McClurg Family Farm, LLC. v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 10-156L

(Filed: February 24, 2014)

__________

MCCLURG FAMILY FARM, LLC, et al., *

for themselves and As Representatives of a * Rails-to-trails case; Cross-motions for partial

Class of Similarly Situated Persons, * summary judgment; Ownership interests

* under Iowa law; Stipulation – application of

Plaintiffs, * Burgess and Jenkins to the parcels in this

* case; Railroad interests – easement versus

* fee; Burden of proof where original

v.

* conveyance documents are missing;

Application of Iowa Code § 327G-77 to

THE UNITED STATES, *

railroad lines owned in fee; Questions of

*

fact.

Defendant. *

*

__________

OPINION

__________

Thomas Scott Stewart, Baker Sterchi Cowden & Rice, Kansas City, MO, for plaintiffs.

Frank James Singer, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., with whom was Acting Assistant Attorney General

Robert G. Dreher, for defendant.

ALLEGRA, Judge:

Plaintiffs, landowners in Iowa, allege that their property was taken as a result of

defendant’s actions under the National Trails System Act (the Trails Act), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-51.

The court certified the class on July 27, 2010. Pending are cross-motions for partial summary

judgment regarding defendant’s liability as to the 360 parcels at issue. For the reasons that

follow, the court renders a split decision, concluding, as a matter of law, that defendant is liable

with respect to some of these parcels and not as to others. For still other parcels, the court

determines that the existence of genuine issues of material fact precludes a ruling as to liability.

The court’s determinations are summarized in the appendix that follows this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

A brief recitation of the underlying facts sets the context for this decision.

The class of plaintiffs in this case owns real estate that assertedly underlies or adjoins a

36.9 mile railroad corridor that runs through Dickinson and Osceola Counties, Iowa (the

Railroad Line). The Railroad Line was originally created by the Iowa Northwestern Railroad

(INW), which established the corridor through a combination of various forms of conveyance

and transfer.

On September 5, 2008, INW filed a petition for an abandonment exemption with the

Surface Transportation Board (STB), 1 seeking permission to abandon the Railroad Line,

specifically a segment between milepost 215.4, west of Mackenzie Junction, to milepost 252.3,

west of Braaksma, located in Dickenson and Osceola Counties. On October 3, 2008, the Iowa

Trails Council filed a Request for Issuance of a Public Use Condition and Notice of Interim Trail

Use. On October 24, 2008, the STB issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) 2 relating to the

Railroad Line identified above. Following several extensions of the negotiating period, on or

about August 31, 2009, INW and the Iowa Natural Heritage Foundation (the Foundation), on

behalf of the Dickinson County Trails Board and the Osceola County Conservation Board,

reached an agreement to purchase the Railroad Line from INW for interim trail use and

railbanking pursuant to section 8(d) of the Trails Act. By letter dated October 19, 2009, the

Foundation notified the STB of this agreement.

On March 12, 2010, plaintiffs filed their complaint in this court seeking just

compensation under the Fifth Amendment for property they claim was taken when the STB

issued the NITU pursuant to the Trails Act. As mentioned, on July 27, 2010, the court certified a

1

The STB has exclusive authority over all the nation’s rail lines. See Chi. & N.W.

Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 321 (1981). A railroad cannot terminate rail

service on a particular line without first getting the STB’s consent. See Barclay v. United States,

443 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1209 (2007).

2

There are three ways to terminate rail service. First, a railroad can apply to the STB for

permission to discontinue service. See 49 U.S.C. § 10903(d)(2). Second, a railroad can ask the

STB for permission to abandon the rail line through a proceeding. See id. at § 10903(d)(1).

Finally, under the Trails Act, a railroad can terminate service through a process known as

“railbanking.” Under the railbanking process, the railroad must first file an abandonment

application under 49 U.S.C. § 10903, or a Notice of Exemption from that process under 49

U.S.C. § 10502. Thereafter, a third party may ask the STB to issue a NITU so that the former

railway can be used for interim trail use. The interim trail is subject to the “possible future

reconstruction and reactivation of the right-of-way for rail service.” 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a)(1)-

(3). The NITU gives the railroad 180 days in which to negotiate an interim trail use agreement

with the third-party trail sponsor. Id. at § 1152.29(d)(1). If an agreement is reached, then the

trail sponsor manages the right-of-way, subject to a possible future restoration of rail service; if

an agreement is not reached, the railroad may exercise its authority to abandon the line. Id. at §§

1152.29(d)(1) and (e)(2).

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class that eventually grew to include 360 individual parcels and 279 individuals or entities. On

August 23, 2010, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint; on March 21, 2011, they filed a

second amended complaint.

As discovery progressed, the parties generated and exchanged a series of claims books, a

process designed to isolate the documents and arguments associated with given parcels and to

identify the need for additional discovery. Through this process, plaintiffs agreed to dismiss

voluntarily their claims as to 19 parcels, leaving 341 parcels. On June 30, 2011, plaintiffs filed a

motion for partial summary judgment as to 150 of these parcels, for which they claimed

defendant had no bona fide objection to liability. Before oral argument on that motion, plaintiffs

filed a motion to compel seeking to require defendant to stipulate to the ownership and adjacency

to the Railroad Line of 188 parcels. In an effort to get a single motion covering all the parcels,

on March 16, 2012, the court conducted a status conference, at which the parties agreed to cancel

the argument scheduled on plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and to take positions

with respect to all of the parcels at issue.

After the parties exchanged additional documents, plaintiffs filed, on September 13,

2012, a supplemental motion for partial summary judgment on liability. On October 12, 2012,

defendant filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. In the midst of the briefing of that

motion, the undersigned decided Burgess v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 223 (2013), which dealt

with the issuance of a NITU under the Trails Act with respect to another rail line in Iowa. On

March 7, 2013, the court issued an order setting argument on May 23, 2013, on the parties’

supplemental cross-motions for partial summary judgment. Three days before that argument, on

May 20, 2013, the parties filed a stipulation in which they agreed, for purposes of the court’s

ruling on the pending cross-motions, to have the treatment of certain parcels be governed by

Burgess and Jenkins v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 598 (2011). Unable to determine which

parcels were still at issue, the court cancelled the oral argument and ordered the parties to file

charts setting forth their positions as to each of the parcels at issue in the case. Those charts have

been since been filed, revealing 58 different parcels on which the parties still dispute liability.

Oral argument on the parcels still covered by the cross-motions for partial summary judgment is

deemed unnecessary. 3

II. DISCUSSION

We begin with common ground. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

3

On December 19, 2013, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking a status conference and trial,

seemingly complaining about the delay encountered in this case. On December 20, 2013, that

motion was denied. While case management of this case could have been better, it should not be

overlooked that a significant portion of the delay encountered in this case came from the shifting

fashion in which the parties developed their positions as to many of the hundreds of parcels at

issue.

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of law. See RCFC 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Disputes

over facts that are not outcome-determinative will not preclude the entry of summary judgment.

Id. at 248. However, summary judgment will not be granted if “the dispute about a material fact

is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable [trier of fact] could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Id.; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Becho, Inc. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 595, 599 (2000).

When making a summary judgment determination, the court is not to weigh the evidence,

but to “determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; see also

Agosto v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 436 U.S. 748, 756 (1978) (“a [trial] court

generally cannot grant summary judgment based on its assessment of the credibility of the

evidence presented”); Am. Ins. Co. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 151, 154 (2004). The court must

determine whether the evidence presents a disagreement sufficient to require fact finding, or,

conversely, is “so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 250-52; see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (“‘Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine

issue for trial.’” (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587)). Where there is a genuine dispute, all

facts must be construed, and all inferences drawn from the evidence must be viewed, in the light

most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88 (citing United

States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also Stovall v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl.

336, 344 (2010); L.P. Consulting Grp., Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 238, 240 (2005).

Where, as here, a court considers cross-motions for (partial) summary judgment, it must view

each motion, separately, through this prism. 4

A. Ownership Interest

It is now settled law that a Fifth Amendment takings occurs when defendant, through

issuance of a NITU, destroys state-defined property rights. See Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d

1015, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Rasmuson v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 267, 272 (2013). In the

context of cases such as these, takings can arise variously – for example, where the NITU

interferes with the landowner’s right to reversion of an unencumbered fee or prevents the

landowner of property adjoining a rail line from augmenting his property under state law. See

Ladd, 630 F.3d at 1019; Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 235-36.

In Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc), the Federal

Circuit held that a threshold issue in rails-to-trails cases is who owned the land involved, with

particular focus on whether the railroad in question acquired only an easement or instead

4

See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Mobil Producing Tex. & N.M., 281 F.3d 1249, 1252-53

(Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Estate of Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2010);

Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., Inc., 598 F.3d 257, 264 (6th Cir.

2010); Stovall, 94 Fed. Cl. at 344; Northrop Grumman Computing Sys., Inc. v. United States, 93

Fed. Cl. 144, 148 (2010).

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obtained fee simple title to the corridor. “Clearly, if the Railroad obtained fee simple title to the

land over which it was to operate, and that title inures, as it would, to its successors,” the court

observed, a plaintiff “would have no right or interest in those parcels and could have no claim

related to those parcels for a taking.” Id.; see also Sutton v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 436, 438

(2012). The Federal Circuit went on to explain that if an easement is found, the court must then

determine whether it was subject to limitations, particularly, one “limited to use for railroad

purposes.” Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1533; see also Ladd, 630 F.3d at 1019; Ellamae Phillips Co. v.

United States, 564 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Iowa law adds a wrinkle to this property

inquiry, as it confers additional rights on the owners of property adjoining a railroad upon the

extinguishment of a railroad easement. See Rasmuson, 109 Fed. Cl. at 272 n.7; Burgess, 109

Fed. Cl. at 229.

