Lawrence Thomas v. Cumberland County

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______

No. 12-3959

______

LAWRENCE THOMAS,

Appellant

v.

CUMBERLAND COUNTY; GLENN SANDERS, both

individually and in his official capacity as the Warden of the

Cumberland County Correctional Facility; CORRECTIONS

OFFICER MARTINEZ, both individually and in his official

capacity as a Correctional Officer; JOHN DOES 1-10, sued in

their individual and official capacities; LIEUTENANT

MICHAEL PALAU, both Individually and in his official

capacity as a Policy Maker of Cumberland County Jail;

CAPTAIN KENNETH LANCKEN, both individually and in

his official capacity as Policy Maker of Cumberland County

Jail; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER JAMES H. WILDE, III

both individually and in his official Capacity as Correctional

Officer

______

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the

District of New Jersey

(D. N.J. No. 1-09-cv-01323)

District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle

______

Argued October 30, 2013

Before: FISHER, JORDAN and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: April 11, 2014 )

Lauren Plevinsky, Esq.

William A. Riback, Esq. ARGUED

132 North Haddon Avenue

Haddonfield, NJ 08033

Steven L. Rothman, Esq. ARGUED

Lipman, Antonelli, Batt, Dunlap, Wodlinger & Gilson

110 North 6th Street

P.O. Box 729

Vineland, NJ 08362

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OPINION OF THE COURT

______

2

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

Lawrence Thomas brought this suit under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 10:6-2, after he sustained an attack at the hands of other

inmates at the Cumberland County Correctional Facility (the

“CCCF”). The attack occurred after a several-minute long

verbal argument between Thomas and a group of inmates in

the presence of corrections officers. Thomas brought suit

against Cumberland County and policymakers at the prison

(together, the “County”) for, among other things, their failure

to properly train corrections officers in conflict de-escalation

and intervention techniques. The District Court granted

summary judgment in the County’s favor on Thomas’s

failure-to-train claim. For the reasons that follow, we will

vacate the District Court’s order.

3

I.

A.

Lawrence Thomas entered Cumberland County’s

custody on June 4, 2008. 1 He was confined in the CCCF

pending trial for shoplifting and failing to pay fines that he

had incurred. He was assigned to the “D-Pod,” a group of

holding cells in the CCCF. The D-Pod is relatively small,

housing only around 100 detainees. It has two levels, and the

upper level is open to the lower level with stairs that connect

the two. It houses minimum and medium security detainees.

Thomas was a minimum security detainee.

The CCCF is considered a tough prison, due in large

part to gang activity. At least four or five fights are seen and

reported every day, and up to twenty or thirty are estimated to

be unseen and unreported. The County knew of these

conditions by way of incident reports filed for the fights that

are seen and reported.

During his detention, Thomas developed a reputation

as a bully. He was known for stealing others’ food. This suit

concerns Thomas’s conflict with a group of inmates in the D-

Pod, which occurred on July 27, 2008. Two corrections

officers were on duty in the D-Pod that day – Corrections

Officer Fernando Martinez (“Officer Martinez”) and

Corrections Officer James Wilde (“Officer Wilde”). Thomas

1

This account of the facts derives from evidence in the

summary judgment record and construes the evidence in the

light most favorable to Thomas.

4

claims he was “bartering” for food, 2 and after acquiring rice

and soup, he left his cell to microwave the food. When he

exited, he found that a crowd of about twelve inmates had

gathered outside of his cell. Officer Martinez was also among

the crowd. The inmates were angry with Thomas, believing

that he had stolen food.

The argument, which began outside of Thomas’s cell

on the upper level of the D-Pod, grew into a heated verbal

dispute that lasted for several minutes. Throughout the

argument, Officer Martinez was with the crowd while Officer

Wilde was at his desk on the lower level of the D-Pod. At

some point, Officer Martinez said something along the lines

of, “If you guys don’t fight or break it up, I’m going to lock

everybody down.” (PA 91, 154). In response to this

statement, the crowd of inmates laughed. The statement did

not cause the crowd to disperse.

While Thomas, Officer Martinez, and the crowd were

on the upper level, another inmate, Leonardo Santiago, yelled

from the lower level, “If you want to take stuff from people,

come down here and take stuff from me.” (PA 120, 150). At

this time, Thomas began to make his way downstairs to the

lower level, allegedly to seek the protection of Officer

2

Thomas states that he was “bartering” – he was

borrowing food and would pay it back with double the

amount on commissary day. Other inmates described his

actions as stealing.

5

Wilde. 3 As he headed down, other inmates started yelling

explicit threats of violence at Thomas, both from the lower

level and from the crowd behind him on the stairs and on the

upper level.

