Taylor v. United States

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No. 13-759 C

Filed: April 4,2014

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

FILED

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APR 4 ?014

RALPH TAYLOR, U.S. COURTOF

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Plaintiff, pro se,

THE TNITED STATES,

Defendant.

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Ralph W. Taylor, Terre Haute, Indiana, Plaintiff , pro se.

Kenneth D, Woodrow, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C.,

Counsel for the Government.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND FINAL ORDER

BRADEN,Judge.

I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY,'

On October 6,2011, Plaintiff sent a "Request For Statement Of Account" to certain

"Respondents," including the United States Secretary of Treasury. Compl. l0-l 1 (Ex. 1). The

Complaint and the October 6,2011 Request reference an Order issued by the United States

'The relevant facts discussed herein were derived from: Plaintiff s September 30,2013

Complaint and the attached Exhibit containing eleven separate documents, most of which are

letters signed by Plaintiff and addressed to various "Respondents," including the United States

Secretary of the Treasury; Plaintiff s February 7,2014 Response to the Government's Motion To

Dismiss; and, United States v. Taylor, 196 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,529 U.S. 1081

(2000).

District Court for the Southem District of Indiana, Case No. 96-CR-0132-01.2 Comp. I6; see

a/so Compl. 10-1 I (Ex. 1) (10/6/11 Request). The Request seeks verification that all

"obligations" related to his criminal conviction have been "satisfied, reconciled, and completely

settled, including all penal obligations, and sums, fines, fees, costs and supervised release."

Compl. 10 (Ex. 1).

On November 3,2011, Plaintiff also sent certain "Respondents" a letter "affirm[ing] and

attest[ing that since] no or non-response has been forthcoming" this fact confirmed his "account

record [was] absolutely correct and accurate" and his criminal conviction satisfied. Compl. 11-

13 (Ex. l). On November 28,2011, Plaintiff also sent a Certification Of Non-Response letter to

certain "Respondents" in which he essentially repeated these statements and his right to a

remedy. Compl. 14 (Ex. l).

On August 3,2012, Plaintiff signed and sent a Form OMB No. 1105-0008, Claim For

Damage-, Injury or Death, to Richard Schott, Office of the Regional Tort Division, Kansas City,

Kansas.' Compl. Ex. 1 at 8. On August 13, 2012, Plaintiff also sent a letter to Mr. Schott

regarding Plaintiff s "Notice Of Tort Claim," in which he names four tortfeasors. Compl. 8 (Ex.

1). None of these individuals appear in the list of "Respondents" in the aforementioned

documents. Compare Compl. 8 (Ex. 1),with Compl. 1G-l 1 (Ex. l).

On September 25,2012, Plaintiff also signed an "lnvoice" for tort damages in the amount

of$405,388,872 and addressed that Invoice to Mr. Schott. Compl. 7, 17 (Ex. l). The Invoice is

styled "Memorandum of Record, Account/Claims Reference No. RL71 132-3 [TRT-NCR-2012-

056721," and lists Plaintiff as the "Account Creditor," and the four tortfeasors identified in the

August 13, 2012 Notice Of Tort Claim as "Account Debtors." Compl. 7 (Ex. 1). Plaintiff

enclosed a copy of the "Invoice" for Ms. Joyce Zoldak, Associate General Counsel for the

Federal Bureau of Prisons. Compl. 17 (Ex. 1). On November 19,2012, Plaintiff sent a "past

due" letter to Ms. Zoldak. Compl. l8 (Ex. 1).

On December 7,2012, Plaintiff sent a letter to Brent M. Phipps, Paralegal for the United

States Department ofJustice, Civil Division Tort Branch, providing "notice for claim of certified

true copies of all insurance agreements and/or other bonding information" for all tortfeasors.

Compl. 19 (Ex. 1). On February 11,2013, Plaintiff "assigned" the September 25,2012 Invoice

to "Timothy Geithner, United States Secretary of the Treasury (an authorized agent of the United

States)" as a "setoff'ofthe costs of Plaintiff s prison sentence. Compl. fl 4; Compl. 5 (Ex. l).

On March 29,2013, Plaintiff sent the Secretary of the Treasury a second letter informing him of

the "breach of [his] fiduciary duty" (by not acting on the February 11, 2013 Assignment within

2 Plaintiff was convicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, committing

money

laundering, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and engaging in an unlawful money

transaction in Terre Haute, Indiana. See Taylor, 196 F.3d at 859. Plaintiff also was sentenced to

ten years supervised release and a fine of$25,000. 1d.