As to many of the parcels at issue, the parties focus on the same deeds and/or conveyance

documents. Questions involving the interpretation of these documents must be resolved by

reference to state law, in this case, that of Iowa. See Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 16 (1990);

Rhutasel v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 220, 225 (2012); see also Douglas R. Bigelow Trust v.

United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 490, 493 (2012). Under Iowa law, deeds are interpreted according to

the ordinary rules of contract construction. See Wiegmann v. Baier, 203 N.W. 2d 204, 208 (Iowa

1972); Maxwell v. McCall, 124 N.W. 760 (Iowa 1910); Jackson v. Benson, 7 N.W. 97 (Iowa

1880); see also Douglas R. Bigelow Trust, 107 Fed. Cl. at 493; Sutton, 107 Fed. Cl. at 440. As to

a number of the parcels at issue, both parties agree that there are no questions of fact and that

deciding how these deeds should be construed presents a question of law, suitable for resolution

under the cross-motions. 5 See Steele’s Lessee v. Spencer, 26 U.S. 552, 560 (1828); Douglas R.

Bigelow Trust, 107 Fed. Cl. at 493; Sutton, 107 Fed. Cl. at 439-40. As to other parcels, however,

5

In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517

U.S. 370 (1996), the Federal Circuit explained the law on this point thusly:

The interpretation of a contract or a deed, like a patent, is ultimately a question of

law. There is nothing novel about the principle that, in the words of Justice Story,

“the interpretation of written documents properly belongs to the Court, and not to

the jury.” William & James Brown & Co. v. McGran, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 479, 493

(1840). This principle has been routinely evoked in the context of contract law.

See Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 180, 186 (1805) (“the construction of a

written evidence is exclusively with the court”); Goddard v. Foster, 84 U.S. (17

Wall.) 123, 142 (1872) (“[I]t is well-settled law that written instruments are

always to be construed by the court . . . .”); see also Meredith v. Picket, 22 U.S. (9

Wheat.) 573, 575 (1824) (interpreting a deed, “[t]he Judges must construe the

words of an entry, or any other title paper, according to their own opinion of the

words as they are found in the instrument itself”).

Id. at 997 (string citations omitted); see also Chevy Chase Land Co. of Montgomery Cnty., Md. v.

United States, 158 F.3d 574, 575 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

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the parties have raised a host of questions of fact that, as will be seen, precludes this court from

resolving, for now, the claims regarding those parcels.

For ease and clarity of decision, the court has grouped the parcels into seven categories,

each raising the same or similar issues. 6 The court will address each of these categories in turn.

1. Parcels for Which Plaintiffs Concede There is No Liability.

Claimant Name Claim Source

Christian Reformed Church c/o Larry Post 15.A & 15.B 5-353

Tom & Le Ann Ransom 33.B & 33.C 5-495

Mark S. & Carol Coleman 67 H-216, H-163

Martin & Melinda Marten 91 F-384

Albert Bartley 92 F-384

Scott Trigg & Nancy J. Johnson 94

Michael K. De Jong 100 F-406

Maye M. Swanson 101 F-406

Dan M. & Lori D. Lewis 110

George W. Garloff 155.B & 155.C H-321, H-239

Great Lakes Cooperative 156.A - 156.H

Robert Sr. & Robert Jr. Kirschbaum 157.A & 157.B

E. L. Ballou 158.A & 158.B

Robert L. Browning 159.A - 159.D

H. & V. Thompson Farms LTD 160

Lonnie S. Browning 161.A & 161.B

Based on their review of the relevant conveyance documents and deeds (and for some of

the parcels, there were no such documents), plaintiffs concede that there is no liability for the 32

parcels listed in the chart above.

2. Parcels Whose Treatment is Controlled, for Purposes of this Decision,

by either Burgess v. United States or Jenkins v. United States.

This court has issued several opinions in other Trails Act cases involving rail corridors in

Iowa. See Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. 223; Jenkins, 102 Fed. Cl. 598; Jenkins v. United States, 2012

WL 10205284 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 21, 2012). On May 20, 2013, the parties stipulated to be bound

tentatively by these decisions as they relate to certain parcels at issue in this case, reserving, inter

6

In several instances, the parcels in these categories will be identified in a chart that lists

the name(s) of the claimant(s), as well as the claim identifier that the parties have assigned to the

claim in their class index. The charts also identify the source document(s) that relate to the claim,

using the record number employed in the Dickenson and Osceola County, Iowa, recorder offices.

For instance, a conveyance located at “M-565” is recorded at Book M, page 565, or one at “53

345” is recorded at Book 53, page 345. These same conventions are used in the appendix that

follows this opinion.

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alia, the right to appeal Burgess, Jenkins or any decision reached here. 7 The following segments

reflect the parties’ agreement.

a. Parcels governed by the court’s ruling in Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl.

at 229-31, that certain deeded easements were limited to railroad purposes

and, therefore, subject to Iowa Code § 327G.76.

Claimant Name Claim Source

The Estate of Theodore Pranger; Loreen J.

4.D 5-471

Bruxvoort; John W. Pranger Life Estate

Robert & Sylvia A. Rolfes 8.A - 8.C 5-353

Clear Lake Stock Farms, Inc. 10.A & 10.B 5-394

Sonstegard Family Farms 5-406, 5-471, & 5-

11.A - 11.C

495

Earl Faber 12.A - 12.C 5-469, 5-471

Marlin & Mary Laverman 14.A - 14.C 5-374

Lawrence W. & Vonna R. Leckband 16.A 5-340

Lawrence W. Leckband 16.B – 16.D 5-340

Mark and Verna Salzman 17 5-340

James Hesebeck 18 5-340, 5-480

Cooperative Elevator Association of

19.A 5-340, 5-480

Ocheyedan

Cooperative Elevator Association of 5-519, 5-515 & 5-

19.B - 19.D

Ocheyedan 402

Randall W. Boeke 20.B 5-519

Larry L. & Ruby E. Brunk 21.C 5-519

Douglas D. & Danette K. Block 22.A - 22.D 5-353

Alan Hart 23.A, 23.D. –

5-353, 5-376

23.G

Helen Hart 23.B & 23.C 5-353

Maurice D. & Barbara L. Block 24.A & 24.B 5-353

Hans J. & Bernice Willadsen 25.B & 25.C 5-382

Larry Bosma; Jerry & Marcella Bosma;

Darlene Wassink; Arlene Van Beek; Ester

Bosma; Presentation Sisters, Inc; Charles &

26.A & 26.B 5-384, 5-412

Joyce Bosma; Leo Bosma; Pamela & Duane

Van deHoef; Lucella Bosma; Frances B.

Bosma Trust

Merle L. & Sarah J. Pedley 27.B 5-388

7

In this regard, the stipulation provided that:

In acknowledging [that] this Court’s decision in Burgess (and Judge Firestone’s

decision in Jenkins) resolved some of the same issues that are presented in the

parties’ instant cross-motions, the parties do not waive, compromise, or otherwise

limit their appellate rights with respect to those issues in either Burgess, Jenkins,

or in this case. Instead, the parties simply acknowledge that the rulings in

Burgess and/or Jenkins apply to the issues identified . . . .

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Travaille Family Farms Inc. 28.A & 28.B 5-380, 5-388

Dale L. Peters 31.C 3-390

J&M Partnership LLP 33.D 5-402

Gerald R. & Joan C. Vander Muelen 37.A & 37.B 5-406

Randy E. Clark; Linda Kunzman; Barbra A.

38.A - 38.E H-564, H-560

Cambilargui & Lori M. Clark-Cotterman

Clifford L. Nebelsick 39.A - 39.C H-560

Frederick Goodno; Scott W. Goodno; Stacy

40.A - 40.D H-560, H-555

Wiese; Justin & Shawna Goodno

Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The

Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert Revocable 41.F - 41.H H-191

Trust

Steven A. & Jennifer L. Krummen; Stewart A.

Krummen; Craig S. Krummen & Royce 42.E H-191

Krummen

Randall J. Johnson 43.C H-191

Arco Dehydrating Co. Inc. 44.B - 44.D H-191

Gregory L. Baloun 45.A - 45.D H-191

Gregory L. Baloun & Wes McClure 45.E H-135

Allen and Mary J. Arnold 46 H-135

William Steven & Dianne Kathleen Jansen 47 H-135

Lake Park Development Corp. 48 H-135

Bradley T. & Francel L. Graham 49.A - 49.C H-135

Krummen Farms LP 50.A - 50.E H-135

Robert Allen 51.A - 51.C H-162

Harold R. Hartmann Trust 52.A & 52.B H-162

Harold R. Hartmann Trust 52.C H-218, H-222

Timothy S. Hoerichs & Ann L. Hoerichs

57.A & 57.B H-161

Family Trust

David B. Olson 58 H-161

Jon Gunderson 63.B H-289

Cohrs Construction, Inc. 66 H-289

Evelyn McClurg & McClurg Family Farm,

68.A - 68.C H-288

LLC

Paul J. & Diane L. Kollasch 69 H-288

Jerry Edward Miller 70.A & 70.B H-288

Gwendolyn Vetter H-288, H-177 &

71.A - 71.E

H-193

Janet Bergman Revocable Trust 72 H-194

Terry L. & Cheryl L. Bruns 73 H-194

Don B. & Barbara F. Erlandson 74 H-194

Raymond A. & Darlene Gustafson 75.A & 75.B H-194

Scott & Mary Lynn Ingvall 76 H-194

Richard L. & Kathy S. Kleen 77.A H-194

Todd Krieger 78.A & 78.B H-194

Kathleen M. Krueger 79.A - 79.C H-194

Dennis A. & Marilyn K. Ladwig 80.A & 80.B H-194

G. Wallis Reed Trust 81 H-194

Roger F. Reppert Revocable Trust 82 H-194

Arthur J. Thompson & Jill N. McDowell 83.B H-194

Ferrellgas Inc. 84 H-194

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Jack L. & Beverly J. Longmore 85.A & 85.B F-402

