Plumhoff v. Rickard

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2013 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

PLUMHOFF ET AL. v. RICKARD, A MINOR CHILD,

INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS SURVIVING DAUGHTER

OF RICKARD, DECEASED, BY AND

THROUGH HER MOTHER RICKARD,

AS PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 12–1117. Argued March 4, 2014—Decided May 27, 2014

Donald Rickard led police officers on a high-speed car chase that came

to a temporary halt when Rickard spun out into a parking lot. Rick-

ard resumed maneuvering his car, and as he continued to use the ac-

celerator even though his bumper was flush against a patrol car, an

officer fired three shots into Rickard’s car. Rickard managed to drive

away, almost hitting an officer in the process. Officers fired 12 more

shots as Rickard sped away, striking him and his passenger, both of

whom died from some combination of gunshot wounds and injuries

suffered when the car eventually crashed.

Respondent, Rickard’s minor daughter, filed a 42 U. S. C. §1983

action, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court denied

the officers’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified im-

munity, holding that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment

and was contrary to clearly established law at the time in question.

After finding that it had appellate jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit held

that the officers’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. It af-

firmed the District Court’s order, suggesting that it agreed that the

officers violated clearly established law.

Held:

1. The Sixth Circuit properly exercised jurisdiction under 28

U. S. C. §1291, which gives courts of appeals jurisdiction to hear ap-

peals from “final decisions” of the district courts. The general rule

2 PLUMHOFF v. RICKARD

Syllabus

that an order denying a summary judgment motion is not a “final de-

cision[n],” and thus not immediately appealable, does not apply when

it is based on a qualified immunity claim. Johnson v. Jones, 515

U. S. 304, 311. Respondent argues that Johnson forecloses appellate

jurisdiction here, but the order in Johnson was not immediately ap-

pealable because it merely decided “a question of ‘evidence sufficien-

cy,’ ” id., at 313, while here, petitioners’ qualified immunity claims

raise legal issues quite different from any purely factual issues that

might be confronted at trial. Deciding such legal issues is a core re-

sponsibility of appellate courts and does not create an undue burden

for them. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372. Pp. 5–7.

2. The officers’ conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Pp. 7–15.

(a) Addressing this question first will be “beneficial” in “devel-

op[ing] constitutional precedent” in an area that courts typically con-

sider in cases in which the defendant asserts a qualified immunity

defense, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 236. Pp. 7–8.

(b) Respondent’s excessive-force argument requires analyzing the

totality of the circumstances from the perspective “of a reasonable of-

ficer on the scene.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396. Respond-

ent contends that the Fourth Amendment did not allow the officers to

use deadly force to terminate the chase, and that, even if they were

permitted to fire their weapons, they went too far when they fired as

many rounds as they did. Pp. 8–12.

(1) The officers acted reasonably in using deadly force. A “po-

lice officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase

that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the

Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk

of serious injury or death.” Scott, supra, at 385. Rickard’s outra-

geously reckless driving—which lasted more than five minutes, ex-

ceeded 100 miles per hour, and included the passing of more than two

dozen other motorists—posed a grave public safety risk, and the rec-

ord conclusively disproves that the chase was over when Rickard’s

car came to a temporary standstill and officers began shooting. Un-

der the circumstances when the shots were fired, all that a reasona-

ble officer could have concluded from Rickard’s conduct was that he

was intent on resuming his flight, which would again pose a threat to

others on the road. Pp. 9–11.

(2) Petitioners did not fire more shots than necessary to end

the public safety risk. It makes sense that, if officers are justified in

firing at a suspect in order to end a severe threat to public safety,

they need not stop shooting until the threat has ended. Here, during

the 10-second span when all the shots were fired, Rickard never

abandoned his attempt to flee and eventually managed to drive away.