3

Mt. Schott is identified as the Regional Counsel for the Federal Bureau of Prisons in

Kansas City in an Exhibit accompanying the Complaint. Compl. 17 (Ex. l).

thirty-one days) and requesting that proceeds ofthe Invoice be retumed to Plaintiff within three

days. Compl. 20 (Ex. l).

On September 30,2013, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the United States Cout of Federal

Claims seeking a $405,388,872 payment for the September 25,2012Invoice that was "assigned"

to the United States Department of the Treasury and specific performance of obligations in that

assignment agreement. Compl. fl 15.

The Complaint also alleges that the September 25, 2012 Invoice is for tort damages owed

to Plaintiff by the Govemment. Compl. tf 15. The basis for the damages apparently stems from

actions of either four or eighteen tortfeasors" who are federal govemment employees; namely,

prison officials overseeing the federal prison that currently houses Plaintiff. Compl. 7-9 (Ex. 1).

In brief, Plaintiff allegedly incurred a personal injury due to these officials "neglecting to give

full faith and credit to the public record filing at the Marion County Recorder's Office"

conceming Plaintiffs obligations under the aforesaid criminal conviction against him in the

Southem District of Indiana, and failing to recognize "evidence that all federal obligations ofthe

United States against [Plaintiff are] satisfied and discharged ofrecord." Compl.9(Ex. 1).

In addition, the Complaint alleges that, on February 20, 2013, the Secretary of the

Treasury accepted "unconditionally and tacitly" the assignrnent of that Invoice for setoff against

Plaintiffs "federal obligations." Compl. flfl 4-8. The assignment for setoff will "result in the

discharge of [those] federal obligations owing to [the United States Government] by [the]

Plaintiff'and debts stemming from Plaintiff s federal criminal conviction. Compl. flfl G7.

Because the Department of the Treasury was required by the thirty-one day time period to fulfill

its obligations, but failed to act within that time period, its failure to do so caused Plaintiff

"irreparable harm." Compl. flfl 10*1 I .

On November 12,2013, Plaintifffiled a Motion For Stay until the arbitration terms of the

assignment agreement were complete, and a copy of a Request For Admissions. On

December 27, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Notice Of Default and a Motion For Claim To Enforce

Arbitration, asserting that the Govemment's non-response evidenced consent to this court's

subject matter jurisdiction. On January 3,2014, Plaintiff filed a Second Motion To Stay. On

December 2, 2013, the Government filed a Motion For Summary Dismissal.

On February 7,2014, Plaintiff filed a Response. On February 18,2014, the Govemment

filed a Reply.

On March 4,2014, Plaintiff filed a'Notice Of Noncompliance, RCFC 7.2(b)(2) And

Claim To Stdke RCFC 12(fl Defendant's Reolv."

" Plaintiff lists the same four tortfeasors in his claim against the Government in all ofthe

Complaint Exhibit documents, except for a December 7 , 2012 letter to the United States

Department of Justice including a "Tortfeasor Information Schedule" listing eighteen

individuals, among which were the four "tortfeasors" listed in other documents. Compare

Compl. 7,8, 17-18 (Ex. 1),with Compl. 19 (Ex. l).

il. DISCUSSION.

A. Jurisdiction.

The United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act "to

render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution,

or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive departrnent, or upon any express or

implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not

sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. $ 1a91(a)(l). The Tucker Act, however, is "a jurisdictional statute;

it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money

damages. . . . [T]he Act merely confers jurisdiction upon [the United States Court of Federal

Claimsl whenever the substantive right exists." United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398

(1e76).

Therefore, to pursue a substantive right under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify

and plead an independent contactual relationship, Constitutional provision, federal statute,

and/or executive agency regulation that provides a substantive right to money damages. ,See

Todd v. United States,386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir.2004) ("[J]urisdiction under rhe Tucker

Act requires the litigant to identifr a substantive right for money damages against the United

States separate from the Tucker Act . . . ."); see also Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167,

1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("The Tucker Act . . . does not create a substantive cause of

action; . . . a plaintiff must identifu a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to

money damages. . . . [T]hat source must be 'money-mandating."'). Specifically, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that the source of substantive law "can fairly be interpreted as mandating

compensation by the Federal Govemment." United States v. Mitchell,463 U.S. 206,216 (1953)

(quoting Testan, 424 U.S. at 400). The plaintiff also bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction

by a preponderance of the evidence. See Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv.,846 F.2d,

746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[O]nce the [trial] court's subject marter jurisdiction [is] put in

question . . . . [the plaintiff] bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction by a

preponderance of the evidence.").

