Jessie Hoffman v. Burl Cain, Warden

Case: 12-70022 Document: 00512626422 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/12/2014

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

No. 12-70022 May 12, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

JESSIE HOFFMAN, Clerk

Petitioner - Appellant

v.

BURL CAIN, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY,

Respondent - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, OWEN, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Jessie Hoffman was convicted of first-degree murder by a Louisiana jury

and sentenced to death. His conviction was upheld by the Louisiana Supreme

Court and he was denied state post-conviction relief. The district court denied

federal habeas relief, and granted a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”). We

AFFIRM the district court’s denial of habeas relief.

I.

A.

On June 25, 1998, a Louisiana jury convicted Jessie Hoffman of first-

degree murder in the death of Mary Elliot. Two days later, the jury found four

aggravating circumstances justifying a death sentence: aggravated rape,

aggravated kidnapping, armed robbery, and that the offense was committed in

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an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner in that the victim was

subjected to torture, physical abuse, or pitiless infliction of unnecessary pain

and suffering. 1 On September 11, 1998, the state trial court (hereinafter, “trial

court”) imposed a sentence of death.

That Hoffman was responsible for the kidnapping, robbery, rape, and

death of Elliot is virtually unchallenged. The evidence at trial showed that on

the night of November 27, 1996, Hoffman kidnapped Elliot at gunpoint as she

left her parking garage in downtown New Orleans after work. 2 He forced Elliot

to drive her car to an ATM machine and withdraw around $200 from her

account. 3 As the Louisiana Supreme Court noted: “The ATM video tape shows

the terror on Ms. Elliot’s face as she withdrew money from her account, and

Hoffman can be seen standing next to his victim.” 4 As his girlfriend would later

corroborate, she and Hoffman went shopping afterwards and he paid in cash

for several items. 5 Additionally, the State presented DNA and serological

evidence linking Hoffman to Elliot. 6

Hoffman then forced Elliot to drive to a remote area in St. Tammany

Parish. 7 Elliot repeatedly begged Hoffman not to hurt her, and he told her he

would not because she was cooperating. 8 Elliot “offered herself” while begging

for her safety, and Hoffman proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her, all

the while still armed with the handgun. 9 Hoffman claimed that the sex was

1 See La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.4 (listing the different aggravating

circumstances).

2 State v. Hoffman, 768 So. 2d 542, 549–50 (La. 2000).

3 Id. at 550.

4 Id.

5 Id.

6 Id.

7 Id.

8 Id.

9 Id.

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consensual, 10 but the jury did not believe him, and found aggravated rape as

one of the aggravating circumstances supporting its verdict of death.

In his final videotaped confession, Hoffman confessed to kidnapping,

robbing, and having sex with Elliot. 11 Hoffman claimed that he shot Elliot

during a struggle over the gun at a boat-launch, where the car had pulled over,

an assertion the State maintains is a lie and which became the focal point of

the trial. Elliot’s body was not found by the boat-launch. Rather, it was found

approximately 150 feet away at a small, makeshift dock, accessible by land

only via a long dirt path, overgrown with vegetation and in an area full of trash.

The prosecutors argued that Hoffman must have known about the dock

beforehand, and had planned to kill Elliot there. Under this theory of the case,

subsequent to raping Elliot, Hoffman forced her to get out of her car while she

was completely nude, and marched her down the dirt path. 12 Hoffman forced

Elliot to kneel and then shot her in the head, execution-style. 13 Elliot probably

survived for a few minutes after being shot, but Hoffman left her on the dock,

completely nude, on a cold November evening. 14 After kidnapping, robbing,

raping, and killing Elliot, Hoffman disposed of her belongings and his gun, and

returned to work two and a half hours after he had left for his “lunch hour.” 15

The State relied in part on this version of facts to argue premeditation which

in turn showed specific intent, a necessary prerequisite under Louisiana law

for a conviction of first-degree murder. 16

10 Id.

11 Id. at 549.

12 Id. at 550.

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Id.

16 See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.

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B.

On direct appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed Hoffman’s

conviction and sentence, 17 and denied his application for rehearing. 18 The

Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari. 19 Hoffman then filed

a petition for state post-conviction relief on July 20, 2001, and a supplemental

petition for post-conviction relief on December 10, 2003. The state post-

conviction court (hereinafter, “state court”) granted an evidentiary hearing

only for the claim made in the supplemental petition that his counsel were

ineffective in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence for the penalty

phase of the trial. Hoffman also filed a revised supplemental petition in order

to correct minor errors on October 20, 2006.

Much of the testimony at the evidentiary hearing upon the ineffective

assistance of counsel claim came in by deposition. Hoffman claimed that

several pieces of physical evidence previously unavailable to him were made

available for his review, and filed requests to test the evidence. After the

evidentiary hearing and before any state court decision, on April 17, 2007,

Hoffman filed an amendment to his supplemental petition raising three new

claims.

The state court denied relief on May 1, 2007, referring only to the claims

in the revised supplemental petition and offering reasons only for its denial of

the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Hoffman applied for a writ of

discretionary review from the Louisiana Supreme Court on October 1, 2007.

After initially refusing to accept many of the exhibits in the attached appendix,

the Louisiana Supreme Court accepted some. Since this meant that Hoffman’s

17 Hoffman, 768 So. 2d at 591; see also State v. Hoffman, 768 So. 2d 592 (per curiam)

(supplementing original opinion).

