Hajjar-Nejad v. George Washington University

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, District Judge.

Plaintiff Mohammad Javad Hajjar-Nejad (“Hajjar-Nejad”) brings this action against The George Washington University (“GW”), principally challenging his dismissal as a medical student from GW’s School of Medicine and Health Sciences (the “Medical School”) in July 2007. In the short time that the action has been pending, Hajjar-Nejad has already amended his complaint twice; he now seeks to do so for a third time through his pending [33] Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint (“Motion to Amend”). Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, the relevant authorities, and the record as a whole, Haj-jar-Nejad’s [33] Motion to Amend shall be GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court shall begin by briefly setting forth the factual background for this action, relying on the factual allegations in Hajjar-Nejad’s Second Amended Com

*3

plaint; the Court shall set forth the factual allegations relevant to Hajjar-Nejad’s proposed Third Amended Complaint primarily when discussing the merits of his Motion to Amend.

See infra

Part III. In this section, after setting forth the pertinent factual background, the Court shall recite the procedural history of the case.

A. Factual Background

While an undergraduate at GW, Hajjar-Nejad applied to GW’s Medical School. Second Am. Compl., ECF No. [20], ¶ 9. On November 5, 2003, the Medical School presented Hajjar-Nejad with a written Offer of Acceptance offering him “admission to the Doctor of Medicine degree program” upon certain terms and conditions, and Hajjar-Nejad executed the document two days later, thereby “accept[ing] the conditional offer of acceptance” for the academic year beginning in 2004.

See id.

Ex. 1 (Offer of Acceptance) at 1.

The Offer of Acceptance identifies several terms and conditions to GW’s offer.

See id.

Among other things, Hajjar-Nejad was required to submit additional application materials, complete his undergraduate studies with a satisfactory level of performance, demonstrate his financial ability to pay tuition and related expenses, and provide a deposit and a tuition prepayment.

Id.

Of particular relevance to this action, the Offer of Acceptance includes the following paragraph:

I understand that the submission of false or misleading information or material omission in connection with the application process shall be grounds for withdrawing my conditional offer of acceptance to [the Medical School]. I further understand and agree that if any such submissions or omissions are discovered after matriculation in the Doctor of Medicine degree program or award of a degree, [the Medical School] has the right, in its sole discretion, to dismiss me from [the Medical School] and/or revoke my degree.

Id.

Outside this narrow context, the Offer of Acceptance does not, on its face, purport to describe the circumstances under which Hajjar-Nejad could be dismissed from the Medical School or the scope of GW’s discretion in determining when dismissal would be appropriate. Nor, for that matter, does it purport to describe whether Hajjar-Nejad had any continuing right to attend the Medical School.

Hajjar-Nejad began his studies at GW’s Medical School in 2004. He was a “superb” student and “exeell[ed]” in his first two years.

Id.

¶ 14. In April 2006, he was accepted into an honors program for third-year students by a committee of nine faculty members based on its consideration of a written essay, project proposal, mentor-ship, prior achievements, and strength of academic performance.

Id.

¶ 15. Hajjar-Nejad participated in the honors program through August 11, 2006.

During this period, Hajjar-Nejad reported to various individuals his “good faith observations” that included, among other things, “limited criticisms of hospital practices.”

Id.

¶ 19. Around this same time period, Hajjar-Nejad began to be subjected to “adverse and unwarranted comments” from faculty and students.

Id.

For example, on August 23, 2006, Senior Associate Dean W. Scott Schroth, M.D. (“Schroth”) reported to other senior faculty that Hajjar-Nejad had “leveled criticisms” against them.

Id.

¶ 20. According to Hajjar-Nejad, this act of reporting marked the beginning of a “pattern of hostility and antagonism” against him.

Id.

In his third year, Hajjar-Nejad began to experience “increasingly hostile treatment” from the Medical School’s faculty, and in particular James L. Scott, M.D. (“Scott”), the Dean of the Medical School.

Id.

¶ 21.

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On October 23, 2006, Schroth, acting under Scott’s direction, informed Hajjar-Nejad that he “would have to leave” the honors program and that, if he did not do so voluntarily, he would be “removed.”

Id.

¶ 26. At a meeting with Medical School faculty, Hajjar-Nejad stated that he believed there was no legitimate basis for the hostile treatment.

Id.

¶ 29. Ultimately, however, Hajjar-Nejad left the honors program.

Id.

¶ 31.

Nonetheless, according to Hajjar-Nejad, his mistreatment continued unabated.

Id.

¶ 32. In February 2007, he learned that the Subcommittee on Professional Comportment (the “Subcommittee”) within the Medical Student Evaluation Committee (the “MSEC”) was evaluating his academic progress.

Id.

¶ 33. Hajjar-Nejad characterizes the outcome of this process as “predetermined.”

Id.

On May 3, 2007, Hajjar-Nejad attended a Subcommittee meeting accompanied by legal counsel.

Id.

¶ 34. He contends that the meeting was conducted in violation of GW’s policies and regulations.

Id.

He further contends that he was not permitted to ask questions, cross-examine witnesses, or to present witnesses or evidence of his own.

Id.

Despite the allegedly hostile treatment, Hajjar-Nejad managed to complete the 2006-2007 academic year with passing grades and positive evaluations from his professors.

Id.

¶ 35. But on June 18, 2007, the Subcommittee issued its recommendations to the MSEC.

Id.

¶ 37. The contents of those recommendations are not entirely clear, though Hajjar-Nejad contends that the recommendations were contrary to GW’s “regulations and policies.”

Id.

On June 18, 2007, the MSEC, chaired by Jeffrey S. Ackman, M.D., held a meeting concerning Hajjar-Nejad.

Id.

¶¶ 38-40. Hajjar-Nejad was accompanied by counsel but was denied leave to bring an expert witness or legal assistant.

Id.

¶ 39. He did not receive a copy of the Subcommittee’s recommendations until early that morning.

Id.

¶ 38. Hajjar-Nejad claims that the MSEC was comprised “primarily of white students” and individuals “preselected” by GW.

Id.

¶ 40. He contends that, contrary to the Medical School’s “regulations,” the MSEC did not issue written recommendations despite his requests.

Id.

¶ 41.

On July 26, 2007, Hajjar-Nejad received a letter, dated two weeks earlier, stating that the MSEC had recommended his dismissal.

Id.

¶ 42. The letter indicates that the MSEC held meetings on June 18, 2007, and July 9, 2007, to conduct their deliberations, and that in doing so they “review[ed] the relevant aspects of the ‘Regulations for MD Candidates.’ ” Ltr. from J. Akman, M.D., to J. Scott, M.D., dated July 12, 2007, ECF No. [21-3], at l.

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The letter goes on to provide as follows:

A motion was made and seconded to accept the Professional Comportment Subcommittee’s report and recommendations. Serious concerns were raised about Mr. Hajjar-Nejad’s professionalism, honesty and integrity, his interpersonal relationships and his capacity to work with others. Of particular concerní ] were the following: Mr. Hajjar-Nejad’s inability to accept responsibility for his own actions; refusal to accept instructions or constructive feedback from residents, faculty and deans; inability to work and communicate effectively with peers and residents; inadequate understanding of the commitment to and responsibility for patient care; lack of insight into personal weaknesses and areas for improvement; and, inappropriate understanding of the role of a

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medical student in the medical education hierarchy. In addition, the Committee noted that these concerns were not the result of an isolated incident, but appeared to be a pattern in most interactions with Mr. Hajjar-Nejad.

Id.

at 2. The letter states that a “motion for dismissal” passed in a “secret ballot vote” with nine votes in favor, none against, and one abstention.

Id.

Hajjar-Nejad claims that the dismissal determination was unjustified and contrary to policies and regulations to which GW was “obliged to adhere.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 43. He contends that the MSEC “exceeded the scope of its authority” and committed a number of “procedural violations” in connection with the dismissal proceedings.

Id.

On July 26, 2007, Scott adopted the MSEC’S recommendation and dismissed Hajjar-Nejad from the Medical School.

Id.

¶45. Hajjar-Nejad claims that this was improper because GW’s regulations required the final decision to be made by the Vice President of Academic Affairs.

Id.

Subsequently, Hajjar-Nejad sought to appeal the determination within GW and the determination was ultimately upheld.

Id.

¶¶ 47, 49.

Hajjar-Nejad claims that the alleged campaign of mistreatment continued even after his dismissal from the Medical School. In particular, he contends that GW put an “unlawful and retaliatory ‘hold’ ” on his academic transcripts for a period of eight months to “preclude his subsequent transfer to an alternative medical school” and prevented him from sitting for a national exam to become a physician.

Id.

¶¶ 51-52.

B. Procedural Background

Despite the relatively recent vintage of this action, its procedural history is extensive. Hajjar-Nejad originally commenced the action

pro se

in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland — on April 9, 2010.

See

Compl., ECF No. [1-4]. By any reasonable measure, Hajjar-Nejad’s original Complaint was sprawling; it spanned 121 color-coded pages, included 193 paragraphs (several with discrete sub-parts), and was accompanied by thousands of pages of exhibits. Although far from clear, Hajjar-Nejad appeared to allege that he was unfairly and unlawfully dismissed from GW based on his race, religion, and perceived national origin

2

in violation of Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d

et seq.

(“Title VI”); Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

et seq.

(“Title VII”); the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code § 2-1401.01

et s'eq.

(the “DCHRA”); and his constitutional rights to free speech, the free exercise of religion, and equal protection under the law.

On April 19, 2010, the action was transferred to this Court,

see

Mem. (Apr. 19, 2010), ECF No. [1-10], whereupon Hajjar-Nejad secured legal counsel and, with GW’s consent, filed an Amended Complaint (the “First Amended Complaint”),

see

Am. Compl., ECF No. [13]. The First Amended Complaint — itself no model of clarity — included three counts. In Count I, Hajjar-Nejad appeared to claim that GW discriminated against him on the basis of his race, religion, and national origin in violation of Title VII; Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981

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(“Section 1981”); and the DCHRA.

3

See id.

¶¶ 72-75 . In Count II, Hajjar-Nejad appeared to claim that GW retaliated against him for engaging in protected activity in violation of Title VII; Section 1981; and the DCHRA.

See id.

¶¶ 77-79 . In Count III, Hajjar-Nejad alleged that GW breached the terms of the Offer of Acceptance by dismissing him from the Medical School.

See id.

¶¶ 81-88 .

On July 26, 2010, GW filed its first Motion to Dismiss, targeted at Hajjar-Nejad’s First Amended Complaint.

See

Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss First Am. Compl., ECF No. [14], On August 20, 2010, Hajjar-Nejad, then acting through counsel, responded by filing a partial opposition and voluntarily dismissing what he referred to as his “civil rights

claims”

— i.e., Counts I and II of the First Amended Complaint — without prejudice.

See

Pl.’s Partial Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss First Am. Compl. and Voluntary Dismissal of All Pending Civil Rights Claims, ECF No. [17]. By way of explanation, Hajjar-Nejad averred that some or all of his claims were still pending before the District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights and therefore were yet to be fully exhausted.

See id.

at 3^4. Concurrently, Hajjar-Nejad moved this Court for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint omitting his “civil rights claims” but retaining his claim for breach of contract,

see

PL’s Mot. for Leave to File Second Am. Compl., ECF No. [18], which the Court granted,

see

Order (Aug. 24, 2010), ECF No. [19].

On August 24, 2010, Hajjar-Nejad filed his Second Amended Complaint.

See

Second Am. Compl., ECF No. [20]. Despite the sweep of its allegations, Hajjar-Nejad’s Second Amended Complaint asserts a single cause of action sounding in breach of contract.

See id.

¶¶ 58-60 . Specifically, Hajjar-Nejad’s Second Amended Complaint contends that the Offer of Acceptance constitutes a binding contractual agreement and that GW breached the agreement by dismissing him from the Medical School.

See id.

On September 17, 2010, GW filed its second Motion to Dismiss, this one targeted at Hajjar-Nejad’s Second Amended Complaint.

See

Def.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of its Mot. to Dismiss PL’s Second Am. Compl., ECF No. [21-1], Hajjar-Nejad, again through his chosen legal counsel, opposed GW’s second Motion to Dismiss.

See

PL’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Second Am. Compl., ECF No. [22], Long after the motion was fully briefed, however, Hajjar-Nejad filed his second Motion to Amend, seeking to add claims arising under Title VI, Title VII and Section 1981.

See

PL’s Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. to Reinsert Civil Rights Compls., ECF No. [24],

Even though Hajjar-Nejad was represented by counsel of record at the time, he filed his second Motion to Amend

pro se.

This prompted his legal counsel to file a Motion to Withdraw.

See

Mot. for Leave to Withdraw as PL’s Counsel of Record, ECF No. [25]. Therein, Hajjar-Nejad’s counsel represented that “[s]everal disagreements ha[d] arisen” between him and Hajjar-Nejad “with respect to the management of this case,”

id.

at 1 , and claimed that Hajjar-Nejad filed his Motion to Amend with the Clerk of the Court without his prior review or approval,

id.

at 2 .

On August 15, 2011, this Court issued a detailed Memorandum Opinion and Order resolving GW’s second Motion to Dismiss, Hajjar-Nejad’s second Motion to Amend,

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and Hajjar-Nejad’s counsel’s Motion to Withdraw.

See Hajjar-Nejad v. George Wash. Univ.,

802 F.Supp.2d 166 (D.D.C. 2011). Beginning with GW’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court first noted that Hajjar-Nejad, through his chosen counsel, had voluntarily narrowed the scope of his Second Amended Complaint to assert a single claim sounding in breach of contract — specifically, his claim that the written Offer of Acceptance constitutes a binding agreement between him and GW and that GW breached the terms of that agreement by dismissing him from the Medical School and refusing to provide him with the contemplated educational services. From there, the Court proceeded to find that the Second Amended Complaint was “deficient in important respects.”

Id.

at 174 . Most notably, in the Second Amended Complaint, Hajjar-Nejad periodically referred to “regulations,” “policies,” “rules,” “procedures,” and “directives” that GW allegedly contravened during the course of the parties’ three-year relationship. However, Hajjar-Nejad’s allegations with respect to those “regulations” and “policies” were conclusory and failed to provide sufficient factual content that would allow the Court to conclude “(i) that these ‘regulations’ and ‘policies’ constituted a valid contract between Hajjar-Nejad and GW; (ii) that they imposed specific obligations or duties on GW; and (iii) that GW breached those specific obligations or duties.”

Id.

Although Hajjar-Nejad had identified five sets of “regulations” or “policies” that he contended GW violated,

4

the Court — citing the well-established principle that a party cannot amend its pleadings by its briefs in opposition to a dispositive motion — found that Hajjar-Nejad’s “belated identification of these documents in his opposition papers [did not] cure the fundamental defects in his Second Amended Complaint.”

Id.

In short, “Hajjar-Nejad’s Second Amended Complaint fail[ed] to provide adequate notice of his breach of contract claim to the extent he intended] to base it on an unidentified universe of ‘regulations,’ ‘policies,’ ‘rules,’ ‘procedures,’ and ‘directives.’ ”

Id.

Moreover, in resolving GW’s second Motion to Dismiss, the Court underscored that “Hajjar-Nejad’s claim for breach of contract, as it is framed in the Second Amended Complaint, is based on one, and only one, alleged breach — namely, that GW allegedly ‘rescinded the contract to provide educational services to [Hajjar-Nejad] through its precipitous and unlawful dismissal of [him].’ ”

Id.

(quoting Second Am. Compl. ¶ 59). Indeed, in his opposition to GW’s second Motion to Dismiss, Hajjar-Nejad “eonfirm[ed] this and expressly disclaimed] that he [was] alleging that anything outside of the ultimate contract termination constituted separate actionable breaches.”

Id.

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

Nonetheless, the Court could not conclude that Hajjar-Nejad had “completely failed to state a claim for breach of contract.”

Id.

at 175 . Hajjar-Nejad had incorporated the Offer of Acceptance into the Second Amended Complaint, specifically alleged that it constituted a mutually binding agreement supported by consideration on both sides, maintained that GW breached the Offer of Acceptance by dismissing Hajjar-Nejad from the Medical School, and averred that he had suffered damages as a result of the alleged breach. Noting that GW had “never argue[d] that the Offer of Acceptance does not — as a matter of law — impose any obligations oh

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GW that would preclude it from dismissing Hajjar-Nejad [from the Medical School] under the facts alleged,” the Court concluded that “Hajjar-Nejad ha[d] stated sufficient facts to provide GW with ‘fair notice’ of a claim that GW breached the Offer of Acceptance by dismissing Hajjar-Nejad from the Medical School in July 2007.”