In addition, if the court determines at any point in the proceedings that it lacks subject

matter jurisdiction, the action must be dismissed. See RCFC l2(h)(3). Jurisdiction is a threshold

matter for the court to decide. PODS, Inc. v. Porta Stor, 1nc.,484 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir.

2007) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (,,We have an

obligation to assure ourselves ofour jurisdiction before considering the merits[.]")).

B. Standard Of Review For Pro Se Litigants.

The pleadings of a pro se plaintiff are held to a less rigorous standard than those of

litigants represented by counsel. See Haines v. Kerner,404 U.S. 519,520 (1972) (holding that

pro se complaints, "however inartfully pleaded," are held to "less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers"). It has been the tradition of the United States Court of Federal

claims to examine the record "to see if fa pro sef plaintiff has a cause of action somewhere

displayed." Ruderer v. United States, 412 F.zd 1285, t292 (Ct. Cl. 1969); see also

Ericlrson v. Pardus, 551 u.s. 89, 94 (2007) ("A document filed pro se is to be liberally

construed." (intemal quotation omitted)). Nevertheless, while the court may excuse ambiguities

in a pro se plaintiff s complaint, the court "does not excuse [a complaint's] failures."

Henke v. Unit ed Stat es, 60 F.3d 795, 7 99 (F ed. Cir. 1 995).

C. Standard Of Review For A Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To RCFC n@Xl).

A challenge to the United States Court ofFederal Claims' "general power to adjudicate in

specific areas of substantive law . is properly raised by a [Rule] 12(b)(l) motion."

Palmerv.United States, 168 F.3d 1310, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see aiso RCFC 12(bxl)

(allowing a party to assert, by motion, "lack of subject-matter jurisdiction"). When considering

whether to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court is "obligated to

assume all factual allegations [of the complaint] to be true and to draw all reasonable inferences

in plaintiff s favor;' Henke,60F.3d.at797.

D. Standard Of Review For A Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To RCFC f2(bx6).

A challenge to the United States Court of Federal Claims' "[ability] to exercise its

general power with regard to the facts peculiar to the specific claim . . . . is raised by a [Rule]

12(bX6) motion[.]" Palmer, 168 F.3d at 1313; see also RCFC 12(bX6) (allowing a parry to

assert, by motion, "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted"). When considering

whether to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim, the court must assess whether the

complaint "allege[s] facts 'plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)' a show of

entitlement to relief." Bank of Guam v. United States, 578 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombt, 550 U.S. 544,557 (2007)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556

U.S. 662,679 (2009) ("[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a

motion to dismiss."). In other words, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In determining factual plausibility, the

court engages in "context-specific analysis" that draws upon "'its judicial experience and

common sense."' Twombly, 550 U.S. at 679.

As a general matter, the court reviews the facts in a favorable light to the plaintiff. ,See

Bank of Guam,578 F.3d at 1326. Nevertheless, "[flactual allegations must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the

complaint are true." Twombly,550 U.S. at 545. But see lqbal,556 U.S. at 678 ('.[T]he tenet that

a court must accept as true all the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions."). Thereafter, "if it appears beyond doubt that [plaintiff] can prove no set of facts

in support of [its] claim which would entitle [it] to relief" then this court should dismiss the

action. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty Bd. ofEduc.,526 U.S.629,654(1999).

E. The Court's Resolution Of The Government's Decemb er 2,2013 Motion For

Summary Dismissal.

l. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have Subject

Matter Jurisdiction To Adjudicate Tort Claims Or Claims Against

Individual Government Offi cials.

As the complaint evidences, several of the alleged claims sound in tort. The united

states court of Federal claims does not have jurisdiction over these claims. see 28 u.s.c. g

1a9l(a)(l) (2006) ("The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render

judgment upon any claim against the United States . . . for liquidated or unliquidated damages in

cases not sounding in tort."); see also Fast Horse v. United States, 101 Fed. Cl. 544,547 (2011)

("[T]ort claims fall outside ofthis [c]ourt's jurisdiction.").

In addition, other claims are asserted against Govemment officials in their individual

roles. The United States Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over these claims.

See 28 U.S.C. $ 1491 ("The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to

render judgment upon any claim against the United States[.]" (emphasis added)); see qlso Fast

Horse,101 Fed. Cl. at 547 ("[T]he Tucker Act grants the [c]ourt jurisdiction over claims against

the 'United States,' not claims against the United States' individual officers." (citing Brown v.

unitedstates,l05 F.3d 621,624 (Fed. Cir. 1997))).