18 Hoffman, 768 So. 2d at 542.

19 Hoffman v. Louisiana, 531 U.S. 946, 946 (2000).

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pleadings, including the revised supplemental petition and the amendment,

would not be presented to the Louisiana Supreme Court as exhibits, Hoffman

filed a supplemental writ application asserting the same claims. On December

12, 2008, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied the writ applications in a

summary opinion. 20

On March 10, 2009, Hoffman timely filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. More

than three years later, 21 the district court denied relief and granted a COA.

Hoffman timely appeals.

II.

“In a habeas corpus appeal, we review the district court’s findings of fact

for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, applying the same standards

to the state court’s decision as did the district court.” 22

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we cannot grant a writ of habeas corpus with

respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless such

adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding. 23

20 State v. Hoffman, 997 So.2d 554, 554 (La. 2008) (“Denied.”).

21 Hoffman v. Cain, No. 09-3041, 2012 WL 1088832, at *1–34 (E.D. La. March 30,

2012).

Lewis v. Thaler, 701 F.3d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks

22

omitted); see also Higgins v. Cain, 720 F.3d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 2013).

23 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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For a challenge to a state court decision under § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court

has clarified that the “contrary to” inquiry is different from the “unreasonable

application” inquiry. 24 A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly

established federal law if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to

that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” 25 A state court’s decision involves an “unreasonable

application” of clearly established federal law if “the state court identifies the

correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s] decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” 26 In

reviewing a state court’s decision under the “unreasonable application” prong,

we focus on “the ultimate legal conclusion that the state court reached and not

on whether the state court considered and discussed every angle of the

evidence.” 27 The Supreme Court has clarified that when a claim is adjudicated

on the merits, for the purposes of review under § 2254(d)(1), the record is

limited to the one before the state court, even if the state court issued a

summary affirmance. 28

A challenge to a state court decision under § 2254(d)(2) challenges the

determination of facts by the state court. 29 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), “a

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be

correct” and the habeas petitioner “shall have the burden of rebutting the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 30

24 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000).

25 Id. at 413.

26 Id.

27 Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam).

28 Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398, 1402 (2011).

29 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

30 Id. § 2254(e)(1).

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Section 2254(e)(1) is the “arguably more deferential standard.” 31 The Supreme

Court has recognized a division among the circuits on the interplay between

these two statutory provisions, 32 but has yet to resolve this question. 33

Regardless, a state court’s factual determination is “not unreasonable merely

because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in

the first instance.” 34 For claims that are not adjudicated on the merits in the

state court, we apply a de novo standard of review. 35

Finally, under AEDPA, a habeas petitioner who has failed to develop the

factual basis of a claim in state court must show two things to be granted an

evidentiary hearing. 36 First, the petitioner has to show either that the claim

relies on 1) “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable” or 2)

“a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.” 37 Second, the petitioner has to show that “the facts

underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing

evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” 38 Even assuming that a

petitioner clears these hurdles, however, we review the district court’s denial

31 Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010).

32 Id. at 299 (“[W]e granted review of a question that has divided the Courts of Appeals:

whether, in order to satisfy § 2254(d)(2), a petitioner must establish only that the state-court

factual determination on which the decision was based was ‘unreasonable,’ or whether

§ 2254(e)(1) additionally requires a petitioner to rebut a presumption that the determination

was correct with clear and convincing evidence.”)

33 Id. at 300 (“Although we granted certiorari to resolve the question of how

§§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1) fit together, we find once more that we need not reach this question

. . . .”).

34 Id. at 301.

35 Wright v. Quarterman, 470 F.3d 581, 591 (5th Cir. 2006).

36 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

37 Id. § 2254(e)(2)(A).

38 Id. § 2254(e)(2)(B).

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of an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. 39

III.

Hoffman first claims that his counsel were ineffective in the penalty

phase of the trial in two respects—that trial counsel failed to properly prepare

for the mitigation phase of the trial and that trial counsel failed to properly

prepare and present the circumstances of the crime.

A.

Hoffman’s two Strickland claims reach us on different procedural

footings.

First, the state court rejected the claim that trial counsel failed to

properly investigate the mitigating factors for failure of proof as to deficient

performance; the federal district court reached the same conclusion and added

an additional finding of no prejudice. We thus review the claim of deficient

performance under the deferential standard of § 2254 and the finding of no

prejudice de novo.

Second, the state court did not expressly address the claim that trial

counsel were ineffective in investigating and presenting evidence that

supported their theory of the crime, a claim that was presented in the

amendment to the supplemental petition. The state court did not mention any

of the claims in the amendment when denying relief. The initial question is

whether this claim was adjudicated on the merits, triggering § 2254(d)

deference. 40

39 Murphy v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 809, 815 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Morris v. Thaler, 425

F. App’x 415, 422 (5th Cir. 2011); Woods v. Thaler, 399 F. App’x 884, 898 (5th Cir. 2010).

40 While Hoffman’s application to the Louisiana Supreme Court for a writ of review

was denied, this is not necessarily a denial on the merits of its legal questions. State v.

Fontenot, 550 So. 2d 179, 179 (La. 1989); see also Alex v. Rayne Concrete Serv., 951 So. 2d

138, 145 n.6 (La. 2007).