Craig F. & Ellen M. Moffitt 86 H-194

Richard A. & Karla J. Heinrichs 95.A - 95.C F-384

Ronald D. Claussen Revocable Trust 96.A & 96.B F-384

Brian A. & Carol A. Woods 99 F-384

Robert W. Thorbrogger 116 F-403, F-413

Janice M. Schultz 117 F-403, F-413

Frigate LLC 118.A & 118.B F-403, F-413

David S. & Darlene I. Shaw 119.A & 119.B F-403, F-413

Keith L. & Susan L. Ostrum 121 H-313

Mark A. & Kristine L. Hoss 122 F-403, F-413

Reed L. Potter 123 F-403, F-413

James E. & Pamela A. Feld 124 H-313

Thomas L. Hoffman 125 H-313

Linda S. Taylor 126 H-313

Dennis D. & Anita Dean 127.A & 127.B H-313

Scott V. & Jolene C. Egertson 128 H-313

Gregory A. & Connie J. Tolan 129 H-313

Michael T. & Rhonda F. Reekers 130 H-313

Beverly Jean Steinberger 131 H-313

Arthur C & Roxa L. Cummings 132 H-313

Kathleen M. Drysdale 133 H-313

Kimberly K. Durst 134 H-313

Gary & Tom Kuhlman, Kathy Jo Swalve, Sally

135 H-313

Ann Lundberg & Phoebe Hersom

Duane H. Serck 136 F-417

Clint T. & Lindsay R. Robinson 137 H-164

William J. & Carleen C. Lambert 138.A & 138.B H-164, F-420

Joyce Overocker F-412, F-411 &

139.A - 139.D

F-419

Rohn K. Shepley 140 F-412

Lavonne Esther Hansen 141.A & 141.B F-411

Margerite Butcher Revocable Trust F-420, F-404, &

142.A - 142.D

F-416

Margaret Hill Northey 143.A & 143.B F-415

Douglas A. & Nancy N. Pringnitz 144.A & 144.B F-415

Steven J. & Julie A. Ingvall 153 H-194

Jerry Moore 154 H-313

George W. Garloff 155.A H-135

In Burgess, a number of the “right-of-way” deeds indicated that the property owner

granted the railroad “the right of way for their railroad,” going on to describe the conveyance as

“[a] strip of land for that purpose one hundred feet wide across.” Construing these deeds, the

undersigned concluded that the language therein conveyed to the railroad only an easement for

railroad purposes. Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 226, 230. Citing, inter alia, Iowa Code §§ 327G-76-

77, 8 the court concluded that “[i]f the easements in question were not unrestricted, but instead

8

For the years in question, Iowa Code § 327G-76 provided:

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limited for railroad purposes only, they were extinguished upon abandonment of the rail line.”

Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 231. In addition, to the extent that these properties adjoined the Rail

Line, for purposes of Iowa Code § 327G.76, the easements in question extinguished due to non-

use before the NITU was issued, making defendant liable for a takings. See Burgess, 109 Fed.

Cl. at 229.

With the limitations discussed above, the parties agree that this ruling in Burgess applies

to the 180 properties listed in the chart above. 9

Railroad property rights which are extinguished upon cessation of service by the

railroad divest when the department of transportation or the railroad, having

obtained authority to abandon the rail line, removes the track materials to the

right-of-way. If the department of transportation does not acquire the line and the

railway company does not remove the track materials, the property rights which

are extinguished upon cessation of service by the railroad divest one year after the

railway obtains the final authorization necessary from the proper authority to

remove the track materials.

For the years in question, Iowa Code § 327G.77(1) provided, in pertinent part, that “[i]f a

railroad easement is extinguished under section 327G.76, the property shall pass to the owners of

the adjacent property at the time of abandonment. If there are different owners on either side,

each owner will take to the center of the right-of-way.” See also Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v.

Kmezich, 48 F.3d 1047, 1049-50 (8th Cir. 1995) (discussing these provisions); Macerich Real

Estate Co. v. City of Ames, 433 N.W. 2d 726, 729 (Iowa 1988); Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 229.

9

A few notes regarding the parcels in this category are in order. While the parties have

not included parcel 31.C in the stipulation, based on a review of the source documents for that

parcel, the court concludes that this parcel was an easement for railroad purposes. Several of the

parcels in group 2(a), (specifically parcels 18, 44.B, 52.C, 139.A and 139.B) had two segments –

one owned in fee by the Railroad, the other a deeded easement. The stipulation covers only the

latter of these segments. However, for the reasons stated below, see discussion regarding

category 4, infra, the court concludes that the segment of the trail that the Railroad owned in fee

did not pass to the adjoining property owner under Iowa Code § 327G.76. In addition, defendant

has expressed caveats and reservations with respect to certain parcels in this group. For

example, defendant asserts in the stipulation that the width of parcels 19.A and 154 are not 100

feet; however, insofar as the court can see, defendant provides no support for these assertions in

any of its filings, and the court determines that these points are waived. The court also rejects

defendant’s claim that a portion of parcel 20.B does not adjoin the Rail Line, as it appears that

the parcel is undivided and does adjoin that line. In addition, defendant correctly contends that

parcels 38.A through 38.E are subject to a life estate in Allen E. Clark, who is not a party to this

action. Likewise, defendant is correct that parcels 26.A and 26.B are partially owned by

individuals who are not parties to this suit.

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b. Parcels governed by the court’s ruling in Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 238-40,

that 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) imposes an easement for interim trail use and for

future reactivation of rail service.

Claimant Name Claim Source

Dale W. and Danna S. Braaksma 1.A & 1.B 3-402

The Estate of Theodore Pranger, Loreen J.

4.A - 4.C 3-419, 13-287

Bruxvoort; John W. Pranger

Wayne D. & Esther Moet 5.A - 5.C 3-417

Juliana Garret & Judson Te Paske 6.A - 6.E 5-353

M. Rock Marco & Dan Hartwig 7.A - 7.C 5-353

Sonstegard Family Farms 11.H, 11.J & 3-388, 3-384, H-

11.L 555

Mary Swalve; Janice Neilsen; Debra Swalve;

Roger Swalve; Norman Swalve; Dwaine 13.A &13.B 3-400

Swalve; Allen Swalve; Karen Swalve

Cooperative Elevator Association of

19.E 3-388

Ocheyedan

Merle L. & Sarah J. Pedley 27.C 5-394

Eugene C. Schmidt 29 3-394

Wilfred & Ellen Bosma 30.A - 30.D 3-394, 3-392

Dale L. Peters 31.A & 31.B 3-392

J&M Partnership LLP 33.E & 33.F 3-388

Ardyce Rueter 35.A & 35.B 3-384, 3-386

Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The

H-555, H-565, H-

Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert Revocable 41.A - 41.E

557

Trust

Steven A. & Jennifer L. Krummen; Stewart A.

Krummen; Craig S. Krummen & Royce 42.A - 42.D H-565, H-557

Krummen

Randall J. Johnson 43.A & 43.B H-557

Arco Dehydrating Co. Inc. 44.F & 44.G H-239

Harold R. Hartmann Trust 52.D & 52.E H-221, H-220

James H. & Mary C. Watts 53 H-231, H-233

Randall & Russell Eckard 54.A & 54.B H-231, H-233

Donald C. McHose, Richard R. McHose & H-231, H-233, H-

55.A - 55.D

Elwin Pearey 229

Estate of Ester Gath H-231, H-233, H-

56.A - 56.C

229

Harlen M. Mitchell Revocable Trust &

60.A & 60.B H-226

Lennace E. Mitchell Revocable Trust

Orr Family Farm Company LLC 61 H-224

Sunny Joan Fronk Revocable Trust 62 H-224

Furman Realty 64 H-224

Donald R. & Phyllis Lago 65.A 10 - 65.C H-218, H-220,

10

Parcel 65.A is listed as “partially” falling under this category within the stipulation.

Like parcels 18, 44.B, 52.C, and 139.A-B, this parcel has two segments—one owned in fee and

- 11 -

H-221, H-222

Underwood Family Trust 115.B & 115.C H-74

William J. & Carleen C. Lambert 138.C F-404

Robert Turpin, Mary Seylar, James L. Turpin

145.A & 145.B H-74

Family Trust

Robert & Peggy Turpin 145.C H-74

Arnold Cook Trust 146.A & 146.B H-76

Monte R. & Chet H. Hartung and Kristyn S.

147.A - 147.D H-76

Shafrath

Giese Family Farms, Inc. 148 H-77

Irel D. and June R. Bruns 149 H-77

James C. & Susan M. Wendelsdorf 150.A H-77

Jon & Deborah Brekke 151.A & 151.B H-77

Wireless Network Management Inc. 152 H-77

It is less than obvious to which part of Burgess this prong of the parties’ stipulation

relates. A review of the cited portion of Burgess reveals that there are no specific references

therein to 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). The cited provision, entitled “Interim use of railroad rights-of-

way,” provides, in pertinent part, that –

Consistent with the purposes of th[e Trails] Act, and in furtherance of the national

policy to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail

service, to protect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy efficient

transportation use, in the case of interim use of any established railroad rights-of-

way pursuant to donation, transfer, lease, sale, or otherwise in a manner consistent

with this chapter, if such interim use is subject to restoration or reconstruction for

railroad purposes, such interim use shall not be treated, for purposes of any law or

rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of such rights-of-way for railroad

purposes.