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 3

Syllabus

A passenger’s presence does not bear on whether officers violated

Rickard’s Fourth Amendment rights, which “are personal rights

[that] may not be vicariously asserted.” Alderman v. United States,

394 U. S. 165, 174. Pp. 11–12.

3. Even if the officers’ conduct had violated the Fourth Amend-

ment, petitioners would still be entitled to summary judgment based

on qualified immunity. An official sued under §1983 is entitled to

qualified immunity unless it is shown that the official violated a

statutory or constitutional right that was “ ‘clearly established’ ” at

the time of the challenged conduct. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. ___,

___. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 201, where an officer shot at

a fleeing vehicle to prevent possible harm, makes plain that no clear-

ly established law precluded the officer’s conduct there. Thus, to pre-

vail, respondent must meaningfully distinguish Brosseau or point to

any “controlling authority” or “robust ‘consensus of cases of persua-

sive authority,’ ” al-Kidd, supra, at ___, that emerged between the

events there and those here that would alter the qualified-immunity

analysis. Respondent has made neither showing. If anything, the

facts here are more favorable to the officers than the facts in

Brosseau; and respondent points to no cases that could be said to

have clearly established the unconstitutionality of using lethal force

to end a high-speed car chase. Pp. 12–15.

509 Fed. Appx. 388, reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,

and SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined, in

which GINSBURG, J., joined as to the judgment and Parts I, II, and III–

C, and in which BREYER, J., joined except as to Part III–B–2.

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 12–1117

_________________

OFFICER VANCE PLUMHOFF, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

WHITNE RICKARD, A MINOR CHILD, INDIVIDUALLY, AND

AS SURVIVING DAUGHTER OF DONALD RICKARD,

DECEASED, BY AND THROUGH HER MOTHER

SAMANTHA RICKARD, AS PARENT AND

NEXT FRIEND

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[May 27, 2014]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.*

The courts below denied qualified immunity for police

officers who shot the driver of a fleeing vehicle to put an

end to a dangerous car chase. We reverse and hold that

the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In the

alternative, we conclude that the officers were entitled to

qualified immunity because they violated no clearly estab­

lished law.

I

A

Because this case arises from the denial of the officers’

motion for summary judgment, we view the facts in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the daughter

——————

* JUSTICE GINSBURG joins the judgment and Parts I, II, and III–C of

this opinion. JUSTICE BREYER joins this opinion except as to Part III–

B–2.

2 PLUMHOFF v. RICKARD

Opinion of the Court

of the driver who attempted to flee. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551

U. S. 537, 543, n. 2 (2007). Near midnight on July 18,

2004, Lieutenant Joseph Forthman of the West Memphis,

Arkansas, Police Department pulled over a white Honda

Accord because the car had only one operating headlight.

Donald Rickard was the driver of the Accord, and Kelly

Allen was in the passenger seat. Forthman noticed an

indentation, “ ‘roughly the size of a head or a basketball’ ”

in the windshield of the car. Estate of Allen v. West Mem-

phis, 2011 WL 197426, *1 (WD Tenn., Jan. 20, 2011). He

asked Rickard if he had been drinking, and Rickard re­

sponded that he had not. Because Rickard failed to pro­

duce his driver’s license upon request and appeared nerv­

ous, Forthman asked him to step out of the car. Rather

than comply with Forthman’s request, Rickard sped away.

Forthman gave chase and was soon joined by five other

police cruisers driven by Sergeant Vance Plumhoff and

Officers Jimmy Evans, Lance Ellis, Troy Galtelli, and

John Gardner. The officers pursued Rickard east on In­

terstate 40 toward Memphis, Tennessee. While on I–40,

they attempted to stop Rickard using a “rolling roadblock,”

id., at *2, but they were unsuccessful. The District Court

described the vehicles as “swerving through traffic at high

speeds,” id., at *8, and respondent does not dispute that

the cars attained speeds over 100 miles per hour.1 See

Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment in No. 2:05–cv–2585 (WD Tenn.),

p. 16; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 54:23–55:6. During the

——————

1 It

is also undisputed that Forthman saw glass shavings on the

dashboard of Rickard’s car, a sign that the windshield had been broken

recently; that another officer testified that the windshield indentation

and glass shavings would have justified a suspicion “ ‘that someone had

possibly been struck by that vehicle, like a pedestrian’ ”; and that

Forthman saw beer in Rickard’s car. See App. 424–426 (Response to

Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in No. 2:05–cv–

2585 (WD Tenn.), ¶¶15–19).

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 3

Opinion of the Court

chase, Rickard and the officers passed more than two

dozen vehicles.

Rickard eventually exited I–40 in Memphis, and shortly

afterward he made “a quick right turn,” causing “contact

[to] occu[r]” between his car and Evans’ cruiser. 2011 WL

197426, *3. As a result of that contact, Rickard’s car spun

out into a parking lot and collided with Plumhoff ’s cruiser.

Now in danger of being cornered, Rickard put his car into

reverse “in an attempt to escape.” Ibid. As he did so,

Evans and Plumhoff got out of their cruisers and ap­

proached Rickard’s car, and Evans, gun in hand, pounded

on the passenger-side window. At that point, Rickard’s

car “made contact with” yet another police cruiser. Ibid.

Rickard’s tires started spinning, and his car “was rocking

back and forth,” ibid., indicating that Rickard was using

the accelerator even though his bumper was flush against

a police cruiser. At that point, Plumhoff fired three shots

into Rickard’s car. Rickard then “reversed in a 180 degree

arc” and “maneuvered onto” another street, forcing Ellis to

“step to his right to avoid the vehicle.” Ibid. As Rickard

continued “fleeing down” that street, ibid., Gardner and

Galtelli fired 12 shots toward Rickard’s car, bringing the

total number of shots fired during this incident to 15.

Rickard then lost control of the car and crashed into a

building. Ibid. Rickard and Allen both died from some

combination of gunshot wounds and injuries suffered in

the crash that ended the chase. See App. 60, 76.

B

Respondent, Rickard’s surviving daughter, filed this

action under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, against

the six individual police officers and the mayor and chief

of police of West Memphis. She alleged that the officers

used excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Four­

teenth Amendments.

The officers moved for summary judgment based on

4 PLUMHOFF v. RICKARD

Opinion of the Court

qualified immunity, but the District Court denied that

motion, holding that the officers’ conduct violated the

Fourth Amendment and was contrary to law that was

clearly established at the time in question. The officers

appealed, but a Sixth Circuit motions panel initially dis­

missed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on this

Court’s decision in Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S. 304, 309

(1995). Later, however, that panel granted rehearing,

vacated its dismissal order, and left the jurisdictional

issue to be decided by a merits panel.

The merits panel then affirmed the District Court’s

decision on the merits. Estate of Allen v. West Memphis,

509 Fed. Appx. 388 (CA6 2012). On the issue of appellate

jurisdiction, the merits panel began by stating that a

“motion for qualified immunity denied on the basis of a

district court’s determination that there exists a triable

issue of fact generally cannot be appealed on an interlocu­

tory basis.” Id., at 391. But the panel then noted that the

Sixth Circuit had previously interpreted our decision in

Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372 (2007), as creating an “ex­

ception to this rule” under which an immediate appeal

may be taken to challenge “ ‘blatantly and demonstrably

false’ ” factual determinations. 509 Fed. Appx., at 391

(quoting Moldowan v. Warren, 578 F. 3d 351, 370 (CA6

2009)). Concluding that none of the District Court’s fac-

tual determinations ran afoul of that high standard, and

distinguishing the facts of this case from those in Scott,

the panel held that the officers’ conduct violated the

Fourth Amendment. 509 Fed. Appx., at 392, and n. 3.

The panel said nothing about whether the officers violated

clearly established law, but since the panel affirmed the

order denying the officers’ summary judgment motion,2

——————

2 After expressing some confusion about whether it should dismiss or

affirm, the panel wrote that “it would seem that what we are doing is

affirming [the District Court’s] judgment.” 509 Fed. Appx., at 393.

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 5

Opinion of the Court

the panel must have decided that issue in respondent’s

favor.

We granted certiorari. 571 U. S. ____ (2013).

II

We start with the question whether the Court of Ap­

peals properly exercised jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C.

§1291, which gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction to

hear appeals from “final decisions” of the district courts.

An order denying a motion for summary judgment is

generally not a final decision within the meaning of §1291

and is thus generally not immediately appealable. John-

son, 515 U. S., at 309. But that general rule does not

apply when the summary judgment motion is based on a

claim of qualified immunity. Id., at 311; Mitchell v. For-

syth, 472 U. S. 511, 528 (1985). “[Q]ualified immunity is

‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to

liability.’ ” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 231 (2009)

(quoting Mitchell, supra, at 526). As a result, pretrial

orders denying qualified immunity generally fall within

the collateral order doctrine. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U. S. 662, 671–672 (2009). This is so because such orders

conclusively determine whether the defendant is entitled

to immunity from suit; this immunity issue is both im­

portant and completely separate from the merits of the

action, and this question could not be effectively reviewed

on appeal from a final judgment because by that time the

immunity from standing trial will have been irretrievably

lost. See ibid; Johnson, supra, at 311–312 (citing Mitchell,

supra, at 525–527).

Respondent argues that our decision in Johnson, fore­

closes appellate jurisdiction under the circumstances here,

but the order from which the appeal was taken in Johnson

was quite different from the order in the present case. In

Johnson, the plaintiff brought suit against certain police

officers who, he alleged, had beaten him. 515 U. S., at

6 PLUMHOFF v. RICKARD

Opinion of the Court

307. These officers moved for summary judgment, assert­

ing that they were not present at the time of the alleged

beating and had nothing to do with it. Id., at 307–308.

The District Court determined, however, that the evidence

in the summary judgment record was sufficient to support

a contrary finding, and the court therefore denied the

officers’ motion for summary judgment. Id., at 308. The

officers then appealed, arguing that the District Court had

not correctly analyzed the relevant evidence. Ibid.

This Court held that the Johnson order was not imme­

diately appealable because it merely decided “a question of

‘evidence sufficiency,’ i.e., which facts a party may, or may

not, be able to prove at trial.” Id., at 313. The Court noted

that an order denying summary judgment based on a

determination of “evidence sufficiency” does not present a

legal question in the sense in which the term was used in

Mitchell, the decision that first held that a pretrial order

rejecting a claim of qualified immunity is immediately

appealable. Johnson, 515 U. S., at 314. In addition, the

Court observed that a determination of evidence sufficiency

is closely related to other determinations that the trial

court may be required to make at later stages of the case.

Id., at 317. The Court also noted that appellate courts

have “no comparative expertise” over trial courts in mak­

ing such determinations and that forcing appellate courts

to entertain appeals from such orders would impose an

undue burden. Id., at 309–310, 316.

The District Court order in this case is nothing like the

order in Johnson. Petitioners do not claim that other

officers were responsible for shooting Rickard; rather, they

contend that their conduct did not violate the Fourth

Amendment and, in any event, did not violate clearly

established law. Thus, they raise legal issues; these issues

are quite different from any purely factual issues that the

trial court might confront if the case were tried; deciding

legal issues of this sort is a core responsibility of appellate

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 7

Opinion of the Court

courts, and requiring appellate courts to decide such is­

sues is not an undue burden.

The District Court order here is not materially distin­

guishable from the District Court order in Scott v. Harris,

and in that case we expressed no doubts about the juris­

diction of the Court of Appeals under §1291. Accordingly,

here, as in Scott, we hold that the Court of Appeals prop-

erly exercised jurisdiction, and we therefore turn to the

merits.

III

A

Petitioners contend that the decision of the Court of

Appeals is wrong for two separate reasons. They maintain

that they did not violate Rickard’s Fourth Amendment

rights and that, in any event, their conduct did not violate

any Fourth Amendment rule that was clearly established

at the time of the events in question. When confronted

with such arguments, we held in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S.

194, 200 (2001), that “the first inquiry must be whether a

constitutional right would have been violated on the facts

alleged.” Only after deciding that question, we concluded,

may an appellate court turn to the question whether the

right at issue was clearly established at the relevant time.

Ibid.

We subsequently altered this rigid framework in Pear-

son, declaring that “Saucier’s procedure should not be

regarded as an inflexible requirement.” 555 U. S., at 227.

At the same time, however, we noted that the Saucier

procedure “is often beneficial” because it “promotes the

development of constitutional precedent and is especially

valuable with respect to questions that do not frequently

arise in cases in which a qualified immunity defense is

unavailable.” 555 U. S., at 236. Pearson concluded that

courts “have the discretion to decide whether that [Sau-

cier] procedure is worthwhile in particular cases.” Id., at

8 PLUMHOFF v. RICKARD

Opinion of the Court

242.

Heeding our guidance in Pearson, we begin in this case

with the question whether the officers’ conduct violated

the Fourth Amendment. This approach, we believe, will

be “beneficial” in “develop[ing] constitutional precedent” in

an area that courts typically consider in cases in which the

defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense. See

Pearson, supra, at 236.

B

A claim that law-enforcement officers used excessive

force to effect a seizure is governed by the Fourth

Amendment’s “reasonableness” standard. See Graham v.

Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471

U. S. 1 (1985). In Graham, we held that determining the

objective reasonableness of a particular seizure under the

Fourth Amendment “requires a careful balancing of the

nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s

Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing

governmental interests at stake.” 490 U. S., at 396 (inter­

nal quotation marks omitted). The inquiry requires ana­

lyzing the totality of the circumstances. See ibid.

We analyze this question from the perspective “of a

reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20

vision of hindsight.” Ibid. We thus “allo[w] for the fact

that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,

and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is

necessary in a particular situation.” Id., at 396–397.

In this case, respondent advances two main Fourth

Amendment arguments. First, she contends that the

Fourth Amendment did not allow petitioners to use deadly

force to terminate the chase. See Brief for Respondent 24–

35. Second, she argues that the “degree of force was ex­

cessive,” that is, that even if the officers were permitted to

fire their weapons, they went too far when they fired as

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 9

Opinion of the Court

many rounds as they did. See id., at 36–38. We address

each issue in turn.

1

In Scott, we considered a claim that a police officer

violated the Fourth Amendment when he terminated a

high-speed car chase by using a technique that placed a

“fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” 550

U. S., at 386. The record in that case contained a vide­

otape of the chase, and we found that the events recorded

on the tape justified the officer’s conduct. We wrote as

follows: “Although there is no obvious way to quantify the

risks on either side, it is clear from the videotape that

respondent posed an actual and imminent threat to the

lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to

other civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the

chase.” Id., at 383–384. We also wrote:

“[R]espondent’s vehicle rac[ed] down narrow, two-lane

roads in the dead of night at speeds that are shock-

ingly fast. We see it swerve around more than a dozen

other cars, cross the double-yellow line, and force cars

traveling in both directions to their respective shoul­

ders to avoid being hit. We see it run multiple red

lights and travel for considerable periods of time in

the occasional center left-turn-only lane, chased by

numerous police cars forced to engage in the same

hazardous maneuvers just to keep up.” Id., at 379–

380 (footnote omitted).

In light of those facts, “we [thought] it [was] quite clear

that [the police officer] did not violate the Fourth Amend­

ment.” Id., at 381. We held that a “police officer’s attempt

to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that

threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate

the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing

10 PLUMHOFF v. RICKARD

Opinion of the Court

motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”3 Id., at 386.

We see no basis for reaching a different conclusion here.

As we have explained supra, at ___, the chase in this case

exceeded 100 miles per hour and lasted over five minutes.

During that chase, Rickard passed more than two dozen

other vehicles, several of which were forced to alter course.

Rickard’s outrageously reckless driving posed a grave

public safety risk. And while it is true that Rickard’s car

eventually collided with a police car and came temporarily

to a near standstill, that did not end the chase. Less than

three seconds later, Rickard resumed maneuvering his

car. Just before the shots were fired, when the front

bumper of his car was flush with that of one of the police

cruisers, Rickard was obviously pushing down on the

accelerator because the car’s wheels were spinning, and

then Rickard threw the car into reverse “in an attempt to

escape.” Thus, the record conclusively disproves respond­

ent’s claim that the chase in the present case was already

over when petitioners began shooting. Under the circum­

stances at the moment when the shots were fired, all that

a reasonable police officer could have concluded was that

Rickard was intent on resuming his flight and that, if he

was allowed to do so, he would once again pose a deadly

threat for others on the road. Rickard’s conduct even after

the shots were fired—as noted, he managed to drive away

despite the efforts of the police to block his path—

——————

3 In holding that petitioners’ conduct violated the Fourth Amend­

ment, the District Court relied on reasoning that is irreconcilable with

our decision in Scott. The District Court held that the danger presented

by a high-speed chase cannot justify the use of deadly force because

that danger was caused by the officers’ decision to continue the chase.