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In Harrington v. Richter, 41 a defendant petitioned the California

Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. 42 The California Supreme Court

denied the petition in a “one-sentence summary order.” 43 Even though no

explanation accompanied the decision, the Supreme Court held that § 2254(d)

still applied. 44 “When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and

the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court

adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-

law procedural principles to the contrary.” 45 The Supreme Court did allow that

the “presumption may be overcome when there is reason to think some other

explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely.” 46 More recently, in

Johnson v. Williams, 47 the habeas petitioner raised a federal claim and the

“state court rule[d] against the defendant and issue[d] an opinion that

addresse[d] some issues but d[id] not expressly address the federal claim in

question.” 48 The Court applied the Richter presumption, 49 explaining that

“[w]hen a state court rejects a federal claim without expressly addressing that

claim, a federal habeas court must presume that the federal claim was

adjudicated on the merits—but that presumption can in some limited

circumstances be rebutted.” 50 According to the Court, the presumption that a

federal claim was adjudicated on the merits could be rebutted “either by the

41 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011).

42 Id. at 783.

43 Id.

44 Id. at 784.

45 Id. at 784–85.

46 Id. at 785.

47 133 S. Ct. 1088 (2013).

48 Id. at 1091.

49 Id. at 1094 (“Although Richter itself concerned a state-court order that did not

address any of the defendant’s claims, we see no reason why the Richter presumption should

not also apply when a state-court opinion addresses some but not all of a defendant’s

claims.”).

50 Id. at 1096.

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habeas petitioner (for the purpose of showing that the claim should be

considered by the federal court de novo) or by the State (for the purpose of

showing that the federal claim should be regarded as procedurally

defaulted).” 51 For example, “a federal claim [that] is rejected as a result of sheer

inadvertence,” would not be afforded the Richter presumption. 52

Here, the parties fail to rebut the Richter presumption. Although both

parties treat the claim as not having been adjudicated on the merits, neither

party briefs the Richter presumption. 53 As the Court has made clear, the

parties bear the burden of rebutting the presumption. 54 Given these

considerations, we apply the Richter presumption here, assuming that the

claim was adjudicated on the merits and giving the deference ordered by

§ 2254(d). 55

B.

The metric is now rote. Under Strickland v. Washington, 56 a successful

ineffective assistance of counsel claim must satisfy two distinct prongs:

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient. This requires showing that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant

by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must

show that the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors

51 Id.

52 Id. at 1097.

53 It must be noted that Johnson v. Williams was a Supreme Court decision that was

issued on February 20, 2013. The State, however, submitted its appellate brief on February

5, 2013. Hoffman filed his reply brief on February 22, 2013. He clearly cites to Williams in

his reply brief.

54 Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 1096.

55 Given the Richter presumption, an evidentiary hearing on this claim is not allowed

for the § 2254(d) inquiry and the district court did not err in not granting a hearing on this

claim.

56 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

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were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair

trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 57

To satisfy the deficient performance prong, “the defendant must show

that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” 58 “[T]he performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s

assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” 59 While

“[p]revailing norms of practice,” such as the American Bar Association

standards, can be used as guides to determine what is reasonable, they are

only guides and do not constitute definite checklists. 60 Judicial scrutiny of

performance has to be “highly deferential.” 61 To avoid the “distorting effects of

hindsight,” 62 conduct must be evaluated “on the facts of the particular case,

viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” 63 There is “a strong presumption

that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.” 64 These same standards govern counsel’s duty to investigate. 65

“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” 66

Thus, “a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for

reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of

deference to counsel’s judgments.” 67 Such reasonableness can be assessed by

taking into account the defendant’s own statements, actions, and information

57 Id. at 687.

58 Id. at 688.

59 Id.

60 Id.

61 Id. at 689.

62 Id.

63 Id. at 690.

64 Id. at 689.

65 Id. at 690.

66 Id. at 691.

67 Id.

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supplied by the defendant; 68 whether counsel has “reason to believe that

pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful”; 69 resource

constraints; 70 and whether the information that might be discovered would be

of only collateral significance. 71

To satisfy the prejudice prong, “[t]he defendant must show that there is

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.” 72 “A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 73 The

“reasonable probability” standard is less demanding than a “more likely than

not” standard, and the defendant does not need to “show that counsel’s

deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.” 74 “[T]he

question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors,

the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” 75 Similarly,

when the defendant challenges a death sentence, “the question is whether

there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer—

including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweigh[ed] the

evidence—would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and

mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” 76 We must consider the

totality of the evidence before the decision maker. 77

68Id.

69Id.; see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 525 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 395;

Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987).

70 See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 789.

71 See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 389 (2005); id. at 394 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring).

72 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

73 Id.

74 Id. at 693.

75 Id. at 695.

76 Id.

77 Id. at 695–96.

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C.

“The pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the

Strickland standard was unreasonable.” 78 The Supreme Court has explained:

This is different from asking whether defense

counsel’s performance fell below Strickland’s

standard. Were that the inquiry, the analysis would be

no different than if, for example, this Court were

adjudicating a Strickland claim on direct review of a

criminal conviction in a United States district court.

Under AEDPA, though, it is a necessary premise that

the two questions are different. For purposes of

§ 2254(d)(1), “an unreasonable application of federal

law is different from an incorrect application of federal

law.” A state court must be granted a deference and

latitude that are not in operation when the case

involves review under the Strickland standard itself. 79

Thus, while “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task,”

“[e]stablishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable

under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult.” 80 Both the Strickland standard and

the AEDPA standard are “highly deferential” and “when the two apply in

tandem, review is doubly so.” 81

D.

Hoffman argues that the state court’s determination that there was no

deficient performance in investigating mitigating factors was based on an

unreasonable determination of facts. The Supreme Court has recognized the

circuit division over the relationship between § 2254(d)(2) and § 2254(e)(1), but

78 Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785.

