Opinion

Gary Sutton v. Wayne Carpenter

  • 745 F.3d 787
  • 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 5101
  • 2014 WL 1041695
Court
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Filed
Mar 19, 2014
Status
Published
Author
White
On the bench
Moore, White, Donald
Cited by
160 cases
Authority
More cited than 92.5%

holding that under Tennessee procedural law, the initial post-conviction proceeding is the first meaningful opportunity to raise ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim

How later courts described this case

  • holding that under Tennessee procedural law, the initial post-conviction proceeding is the first meaningful opportunity to raise ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim
  • concluding that, in Tennessee, ineffective-assistance claims “are best resolved, with least risk to the defendant, in post-conviction proceedings,” not on direct appeal
  • holding that Martinez and Trevino apply in Tennessee
  • “[Ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel can establish cause to excuse a Tennessee defendant’s procedural default of a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” (emphasis added)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 14a0050p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

GARY WAYNE SUTTON, ┐

Petitioner-Appellant, │

│

v. │ No. 12-6310

│

WAYNE CARPENTER, Warden, >

│

Respondent-Appellee. │

┘

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville

No. 3:07-cv-00030—Thomas A. Varlan, Chief District Judge.

Decided and Filed: March 19, 2014

Before: MOORE, WHITE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Susanne Bales, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES, Knoxville, Tennessee, for

Appellant. Andrew Hamilton Smith, OFFICE THE TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. The question is whether Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.

Ct. 1309 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013), permit a habeas petitioner

challenging a Tennessee conviction to assert the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel

as “cause” to excuse the petitioner’s procedural default of a claim that his trial counsel was

constitutionally ineffective. We answer in the affirmative, and therefore REMAND.

1

12-6310 Sutton v. Carpenter Page 2

I.

In 1993, a Tennessee jury convicted petitioner Gary W. Sutton of premeditated first

degree murder and felonious burning of personal property. Sutton received a life sentence for

the murder and a consecutive two-year term for the felonious burning. Sutton’s trial counsel

represented him throughout his direct appeal, and filed his first petition for post-conviction relief.

In 2000, Sutton dismissed his trial counsel and was appointed new counsel. Sutton’s new

counsel amended his petition for post-conviction relief, raising ineffective-assistance-of-trial-

counsel claims for the first time, although not the claims at issue here. The state trial court held

an evidentiary hearing on the petition and denied relief.

Sutton was appointed new counsel for his federal habeas petition, and on January 31,

2007, he filed this petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Sutton’s

petition included a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In support, Sutton argued for

the first time that his trial counsel were ineffective for (1) failing to object to the jury-selection

procedures used at his trial and (2) failing to object to the trial court’s use of a “moral certainty”

standard in its jury instructions regarding finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The district court denied the petition on September 29, 2011. With respect to the

ineffective assistance of Sutton’s trial counsel, the court found Sutton’s newly raised ineffective-

assistance claims procedurally defaulted. See Lovins v. Parker, 712 F.3d 283, 295 (6th Cir.

2013) (“[A] claim is procedurally defaulted where the petitioner failed to exhaust state court

remedies, and the remedies are no longer available at the time the federal petition is filed because

of a state procedural rule.”); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(c) (precluding successive

petitions for post-conviction relief); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117 (setting forth limited bases for

reopening petitions). A federal court will review a state prisoner’s procedurally defaulted federal

claim if the prisoner shows “cause” for the default and “prejudice” from the error, or if a

manifest miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 749–50 (1991). Finding that Sutton did not make that showing, the district court declined to

review his defaulted claims.

12-6310 Sutton v. Carpenter Page 3

Within days of the district court’s order denying Sutton’s habeas petition, the Supreme

Court heard oral argument in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), and the district court

agreed to hold Sutton’s case in abeyance pending the decision. Martinez held that the ineffective

assistance of post-conviction counsel can establish “cause” to excuse the procedural default of a

defendant’s substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial where state procedural law

prohibits defendants from raising such claims on direct appeal and instead requires defendants to

raise the claims for the first time in post-conviction proceedings. See id. at 1318–19. The

district court found Martinez inapplicable to Sutton’s Tennessee conviction because Tennessee’s

procedural law does not prohibit litigation of ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal.

Concluding that reasonable jurists could find its ruling debatable, however, it granted Sutton a

certificate of appealability on the question. Sutton filed a timely notice of appeal.