Id.

at 177 . Only that narrow claim survived GW’s second Motion to Dismiss.

After resolving GW’s second Motion to Dismiss in its August 15, 2011 Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court turned to Hajjar-Nejad’s second Motion to Amend, through which he sought to reintroduce claims arising under Title VI, Title VII, and Section 1981. Briefly stated, the Court found that Hajjar-Nejad’s second Motion to Amend, which he had filed

pro se

despite being represented by counsel of record, was procedurally defective because he had failed to comply with the meet-and-confer requirements imposed by Local Civil Rule 7(m) and had further failed to provide a proposed amended pleading as required by Local Civil Rules 7(i) and 15.1.

See id.

at 178-79 . For these reasons, the Court denied Hajjar-Nejad’s second Motion to Amend, advising Hajjar-Nejad that, “[t]o the extent [he] intended] to move this Court for leave to amend his complaint, he must include with his motion to amend a proposed pleading identifying each [and] every claim he intends to pursue in this action and a short and plain statement of the factual basis for those claims.”

Id.

Finally, in its August 15, 2011 Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court granted Hajjar-Nejad’s counsel’s Motion to Withdraw, which Hajjar-Nejad had not opposed.

See id.

at 179-80 . Although Hajjar-Nejad has since been afforded an opportunity to secure alternate legal counsel, he has elected to proceed in this action

pro se.

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On September 7, 2011, over three weeks after the Court resolved GW’s second Motion to Dismiss and Hajjar-Nejad’s second Motion to Amend, Hajjar-Nejad filed the pending Motion to Amend — his third.

See

PL’s Mot. for Leave to File Third Am. Compl. (“PL’s Mem.”), ECF No. [33]. Hajjar-Nejad’s proposed Third Amended Complaint is, like his original Complaint, sprawling; it spans 67 pages, includes hundreds of paragraphs (several unnumbered), and is accompanied by 19 separate exhibits.

See

Proposed Third Am. Compl., ECF No. [33-2], On September 26, 2011, GW filed an opposition.

See

Def.’s Opp’n to Hajjar-Nejad’s Mot. to File Third Am. Compl. (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. [36], On September 29, 2011, Hajjar-Nejad file a reply.

See

PL’s Reply Mem. to Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Leave to File a Third Am. Compl. (“PL’s Reply”), ECF No. [40], As a result, Hajjar-Nejad’s third Motion to Amend is now fully briefed and ripe for a decision. In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument on the motion would not assist the Court in rendering its decision.

See

LCvR 7(f).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend its pleadings once as a matter of course within a prescribed time period.

See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). When a party seeks to amend its pleadings outside that time period or for a second time, it may do so only with the opposing party’s written consent or the district court’s leave.

See

Fed.R.CivP. 15(a)(2). The decision whether to grant leave to amend a complaint is entrusted to

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the sound discretion of the district court, but leave “should be freely given unless there is a good reason, such as futility, to the contrary.”

Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,

100 F.3d 999, 1003 (D.C.Cir.1996),

cert. denied,

520 U.S. 1197 , 117 S.Ct. 1553 , 137 L.Ed.2d 701 (1997). As the Supreme Court has observed:

If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. — the leave sought should, as the rules require, be “freely given.”

Foman v. Davis,

371 U.S. 178, 182 , 83 S.Ct. 227 , 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). “[A] district court has discretion to deny a motion to amend on grounds of futility where the proposed pleading would not survive a motion to dismiss.”

Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ.,

366 F.3d 930, 945 (D.C.Cir.2004),

cert. denied,

545 U.S. 1104 , 125 S.Ct. 2537 , 162 L.Ed.2d 274 (2005). Review for futility is practically “identical to review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on the allegations in the amended complaint.”

In re Interbank Funding Corp. Secs. Litig.,

629 F.3d 213, 215-16 (D.C.Cir.2010) (quotation marks omitted). Because leave to amend should be liberally granted, the party opposing amendment bears the burden of coming forward with a colorable basis for denying leave to amend.

Abdullah v. Washington,

530 F.Supp.2d 112, 115 (D.D.C.2008).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. (8)(a), “in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,’ ”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 , 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting

Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 47 , 78 S.Ct. 99 , 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary, a plaintiff must furnish “more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”

Id.

“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 , 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 , 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting

Twombly,

550 U.S. at 557 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Rather, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 . “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal,

129 S.Ct. at 1949 . The plaintiff must provide more than just “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Id.

at 1950. When a complaint’s well-pleaded facts do not enable a court, “drawing] on its judicial experience and common sense,” “to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint has not shown that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Id.

While “[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f), a document filed by a party proceeding

pro se

must be “liberally construed,”

Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 , 127 S.Ct. 2197 , 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007)

(per

curiam) (quotation marks omitted). For example, when a

pro se

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party has filed multiple submissions, the district court must generally consider those filings together and as a whole.

Richardson v. United States,

193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C.Cir.1999);

see also Sieverding v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

693 F.Supp.2d 93 , 101 n. 2 (D.D.C.2010). Moreover, “a

pro se

complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson,

551 U.S. at 94 , 127 S.Ct. 2197 (quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, “[a] pro se complaint, like any other, must present a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

Crisafi v. Holland,

655 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C.Cir.1981). Even with the liberality afforded

pro se

complaints, the district court “need not accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged in the complaint or legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.”

Kaemmerling v. Lappin,

553 F.3d 669, 677 (D.C.Cir.2008) (quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Through his third [33] Motion to Amend, Hajjar-Nejad seeks to assert additional claims for breach of contract and for violations of Title VI, Title VII, Section 1981, the DCHRA, and his constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

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The Court addresses each claim in turn.

Preliminarily, the Court notes that the parties dispute whether Hajjar-Nejad fully complied with the meet-and-confer requirements of Local Civil Rule 7(m). The parties seem to forget that Local Civil Rule 7(m) is designed to prevent the Court from becoming embroiled in unnecessary disputes, not to multiply them. In this case, the Court finds that the record shows that Hajjar-Nejad made a sufficient effort to consult with GW prior to the filing of the pending Motion and that reaching the merits is appropriate and expeditious. The Court reiterates, however, that the parties are expected to meet and confer prior to the filing of any non-dispositive motion and attempt to resolve or narrow the areas of dispute.

A. Hajjar-Nejad’s Proposed Breach of Contract Claims

Through his third [33] Motion to Amend, Hajjar-Nejad seeks to radically expand the scope of his breach of contract claims in this case. In particular, Hajjar-Nejad seeks leave to allege that, in addition to the Offer of Acceptance that was the locus of his Second Amended Complaint, a wide set of regulations, policies, procedures, and directives “are mutually binding contracts in themselves.” Proposed Third Am. Compl. ¶ 95. Hajjar-Nejad then proceeds to provide what he characterizes as a “non-exhaustive list” of alleged breaches committed by GW over the course of their three-year relationship.

Id.

¶ 96.

As was the case with his original Complaint, Hajjar-Nejad’s allegations in this regard are prolix and often difficult to follow. However, the fundamental problem with Hajjar-Nejad’s third Motion to Amend is that, by his own admission, it seeks to resurrect the very same claims that were previously dismissed by this Court in its August 15, 2011 Memorandum Opinion and Order.

See

Proposed Third Am. Compl. ¶ 96; Pl.’s Mem. at 2-3. In that Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court found that the Second Amended Complaint was “deficient in important respects” insofar as it intended to assert

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breach of contract claims based on anything other than the Offer of Acceptance.

Hajjar-Nejad,

802 F.Supp.2d at 174-75 . Most notably, in the Second Amended Complaint, Hajjar-Nejad periodically referred to “regulations,” “policies,” “rules,” “procedures,” and “directives” that GW allegedly contravened during the course of the parties’ three-year relationship. However, Hajjar-Nejad’s allegations with respect to those “regulations” and “policies” were conclusory and failed to provide sufficient factual content that would allow the Court to conclude “(i) that these ‘regulations’ and ‘policies’ constituted a valid contract between Hajjar-Nejad and GW; (ii) that they imposed specific obligations or duties on GW; and (iii) that GW breached those specific obligations or duties.”

Id.

Although Hajjar-Nejad had identified five sets of “regulations” or “policies” that he contended GW violated, the Court — citing the well-established principle that a party cannot amend its pleadings by its briefs in opposition to a dispositive motion — found that Hajjar-Nejad’s “belated identification of these documents in his opposition papers [did not] cure the fundamental defects in his Second Amended Complaint.”

Id.

In short, “Hajjar-Nejad’s Second Amended Complaint fail[ed] to provide adequate notice of his breach of contract claim to the extent he intend[ed] to base it on an unidentified universe of ‘regulations,’ ‘policies,’ ‘rules,’ ‘procedures,’ and ‘directives.’ ”

Id.

Critically, the Court did not raise these defects in the Second Amended Complaint

sua sponte.

They were, rather, the principal focus of GW’s second Motion to Dismiss, in which GW unambiguously argued that Hajjar-Nejad’s allegations of “unspecified violations” of regulations, policies, procedures, and directives were insufficient to raise his breach of contract claims above the speculative level.

See

Def.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of its Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Second Am. Compl., ECF No. [21-1], at 3-4. Hajjar-Nejad, who was then represented by legal counsel of his own choosing, had a full and fair opportunity to respond to this argument.

See

PL’s Reply at 9 (conceding that “the third amended pleading is addressing exactly what GW strongly argued [the Complaint] should [include] in its Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint”). But he did not do so. Instead, he elected to frame his claim for breach of contract as resting on “one, and only one, alleged breach — namely, that GW allegedly ‘rescinded the contract to provide educational services to [Hajjar-Nejad] through its precipitous and unlawful dismissal of [him].’ ”

Hajjar-Nejad,

802 F.Supp.2d at 175 (quoting Second Am. Compl. ¶ 59). Indeed, in opposing GW’s second Motion to Dismiss, Hajjar Nejad “confirm[ed] this and expressly disclaim[ed] that he [was] alleging that anything outside of the ultimate contract termination constituted separate actionable breaches.”

Id.

(quotation marks and citation omitted). He stated, in no uncertain terms, that “[a]ll the matters of ‘alleged conduct’ cited in Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss ... are not alleged to be in and of themselves separate actionable acts outside of the ultimate contract termination” represented by his dismissal from the Medical School in July 2007. PL’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Second Am. Compl., ECF No. [22], at 12. These representations were made to the Court by Hajjar-Nejad’s chosen legal counsel, the Court relied upon them, and Hajjar-Nejad is bound by them.

Despite the liberality of the standard for granting leave to amend, there is no doubt that the district court has the discretion to deny a plaintiff leave to amend his or her complaint to add claims already dismissed.

See Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. LLC,

305 F.3d 140 ,

*12

144 (3d Cir.2002) (“A [district [e]ourt has discretion to deny a plaintiff leave to amend where the plaintiff was put on notice as to the deficiencies in his complaint, but chose not to resolve them.”) (citation omitted),

cert. denied, 537

U.S. 1113, 123 S.Ct. 928 , 154 L.Ed.2d 787 (2003);

Henderson v. Frank,

293 Fed.Appx. 410, 414 (7th Cir.2008) (district court did not err in refusing to allow plaintiff to amend complaint containing claims already dismissed). When parties are put on notice of potential deficiencies in their pleadings through a dispositive motion, they fail to “avail themselves of an opportunity to rectify the deficiencies” “at their peril.”

Ca. Pub. Emps.

’

Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp.,

394 F.3d 126 , 165 (3d Cir.2004);

Hester v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng’rs, AFL-CIO,

941 F.2d 1574 , 1578-79 (11th Cir.1991) (upholding the district court’s denial of leave to amend, where district court found that the motion amounted to an attempt to “resurrect” a claim when plaintiff had the opportunity to correct the deficiencies earlier). In this case, not only did Hajjar-Nejad fail to promptly rectify the deficiencies in his Second Amended Complaint that were challenged in GW’s second Motion to Dismiss, he expressly disclaimed any intention of pursuing a breach of contract claim predicated on anything beyond the Offer of Acceptance.

Cf. Wopsock v. Natchees,

279 Fed.Appx. 679, 689 (10th Cir.2008) (district court was within its discretion to deny leave to amend a second time where plaintiffs responded to the defendants’ motion for dismissal on the merits and waited to seek leave to amend until after the motions were fully briefed and motion to amend sought to respond to the problems identified by the court in resolving the motions). Under these circumstances, the Court finds that granting leave to amend is inappropriate.

Three additional considerations counsel in favor of denying Hajjar-Nejad leave to amend to add his additional breach of contract claims. First, the Court is mindful of the timing of Hajjar-Nejad’s third Motion to Amend, which was filed one' year and five months after the commencement of this action on April 9, 2010, and after a full round of dispositive motions had already been fully briefed and submitted for the Court’s con'sideration.

See Wilderness Soc. v. Griles,

824 F.2d 4, 19 (D.C.Cir.1987) (upholding district court’s denial of motion to amend that “occurred more than a year after the filing of [the] initial complaint and after dispositive motions had been filed and opposed.”). Second, the pending Motion to Amend, if granted, would represent Hajjar-Nejad’s third amendment of the Complaint. It is well-established that “[t]he district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where a plaintiff previously has amended the complaint,”

World Wide Rush, LLC v. City of Los Angeles,

606 F.3d 676, 690 (9th Cir.2010), especially where, as here, the amendment relates to conduct of which the plaintiff should have been aware at the inception of the action. Third, and finally, granting Hajjar-Nejad leave to amend his Complaint in the requested manner would radically expand the scope of his breach of contact claims to reach a broad universe of additional acts and alleged agreements that were previously uncovered.

See Dave v. District of Columbia,

811 F.Supp.2d 111, 119-20 (D.D.C.2011) (noting that amendments that' expand the allegations beyond the scope of the initial complaint and require additional discovery may unduly prejudice defendants).

Under these unique circumstances, whether considered together or independently, the Court elects to exercise its discretion in this case to deny Hajjar-Nejad leave to amend his Complaint a third time to add breach of contract claims

*13

that have already been dismissed by the Court. Accordingly, the Court shall DENY Hajjar-Nejad’s third [33] Motion to Amend insofar as he seeks to add breach of contract claims beyond his claim that GW breached the Offer of Acceptance by dismissing him from the Medical School in July 2007.

B. Hajjar-Nejad’s Proposed DCHRA Claims

Through his third [33] Motion to Amend, Hajjar-Nejad seeks to add claims that GW discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of the DCHRA by dismissing him from the Medical School in July 2007 and denying him the right to timely graduate.

See

Proposed Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 84-93. In opposition, GW argues that Hajjar-Nejad is precluded from bringing suit on his DCHRA claims in federal court because they were submitted to the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights (the “DCOHR”), the local investigating and prosecuting entity in the District of Columbia,

7

and because the DCOHR issued a “probable cause” determination.

See

Def.’s Opp’n at 10-12.

GW’s argument rests on the DCHRA’s so-called “election of remedies” provision, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice shall have a cause of action in any court of competent jurisdiction for damages and such other remedies as may be appropriate, unless such person has filed [an administrative] complaint hereunder; provided, that where the Office has dismissed such complaint on the grounds of administrative convenience, or where the complainant has withdrawn a complaint, such person shall maintain all rights to bring suit as if no complaint had been filed. No person who maintains, in a court of competent jurisdiction, any action based upon an act which would be an unlawful discriminatory practice under this chapter may file the same complaint with the Office.

D.C. Code § 2-1403.16 (a). In this case, it is undisputed that Hajjar-Nejad submitted an administrative complaint with the DCOHR raising charges mirroring the claims he seeks to pursue against GW in this action. The sequence of the events that transpired thereafter is similarly undisputed. By Hajjar-Nejad’s own admission, after “an extensive period of investigation,” the DCOHR issued a “probable cause” determination on June 22, 2009, and that determination was affirmed on January 12, 2010.

8

Proposed Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-12. At that moment in time, Hajjar-Nejad’s administrative charge became ripe to be transferred and heard before the Commission. Nonetheless, it was not until June 15, 2011, long after the DCOHR had rendered its “probable cause” determination, that Hajjar-Nejad sought to voluntarily withdraw his administrative complaint from further consideration.

See id.

¶¶ 16-17 & Exs. 3-4. The Commission, honoring what it saw as Hajjar-Nejad’s clear and unambiguous desire, granted the request and dismissed the administrative proceedings with prejudice on June 24, 2011.

See id.

Ex. 5.

In terms of the “election of remedies” bar imposed by the DCHRA, the relevant triggering event is not, as Hajjar-Nejad seems to believe, the date on which

*14

the Commission issues a final determination after a full evidentiary hearing. Rather, under the DCHRA, “a plaintiff is required to withdraw his [administrative complaint] prior to the DCOHR’s determination of whether probable cause exists.”