79 Id. (citation omitted).

80 Id. at 788 (internal quotation marks omitted).

81 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

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has declined to resolve it. 82 The Supreme Court has indicated that while

§ 2254(e)(1) “pertains only to state-court determinations of factual issues,

rather than decisions,” § 2254(d)(2) “contains the unreasonable requirement

and applies to the granting of habeas relief” itself. 83

We have held that § 2254(e)(1) “pertains only to a state court’s

determinations of particular factual issues, while § 2254(d)(2) pertains to the

state court’s decision as a whole.” 84 In other words:

Whereas § 2254(d)(2) sets out a general standard by

which the district court evaluates a state court’s

specific findings of fact, § 2254(e)(1) states what an

applicant will have to show for the district court to

reject a state court’s determination of factual issues.

For example, a district court may find by clear and

convincing evidence that the state court erred with

respect to a particular finding of fact, thus rebutting

the presumption of correctness with respect to that

fact. See § 2254(e)(1). It is then a separate question

whether the state court’s determination of facts was

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the

state court proceeding. See § 2254(d)(2). Thus, it is

possible that, while the state court erred with respect

to one factual finding under § 2254(e)(1), its

determination of facts resulting in its decision in the

case was reasonable under § 2254(d)(2). 85

Thus, for Hoffman to succeed in showing that the state court’s

determination of facts was unreasonable, he will have to do more than simply

82 Wood, 558 U.S. at 300–01 (noting that the circuits are split on this question, but

finding it unnecessary to resolve it because the state court’s finding that trial counsel made

a strategic decision was not unreasonable even under § 2254(d)(2)).

83 Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El I), 537 U.S. 322, 341–42 (2003).

84 Blue v. Thaler, 665 F.3d 647, 654 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 341–

42).

85 Fields v. Thaler, 588 F.3d 270, 279 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Valdez v. Cockrell, 274

F.3d 941, 951 n.17 (5th Cir. 2001)).

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show the erroneous nature of one individual fact-finding.

Hoffman takes issue with four findings of fact by the state court: (i) the

state court’s finding that trial counsel “followed the American Bar Associations

guidelines”; (ii) that trial counsel interviewed Marvin Fields, Hoffman’s

brother, and Joann Norman, his aunt-by-marriage; (iii) that Dr. Elaine Salzer

“concluded that [Hoffman] suffered from no psychosis or mental deficiencies”;

and (iv) that trial counsel were “certified in accordance with the state rules to

represent persons charged with capital offenses.”

As for the ABA Guidelines, Hoffman has failed to rebut the relevant fact-

finding by clear and convincing evidence. Hoffman points primarily to the

testimony of his expert Michele Fournet. Fournet testified to the content of the

ABA Guidelines, and indicated that in her opinion trial counsel had failed to

meet the ABA Guidelines as a whole. For example, Hoffman asserts that

Fournet’s testimony proves that trial counsel did not follow Guideline 11.8.6. 86

But when Fournet was asked whether trial counsel had followed certain other

Guidelines, she either acknowledged that trial counsel did follow those

Guidelines or that she did not know if trial counsel had fulfilled them. For

example, she acknowledged that she did not know whether trial counsel had

fulfilled Guideline 11.4.1(2) and testified that trial counsel had fulfilled

Guideline 11.4.1(2)(A).

Hoffman also points to the fact that J. Kevin McNary, Hoffman’s second-

chair counsel, testified that he had never heard of the ABA Guidelines at the

time of the trial. But this is not proof that trial counsel’s work did not meet its

standards. For one thing, the ABA Guidelines and the state certification

standards cover much of the same ground, and both counsel were properly

86See Am. Bar Ass’n, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in

Death Penalty Cases 11.8.6 (1989).

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certified. Hoffman has not here overcome the presumption of correctness by

clear and convincing evidence.

Next, Hoffman disputes the state court’s finding that trial counsel

interviewed Marvin Fields, Hoffman’s brother, and Joann Norman, his aunt-

by-marriage. He points out that neither William Alford, Hoffman’s lead

counsel, nor McNary claimed to have spoken to them, and both Fields and

Norman testified that they were not interviewed by trial counsel. The district

court correctly recognized that the state court fact-finding was erroneous on

this point. But this is not enough to support a holding by this Court that the

state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. The district

court was correct in finding that this individual fact was not so important as

to undermine the state court’s fact-finding on the whole.

Hoffman also disputes the state court’s finding that Dr. Elaine Salzer

“concluded that [Hoffman] suffered from no psychosis or mental deficiencies.”

Dr. Salzer, a psychologist retained by Alford and McNary to evaluate Hoffman,

testified at the trial. Hoffman argues that Dr. Salzer only concluded that “the

available data” “fails to support a diagnosis of major psychopathology.” In other

words, Hoffman’s attack is that Dr. Salzer did not affirmatively find that

Hoffman suffered no major psychopathology, but only found that there was

insufficient evidence to make a diagnosis. But Dr. Salzer did not find that

Hoffman suffered from mental illness, and the state court was correct in so

concluding.

Finally, Hoffman argues that the state court unreasonably relied on its

finding that trial counsel were “certified in accordance with the state rules to

represent persons charged with capital offenses.” Hoffman accepts that both

counsel were certified but argues that the inquiry ought to be whether the

lawyers adhered to the state certification requirement, not whether they were

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certified in the first place. We need not disagree with this accent to conclude

that the state court did not on balance give this fact undue weight.

E.

Turning to the state court’s determination that there was no deficient

performance in investigating mitigating factors, Hoffman argues that it is

contrary to and involves an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. Hoffman argues that trial counsel’s performance was deficient,

and that they failed to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence

and did not follow prevailing standards of capital defense.