16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). In Carolina Plating Works, Inc. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 555, 560

(2011), this court discussed this provision in concluding that “[i]n the Rails-to-Trails Act,

Congress provided that conversions to trail use that were subject to reactivation of rail service on

the route did not constitute abandonment.” In Burgess, defendant suggested that the activity

authorized by the Trails Act (which includes section 1247(d)) and the NITUs was within the

scope of the permissible uses for easements dedicated to railroad purposes. The court rejected

this claim, concluding that neither the creation of a public recreational trail nor the railbanking of

the property for potential future use could be considered an act in furtherance of a railroad

purpose. Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 239-40; see also West Chelsea Bldgs., LLC v. United States,

109 Fed. Cl. 5, 26 (2013); Jenkins, 102 Fed. Cl. at 609.

The court believes that the parties’ stipulation refers to the ruling in Burgess in which the

court refused to conclude that the activity authorized by the Trails Act came within the scope of

the other a deeded easement. It is the easement that is covered by the stipulation; the fee portion

did not pass to the adjoining property owner under Iowa Code § 327G.76.

- 12 -

easements restricted to railroad use. Accordingly, it would appear that under the stipulation,

defendant agrees (with all the caveats discussed above) that the 85 parcels in this category will

be ones for which liability for a takings should be imposed. 11

c. Parcels governed by this court’s ruling in Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at

232-36, that subsequent deeds for a depot merged with prior easement

deeds for the right-of-way.

Claimant Name Claim Source

Allendorf Wind Farm Inc. 3-402, 3-419, 13-

2.A & 2.B

287

Farmers Cooper Elevator Company of

3 3-402, 13-286

Allendorf

Sonstegard Family Farms 11.E - 11.G 5-495

Randall W. Boeke 20.A 5-519

Tom & Le Ann Ransom 32.B - 32.D 5-495

J&M Partnership LLP 33.A 5-424

Scott Rueter Revocable Trust 36.A & 36.B 5-495

Jon & Tim Gunderson 63.A H-224

Deja Blues Diner 87 F-402

BV Buildings, LLC 88.A & 88.B F-402

Neil & Katie Slater 98 F-402

In Burgess, this court held that under Iowa law, the acquisition by a grantee of a fee

interest in the same property in which it previously held an easement extinguishes the easement,

leaving only a fee. See 109 Fed. Cl. at 234 (citing cases). The court held that this rule applied to

a variety of properties that had been sold and conveyed to the railroad for building a depot,

finding that “when the railroad obtained a fee interest in portions of the parcels in question any

prior easement it possessed in the same property ceased to exist and, more importantly, no longer

limited the use of the property.” Id.; see also Jenkins, 2012 WL 10205284, at *5-6.

With the caveats highlighted above, the parties agree that this ruling in Burgess applies to

the 18 properties listed in the chart above. 12

11

Defendant argues as to six parcels in this category (6.A, 6.B, 6.C, 6.D, 6.E and 23.C)

that plaintiffs have failed to account for all of the ownership interests associated with these

parcels. In one of its briefs, however, defendant indicated that it did “not object to ownership

because it appears that the omitted owners are closely related to the claimants.” (Supplement to

United States’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment & United States’ Response to Plaintiffs’

Supplement to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 15 n.3). Relying upon the latter

statement, the court rejects defendant’s caveats as to these six parcels. Defendant also contests

the ownership of Parcel 4.C at the time the NITU was issued. Having reviewed plaintiffs’

response to these objections, the court finds that defendant’s objections are not well-taken.

- 13 -

d. Parcels governed by the ruling in Jenkins, 102 Fed. Cl. 598 (2011), that a

municipality or county which becomes the trail operator is a successor to the

railroad and not a proper party.

Claimant Name Claim Source

Osceola County Courthouse 5-353, 5-394,

9.A - 9.E & 9.K

5-406, 5-495

Osceola County Conservation Board 9.F - 9.I 5-471

Osceola County 9.J 5-519

This portion of the parties’ stipulation mistakenly refers to Judge Firestone’s 2011

opinion in Jenkins. In fact, the principle referenced in the stipulation appears in a later opinion

in the same case, Jenkins v. United States, 2012 WL 10205284 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 21, 2012). In that

2012 opinion, Judge Firestone held that the City of Dallas Center was a successor-in-interest to

the Union Pacific and excluded from the class defined by the court. Id. at *7-8. Like the

definition of the class in Jenkins, the class here is defined to exclude “railroad companies and

their successors-in-interest.” Hence, the parties’ stipulation gives effect to this class definition in

excluding the eleven properties listed in the chart above.

3. Parcels that Adjoin Segments of the Rail Corridor Which the

Railroad Allegedly Owned in Fee, But For Which the Original

Conveyance Documents Are Missing.

Claimant Name Claim Source

Sonstegard Family Farms 11.D 3-114

Sonstegard Family Farms 11.I & 11.K

Tom & Le Ann Ransom 32.A H-313

As to the four parcels listed above, plaintiffs argue that defendant has not established that

the Railroad owned the adjoining corridor in fee. As to some of these parcels, plaintiffs note that

the deeds provided by defendant are not evidence of the original source conveyance, but merely

reflect a later transfer of the parcels from one railroad to another, albeit in fee. Because there is

no documentation of the original source conveyance, plaintiffs contend, the railroad only

acquired an easement by prescription, which easement must be presumed to be for railroad

purposes only. Defendant argues that these parcels are controlled by this court’s earlier decision

in Burgess. There, this court rejected the notion that, under Iowa law, a railroad cannot obtain

and own corridors in fee. Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 231-32; see also Lowers v. United States, 663

12

For the reasons stated, in the court’s view, the cited ruling in Burgess also applies to

parcel 3.

- 14 -

N.W. 2d 408, 411 (Iowa 2003). 13 To the extent that plaintiffs may be viewed as reiterating this

argument, the court adheres to its prior ruling.

Burgess, however, did not address whether a railroad should be viewed as acquiring an

easement limited to railroad purposes or a fee, where the original conveyance documents are

missing. Under Iowa law, the answer to this question may depend upon whether there is other

evidence bearing on the question. If no conveyance documents can be found, the Iowa courts

have held that the railroad company is presumed to hold a prescriptive easement by adverse

possession. See Collins Trust v. Allamakee Cnty. Bd. of Sup’rs of Allamakee Cnty., 599 N.W. 2d

460 (Iowa 1999); Drake v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 19 N.W. 215, 217 (Iowa 1884). But, these

cases are distinguishable as they apply only where there is no deed – quitclaim or otherwise –

upon which to predicate, at least in part, a fee title claim. See Jenkins, 2012 WL 10205284, at

*6. The result appears to be different if there is such evidence, as was true in Louisa Cnty.

Conservation Bd. v. Malone, 778 N.W. 2d 204 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). In Louisa County, the

court held that the county established fee title by adverse possession because, even though the

original conveyance documents could not be produced, the county had a quitclaim deed to the

property that appeared valid on its face. 778 N.W. 2d at 207; see also Jenkins, 2012 WL

10205284, at *6. Such is the case here, rendering decisions like Collins Trust inapplicable. See

Jenkins, 2012 WL 10205284, at *6 (distinguishing Louisa County on this basis). Plaintiffs have

provided no basis – statutory or otherwise – for this court to apply a different rule here.

To be sure, plaintiffs cite Nichols v. City of Evansdale, 687 N.W. 2d 562 (Iowa 2004), for

the proposition that it is the law “everywhere[] that a railroad merely obtains a prescriptive

easement for railroad purposes if no original source conveyance exists.” But Nichols did not

involve a railroad, but rather a sewer main that was not reserved in a deed the city gave to a

private party. 687 N.W. 2d at 565-66. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the city did not

perfect a prescriptive easement because ten years had not passed since the city deeded the land in

question to the private party. Id. at 568. Nothing in Nichols suggests that absent a source

document indicating otherwise, this court (or any other) must presume that a railroad obtained

merely a prescriptive easement. The burden remains on plaintiffs to prove their case.

Accordingly, the court concludes that the parcels in this category represent ones in which

the railroad owned a fee simple interest.

13

In Rasmuson, 109 Fed. Cl. at 275, this court likewise concluded that “[t]he

condemnation statute did not bar the railroad’s right to acquire greater interests in land than

otherwise authorized through condemnation,” adding that “[n]othing in Iowa law provides that a

deed granting a fee interest to a railroad for a negotiated sum should be construed in accordance

with anything but the intent of the parties as expressed in plain terms.”

- 15 -

4. Parcels that Adjoin Segments of the Rail Corridor Which the Railroad

Allegedly Owned in Fee, Where the Deed or Other Conveyance Documents

Are Available.

As to three parcels (44.E, 114 and 150.B), which were once owned by the Railroad in fee,

plaintiffs argue that Iowa Code § 327G-77(1), conferring property interests to the owners of

property adjoining an abandoned rail line, applies. However, by its terms, this provision applies

only to “a railroad easement is extinguished under section 327G.76.” As this language indicates,

this provision does not apply where the rail corridor is owned in fee. See McKinley v. Waterloo

R. Co., 368 N.W. 2d 131, 138 (Iowa 1985) (“This statute applies only to easements and land

acquired by condemnation.”); Turner v. Unknown Claimants of Land in Section 4, 207 N.W. 2d

544, 546 (Iowa 1973) (“reverter statute does not apply” where railroad “own[ed] the strip of

land”); see also Montgomery Cnty. v. Case, 232 N.W. 150 (Iowa 1930). Accordingly, the

reverter statute does not apply to the parcels listed above. 14

5. Parcels that Do Not Adjoin the Rail Corridor.

Claimant Name Claim Source

Richard L. & Kathy S. Kleen 77.B F-406

American Legion Post #23 89 H-297

Robert Tatman 90 F-384

Carol & Larry Rasmussen 93 F-384

Dawn Shryock 97 F-384

Rick B. & Phyllis M. Hartwig 102 F-406

Brett Heaton 103 F-406

Matthew L. & Dawn D. Zeman 104 F-406

Michael E. & Richard H. Jensen 105 F-406

Larry Gilbert Revocable Trust 106 F-406

Gertrude M. Shipley 107 F-406

Evelyn Larsen 108 F-406

Raymond N. & Mary Lou John 109 F-406

Jean J. & Joan J. McKnight 111 F-406

Tanya A. Noble 112 F-406

Sarah E. Page Verrips 113 F-406

Underwood Family Trust 115.A F-410

William A. & Carol J. Naviaux 120 F-403, F-413

As to the parcels in Spirit Lake, Iowa, listed above, defendant argues that one or more

parcels owned by a third party, Dickinson County, separates the parcels from the rail corridor.