Adams v. District of Columbia,

798 F.Supp.2d 392 , 397 (D.D.C.2011) (citing

Anderson v. U.S. Safe Deposit Co., 552

A.2d 859, 861-62 (D.C.1989)). As Hajjar-Nejad conceded at an earlier point in this case, once the DCOHR issued its “probable cause” determination, he was “bound to continue” his administrative complaint before the Commission. Pl.’s Partial Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss First Am. Compl. and Voluntary Dismissal of All Pending Civil Rights Claims, ECF No. [17], at 3. By waiting until after the DCOHR issued its “probable cause” determination to attempt to withdraw his complaint, Hajjar-Nejad simply waited too long. By the time he sought to withdraw, his election had already been made. As a result, he may not now relitigate his claims in this Court. Accordingly, the Court shall DENY Hajjar-Nejad’s third [33] Motion to Amend insofar as he seeks to add claims that GW discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of the DCHRA.

'

C. Hajjar-Nejad’s Proposed Title VII Claims

Through his third [33] Motion to Amend, Hajjar-Nejad also seeks to add a claim arising under Title VII in order to challenge GW’s allegedly “retaliatory and discriminatory practices,” including GW’s alleged efforts to “block” Hajjar-Nejad’s ability to take examinations and otherwise prepare for a residency position in the future. Proposed Third Am. Compl. ¶ 19. However, Title VII prohibits discrimination and retaliation in the employment context and “an individual’s status as an employee is of crucial importance in determining whether [he or] she can receive protection under Title VII.”

Simms v. Ctr. for Corr. Health and Policy Studies,

794 F.Supp.2d 173, 188 (D.D.C.2011). In this case, although Hajjar-Nejad periodically alleges that GW’s alleged wrongful conduct affected his future employment prospects, he concedes that he was in his “fourth and final year of medical school” when he was dismissed, Proposed Third Am. Compl. ¶ 19, and he has failed to allege facts that would support the existence of an extant employment relationship between him and GW.

See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (“The term ‘employee’ means an individual employed by an employer.”). Absent that factual predicate, he cannot invoke the protections of Title VII.

See Lems v. Russe,

713 F.Supp. 1227, 1230 (N.D.I11.1989) (medical student failed to allege plausible claim under Title VII);

McGuinness v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Medicine,

170 F.3d 974, 979 (10th Cir.1998) (same, in connection with the Americans with Disabilities Act),

cert. denied,

526 U.S. 1051 , 119 S.Ct. 1357 , 143 L.Ed.2d 518 (1999);

see also Pell v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City of N.Y.,

No. 97 Civ. 0193(SS), 1998 WL 19989 , at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1998) (Sotomayor, J.) (“[B]ecause plaintiff was a student at Columbia University, not an employee, there exists no employer-employee relationship.”). Accordingly, Hajjar-Nejad’s third [33] Motion to Amend shall be DENIED insofar as it seeks to amend the Complaint to assert claims of discrimination and retaliation arising under Title VII.

D. Hajjar-Nejad’s Proposed Constitutional Claims

Through his third [33] Motion to Amend, Hajjar-Nejad seeks to add a number of constitutional claims that would collectively allege that GW’s conduct over the course of the parties’ three-year relationship ran afoul of the protections afforded

*15

by the Establishment, Free Exercise, and Freedom of Speech Clauses of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

See, e.g.,

Proposed Third Am. Compl. ¶ 3; Pl.’s Reply at 13-15. While the precise factual contours of these claims and their legal bases are never made completely clear, it is nonetheless evident that allowing Hajjar-Nejad to amend his Complaint to assert such claims would be futile. It is undisputed that GW is a private actor,

see

Proposed Third Am. Compl. ¶ 8; Pl.’s Reply at 14, and Hajjar-Nejad has alleged no facts that would allow him to bring such constitutional claims against GW.

See generally Williams v. Savage,

569 F.Supp.2d 99, 111 (D.D.C.2008) (articulating the “state actor” requirement in First Amendment jurisprudence);

Shelley v. Kraemer,

334 U.S. 1, 13 , 68 S.Ct. 836 , 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948) (same, in connection with Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence);

see also Remy v. Howard Univ.,

55 F.Supp.2d 27, 29 (D.D.C.1999) (“Instead of just providing funds, the government must exert control over an institution before a body becomes subject to governmental [constitutional] restrictions.”). Accordingly, Hajjar-Nejad’s third [33] Motion to Amend shall be DENIED insofar as it seeks to amend the Complaint to assert constitutional claims arising under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

E. Hajjar-Nejad’s Proposed Title VI and Section 1981 Claims

Finally, through his third [33] Motion to Amend, Hajjar-Nejad seeks to add claims alleging unlawful discrimination and retaliation under Title VI and Section 1981.

See

Proposed Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 84-104; Pl.’s Reply at 4-5. In opposition, GW argues that leave to amend should be denied for one, and only one, reason — namely, that Hajjar-Nejad’s proposed Title VI and Section 1981 claims are barred-in-part by the applicable statutes of limitations insofar as they challenge conduct predating April 9, 2007 — three years prior to the commencement.of this action.

9

See

Def.’s Opp’n at 12-13. GW identifies a total of eleven of Hajjar-Nejad’s allegations that fall before this temporal threshold, in the period extending from August 23, 2006, through February 2007.

See id.

In this Circuit, the statute of limitations for Title VI claims is three years.

See, e.g., Mwabira-Simera v. Howard Univ.,

692 F.Supp.2d 65, 71 (D.D.C.2010);

Richards v. Duke Univ.,

480 F.Supp.2d 222, 237-38 (D.D.C.2007). Therefore, GW is correct that Hajjar-Nejad cannot recover for alleged violations of Title VI pre-dating April 9, 2007. In particular, Hajjar-Nejad cannot recover under Title VI for the eleven allegations identified by GW in its opposition. Those include Hajjar-Nejad’s allegations that (1) Scott violated GW’s confidentiality policy on or about August 23, 2006;' (2) Schroth directed a professor to give Hajjar-Nejad a below passing grade on or about September 22, 2006; (3) GW generated “false and contrived” student evaluations in or about September and October 2006; (4) Schroth directed Hajjar-Nejad to discontinue his ongoing medical research on or about October 23, 2006; (5) Schroth indicated that he would not permit Hajjar-Nejad to transfer to another school on or about October 23, 2006; (6) Schroth and Scott removed Hajjar-Nejad from GW’s honors program on or about October 23, 2006; (7) Scott stated that Hajjar-Nejad was angering him on or about October 23, 2006; (8) Scott stated that he did not want Hajjar-Nejad to pursue surgery as a profession on or about

*16

October 23, 2006; (9) GW included false allegations in Hajjar-Nejad’s performance evaluations in late 2006 and early 2007; (10) GW decided to initiate a review of Hajjar-Nejad’s professional comportment in December 2006; and (11) GW decided to form a committee to evaluate Hajjar-Nejad’s progress in or about February 2007.

See

Def.’s Opp’n at 12-13 (citing Proposed Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36, 39-40, 43-48, 51-53). Despite this, GW does not contend — let alone provide a colorable argument — that Hajjar-Nejad should be denied leave to amend his Complaint to allege violations of Title VI occurring on or after April 9, 2007, including his dismissal from the Medical School in July 2007.

Meanwhile, Hajjar-Nejad’s claims arising under Section 1981 present a somewhat more complicated question. To the extent such claims implicate the sort of post-contract-formation conduct that was not actionable until Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, they are subject to a four-year statute of limitations; to the extent they implicate the act of contract formation, a three-year statute of limitations applies.

See Graves v. District of Columbia,

777 F.Supp.2d 109, 115-116 (D.D.C.2011) (providing an extended analysis of the reason for the disparate treatment). In this case, Hajjar-Nejad does not challenge the act of contract formation — that is, the circumstances surrounding the Offer of Acceptance itself. Rather, he claims that GW ran afoul of Section 1981 by denying him “the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (b). As a result, the claim is subject to a four-year limitations period, meaning that Hajjar-Nejad may recover for acts of retaliation or discrimination occurring on or after April 9, 2006. Since not one of the eleven allegations challenged by GW in opposition to Hajjar-Nejad’s third Motion to Amend pre-date April 9, 2006, GW has failed to supply a colorable basis for denying Hajjar-Nejad leave to amend his Complaint to add his Section 1981 claims, as is its burden.

See Abdullah,

530 F.Supp.2d at 115 . The Court reiterates that, given the limited basis for GW’s opposition, the Court has no occasion to determine whether Hajjar-Nejad has otherwise stated plausible claims for relief under Title VI or Section 1981.

Accordingly, the Court shall GRANT-IN-PART and DENY-IN-PART Hajjar-Nejad’s third [33] Motion to Amend insofar as he seeks to add claims of discrimination and retaliation arising under Title VI and Section 1981. Specifically, the Motion to Amend shall be DENIED insofar as Hajjar-Nejad seeks to recover under Title VI based on allegations of discrimination or retaliation predating April 9, 2007; the Motion shall otherwise be GRANTED.

F. Practical Considerations

Ordinarily, the Court would require a party granted partial leave to amend to prepare and submit a revised pleading in conformity with the Court’s opinion. In this particular case, however, the Court believes that such a route is more likely to expand the avenues of dispute and engender satellite litigation instead of simplifying the further conduct of this litigation. Accordingly, the Court attaches to this Memorandum Opinion and Order a redacted version of Hajjar-Nejad’s proposed Third Amended Complaint, which omits, to the extent practicable, references to those claims that are no longer at issue. Nonetheless, the Court emphasizes that the redacted version of the proposed Third Amended Complaint is accepted only insofar as it is consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order and the terms of

*17

the Court’s August 15, 2011 Memorandum Opinion and Order.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court has considered the remaining arguments tendered by the parties and has concluded that they are either without merit or need not be reached in light of the reasons for the Court’s decision. Accordingly, it is, this 4th day of January, 2012, hereby

ORDERED that Hajjar-Nejad’s third [33] Motion to Amend is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART. Specifically, the Motion is DENIED insofar as Hajjar-Nejad seeks leave to amend the Complaint to add (a) breach of contract claims beyond his claim that GW breached the Offer of Acceptance by dismissing him from the Medical School in July 2007; (b) claims that GW discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of the DCHRA; (c) claims of discrimination and retaliation arising under Title VII; (d) constitutional claims arising under the First and Fourteenth Amendments; and (e) claims of discrimination and retaliation arising under Title VI based on acts pre-dating April 9, 2007. The Motion is GRANTED insofar as Hajjar-Nejad seeks leave to add those claims identified in his Proposed Third Amended Complaint that allege (a) discrimination or retaliation under Title VI based on acts occurring on or after April 9, 2007; and (b) claims of discrimination or retaliation under Section 1981 based on acts occurring on or after April 9, 2006.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall accept Hajjar-Nejad’s attached [43-1] Third Amended Complaint, which has been redacted by the Court, and its accompanying exhibits, for filing. Going forward, the Third Amended Complaint shall be considered viable only insofar as it is compatible with the terms of this Memorandum Opinion and Order and the Court’s August 15, 2011 Memorandum Opinion and Order.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to Haj-jar-Nejad at his address of record.

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

(UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION BASED UPON RACE, RELIGION AND NATIONAL ORIGIN; UNLAWFUL RETALIATION FOR PRIOR PROTECTED ACTIVITIES; RETALIATION BASED ON § 1981; BREACH OF CONTRACT)

COMES NOW the Plaintiff in this proceeding, Mr. Mohammad Javad Hajjar-Nejad, appearing

Pro Se,

to respectfully present an Amended Complaint regarding his facts and claims to this Honorable Court. In furtherance thereof, the following information and claims are submitted:

JURISDICTION

1. Jurisdiction in this matter is based upon [redacted] Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d

et seq.

(“Title VI”); Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”); [redacted] and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Award Act, as amended, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1988

et seq.;

in that Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad was unlawfully discriminated against by an educational institution on the bases of race (Arabic or Middle Eastern), Religion (Muslim) and National Origin (Iranian), and subsequently was subject to unlawful retaliation for prior protected EEO activities, when he was wrongfully refused certain educational entitlements and privileges which he had properly and rightfully earned, as further set forth and described herein.

2. [redacted]

*18

3. Furthermore, the Plaintiff in this Amended Complaint respectfully asserts relation back of amendments for his civil rights claims outlined above based on FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c).

4. [redacted]

5. Further jurisdiction in this matter for the contract claims cited herein is based upon the United States Constitution, Article III, Section 2, Diversity Jurisdiction, also codified in the Judiciary Act of 1978 and currently cited at 28 U.S.C.A. Section 1332 . Such diversity jurisdiction is based upon Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad being a resident of the State of Maryland; Defendant George Washington University being an educational institution located in Washington, D. C, and the amount in dispute and resulting claim for relief by Plaintiff being in excess of $75,000.00, as required by 28 U.S.C.A. Section 1332 (a).

VENUE

6. Venue in this matter properly lies with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia insofar as the Defendant George Washington University and its School of Medicine are located at 2300 Eye Street, N. W., Washington, D.C. 20037; the acts complained of herein occurred or were directed primarily within the geographical boundaries of the District of Columbia; and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1391 and 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-5(f). Moreover, the contract described below was executed by the parties and concluded in the District of Columbia.

PARTIES

7. Plaintiff Mohammad Javad Hajjar-Nejad is a resident of Gaithersburg, Maryland, and is an adult male who in the relevant time periods hereof was an enrolled student at the George Washington University Medical School. Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad is Arabic or Middle Eastern by race, is Muslim by religion, and is identified as Iranian by National Origin because that is the nationality of his parents — in fact, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad was born in Gaithersburg, Maryland.

8. Defendant George Washington University is a non-profit entity and a recognized educational institution located at 2300 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. The George Washington University Medical School and Center, also known as the George Washington University School of Medicine and Health Sciences, is a subordinate entity of George Washington University and is largely integrated onto the campus of George Washington University. The below-named officials, supervisors and employees of Defendant George Washington University committed the acts described herein as employees and agents of the Defendant while acting in furtherance of the business and non-profit goals and objectives of the Defendant, and those acts are ascribed to Defendant George Washington University under the theories of agency and

respondeat superior.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

9. To the extent that it is determined that the unlawful discrimination and retaliation claims made herein are subject to a requirement for exhaustion of administrative remedies, the matters addressed herein involving allegations of unlawful discrimination and retaliation were presented to and heard by the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights (OHR) pursuant to provisions of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (HRA). Such matter was initiated by Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad on August 24, 2007.

10. On or about September 4, 2007, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad also filed a complaint of unlawful discrimination with the

*19

U.S. Department of Education (DOE), which was docketed as EEO Complaint No. 11-07-2098. The Department of Education refused to follow up or investigate the complaint, however, citing an alleged requirement that Plaintiff deal exclusively with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights in pursuing a remedy.

11. Following an extensive period of investigation by the DC OHR, including the conduct of hearings, on June 22, 2009, a Letter of Determination (LOD) was issued by DC OHR which found that George Washington University Medical School had unlawfully retaliated against Plaintiff Haj-jar-Nejad in the following manner: (l)-by improperly performing adverse evaluations of Plaintiff based upon Plaintiffs assertions of civil rights; (2) by the Dean of the Medical School improperly directing the Director of Surgery to not give Plaintiff a passing grade in a critical course required for graduation; (3) by improperly removing Plaintiff from the Medical School Honors Program; (4) by the dean of the Medical School improperly directing Plaintiff to take an academic leave of absence, and if such leave would not be taken, refusing to permit Plaintiff to transfer to another medical school; (5) by dismissing Plaintiff from the Medical School; and, (6) by improperly refusing to issue transcripts to Plaintiff for use in continuing his medical education.

12. Following an application for reconsideration regarding the initial DC OHR findings filed by both Plaintiff (on July 20, 2009) and Defendant George Washington University (on July 22, 2009), OHR subsequently issued on January 12, 2010, a Final Decision affirming its prior “Probable Cause” determination regarding Plaintiffs claims of unlawful retaliation. This Final Decision also affirmed findings of “No Probable Cause” regarding Plaintiffs claims against Defendant of disparate treatment and a hostile educational environment.

13. Following receipt of the DC OHR Final Decision, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad re-approached the U.S. Department of Education regarding his earlier complaint, and seeking enforcement assistance against Defendant George Washington University. He was initially informed that DOE had no record of his initial complaint, and following a later reversal of that position, stated that DOE had closed the record of the complaint with no action taken.