Estate of Allen v. West Memphis, 2011 WL 197426, *8 (WD Tenn., Jan.

20, 2011). In Scott, however, we declined to “lay down a rule requiring

the police to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they drive so

recklessly that they put other people’s lives in danger,” concluding that

the Constitution “assuredly does not impose this invitation to impunity­

earned-by-recklessness.” 550 U. S., at 385–386.

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 11

Opinion of the Court

underscores the point.

In light of the circumstances we have discussed, it is

beyond serious dispute that Rickard’s flight posed a grave

public safety risk, and here, as in Scott, the police acted

reasonably in using deadly force to end that risk.

2

We now consider respondent’s contention that, even if

the use of deadly force was permissible, petitioners acted

unreasonably in firing a total of 15 shots. We reject that

argument. It stands to reason that, if police officers are

justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a severe

threat to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting

until the threat has ended. As petitioners noted below, “if

lethal force is justified, officers are taught to keep shooting

until the threat is over.” 509 Fed. Appx., at 392.

Here, during the 10-second span when all the shots were

fired, Rickard never abandoned his attempt to flee. In­

deed, even after all the shots had been fired, he managed

to drive away and to continue driving until he crashed.

This would be a different case if petitioners had initiated a

second round of shots after an initial round had clearly

incapacitated Rickard and had ended any threat of con­

tinued flight, or if Rickard had clearly given himself up.

But that is not what happened.

In arguing that too many shots were fired, respondent

relies in part on the presence of Kelly Allen in the front

seat of the car, but we do not think that this factor

changes the calculus. Our cases make it clear that “Fourth

Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not

be vicariously asserted.” Alderman v. United States, 394

U. S. 165, 174 (1969); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S.

128, 138–143 (1978). Thus, the question before us is

whether petitioners violated Rickard’s Fourth Amendment

rights, not Allen’s. If a suit were brought on behalf of

Allen under either §1983 or state tort law, the risk to

12 PLUMHOFF v. RICKARD

Opinion of the Court

Allen would be of central concern.4 But Allen’s presence in

the car cannot enhance Rickard’s Fourth Amendment

rights. After all, it was Rickard who put Allen in danger

by fleeing and refusing to end the chase, and it would be

perverse if his disregard for Allen’s safety worked to his

benefit.

C

We have held that petitioners’ conduct did not violate

the Fourth Amendment, but even if that were not the case,

petitioners would still be entitled to summary judgment

based on qualified immunity.

An official sued under §1983 is entitled to qualified

immunity unless it is shown that the official violated a

statutory or constitutional right that was “ ‘clearly estab­

lished’ ” at the time of the challenged conduct. Ashcroft v.

al-Kidd, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 3). And a

defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly estab­

lished right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently

definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s

shoes would have understood that he was violating it. Id.,

at ___ (slip op., at 9). In other words, “existing precedent

must have placed the statutory or constitutional question”

confronted by the official “beyond debate.” Ibid. In addi­

tion, “[w]e have repeatedly told courts . . . not to define

clearly established law at a high level of generality,” id., at

——————

4 There seems to be some disagreement among lower courts as to

whether a passenger in Allen’s situation can recover under a Fourth

Amendment theory. Compare Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F. 3d 1323 (CA11

2003) (suggesting yes), and Fisher v. Memphis, 234 F. 3d 312 (CA6

2000) (same), with Milstead v. Kibler, 243 F. 3d 157 (CA4 2001) (sug­

gesting no), and Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F. 2d 791 (CA1

1990) (same). We express no view on this question. We also note that

in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 836 (1998), the Court

held that a passenger killed as a result of a police chase could recover

under a substantive due process theory only if the officer had “a pur­

pose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest.”