To the point, Hoffman contends that trial counsel failed in collecting his

medical history, mental and physical, and family and social history, including

physical, sexual, and emotional abuse. Hoffman also faults trial counsel’s

failure to use a mitigation specialist. He argues that counsel’s reliance on

limited information from Hoffman himself was not enough; that counsel’s

contact with lay witnesses was not sufficient; and that counsel should have

interviewed his mother and brothers, at a minimum. But evidence from the

state post-conviction proceedings shows that counsel interviewed Hoffman and

his girlfriend, conferred with several family members, including Hoffman’s

father, and interviewed other potential witnesses by telephone. While counsel

did not speak to one witness until trial, they interviewed most of the witnesses

earlier. It is true that counsel did not speak to Hoffman’s mother or brother,

but there were reasons given for the mother’s lack of involvement. Hoffman’s

contention that counsel relied too extensively on information that he provided

himself does not persuade and is in tension with the Supreme Court’s

observation that the “reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined

or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions.” 87 As

87 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.

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our sister circuit has recognized, there is no “per se rule that trial counsel is

ineffective at mitigation unless a particular type of expert is retained.” 88

Hoffman further contends that trial counsel only subpoenaed Hoffman’s

school records, but no other records, and that trial counsel did not collect

medical and mental health records that would have shown Hoffman’s “failure

to thrive,” his mother’s erratic and violent behavior, his paternal

grandmother’s problems, and the family history of psychosis and mental

illness. Similarly, Hoffman contends that other public records would have

shown more disturbing family history, including records of 911 calls, proof of

substandard housing, reports of the murder of 10 family members, records of

domestic violence within the family, and a police report of an armed robbery in

which Hoffman was a victim. That might well be true but trial counsel did

collect information about Hoffman’s education, sports activities, employment,

and prior criminal record. In that information, they found no indication that

Hoffman suffered from more serious problems or that fruitful paths were yet

to be followed. We cannot find error in the state court’s finding that counsel’s

failure to seek more records was not deficient.

Hoffman also urges that the retained psychologist, Dr. Salzer, did not

compile a psychosocial history, was not qualified to administer

neuropsychological testing or conduct psychiatric testing, did not interview

any other witnesses besides Hoffman, and did not review any records besides

Hoffman’s school records. Dr. Salzer’s failure to compile a history ought not

surprise: trial counsel specifically told Dr. Salzer not to issue a written report.

According to Dr. Salzer, Hoffman had an atypical profile for such a crime, in

that there was no evidence of early childhood conduct disorder, such as

defiance, truancy, theft, or fire setting. Instead, Hoffman had passing grades

88 Carter v. Mitchell, 443 F.3d 517, 527 (6th Cir. 2006).

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in high school and leadership experience—he was the quarterback and captain

of the football team, had worked since the age of 15, and was a camp counselor

for a church summer camp. Dr. Salzer’s testing of Hoffman did not disclose any

sociopathy, aggression, or violence, and Hoffman related a positive view of his

mother and father. In short, there was no showing that Dr. Salzer ought to

have nonetheless been alerted to pursue further his mental health history or

family background.

In addition to Dr. Salzer, two other mental health experts appointed by

the trial court also examined Hoffman prior to trial: Dr. Rafael Salcedo and Dr.

John Paul Pratt. Dr. Salcedo testified at the state post-conviction hearing that

his task “consisted of determining whether Mr. Hoffman at the time of the

examination was suffering from a psychiatric disorder” and whether he was

competent to stand trial. The results of his examination was that Hoffman was

not suffering from any diagnosable mental disorder or any major

psychopathology. Dr. Pratt also testified in state post-conviction proceedings

that Hoffman had no psychiatric symptoms before trial. Hoffman presented

three post-conviction mental health experts as evidence of ineffective

assistance of counsel. However, both Dr. Salcedo and Dr. Pratt testified at the

post-conviction hearing that they disagreed with the post-conviction experts’

analysis. For example, Dr. Salcedo disagreed with Hoffman’s post-conviction

experts and stated that there was no evidence of schizophrenia at the time of

the trial. Moreover, he disputed the availability of brain imaging at the time of

the trial—thus challenging an argument of Hoffman’s post-conviction experts.

Similarly, Dr. Pratt also disputed the availability of brain imaging that

Hoffman’s post-conviction experts relied on. Given these conflicting

testimonies, the state court’s decision did not violate the strictures of § 2254.

Hoffman also contends that the state court erred in dismissing the

credibility of much of the mitigating evidence as unsubstantiated hearsay and

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irrelevant. But the state court ruled that trial counsel’s performance was not

deficient, never reaching the issue of prejudice.

Finally, Hoffman argues that lead counsel did not make a strategic

decision and admitted that his investigation was insufficient, and that trial

counsel did not affirmatively pursue a mitigation case, simply relying upon a

plea for mercy. Trial counsel’s sought-for narrative was that Hoffman was a

“good kid” who had a “bad day” and that the situation got out of hand. Hoffman

argues that this strategy backfired when the prosecutor spun it in support of

the death penalty. Lead counsel Alford testified at the post-conviction hearing

that while he would have introduced evidence of Hoffman’s mental health and

family background at trial, he doubted the effectiveness of such evidence.

Counsel seems to have made a strategic choice here, opting for two strategies

at trial: contesting the accidental nature of the murder and utilizing the “good

kid, bad day” narrative.

