Opinion

Darryl Frazier v. USA

  • 560 F. App'x 320
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Mar 26, 2014
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Davis, Barksdale, Elrod
Cited by
3 cases
Authority
More cited than 70.3%

The opinion

Case: 13-50005 Document: 00512574843 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/26/2014

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

No. 13-50005 March 26, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

DARRYL DEWAYNE FRAZIER, Clerk

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS;

WARDEN M. TRAVIS BRAGG, Federal Correctional Institution La Tuna;

CHRIS SHACKS, Assistant Warden, Federal Correctional Institution La

Tuna; MS. BEST, Administrator, Federal Correctional Institution La Tuna;

LAVERNE REESE, Unit Manager, Federal Correctional Institution La Tuna;

DOCTOR ALTENBERG, Medical Director, Federal Correctional Institution

La Tuna; R SANCHEZ, Practitioner, FSL La Tuna; UTILIZATION REVIEW

COMMITTEE; JOHN/JANE DOES, in both Personal and Professional

Capacity,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:11-CV-434

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 13-50005 Document: 00512574843 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/26/2014

No. 13-50005

Darryl Dewayne Frazier, federal prisoner # 69201-080, proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed this action in January 2012 against the United

States (Government), the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the warden of Federal

Correctional Institution La Tuna (FCI La Tuna), the La Tuna Utilization

Review Committee (La Tuna URC), and various staff members and medical

personnel at Federal Satellite Low La Tuna (FSL La Tuna) (an associated low-

security institution under the FCI La Tuna umbrella). The district court

dismissed this action. AFFIRMED; Frazier’s motions DENIED.

I.

This action arose from the denial of surgery to treat a chronic scalp

condition, diagnosed in 2000. Frazier presented four claims: (1) prison

personnel acted negligently and with careless disregard by denying him

surgery to save money, making the Government liable under the Federal Tort

Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674 (FTCA), because (claim one); (2)

Appellees were deliberately indifferent, in violation of the Eighth Amendment,

to his medical needs and acted “in concert” to deny him surgery (claim two); (3)

Appellees engaged in a continuing tort because his scalp condition posed a

daily risk of infection (claim three); and (4) individual, nonmedical Appellees

(Bragg, Shacks, Best, and Reese) violated his First Amendment rights by

retaliating against him for filing administrative complaints and by denying

him access to the courts (claim four).

This action was referred to a magistrate judge (MJ). On 10 January

2012, the MJ ordered officials at FCI La Tuna to provide authenticated copies

of various records from 1 November 2009 to the date of the order, including

medical, disciplinary, classification, and grievance records. In February 2012,

after the required documents had been filed, the MJ ordered service on

Appellees.

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No. 13-50005

Appellees, including the Government, filed a joint motion to dismiss

claims two–four, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. The

Government separately answered claim one (FTCA).

In his October 2012 report and recommendation, the MJ provided the

following findings. Frazier was transferred to FCI Seagoville in 2002. In 2008,

he was evaluated and treated by a dermatologist for alopecia and prescribed

an antiseptic and antibiotics. In 2009, he continued to receive treatment for

his condition; that July, a dermatologist recommended surgical excision by a

plastic surgeon and a plastic-surgery consultation was initiated. That

November, Frazier was seen again by a dermatologist, who prescribed

medications and recommended surgical excision by a plastic or general

surgeon. Again, a plastic-surgery consultation was initiated.

Prior to a decision regarding surgery being made, Frazier was

transferred to FSL La Tuna. In April 2010, Appellee Dr. Altenberg (La Tuna

clinical director and URC chair) reviewed the consultation and recommended

denying surgery because it was not medically necessary and the risks

outweighed the benefits. La Tuna URC followed this recommendation and

denied surgery. Medical staff at La Tuna treated Frazier with antibiotics,

prescription shampoos, oral medication, and steroid injections.

Following a medication-ineffectiveness complaint in July 2010, a plastic-

surgery consultation was initiated, but disapproved by La Tuna URC. After

an October 2010 assessment, a dermatology consultation was initiated and

later disapproved by La Tuna URC (after determining the consultation was

cosmetic in nature).

In November 2011, Frazier was transferred from FSL La Tuna to the

adjacent FCI La Tuna. Frazier continued to receive treatment with antibiotics,

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No. 13-50005

prescription shampoo, and steroids, although medications were periodically

adjusted.

Based on these findings, the MJ recommended dismissing claims two–

four because: the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction for Frazier’s

claims against the Government and individual Appellees in their official

capacities; Bragg, Shacks, Best, and Reese were not personally involved in

Frazier’s medical treatment, nor did they implement the relevant policies

(moreover, Frazier failed to establish Appellees acted with deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need); the continuing-tort doctrine was

inapplicable; and, finally, summary-judgment evidence demonstrated

Appellees had not interfered with Frazier’s mail, given that he was able to both

exhaust his administrative remedies and file numerous papers in this action.

On the other hand, the MJ recommended claim one (FTCA) be allowed to

proceed.

Frazier objected to the report and recommendation. On the other hand,

he did not dispute the findings; instead, he insisted they supported his claims.

Additionally, he claimed, inter alia, he was not given an opportunity “to obtain

depositions, interrogatories, and any other discovery in [this] case”. (Frazier

failed to suggest, however, what additional discovery would disclose.)

