Brown v. Levi

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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Kevin Arthur Brown,

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Petitioner,

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Troy Levi,

Respondent.

MEl\/IORANDUM OPINlON

Petitioner, a District of Columbia prisoner currently confined at the Federal Detention

Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, seeks habeas corpus relief from his conviction and

sentence imposed in 2005 by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia following a guilty

plea. Specifically, petitioner claims that his criminal proceedings were tainted by ineffective

assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct and a procedural error by the court. For the

following reasons, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition and therefore

will dismiss the case.

Collateral challenges to sentences imposed by the Superior Court must be brought in that

court under D.C. Code § 23-110. See Blair-Bey v. Quz`ck, 151 F.3d 1036, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

( § 23-110 is exclusive remedy for such challenges). Under the local statute, an "application for a

writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion

pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by . . . any Federal . . . court if it appears . . . that

the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is

inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." D.C. Code § 23-1 l()(g). Unlike

other prisoners convicted in state courts or those convicted in a United States District Court,

"District of Columbia prisoner[s] ha[ve] no recourse to a federal judicial forum [under either 28

U.S.C. § 2254 or § 2255] unless [the prisoner shows that] the local remedy is inadequate or

ineffective to test the legality of his detention." Garris v. Lz`na’say, 794 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir.)

(intemal footnote and quotation marks omitted); see Byra’ v. Henderson, 119 F.3d 34, 36-37

(D.C. Cir. 1997) ("ln order to collaterally attack his sentence in an Article lll court a District of

Columbia prisoner faces a hurdle that a federal prisoner does not.")

Except in rare circumstances not applicable here, see, e.g., Streater v. Jackson, 691 F.2d

1026, 1027-28 (D.C. Cir. 1982), "Section 23-110 has been found to be adequate and effective

because it is coextensive with habeas corpus." Saleh v. Braxton, 788 F. Supp. 1232 (D.D.C.

1992); accord Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d at 1042 (describing § 23-110 remedy as "analogous

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for prisoners sentenced in D.C. Superior Court who wished to challenge

their conviction or sentence."). As the court of appeals said in Garris v. Lz'ndsay:

ln determining whether the local remedy is ‘inadequate or ineffective,’ we

are guided by judicial interpretations of the statutory provisions enabling federal

prisoners to challenge their convictions. The federal and local statutes are nearly

identical in language, and functionally they are equivalent. The remedy now

available to District of Columbia prisoners was pattemed after that conferred upon

federal prisoners, and both remedies are commensurate with habeas corpus. That

judges of the Superior Court do not have the tenure and salary protection afforded

federal judges does not call for a different conclusion. ‘[T]he judges of the

Superior Court of the District of Columbia must be presumed competent to decide

all issues, including constitutional issues, that routinely arise in the trial of

criminal cases.’

Garrz`s v. Lz'ndsay, 794 F.2d at 726 (quotz`ng Swal`n v. Pressley, 430 U.S.372, 382-83 (1977))

(footnotes omitted). The mere denial of relief by the local courts does not render the local

remedy inadequate or ineffective. See id. at 727; Charles v. Chana'ler, 180 F.3d 753, 756-58 (6th

Cir. l999) (citing cases); Wilson v. Ojj‘ice of the Chairperson, 892 F. Supp. 277, 280 (D.D.C.

1995).

Petitioner has not claimed that his remedy by motion under § 23-110 is inadequate or

ineffective to test the legality of his detention. The Court therefore concludes that this action

must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. A separate order accompanies this memorandum

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Date: United States District Judge

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opinion.