By the metric of our review, we cannot here fault the state court’s

adjudication. As we have observed, the state court found that trial counsel

followed the ABA Guidelines, a state fact-finding that binds our review. This

compliance weighs in favor of counsel’s performance. Both counsel were

certified to handle capital cases and had experience in representing capital

defendants. Given the lack of notice that counsel had about Hoffman’s mental

health history and about his family background, the state court’s decision that

there was no deficient performance, and no Strickland error, was neither

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

The district court committed no error.

F.

Hoffman contends that trial counsel were also deficient because they did

not adequately investigate and present the circumstances of the crime to

support his theory at trial. He contends that this prejudiced him during the

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penalty phase of the trial because the jury had already lost faith in trial counsel

and because the jury’s understanding of the circumstances of the crime was

adversely impacted.

Recall that, Hoffman stated that he had shot Elliot during a struggle at

the boat-launch, leaving unexplained the discovery of her body by a wooden

dock, which was approximately 150 feet downstream from the boat-launch and

accessible by land only via a long, dirt path. As a result, the State argued that

Hoffman lied in his confession. According to the State, Hoffman must have

known about the dock beforehand, had planned to kill Elliot there, and forced

her to march down there before shooting her execution-style.

Trial counsel argued that Hoffman was truthful in his confession, and

that the shooting did happen at the boat-launch, but that the body floated

downriver to the dock. The State countered in several ways: it provided

testimony that the tide did not reach the body, it argued that the blood spatter

on the dock proved Elliot was shot there, it showed photographs of the path

and had witnesses describe it, and it took the jurors to the scene to see and

march the path themselves.

Hoffman now contends that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient

because they should have done more. He argues that counsel made no strategic

decisions of how to best present the circumstances of the case. He points to the

fact that during their post-conviction deposition, trial counsel admitted that

they did not have “a truly coherent plan” for the guilt phase, and they were

hoping that the State would make some kind of mistake. For example, he finds

fault with the fact that trial counsel did not use an office investigator or a

forensic expert; did not interview witnesses; and did not use the report of the

first responding deputy, who described the water levels and the tides.

Hoffman also claims that what trial counsel did do was insufficient. For

example, trial counsel tried to argue that Elliot could not have walked down

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the path because her feet were not cut, but the State ridiculed this argument.

Similarly, trial counsel tried to show that the body did float down to the dock

by eliciting testimony during cross-examination, but they only got unhelpful

testimony. Finally, trial counsel tried to show that the body must have floated

down to the dock by trying to demonstrate that there was no lividity and

limited rigor mortis in the body when it was found. However, trial counsel only

used the cross-examination of the coroner to prove this, and the coroner

testified that the lividity had changed by the time of the autopsy, meaning that

he could not testify one way or another as to the lividity of the body when it

was found.

Hoffman further contends that the jury did not review several dispositive

pieces of information. First, they did not hear that the tide data and evidence

from a post-conviction pathologist, geologist, and crime scene reconstruction

expert support Hoffman’s version of events. Second, they did not hear evidence

that the scrapes on Elliot’s knees were consistent with her body scraping the

jagged riverbed as she floated, thus countering the State’s theory that her

knees were scraped because she was kneeling during the execution-style

shooting. Third, they did not hear evidence that the bullet path did not

demonstrate an execution-style killing. Fourth, they did not hear that Hoffman

was carrying a gun with him because he lived in an area where he had lost

family members and had suffered from three violent attacks in the months

preceding the crime.

Even on these facts, we cannot conclude that the state court was

unreasonable in rejecting this claim. Trial counsel did conduct an investigation

into the circumstances of the crime. Alford testified that he tracked the crime

scene, starting in New Orleans to the end point. McNary testified that he hired

a DNA expert to review the relevant tests. There is no checklist to assess trial

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counsel’s performance and no list of necessary expert testimony. 89 Rather, the

question is whether the investigation was reasonable and whether decisions

not to investigate were reasonable. 90 Trial counsel made a reasonable decision

not to investigate further, and chose a strategy of discrediting the State’s

theory of the case.

Hoffman has again not shown deficient performance. In deciding that no

Strickland error occurred, the state court decision was neither contrary to nor

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The district

court committed no error in rejecting this claim.

G.

We thus do not need to reach the issue of prejudice.

IV.

Hoffman next brings a Brady challenge, claiming that the State

suppressed favorable evidence that would have been exculpatory. This claim

was also raised for the first time in Hoffman’s amendment to the supplemental

petition. The state court order denying relief never mentioned this claim.

Applying the Richter presumption as we must, 91 we conduct our review under

the deference ordered by § 2254.

Under Brady v. Maryland, 92 a habeas petitioner must show three

components to prevail: “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused,

either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence

must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and

89 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.

90 Id. at 691.

91 See supra Part III(A) (explaining why the Richter presumption is proper for the

claims brought in the amendment to the supplemental petition, and resultantly, why an

evidentiary hearing was not warranted for the § 2254 analysis).

92 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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prejudiced must have ensued.” 93

Hoffman argues that the state suppressed a coroner’s investigator’s

report, which documented a lack of lividity and limited rigor mortis in Elliot’s

body at the scene of the crime.

According to Hoffman’s post-conviction pathologist, this lack of lividity

and limited rigor mortis indicated that the body had not been lying in the

position in which it was found; rather, it indicated that the body was moving,

which would be consistent with the theory that the body floated down the water

from the boat-launch to the dock. The district court found, and we agree, that

the suppressed evidence was neither favorable nor material. In terms of

materiality, Hoffman argues that the Brady error prejudiced his sentencing.

In this narrow and limited posture, we cannot conclude that the state court

was unreasonable in its finding of no prejudice in the penalty phase because

there were other aggravating circumstances. The district court committed no

error.