14. Subsequently, on April 9, 2010, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad timely filed on his own behalf a United States District Court Complaint with the District Court of Maryland in Baltimore (the Northern Division of Maryland), which was subsequently and properly transferred to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1406 (a) by Order of United States District Judge Catherine C. Blake dated April 19, 2010.

15. On September 29, 2010 the Plaintiff, received a Notice of Right to Sue from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Exhibit 1). The EEOC, because the matter was already before the Honorable Court and had been filed on April 9, 2010, readily provided a Notice of Right to Sue upon request. The Honorable Court expressed in its August 15, 2011 Memorandum:-

“Hajjar-Nejad acknowledges that he voluntarily withdrew his claims based on similar legal theories without prejudice on August' 20, 2010, on the ostensible basis that some or all of his claims were still pending before the District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights and yet to be fully exhausted, but he now contends that he received a “right to sue” letter from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on September 29, 2010 and appears to sug

*20

gest that this is sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion doctrine.

See

Pl.’s MTA Mem. at 2 & Ex. 1 (Notice of Right to Sue).”

While Plaintiff had notified the DC OHR on April 9, 2010 that he had filed his case, with the United States District Court, on June 9, 2011, Plaintiffs former counsel emailed him regarding a June 8, 2011 “Order Scheduling a Status Conference” from the Chief Judge of the DC Commission on Human Rights (CHR) David Simmons to resume the procedural schedule based on the request of Plaintiffs counsel (Exhibit 2). This was approximately two (2) years after the June 22, 2009 Letter of Determination and after the matter had been closed.

16. On June 15, 2011, Plaintiff filed an -8-page

Reply Memorandum

with the Chief Administrative Law Judge informing him that he had a Right to Sue Notice and his case was pending in federal court before a federal judge with Civil Case No. 10-CV-626 (Exhibit 3).

17. The Chief Law Judge David Simmons ordered and explained on June 16, 2011, in contradiction to all of GW’s wrongful assertions in its first Motion to Dismiss regarding filing of civil rights claims in federal court and the DC HRA (See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss First Am. CompL, ECF No. [14]), that per the DC Municipal Regulations (4 DCMR § 416.1, DCMR § 416.3, DCMR § 416.4, DCMR § 426.1) and DC OHR guidelines and the DCHRA, that Plaintiff had the right to go to federal court because he had a Right to Sue Notice in. hand

(See

Exhibit 4, Proposed Decision and Final Order and Exhibit 5, Notice of Final Decision and Order).

18. The DC Commission on Human Rights formally closed this matter on June 24, 2011. The Plaintiff had requested by electronic mail that they close this matter on April 9, 2010.

LEGAL THEORIES

19. [redacted]

■The Plaintiff was in his fourth and final year of medical school when he was wrongfully terminated based on retaliatory and discriminatory practices. He was preparing for the start of his residency in July of 2008 which was a discrete employment opportunity. In preparation for entering a U.S. residency, Plaintiff had to register with the Electronic Residency Application Service (ERAS), take the Step 2 National Board Exams, and complete acting internships (AIs) in his field of choice, amongst other tasks.

Fourth year medical students are termed Acting Interns, akin to actual first year residency interns because in preparation for the internship they perform those

similar jobs

and

functions

as an intern. Importantly, the Defendant wrongfully

blocked

Plaintiff from starting his acting internship in medicine after he had received a schedule from the Defendant and was planned to start the AI

(see Exhibit 1, pages .57-64, pg. 146, and pgs. 55-56).

What’s more, after Defendant dismissed Plaintiff, it went out of its way to place a hold on his academic transcripts for approximately 8 months denying him the ability to transfer elsewhere, complete his degree and start his residency.

Plaintiff was discriminated against with respect to the residency process and did not start his residency as planned in July of 2008 because of the Defendant’s “discriminatory animus” and “discriminatory behavior”. Plaintiff was deprived of employment opportunities and the Defendant’s retaliatory and discriminatory actions adversely affected Plaintiffs’ status to become an employee, or surgical resident. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ status as a student was intertwined and inseparable from his

*21

employment status as a resident, literally, months away.

In addition, the discriminatory and retaliatory acts of the Defendant prevented and prohibited the Plaintiff from taking part in the 2008 National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) and the Electronic Residency Application Service (ERAS) to file applications for residency programs. Indeed, the Defendant prohibited Plaintiff from receiving a “token” to start the application process, which it had provided to all other students.

On November 20, 2007, the Defendant in retaliation for Plaintiffs filing of the Charge of Discrimination on November 1, 2007, contacted the National Board of Medical Examiners (NBME) and blocked him from taking the test — or Step 2 National Board exam. Again, this was done in order to stop Plaintiff from entering a residency position. This was truly an action to deny access to Plaintiff to enter a position based on merits and academic consideration and is a simple and plain form of discrimination.

Essentially, all of the wrongful actions taken by Defendant, including the hold placed on September 26, 2007 denying access to academic transcripts from seven years of study, show that the Defendant did not and does not wish to allow Plaintiff to become a resident physician by committing such actions and “[deprived him of employment opportunities and adversely affected his status as a physician]”. This includes taking the necessary exams, attaining the necessary licensure requirements and starting a residency position. The Plaintiff acted wrongfully and illegally by blocking the Plaintiff from acquiring his academic transcripts in order to seek to further his education in any regard and attain employment.

Also, Defendant has not provided Plaintiff all of his grades and credits for research on academic projects as were spelled out in the detailed Original Complaint.

“Title VI”

20. Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in programs and activities receiving Federal financial assistance. Specifically, Title VI provides that

[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.

Apart from the provisions common to Title VI, Title IX, and Section 504, courts also have held that Title VI adopts or follows the Fourteenth Amendment’s standard of proof for intentional discrimination, and Title VIPs standard of proof for disparate impact.

See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ.,

997 F.2d 1394 , 1405 n. 11, 1407 n. 14 (11th Cir.), reh’g denied, 7 F.3d 242 (11th Cir.1993); (see Chapter VIII). Accordingly, cases under these constitutional and statutory provisions may shed light on an analysis concerning the applicability of Title VI to a given situation.

§ 1981

21. Plaintiff had already included in his First Amended Complaint 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (See Am Comp, par. 1), a post-Civil War statute prohibiting race discrimination and authorizing retaliation claims.

§ 1981 provides equal protection to “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States ... to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981 .

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To state a claim for racial discrimination under Section 1981, a plaintiff “must allege that (1) the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant intended to discriminate against the plaintiff on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination concerned an activity enumerated in § 1981.”

Mazloum v. Dist. of Columbia Metro. Police Dep’t,

522 F.Supp.2d 24, 37 (D.D.C.2007) (quotations omitted). Section 1981 “can be violated only by purposeful discrimination.”

(Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania,

458 U.S. 375, 391 , 102 S.Ct. 3141 , 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982)). To plead intentional discrimination, “plaintiff ... must allege some facts that demonstrate that race was the reason for the defendant’s actions.”

Bray v. RHT, Inc.,

748 F.Supp. 3, 5 (D.D.C.1990); see also

Alexander v. Wash. Gas Light Co.,

481 F.Supp.2d 16, 31 (D.D.C.2006) (quoting

Bray).

22. [redacted]

Retaliation

[redacted]

[redacted]

Complainant establishes

a prima facie

case for retaliation. He claims to have engaged in protected activity when he submitted the “good faith reports” in July 26, 2007, September 2006 and the Brief of Case Findings in April of 2007.

Protected Activity

As noted

supra,

protected activity includes opposition and participation in a discrimination proceeding. Opposition to a practice believed to be unlawful discrimination includes, but is not limited to, informing an entity that you believe that he/she is engaging in prohibited discrimination. Opposition is protected from retaliation as long as it is based on a reasonable, good-faith belief that the complained of practice violates anti-discrimination law; and the manner of the opposition is reasonable. Examples of protected opposition include: 1) Complaining to anyone about alleged discrimination against oneself or others; threatening to file a charge of discrimination; picketing in opposition to discrimination; or refusing to obey an order reasonably believed to be discriminatory. Participation in a discrimination proceeding means taking part in a discrimination proceeding. Participation is protected activity even if the proceeding involved claims that ultimately were found to be invalid. Examples of participation include: filing a charge of discrimination; cooperating with an internal investigation of alleged discriminatory practices; or serving as a witness in an investigation or litigation; or requesting a reasonable accommodation based on religion or disability. It can also include simply making the comment that certain actions by students may result in retaliation, as Complainant did in his “good faith reports.”

On July 25, 2006, Complainant reported a “difficulty” that he had had with a Resident. Although this communication does not make allegations of discrimination, the September 22, 2006 [good faith report] does make such a claim. On September 22, 2006, Complainant submitted a “Motion for Injunctive Relief of Incorrect/Wrong Evaluation and for Development of an Active [Task] Force Committee.” In this report, Complainant criticized Respondent’s programs complaining of Respondent’s teaching methods and procedures and he gave suggestions for improvement. But he also makes statements regarding retaliation. On page 2, of the document, he states, “To ignore our weaknesses and to appease voices for change by retaliation is wrong as history has shown over the years.” He also states, “I embraced these ideas and regretfully was subject to retaliation, but I stand up for what I did and believe that I acted correctly and with the

*23

highest levels of integrity and honesty.” In this document he also quotes

University Policy,

“The current university policy within the student mistreatment policy is that when a student brings a matter, whatever it might be, to the attention of a superior, retaliation is not tolerated and is fully prohibited at all levels. Further, a resident that retaliates against a medical student for having informed a higher authority of wrongdoings is not to evaluate that medical student ... I have already given feedback to the Department of Medicine which they have used against me and incriminated me on the basis of what I have said, which was in good intention.”

Finally, Complainant continued to allege retaliation in the statement, “This discrepancy and tactic of retaliation by the Department of Medicine that raises the question of outright student mistreatment.” Therefore, although one could argue that some of the retaliation Complainant cites is a more general, instead of discriminatory, his citation of the University’s

Anti-Discrimination Policy,

which cites all forms of discrimination, provides Complainant protection

Complainant’s Brief of Case Findings of April of 2007 also amounts to protected activity. In his Brief of Case Findings, Complainant claimed discrimination based on the following facts:

• His case lasted ten (10) months precluding him from academic research,

• He should have been entitled to a grievance procedure, that the professional comportment subcommittee was against Respondent’s policies,

• The Dean removed him from the Hon- or’s Program without MSEC approval, that his allegations of mistreatment were not investigated,

• The professional comportment charges were manifestations of retaliation for his questioning how Respondent’s hospital works, and

• His evaluations from Surgery and Medicine were not based on his ability or performance.

Materially Adverse Employment Actions

After the submission of “the good faith reports,” Complainant suffered an educational adverse action when he received an unfavorable evaluation in medicine, was not given a passing grade in surgery, and was removed from the Honors curriculum in October 2006. After the submission of his Brief of Case Findings in April 2007, Complainant was dismissed from school in July 2007 and denied a copy of his transcript in April 2008.

Temporal Proximity

The temporal proximity between the claimed protected activity and the adverse action is very close and infers discriminatory behavior. The protected activities of September 2006 and April of 2007 were followed by materially adverse educational actions of October 2006 through the denial of his transcript of 2008. All actions were close enough to Complainant’s claims of discrimination to create the inference of a causal connection. Since Respondent was aware of Complainant’s activity, Complainant establishes a

prima facie

case.

Conclusion

Although the OHR acknowledges a medical school’s discretionary authority to assess the academic and professional/ethical demeanor of its students, it cannot do so in retaliation of protected activity. Although this Office reviewed many factors in this case, one thing is clear. After Complainant waged complaints against senior residents and the program in general, his stellar career took a precipitous turn for the worse. Although Complainant demon

*24

strates a number of inconsistencies, the OHR finds a number of factors compelling.

Specifically, the one of the initial emails from the Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs to Chief of Medicine [Clerkship Director of Surgery] is troubling. On Friday, September 22, 2006, he states, “I would urge you and residents to strongly consider whether his performance is indeed “passing or not.” Technically, a low pass is still a pass, and he will move on through the curriculum [the Honors Program

4

], If you really think he as serious clinical performance deficiencies [there were no clinical deficiencies as described below], a below pass grade (e.g., conditional or fail) will bring this to a clear “head” and allow us to work with him on remediation efforts.”

Although Respondent attempts to explain this correspondence as the school’s attempt to confront Complainant’s difficulties, Complainant, at the very least, offers enough evidence for this Office to question Respondent’s reasoning.

Moreover, Complainant provides enough credible evidence to demonstrate pretext through the questionable e-mails from the Dean, the possible irregularities of the comportment process and the transcript issues [the Dean placed a hold on my transcripts for 8 months [redacted]

In sum, Complainant has established his burden and sustained his prima facie case for retaliation; and the case moves forward to the adjudicatory phase of the administrative process.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

23. Paragraphs 1 through 22 are herein incorporated by reference.

24. Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad graduated from the George Washington University in May 2004

Summa Cum Laude,

with a Grade-Point Average of 3.98, and as a top 2% member of his graduating class.

25. While an undergraduate, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad was the Teaching Assistant (TA) for the GWU Histology Course, where he was responsible for teaching medical students in the Early Selection, Integrated BA/MD course regarding microscopic anatomy. Plaintiff further performed research in microscopic anatomy, publishing an abstract study based on electron microscopy in a well-recognized medical field journal.

26. Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad applied for and was presented with an Offer of Acceptance to the George Washington University School of Medicine and Health Sciences on November 5, 2003, prior to his graduation from GWU. Plaintiff executed this Offer of Acceptance on November 7, 2003, and subsequently completed all terms and conditions of his contract for matriculating at the GWU Medical School, including payment of tuition and fees.

27. Following his initial enrollment at the GWU School of Medicine and Health Sciences, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad was a superb medical school student, excelling in all academic disciplines during the period of the academic years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006.

28. In 2004, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad received the Katzen Medical Education Award for exemplary level academic achievement.

29. On April 22, 2006, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad was accepted into the Third-Year Medical School Honors Curriculum by a committee of nine faculty members. This

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selection was based upon enunciated criteria including strength of Plaintiffs written essay, the rigor of his Honors project proposal, the strength of Plaintiffs mentor-ship, evidence of Plaintiffs prior achievement and the strength of his academic performance.

30. Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad’s primary medical school research project addressed cardiovascular disease and the development of a serum “inflammatory marker” that could detect with 80% specificity those patients who would face a future heart attack; a critical area of research possibly resulting in saving 100,000 lives per year. This project was deemed noteworthy by the GWU medical and teaching staff.

31. Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad also received very high marks in the Practice of Medicine (P.O.M.) Course, which spans the entire four years of medical school. The POM Course evaluates communication, character and compassion of medical students. Plaintiff completed the third year of this course with Clinical Honors and high grades.

32. The POM Course also included a Clinical Apprenticeship Program, Problem-Based Learning, and Doctor Patient Society; with Plaintiff excelling in each area of study and practice.

33. On several occasions while a medical student, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad became known among the academic and medical leaders at Defendant George Washington University for his race, religion, and family’s national origin. These occasions included the following:

a. The presentation of a speech by Plaintiff at the close of the first academic year of medical school, in approximately April or May 2005, at an anatomy ceremony honoring donors of human cadavers and their families. Plaintiffs comments included citations to an Iranian poet, Muslim religious texts, and Islamic teachings, with a theme of equality and the human elements of working with patients and colleagues. Attending this event were Senior Associate Dean Scott Schroth and Associate Dean Rhonda Goldberg, with anatomy and other faculty members, including Plaintiffs entire medical school class (the Class of 2008).

b. Further, at the end of his second academic year of medical school, in approximately April or May 2006, Plaintiff gave a speech at a scholarship ceremony attended by Medical School Dean Dr. James Scott. Plaintiff spoke from the Holy Quran. Following the speech, Dean Scott stated to guests at the ceremony that he “didn’t teach [Plaintiff] anything [he] said.”

34. Numerous subsequent communications generated by senior personnel at Defendant George Washington University also reflect the common knowledge of Plaintiffs race, religion and national origin.

35. Plaintiff commenced medical rotations in internal medicine as an Honors student on July 7, 2006, continuing through August 11, 2006. During this period, in the course of making and reporting good faith observations, including certain limited criticisms of hospital practices which had been invited in the course of rotations, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad began experiencing adverse comments from certain members of the faculty and students.

36. On August 23, 2006, Senior Associate Dean Scott Schroth, apparently in violation of the university’s academic confidentiality policy, reported to the Director of Medicine that Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad had leveled criticisms at the Director of Medicine and Clerkship Director. The result of this report was the commencement of a pattern of hostility and antagonism against Plaintiff based on both unlawful

*26

discrimination and the failure of the Defendant’s senior personnel to abide by school policies and guidelines.

37. Subsequent to the start of the academic year 2006-2007, Plaintiffs third year of medical school, he began to experience increasingly hostile treatment from members of the faculty, particularly Medical School Dean Dr. James Scott.

38. Without any legitimate foundation from either Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad’s academic performance or progress as a medical school student, or Plaintiffs conduct or behavior within the University community, Dean Scott and his subordinates, particularly Dean Schroth, began a series of actions to penalize and adversely affect the academic progress of Plaintiff.

39. For example, Plaintiffs surgery rotation at GWU began on August 14, 2006. On September 22, 2006, with no apparent justification, Senior Associate Dean Schroth told the course director of surgery, Dr. Juliet Lee, not to give Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad a passing grade — so that he would be removed from the Honors Curriculum. Dean Schroth had no association whatsoever with the surgery rotation, and he directly violated University regulations when he interfered in this manner with the University grading process. On information and belief, Dr. Schroth’s actions were directed by Dean Scott. This effort occurred only one day after Dean Schroth was told by Dr. Lee that Plaintiff would pass the surgery rotation based on exams given.

6

40. Such actions included the generation in September and October of 2006 of false and contrived student evaluations against Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad, which were unfairly and improperly critical of aspects of his academic progress and performance.

41. On September 22, 2006, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad submitted a written report to Senior Associate Dean Schroth and to Dr. Williams, Provost and Vice President of GWU for Health Affairs. This report, which was styled by Plaintiff as a “good faith” report, incorporated Plaintiffs observations with respect to problems regarding hospital organization, resident teaching, and patient care. This report was prepared at the specific request of Dean Schroth.

42. Plaintiffs report specifically stated that he had been personally subjected to degrading, dehumanizing and humiliating treatment, and that such treatment had escalated after he had reported the types of problems cited in report to supervisors. There was a clear understanding that Plaintiffs complaints of personal degrading, dehumanizing and humiliating treatment were directly tied to his race, religion and perceptions of his national origin. Following the submission of the report, Plaintiff saw further escalation of his adverse treatment.

43. On October 23, 2006, Plaintiff was directed by Senior Associate Dean Schroth, without legitimate cause or reason, to stop all of his ongoing medical research. This directive was in direct contravention of the Liaison Committee on Medical Education (LOME) Standards for

*27

Accreditation of Medical Education Programs and University policy regarding' Disruption of University Functions (Exhibit 12). University policy in this regard unambiguously states that “no member of the University shall: a) engage in conduct that obstructs teaching, research or learning.” On information and belief, and as supported by an e-mail communication, this action had been directed by Medical School Dean Scott.

44. On this same day, October 23, 2006, Plaintiff was improperly and without cause told by Senior Associate Dean Schroth that he would not permit Plaintiff to transfer from the George Washington Medical School to another medical school, and that he would block such transfer by placing the demonstrably false performance appraisals into his academic records. Again, on information and belief, such action had been directed by Medical School Dean Scott.

45. On this same day, October 23, 2006, Plaintiff was informed by Senior Associate Dean Schroth that he would have to leave, and was being removed, from the Medical School Honors Program, and had to return to the traditional curriculum. If Plaintiff would not voluntarily leave the Honors Program, he was threatened with being forced to take a “leave of absence” from medical school. Senior Associate Dean Schroth also stated to Plaintiff that he “had never used this [threat of a student being forced to take a leave of absence] before,” but “I will if I have to.”

46. These statements' were later repeated to Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad by Senior Associate Dean Schroth and Medical School Dean Scott in a subsequent (second) meeting also on October 23, 2006, attended by Plaintiff and his parents. Plaintiff was told at this meeting that if he would not “step down” from the Honors Program, he would be forced to take a leave of absence.

47. After Plaintiff explained to Dean Scott that being removed from an ability to conduct research as a student would be detrimental to the school’s stated goals of performing research, Dean Scott responded, “You’re making me angry,” and “not to say that.” Upon being queried by Plaintiffs father as to why he was acting so angry, Dean Scott responded that Plaintiff was “moving up too fast,” and that he doesn’t “want [Plaintiff] to move so fast.”

48. Additionally at this second meeting on October 23, 2006, Medical School Dean Scott told Plaintiff that he “did not want” Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad to go into surgery as a profession, which had been a stated and known educational objective of Plaintiff. On information and belief, Dean Scott simply did not want Plaintiff, an American Muslim, to become a cardiovascular surgeon in his medical school program, and had no legitimate reasons for barring Plaintiff from this academic and professional program.

49. In the course of the meetings, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad clearly stated that he believed that there was no legitimate bases for the actions being taken against him, and inferred such actions to be based upon discriminatory motives.

50. Because of the various inappropri-' ate and discriminatory threats to terminate his long-sought medical career, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad was forced to leave the Medical School Honors Program, and enter the general medical school academic community.

51. Despite a return to the general medical school community and a curtailment of his research efforts, Plaintiff Haj-jar-Nejad continued to suffer periodic discrimination and retaliation. In late 2006 and early 2007, false allegations were in-

*28

eluded in the performance evaluations of Plaintiff for his Obstetrics and Gynecology Course of Instruction and Rotation, and such allegations were inserted into other course evaluations of Plaintiff.

52. On December 27, 2006, Dean Schroth notified Plaintiff in writing that the Defendant was initiating a committee review on Plaintiffs “professional comportment” allegedly based on Plaintiffs evaluations in the Medicine, Surgery, and Obstetrics and Gynecology rotations. No further information was provided by Dr. Schroth, but Plaintiff was aware of the inclusion of false information in such evaluations that Plaintiff had challenged when he received the evaluations.

53. In February 2007, Plaintiff was notified of an improperly formed and constituted committee evaluation of his professional comportment. Such reminder occurred just prior to an examination period and was intended to disrupt Plaintiffs examination preparations.

54. On March 2, 2007, Plaintiff provided an elaborate response to the false allegations of professional comportment to be given to the subcommittee. Despite such efforts, the process moved forward to an apparent pre-determined destination.

55. The referenced committee meeting still was not scheduled until a date finally was set in April 2007. Following the Virginia Tech school tragedy of April 16, 2007, the committee meeting was scheduled for May 3, 2007. The reason given for the delayed committee meeting was “security considerations,” an obvious reference to Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad’s Islamic and Middle Eastern background.

56. On May 3, 2007, the committee (named the Subcommittee on Professional Comportment of the Medical Student Evaluation Committee, or MSEC) meeting occurred. The Chairman announced at the meeting that its purpose was to investigate Plaintiffs “veracity,” and stated that grades and evaluations would not be discussed.

57. The meeting, as convened and conducted, violated numerous specific University policies and regulations, and Plaintiff and his counsel were not permitted to ask questions, cross examine witnesses, name additional witnesses for testimony, or present substantial evidence. The specific GW policies and regulations that were violated in the initiation and conduct of the subcommittee are itemized below:

• Rule-Article E: Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Section 6 (Regulations for M.D. Candidates) (Exhibit 1, pg. 41)

• Rule-Article E: Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Section 7 (Regulations for M.D. Candidates) (Exhibit 1, pg. 41)

• Rule-Article E: Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Section 10 (Regulations for M.D. Candidates) (Exhibit 1, pg. 42)

• Rule-Article E: Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Section 13 (Regulations for M.D. Candidates) (Exhibit 1, pg. 42)

• Rule-Article E: Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Section 14 (Regulations for M.D. Candidates) (Exhibit 1, pg. 43)

• Rule-Article E: Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Sections 15-16 (Regulations for M.D. Candidates) (Exhibit 1, pg. 44)

• Rule-Article V: Regulations Concerning Student Life on Campus, Sections A (The Enactment of Regulations) and B (Standards of Fairness and Student Rights in Disciplinary Cases) The Guide to Student Rights and Responsibilities 2006-2007 (Exhibit 1, pg. 45)

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• Rule-Article V, Regulations Concerning Student Life on Campus, Section B, Points 1-8 The Guide to Student Rights and Responsibilities 2006-2007(Exhibit 1, pg. 46)

58. The contents of the recommendations of the Subcommittee were basically that Plaintiff (i) repeat any clerkship for which he

receives a grade of low pass or below,

(ii) even if Plaintiff receives passing grades subsequently, the Subcommittee Chair must review his clerkship evaluations when he has completed all clerkships to look for comportment-related issues, and if less than satisfactory will refer to the Medical Student Evaluation Committee for investigation, (iii) following completion of all third year clerkships, Plaintiff must complete an acting internship in internal medicine at GW Hospital, (iv) that the Subcommittee recommendations be permanently made a part of the Plaintiffs fide and record, and (v) for Plaintiff to take a leave of absence.

59. Moreover, Dean Goldberg informed the Plaintiff on June 17, 2007 that he would have to repeat the Obstetrics and Gynecology clerkship even though he received a grade of High Pass from the Clerkship Director Dr. Charles Macri. Plaintiffs final evaluation in the obstetrics and gynecology rotation was a high pass— Dr. Macri writes that Plaintiffs cognitive skills are excellent ... [He is] very well read ... [clinically] Plaintiff is competent and has excellent exam skills ... [and] in the categories of information presentation, professional behavior and work habits he provides strong marks ...” The actions of GW again in this regard reveal how the interactions and directives to and with Plaintiff were tainted by discriminatory animus.

60. Additionally, as the affidavit by Mr. Sarsour (Plaintiffs Emergency Counsel for MSEC) reveals, the Subcommittee was unable throughout the investigation to find any evidence or proof that Plaintiff had been untruthful (Exhibit 17). This should have led to closure after no evidence was found but it didn’t because of discrimination. There was a big gap between the subcommittee recommendations for remedial action and the MSEC’S decision for dismissal.

61. Despite these ongoing and unrelenting efforts of Defendant to dissuade Plaintiff from completing medical school, Plaintiff remained steadfast and somehow finished the 2006-2007 academic school year (Plaintiffs third year of the four-year medical school curriculum) with passing grades in all of his graded courses, completing several courses with “High Pass” and “Honors” grade results. This was despite Plaintiff having been removed from the Honors Academic Program.

62. The evaluations of his individual professors, to the apparent consternation of senior Medical School officials, and particularly Medical School Dean Scott and Senior Associate Dean Schroth, were continuously high and full of praise for Plaintiffs academic accomplishments and class comportment.

63. In certain instances, however, including the Obstetrics and Gynecology Rotation related duties performed by Plaintiff at Inova Fairfax Hospital (IFH) in early 2007, Plaintiffs highly favorable review and evaluation was not placed into his transcript for several months. No explanation has ever been presented for such delays.

64. The Subcommittee issued recommendations on June 18, 2007, which again failed to meet numerous University standards and guidelines. After finding no evidence or proof of any untruthfulness by Plaintiff in his academic efforts, the Subcommittee still recommended changes af

*30

fecting

only

Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad’s grades and academic requirements. Such recommendations were abjectly discriminatory and retaliatory, and contrary to University regulations and policies. For example, the Subcommittee recommended that Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad be forced to repeat any clerkship (an academic form of apprenticeship) if he were to receive a “Low Pass” grade. That grade, however, is a passing grade, and is a successful grade and recognized for full credit under University regulations and policies.

65. The Subcommittee presented its recommendations to the Medical Student Evaluation Committee (MSEC) on or about June 18, 2007, the same day that the MSEC was scheduled to meet regarding Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad. Plaintiff himself did not receive the recommendations of the Subcommittee until 12:03 a.m. on June 18, 2007, the same day as the scheduled MSEC meeting.

66. Dean Goldberg sat as an apparent of the MSEC meeting conducted on June 18, 2007. She denied the presence at the meeting of an expert witness and legal assistant for Plaintiff, and stated that neither Plaintiff nor his counsel could speak or ask questions at the hearing, except for an oral statement which Plaintiff could make.

67. The MSEC membership consisted primarily of white students and individuals pre-selected and appointed by senior member of the GWU administration. The Chairman was Dr. Jeffrey Akman. The names and positions of the members were requested by Plaintiff, but never provided. There was no apparent certification, authentication or verification of the hearing-process, and contrary to the regulations of the Medical School the MSEC did not present a written recommendation. Plaintiff had no ability to challenge any MSEC member for cause.

68. Plaintiff requested in writing from Medical School Dean Scott a copy of any recommendations made by the MSEC regarding his “hearing” of June 18, 2007. On July 13, 2007, Dean Scott denied this request. A further request for the MSEC determinations was made on July 17, 2007, by Plaintiff. Again, Dean Scott denied Plaintiffs request.

69. On July 26, 2007, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad received from Dean Scott a letter from the Chairman of the MSEC (Dr. Akman) addressed to Dean Scott. The letter was dated July 12, 2007, and stated that the MSEC had decided by “motions” and “secret ballot voting” to dismiss Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad from GWU Medical School. There were no

valid

explanations or bases for such decision provided.

70. This determination was totally unjustified, without substantial bases in fact, contrary to the apparent findings and recommendations of the cited Subcommittee, and a furtherance of the acts of discrimination and retaliation fostered by Medical School Dean Scott since at least mid-2006. Numerous specific violations of University policy .and regulations were apparent. The MSEC greatly exceeded its scope of authority, and its numerous procedural violations constituted an egregious denial of Plaintiffs fundamental procedural rights. Plaintiffs emergency counsel for the MSEC, Mr. Jad Sarsour, provided an Affidavit verifying the discriminatory nature of the MSEC proceeding and expressed regulations violated by the MSEC (Exhibit 17).

71. By not providing a mechanism for Plaintiff to identify and disqualify members for conflicts of interest, the MSEC proceeding created a clear opportunity to achieve a biased and perverted objective, to serve as a mere rubber stamp to whatever the administration, and Dean Scott,

*31

wanted to achieve.' Dean Scott had clearly-used the MSEC process as a veneer to accomplish a pre-determined course of action to ensure the dismissal of Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad from school that had been substantially stated in the October 23, 2006, meetings cited previously.

72. Dean Scott apparently adopted the recommendations of the MSEC for the dismissal of Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad from medical school, and dismissed Plaintiff summarily on or about July 26, 2007. Dean Scott stated to Plaintiff that he was the “final arbiter” of the matter. As stated by University regulations, however, the final decision regarding a dismissal is to be made by the University Vice President for Academic Affairs. The specific guiding regulation in this instance is Regulations for MD Candidates, Article E, Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Sections 17-18.

73. Even though Plaintiff had received his fourth year medical school schedule from Assistant Dean Haywood on April 18, 2007, and Plaintiff was authorized to begin an acting internship (AI) in medicine despite the pendency of the MSEC proceedings, there was a unilateral modification of Plaintiffs schedule to substitute the AI in medicine with a research elective. Clearly, this was done because the decision on dismissal already had been made by University senior personnel.

74. Prior to his dismissal from the medical program, Plaintiff worked for four weeks to attain Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval for his research on human arteries. He arranged collaboration between the Department of Biochemistry and heart/vascular surgeons at the hospital, under his mentor, Dr. McCaffrey. The IRB approval was received on July 23, 2007; but all progress on this project was terminated with Plaintiffs dismissal on July 26, 2007.

75. Because Dean Scott actually did not have the authority to dismiss Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad on July 26, 2007, even though Dean Scott did improperly and immediately terminate Plaintiffs participation in the academic process, Plaintiff subsequently filed an appeal regarding his dismissal to the Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs (EVPAA). Plaintiffs appeal, submitted on August 7, 2007, contained a detailed account of clear and definite violations of rules and regulations by the Defendant in taking its various adverse and discriminatory actions.

76. On August 9, 2007, Plaintiff spoke with former President of GWU Mr. Stephen J. Trachtenberg. He told Plaintiff to “return back to Iran to complete medical studies,” and that the Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs would uphold Dean Scott’s decision.

77. Formal dismissal is exactly the result that occurred, although not in the manner prescribed by GWU regulations. On September 13, 2007, a designee of the Vice President for Academic Affairs (VPAA), Ms. Carol K. Sigelman, Associate Vice President, upheld the decision of Dean Scott to dismiss Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad from the medical school.

78. The threats of senior Defendant academic leaders, including Medical School Dean Scott and Senior Associate Dean Schroth, to withhold Plaintiffs academic transcripts to preclude his subsequent transfer to an alternative medical school were subsequently enacted. These threats, made initially on October 23, 2006, were always planned for enactment once the Defendant’s objective of obtaining Plaintiffs dismissal was achieved. Specifically, on September 26, 2007, there was an eight (8) month hold put on Plaintiffs transcripts by the Dean of the School of Medicine and Health Sciences (Dr. Scott);

*32

thereby prohibiting Plaintiffs efforts to continue his medical studies at an alternative medical school.

79. The unlawful and retaliatory “hold” on Plaintiffs transcripts was removed, after several requests, on April 8, 2008; with an apology rendered to Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad by the University Office of the Registrar. On April 7, 2008 the Defendant provided a letter to Plaintiff stating that “the hold was placed by the Dean of the School of Medicine and Health Sciences” (Exhibit 15). On April 14, 2008, a Letter of Record Status was provided to Plaintiff that states, “This is to certify that the academic hold (SMHS Dean’s Office) preventing the above student from obtaining his transcript was erroneously placed. The hold was intended to prevent future registration, but unwittingly additionally prevented transcript production” (Exhibit 16). This is a blatantly pretextual excuse, however, for the conduct of the cited pattern of abject discrimination and retaliation against Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad.

80. On November 1, 2007, Dean Scott e-mailed the National Board of Medical Examiners (NBME) and instructed them to not let Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad sit for the Step 2 National Exam to be a physician. Had Dean Scott not placed an improper and unwarranted hold on Plaintiffs medical school transcripts, however, Plaintiff would have been able to enroll elsewhere, and would have been permitted to take this examination in his fourth year.

81. Further, because Plaintiff already had completed his third year in May 2007 by passing the end of third-year examination, with a score/grade above the class average, and he had completed twenty-eight (28) research credits towards his fourth year academic requirements, Plaintiff would have graduated on time in 2008 for the commencement of a residency program. Such residency program would have represented the culmination of over eight years of hard work, study and dedication.

82. From August 4, 2008, to the current date, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad has performed an independent clerkship in urology with Dr. Parvez I. Shah. He has successfully performed all of his job-related duties in this position.

83. On October 15, 2008, reflecting many of the same problems that had been surfaced by Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad in mid-2006 and which triggered the wave of discrimination and retaliation against him by Dr. Scott and his subordinates, GWU Medical School was placed on probation by the Liaison Committee on Medical Education (LOME). LOME is recognized by the U.S. Department of Education to accredit all medical schools in the United States. GWU was placed on probation for “reasons seriously compromising the quality of the MD program.” On information and belief, GWU was the only medical school in the United States to be placed on probation during this time frame.

84. The unlawful discriminatory and retaliatory actions of Defendant George Washington University and its senior officials, employees and agents, have caused the following damages and injuries to Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad:

a. The denial by Defendant of the rightful and timely graduation of Plaintiff from GW Medical School, scheduled for May 2008, has resulted in significant financial loss to Plaintiff resulting in the denial of income as a practicing medical resident and as a fully licensed medical doctor from the period May 2008 to the present, in the amount of not less than One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00), plus interest.

b. The denial by Defendant of the rightful graduation of Plaintiff from the

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GW Medical School will result in future earnings and lost income from the date of judgment to Plaintiffs anticipated life span in an amount of not less than Fifty Million Dollars ($50,000,000.00).

c. The unlawful and premature dismissal of Plaintiff from the GW Medical School by Defendant resulted in the loss of all investment costs of such education, including education costs, living expenses and deferred or missed income from alternative employment during the period June 2004 through August 2007, in an amount not less than Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars ($800,000.00).

d. Because of the aforestated unlawful and retaliatory acts of Defendant GWU, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad has experienced significant mental pain and suffering, stress, depression and other physical and mental ailments.

e. Because of the aforestated unlawful and retaliatory acts of Defendant GWU, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad has suffered significant loss of personal esteem and reputation in the professional and academic communities, and among his family and personal friends.

85. The blatantly deliberate and unlawful acts of discrimination and retaliation conducted by Medical School Dean Scott and Senior Associate Dean Schroth, both senior officials of Defendant’s institution, constitute egregious violations of Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad’s [redacted] civil rights. These reprehensible acts are directly attributable to employer Defendant GW University, which refused to correct the blatant acts of discrimination and retaliation, refused to discipline the responsible individuals, and furthered their actions with independent corroboration and support. Such conduct warrants the award in this case of punitive damages.

COUNT I:

UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION BASED UPON RACE, RELIGION AND NATIONAL ORIGIN

86. Paragraphs 1-85 are herein incorporated by reference.

87. The above-described acts reflect discrete and continuing unlawful discrimination against Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad based upon Plaintiffs race (Arabic or Middle Eastern), religion (Muslim), and apparent family-related National Origin (Iranian), conducted by senior officials and employees of Defendant George Washington University and the George Washington University School of Medicine and Health Services.

88. The actions of Defendant George Washington University, through its senior officers, employees and agents, have caused the damages and injuries cited in paragraphs 84 and 85 of this Amended Complaint, cited above.

89. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful discriminatory conduct, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad demands the relief set forth below:

a. Payment of an amount not less than $51,800,000 for monetary compensation for loss of income and loss of future income, plus appropriate interest on past lost income;

b. Compensatory damages in an amount of at least $2,000,000;

c. Punitive damages in an amount of at least $10,000,000;

d. Removal of all references to Plaintiffs dismissal from medical school from all records and documents maintained by the Defendant (i.e., transcript, etc);

e. The provision of favorable recommendations and Dean’s Letter by Defendant to locations at which Plaintiff can perform intern and residency require

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ments following medical school graduation;

f. Complete access to Plaintiffs undergraduate and medical school transcripts at all times;

g. The Defendant will not convey any disparaging information (i.e., including any harmful acts, communications, reports, records, transcripts, statements, documents, recommendations or disclosures) regarding or against Plaintiff to any residency program, licensing authority, including state medical board, credentials verification service, hospital, etc.

h. Payment of all reasonable attorney’s fees and costs associated with this litigation and all administrative proceedings which occurred prior to the initiation of this litigation; and,

i. Such other relief as this Honorable Court may direct.

COUNT II:

UNLAWFUL RETALIATION FOR PRIOR PROTECTED EEO ACTIVITIES

90. Paragraphs 1-85 are herein incorporated by reference.

91. The above-described acts reflect discrete and continuing unlawful retaliation against Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad based upon Plaintiffs prior protected activities of complaining of adverse treatment based on race (Arabic or Middle Eastern), religion (Muslim), and apparent family-related National Origin (Iranian), conducted by senior officials and employees of Defendant George Washington University and the George Washington University School of Medicine and Health Sciences.

92. The actions of Defendant George Washington University, through its senior officers, employees and agents, have caused the damages and injuries cited in paragraphs 84 and 85 of this Amended Complaint, cited above.

93. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful retaliatory conduct, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad demands the relief set forth below:

a. Payment of an amount not less than $51,800,000 for monetary compensation for loss of income and loss of future income, plus appropriate interest on past lost income;

b. Compensatory damages in an amount of at least $2,000,000;

c. Punitive damages in an amount of at least $10,000,000;

d. Removal of all references to Plaintiffs dismissal from medical school from all records and documents maintained by the Defendant;

e. The provision of favorable recommendations and Dean’s Letter by Defendant to locations at which Plaintiff can perform intern and residency requirements following medical school graduation;

f. Complete access to Plaintiffs undergraduate and medical school transcripts at all times;

g. The Defendant will not convey any disparaging information (i.e., including any harmful acts, communications, reports, records, transcripts, statements, documents, recommendations or disclosures) regarding or against Plaintiff to any residency program, licensing authority, including state medical board, credentials verification service, hospital, etc.

h. Payment of all reasonable attorney’s fees and costs associated with this litigation and all administrative proceedings which occurred prior to the initiation of this litigation; and,

i. Such other relief as this Honorable Court may direct.

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COUNT III:

BREACH OF CONTRACT

94. Paragraphs 1-85 are herein incorporated by reference.

95. The Offer of Acceptance issued by Defendant GW University to Plaintiff Haj-jar-Nejad on November 5, 2003, and signed and accepted by Plaintiff on November 7, 2003, constitutes a contractual agreement with mutually binding promises, obligations and responsibilities established by and between Defendant and Plaintiff (Exhibit 19). Such Agreement was supplemented in turn by a reasonably promulgated set of rules, regulations, directives and policies implemented by the Defendant and relied upon by the Plaintiff. Plaintiff in this proceeding complied in every reasonable manner with every provision of this Agreement, including making in a timely manner all required payments and obligations.

The Honorable Judge explains in her August 15, 2011 Memorandum that in order:

“To state a claim for breach of contract under District of Columbia law, a plaintiff must allege (i) a valid contract between the parties, (ii) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract, (iii) a breach of that duty, and (iv) damages caused by that breach.

Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez,

984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C.2009).”

[redacted] The Plaintiff herein incorporates into this Third Amendment Complaint the following documents, a number of which were formerly attached to PL’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Second Am. Compl. (“PL’s MTD Opp’n”), ECF No. [22]:

• GWU School of Medicine and Health Sciences Student Mistreatment Policy and Procedures (Exhibit 7)

• GWU Non-Retaliation Policy (Exhibit 8)

• GW School of Medicine and Health Sciences Regulations for MD Candidates (Exhibit 9)

• GWU Guide to Student Rights and Responsibilities (Exhibit 10)

• Email Communication by Dean to Trigger Professional Comportment Review (Exhibit 11)

• GWU Disruption of University Functions Policy (Exhibit 12)

• Correspondence and E-Mail Communications re Professional Comportment Subcommittee Review (Exhibit 13)

• Twenty One (21) Questions Presented to Subcommittee on Professional Comportment and Never Answered Against MD Candidate Regulations (Exhibit 14)

• Letter from University Registrar re Transcript-Letter of No Transcript (Exhibit 15)

• Letter from University Registrar re Transcript-Letter of Record Status (Exhibit 16)

• Affidavit of Mr. Jad Sarsour, Plaintiffs Emergency Counsel for MSEC (Exhibit 17)

• Mr. Syed H. Zaidi Affidavit, Plaintiffs Counsel for Subcommittee (Exhibit 18)

96. The Honorable Judge discusses that GW’s motion is “GRANTED” insofar as it seeks dismissal of any breach of contract claim based on an unidentified universe of “regulations,” “policies,” “rules,” “procedures,” “directives,” and the like (See Order, Honorable Judge Kollar-Kotelly, August 15, 2011 at 1). The Honorable Judge explains ‘ “that Haj-jar-Nejad’s Second Amended Complaint fails to provide adequate notice of his breach of contract claim to the extent he

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intends to base it on an

unidentified

universe of “regulations,” “policies,” “rules,” “procedures,” and “directives.” ’ In order to address this concern, the Plaintiff is including in this Third Amendment specific regulations violated within the Regulations for MD Candidates Guide to Student Rights and Responsibilities.

97. Here follows a non-exhaustive list of the specific regulation violations in those documents with reference to specific provisiones) and if an e-mail or letter, a citation of the specific regulation or policy that it addresses, with location precisely spelled out:

• Student Mistreatment Policy and Procedures (Exhibit 7)

• Mistreatment (Student Mistreatment Policy and Procedures), pgs. 1-5

• Confidentiality (Student Mistreatment Policy and Procedures), Policy Objectives, p. 1; Confidentiality, p. 4

• Non-Retaliation Policy (Exhibit 8)

• Violated in its entirety, specifically, p. 1 policy statement; p. 1 reason for policy/purpose; p. 2 Policy/proeedures (“... retaliation against a member of the university community for making a good faith report of potential university-related ... violations is prohibited ... ”)

• Regulation for MD Candidates (Exhibit 9)

• Article B: Evaluation of Academic Performance, Article B, Sections 1-2,7

• Article B: Evaluation of Academic Performance, Sections 5 and 6;

• Article E. Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Section 1

• Article E. Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Section 3

• Article E, Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Section 6 (Regulation Violations for Committee Review)

• Article E: Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Section 7 (Regulation Violations for Committee Review)

• Article E: Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Section 10 (Regulation Violations for Committee Review)

• Article E: Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Section 13 (Regulation Violations for Committee Review)

• Article E: Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Section 14 (Regulation Violations for Committee Review)

• Article E: Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Sections 15-16 (Regulation Violations for Committee Review)

• Guide to Student Rights and Responsibilities 2006-2007 (Exhibit 10)

• Article II Section C: Protection Against Disclosure, Page 1

• Article II, Section B: Protection Against Improper Academic Evaluation, Page 1

• Article V: Regulations Concerning Student Life on Campus, Sections A (The Enactment of Regulations) and B (Standards of Fairness and Student Rights in Disciplinary Cases, Points 1-8), Page 3

• Email from Dr. Schroth to “trigger” a comportment hearing (Exhibit 11)

• Article B: Evaluation of Academic Performance, Article B, Sections 1-2, 7 (Regulations for MD Candidates)

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• Article II, Section B: Protection Against Improper Academic Evaluation, Page 1 (Guide)

• This email is connected to two other emails and shows that Senior Associate Dean Schroth orchestrated Hajjar-Nejad’s removal from Honors and the formation the subcommittee.

• This email, along with Exhibit 1

7

, page 95 and 97 show that the Senior Associate Dean interfered in the grading process in the surgery rotation against school grading regulations.

• Exhibit 1 page 95 shows that the Dean told the course director not to pass Hajjar-Nejad in surgery after she said he would pass (Exhibit 6). Then, in Exhibit 1, page 97 it lucidly shows that the same dean moved to cement a conditional grade in surgery for Hajjar-Nejad and include the false and misleading evaluations to “trigger” a comportment proceeding against him (Exhibit 11). This is in violation of the MD Candidate Regulations and the Guide.

• Disruption of University Functions (Exhibit 12)

• Violated in its entirety, specifically, Policy statement, Page 1 and Policy/Proeedures, Page 2. Clearly violated when Hajjar-Nejad was ordered to stop research and was removed from the Honors Program.

• Subcommittee emails for irregular process (Exhibit 13)

• Article E, Sections 1-19, Regulations for MD Candidates

• Twenty one questions presented to and for the subcommittee and left unanswered by GW (Exhibit 14)

• As above and broad in scope, however, to be specific includes:

□ Article B: Evaluation of Academic Performance, Article B, Sections 1-2, 7 (Regulations for MD Candidates)

□ Article B: Evaluation of Academic Performance, Sections 5 and 6;

□ Article E. Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Section 1

□ Article E. Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Section 3

□ Article II, Section B: Protection Against Improper Academic Evaluation, Page 1 (Guide)

□ Article V: Regulations Concerning Student Life on Campus, Sections A (The Enactment of Regulations) and B (Standards of Fairness and Student Rights in Disciplinary Cases, Points 1-8), Page 3

□ Article E, Sections 1-19, Regulations for MD Candidates

• Letter of No Transcript and Letter of Record Status (Exhibits 15 and 16 respectively). Deal with Hold on Hajjar-Nejad’s transcript for 8 months.

• Violates Non-retaliation policy, disruption of university functions policy, Guide, Regulations, and

• [redacted] The University issued an apology after placing the hold for eight months which prohibited access to my transcripts to continue my education.

• Article V: Regulations Concerning Student Life on Campus, Sections A (The Enactment of Regulations) and B (Standards of Fairness and

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Student Rights in Disciplinary Cases, Points 1-8), Page 3

98. How specifically each regulation was violated is present within the record. For example, the subcommittee recommendations were discriminatory as they distinctly changed the grading policy and requirement for the Plaintiff only.

“The recommendation that [Plaintiff] must repeat any clerkship he received a low pass [in] is not cohesive with policy.

A low pass is a passing grade

” (See exhibit 3

8

, p. 95, bottom), however, the subcommittee states that “[he] must repeat any clerkship for which [he] receive[s] a grade of low pass or below” (See Exhibit 1, page 133, last paragraph, point 1). The students of the medical center are not upheld to such a policy. That GW violated its own policy is clear and the specific policy that was violated is crystal clear — Regulations for MD Candidates, Articles A and B.

The Defendant’s treatment of Plaintiff was not uniform (See U.S. D.O.E. complaint, pages 63-64). Also, “when Dean Schroth told Dr. Lee to give [Plaintiff] a conditional grade, he tells her a low pass is still a pass and that would keep [him] in the honors curriculum,” so the subcommittee’s ruling was purely and simply discriminatory (Exhibit 6, Give a CN or Failing Grade Email). In this Exhibit, it clearly shows the Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs stating that a low pass is a passing grade. Therefore, the subcommittee recommendation which states that Plaintiff must repeat any clerkship for which he receives a low pass grade or below is purely discriminatory. As the affidavit from Mr. Sarsour (Plaintiffs emergency counsel for MSEC) explains, “the administration of the dean’s office changed the school’s regulations specifieally for Mr. Hajjar-Nejad by changing grading policies” (Exhibit 17).

99. [redacted]

100. More specifically, a glimpse of Exhibit 1 (Green Cover), the Appeal to the Vice President for Academic Affairs Dr. Donald R. Lehman, shows a detailed and extensive list of regulation violations by GW, a definition of the specific regulation at-hand, how GW violated that regulation, and actions not taken by GW as required by the regulations.

101. To illustrate, the Plaintiff will review a series of violations (adapted from Exhibit 1, pages 41 -46) that reveal imposed duty on GW and breach of that duty. These were all brought to the attention of GW in a timely manner:

i. The Senior Associate Dean, Scott Schroth, emails the Course Director of Surgery and tells her not to give the Plaintiff a passing grade in the surgery rotation after she emails him that the Plaintiff will pass even with the higher grading requirements of the honors program. The Dean’s interference in the grading process violated the Regulations for MD Candidates.

This is directly against school regulations,

one of which state “the faculty is responsible for evaluation of the performance of students in a meaningful, useful, and timely manner” (Evaluation of Academic Performance, Sections 1-2, 7, See Regulations for MD Candidates). The faculty is responsible for giving evaluations, and authority for giving grades lies with the Department of Surgery, not Dean Schroth or the Dean’s office. Article B, Section 7 of the Regulations for MD Candidates was violated because an appeal was sent to Dr. Lee (Clerkship Director

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of Surgery) on November 17, 2006 and no response was ever provided in line with regulation. The Guide to Student Rights and Responsibilities also clearly provides “protection against improper academic evaluation” under Article II, Section B: Protection against Improper Academic Evaluation. The evaluations in surgery were based on violation of a protected activity and therefore the DC OHR ruled for discriminatory retaliation. The MSEC was informed of Dean Schroth’s violation and did nothing about it. Dr. Lee obstructed Plaintiffs right to appeal the surgery grade and he was not permitted to move through the process in accord with the regulations. The Deans committed an act of retaliation by giving Plaintiff a conditional grade in surgery as a direct result of the good-faith report made by him on September 22, 2006.

ii. A second example of black and white discrimination and concomitant violation of MD Candidate Regulations of the Defendants’ institution is when the Dean emails the Clerkship Director of Medicine telling him that Plaintiff has leveled criticism at him and the level of the Department of Medicine,

thus directly leading to a retaliatory and capricious evaluation,

and violating school confidentiality policies that exist to protect students (Exhibit 2

9

, pg. 15). Dean Schroth writes in an electronic message that Plaintiff was “fairly dismissive of his meetings with Robert [Clerkship Director of Medicine], implying that you were contradictory in your advice and poorly informed about his fund of knowledge and work habits.” Dean Schroth revealed good faith reports made in confidence solely for the improvement of the University to the Department of Medicine, however, he did so in a way that distorted and misrepresented Plaintiffs report, and turned the Director against him. The Director of the Medicine Clerkship goes from seeing Plaintiff as “very conscientious, enthusiastic, and disciplined student” with valid concerns of “experiences not conducive to learning” to characterizing him as someone “defensive,” “resistant,” and “closed to constructive feedback” (See Exhibit 2, p. 17) after meddling by Dean Schroth. The medicine evaluation was appealed in line with the article above. The appeal process was blocked also against Article B Section 7. This all led to a retaliatory medicine evaluation. This shows clearly direct and proximate cause of damages as a result of the Defendant’s violating regulations and guidelines.

iii. The Plaintiffs removal from the Honors Academic Program and the prohibition of his performing research also violated specific identified rules of the university. Specifically, GW had certain duties imposed on it by Article B: Evaluation of Academic Performance, Sections 5 and 6 (Regulations for MD Candidates) and Article II, Section B: Protection Against Improper Academic Evaluation (Guide to Student Rights and Responsibilities 2006-2007). They completely and obviously breached that duty. Dean Schroth first removed Plaintiff from Honors based on a pretext reason, and then he choreographed the forming of a subcommittee on professional comportment to further discriminate against Plaintiff and dismiss him from medical school. To illustrate, as his

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first action Dean Schroth writes on October 18, 2006 “so I assume this means he will receive at least a conditional (if not a fail) grade for the surgery clerkship? If so, I need to know ASAP because it will mean that we must pull him out of the Honors curriculum (!) (See Original Exhibit 1, page 97, email 1

10

) (Exhibit 11). In his second action, he writes, “will Reza’s (the general surgery resident) evaluation be submitted as part of his formal surgery evaluation? I think it should be, and it may trigger a professional comportment committee review. I will go over it with the other deans (See also Original Exhibit 1, page 97). The dean’s purpose was to “bring this case to his own committees to move for [Plaintiffs] dismissal” (See exhibit 1, p. 16, paragraph 2). (Exhibit 11)

a. These regulations and guidelines clearly spell out that “All departments should submit F and CN grades to the Office of the Dean as soon as possible after the student has completed a course or clerkship., a definition of work required to convert an F or CN shall be developed by the department, reviewed by the Medical Student Evaluation Committee, or MSEC, and approved by the dean ... a grade of CN may be converted by a program of more limited work, as developed by the responsible department and approved by the MSEC ... The dean will inform the MSEC of the names of ... students receiving grades F or CN and submit their records to the Committee for evaluation and recommendations.”

i. GW’s breach of duty was that Plaintiff was removed prematurely from his academic program before the appropriate review in accordance with regulations. He was accepted into Honors by three committees of three professors. Plaintiff should have been taken out by a committee process. While surgery ended in September, the grade was not submitted until November. No definition of how to convert the grade was given by the Surgery department. There was no recommendation(s) for remediation and no review by the MSEC. The Plaintiff was told by Dean Schroth he must be removed from Honors because he had to remediate the surgery clerkship in its entirety and that was not compatible with Honors. However, he did not follow the required process to arrive at that decision and it later became apparent that the Dean had actually interfered in the grading process. The dean failed to inform the MSEC of the CN grade in Surgery. Basically, the basis for removing Plaintiff from the Honors Academic Program was improper and against the Regulations for MD Candidates.

iv. The eight month hold placed on September 26, 2007 on the academic undergraduate and medical transcripts of the Plaintiff violated GW’s own regulations (i.e., GWU Non-Retaliation Policy, GWU Disruption of University Functions Policy, the Guide to Student Rights and Responsibilities, and the Regulations for MD Candidates) [redacted]

v. GW violated its Regulations for MD Candidates and Guide to Student Rights and Responsibilities during the

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Subcommittee on Professional Comportment and Medical Student Evaluation Committee. GW had certain duties imposed on it and GW completely and obviously breached that duty. Specifically, Article E, Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Section 1 of the Regulations for MD Candidates.

a. This regulation precisely states “When a problem with professional comportment ... regarding a student is perceived, the observer will communicate this concern to the dean. If the communication is verbal, it must be confirmed immediately by a signed written statement or else it will not be pursued further.”

i. GW’s breach of duty was that the resident of general surgery did not provide a written report falsely questioning Plaintiffs integrity until November 3, 2006. This is the day the surgery evaluation was given to Plaintiff by the Dean. The report was almost two months after the surgery clerkship ended. Therefore, it was not immediate. Second, it was not signed as the regulations require. Third, it was submitted as an effort to justify the CN grade ordered by the Dean. Fourth, the Dean in his email writes that the report should be included in a formal evaluation to trigger a comportment proceeding (Exhibit 11).

vi. GW violated its Disruption of University Functions Policy. GW had certain duties imposed on it and GW completely and obviously breached that duty.

a. This policy clearly states “No member of the University shall: a) Engage in conduct that obstructs teaching, research or learning; or

b) engage in conduct that obstructs free access to members of the University or to University buildings; or c) disobey general regulations of the University ...”

i. GW’s breach of duty was that Dean Schroth writes in his private memo that he told Plaintiff point blank to stop doing research. On October 23, 2006 Deans Dr. Scott Schroth and Jim Scott ordered Plaintiff to leave Honors or else he would be forced to take a leave of absence and to stop doing research. The Dean also obstructed teaching and learning by emailing Plaintiff every time he had an exam. The first email was on October 18, 2006 by Dean Schroth about removing Plaintiff from honors. The Obstetrics Shelf exam was on October 20, 2006. This same pattern was repeated for Psychiatry and Pediatrics exactly the same week of Plaintiffs exam. Plaintiff informed the Subcommittee Chairman during the hearing and no action was taken for redress.

vii. GW violated its Regulations for MD Candidates and Guide to Student Rights and Responsibilities during the Subcommittee on Professional Comportment and Medical Student Evaluation Committee. GW had certain duties imposed on it and GW completely and obviously breached that duty. Specifically, Article E: Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Section 6 of the Regulations for MD Candidates.

a. This regulation precisely states “A Subcommittee on Professional Comportment and its Chair will be named by the

Chair of the MSEC.

The Subcommittee will consist of two students .... and two faculty

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... at least one of whom shall be a member of the MSEC.”

i. GW’s breach of duty was that Dean Goldberg writes in her email on February 20, 2007 that she appointed the Subcommittee (Exhibit 13). That is against the regulations clearly. Plaintiff objected and informed her that she is not abiding by the regulations. She disregarded his objections entirely. Also in line with regulations she never identified who of the two faculty was a member of MSEC.

viii. GW violated its Regulations for MD Candidates and Guide to Student Rights and Responsibilities during the Subcommittee on Professional Comportment and Medical Student Evaluation Committee. GW had certain duties imposed on it and GW completely and obviously breached that duty. Specifically, Article E, Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Section 7 of the Regulations for MD Candidates.

a. This regulation states exactly “The student will be allowed ten calendar days from the mailing of ... notice to object to any person’s appointment to the Subcommittee.” i. GW’s breach of duty was that Plaintiff clearly made an objection to the dean as shown in the emails (Exhibit 13). Plaintiffs objection was completely and totally ignored by Dean Goldberg. On March 8, 2007, Dean Goldberg, or GW, formed and confirmed its own committee members unfairly and unjustly against the regulations by stating “since you did not object in your email, I will assume that all are approved ...” After proposing subcommittee members, the Dean changed them again without Plaintiffs confirmation as outlined as being required per the Regulations. Further, this was not addressed by the Subcommittee as Dean Goldberg said it would be in her emails (Exhibit 13). On March 30, 2007, Plaintiff responded to Dean Goldberg once more stating his reasons of objection clearly and concisely by re-summarizing the March 2nd email. She failed to respond within the ten (10) day time frame that she set herself for filing a response. She emailed Plaintiff again about seventeen (17) days later on April 17, 2007 stating she would

be setting a date

for the Subcommittee on Professional Comportment information gathering session. Her lack of response until that date was an acceptance of Plaintiffs objections given the

lack of filing within the necessary time limit set by the Dean.

This all happened during the same week of the Virginia Tech tragedy (April 16, 2007) that caused our nation grief and sadness. GW left the matter alone, and then after this tragic event, picked it back up again. On April 18, 2007, Plaintiff responded reciting his objections that were previously ignored. The objection was that a committee was not formed at the time Plaintiff was stepped down from the Honors Academic Program and that he was denied a fair and just response and the dean unilaterally proceeded to form and confirm its own chosen committee members without his input placing its own people in the committee. As a result, GW did not receive Plaintiffs objections and this led to the formation of a subcommittee without his input and notice of his objections. The Plaintiff

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clearly wrote in his April 18, 2007 email “the policy and rules of our University are a right to its students. In effect, this is our constitution that we respect. The right that our constitution at GW has given me I have not been allowed to use. The Dean’s office unilateral decision making without following University procedures is unjust” (Exhibit 13).

ix. GW violated its Regulations for MD Candidates and Guide to Student Rights and Responsibilities during the Subcommittee on Professional Comportment and Medical Student Evaluation Committee. GW had certain duties imposed on it and GW completely and obviously breached that duty. Specifically, Article E, Evaluation of Professional Comportment, Section 10 of the Regulations for MD Candidates.

a. This regulation states exactly “... the student and/or his or her attorney or advisor may submit questions to be answered by persons interviewed by the Subcommittee ... the student may speak on his/ her behalf and may submit other material ... the student may suggest that the Subcommittee interview such persons ...”

i. GW’s breach of duty was that during the subcommittee hearing his counsel (Mr. Zaidi, Esquire) and he asked a question of Dean Schroth. The question was presented to the Subcommittee chairman and never asked of Dean Schroth. Plaintiff was denied his right to ask questions (Exhibit 18). Also, 21 questions were presented to and for the subcommittee (Exhibit 14). However, none of the questions were answered. Plaintiff requested floor time to speak to the Subcommittee, but after the questioning was over the Subcommittee and Dean Goldberg did not allow him time to speak. Finally, Plaintiff was not allowed to speak freely and to present a list of people to interview. The subcommittee was concerned with covering its own agenda and gathering the information it required. As a result, it did not hear fully Plaintiffs side of the story and did not give him an opportunity to speak openly and freely. The questions that he submitted by the 5:00 P.M. deadline on May 4, 2007 were not answered. This is a clear and distinct breach of duty that led to damages to the Plaintiff as a result.

102. These facts are poised to be heard at trial after a thorough deposition and discovery process. The Plaintiff is prepared to list with ample reasoning and supporting documentation in itemized format all remaining regulation violations by GW if the Honorable Court deems as necessary, however, Plaintiff has not done so here because of judicial economy and efficiency.

103. The Defendant was informed countless times of the gross and bold violations of its own regulations, and completely ignored those objections. GW’s claims regarding “fair notice” are bogus in that at each step throughout this matter they have been repeatedly informed of the violations and wrongdoing that they have committed through these documents already provided to the Court and to GW multiple times:

• Exhibit 1 (Green), Appeal to the Vice President for Academic Affairs Dr. Donald R. Lehman.

• Exhibit 2 (White background with Blue), Written statement to the Med

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ical Student Evaluation Committee (MSEC),

delivered to the office of the dean (GW, defendant),

fourteen (14) pages body of the brief, two-hundred eighty-eight (288) pages in total including evidentiary documents, plus twenty-one (21) pages MSEC hearing transcript, submitted on July 6, 2007 to GW.

• Exhibit 3 (Blue Cover), to former President Trachtenberg, one-hundred sixteen (116) pages in total with evidentiary documents,

submitted on March 5, 2007 to GW.

The first fifteen (15) pages are the body of the brief, which included table of citations, synopsis, statement of the case, statement of the facts, statement of the questions presented, argument and conclusion with exhibits.

• Exhibit 4 (Yellow cover), Brief of Case Findings, to Senior Associate Dean of Students of the University, Ms. Linda Donnels, sixteen (16) pages body of the brief, sixty-one (61) pages in total with evidentiary documents,

submitted on April 23, 2007 to GW.

• Exhibit 5 (Tan cover), Academic Portfolio (old version),

submitted to

Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs (EVPAA) in Appeal on August 7, 2007 and to the current President, Dr. Steve Knapp on August 9, 2007.

11

• DC Office of Human Rights (OHR) Complaint Form (brief) (light blue cover), on August 24, 2007 Plaintiff initiated and filed a complaint of discrimination with the D.C. Office of Human Rights (O.H.R.) against the Defendant.

• U.S. Department of Education (DOE) Complaint brief (white cover); on September 4, 2007 Plaintiff eleetronically filed a discrimination complaint with the U.S. Department of Education (DOE). The complaint form/ brief is seventy-eight (78) pages long, cites four (4) discriminatory actions and five (5) retaliatory actions, and has a list of witnesses.

• Complainant’s Response to the Respondent’s position statement, on January 3, 2008 Plaintiff filed Complainant’s response to the Defendant’s position statement with the DC Office of Human Rights. It is in a timeline format, sixty (60) pages long, and has thirty (30) attachments.

• Complainant’s Response to Position Statement based on Amendment, on May 7, 2008 Plaintiff submitted to the D.C. O.H.R. Complainant’s Response to Position Statement based on Amendment. The response is thirty-one (31) pages long with thirty-one (31) attachments.

• Academic Portfolio (updated version— dark grey cover)

•

Master Case Binder, Sections 1-32

• Application for Reconsideration of Decision for Disparate Treatment and Hostile Environment

Brief (Green Edge and White),

filed with the DC OHR on July 20, 2009, a copy was sent to the Defendant by the DC OHR.

Appendix contains DC OHR June 22, 2009 Decision

• Application for Reconsideration of Decision for Disparate Treatment and Hostile Environment Record Extract (Sun Yellow), filed with the DC OHR on July 20, 2009, a copy was sent to the Defendant by DC OHR. Contains all LCME materials in Supporting Document No. 13, including

LCME Accreditation Standards

at the very

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end referred to in the Initial Complaint.

• Hajjar-Nejad placed the LOME Accreditation Standards in his Initial Complaint because the violations of those standards were concomitant with violations of the Medical School’s regulations and policies, and the Medical School was the only school in the United States to be placed on probation by the LCME for “reasons seriously compromising the quality of its medical education program.”

