doctrine exist.” However, this is not the only time sovereign immunity exists. As our supreme

court recently stated: “The doctrine of sovereign immunity ‘protects the State from

interference in its performance of the functions of government and preserves its control over

State coffers.’ ” Township of Jubilee, 2011 IL 111447, ¶ 22, 960 N.E.2d 550 (quoting State

Building Venture, 239 Ill. 2d at 159, 940 N.E.2d at 1128). This is true as long as the actions of

the government are authorized. Regardless of whether a plaintiff seeks only prospective relief

against the State, sovereign immunity applies if the prospective relief would interfere with the

State’s performance of the legitimate, authorized functions of government. See Ellis v. Board

of Governors of State Colleges & Universities, 102 Ill. 2d 387, 395, 466 N.E.2d 202, 206-07

(1984) (immunity prohibition does not pertain to a claim seeking “to enjoin a State officer from

taking future actions in excess of his delegated authority”). In this case, the prospective relief

asked for by plaintiff would interfere with the defendants’ performance of a legitimate

governmental function defendants have the authority to perform.

¶ 28 Plaintiff’s argument boils down to the following: defendants did not follow their own rules

and procedures when conducting an investigation. Plaintiff concedes defendants had the

authority to conduct an investigation. Even assuming, as we must for purposes of this appeal,

defendants erred in the way they conducted the investigation, the errors occurred within the

scope of defendants’ valid delegated authority. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

explained in Turpin v. Koropchak, 567 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2009), “When the Illinois courts

speak of an act ‘beyond the scope of authority,’ they contemplate an employee acting not just

in a wrongful manner, but sticking his nose in business where it doesn’t belong.” (Emphasis in

original.) Id. at 883. As noted above, plaintiff does not contend defendants are “sticking their

noses” where they do not belong. Rather, he is complaining about the manner in which they are

carrying out their clearly authorized duties. This is a significant distinction.

¶ 29 If the State “sticks its nose” where it does not belong, a claim for prospective relief may be

appropriate in the circuit court. For example, in Rockford Memorial Hospital v. Department of

Human Rights, 272 Ill. App. 3d 751, 651 N.E.2d 649 (1995), a physician filed a complaint with

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the Department of Human Rights (DHR), alleging he had been discriminated against by the

credentials committee that restricted his hospital staff privileges. The hospital sought an

injunction in the circuit court to halt DHR’s investigation on the bases (1) the hospital had

absolute immunity for decisions made by credential committees and (2) DHR had no authority

to investigate the charge because the complainant was not an employee within the meaning of

the Human Rights Act. Id. at 753, 651 N.E.2d at 652.

¶ 30 DHR filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619

(West 1992)), arguing the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the complaint. Rockford

Memorial Hospital, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 753, 651 N.E.2d at 652. The circuit court denied the

motion and asserted jurisdiction over the action. Id. Following a hearing, the court granted the

hospital’s motion for summary judgment and enjoined DHR from investigating the physician’s

claim of discrimination. Id. at 754, 651 N.E.2d at 652. The court found as a matter of law, the

physician’s complaint with DHR could not be maintained against the hospital because of the

absolute immunity conferred by statute on credentials committees. Id.

¶ 31 On appeal, DHR contended the trial court’s injunction should be reversed because the

hospital’s claim against DHR was barred by sovereign immunity and the trial court erred in

finding credential committee decisions were absolutely immune from legal challenge. Id.

Looking at the hospital’s complaint, the appellate court found it did not seek to enforce a

present claim against the State. Id. at 757, 651 N.E.2d at 654. Rather, it sought a declaration

DHR was without statutory authority to investigate the claim of discrimination and an

injunction to prevent DHR’s Director from acting in excess of his authority. Id. at 757, 651

N.E.2d at 654-55.

¶ 32 Relying on Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 74 Ill. 2d 541, 387 N.E.2d 258

(1978), the appellate court in Rockford Memorial Hospital held the hospital’s action was not

barred by sovereign immunity because it only sought to prevent a state official from acting

outside her statutory authority. Rockford Memorial Hospital, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 757, 651

N.E.2d at 655. Although the appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment to the

hospital on the absolute immunity grounds (id. at 763-64, 651 N.E.2d at 659), it found the trial

court had jurisdiction to hear the case, i.e., it was not barred by statutory immunity.

¶ 33 Likewise, in Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor, 68 Ill. 2d 540, 370 N.E.2d 223

(1977), the circuit court found the Director of the Department of Public Aid had no express or

implied statutory authority to suspend or terminate a vendor’s participation in the Illinois

medical assistance program (Medicaid) and issued an injunction preventing him from doing

so. Id. at 544, 370 N.E.2d at 225. On appeal, our supreme court found the sole issue to be

whether the Director had the delegated authority to suspend or terminate Medicaid vendors.

Id. at 549, 370 N.E.2d at 227. Finding no express statutory authority allowing the Director to

suspend or terminate a vendor and further finding the legislature had not provided any

standards or criteria to suggest the grounds that would warrant termination or suspension, the

supreme court affirmed the issuance of an injunction. Id. at 553-54, 370 N.E.2d at 229. The

supreme court also found the statute required the Director to refer fraud findings to proper

prosecutorial authorities for further action. Id. at 553, 370 N.E.2d at 229. “We find that the

total absence of standards, criteria or procedures for terminating or suspending vendors,

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coupled with the express delegation of enforcement responsibilities, is persuasive evidence

that the legislature did not intend to confer on the defendant the authority now claimed.” Id. at

553-54, 370 N.E.2d at 229.

¶ 34 Thus, in cases where jurisdiction to enter an injunction against the State has been found to

exist, the State’s agent had been acting without authority. In the case sub judice, it is clear the

defendants are authorized to conduct such an investigation.

¶ 35 We also hold section 1 of the University of Illinois Act (110 ILCS 305/1 (West 2012)) does

not provide the trial court with jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim. Section 1 of the University of

Illinois Act states: