Andrew Carman v. Jeremy Carroll

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 13-2371

_____________

ANDREW CARMAN and KAREN CARMAN,

Appellants

v.

JEREMY CARROLL

_____________

On Appeal From the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Pennsylvania

(No. 3:10-cv-01013)

District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley

_____________

Argued: December 17, 2013

Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES, Circuit Judge, and

SCHILLER, District Judge.1

1

Honorable Berle M. Schiller, United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by

designation.

1

(Opinion Filed: May 15, 2014)

Barry H. Dyller, Esq. [ARGUED]

Kelly A. Bray, Esq.

88 North Franklin Street

Wilkes-Barre, PA 18701

Attorneys for Appellants Andrew Carman and Karen Carman

Kathleen G. Kane

Sean A. Kirkpatrick [ARGUED]

John G. Knorr, III

Office of Attorney General

Appellate Litigation Section

15th Floor, Strawberry Square

Harrisburg, PA 17120

Attorneys for Appellee Jeremy Carroll

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OPINION OF THE COURT

_____________

FUENTES, Circuit Judge:

Responding to a police dispatch, Pennsylvania State

Trooper Jeremy Carroll and another trooper proceeded to the

home of Andrew and Karen Carman to search for a man who

had stolen two loaded handguns and a car with New Jersey

plates. Upon arriving at the Carmans’ residence, the troopers

bypassed the front door and went directly to the back of the

house and onto a deck adjoining the kitchen. On the deck, a

2

scuffle ensued between Carroll and Andrew Carman. This

§ 1983 action arises from Carroll’s warrantless entry onto the

Carmans’ property. Carroll contends that he did not violate

the Carmans’ Fourth Amendment rights because he entered

into their curtilage, the area immediately surrounding their

home, while executing a legitimate “knock and talk”

encounter. Because Carroll proceeded directly through the

back of the Carmans’ property and did not begin his visit at

the front door, the “knock and talk” exception to the warrant

requirement does not apply. Therefore, we reverse the District

Court’s denial of the Carmans’ motion for judgment as a

matter of law on their unlawful entry claim. We affirm the

jury verdict regarding the Carmans’ unlawful seizure claim

because there was sufficient support for the jury’s finding that

Carroll acted reasonably.2 Accordingly, we affirm in part and

reverse in part the judgment of the District Court.

2

In reviewing a jury verdict, “[w]e are not free to weigh the

evidence or to pass on the credibility of witnesses,” but rather

“[o]ur function is to determine only whether there is evidence

upon which the jury could properly return a verdict, viewing

the evidence most favorably to . . . the non-movant, and

giving [the non-movant] the benefit of all reasonable

inferences.” Kinnel v. Mid-Atlantic Mausoleums, Inc., 850

F.2d 958, 961-62 (3d Cir. 1988). Therefore, we construe the

facts in the light most favorable to Carroll, the non-movant.

3

I.

A.

In July 2009, Pennsylvania State Police Troopers

Jeremy Carroll and Brian Roberts were dispatched to the

Carmans’ residence to search for a man named Michael Zita

and a car bearing New Jersey license plates. The troopers

were told that Zita had stolen the car, was armed with two

loaded handguns, and might have fled to the Carmans’

residence. Neither Roberts nor Carroll had been to the

Carmans’ property before, and neither knew what Zita looked

like. The troopers did not have a warrant to search the

Carmans’ property nor did they have a warrant to arrest Zita.

The Carmans’ house sits on a corner lot. The main

street runs along the front of the house and a side street runs

along the left of the house, as viewed from the front. A

clearly marked path leads to the front door. See Pl.’s Exs. 22,

26.3 There is no other marked path to the Carmans’ house. A

stone parking area is located on the left side of the house, see

Pl.’s Ex. 25, and a shed and carport, which the parties refer to

as a “garage,” are located in the Carmans’ backyard.

The Carmans also have a back deck that adjoins their

kitchen area. See Pl.’s Ex. 18, 21. Two sets of stairs lead up to

the deck, and a sliding glass door by the deck leads to the

kitchen. See id. However, the Carmans testified that visitors

use the front entrance when they come to visit.

3

For ease of reference, various photographs introduced at

trial are appended to this Opinion.