Thomas stated that when he reached the lower level,

the crowd was blocking his path to Officer Wilde’s desk. He

moved towards Santiago’s cell. Within fifteen or twenty

seconds after Thomas reached the lower level, Santiago

struck Thomas. Santiago stated that he struck Thomas

partially in self-defense, because Thomas was approaching

him in a threatening manner. Officer Martinez attempted to

restrain Santiago, but at this time, another inmate, Michael

Cruz, struck Thomas twice. When Thomas was injured,

Officer Martinez was immediately next to him. Officer

Martinez yelled for everyone to lock down, and the inmates

reluctantly complied. The total time that elapsed between the

beginning of the argument on the upper level and the violence

that erupted on the lower level was three or four minutes.

Neither Officer Martinez nor Officer Wilde took any

action to quell the unrest as the argument progressed. One

inmate testified that he could tell that a fight was imminent

and wanted to see a fight happen. Other inmates stated that

the officers could and should have stopped the argument

before the violence occurred. Officer Martinez

acknowledged that he saw the entire incident. Thomas

suffered a serious eye injury and a concussion. He was left

with no sight in one eye.

3

Other inmates stated that Thomas was heading

downstairs in an aggressive manner to confront Santiago.

Thomas, by contrast, maintained that he was heading down to

the lower level in order to reach and seek protection from

Officer Wilde.

6

In New Jersey, new corrections officers must complete

pre-service training and Academy training. The CCCF

provides a three-week pre-service training program with

materials from the state. New corrections officers are

required to complete this program prior to assuming their

duties. A corrections officer must then complete state-

provided Academy training within the first twelve to eighteen

months of employment. The CCCF does not, as a part of its

pre-service training, include training on de-escalating or

intervening in conflicts before violence occurs. The officers

do not receive specific training on calling for back-up;

instead, they must use their discretion based on the training

that they do receive. Both Officer Martinez and Officer

Wilde had completed pre-service training, but because they

had been working at the CCCF for less than one year, they

had not yet completed Academy training.

Thomas obtained an expert report from Dr. Richard

Kiekbusch regarding the need for de-escalation and

intervention training and the failure to intervene in this

situation. Dr. Kiekbusch, a professor of criminology, has

over twenty years of experience in correctional

administration. Dr. Kiekbusch reviewed materials in the

summary judgment record and also relied on materials on

national standards for prison training, with which he was

familiar. He observed that the CCCF does not have any

training on defusing a volatile situation with an inmate, de-

escalating inmate tension, intervening in situations of inmate

unrest, or calling for back-up when control requires additional

personnel. He explained that prison training programs across

the country proactively address the use of intervention and

de-escalation skills and calling for back-up to defuse inmate

tension and unrest.

7

Dr. Kiekbusch observed that the CCCF administration

“failed to provide pre-service training to its correctional

officers regarding the de-escalation of inmate tension and

unrest and calling for back-up in situations in which

maintaining control of the inmates under their supervision has

exceeded, or is likely to exceed, the capabilities of those

officers.” (PA 56). He concluded that Officer Martinez

failed to intervene in the rising inmate tension or call for

back-up to help quell the argument and that Officer

Martinez’s failure to intervene contributed to the injuries that

Thomas sustained. Based upon his education, training, and

experience in jail management, Dr. Kiekbusch found that the

CCCF’s failure to provide training on de-escalation,

intervention, and when to call for back-up “to be a careless

and dangerous practice, and one which reflects a deliberate

indifference to inmate health and safety.” (PA 61).

B.

Thomas filed a complaint in the United States District

Court for the District of New Jersey. He later filed a second

amended complaint that included claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 10:6-2. The complaint named Cumberland County and

policymakers at the prison along with Officers Martinez and

Wilde as defendants.

On April 5, 2011, all defendants filed a motion for

summary judgment and a motion to exclude the expert

testimony of Dr. Kiekbusch. The District Court granted

summary judgment on all claims against the County and

Officer Wilde. It denied summary judgment with respect to

Thomas’s claims against Officer Martinez for failure to

protect, failure to intervene, and incitement. It also denied the

motion to exclude Dr. Kiekbusch’s expert testimony.

8

Thomas’s claims against Officer Martinez proceeded

to trial. The jury found in favor of Officer Martinez,

concluding that he was aware of the danger that Thomas

faced, but was not willfully indifferent. The District Court

entered final judgment and Thomas filed a timely notice of

appeal. Thomas appeals only the District Court’s grant of

summary judgment in the County’s favor on the section 1983

failure-to-train claim.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291.