Defendant bases that assertion on a quitclaim deed that Dickinson County obtained from Iowa

Northwestern’s predecessor-in-interest, Midwestern Railroad, in 1994. Plaintiffs argue that the

14

The parties’ briefs appear to agree that only a portion of parcel 150.B was owned in

fee and is subject to this ruling; as to the remainder of that parcel, it is difficult to discern what

the parties are arguing and the court defers its ruling.

- 16 -

1994 conveyance should be ignored because Midwestern possessed only an easement for railroad

purposes and that Dickinson could acquire no greater rights from Midwestern than the railroad

itself possessed.

A review of the relevant deeds does suggest that the interest originally possessed by the

Midwestern Railroad was an easement for railroad purposes. 15 At the very least, that position is

strongly arguable. However, the 1994 quitclaim deed, under which the Dickinson County

Conservation Board obtained its interest in the properties, contained different language,

conveying “all interest” in the affected parcels, including an “[i]ncorporated railroad right of

way.” Contrary to plaintiffs’ claims, this quitclaim deed does not appear to transfer only the

right-of-way. This is important, for defendant appears correct in arguing that if Dickinson

County did not obtain a fee interest in the intervening parcel through the 1994 conveyance, it,

nevertheless, acquired the same through adverse possession prior to the time the NITU was

issued here. Under Iowa law:

[W]hen one who in good faith enters into possession of a tract of land under a

deed conveying the same to him absolutely without exception or reservation, and

continues in possession thereof for 10 years, all outstanding claims or interests in

or to said tract are completely barred by the statute of limitations.

Collins v. Reimers, 165 N.W. 373, 375 (Iowa 1917). For this doctrine to apply, there must be

proof that the “possession” was “hostile, actual, open, exclusive and continuous” for the required

ten-year period. C.H. Moore Trust Est. by Warner v. City of Storm Lake, 423 N.W. 2d 13, 15

(Iowa 1988); see also Garrett v. Huster, 684 N.W. 2d 250, 253 (Iowa 2004). Proof of these

elements must be “clear and positive.” C.H. Moore Trust Est., 423 N.W. 2d at 15.

Here, Dickinson County, relying on the 1994 quitclaim deed from Midwestern Railroad,

openly constructed, maintained and used the parcels in question as a trail. Every indication is

that it thereby exercised “the type of possession or control owners ordinarily exercise in holding,

managing and caring for property of like nature and condition.” Burgess v. Leverett & Assocs.,

105 N.W. 2d 703, 706 (Iowa 1960). Evidence in the case indicates that the trail was in use by no

later than July 1998, more than ten years before the NITU was issued in this case, and that

adverse possession thus ripened into fee ownership prior to the issuance of the NITU. An Iowa

court reached an analogous holding in Louisa County, 778 N.W. 2d at 204. There, a county

conservation board filed a quiet title action seeking to be declared the absolute owner in fee

simple of an abandoned railroad right-of-way based on a quitclaim deed. Reversing a contrary

trial court decision, the Iowa appellate court held that the board’s predecessor-in-interest’s use of

a parcel as a nature trail triggered the adverse possession rules, shifting ownership to those

15

Twelve of the eighteen (parcels) were subject to deeds in which the property owners

conveyed to the railroad a “Right-of-Way for [a described] railway,” to be used “for the purposes

of constructing a Railway thereon, and for all uses and purposes connected with the use of said

Railway.”

- 17 -

predecessors prior to the time the property was quit claimed. Id. at 207. The court of appeals

held that the interest so acquired was then transferred by deed to the board. Id. at 209.

Based on the rules outlined in Louisa County, the court holds that Dickinson County, by

relying on its 1994 deed and operating the corridor as a trail, acquired an interest in the

intervening parcels via adverse possession prior to the time of the NITU here. Because

Dickinson’s actions were based upon a deed, its adverse use gave rise not merely to a

prescriptive easement, but also to the acquisition of fee title to the property. See Ravenwood,

L.L.C v. Kevin Koethe, 8450/10, L.L.C., 808 N.W. 2d 754 (Iowa App. 2011) (table) (describing

the difference between an easement obtained through prescription and adverse possession

leading to acquisition of the title to the property). 16 This prevents the owners of the parcels in

this category from claiming compensation as adjoining property holders. 17

6. Parcels for Which Plaintiffs are Unable to Produce Conveyance

Documents or Other Documents Demonstrating Ownership.

As to the two parcels in this category (27.A and 83.A), plaintiffs have failed to produce

any documents documenting the circumstances under which the railroad acquired use of the

property. Plaintiffs argue that absent such documentation, the court must presume that the

Railroad possessed only an easement for railroad purposes. Adoption of this argument, however,

would turn the burden of proof in this case on its head.

The Federal Circuit has made amply clear that “[i]t is plaintiffs’ burden to establish

cognizable property interests for purposes of their takings . . . claims.” Klamath Irr. Dist. v.

United States, 635 F.3d 505, 519 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Estate of Hage v. United States,

687 F.3d 1281, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206,

1212 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

16

Because Dickinson County was relying on a deed, it did not need to meet the other

requirements under Iowa law relating to easements by prescription. See Iowa Code § 564.1

(requiring a claimant to provide express notice to the owner of the servient estate).

17

The court likewise finds that parcels that were separated from the rail corridor by 140th

Street (34.A and 34.B) do not adjoin the rail corridor. Plaintiffs rely on Adkins v. United States,

2013 WL 951158 (Fed. Cl. 2013) for the proposition that the filing of a plat dedicating a road to

an unincorporated village conveys only an easement to use the tract for public purposes. Id. at

*4-5 (citing Town of Kenwood Park v. Leonard, 158 N.W. 655, 658 (Iowa 1916)). In Steicklein,

however, the Iowa Supreme Court made clear that upon the incorporation of a city and its

acceptance of the same dedication, the village streets “are held by the incorporated city in fee

simple.” Steicklein, 693 N.W. 2d 335, 339 (Iowa 2005); see also Kelroy v. City of Clear Lake, 5

N.W. 2d 12, 16 (Iowa 1942); Inc. Town of Ackley v. Cent. States Elec. Co., 220 N.W. 315, 316

(Iowa 1928). The latter rule of law applies here and compels the court to conclude, as to this

issue, that defendant is correct.

- 18 -

And this requirement plainly applies to rails-to-trails cases. See Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 237;

Thomas v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 467, 478 (2012); Rhutasel, 105 Fed. Cl. at 226-27.

Moreover, nothing in Iowa law alters this proof requirement. See Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 237;

Jenkins, 102 Fed. Cl. at 604.

The affected plaintiffs have not met their burden of proof. In some instances, this is

because they have produced nothing to support their ownership claim. In other instances, it is

because the evidence produced merely suggests that a right-of-way was transferred, but does not

prove whether such an interest was, in fact, conveyed, or if an easement was conveyed, whether

that interest was unrestricted, subject only to railroad use, or subject to some other limitation.

See Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 237. Accordingly, as to these parcels, plaintiffs have failed to

establish that they have a cognizable property interest, requiring that the claims relating to these

parcels be dismissed. 18

7. Other Parcels for Which the Evidence is Disputed.

Claimant Name Claim Source

Larry L. & Ruby E. Brunk 21.A & 21.B 5-519

Hans J. & Bernice Willadsen 25.A 5-382

Kay G. & Susan D. Blahauvietz 34.A & 34.B 3-384

Arco Dehydrating Co., Inc. 44.A H-191

Everett J. & Phyllis A. Johnson Revocable

59 F-410

Trust

As to the seven parcels listed above, the parties make various conflicting factual

arguments that rely, inter alia, on the chain of title and plat maps in the record. As to six of these

parcels (all but parcel 59), the parties have provided conflicting evidence as to whether these

parcels adjoin the rail corridor. Determining whether that is the case is, of course, critical under

Iowa Code §§ 327G.76 and 77, which confer a statutory reversionary right to adjoining

landowners triggered upon the extinguishment of a railroad easement. Primarily, these factual

disputes focus on whether the parcel in question is separated from the rail corridor by property

owned by a third party. In some instances, these disputes impact only a portion of the affected

parcel, with the parties agreeing that the remainder of the parcel either does or does not adjoin

the rail corridor. In the court’s view, these disputes give rise to genuine issues of material fact

that cannot be resolved under the pending motions, but must instead be resolved at trial. See

Burgess, 109 Fed. Cl. at 238.

18

Contrary to defendant’s claims, the court believes that plaintiffs have provided

sufficient documentation of ownership as to parcel 27.A. While plaintiffs are unable to provide a

deed that perfectly matches the legal description of the subject property, that incongruity is

explained by a 1959 affidavit of the county assessor. Defendant has not provided any evidence

contradicting this affidavit. In the court’s view, this means that plaintiffs are entitled to partial

summary judgment as to liability for this parcel. See RCFC 56(c)(1); 56(d)(2); see also Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

- 19 -

* * * * *

A chart summarizing the court’s conclusions regarding all 360 parcels may be found in

Appendix A to this opinion.