104. The actions of Defendant George Washington University, through its senior officers, employees and agents, have caused the established contract between Plaintiff and Defendant to be breached, as Defendant unilaterally and without just reason rescinded the contract to provide educational services to Plaintiff through its precipitous and unlawful dismissal of Plaintiff.

Statute of Limitations

The contract between the parties was entered into effect on November 7, 2003, for a duration of four (4) years during the Plaintiffs medical education tenure at the Defendant’s medical school. As the contract specifically states Plaintiffs admission was to begin with the commencement of the “Doctor of Medicine program for the academic year beginning with mandatory orientation on August 18, 2004.” As the MD program is a four year program, the contract was binding and into effect until approximately May 18, 2008, the end of the four year doctor of medicine degree program and hence graduation. This was the duration of applicability of the terms of the contract. The Plaintiff was dismissed on July 26, 2007, during the contract period. As a result, the Defendant’s claims as they pertain to timing are null and void.

As stated this contract, and the regulations which it is based on, is binding on both parties in the District of Columbia

[redacted] Numerous additional violations exist that have been referred to within this, the Third Amended Complaint.

105. The breach of contract by Defendant caused the following damages and injuries to Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad:

a. The denial by Defendant of the rightful and timely graduation of Plaintiff from GW Medical School, scheduled for May 2008, has resulted in significant financial loss to Plaintiff resulting in the denial of income as a practicing medical resident and as a fully licensed medical doctor from the period May 2008 to the present, in the amount of not less than One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00), plus interest.

b. The unlawful and premature dismissal of Plaintiff from the GW Medical School by Defendant resulted in the loss of all investment costs of such education, including education costs, living expenses and deferred or missed income from alternative employment during the period June 2004 through August 2007, in an amount not less than Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars ($800,000.00).

c. The denial by the Defendant of complying with its contract to graduate and present Plaintiff with a medical degree upon successful completion of medical school denied the Plaintiff of a material asset worth no less than Twenty Million Dollars ($20,000,000).

106. As a result of Defendant’s conduct in breaching its contract with Plaintiff, Plaintiff Hajjar-Nejad demands the relief set forth below:

a. Payment of an amount not less than $29,800,000 for monetary compensation for loss of income and loss of

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future income, plus appropriate interest on past lost income;

b. Removal of all references to Plaintiffs dismissal from medical school from all records and documents maintained by the Defendant;

c. The provision of favorable recommendations and Dean’s Letter by Defendant to locations at which Plaintiff can perform intern and residency requirements following medical school graduation;

d. Complete access to Plaintiffs undergraduate and medical school transcripts at all times;

e. The Defendant will not convey any disparaging information (i.e., including any harmful acts, communications, reports, records, transcripts, statements, documents, recommendations or disclosures) regarding or against Plaintiff to any residency program, licensing authority, including state medical board, credentials verification service, hospital, etc.

f. Payment of all reasonable attorney’s fees and costs associated with this litigation and all administrative proceedings which occurred prior to the initiation of this litigation; and,

g. Such other relief as this Honorable Court may direct.

For the foregoing reasons, demand is made by Plaintiff for such damages and injuries suffered by Plaintiff as attributed to Defendant’s discriminatory and retaliatory actions, civil rights violations, and breach of contract, and should include any further relief as this Honorable Court may grant.

Respectfully submitted,

MOHAMMAD JAVAD HAJJAR-NEJAD

By: /s/

Mohammad Javad Hajjar-Nejad

Pro Se

9920 Shelburne Terrace, Apt. 308

Gaithersburg, M.D. 20878

Enclosures:

Exhibit 1: Right to Sue Notice

Exhibit 2: DC Commission on Human Rights Order Scheduling a Status Conference

Exhibit 3: Plaintiffs -8-page

Reply Memorandum

to the Chief Administrative Law Judge of the DC HRC

Exhibit 4: Proposed Decision and Final Order of DC HRC

Exhibit 5: Notice of Final Decision and Order of DC HRC

Exhibit 6: Dean Schroth’s email to give Plaintiff a Conditional or Failing Grade in the Surgery Clerkship against MD Candidate Regulations

Exhibit 7: GWU School of Medicine and Health Sciences Student Mistreatment Policy and Procedures

Exhibit 8: GWU Non-Retaliation Policy

Exhibit 9: GW School of Medicine and Health Sciences Regulations for MD Candidates

Exhibit 10: GWU Guide to Student Rights and Responsibilities

Exhibit 11: Email Communication by Dean to Trigger Professional Comportment Review

Exhibit 12: GWU Disruption of University Functions Policy

Exhibit 13: Correspondence and E-Mail Communications re Professional Comportment Subcommittee Review

Exhibit 14: Twenty One (21) Questions Presented to Subcommittee on Professional Comportment and Never Answered Against MD Candidate Regulations)

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Exhibit 15: Letter from University Registrar re Transcript-Letter of No Transcript

Exhibit 16: Letter from University Registrar re Transcript-Letter of Record Status)

Exhibit 17: Affidavit of Mr. Jad Sarsour, Plaintiffs Emergency Counsel for MSEC)

Exhibit 18: Mr. Syed H. Zaidi Affidavit, Plaintiffs Counsel for Subcommittee

Exhibit 19: Offer of Acceptance

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that one copy of the foregoing “Plaintiff’s Leave to file Third Amended Complaint” and the “Third Amended Complaint” has been sent by USPS, First Class, to the following named counsel for Defendant, this 7th day of September, 2011:

Henry Morris, Jr., Esq.

ARENT FOX KINTNER PLOTKIN & KAHN, PLLC

1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW

Washington, D.C. 20036

E-Mail: “moorish(2), arentfox.com”

MOHAMMAD JAVAD HAJJAR-NEJAD

By: /s/

Mohammad Javad Hajjar-Nejad

Pro Se

9920 Shelburne Terrace, Apt. 308

Gaithersburg, M.D. 20878

PLAINTIFF’S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

EXHIBIT 1

(Right to Sue Notice)

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Notice of Right to Sue

(Issued on Request)

To: Mohammad J. Hajjar-Nejad 950 25th Street, N.W., Apt. 605n Washington, DC 20037

From: Washington Field Office 131 M Street, N.E. Suite 4NW02F Washington, DC 20507

□

On behalf of person(s) aggrieved whose identity is CONFIDENTIAL ( 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7 (a))

EEOC Charge No

EEOC Representative David Gonzalez, State

Telephone No

10C-2008-00023 & Local Coordinator (202)419-0714

(See also the additional information enclosed with this form.)

Notice to the Person Aggrieved:

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), or the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA): This is your Notice of Right to Sue, issued under Title VII, the ADA or GINA based on the above-numbered charge. It has been issued at your request. Your lawsuit under Title VII, the ADA or GINA must be filed in a federal or state court

WITHIN 90 DAYS

of your receipt of this notice; or your right to sue based on this charge will be lost. (The time limit for filing suit based on a claim under state law may be different)

|x| More than 180 days have passed since the filing of this charge.

□ Less than 180 days have passed since the filing of this charge, but I have determined that it is unlikely that the EEOC will be able to complete its administrative processing within 180 days from the filing of this charge.

13 The EEOC is terminating its processing of this charge.

□ The EEOC will continue to process this charge.

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Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA): You may sue under the ADEA at any time from 60 days after the charge was filed until 90 days after you receive notice that we have completed action on the charge. In this regard, the paragraph marked below applies to your case:

□ The EEOC is closing your case. Therefore, your lawsuit under the ADEA must be filed in federal or state court

WITHIN 90 DAYS

of your receipt of this Notice. Otherwise, your right to sue based on the above-numbered charge will be lost

□ The EEOC is continuing its handling of your ADEA case. However, if 60 days have passed since the filing of the charge, you may file suit in federal or state court under the ADEA at this time.

Equal Pay Act (EPA): You already have the right to sue under the EPA (filing an EEOC charge is not required) EPA suits must be brought in federal or state court within 2 years (3 years for willful violations) of the alleged EPA underpayment. This means that backpay due for any violations that occurred

more than 2 years (3 years)

before you file suit may not be collectible.

If you file suit, based on this charge, please send a copy of your court complaint to this office.

On behalf of the Commission

/s/

Mindy E. Weinstein, Acting Director

September 29, 2010

(Date Mailed)

Enclosures(s)

cc

GEORGE WASHINGTON SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

2300 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20037

PLAINTIFF’S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

EXHIBIT 2

(DC Commission on Human Rights Order Scheduling a Status Conference)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

In the Matter of: Mohammed J. Hajjar-Nejad, Complainant

v.

George Washington University, Respondent.

Case No. 08-020-EI (DCS)

ORDER SCHEDULING STATUS CONFERENCE

On April 7, 2010, the Office of Human Rights for the District of Columbia made a finding of probable cause of discriminatory retaliation in the above-named matter and certified it to this Commission for a public hearing. On August 20, 2010, counsel for the Complainant entered an appearance and requested resumption of the procedural schedule in this matter. To this date, no further pleadings have been filed and no further action has been taken in this matter. In order to move this matter toward resolution.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1) The parties participate in a status conference via telephone on Thursday, June 16.2011, at 11:00 am.

2) Counsel for Complainant is requested to be responsible for initiating this telephonic status conference call to

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this judicial officer and Counsel for Respondent.

3) In the event that a party cannot participate in this telephonic status conference call, the parties are directed to consult with one another to determine an alternative date and time, no later than June 24, 2011, during which they will both

PLAINTIFF’S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

EXHIBIT 3

(Plaintiffs -8-page

Reply Memorandum

to the Chief Administrative Law Judge of the DC HRC) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

IN THE MATTER OF: Mohammad J. Hajjar-Nejad, Complainant,

v.

George Washington University, Respondent.

Case No.: 08-020-EI (DCS)

REPLY MEMORANDUM

Comes forth, the ComplainanVPlaintiff Mohammad J. Hajjar-Nejad, and states the following based on fact and meritorious grounds:

I. GENERAL STATEMENT

In this motion, Plaintiff aims to set the record straight as it pertains to him and make his position which has remained the same from the outset crystal clear.

II. INTRODUCTION

First Plaintiff responds directly to the Honorable Chief Judge Simmon’s

Order Scheduling Status Conference

in the section entitled

Synopsis of Case Status.

Basically, the case is in federal court before a federal judge on three counts of discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract. Second, Plaintiff spells out in chronological format the events as they have transpired since the DC OHR rendered its final decision in the section

Detailed Review of Case Status

and provides a brief non-inclusive rationale for filing and staying his case with our strong federal court system. Third, Plaintiff touches on the details surrounding the attainment of the Right to Sue Notice.

III.

SYNOPSIS OF CASE STATUS

1. That this case presently resides in federal court, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, with Civil Case No. 10-cv-626.

2. The DC OHR rendered its initial decision on June 22, 2009 and its final opinion on January 12, 2010 after an almost two (2) year investigation. The investigation process has been completed and an opinion/determination generated.

3. Currently, the case has pleadings awaiting decision before the Honorable Judge Kollar-Kotelly.

4. A Right to Sue Notice was obtained from the EEOC, EEOC informed the DC OHR, and the case has been closed out thus extinguishing the EEO complaint process.

5. Mr. Michael Beasley filed a Motion to Withdraw from this case and is not the counsel of record before the DC OHR or federal court. He is not my authorized representative and cannot make any decisions on my behalf. However, out of courtesy he informed me that he had been in communication with the DC HRC and was informed of

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a Status Conference. I never initiated or requested that any proceedings be scheduled by the DC HRC as my case has been in federal court all along.

6. Clearly, there is no case before the DC HRC for there to be scheduled a status conference. While I am thankful for the DC OHR’s investigative efforts, this case now resides in federal court before a federal Judge outside of the jurisdiction of the DC HRC.

7. The DC HRC has taken no action whatsoever on this matter for almost two years. It is questionable at best what the impetus is for trying to reopen a closed matter

1

that was completed almost two years ago and who in this case would be trying to accomplish such a feat.

IV.

DETAILED REVIEW OF CASE STATUS

1. On June 22, 2009 the DC Office of Human Rights (“OHR”) issued a Letter of Determination (LOD) in this matter (Case No. 08-020-EI) for five (5) counts of probable cause retaliation.

2. On January 12, 2010 the DC OHR issued a final opinion which affirmed its “probable cause” finding as to plaintiffs claim of retaliation and affirmed its “no probable cause” findings regarding plaintiffs claims of disparate treatment and hostile education environment

(See Memorandum,

the Honorable Judge Blake, U.S. District Court for District of Maryland).

3. On April 9, 2010, Plaintiff, Mohammad J. Hajjar-Nejad filed a

pro se

complaint (Civil Action No. 10-cv-626) with the United States District Court for the District of Maryland

(See Memorandum,

the Honorable Judge Blake, U.S. District Court for District of Maryland).

4. Judge Blakes’ Memorandum goes on to say that:

a. . “Plaintiff, who primarily focuses on Title VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d and 2000e, et seq. in support of his claims, states that he is a former medical student of the George Washington University (“GWU”).”

b. “Plaintiff provides thousands of pages of documents comprising his complaint and complaint exhibits regarding his academic background and credentials and the grievance and complaint process he followed within GWU, the Liaison Committee on Medical Education (“LCME”), the Medical Student Evaluation Committee (“MSEC”), U.S. Department of Education, and the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights (“DCOHR”) to raise his claims of retaliation and discrimination.”

5. On April 9, 2010 Plaintiff notified via email the Director of the DC OHR and the Manager of the Mediation Unit that a Complaint had been filed with the U.S. District Court. ■

6. On April 22, 2010 the above-entitled action was transferred from the U.S. District Court of Maryland to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and assigned to the Honorable Judge Kollar-Kotelly.

7. On September 29, 2010 the Plaintiff, received a

Notice of Right to Sue

from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. From the outset of filing a charge of discrimination I chose to cross file the case with the EEOC.

*51

8. The Plaintiff reserves the right to keep his civil rights complaints before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for the reasons stated forth in his

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Notice of Right to Sue

before the U.S. District Court filed on November 9, 2010.

9. The civil rights complaints and the breach of contract in this case are inextricably intertwined

(See Memorandum

).

10. The Plaintiff sincerely and wholeheartedly attempted to gain a Notice of Right to Sue from the DC OHR initially upon filing, but for reasons stated in the

Memorandum,

and outlined below, such as the DC OHR failing to cross file the case, Plaintiff was unable to do so.

11. In addition to Title VII, Plaintiff respectfully suggests that he has jurisdiction also under § 1981 and Title VI which he filed with the U.S. Department of Education under to have his case heard in U.S. District Court.

12. On November 12, 2010, Mr. Michael W. Beasley, Esquire filed a Motion to Withdraw before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

13. Mr. Beasley’s scope of representation was to provide legal services in federal court

only

and that was the basis of the agreement between Plaintiff and legal counsel.

14. It has been approximately two (2) years since the filing of the LOD by DCOHR and more than a year since the Plaintiff has filed his federal court case, therefore, it is unclear why the DC HRC has chosen to schedule a status hearing regarding this matter now at this time.

15. Plaintiff greatly appreciates the time, hard work and investigation of the DCOHR to review his case for almost two years, however, the case is in federal court now before a federal judge.

V.

DETAILED CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ATTAINING THE NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUE

1. Initially, during the filing of the Charge of Discrimination on August 24, 2007 with the DC Office of Human Rights (EEO), the DC Office of Human Rights (OHR) failed to cross file the case with the EEOC as is required under the formal work sharing agreement and memorandum of understanding. The Plaintiff clearly initialed next to the statement on page 2 of the charge, emphasizing his position that “I want this charge filed with both the EEOC and the State or local Agency ...” (Page 2, left box at bottom above signature line).

2. Subsequently, after the filing of an Amendment to the initial Charge, filed on April 17, 2008, the DC OHR again failed to cross file the matter with the EEOC as is distinctly reflected on the Charge Form. First, on the charge form, page 1, the box at the top right hand corner that conveys that the case was cross filed with the EEOC

was not checked in either

of the Charge documents. Second, at the end of the Charge, on the second page, is where it should state briefly that the case has been cross-filed with the EEOC.

However, it explicitly does not do so on either document.

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3. In fact, the April 17, 2008 charge, second page, last paragraph reads, “Therefore, I charge Respondent with an unlawful discriminatory act on the bases of my perceived national origin ... and religion ... in violation of the DC Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended [blank] ...” and then states “I have not commenced any action, civil, criminal, or administrative, based on the above allegations, other than the following: [blank]”. Upon examining the original document it clearly and plainly shows that the following had been “whit

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.