Just two weeks later, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.

Ct. 1911 (2013). At Sutton’s request, we held briefing in abeyance pending resolution of that

case. In Trevino, the Court broadened the reach of Martinez, holding that its rule also applies

where, although state procedural law may permit defendants to raise ineffective-assistance

claims on direct appeal, a state’s “procedural framework, by reason of its design and operation,

makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to

raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal.” Id. at 1921.

After the Trevino decision issued, Sutton filed a motion to remand to the district court for

consideration in the first instance whether, in light of Trevino, Sutton could raise his post-

conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness as cause for the procedural default of his ineffective-

assistance-of-trial-counsel claims. This court has granted motions to remand in several cases in a

similar posture. In Sutton’s case, rather than remand, we directed the parties to address

Trevino’s application in their merits briefs. Thus, the issue fully briefed and squarely presented

for decision is whether, under Trevino, the rule in Martinez applies to Tennessee convictions.

Reviewing the question de novo, Lovins, 712 F.3d at 293, we find that it does.

12-6310 Sutton v. Carpenter Page 4

II.

A federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner who demonstrates that his

conviction rests on a violation of the Federal Constitution. See Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1917. Our

review for constitutional infirmity, however, is circumscribed by deference to “a State’s

application of its own firmly established, consistently followed, constitutionally proper

procedural rules.” Id. Accordingly, we will normally not consider a petitioner’s constitutional

claim when his conviction rests on a state court’s independent determination that the defendant

failed to raise an argument at the time or place required by the state’s procedural law. Id. A

petitioner can obtain federal review of such “procedurally defaulted” claims only if he shows

“cause” and “prejudice,” or a “manifest miscarriage of justice.” See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749–

50.

The right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial is a “critically important” right,

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and a state prisoner whose conviction rests on a denial of

that right may be entitled to habeas relief. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921. Just as with any other

habeas claim, however, a state prisoner’s procedural default of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-

counsel claim precludes this court’s review absent a showing of cause and prejudice, or manifest

miscarriage of justice. In Coleman, the Supreme Court held that “[b]ecause Coleman had no

right to counsel to pursue his appeal in state habeas, any attorney error that led to the default of

Coleman’s claims in state court cannot constitute cause to excuse the default in federal habeas.”

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 757.

Martinez announced a narrow exception to Coleman’s general rule. It allows post-

conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness to establish “cause” to excuse the procedural default of an

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in states where post-conviction proceedings present

the defendant’s first opportunity to raise such a claim. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320. When

state law does not permit a defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim to be brought until post-

conviction proceedings, the Court reasoned, the post-conviction proceeding “is in many ways the

equivalent of a prisoner’s direct appeal” on that claim. Id. at 1317. Without Martinez’s

exception, a defendant’s claim that he was denied constitutionally adequate assistance at trial

could get caught in an eddy at the confluence of federal deference, state procedural law, and

12-6310 Sutton v. Carpenter Page 5

inadequate post-conviction counsel, and thereby escape review entirely. Id. at 1316 (“[I]f

counsel’s errors in an initial-review collateral proceeding do not establish cause to excuse the

procedural default in a federal habeas proceeding, no court will review the prisoner’s claims.”).

In Trevino, the Court, considering Texas law, held that the same concerns are present (and

therefore the Martinez exception applies) when a state’s procedural framework makes it “highly

unlikely” that a defendant in a typical case will have a “meaningful opportunity” to raise

ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921. We turn, therefore,

to the question whether Tennessee’s procedural rules are sufficiently similar to Texas’s to come

within Trevino.

A.

In Trevino, “two characteristics” of Texas’s procedural framework led the Court to

conclude that a Texas defendant in the typical case is unlikely to have a meaningful opportunity

to raise ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. Id. at 1918. First, although Texas permits

defendants to raise the claims on direct appeal, Texas’s procedural rules make it “virtually

impossible” to adequately present the claims on direct appeal. Id. (quoting Robinson v. State, 16

S.W.3d 808, 810–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). In so finding, the Court noted that Texas courts

recognize that most ineffective-assistance claims require the development of extra-record

evidence. Id. (citing Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc)).

