Troy K. Scheffler v. Jack Molin

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 13-1008

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Troy K. Scheffler

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Jack Molin, in his individual capacity acting under color of law as Building

Inspector and employee of the City of Crystal, MN

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

City of Crystal, a political subdivision of the state of Minnesota

llllllllllllllllllllll Defendant

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

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Submitted: December 17, 2013

Filed: February 25, 2014

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Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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KELLY, Circuit Judge.

After an altercation with Crystal City building inspector Jack Molin, Troy

Scheffler brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Molin, alleging violations of

his First Amendment rights. Scheffler also brought a defamation claim against Molin

and the city, which is not before us on appeal. Both parties moved for summary

judgment. Molin argued that Scheffler’s constitutional rights had not been violated

and that, regardless, the defense of qualified immunity applied. The district court1

denied Scheffler’s motion, granted summary judgment to Molin and the city, and

dismissed Scheffler’s suit with prejudice. With jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

we affirm.

I. Background

On October 3, 2008, Scheffler went to Crystal City Hall to inquire about a

recent stop-work order issued by Molin on the property of Scheffler’s friend Brandon

Bohn. With little preliminary conversation, Molin yelled at Scheffler, called him a

“criminal,” and accused him of living at the property unlawfully. After Scheffler

urged Molin to calm down, Molin walked into the lobby from behind the customer

service desk and effectively escorted Scheffler to the door, placing his hand on

Scheffler’s shoulder but with no apparent physical force.

Scheffler quickly returned and requested from Jenny Gooden, a city employee

at the building inspection office, a form on which he could file a complaint against

Molin. Before she could reply, Molin approached and asked Scheffler why he had

returned. When Scheffler told him, Molin instructed Gooden to call the police.

Scheffler responded that all he wanted was a complaint form, and he left after Gooden

gave him the contact information for Patrick Peters, Molin’s supervisor, and told

Scheffler that Peters could help him. All employees present believed that Molin was

acting inappropriately.

1

The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

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Scheffler went down the hall to the police station, where he told Sergeant Holm

that the police might receive a call about his involvement in disorderly conduct.

After Scheffler explained what had happened with Molin, Sergeant Holm asked

Scheffler to wait while he investigated. Fifteen minutes later, Sergeant Holm

returned, gave Scheffler another business card for Peters, and told Scheffler that

Peters was interested in Scheffler filing a complaint against Molin. Scheffler later

called the city to file such a complaint, and the city subsequently disciplined Molin.

II. Discussion

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, finding

such an order appropriate if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact such

that Molin is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Naucke v. City of Park

Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2002). When the defense of qualified immunity has

been asserted, we evaluate both whether the defendant violated the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights and whether those rights were clearly established. Chambers v.

Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2011). If there is no constitutional violation,

however, we need not proceed further. Riehm v. Engelking, 538 F.3d 952, 962 (8th

Cir. 2008).

Scheffler argues that by instructing Gooden to call the police, Molin retaliated

against him when he was attempting to exercise his First Amendment right of speech

and his right to petition the government for redress of grievances.2 To prevail on his

First Amendment retaliation claim, Scheffler must show (1) that he engaged in a

2

In his reply brief on appeal, Scheffler also argues that Molin’s conduct was an

unconstitutional, content-based restriction on his right of expression in a limited

public forum. Since he did not raise this claim at the district court, however, we need

not consider it here. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing

“our general rule that claims not presented in the district court may not be advanced

for the first time on appeal”).

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constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the defendant took adverse action against

him that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity;

and (3) that the adverse action was motivated in part by Scheffler’s exercise of his

constitutional rights. Naucke, 284 F.3d at 927–28. This is an objective test: “[t]he

question is not whether the plaintiff [him]self was deterred, though how plaintiff

acted might be evidence of what a reasonable person would have done.” Garcia v.