2. The September 30, 2013 Complaint Fails To Allege A Breach Of A

Government Contract.

Plaintiff inconectly assumes that the court has recognized that he has established a claim

upon which relief may be granted by allowing him leave to proceed informa paupens. In doing

so, the court did not recognize that Plaintiff stated a good-faith cognizable claim upon which

relief may be granted, but only that Plaintiff showed good cause for the court to waive filing

fees. Compare RCFC l2(bX6), wtrr 28 U.S.C. g 1915.

As to the merits, "[a]n implied-in-fact contract with the government requires proof of (1)

mutuality of intent, (2) consideration, (3) an unambiguous offer and acceptance, and (4) actual

authority on the part of the government's representative to bind the govemment in contract."

Kam-Almaz v. United States,682 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hanlin v. United

States, S16 F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). The party alleging a contract has the burden of

demonstrating these elements. See Harbert/Lummus Agrifuels Projects v. United States, 142

F.3d 1429, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (determining that a government contractor failed to

demonstrate the elements of a contract to modiff a construction schedule). The Tucker Act

authorizes the court to "render judgment upon . . any express or implied contract with the

United States[.]" 28 U.S.C. $ 1491(a). But "jurisdiction under this provision requires . . . a non-

frivolous allegation of a contract with the [G]ovemment." Engage Learning, Inc. v. Salazar,

660 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original). At a minimum, "there needs to be

something more than a cloud of evidence that could be consistent with a contract to prove a

contract and enforceable contract rights. . . . [T]here must still be a clear indication of intent to

contract and the other requirements for concluding that a contract was formed." D & N Bank v.

United States,33l F.3d 1374. 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

The Complaint does not allege the necessary offer and acceptance because all

communications are from Plaintiff to the Govemment. See ResrerevnNT (SEcoND) oF

CoNTRAcrs $ 22(1) ("The manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange ordinarily takes the

form of an offer or proposal by one party followed by an acceptance by the other party or

parties."). At no point did the Government respond, let alone accept, the alleged terms proposed.

Moreover, an assignment that is signed by only one party is not a bilateral contract and the

Govemment's failure to respond does not create a binding contract. see Harbert/Lummus

Agrifuels Projects, 142 F.3d at 1433-34 ("In the absence of either actual or constructive

knowledge . . . the [receiving party's] silence cannot be a ratification[.]").

The Complaint also must allege consideration "in the form of a bargained-for

exchange . . . that the promisee's expectation of performance is reasonable, and not disingenuous

reliance on the words of a non-serious and unwilling promisor." Howell v. United States,5l

Fed. Cl. 516, 521 (2002) (reviewing the definition of "consideration" in the context of indefinite-

quantity contracts regarding maintenance of federal properties). Here, Plaintiff created the

September 25,2012 Invoice, but the Complaint alleges only an agreement by which the alleged

"tortfeasors" were found to owe Plaintiff money. Sending an "Invoice" to the alleged

"tortfeasors" or anyone else, is not consideration for a "setoff." See Applied Cos. v. [Jnited

States,37 Fed,. Cl. 749,760 & n.6 (1997) (determining that "[t]he flaw in plaintiff s argument . .

. is that plaintiff has not established that at the time the government properly exercised its setoff

rights plaintiff had . . . a valid setoff," because "plaintiff has not established at this time a viable

debt for setoff purposes and the govemment has not acknowledged any such debt"), affd, 144

F.3d1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff inconectly assumes that the Complaint properly alleges a valid contract by the

"binding legal effect" of the Govemment's lack of response to his November 12,2013 Request

for Admissions. But, requests for admissions are meant to "establish facts about which there is

no real dispute in order to expedite litigation and save the time and money that would otherwise

be spent on unnecessary discovery and proof of facts at luial." JZ Buckingham Invs. LLC v.

united states,77 Fed. cl. 37,44 (2007). Admissions are limited to facts, application of law to

fact, opinions about either, or the genuine nature of documents. ,See RCFC 36(a\l\AHB). As

such, the Govemment's lack ofresponse to the November 12,2013 Request For Admissions has

no binding legal effect and does not establish the court's jurisdiction over a contract dispute. ,See

Burnside-Ou Aviation Training Ctr. v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 854, 858 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (,,[p]arties

cannot by consent confer subject matter jurisdiction on the [court.]").

For these reasons, the court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the breach of contract

claims in the September 30,2013 Complaint.

