William Thornton v. Edmund G. Brown, Jr

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM CECIL THORNTON, No. 11-56146

Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v. 3:10-cv-01583-

RBB

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR.,* Governor

of California; MATTHEW CATE,

Secretary of Corrections; LEWIS, ORDER AND

John Doe, Parole Unit Supervisor; AMENDED

MARK JOSEPH, Parole Agent; OPINION

CHRISTINE CAVALIN, Parole Agent;

JOHN DOE #1, Parole Agent,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Ruben B. Brooks, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 9, 2012—Pasadena, California

Filed July 31, 2013

Amended February 18, 2014

*

The Honorable Edmund G. Brown, Jr., is substituted for his

predecessor, The Honorable Arnold Schwarzenegger, as Governor of

California. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

2 THORNTON V. BROWN

Before: Myron H. Bright,** Susan P. Graber,

and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Order;

Dissent to Order by Judge O’Scannlain

Opinion by Judge Graber;

Dissent by Judge Ikuta

SUMMARY***

Civil Rights

The panel replaced the opinion and dissenting opinion,

filed on July 31, 2013, and published at 724 F.3d 1255, with

an amended opinion and amended dissenting opinion, denied

a petition for panel rehearing, denied a petition for rehearing

en banc on behalf of the court, and ordered that no further

petitions shall be entertained.

In the amended opinion, the panel reversed the district

court’s order dismissing, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),

a civil rights action involving a constitutional challenge to the

imposition and enforcement of two conditions of plaintiff’s

parole: a residency restriction and a requirement that plaintiff

submit to electronic monitoring using a Global Positioning

System device. The panel held that because plaintiff

challenged two parole conditions, which were imposed

**

The Honorable Myron H. Bright, Senior Circuit Judge for the United

States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

***

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

THORNTON V. BROWN 3

through a discretionary decision of the Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation, his success would neither

result in speedier release from parole nor imply, either

directly or indirectly, the invalidity of the criminal judgments

underlying that parole term. Therefore Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), did not bar plaintiff from

proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dissenting, Judge Ikuta

stated that as a matter of California law, plaintiff’s

challenges, if successful, would necessarily demonstrate that

a portion of his underlying sentence was invalid.

Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge

O’Scannlain, joined by Judges Bybee, Callahan, Bea and

Ikuta, stated that the panel misapplied Supreme Court

precedent and created a split with the Seventh Circuit, as

described in Judge Ikuta’s dissent. He wrote that as a result

of the panel’s decision, state decisions about parole

conditions will now be subject to far-reaching and searching

review by federal courts in this circuit. He emphasized the

important federalism and practical concerns that warranted

rehearing this case en banc.

COUNSEL

Karen Gal-Or (argued) and Craig E. Stewart, Jones Day, San

Francisco, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jose A. Zelidon-Zepeda (argued), Deputy Attorney General;

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California; Jonathan

L. Wolff, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Thomas S.

Patterson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, San

Francisco, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

4 THORNTON V. BROWN

ORDER

The opinion and dissenting opinion, filed on July 31,

2013, and published at 724 F.3d 1255, are replaced by the

amended opinion and amended dissenting opinion filed

concurrently with this order. With these amendments, Judges

Bright and Graber have voted to deny the petition for panel

rehearing, and Judge Ikuta has voted to grant it. Judge

Graber has voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc,

and Judge Bright has so recommended. Judge Ikuta has

voted to grant it.

The full court has been advised of the petition for

rehearing en banc. A judge of the court called for a vote on

whether to rehear the matter en banc. On such vote, a

majority of the nonrecused active judges failed to vote in

favor of en banc rehearing.

The petition for panel rehearing and petition for rehearing

en banc are DENIED. No further petitions for panel

rehearing or petitions for rehearing en banc shall be

entertained.