City of Trenton, 348 F.3d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 2003). Molin does not dispute that

Scheffler was engaging in a protected activity. Finding that Molin’s conduct was not

sufficient to meet the second prong of the test, the district court did not address the

third. We therefore focus on the question of whether Molin’s actions would chill a

person of ordinary firmness from continuing to petition and speak.

In Garcia v. City of Trenton, we evaluated a plaintiff’s claim of First

Amendment retaliation by the mayor of her city. Garcia spoke with the mayor on

numerous occasions in an attempt to get a city ordinance enforced against people who

unlawfully rode their bicycles in front of her shop. Garcia herself regularly parked

her car outside her shop, in violation of a two-hour time limit ordinance that was not

enforced unless someone complained. During a “heated exchange,” the mayor told

Garcia that the two-hour parking limit would be enforced against her “because of her

complaints about the bicycling ordinance.” Garcia, 348 F.3d at 728. She received

her first ticket an hour later and three others soon thereafter, in sharp contrast to her

neighbor who also parked in violation of the two-hour limit. We asked whether the

plaintiff would “have simply ignored the [tickets], or would he or she have been

slowed down, at least to some degree?” Id. at 729. Finding that a person of ordinary

firmness in Garcia’s situation would have been chilled from further speech, we relied

in part on the fact that the defendant’s actions “went beyond mere speech, however

offensive.” Id. The defendant, “in his capacity as Mayor, engaged the punitive

machinery of government in order to punish Ms. Garcia for her speaking out.” Id.

Although parking ticket charges “are typically only petty offenses, not even

misdemeanors, . . . they have concrete consequences.” Id.

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We distinguished Garcia’s claim from that of the plaintiff in Naucke v. City of

Park Hills. Naucke experienced multiple instances of embarrassment, which she

attributed to the city administrator—including conducting a public audit of an

organization she ran, publicly scolding her at city council meetings, publicly calling

her names, and circulating false information about her family—but the conduct was

still not “sufficiently egregious” to meet the second prong of the test. 284 F.3d at

928. We acknowledged that “embarrassment, humiliation and emotional distress may

be sufficient” for a First Amendment retaliation claim, but the consequences to

Naucke in particular would not chill someone of ordinary firmness from continued

speech. Id. Naucke did, in fact, continue to speak out against the city administrator

involved.

We do not doubt that Scheffler’s experience with Molin was quite unpleasant,

particularly given Molin’s position of trust as a city official; nor do we condone

Molin’s treatment of him. However, the actions ascribed to the city administrator in

Naucke—which did not inflict constitutional injury—were far more severe and

persistent than the single instance of misconduct involved here. Unlike the plaintiff

in Garcia, who did prevail on her claim, Scheffler did not experience “concrete

consequences.” Moreover, the mayor in Garcia successfully used his power to

mobilize city resources against the plaintiff in response to her First Amendment

activity. When Sergeant Holm arrived at the building inspection office, he did not

take Molin’s side or arrest Scheffler; instead, after investigating the situation, he

offered Scheffler information to help him further exercise his rights. Molin’s

instruction to call the police could be deemed a threat of retaliation, which may be an

adverse action sufficient to chill a person of ordinary firmness. See Santiago v. Blair,

707 F.3d 984, 992–93 (8th Cir. 2013). But if anything, Molin’s statement was a

threat that the police would come; what the police would do after that was in their

discretion, not Molin’s. In this case, the potential chilling effect of Molin’s

instruction was mitigated by the fact that the other city employees present did not

echo Molin’s attitude—instead, they also believed Molin was acting inappropriately

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and later vouched for Scheffler to the police. Finally, to the extent that we can rely

on Scheffler’s actual conduct in our objective inquiry, Scheffler did, in fact,

successfully exercise his First Amendment right to file a complaint against Molin.

While Molin’s conduct was certainly disrespectful, it did not violate Scheffler’s First

Amendment rights.

III. Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Molin and the City

of Crystal.

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