“We review the District Court’s disposition of a

summary judgment motion de novo, applying the same

standard as the District Court.” Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660

F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is proper

“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “An issue is genuine

only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a

reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and a

factual dispute is material only if it might affect the outcome

of the suit under governing law.” Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks,

455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In conducting our

review, we view the record in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that

party’s favor. Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475

F.3d 524, 535 (3d Cir. 2007). A motion for summary

judgment is properly denied if “a fair-minded jury could

return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

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III.

The sole issue on appeal is the County’s municipal

liability under section 1983 for its failure to provide pre-

service training on conflict de-escalation and intervention

techniques. A municipality cannot be held liable for the

unconstitutional acts of its employees on a theory of

respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 691 (1978). A plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality

liable under section 1983 must demonstrate that the violation

of rights was caused by the municipality’s policy or custom.

Id. at 690-91. Liability is imposed “when the policy or

custom itself violates the Constitution or when the policy or

custom, while not unconstitutional itself, is the ‘moving

force’ behind the constitutional tort of one of its employees.”

Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1027 (3d Cir.

1991) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326

(1981)).

Where the policy “concerns a failure to train or

supervise municipal employees, liability under section 1983

requires a showing that the failure amounts to ‘deliberate

indifference’ to the rights of persons with whom those

employees will come into contact.” Carter v. City of Phila.,

181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting City of Canton,

Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (“Canton”)).

Additionally, “the identified deficiency in a city’s training

program must be closely related to the ultimate injury;” or in

other words, “the deficiency in training [must have] actually

caused” the constitutional violation. Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.

The parties do not challenge the existence of a policy

or of a constitutional violation on appeal. The relevant policy

for the purposes of municipal liability is the County’s

decision not to provide conflict de-escalation and intervention

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training as a part of pre-service training for corrections

officers. The alleged constitutional violation stems from the

officers’ failure to “take reasonable measures to protect

prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” 4

Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal

quotation marks omitted). We will focus on whether the

failure to provide pre-service training on conflict de-

escalation and intervention amounts to deliberate

indifference, and whether this deficiency in training caused

Thomas’s injury.

A.

“‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of

fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a

known or obvious consequence of his action.” Bd. of Cnty.

4

This duty to protect a prisoner from other prisoners

has been read as a limitation on punishment from the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment. Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir.

1997). As a pretrial detainee, Thomas is not subject to the

Eighth Amendment’s protections; rather, the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause governs. A.M. ex rel.

J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 579

(3d Cir. 2004). This Court has applied the same standard to a

failure-to-protect claim under the Fourteenth Amendment as

under the Eighth Amendment. Id. A prisoner has a valid

failure-to-protect claim if the prison official shows

“‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm

to an inmate.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994).

Officer Martinez’s failure to protect Thomas, on which the

District Court denied summary judgment, is therefore the

relevant constitutional injury for the purposes of the County’s

municipal liability.

11

Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410

(1997) (“Bryan Cnty.”). Ordinarily, “[a] pattern of similar

constitutional violations by untrained employees” is

necessary “to demonstrate deliberate indifference for

purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, -- U.S. --,

--, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011). “Without notice that a

course of training is deficient in a particular respect,

decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen

a training program that will cause violations of constitutional

rights.” Id. A pattern of violations puts municipal

decisionmakers on notice that a new program is necessary,

and “[t]heir continued adherence to an approach that they

know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct

by employees may establish the conscious disregard for the

consequences of their action – the ‘deliberate indifference’ –

necessary to trigger municipal liability.” Bryan Cnty., 520

U.S. at 407.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court posited in Canton

that in certain situations, the need for training “can be said to

be ‘so obvious,’ that failure to do so could properly be

characterized as ‘deliberate indifference’ to constitutional

rights” even without a pattern of constitutional violations.

489 U.S. at 390 n.10. The Court offered a hypothetical

example of this “single-incident” failure-to-train liability.

Because “city policymakers know to a moral certainty that

their police officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons,”

if the city arms the officers with firearms, “the need to train

officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly

force” is “so obvious” that a failure to provide such training

could provide a basis for single-incident municipal liability.

Id. Liability in single-incident cases depends on “[t]he

likelihood that the situation will recur and the predictability

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that an officer lacking specific tools to handle that situation

will violate citizens’ rights.” Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409.

The Supreme Court recently examined the

applicability of single-incident liability in Connick v.