III. CONCLUSION

This court need go no further. Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS, in part, and

DENIES, in part, plaintiffs’ supplemental motion for partial summary judgment, and

GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part, defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. On

or before March 14, 2014, the parties shall file a joint status report indicating how this case

should proceed, with a proposed schedule, as appropriate. The parties shall have at least one

serious discussion regarding settlement before filing this report.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Francis M. Allegra

Francis M. Allegra

Judge

- 20 -

APPENDIX A

Claimant Name Claim Source Category

1. Dale W. and Danna S. Braaksma 1.A 3-402 2(b)

2. Dale W. & Danna S. Braaksma 1.B 3-402 2(b)

3. Allendorf Wind Farm Inc., c/o Irvin Clubine 2.A 3-402 2(c)

4. Allendorf Wind Farm Inc., c/o Irvin Clubine 2.B 3-419, 13-287 2(c)

5. Farmers Cooper Elevator Company of Allendorf 3 3-402, 13-286 2(c)

6. The Estate of Theodore Pranger; Loreen J. Bruxvoort; John W. Pranger 4.A 3-419, 13-287 2(b)

7. The Estate of Theodore Pranger; Loreen J. Bruxvoort; John W. Pranger 4.B 3-419 2(b)

8. The Estate of Theodore Pranger; Loreen J. Bruxvoort; John W. Pranger 4.C 3-419 2(b)

9. The Estate of Theodore Pranger; Loreen J. Bruxvoort; John W. Pranger 4.D 5-471 2(a)

10. Wayne D. & Esther Moet 5.A 3-417 2(b)

11. Wayne D. & Esther Moet 5.B 3-417 2(b)

12. Wayne D. & Esther Moet 5.C 3-417 2(b)

13. Juliana Garret & Judson Te Paske 6.A 5-353 2(b)

14. Juliana Garret & Judson Te Paske 6.B 5-353 2(b)

15. Juliana Garret & Judson Te Paske 6.C 5-353 2(b)

16. Juliana Garret & Judson Te Paske 6.D 5-353 2(b)

17. Juliana Garret & Judson Te Paske 6.E 5-353 2(b)

18. M. Rock Marco & Dan Hartwig 7.A 5-353 2(b)

19. M. Rock Marco & Dan Hartwig 7.B 5-353 2(b)

20. M. Rock Marco & Dan Hartwig 7.C 5-353 2(b)

21. Robert & Sylvia A. Rolfes 8.A 5-353 2(a)

22. Robert & Sylvia A. Rolfes 8.B 5-353 2(a)

23. Robert & Sylvia A. Rolfes 8.C 5-353 2(a)

24. Osceola County Courthouse 9.A 5-353 2(d)

25. Osceola County Courthouse 9.B 5-353 2(d)

26. Osceola County Courthouse 9.C 5-394 2(d)

27. Osceola County Courthouse 9.D 5-394 2(d)

28. Osceola County Courthouse 9.E 5-406 2(d)

29. Osceola County Conservation Board 9.F 5-471 2(d)

30. Osceola County Conservation Board 9.G 5-471 2(d)

31. Osceola County Conservation Board 9.H 5-471 2(d)

32. Osceola County Conservation Board 9.I 5-471 2(d)

33. Osceola County 9.J 5-519 2(d)

34. Osceola County Courthouse 9.K 5-495 2(d)

35. Clear Lake Stock Farms, Inc., c/o John Dreeson 10.A 5-394 2(a)

36. Clear Lake Stock Farms, Inc., c/o John Dreeson 10.B 5-394 2(a)

37. Sonstegard Family Farms, c/o Phil Sonstegard 11.A 5-406 2(a)

38. Sonstegard Family Farms, IA General Partnership 11.B 5-406 2(a)

39. Sonstegard Family Farms, IA General Partnership 11.C 5-471 2(a)

40. Sonstegard Family Farms, IA General Partnership 11.D 3-114 3

41. Sonstegard Family Farms, IA General Partnership 11.E 5-495 2(c)

42. Sonstegard Family Farms, IA General Partnership 11.F 5-495 2(c)

43. Sonstegard Family Farms, IA General Partnership 11.G 5-495 2(c)

44. Sonstegard Family Farms, IA General Partnership 11.H 3-388 2(b)

45. Sonstegard Family Farms, IA General Partnership 11.I 3

46. Sonstegard Family Farms, IA General Partnership 11.J 3-384 2(b)

47. Sonstegard Family Farms, c/o John Carlson, Sr. 11.K 3

48. Sonstegard Family Farms, c/o John Carlson, Sr. 11.L H-555 2(b)

49. Earl Faber 12.A 5-469 2(a)

50. Earl Faber 12.B 5-471 2(a)

- 21 -

Claimant Name Claim Source Category

51. Earl Faber 12.C 5-471 2(a)

52. Mary, Debra, Roger, Norman, Dwaine, Allen, & Karen Swalve; Janice Neilsen 13.A 3-400 2(b)

53. Mary, Debra, Roger, Norman, Dwaine, Allen, & Karen Swalve; Janice Neilsen 13.B 3-400 2(b)

54. Marlin & Mary Laverman 14.A 5-374 2(a)

55. Marlin & Mary Laverman 14.B 5-374 2(a)

56. Marlin & Mary Laverman 14.C 5-374 2(a)

57. Christian Reformed Church c/o Larry Post 15.A 5-353 1

58. Christian Reformed Church c/o Larry Post 15.B 5-353 1

59. Lawrence W. & Vonna R. Leckband 16.A 5-340 2(a)

60. Lawrence W. Leckband 16.B 5-340 2(a)

61. Lawrence W. Leckband 16.C 5-340 2(a)

62. Lawrence W. Lackband 16.D 5-340 2(a)

63. Mark and Verna Salzman 17 5-340 2(a)

64. James Hesebeck 18 5-340, 5-480 2(a)

65. Cooperative Elevator Association of Ocheyedan 19.A 5-340, 5-480 2(a)

66. Cooperative Elevator Association of Ocheyedan 19.B 5-519, 5-515 2(a)

67. Cooperative Elevator Association of Ocheyedan 19.C 5-519, 5-515 2(a)

68. Cooperative Elevator Association of Ocheyedan, c/o Robert Jacobs 19.D 5-402 2(a)

69. Cooperative Elevator Association of Ocheyedan 19.E 3-388 2(b)

70. Randall W. Boeke 20.A 5-519 2(c)

71. Randall W. Boeke 20.B 5-519 2(a)

72. Larry L. & Ruby E. Brunk 21.A 5-519 7

73 Larry L. & Ruby E. Brunk 21.B 5-519 7

74. Larry L. & Ruby E. Brunk 21.C 5-519 2(a)

75. Douglas D. & Danette K. Block 22.A 5-353 2(a)

76. Douglas D. & Danette K. Block 22.B 5-353 2(a)

77. Douglas D. & Danette K. Block 22.C 5-353 2(a)

78. Douglas D. & Danette K. Block 22.D 5-353 2(a)

79. Alan Hart 23.A 5-353 2(a)

80. Helen Hart 23.B 5-353 2(a)

81. Helen Hart 23.C 5-353 2(a)

82. Alan Hart 23.D 5-353 2(a)

83. Alan Hart 23.E 5-353 2(a)

84. Alan Hart 23.F 5-353 2(a)

85. Alan Hart 23.G 5-376 2(a)

86. Maurice D. & Barbara L. Block 24.A 5-353 2(a)

87. Maurice D. & Barbara L. Block 24.B 5-353 2(a)

88. Hans J. & Bernice Willadsen 25.A 5-382 7

89. Hans J. & Bernice Willadsen 25.B 5-382 2(a)

90. Hans J. & Bernice Willadsen 25.C 5-382 2(a)

91. Larry Bosma; Jerry & Marcella Bosma; Darlene Wassink; Arlene Van Beek;

Ester Bosma; Presentation Sisters, Inc; Charles & Joyce Bosma; Leo Bosma; 26.A 5-384 2(a)

Pamela & Duane Van deHoef; Lucella Bosma; Frances B. Bosma Trust

92. Larry Bosma; Jerry & Marcella Bosma; Darlene Wassink; Arlene Van Beek;

Ester Bosma; Presentation Sisters, Inc; Charles & Joyce Bosma; Leo Bosma; 26.B 5-412 2(a)

Pamela & Duane Van deHoef; Lucella Bosma; Frances B. Bosma Trust

93. Merle L. & Sarah J. Pedley 27.A 5-380 6

94. Merle L. & Sarah J. Pedley 27.B 5-388 2(a)

95. Merle L. & Sarah J. Pedley 27.C 5-394 2(b)

96. Travaille Family Farms Inc., c/o Robert Travaille, President 28.A 5-380 2(a)

97. Travaille Family Farms Inc., c/o Robert Travaille, President 28.B 5-388 2(a)

98. Eugene C. Schmidt 29 3-394 2(b)

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Claimant Name Claim Source Category