V.

Hoffman next brings a claim of discrimination in selecting a grand jury

foreperson. As we will explain, this claim is procedurally barred and thus

presents no claimed error of federal law.

Hoffman moved to quash the indictment returned against him in this

case by a St. Tammany Parish grand jury based on allegations of racial

discrimination in the selection of the grand jury foreperson. The trial court

denied the motion without oral or written reasons.

According to Hoffman, he brought his claim of discrimination in the

selection of the grand jury foreperson once again in state post-conviction

proceedings and the state court denied it on the merits. The State replies that

93 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999).

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the state court held the claim to be procedurally barred in the May 1st order.

The state court order does have suggestions of a merits decision, but it also

explicitly references an earlier post-conviction hearing by the state court. At

the earlier hearing, the state court found that Hoffman filed his motion to

quash and then abandoned it; that when the trial court marked the motion

satisfied it meant that Hoffman was not going to pursue the motion and

therefore the claim would not be considered in post-conviction proceedings. In

sum, the state court found that this claim of discrimination in selecting a grand

jury foreperson was abandoned by Hoffman before trial and was procedurally

barred. The State urges that this is as an independent and adequate state law

decision which presents no clear error of federal law.

“Out of respect for finality, comity, and the orderly administration of

justice, a federal court will not entertain a procedurally defaulted

constitutional claim in a petition for habeas corpus absent a showing of cause

and prejudice to excuse the default.” 94 The narrow exception is when the

petitioner “can demonstrate that the alleged constitutional error has resulted

in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the underlying offense or,

in the capital sentencing context, of the aggravating circumstances rendering

the inmate eligible for the death penalty.” 95 To determine whether the state

court denied relief based on an adequate and independent state procedural

rule, we examine the last reasoned state court decision to see whether it

applies a procedural bar or addresses the merits of the claim. 96 We agree with

the district court’s determination that the record shows that the state court

found the motion to be abandoned and procedurally barred; that this claim is

procedurally defaulted; and that as Hoffman does not meet the narrow

94 Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 388 (2004).

95 Id.

96 Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991).

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exception to such default, we cannot review its merits.

VI.

Hoffman also claims that the district court erred in denying his Batson

challenge. The State used its preemptory challenges to strike two of the three

prospective jurors from the venire who were African-American, Mr. Galatas

and Ms. Malter, and successfully challenged the other African-American

prospective juror for cause.

A.

The trial court rejected this claim. 97 On direct appeal, the Louisiana

Supreme Court affirmed. 98 The state court in turn rejected this claim on the

merits. We give the deference ordered by § 2254.

Under Batson v. Kentucky, 99 a claim works in three steps. The defendant

first must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a

preemptory strike on the basis of race. 100 Next, the burden shifts to the

prosecutor to provide a race-neutral explanation for the challenged strike and

rebut the prima facie case. 101 Finally, the trial court must determine whether

the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. 102

A state trial court’s finding of the absence of discriminatory intent is a

pure issue of fact and is accorded great deference; it will not be overturned

unless clearly erroneous. 103 Therefore, the federal court’s role is to “determine

whether the trial court’s determination of the prosecutor’s neutrality with

respect to race was objectively unreasonable and has been rebutted by clear

97 Hoffman, 768 So. 2d at 556–57.

98 Id. at 560.

99 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

100 Murphy v. Dretke, 416 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 2005).

101 Id.

102 Id.

103 Id.

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and convincing evidence to the contrary.” 104

B.

With respect to Mr. Galatas, the prosecution offered a race-neutral

explanation for the strike: Galatas was hesitant about his willingness to

impose the death penalty. The prosecution directed the trial judge to two

responses: 1) In individual voir dire, when asked if he could consider the death

penalty, Galatas hesitated and said “I think I could,” but when asked if he

could consider life, he said “I could.” 2) In full-panel voir dire, Galatas

“hesitated and gave a very weak ‘I think I could’” when asked if he could

consider death, and his response was soft such that the District Attorney had

to ask him to repeat it. When the defense disputed these reasons, the

prosecution also offered another reason: that it had struck five white jurors

who were similarly situated on the death penalty. The trial court accepted

these race-neutral reasons, including that “similar[] preemptory challenges

were exercised by the State” against white prospective jurors. On appeal, the

Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed accepting all three reasons. 105 According to

the Louisiana Supreme Court, while certain portions of the voir dire tended to

support Hoffman’s contentions, the voir dire in totality did not support his

Batson challenge as to Galatas. 106 Specifically, the Louisiana Supreme Court

found that Galatas clearly waivered when questioned about his stance on the

death penalty. 107 In contrast, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that Galatas

answered “affirmatively without equivocation” when asked about life

imprisonment. 108 Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court also rejected

104 Id. (quoting Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 341).

105 Hoffman, 768 So. 2d at 557–59.

106 Id.

107 Id. at 558.

108 Id.

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Hoffman’s contention that Galatas was subject to disparate questioning. 109

Finally, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that similarly situated white

jurors had also been struck by the State. 110 The record supports these findings,

and they are not clearly erroneous. Hoffman contends that the Louisiana

Supreme Court erred in conducting its own Batson analysis, that the trial

judge relied only on the race-neutral reason that similarly situated white

jurors had been struck, and that the Louisiana Supreme Court did not defer to

this trial court finding. We are not persuaded. It is not clear from the record

that the trial judge solely relied on that one race-neutral reason, and we give

AEDPA deference to fact-findings made by a state appellate court. 111

With respect to Ms. Malter, the prosecution offered race-neutral

explanations for the strike as well: that Malter had rated herself as a 1 out of

10 when asked by the prosecution to rate herself on the decisiveness scale, and

that Malter looked Hoffman in the eye and smiled when answering that she

could give him a fair trial. The trial court accepted this explanation noting that