4

When the troopers arrived at the Carmans’ home,

Andrew and Karen Carman were sitting in their kitchen with

Karen Carman’s sister; they were the only people present at

the home. Because there was no parking in front of the

Carmans’ house, the troopers drove down the side street,

passed numerous cars parked along the side of the Carmans’

house, and parked their cars at the first available spot, at “the

far rear of the property.” App. 79. The troopers then got out

of their cars, entered the Carmans’ backyard, and headed

toward the garage. Carroll purportedly took this route because

he saw a light on in the garage and thought someone might be

there. He “poked [his] head in” the garage “and said,

Pennsylvania State Police,” but “there was nobody in there.”

App. 80.

Carroll thought the sliding door attached to the back

deck of the house “looked like a customary entryway.” App.

92. Thus, after searching the garage and finding no one there,

he and Roberts continued walking through the backyard and

proceeded to the back deck. As the troopers stepped onto the

deck, Andrew Carman came out of the house. Carman was

belligerent and aggressively approached the troopers, asking,

“Who the fuck are you?” App. 63, 80-81. Given Carman’s

behavior, Carroll thought the man he was speaking with

might be Zita. Carroll informed him that they were looking

for Zita and asked Carman to identify himself. Carman

refused to divulge his identity, made a quick turn away from

the troopers, and appeared to reach for his waist, bringing his

hands outside the troopers’ view. Still unsure of Carman’s

identity, Carroll feared that Carman might be reaching for a

weapon. He, therefore, momentarily grabbed Carman’s right

arm. Upon seeing that Carman was unarmed, he let go.

Carman twisted and fell off the deck.

5

Karen Carman subsequently exited her house and

came onto the deck with her sister. The two women were

screaming when they approached Roberts. Consequently,

Roberts ordered them to stand back and drew his Taser.

Karen Carman asked the troopers what was going on, and

Carroll explained that they were looking for Zita and asked

her if they could search the house for him. She gave her

consent and everyone went into the house.

The troopers searched the Carmans’ house and did not

find Zita. The stolen vehicle was not at the Carmans’

residence, and the Carmans were not charged with any

crimes.

B.

Andrew and Karen Carman brought this case pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Carroll violated their

Fourth Amendment rights. In particular, the Carmans’ two-

count complaint alleged that Carroll’s warrantless entry into

their backyard, garage, back deck, and home constituted an

unlawful search and that Carroll unreasonably seized Andrew

Carman. Before trial, the Carmans advised the District Court

of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Florida v. Jardines,

133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), and asserted that they should be

entitled to a directed verdict at trial based on that case. They

also submitted a proposed jury instruction regarding the

“knock and talk” exception to the warrant requirement; their

instruction cited heavily to Jardines.

The District Court conducted a two-day jury trial.

After opening arguments, the Carmans moved for a directed

6

verdict, effectively a judgment as a matter of law, on their

unlawful entry claim.4 At the close of Carroll’s testimony, the

Carmans renewed their request for judgment as a matter of

law on the unlawful entry claim and also moved for judgment

as a matter of law on their unreasonable seizure claim. Carroll

moved for judgment as a matter of law on the Carmans’

unlawful entry claim on the ground that he was entitled to

qualified immunity. The District Court denied all of the

motions without explanation.

The District Court also rejected the Carmans’ proposed

jury instruction regarding the “knock and talk” exception.

Over the Carmans’ objections, the District Court charged the

jury with a different instruction; the District Court’s

instruction cited language from our decision in Estate of

Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2003), but did not

cite Jardines.

4

As a result of the 1991 Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 50(a), the term “directed verdict” has been

abandoned and replaced with the term “judgment as a matter

of law.” Therefore, we construe the parties’ motions for a

directed verdict as motions for judgment as a matter of law

under Rule 50(a). See Wittekamp v. Gulf & W., Inc., 991 F.2d

1137, 1141 n.6 (3d Cir. 1993) (“The parties’ briefs have

referred to the motion as seeking a directed verdict, but the

motion more appropriately is termed a motion for judgment

as a matter of law because the 1991 revision to Rule 50(a)

abandoned the term ‘directed verdict.’”).

7

Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict finding in

Carroll’s favor on both claims. Judgment was entered on

April 10, 2013. This appeal followed.5

II.

On appeal, the Carmans argue that the District Court

erred in denying their motions for judgment as a matter of law

on their Fourth Amendment unlawful entry and unreasonable

seizure claims. The Carmans also argue that the District Court

provided an erroneous jury instruction regarding the “knock

and talk” exception to the warrant requirement.

A.