99. Wilfred & Ellen Bosma 30.A 3-394 2(b)

100. Wilfred & Ellen Bosma 30.B 3-392 2(b)

101. Wilfred & Ellen Bosma 30.C 3-392 2(b)

102. Wilfred & Ellen Bosma 30.D 3-392 2(b)

103. Dale L. Peters 31.A 3-392 2(b)

104. Dale L. Peters 31.B 3-392 2(b)

105. Dale L. Peters 31.C 3-390 2(a)

106. Tom & Le Ann Ransom 32.A H-313 3

107. Tom & Le Ann Ransom 32.B 5-495 2(c)

108. Tom & Le Ann Ransom 32.C 5-495 2(c)

109. Tom & Le Ann Ransom 32.D 5-495 2(c)

110. J&M Partnership LLP, c/o Mark Bergman 33.A 5-424 2(c)

111. J&M Partnership LLP, c/o Mary Bergman 33.B 5-424 1

112. J&M Partnership LLP, c/o Mary Bergman 33.C 5-424 1

113. J&M Partnership LLP, c/o Mary Bergman 33.D 5-402 2(a)

114. J&M Partnership LLP, c/o Mary Bergman 33.E 3-388 2(b)

115. J&M Partnership LLP, c/o Mary Bergman 33.F 3-388 2(b)

116. Kay G. & Susan D. Blahauvietz 34.A 3-384 7

117. Kay G. & Susan D. Blahauvietz 34.B 3-384 7

118. Ardyce Rueter 35.A 3-384 2(b)

119. Ardyce Rueter 35.B 3-386 2(b)

120. Scott Rueter Revocable Trust 36.A 5-495 2(c)

121. Scott Rueter Revocable Trust 36.B 5-495 2(c)

122. Gerald R. & Joan C. Vander Muelen 37.A 5-406 2(a)

123. Gerald R. & Joan C. Vander Muelen 37.B 5-406 2(a)

124. Randy E. Clark; Linda Kunzman; Barbra A. Cambilargui & Lori M. Clark- 2(a)

38.A H-564

Cotterman

125. Randy E. Clark; Linda Kunzman; Barbra A. Cambilargui & Lori M. Clark- 2(a)

38.B H-564

Cotterman

126. Randy E. Clark; Linda Kunzman; Barbra A. Cambilargui & Lori M. Clark- 2(a)

38.C H-564

Cotterman

127. Randy E. Clark; Linda Kunzman; Barbra A. Cambilargui & Lori M. Clark- 2(a)

38.D H-560

Cotterman

128. Randy E. Clark; Linda Kunzman; Barbra A. Cambilargui & Lori M. Clark- 2(a)

38.E H-560

Cotterman

129. Clifford L. Nebelsick 39.A H-560 2(a)

130. Clifford L. Nebelsick 39.B H-560 2(a)

131. Clifford L. Nebelsick 39.C H-560 2(a)

132. Frederick & Scott W. Goodno; Stacy Wiese; Justin & Shawna Goodno 40.A H-560 2(a)

133. Frederick & Scott W. Goodno; Stacy Wiese; Justin & Shawna Goodno 40.B H-560 2(a)

134. Frederick & Scott W. Goodno; Stacy Wiese; Justin & Shawna Goodno 40.C H-555 2(a)

135. Frederick & Scott W. Goodno; Stacy Wiese; Justin & Shawna Goodno 40.D H-555 2(a)

136. Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert 2(b)

41.A H-555

Revocable Trust

137. Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert 2(b)

41.B H-565

Revocable Trust

138. Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert 2(b)

41.C H-565

Revocable Trust

139. Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert 2(b)

41.D H-557

Revocable Trust

140. Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert 2(b)

41.E H-557

Revocable Trust

141. Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert 2(a)

41.F H-191

Revocable Trust

142. Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert 2(a)

41.G H-191

Revocable Trust

- 23 -

Claimant Name Claim Source Category

143. Jared Andrew Herbert Revocable Trust & The Mary Julianne Spencer-Herbert 2(a)

41.H H-191

Revocable Trust

144. Steven A. & Jennifer L. Krummen; Stewart A. Krummen; Craig S. Krummen & 2(b)

42.A H-565

Royce Krummen

145. Steven A. & Jennifer L. Krummen; Stewart A. Krummen; Craig S. Krummen & 2(b)

42.B H-565

Royce Krummen

146. Steven A. & Jennifer L. Krummen; Stewart A. Krummen; Craig S. Krummen & 2(b)

42.C H-557

Royce Krummen

147. Steven A. & Jennifer L. Krummen; Stewart A. Krummen; Craig S. Krummen & 2(b)

42.D H-557

Royce Krummen

148. Steven A. & Jennifer L. Krummen; Stewart A. Krummen; Craig S. Krummen & 2(a)

42.E H-191

Royce Krummen

149. Randall J. Johnson 43.A H-557 2(b)

150. Randall J. Johnson 43.B H-557 2(b)

151. Randall J. Johnson 43.C H-191 2(a)

152. Arco Dehydrating Co. Inc., c/o Steven Krummen, President 44.A H-191 7

153. Arco Dehydrating Co. Inc., c/o Steven Krummen, President 44.B H-191 2(a)

154. Arco Dehydrating Co. Inc., c/o Steven Krummen, President 44.C H-191 2(a)

155. Arco Dehydrating Co. Inc., c/o Steven Krummen, President 44.D H-191 2(a)

156. Arco Dehydrating Co. Inc., c/o Steven Krummen, President 44.E H-191 4

157. Arco Dehydrating Co. Inc., c/o Steven Krummen, President 44.F H-239 2(b)

158. Arco Dehydrating Co. Inc., c/o Steven Krummen, President 44.G H-239 2(b)

159. Gregory L. Baloun 45.A H-191 2(a)

160. Gregory L. Baloun 45.B H-191 2(a)

161. Gregory L. Baloun 45.C H-191 2(a)

162. Gregory L. Baloun 45.D H-191 2(a)

163. Gregory L. Baloun & Wes McClure 45.E H-135 2(a)

164. Allen and Mary J. Arnold 46 H-135 2(a)

165. William Steven & Dianne Kathleen Jansen 47 H-135 2(a)

166. Lake Park Development Corp. c/o Richard Packebush 48 H-135 2(a)

167. Bradley T. & Francel L. Graham 49.A H-135 2(a)

168. Bradley T. & Francel L. Graham 49.B H-135 2(a)

169. Bradley T. & Francel L. Graham 49.C H-135 2(a)

170. Krummen Farms LP, c/o Steven Krummen 50.A H-135 2(a)

171. Krummen Farms LP, c/o Steven Krummen 50.B H-135 2(a)

172. Krummen Farms LP, c/o Steven Krummen 50.C H-135 2(a)

173. Krummen Farms LP, c/o Steven Krummen 50.D H-135 2(a)

174. Krummen Farms LP, c/o Steven Krummen 50.E H-135 2(a)

175. Robert Allen 51.A H-162 2(a)

176. Robert Allen 51.B H-162 2(a)

177. Robert Allen 51.C H-162 2(a)

178. Harold R. Hartmann Trust, Darlene S. Hartmann, Trustee 52.A H-162 2(a)

179. Harold R. Hartmann Trust, Darlene S. Hartmann, Trustee 52.B H-162 2(a)

180. Harold R. Hartmann Trust, Darlene S. Hartmann, Trustee 52.C H-218, H-222 2(a)

181. Harold R. Hartmann Trust, Darlene S. Hartmann, Trustee 52.D H-221, H-220 2(b)

182. Harold R. Hartmann Trust, Darlene S. Hartmann, Trustee 52.E H-221, H-220 2(b)

183. James H. & Mary C. Watts 53 H-231, H-233 2(b)

184. Randall & Russell Eckard 54.A H-231, H-233 2(b)

185. Randall & Russell Eckard 54.B H-231, H-233 2(b)

186. Donald C. McHose, Richard R. McHose & Elwin Pearey 55.A H-231, H-233 2(b)

187. Donald C. McHose, Richard R. McHose & Elwin Pearey H-231, H-233, 2(b)

55.B

H-229

188. Donald C. McHose, Richard R. McHose & Elwin Pearey H-231, H-233, 2(b)

55.C

H-229

- 24 -

Claimant Name Claim Source Category

189. Donald C. McHose, Richard R. McHose & Elwin Pearey H-231, H-233, 2(b)

55.D

H-229

190. Estate of Ester Gath H-231, H-233, 2(b)

56.A

H-229

191. Estate of Ester Gath H-231, H-233, 2(b)

56.B

H-229

193. Timothy S. Hoerichs & Ann L. Hoerichs Family Trust, Timothy & Ann 2(a)

57.A H-161

Hoerichs, Trustees

194. Timothy S. Hoerichs & Ann L. Hoerichs Family Trust, Timothy & Ann 2(a)

57.B H-161

Hoerichs, Trustees

195. David B. Olson 58 H-161 2(a)

196. Everett J. & Phyllis A. Johnson Revocable Trust 59 F-410 7

197. Harlen M. Mitchell Revocable Trust & Lennace E. Mitchell Revocable Trust, 2(b)

60.A H-226

c/o Scott Mitchell POA

198. Harlen M. Mitchell Revocable Trust & Lennace E. Mitchell Revocable Trust, 2(b)

60.B H-226

c/o Scott Mitchell POA

199. Orr Family Farm Company LLC, c/o Julia Ceasar 61 H-224 2(b)

200. Sunny Joan Fronk Revocable Trust 62 H-224 2(b)

201. Jon & Tim Gunderson 63.A H-224 2(c)

202. Jon Gunderson 63.B H-289 2(a)

203. Furman Realty, c/o CJ Furman 64 H-224 2(b)

204. Donald R. & Phyllis Lago, c/o Douglas K. Lago POA 65.A H-222 2(b)

205. Donald R. & Phyllis Lago, c/o Douglas K. Lago POA 65.B H-220, H-221 2(b)

206. Donald R. & Phyllis Lago, c/o Douglas K. Lago POA 65.C H-220, H-221 2(b)

207. Cohrs Construction, Inc. 66 H-289 2(a)

208. Mark S. & Carol Coleman 67 H-216, H-163 1

209. Evelyn McClurg & The McClurg Family Farm, LLC 68.A H-288 2(a)

210. Evelyn McClurg & The McClurg Family Farm, LLC 68.B H-288 2(a)

211. Evelyn McClurg & The McClurg Family Farm, LLC 68.C H-288 2(a)

212. Paul J. & Diane L. Kollasch 69 H-288 2(a)

213. Jerry Edward Miller 70.A H-288 2(a)

214. Jerry Edward Miller 70.B H-288 2(a)

215. Gwendolyn Vetter 71.A H-288 2(a)

216. Gwendolyn Vetter 71.B H-288 2(a)

217. Gwendolyn Vetter 71.C H-177 2(a)

218. Gwendolyn Vetter 71.D H-193 2(a)

219. Gwendolyn Vetter 71.E H-193 2(a)

220. Janet Bergman Revocable Trust, c/o Janet Bergman, Trustee 72 H-194 2(a)

221. Terry L. & Cheryl L. Bruns 73 H-194 2(a)

222. Don B. & Barbara F. Erlandson 74 H-194 2(a)

223. Raymond A. & Darlene Gustafson 75.A H-194 2(a)

224. Raymond A. & Darlene Gustafson 75.B H-194 2(a)

225. Scott & Mary Lynn Ingvall 76 H-194 2(a)

226. Richard L. & Kathy S. Kleen 77.A H-194 2(a)

227. Richard L. & Kathy S. Kleen 77.B F-406 5

228. Todd Krieger 78.A H-194 2(a)

229. Todd Krieger 78.B H-194 2(a)

230. Kathleen M. Krueger 79.A H-194 2(a)

231. Kathleen M. Krueger 79.B H-194 2(a)

232. Kathleen M. Krueger 79.C H-194 2(a)

233. Dennis A. & Marilyn K. Ladwig 80.A H-194 2(a)

234. Dennis A. & Marilyn K. Ladwig 80.B H-194 2(a)

235. G. Wallis Reed Trust, G. Wallis Reed, Trustee 81 H-194 2(a)

236. Roger F. Reppert Revocable Trust, Roger F. Reppert, Trustee 82 H-194 2(a)

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Claimant Name Claim Source Category