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, joined by BYBEE,

CALLAHAN, BEA, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, dissenting

from the denial of rehearing en banc:

Today, a panel of our Court disregards the “strong

considerations of comity” between federal courts and the

States, grasping power for itself where it is “difficult to

imagine . . . a State has a stronger interest.” Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491–92 (1973). To reach this

THORNTON V. BROWN 5

result, the panel misapplies Supreme Court precedent and

creates a split with the Seventh Circuit, as described in Judge

Ikuta’s compelling dissent. I write to emphasize the

important federalism and practical concerns that warranted

rehearing this case en banc.

I

The central question in this appeal is whether William

Cecil Thornton may challenge his parole conditions under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 or whether he must instead petition for a

writ of habeas corpus. To a casual observer, this issue may

appear trivial, but as the relevant statutory framework and

Supreme Court precedents make clear, the answer to this

question directly implicates our constitutional system’s

respect for state sovereignty and the limitations Congress has

placed on federal judicial power.

As the Supreme Court has observed, federal habeas

review “frustrates both the States’ sovereign power to punish

offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor

constitutional rights.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538,

555–56 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a

federal court has authority to review state criminal matters, it

“intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few

exercises of federal judicial authority.” Harrington v.

Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (quoting Harris v. Reed,

489 U.S. 255, 282 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).

In order to “confirm that state courts are the principal

forum for asserting constitutional challenges” to state

confinement, Congress has dramatically restricted federal

habeas review. Id. A petitioner seeking a writ from a federal

court must “first attempt to present his claim in state court.”

6 THORNTON V. BROWN

Id. Moreover, a federal court can issue a writ of habeas

corpus only where a state court’s judgment “resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1)–(2). In this way,

Congress has curtailed federal judicial interference with a

State’s “sovereign power to punish offenders.” Thompson,

523 U.S. at 555.

By contrast, the power of federal courts in § 1983 suits is

far greater—and the intrusion on state sovereignty far more

significant. Unlike a habeas petitioner, a plaintiff suing under

§ 1983 bypasses the state court system and goes directly to

federal court. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500–01

(1982); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472–73 (1974).

Absent is the notion that “state proceedings are the central

process,” as they are in the habeas context. Richter, 131 S.

Ct. at 787. And whereas federal habeas review entails

deference to a state court judgment unless that judgment is

“beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement,” id., no

such deference to the States exists in § 1983 suits. For these

and other reasons, § 1983 suits involve “a basic problem of

American federalism,” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 222

(1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and this is especially true

in the context of state penal systems. Cf. Thompson, 523 U.S.

at 555.

Against this background, the implications of the panel’s

decision for state sovereignty are obvious. State decisions

about parole conditions will now be subject to far-reaching

and searching review by federal courts in our circuit. Rather

THORNTON V. BROWN 7

than reserving federal judicial intervention for cases of

“extreme malfunctio[n]” of state penal systems, as is the case

with habeas review, Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013)

(alteration in original) (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786),

federal judicial involvement in the setting of parole

conditions will now become routine. As Judge Ikuta’s dissent

convincingly argues, challenges to parole conditions fall

within the purview of the federal habeas statute, with all its

attendant limitations on our power. By instead permitting

such challenges to be brought under § 1983, the panel has

worked “a major new intrusion into state sovereignty under

our federal system,” Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 33

(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting), something Congress expressly

sought to avoid.

II

The consequences of the panel’s decision go beyond its

disregard of fundamental federalism principles. One of the

key differences between habeas and § 1983 actions is that the

latter holds out the prospect of attorney’s fees for a prevailing

plaintiff. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). As federal courts have

observed on numerous occasions, awarding attorney’s fees in

§ 1983 litigation encourages would-be plaintiffs to bring suits

that might otherwise never make it into court because counsel

have a financial incentive to undertake such cases. See, e.g.,

Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1306–07 (9th Cir. 1980).

That incentive is conspicuously lacking in habeas actions,

which means that the likely effect of the panel’s decision will

be a rush of parolees to the federal courthouse steps.

Given the predictable increase in § 1983 litigation the

panel’s opinion will produce, one would expect the panel to

articulate how litigants and district courts will determine

8 THORNTON V. BROWN

when a challenge must be brought in habeas. But the panel

remains coy, offering only hints at what may or may not be

relevant considerations in future cases. The panel’s proffered

standard is a mystery, one that the district courts of this

circuit must struggle now to solve.