The Fourth Amendment provides that the “right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not

be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable

cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the Fourth

Amendment, a search occurs when the government: (1)

5

We have jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We exercise plenary review over a district court’s denial of

judgment as a matter of law. Moyer v. United Dominion

Indus., Inc., 473 F.3d 532, 545 n.8 (3d Cir. 2007). Such a

motion “should be granted only if, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no

question of material fact for the jury and any verdict other

than the one directed would be erroneous under the governing

law.” Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55, 63 (3d Cir. 2014)

(quoting Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir.

1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

8

physically intrudes on constitutionally protected areas, see

Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414, or (2) invades “a subjective

expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable,”

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (citing Katz v.

United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). Accord Jardines,

133 S. Ct. at 1417 (“The Katz reasonable-expectations test

‘has been added to, not substituted for,’ the traditional

property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment . . .

.” (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952

(2012))).

“It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that

searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are

presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.

573, 586 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). This rule

is “subject only to a few specifically established and well-

delineated exceptions.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.

218, 219 (1973) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357). We “regard

the area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with the

home’—what our cases call the curtilage—as ‘part of the

home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’” Jardines, 133

S. Ct. at 1414 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,

180 (1984)); see also Marasco, 318 F.3d at 518 (“Fourth

Amendment protections extend not only to a person’s home,

but also to the curtilage surrounding the property.”). Thus, we

presume a warrantless search of curtilage to be unreasonable.

B.

From the moment that Carroll entered the Carmans’

backyard, he was in the curtilage surrounding their house. It

is undisputed that Carroll entered into the Carmans’ curtilage

without a warrant, without consent, and without exigent

9

circumstances. Carroll argues that he nonetheless did not

violate the Fourth Amendment because he entered the

Carmans’ property while conducting a “knock and talk.” As

he correctly points out, a “knock and talk” encounter is a

permitted exception to the warrant requirement. Accordingly,

we assess whether this exception applies to this case.

Under the “knock and talk” exception, “a police officer

not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock,

precisely because that is ‘no more than any private citizen

might do.’” Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 (quoting Kentucky v.

King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011)); see also Marasco, 318

F.3d at 519 (“Officers are allowed to knock on a residence’s

door or otherwise approach the residence seeking to speak to

the inhabitants just as any private citizen may.”). Needless to

say, government officers cannot benefit from the “knock and

talk” exception simply because they knock on a door. For

purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a “knock and talk” is a

brief, consensual encounter that begins at the entrance used

by visitors, which in most circumstances is the front door.6 A

“knock and talk” encounter must satisfy three requirements.

First, a police officer, like any visitor, must “knock

promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent

invitation to linger longer) leave.” See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at

1415.

6

We recognize that there may be some instances in which the

front door is not the entrance used by visitors. Despite

Carroll’s argument to the contrary, this is not one such

instance.

10

Second, the purpose of a “knock and talk” must be to

interview the occupants of a home, not to conduct a search.

See id. at 1416 n.4 (“[I]t is not a Fourth Amendment search to

approach the home in order to speak with the occupant,

because all are invited to do that. . . . But no one is impliedly

invited to enter the protected premises of the home in order to

do nothing but conduct a search.”); Marasco, 318 F.3d at 520

(noting that the “knock and talk” exception may apply

“[w]here officers are pursuing a lawful objective,

unconnected to any search for the fruits and instrumentalities

of criminal activity” (emphasis added)). In Jardines, for

example, the officer’s entry into the curtilage violated the

Fourth Amendment because his “behavior objectively

reveal[ed] a purpose to conduct a search, which is not what

anyone would think he had license to do.” 133 S. Ct. at 1417.

Third, a “knock and talk” encounter must begin at the

front door because that is where police officers, like any other

visitors, have an implied invitation to go. It is well settled that

“the knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation or

license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by

solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds.” Id. at 1415

(quoting Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951))

(internal quotation marks omitted). This implied invitation

“typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the

front path . . . . Complying with the terms of that traditional

invitation does not require fine-grained legal knowledge; it is

generally managed without incident by the Nation’s Girl

Scouts and trick-or-treaters.” Id. at 1415.

Although officers have a right to knock at the front

door while executing a “knock and talk,” this right does not

“necessarily extend[] to the officers the right to enter

11

[elsewhere] into the curtilage.” Marasco, 318 F.3d at 520. In

Marasco, we recognized that an officer’s entry into other

parts of the curtilage “after not receiving an answer at the

front door might be reasonable” in limited situations. Id.

(emphasis added). However, we rejected the “sweeping

proposition” that “officers may proceed to the back of a home

when they do not receive an answer at the front door any time

they have a legitimate purpose for approaching the house in

the first place.” Id. at 519-20.