In a 30 October 2012 order, the district court overruled Frazier’s

objections, accepted the report and recommendation, and focused on whether

Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law (in the light of Frazier’s

concurrence with the MJ’s findings). Order Adopting Rep. and Recommenda-

tion for Mot. to Dismiss, Mot. for Summ. J. at *15–16, Frazier v. United States,

No. 3:11-CV-434 (W.D. Tex. 30 Oct. 2012). Regarding claim two (deliberate

indifference), the court ruled it lacked jurisdiction to address claims against

the Government, BOP, and La Tuna URC. Id. at *12–14. Moreover, Frazier’s

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No. 13-50005

assertions were, at most, “a disagreement over his treatment” and as such

could not support an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at *13. Because individual

Appellees’ actions did not amount to a constitutional violation, they were

entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at *14. For claim three (continuing tort),

the court ruled the statute of limitations was not an issue because Frazier

timely filed his complaint; therefore, the continuing-tort doctrine was

inapplicable. Id. at *14–15. Finally, for claim four (access to courts), the court

ruled Frazier failed to demonstrate error in the report-and-recommendation’s

analysis. Id. at *15.

Accordingly, the court ruled Appellees were entitled to judgment as a

matter of law on claims two–four. Id. For the remaining claim (FTCA), for

which the Government was the sole defendant, the court ordered it and Frazier

to submit dispositive motions. Id. at *16. Additionally, the district court

ordered Frazier to:

DISCLOSE to the Court and the Government no later

than [16 November 2012] the identity of any witness

he may use to present evidence under Federal Rule of

Evidence 702, 703, or 705, and to provide to the Court

and the Government the written report of any

witnesses retained or specially employed to provide

expert testimony at a bench trial . . . .

Id. at *17.

In response, on 13 November 2012, Frazier submitted a potential-

witnesses list, in which he noted: “At the present time Plaintiff has not

retained or specifically employed any expert witness, and is currently awaiting

the response from potential expert witness, Warren Kelly [sic], a licensed and

certified Dermatologist in Seagoville, Texas.”

On 16 November 2012, the Government filed a motion to dismiss or,

alternatively, for summary judgment, claiming: Texas provided the

substantive law underlying liability for the FTCA claim, see 28 U.S.C.

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No. 13-50005

§ 1346(b)(1); for a medical-malpractice claim, plaintiff must have a medical

expert identify specifically the relevant standard of care in order to raise a fact

issue sufficient to defeat summary judgment; Frazier failed to establish his

injuries were proximately caused by a breach of that standard of care because

he did not provide expert medical evidence; as a result, he could not show the

Government caused his alleged injuries; and, accordingly, he could not survive

summary judgment. In support, the Government provided the affidavit of Dr.

Charles Adams, a non-BOP physician, who, after reviewing Frazier’s medical

records, concluded his treatment conformed to all applicable standards of care.

Frazier opposed the motion, primarily by claiming Dr. Warren’s

diagnosis (attached to his complaint) established the essential elements of his

claim. Frazier also maintained he met his burden of proof because he had

informed the court he was awaiting an affidavit from Dr. Warren (although he

did not request a continuance). Lastly, Frazier contended: he had never been

examined by Dr. Adams; and the record did not indicate whether he was a

certified dermatologist.

In a subsequent 3 December 2012 order, the district court ruled Texas

law applied because the alleged malpractice took place in Texas. Order

Granting Mot. for Summ. J. at *6–7, Frazier v. United States, No. 3:11-CV-434

(W.D. Tex. 3 Dec. 2012). Citing Texas law, the court noted expert testimony

was required because the mode or form of treatment for Frazier’s condition was

“not a matter of common knowledge or within the experience of the Court”. Id.

at *9. The court considered and discussed Frazier’s documentation relating to

Dr. Warren, in which he “cited options including . . . bactrim . . . , Accutane,

and surgery (The most definitive treatment is surgical [excision] to be done by

plastic surgery or general surgery) to remedy [the] condition”. Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). The court ruled this documentation did not

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No. 13-50005

“support Frazier’s assertion . . . that his ‘serious medical condition . . . [could]

only be treated with general surgery’”. Id. (emphasis by district court). Based

on the record, the court could “only agree with the Government that Frazier

has failed to support his allegations with any expert medical evidence or

testimony”. Id. at *10. Accordingly, the court granted the Government’s

summary-judgment motion, based on Frazier’s failure to establish the

essential elements of his claim. Id.

II.

At issue are whether the district court erred: by dismissing Frazier’s

claim that Appellees were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs due to

disputed issues of material fact regarding impermissible motive; in, according

to Frazier, applying Texas medical-malpractice law to Frazier’s FTCA claim

and dismissing the claim without inquiry pursuant to United States v. Gaubert,

499 U.S. 315, 322–25 (1991) (Frazier raises Gaubert for the first time on

appeal; it provides a two-part test for determining whether the discretionary-

function exception applies once invoked by Government); by failing to allow

Frazier, pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993),

to challenge the evidence provided by Dr. Adams; and by failing to grant a

continuance for Frazier to conduct discovery and secure an expert witness.

In addition to these issues, in July 2013, Frazier filed motions with this

court to strike the footnotes, and order Appellees to correct page citations, in

their brief, as well as to impose sanctions. The motions were carried with the

case.

III.

Frazier’s motions are DENIED. Essentially for the reasons stated by

district court in its well-reasoned orders, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

7

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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