And, although a defendant may raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in a motion for new trial and

may even be granted additional time to develop the record, Texas courts recognize that the

“motion-for-new-trial ‘vehicle is often inadequate [to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness]

because of time constraints and because the trial record has generally not been transcribed at this

point.’” Id. (quoting Torres, 943 S.W.2d at 475). Specifically, Texas procedural rules require

defendants to file motions for new trial within 30 days of sentencing, Tex. R. App. P. 21.4, and

trial courts to dispose of the motions within 75 days of sentencing, Tex. R. App. P. 21.8 (a), (c),

but allow up to 120 days post-sentencing for preparation of the transcript, Tex. R. App. P.

35.2(b), 35.3(c). In combination, Texas courts recognize, the rules preclude the fact-gathering

necessary to adequately present the claim. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1918–19 (collecting cases).

12-6310 Sutton v. Carpenter Page 6

Second, the Court found that Texas defendants lack a meaningful opportunity to develop

claims on direct appeal because “Texas courts in effect have directed defendants to raise claims

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on collateral, rather than on direct, review.” Id. at 1919.

Specifically, the Court noted, Texas courts have (1) explained why direct review proceedings are

likely inadequate; (2) held that failure to raise the claim on direct review does not bar the

defendant from bringing it in post-conviction proceedings; and (3) suggested that appellate

counsel’s failure to raise the claim on direct review is not ineffective assistance. Id. at 1919–20.

Further, Texas’s highest criminal court has explicitly stated that defendants “should not” bring

the claims on direct appeal. Id. at 1920 (quoting Mata v. State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 430, n.14 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007) (emphasis in original)). Noting that “[t]he criminal bar, not surprisingly, has

taken this strong judicial advice seriously,” the Court concluded that it would be unfair to decline

to extend Martinez under these circumstances. Id.

B.

Consideration of the same characteristics of Tennessee’s procedural law compels our

conclusion that Tennessee defendants, too, are highly unlikely to have a meaningful opportunity

to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal.

First, like Texas, Tennessee’s procedural rules make it almost impossible for a defendant

in a typical case to adequately present an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal.

Tennessee courts recognize that “the practice of raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims

on direct appeal is ‘fraught with peril’ since it ‘is virtually impossible to demonstrate prejudice

as required’ without an evidentiary hearing.” State v. Blackmon, 78 S.W.3d 322, 328 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 2001) (citations omitted). Courts advise defendants not to raise the claims on direct

appeal for that reason. See id. (“‘[I]neffective assistance of counsel claims should normally be

raised by petition for post-conviction relief.’”) (citation omitted); Kendricks v. State, 13 S.W.3d

401, 405 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (“[W]e have previously warned defendants and their counsel

of the dangers of raising the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal

because of the significant of [sic] amount of development and factfinding such an issue

entails.”). And although an evidentiary hearing may be available to a defendant who files a

motion for new trial, Tennessee’s procedural rules create some of the same timing obstacles with

12-6310 Sutton v. Carpenter Page 7

respect to motions for new trial as do Texas’s rules. A defendant must file the motion within 30

days of sentencing, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 33(b), and trial transcripts may not be available until much

later. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b) (requiring the transcript to be filed 60 days after filing the

notice of appeal); Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), (c) (providing that the deadline for filing a notice of

appeal is tolled by a motion for new trial). These time limits are critical because if a defendant

fails to raise an issue in the time allotted, he forfeits his opportunity to litigate the issue on direct

appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e); see also Fahey v. Eldridge, 46 S.W. 3d 138, 141 (Tenn. 2001) (“It

has long been the rule in this state that in order to preserve errors for appeal, the appellant must

first bring the alleged errors to the attention of the trial court in a motion for a new trial.”).

Where trial counsel files the motion for new trial, the waiver rule alone effectively forecloses

litigation of most ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal because “trial counsel . . . can

hardly be expected to challenge . . . his own ineffectiveness.” Frazier v. State, 303 S.W.3d 674,

682–83 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting Velarde v. United States, 972 F.2d 826, 827 (7th Cir. 1992)). In a

typical Tennessee case, it is likely that trial counsel will file the motion for new trial because

Tennessee requires appointed1 trial counsel to continue representation throughout a defendant’s

direct appeal, and permits withdrawal only on a showing of good cause. See Tenn. Sup. Ct.