In this case, Carroll cannot avail himself of the “knock

and talk” exception to the warrant requirement because he

entered the back of the Carmans’ property without

approaching the front door first. Carroll contends that the

layout of the Carmans’ property “made the back door the

most expedient and direct access to the house from where the

troopers had to park.” Carroll Br. at 18. While it may have

been more convenient for the troopers to cut through the

backyard and knock on the back door, the Fourth Amendment

is not grounded in expediency. The “knock and talk”

exception requires that police officers begin their encounter at

the front door, where they have an implied invitation to go.

This exception does not license officers to bypass the front

door and enter other parts of the curtilage based on where

they park their cars. Because Carroll did not knock on the

Carmans’ front door, but instead proceeded directly through

the back of their property, his intrusion cannot be justified as

a “knock and talk.” Accordingly, Carroll’s warrantless entry

into the Carmans’ curtilage violated the Fourth Amendment

as a matter of law.

C.

Under the qualified immunity doctrine, government

12

officials are shielded from civil liability for conduct that does

not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citing

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 475 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Therefore,

in determining whether Carroll is entitled to qualified

immunity for violating the Carmans’ Fourth Amendment

rights, we must decide whether these rights were “clearly

established at the time of [Carroll’s] alleged misconduct.

Qualified immunity is applicable unless [his] conduct violated

a clearly established constitutional right.” See id. at 232

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

“An individual’s Fourth Amendment interest in the

curtilage of his home has been well settled for over a

century.” Marasco, 318 F.3d at 521 n.13. Over a decade ago,

in Marasco, we made clear that an officer’s right to knock at

the front door while conducting a “knock and talk” does not

carry a concomitant right to enter other parts of the curtilage.

We established that “entry into the curtilage after not

receiving an answer at the front door might be” justified

under the “knock and talk” exception in limited situations. Id.

at 520 (emphasis added). Because Carroll bypassed the front

door completely, he exceeded the boundaries of the “knock

and talk” exception. Based on Marasco, which pre-dated

Carroll’s conduct, it was clearly established that the trooper’s

warrantless entry into the Carmans’ curtilage violated their

Fourth Amendment rights.

Therefore, we reverse the District Court’s denial of the

Carmans’ motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect

13

to their unlawful entry claim.7

D.

We next address Andrew Carman’s unreasonable

seizure claim. It is undisputed that Carroll seized Carman

when he grabbed Carman’s arm. Thus, the relevant question

is whether there was a “minimum quantum of evidence from

which the jury could have rationally reached [its] verdict” that

the seizure was reasonable. See Dutton v. Wolpoff &

Abramson, 5 F.3d 649, 653 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

“[S]ubject only to a few well-defined exceptions,

warrantless . . . seizures are per se unreasonable under the

Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Williams, 413 F.3d

347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Ross, 466

U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982)). However, “an officer may,

consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief,

investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable,

articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Id.

(quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000))

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Adams v.

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (“A brief stop of a

suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to

maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more

information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts

known to the officer at the time.”). This right to conduct an

7

Because we hold that Carroll’s warrantless entry violated

the Fourth Amendment, entitling the Carmans to judgment as

a matter of law, we do not address the Carmans’ challenge to

the District Court’s jury instructions.

14

“investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use

some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect

it.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

Based on the facts presented at trial, there was a

“minimum quantum of evidence” from which a jury could

rationally conclude that Carroll’s conduct was reasonable.

Carroll testified that he was unsure of Carman’s identity at

the time, did not know whether he was dealing with Zita, and

did not know why this unidentified man approached him and

Roberts with such hostility. Thus, a jury could rationally find

that Carroll had reasonable suspicion to momentarily question

Carman to ascertain his identity. Moreover, based on

Carroll’s testimony that he thought Carman might be an

armed car thief and feared that the man was reaching for a

weapon, a jury could rationally find that Carroll was justified

in momentarily grabbing Carman’s arm to effectuate a stop.

Because the facts provide a minimum amount of evidence to

support the jury’s finding that Carroll acted reasonably, we

affirm the jury verdict on the unreasonable seizure claim.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and

reverse in part the judgment of the District Court. As to the

unlawful entry claim, we reverse the District Court’s denial of

the Carmans’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. We

remand the case with the direction that judgment be entered

in the Carmans’ favor and that a new trial be ordered with

respect to damages. As to the unreasonable seizure claim, we

affirm the jury verdict and the District Court’s denial of

judgment as a matter of law.

15

EXHIBITS TO OPINION

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