Thompson, where an exonerated convict sought to hold the

New Orleans District Attorney liable for failing to train

prosecutors on discovery disclosure obligations under Brady

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), with respect to the specific

types of evidence in his case. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355. In

finding that the failure to train did not “fall within the narrow

range of Canton’s hypothesized single-incident liability,”

Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361, the Court highlighted

prosecutors’ legal training and professional obligations,

which differentiate them from other public employees. Id. at

1361-63. Unlike armed police officers who “must sometimes

make split-second decisions with life-or-death consequences”

and have no reason to be “familiar with the constitutional

constraints on the use of deadly force,” id. at 1361,

“[p]rosecutors are not only equipped but are also ethically

bound to know what Brady entails and to perform legal

research when they are uncertain,” id. at 1363. “In light of

this regime of legal training and professional responsibility,

recurring constitutional violations are not the ‘obvious

consequence’ of failing to provide prosecutors with formal in-

house training about how to obey the law.” Id. (quoting

Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409). The Court also differentiated

the situation from the example in Canton due to “the nuance

of the allegedly necessary training.” Id. Because prosecutors

were familiar with the general Brady rule, Thompson’s claim

relied on a failure to train “about particular Brady evidence or

the specific scenario related to the violation in his case,” and

“[t]hat sort of nuance simply cannot support an inference of

deliberate indifference.” Id.

13

We have previously found that a single-incident

constitutional violation was sufficient to preclude summary

judgment on a failure-to-train claim against a municipality.

In Berg v. County of Allegheny, the plaintiff was wrongly

arrested pursuant to a warrant that was erroneously issued

when a clerk transposed two numbers. 219 F.3d 261, 266 (3d

Cir. 2000). The plaintiff sought to hold the county liable for

its poor training procedures on the warrant-creation process.

Id. at 275. We held that summary judgment was not

appropriate, because “[h]aving employed a design where the

slip of a finger could result in wrongful arrest and

imprisonment, there remains an issue of fact whether the

County was deliberately indifferent to an obvious risk.” Id. at

277. The failure to provide protective measures and training

to prevent the mistake was “comparable to ‘a failure to equip

law enforcement officers with specific tools to handle

recurring situations.’” Id. (quoting Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at

409).

We have also previously addressed a failure-to-train

case involving the need for conflict de-escalation training. In

A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Detention

Center, a child confined in a juvenile facility who was

physically assaulted by other residents sought to hold the

facility liable for its lack of training on conflict de-escalation

and management of youth behavior. 372 F.3d 572, 575, 580

(3d Cir. 2004). The facility had offered no training on de-

escalating conflicts or identifying children who could be

victimized by others. Id. The plaintiff presented expert

opinion evidence that the training program was not adequate

and did not meet nationally recognized standards. Id. at 582.

We observed that “the evidence supports an inference that the

potential for conflict between residents of the Center was

high” and concluded that “the evidence concerning the

14

Center’s failure to train its child-care workers in areas that

would reduce the risk of a resident being deprived of his

constitutional right to security and well-being was sufficient

to prevent the grant of summary judgment.” Id. at 583.

Thomas advances a single-incident theory of liability,

arguing that a jury could find that the CCCF was deliberately

indifferent “when ‘patently obvious’ standards, widely-

accepted national standard[s] and training relevant to inmate

safety were disregarded, at the same time their Corrections

Officers were confronting a combustible jail.” (Appellant’s

Br., at 10). To find deliberate indifference from a single-

incident violation, the risk of Thomas’s injury must be a

“highly predictable consequence” of the CCCF’s failure to

provide de-escalation and intervention training as a part of

pre-service training for corrections officers. Connick, 131 S.

Ct. at 1361.

Thomas put forward evidence that fights regularly

occurred in the prison. While these fights are not sufficient to

create a pattern of violations, because there is scant evidence

that they resulted in constitutional violations, they are

relevant to whether his injury was a “highly predictable

consequence” of the failure to train on de-escalation

techniques for single-incident liability. A reasonable jury

could conclude based on the frequency of fights and the

volatile nature of the prison that the “predictability that an

officer lacking [de-escalation and intervention training] to

handle that situation will violate rights” and the “likelihood

that the situation will recur” demonstrate deliberate

indifference on the County’s part. Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at

409. Thomas also provided expert opinion evidence that the

failure to provide conflict de-escalation and intervention

training was a careless and dangerous practice not aligned

with prevailing standards. Viewing the evidence in the

15

record, including Dr. Kiekbusch’s expert opinion, in the light

most favorable to Thomas, a reasonable jury could find that

the County acted with deliberate indifference.

Thomas’s case for single-incident liability falls

somewhere between the plainly obvious need to train armed

police officers “in the constitutional limitations on the use of

deadly force” in Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10, and the lack of

such an obvious need in Connick, where prosecutors had a

legal education and ethical obligations and the allegedly

necessary training was nuanced, 131 S. Ct. at 1363.