3. The September 30, 2013 Complaint Does Not Allege A Setoff For An

Illegal Exaction

Plaintiffalso contends that the basis for his claim is founded on "3l uscs [sic] g 3701 et

seq." Pl. Resp. tffl l-10. In accordance with the standard of review for pro se claims, this court

liberally conshues Plaintiffs reliance on this statutory section to include all subchapters under

Chapter 37 of Title 31, and to specifically include reference to the SetoffAct under Section 3728

that allows the Government to withhold paying part of a judgment to satisfu a creditor's debts to

the Govemment. This statute has been applied in prisoner tort cases. See, e.g., United

states v. Cohen, 389 F.2d 689 (5th cir. 1967) (applying the Govemment's right to set off against

monetary damages awarded to a prisoner based on a Federal rort claims Act judgment in his

favor). Here, however, there is no judgment in Plaintifls favor against the united states

regarding his tort allegations. Since there is no financial debt for the Govemment to set off

against Plaintiff s debt obligations stemming from his criminal conviction, section 372g is

inapplicable.

Likewise, the Complaint fails to allege an illegal exaction claim. ,See Norman v. United

States,429 F.3d 1081, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("To invoke Tucker Act jurisdiction over an illegal

exaction claim, a claimant must demonstrate that the statute or provision causing the exaction

itself provides, either expressly or by 'necessary implication,' that 'the remedy for its violation

entails a retum of money unlawfi.rlly exacted.' (quoting Cyprux Amax Coal Co. v. United States,

20s F.3d 1369,1373 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).

UI. CONCLUSION,

For these reasons, the Govemment's December 2, 2013 Motion For Summary Dismissal

is granted. See RCFC 12(bXl), l2(bX6).5 Accordingly, the Clerk of Court is directed to dismiss

the September 30,2013 Complaint.

In addition to the September 30,2013 Complaint, Plaintiff has filed numerous complaints

in this cor,rrt and others, including one with markedly similar facts involving the Secretary of the

Treasury.6 Based on a review of Plaintiff s claims and correspondence,- the court finds that

PlaintifPs contacts with this cout reflect "indicia of frivolousness and harassment," specifically

in both the "number and content of filings" and their lack of merit. In re Powell,B5l F.Zd 427,

431 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Hemphill v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,374 Fed. App'x 4l (Fed. Cir.

2010) (following the guidelines discussed in In re Powell conceming anti-filing injunctions for

pro se litigants).

Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(3) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims,

Plaintiff has thirty (30) days to show cause why the court should not issue an anti-filing

injunction. see also In re Powell,851 F.2d at 433 (suggesting that a "district court should

s

Finally, the claims in the Septembe r 30,2013 Complaint are baseless. ,.[A] coun may

dismiss a claim as factually frivolous 'only if the facts alleged are "clearly baseless."

Spencer v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 349,356 (2011) (quoting Denton v. Hernandez,504 U.S.

25,32-33 (1992)); see also Moden v. United States,404 F.3d 1335, 134142 (Fed. Cir. 2005)

(interpreting "frivolous" as "insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions, or

otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy"); young v. United

states,88 Fed. cl. 283, 291-92 (2009) ("[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when

the facts alleged rise to the level of the inational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there

are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.").

6

Plaintiff has initiated several otler pro se actions. See Taylor v. Oliver, No. 13-328,

2013 WL 51'77113 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 13, 2013) (summary dismissal of habeas petition); Taylor v.

U.S. Treasury, No. 13-1047, 2013 WL 5303255 (D.D.C. July 10, 2013) (dismissing for

frivolity); Taylor v. United states, No. 13-112C, 2013 WL 638885 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 19,2013),

reconsideration denied,2013 wL 1094818 (Fed. cl. Mar. 18, 2013) (dismissing plaintiffs

complaint for lack ofjurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted);

Taylor v. Patton,No.06-169,2007 WL 496663 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2007) (dismissing habeas

corpus petition, with prejudice); Taylor v. Tinder, No. 06-90 (E.D. Ky. filed June 2, 2006,

dismissed July 24,2006) (dismissing habeas corpus petition, without prejudice).

consider issuing an order to show cause" before issuing an anti-filing injunction). If Plaintiff

does not do so, the Clerk will be fi.rther directed to accept no other actions or filings by

Ralph W. Taylor, without an Order of the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Federal

Claims. See RCFC Rule 1l(b) (baning the filing of unwananted claims).

In the interim, the Clerk's Office shall reject any additional complaints from Plaintiff

unless accompanied by the court's requiredfiling fee.

IT IS SO ORDERED.