“the State has presented a sufficiently racially neutral reason for use of its

preemptory challenge.” The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, concluding

that while Hoffman was correct that Malter actually rated herself a 5 out of

10, and not a 1 out of 10, two different prosecutors used two different

“decisiveness” scales. 112 On the one hand, District Attorney Reed defined the

scale in such a way that he wanted people in the middle of the scale. 113 On the

other hand, Assistant District Attorney Gracianette defined the scale in such

a way that he wanted people at the high end of the scale. 114 Malter was asked

109 Id.

110 Id. at 559.

111 See Moody v. Quarterman, 476 F.3d 260, 268–72 (5th Cir. 2007).

112 Hoffman, 768 So. 2d at 559–60.

113 Id. at 559.

114 Id.

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to rate herself by Assistant District Attorney Gracianette, and not District

Attorney Reed. 115 Therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that

striking Malter was consistent with the use of the decisiveness scale, even

though the trial court incorrectly held that Malter was 1 on the scale, and

affirmed while also pointing to the body language cited by the prosecutors. 116

The record supports these findings, and they are not clearly erroneous.

Hoffman also claims repeatedly that the venue chosen by the State in

which to prosecute Hoffman demonstrates purposeful discrimination as to both

Galatas and Malter. We do not find this contention persuasive.

The preemptory strikes were race-neutral, and the state court did not

violate the strictures of § 2254 in refusing to overturn the previous rulings on

this Batson challenge. For these reasons, the district court did not err in

holding that Hoffman had not provided clear and convincing evidence that the

state court’s determination was unreasonable.

VII.

Hoffman also claims that both the state court and the district court erred

in denying his claim of racial discrimination by the petit jury. Hoffman

attempted to produce evidence of the jury’s racial discrimination during the

state post-conviction proceedings. He attached an alleged affidavit from one of

the jurors, Mari Lower, which he claims demonstrates the racial bias held by

the jury.

A.

This claim was originally presented to the state court. The state court

adjudicated this claim on the merits and denied it. The deferential lens of

§ 2254 still applies. The district court did not address the § 2254 issue, but

115 Id.

116 Id. at 559–60.

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denied this claim on an evidentiary basis, holding that the affidavit would not

have been admissible in any case because of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b).

B.

The district court denied this claim on Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)

grounds. However, the first inquiry is whether the state court was

unreasonable in rejecting this claim in the post-conviction setting. Upon close

examination, we determine that it was not.

First, the Louisiana Code of Evidence has a rule similar to Rule 606(b)

that prevents the impeachment of verdicts via juror testimony:

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or

indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or

statement occurring during the course of the jury’s

deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or

any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him

to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment

or concerning his mental processes in connection

therewith, except that a juror may testify on the

question whether any outside influence was

improperly brought to bear upon any juror, and, in

criminal cases only, whether extraneous prejudicial

information was improperly brought to the jury’s

attention. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any

statement by him concerning a matter about which he

would be precluded from testifying be received for

these purposes. 117

The state court could have easily decided that this juror affidavit fell within

this jury shield provision. Deciding so would not be contrary to or involve an

unreasonable application of federal law, because the Supreme Court has

clarified that the jury shield provision is a strong evidentiary bar. In Tanner v.

117 La. Code Evid. Ann. art. 606(b).

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United States, 118 there were allegations that many jurors had consumed

alcohol and drugs during their lunch breaks, which caused them to sleep

during the afternoon session of the trial and might have affected their

reasoning capabilities. 119 The Court recognized that an exception existed in

which juror testimony could be taken as to “extraneous influence.” 120 However,

the Court held that juror intoxication did not fit within the exception for

“outside influence[s],” but was rather an internal issue. 121 The Court held that

the district court did not err in not holding an evidentiary hearing. 122 As a

result, it would have been entirely proper for the state court to have decided

this case on these grounds.

Hoffman contends that Louisiana’s Article 606(b) has an exception for

constitutional challenges. Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that

Article 606(b) is flexible and can yield when there is a constitutional

challenge. 123 However, it does not follow that the state court was in error. The

evidentiary bar aside, the state court could have concluded that the evidence

did not support a finding of intentional bias or discrimination. And again this

fact-finding is due heightened deference under § 2254. In examining the

affidavit, the state court cannot be said to have been unreasonable or contrary

to federal law in deciding that no bias or discrimination was shown. The

affidavit presents juror speculation, and, more importantly, affirms that the

jury acted on the basis of the evidence and the jury instructions.

Finally, Hoffman invokes the general juror misconduct standard. Even

118 483 U.S. 107 (1987).

119 Id. at 113–16.

120 Id. at 117–21.

121 Id. at 122–27.

122 Id.

123 State v. Graham, 422 So. 2d 123, 131 (La. 1982); State v. Johnson, 796 So. 2d 201,

210 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2001).

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assuming the state court did not rely on the evidentiary bar, the state court

was not in error. On collateral review, “habeas petitioners are not entitled to

relief based on a constitutional error unless the error had [a] substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 124 Hoffman does

not meet this high standard because, again, the affidavit indicates that the

jury acted on the basis of the evidence and the jury instructions. As a result,

Hoffman’s claim of racial discrimination by the jury must fail. The district

court was correct in rejecting this claim.

VIII.

We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of habeas relief.

124Oliver v. Quarterman, 541 F.3d 329, 341 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946).

32