Rules 13(e)(5); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-14-205(a); see also Sasser v. Hobbs, 735 F.3d 833, 851

(8th Cir. 2013) (finding a similar requirement in Arkansas law dispositive to its determination

that Arkansas does not provide “defendants a meaningful opportunity to challenge their trial

counsel’s effectiveness on direct appeal” under Trevino). Thus, the rules combine to make it

highly improbable that Tennessee defendants will be in a position to raise ineffective assistance

in a motion for new trial, much less to pursue an evidentiary hearing on the claim. Under those

circumstances, as Tennessee courts recognize, it is “virtually impossible” for the defendant to

adequately present the claim on direct appeal. Blackmon, 78 S.W.3d at 328.

With respect to the second characteristic, Tennessee courts, like Texas courts, “in effect

have directed defendants to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on collateral,

1

Appointed counsel represent criminal defendants in the overwhelming majority of cases. See Robert L.

Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58 Law & Contemp. Probs. 31, 31

(1995) (“It is not uncommon for indigent defense programs to represent up to 90 percent of all criminal defendants

in a given felony jurisdiction.”).

12-6310 Sutton v. Carpenter Page 8

rather than on direct, review.” Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1919. Specifically, Tennessee courts have

explained that direct review proceedings are inadequate to present ineffective-assistance claims

“because of the significant . . . amount of development and factfinding such an issue entails.”

Kendricks, 13 S.W.3d at 405 (collecting cases holding the same). They hold, as do Texas courts,

that failure to raise an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal is not grounds for finding the

claim waived in post-conviction proceedings. See id. (“[T]he post-conviction court erred in

holding that the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were barred for failure to

raise them on direct appeal.”); see also Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 868 (Tenn. 2008) (“A

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a claim cognizable under Tennessee’s Post-

Conviction Procedure Act.”) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-101–313). And, Tennessee’s

highest criminal court regularly advises defendants that raising ineffective assistance on direct

appeal is a practice “fraught with peril” and that “the better practice is to not raise the issue on

direct appeal.” State v. Wagner, E2012-01144-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 60971, at *11 (Tenn.

Crim. App. Jan. 8, 2014) (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Sluder, No. 1236, 1990 WL

26552, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 1990); see also, e.g., Sterling v. State, W1999-00608-

CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1117518, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 24, 2001) (same); State v.

Frantz, 03C01-9509-CC-00269, 1998 WL 46432, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 6, 1998) (same);

State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 607 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (same). As the Court observed

in Trevino, it “would create significant unfairness” to deny defendants the benefit of Martinez

“because of the existence of a theoretically available procedural alternative, namely direct

appellate review,” that Tennessee courts advise defendants not to use. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at

1919–20.

C.

Respondent argues that Tennessee and Texas differ in crucial ways. First, Respondent

notes that Tennessee is unlike Texas in that Tennessee procedural rules do not impose a deadline

for resolution of new trial motions, and Tennessee rules provide that trial courts shall “liberally

grant motions to amend the motion for new trial until the day of the hearing on the motion.”

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 33(b). These differences, Respondent argues, make it feasible for a Tennessee

defendant to develop the record in a motion for new trial and, therefore, provide Tennessee

12-6310 Sutton v. Carpenter Page 9

defendants a “meaningful opportunity” to raise ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. In

support, Respondent cites a series of fourteen decisions involving Tennessee defendants who

litigated ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims in an evidentiary hearing held pursuant to

a motion for new trial. See Resp. Br. 27–28. In at least three of those cases, Respondent notes,

the trial court did not hold a hearing on the motion for new trial for several months, thus

allowing time to develop the factual record. See State v. Urbano-Uriostegui, M2012-00235-

CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 1896931, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 6, 2013), appeal denied (Oct.

16, 2013) (hearing held ten months after motion filed); State v. Monroe, E02011-00315-CCA-

R3-CD, 2012 WL 2367401, at *1–2 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 22, 2012) (hearing held 11 months

after motion filed); State v. Honeycutt, M199800245CCA R3CD, 1999 WL 1063546, at *1

(Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 24, 1999), rev’d, 54 S.W.3d 762 (Tenn. 2001) (hearing held 7 months

after motion filed).

The differences identified by Respondent are not immaterial for defendants in a position

to take advantage of them. Under Texas’s procedural rules, a defendant may amend his motion

for new trial “without leave of court,” but only within the 30-day period for filing such motions,

Tex. R. App. P. 21.4(b), and a defendant’s motion for new trial is denied by operation of law if a

trial court does not decide the motion within the 75-day time period, Tex. R. App. P. 21.8(a), (c).