However, the case here is more similar to the hypothetical in

Canton than to the situation in Connick. Like the police

officers in Canton, corrections officers have no reason to

know how or when to de-escalate a conflict to avoid a

constitutional violation for failure to protect. Given the

frequency of fights occurring between inmates in the CCCF

that could lead to constitutional violations for failure to

protect, the lack of training here is akin to “a failure to equip

law enforcement officers with specific tools to handle

recurring situations.” Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409

(discussing the single-incident hypothetical in Canton, 489

U.S. at 390 n.10).

In contrast to Connick, the officers here have no reason

to have an independent education, knowledge base, or ethical

duty that would prepare them to handle the volatile conflicts

that might lead to inmate-on-inmate violence. Also unlike in

Connick, there is no nuance to the training Thomas seeks to

require. While the prosecutors in Connick had some

knowledge of Brady’s requirements, corrections officers had

no de-escalation or intervention training as a part of their pre-

service training.

16

Thomas’s case is not precisely analogous to either

Berg or A.M. ex rel. J.M.K., but there are enough similarities

such that the District Court should not have precluded the

factual issues underlying the deliberate indifference

determination from going to a jury. Like in Berg, the County

“fail[ed] to provide protective measures and fail safes” to

prevent mistakes in a situation that occurs frequently. 219

F.3d at 277. And similar to A.M. ex rel. J.M.K., the potential

for conflict was high and there was a complete lack of

training on de-escalation and intervention. While the juvenile

facility and the series of assaults on the plaintiff in A.M. ex

rel. J.M.K. differentiate it from this case, these differences do

not justify discounting factual issues to conclude that the

County was not deliberately indifferent as a matter of law.

We therefore hold that there was sufficient evidence for the

question of whether the County acted with deliberate

indifference to survive summary judgment and proceed to a

jury.

B.

In addition to deliberate indifference, “City of Canton

teaches that to sustain a claim based on a failure to train

theory, ‘the identified deficiency in [the] training program

must be closely related to the ultimate [constitutional]

injury.’” Colburn, 946 F.2d at 1028 (alterations in original)

(quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 391). The failure to train must

have “a causal nexus with [the plaintiff’s] injury.” Id. at

1030. In analyzing causation, “the focus must be on

adequacy of the training program in relation to the tasks the

particular officers must perform.” Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.

Liability cannot rest only on a showing that the employees

“could have been better trained or that additional training was

available that would have reduced the overall risk of

constitutional injury.” Colburn, 946 F.2d at 1029-30. Rather,

17

the causation inquiry focuses on whether “the injury [could]

have been avoided had the employee been trained under a

program that was not deficient in the identified respect.”

Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.

Causation is a requirement for failure-to-train liability

that is separate from deliberate indifference; however, “[t]he

high degree of predictability [in a single-incident case] may

also support an inference of causation – that the

municipality’s indifference led directly to the very

consequence that was so predictable.” Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S.

at 409-10. The causation inquiry – “[p]redicting how a

hypothetically well-trained officer would have acted under

the circumstances” – “may not be an easy task for the

factfinder, particularly since matters of judgment may be

involved.” Canton, 489 U.S. at 391. Nonetheless, “judge and

jury, doing their respective jobs, will be adequate to the task.”

Id.

Thomas put forward evidence from Santiago – the first

inmate who struck Thomas – that the officers could have

stopped the argument before violence broke out. He also

presented an inmate witness’s statement that the officers

allowed the inmates to fight. There is ample evidence in the

record that Martinez was present throughout the argument,

which lasted for several minutes, before Thomas was struck.

Thomas offered expert opinion evidence that the CCCF’s lack

of de-escalation training, among other things, contributed to

the serious injuries that Thomas sustained. Similar expert

opinion evidence was offered to preclude summary judgment

in A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. See 372 F.3d at 582 (“In [the expert’s]

opinion, the Center’s failure to train its staff and follow other

recognized standards for the operation of juvenile detention

facilities directly contributed to the inappropriate treatment of

A.M. while he was detained.”). Presented with this evidence

18

and using their judgment and common sense, a reasonable

jury could have concluded that the lack of training in conflict

de-escalation and intervention caused Thomas’s injuries.

IV.

Viewing the evidence in the record in the light most

favorable to Thomas, we conclude that there are genuine

issues of material fact as to whether the County exhibited

deliberate indifference to the need for pre-service training in

conflict de-escalation and intervention and whether the lack

of such training bears a causal relationship to Thomas’s

injuries. Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s

grant of summary judgment in the County’s favor so that a

factfinder may consider these issues. We remand the case to

the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

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