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 13

Opinion of the Court

___ (slip op., at 10), since doing so avoids the crucial ques­

tion whether the official acted reasonably in the particular

circumstances that he or she faced. We think our deci­

sion in Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194 (2004) (per

curiam) squarely demonstrates that no clearly established

law precluded petitioners’ conduct at the time in question.

In Brosseau, we held that a police officer did not violate

clearly established law when she fired at a fleeing vehicle

to prevent possible harm to “other officers on foot who

[she] believed were in the immediate area, . . . occupied

vehicles in [the driver’s] path[,] and . . . any other citizens

who might be in the area.” Id., at 197 (quoting 339 F. 3d

857, 865 (CA9 2003); internal quotation marks omitted).

After surveying lower court decisions regarding the rea­

sonableness of lethal force as a response to vehicular

flight, we observed that this is an area “in which the result

depends very much on the facts of each case” and that the

cases “by no means ‘clearly establish[ed]’ that [the of­

ficer’s] conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.” 543

U. S., at 201. In reaching that conclusion, we held that

Garner and Graham, which are “cast at a high level of

generality,” did not clearly establish that the officer’s

decision was unreasonable. 543 U. S., at 199.

Brosseau makes plain that as of February 21, 1999—the

date of the events at issue in that case—it was not clearly

established that it was unconstitutional to shoot a fleeing

driver to protect those whom his flight might endanger.

We did not consider later decided cases because they

“could not have given fair notice to [the officer].” Id., at

200, n. 4. To defeat immunity here, then, respondent

must show at a minimum either (1) that the officers’ con­

duct in this case was materially different from the conduct

in Brosseau or (2) that between February 21, 1999, and

July 18, 2004, there emerged either “ ‘controlling authority’ ”

or a “robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority,’ ”

al-Kidd, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 10) (quoting Wilson

14 PLUMHOFF v. RICKARD

Opinion of the Court

v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603, 617 (1999); some internal quota­

tion marks omitted), that would alter our analysis of the

qualified immunity question. Respondent has made nei­

ther showing.

To begin, certain facts here are more favorable to the

officers. In Brosseau, an officer on foot fired at a driver

who had just begun to flee and who had not yet driven his

car in a dangerous manner. In contrast, the officers here

shot at Rickard to put an end to what had already been a

lengthy, high-speed pursuit that indisputably posed a

danger both to the officers involved and to any civilians

who happened to be nearby. Indeed, the lone dissenting

Justice in Brosseau emphasized that in that case, “there

was no ongoing or prior high-speed car chase to inform the

[constitutional] analysis.” 543 U. S., at 206, n. 4 (opinion

of Stevens, J.). Attempting to distinguish Brosseau, re­

spondent focuses on the fact that the officer there fired

only 1 shot, whereas here three officers collectively fired

15 shots. But it was certainly not clearly established at

the time of the shooting in this case that the number of

shots fired, under the circumstances present here, ren­

dered the use of force excessive.

Since respondent cannot meaningfully distinguish

Brosseau, her only option is to show that its analysis was

out of date by 2004. Yet respondent has not pointed us to

any case—let alone a controlling case or a robust consen­

sus of cases—decided between 1999 and 2004 that could

be said to have clearly established the unconstitutionality

of using lethal force to end a high-speed car chase. And

respondent receives no help on this front from the opinions

below. The District Court cited only a single case decided

between 1999 and 2004 that identified a possible constitu­

tional violation by an officer who shot a fleeing driver, and

the facts of that case—where a reasonable jury could have

concluded that the suspect merely “accelerated to eighty to

eighty-five miles per hour in a seventy-miles-per-hour

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 15

Opinion of the Court

zone” and did not “engag[e] in any evasive maneuvers,”

Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F. 3d 1323, 1330–1331 (CA11

2003)—bear little resemblance to those here.

* * *

Under the circumstances present in this case, we hold

that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit petitioners

from using the deadly force that they employed to termi­

nate the dangerous car chase that Rickard precipitated.

In the alternative, we note that petitioners are entitled to

qualified immunity for the conduct at issue because they

violated no clearly established law.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and

the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

It is so ordered.