237. Arthur J. Thompson & Jill N. McDowell 83.A H-194 6

238. Arthur J. Thompson & Jill N. McDowell 83.B H-194 2(a)

239. Ferrellgas Inc. c/o Jason P. Cullen 84 H-194 2(a)

240. Jack L. & Beverly J. Longmore 85.A F-402 2(a)

241. Jack L. & Beverly J. Longmore 85.B F-402 2(a)

242. Craig F. & Ellen M. Moffitt 86 H-194 2(a)

243. Deja Blues Diner, LLC c/o Ivan Brown 87 F-402 2(c)

244. BV Buildings, LLC c/o John C. Brown 88.A F-402 2(c)

245. BV Buildings, LLC c/o John C. Brown 88.B F-402 2(c)

246. American Legion Post #23 c/o Denny L. Perry, Commander 89 H-297 5

247. Robert Tatman 90 F-384 5

248. Martin & Melinda Marten 91 F-384 1

249. Albert Bartley 92 F-384 1

250. Carol & Larry Rasmussen 93 F-384 5

251. Scott Trigg & Nancy J. Johnson 94 1

252. Richard A. & Karla J. Heinrichs 95.A F-384 2(a)

253. Richard A. & Karla J. Heinrichs 95.B F-384 2(a)

254. Richard A. & Karla J. Heinrichs 95.C F-384 2(a)

255. Ronald D. Claussen Revocable Trust 96.A F-384 2(a)

256. Ronald D. Claussen Revocable Trust 96.B F-384 2(a)

257. Dawn Shryock 97 F-384 5

258. Neil & Katie Slater 98 F-402 2(c)

259. Brian A. & Carol A. Woods 99 F-384 2(a)

260. Michael K. De Jong 100 F-406 1

261. Maye M. Swanson 101 F-406 1

262. Rick B. & Phyllis M. Hartwig 102 F-406 5

263. Brett Heaton 103 F-406 5

264. Matthew L. & Dawn D. Zeman 104 F-406 5

265. Michael E. & Richard H. Jensen 105 F-406 5

266. Larry Gilbert Revocable Trust, c/o Larry Gilbert and Chris & Angela Geinitz 106 F-406 5

267. Gertrude M. Shipley 107 F-406 5

268. Evelyn Larsen 108 F-406 5

269. Raymond N. & Mary Lou John 109 F-406 5

270. Dan M. & Lori D. Lewis 110 1

271. Jean J. & Joan J. McKnight 111 F-406 5

272. Tanya A. Noble 112 F-406 5

273. Sarah E. Page Verrips 113 F-406 5

274. Mark & Karen Byers 114 F-410 4

275. Underwood Family Trust, c/o Tom Underwood 115.A F-410 5

276. Underwood Family Trust, c/o Tom Underwood 115.B H-74 2(b)

277. Underwood Family Trust, c/o Tom Underwood 115.C H-74 2(b)

278. Robert W. Thorbrogger 116 F-403, F-413 2(a)

279. Janice M. Schultz 117 F-403, F-413 2(a)

280. Frigate LLC, c/o Natalie Brenton 118.A F-403, F-413 2(a)

281. Frigate LLC, c/o Natalie Brenton 118.B F-403, F-413 2(a)

282. David S. & Darlene I. Shaw 119.A F-403, F-413 2(a)

283. David S. & Darlene I. Shaw 119.B F-403, F-413 2(a)

284. William A. & Carol J. Naviaux 120 F-403, F-413 5

285. Keith L. & Susan L. Ostrum 121 H-313 2(a)

286. Mark A. & Kristine L. Hoss 122 F-403, F-413 2(a)

287. Reed L. Potter, Julie A. Bergquist, POA 123 F-403, F-413 2(a)

- 26 -

Claimant Name Claim Source Category

288. James E. & Pamela A. Feld 124 H-313 2(a)

289. Thomas L. Hoffman 125 H-313 2(a)

290. Linda S. Taylor 126 H-313 2(a)

291. Dennis D. & Anita Dean 127.A H-313 2(a)

292. Dennis D. & Anita Dean 127.B H-313 2(a)

293. Scott V. & Jolene C. Egertson 128 H-313 2(a)

294. Gregory A. & Connie J. Tolan 129 H-313 2(a)

295. Michael T. & Rhonda F. Reekers 130 H-313 2(a)

296. Beverly Jean Steinberger 131 H-313 2(a)

297. Arthur C & Roxa L. Cummings 132 H-313 2(a)

298. Kathleen M. Drysdale 133 H-313 2(a)

299. Kimberly K. Durst 134 H-313 2(a)

300. Gary & Tom Kuhlman, Kathy Jo Swalve, Sally Ann Lundberg & Phoebe 2(a)

135 H-313

Hersom

301. Duane H. Serck 136 F-417, H-66 2(a)

302. Clint T. & Lindsay R. Robinson 137 H-164 2(a)

303. William J. & Carleen C. Lambert 138.A H-164 2(a)

304. William J. & Carleen C. Lambert 138.B F-420 2(a)

305. William J. & Carleen C. Lambert 138.C F-404 2(b)

306. Joyce Overocker 139.A F-412, F-419 2(a)

307. Joyce Overocker 139.B F-412, F-419 2(a)

308. Joyce Overocker 139.C F-412 2(a)

309. Joyce Overocker 139.D F-411 2(a)

310. Rohn K. Shepley 140 F-412 2(a)

311. Lavonne Esther Hansen 141.A F-411 2(a)

312. Lavonne Esther Hansen 141.B F-411 2(a)

313. Margerite Butcher Revocable Trust 142.A F-420 2(a)

314. Margerite Butcher Revocable Trust 142.B F-404 2(a)

315. Margerite Butcher Revocable Trust 142.C F-416 2(a)

316. Margerite Butcher Revocable Trust 142.D F-416 2(a)

317. Margaret Hill Northey 143.A F-415 2(a)

318. Margaret Hill Northey 143.B F-415 2(a)

319. Douglas A. & Nancy N. Pringnitz 144.A F-415 2(a)

320. Douglas A. & Nancy N. Pringnitz 144.B F-415 2(a)

321. Robert Turpin, Mary Seylar, James L. Turpin Family Trust 145.A H-74 2(b)

322. Robert Turpin, Mary Seylar, James L. Turpin Family Trust 145.B H-74 2(b)

323. Robert & Peggy Turpin 145.C H-74 2(b)

324. Arnold Cook Trust, Bruce Cook, Trustee (signed by Van C. Vernon) 146.A H-76 2(b)

325. Arnold Cook Trust, Bruce Cook, Trustee (signed by Van C. Vernon) 146.B H-76 2(b)

326. Monte R. & Chet H. Hartung and Kristyn S. Shafrath 147.A H-76 2(b)

327. Monte R. & Chet H. Hartung and Kristyn S. Shafrath 147.B H-76 2(b)

328. Monte R. & Chet H. Hartung and Kristyn S. Shafrath 147.C H-76 2(b)

329. Monte R. & Chet H. Hartung and Kristyn S. Shafrath 147.D H-76 2(b)

330. Giese family Farms, Inc. 148 H-77 2(b)

331. Irel D. and June R. Bruns 149 H-77 2(b)

332. James C. & Susan M. Wendelsdorf 150.A H-77 2(b)

333. James C. & Susan M. Wendelsdorf 150.B H-77 4

334. Jon & Deborah Brekke 151.A H-77 2(b)

335. Jon & Deborah Brekke 151.B H-77 2(b)

336. Wireless Network Management Inc., c/o Michael A. Mitchell 152 H-77 2(b)

337. Steven J. & Julie A. Ingvall 153 H-194 2(a)

338. Jerry Moore 154 H-313 2(a)

- 27 -

Claimant Name Claim Source Category

339. George W. Garloff 155.A H-135 2(a)

340. George W. Garloff 155.B H-321, H-239 1

341. George W. Garloff 155.C H-321, H-239 1

342. Great Lakes Cooperative 156.A 1

343. Great Lakes Cooperative 156.B 1

344. Great Lakes Cooperative 156.C 1

345. Great Lakes Cooperative 156.D 1

346. Great Lakes Cooperative 156.E 1

347. Great Lakes Cooperative 156.F 1

348. Great Lakes Cooperative 156.G 1

349. Great Lakes Cooperative 156.H 1

350. Robert Sr. & Robert Jr. Kirschbaum 157.A 1

351. Robert Sr. & Robert Jr. Kirschbaum 157.B 1

352. E. L. Ballou, c/o David H. Dreryser, Executor of Estate 158.A 1

353. E. L. Ballou, c/o David H. Dreryser, Executor of Estate 158.B 1

354. Robert L. Browning 159.A 1

355. Robert L. Browning 159.B 1

356. Robert L. Browning 159.C 1

357. Robert L. Browning 159.D 1

358. H. & V. Thompson Farms LTD, by Virginia Thompson 160 1

359. Lonnie S. Browning 161.A 1

360. Lonnie S. Browning 161.B 1

- 28 -