In Tennessee, however, a defendant can seek leave to amend or supplement a motion for new

trial any time before the hearing, as to which the trial court has no deadline. The absence of

Texas’s 30- and 75-day deadlines in Tennessee’s procedural rules means that a Tennessee

defendant could potentially be afforded more time to identify and substantiate ineffectiveness

claims than could a Texas defendant.

But many Tennessee defendants are in no position to take advantage of the opportunity

because of the interplay of other Tennessee procedural rules. As noted, Tennessee’s procedural

law creates a presumption that indigent defendants will be represented by trial counsel on appeal,

and trial counsel are unlikely to raise their own errors in a motion for new trial. See Sasser,

735 F.3d at 852 (“‘[I]t is unrealistic to expect trial counsel, who is also appellate counsel, to call

into question his own competence.’”) (citation omitted); Robinson, 16 S.W.3d at 810

(“[M]ounting an ineffective assistance attack in a motion for new trial is inherently unlikely if

12-6310 Sutton v. Carpenter Page 10

the trial counsel remains counsel during the time required to file such a motion.” (quoting

Torres, 943 S.W.2d at 475)); Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 620 n.5 (2005) (“A lawyer may

not, however, perceive his own errors . . . .”); see also Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921 (recognizing

“the need for a new lawyer” as a consideration that “argue[s] strongly” for consideration of

ineffective-assistance claims on collateral review, rather than direct appeal). For a defendant

represented by trial counsel on appeal, absent the insight and wherewithal to seek his attorney’s

withdrawal, Tennessee’s expanded window for amending new-trial motions has little effect on

the ability to identify and develop ineffective-assistance claims in time to raise them in a new-

trial motion. The lack of access to a trial transcript during that time period augments the

difficulty. A defendant who misses the opportunity to raise claims in a new-trial motion waives

the claims on direct appeal. If a defendant disregards the waiver rule and raises them anyway, he

runs the risk that the court of appeals will deny the claims as procedurally defaulted or will

decide them without an evidentiary hearing. See Wilson v. State, No. 909, 1991 WL 87245, at *6

(Tenn. Crim. App. May 29, 1991) (“[S]uch a path by counsel is doomed to procedural failure.”).

Thus, in combination, Tennessee procedural rules create significant obstacles to a defendant’s

adequate presentation of an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal. The absence of

Tennessee analogues to Texas’s time limits for amending and resolving new-trial motions does

not change our conclusion on this point.

Respondent also contends that, rather than discouraging defendants from raising

ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal, Tennessee courts have “merely admonished

defendants for advancing trial-effectiveness claims after failing to avail themselves of the

meaningful procedural opportunity Tennessee provides.” Resp. Br. 31 (emphasis in original).

Respondent contends that Tennessee courts have “only declined to consider trial-ineffectiveness

claims on direct appeal where: (1) the defendant has conceded the issue; (2) the record does not

contain a transcript of the motion for new trial hearing, or; (3) the defendant waived the

issue . . . by failing to include the issue in his or her motion for new trial, or by presenting the

issue for the first time on appeal.” Id. at 32 (footnotes omitted). But a state’s courts of appeals

need not decline to hear ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal in order to be understood

as directing defendants to raise the claims in collateral proceedings in the manner Trevino found

significant. A state whose appellate courts consistently declined to hear the claims would likely

12-6310 Sutton v. Carpenter Page 11

fall within the rule as stated in Martinez. More to the point, although sometimes Tennessee

courts observe that raising ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal is “fraught with peril” in the

context of admonishing defendants for advancing trial-effectiveness claims after failing to first

present the claims in a motion for new trial, see, e.g., Sterling, 2001 WL 1117518, at *7,

Tennessee courts make the same observation when reviewing ineffectiveness claims that were

presented in a motion for new trial with an evidentiary hearing. See Anderson, 835 S.W.2d at

607. Accordingly, the message overwhelmingly communicated is that the claims are best

resolved, with least risk to the defendant, in post-conviction proceedings.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we find that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel

can establish cause to excuse a Tennessee defendant’s procedural default of a substantial claim

of ineffective assistance at trial. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320. We REMAND to the district

court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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