I respectfully dissent from our regrettable decision not to

rehear this case en banc.

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

In this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff

William Cecil Thornton brings a constitutional challenge to

the imposition and enforcement of two conditions of his

parole: a residency restriction and a requirement that he

submit to electronic monitoring using a Global Positioning

System (“GPS”) device. Citing Preiser v. Rodriguez,

411 U.S. 475, 489–90 (1973), and Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), the district court concluded that

habeas corpus provided the exclusive federal remedy for

Plaintiff’s claims and dismissed the action under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

The Supreme Court has not directly considered the

application of the Heck doctrine to § 1983 actions that

challenge conditions of parole. Among the courts of appeals,

only the Seventh Circuit has done so, in Drollinger v.

Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1977), which considered

conditions of probation, and Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d

576 (7th Cir. 2003), which considered conditions of parole.

THORNTON V. BROWN 9

Consistent with Supreme Court precedent and that of our

sister circuit, we hold that such an action is not barred by

Heck if it is not a collateral attack on either the fact of a

parolee’s confinement as a parolee or the parolee’s

underlying conviction or sentence. Because we conclude that

Plaintiff’s action is not such an attack, we reverse and

remand.

BACKGROUND

California’s Sex Offender Registration Act requires

certain convicted sex offenders to register with law

enforcement officials in the communities in which they

reside. Cal. Penal Code §§ 290(c), 290.005(a). California’s

Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act of 2006—also

known as Jessica’s Law or Proposition 83—imposes several

requirements that apply to parolees who, as sex offenders, are

subject to that duty to register. One of those requirements is

a residency restriction according to which a person who is

required to register may not “reside within 2000 feet of any

public or private school, or park where children regularly

gather.” Id. § 3003.5(b). Another requirement is that any

person who is convicted of a “registerable sex offense” as

defined by section 290(c)—a section which enumerates

various sex offenses under California law—must submit to

electronic monitoring by a GPS device, either for the duration

of that person’s parole or for life. Id. §§ 3000.07(a), 3004(b).

The state’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(“the Department”) also has discretionary authority to require

any parolee to submit to electronic monitoring. See id.

§ 3010(a) (providing that “the [Department] may utilize

continuous electronic monitoring to electronically monitor

the whereabouts of persons on parole”).

10 THORNTON V. BROWN

In 2011, a California trial court ruled that section

3003.5(b)’s residency restriction, when applied to all

registered sex offenders as a “blanket” parole condition, was

unconstitutional. In re Taylor, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 64, 67–68

(Ct. App. 2012). The appellate court affirmed the lower

court’s order, which prohibited the “blanket enforcement of

the residency restriction”; but the court also held that the

Department “may, after consideration of a parolee’s

particularized circumstances, impose a special parole

condition that mirrors section 3003.5(b) or one that is more

or less restrictive.” Id. at 83–84.1

In 1987, Plaintiff pleaded guilty in Tennessee to sexual

battery. In 2006, he was convicted in California of buying or

receiving stolen property and was sentenced to a 16-month

term of imprisonment. California law requires a period of

parole or supervised release following such a prison term,

Cal. Penal Code § 3000, and when Plaintiff was released in

June 2008, he received a three-year parole term. Citing

Plaintiff’s previous Tennessee offense, the Department

imposed, as parole conditions, a GPS monitoring requirement

(pursuant to section 3010 of the Penal Code) and a residency

restriction prohibiting him from living within 2000 feet of

schools or parks where children gather (pursuant to section

3003.5(b)). Plaintiff was later convicted of robbery and was

sentenced to a three-year prison term for that offense,

pursuant to California Penal Code section 1170. Again,

California law required a term of parole to follow his

sentence. Cal. Penal Code § 3000. While he was in prison,

the Department issued new parole conditions that would

1

The California Supreme Court has granted the state’s petition for

review of that ruling. In re Taylor, 290 P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2013).

THORNTON V. BROWN 11

apply upon his release. Those conditions included the same

GPS monitoring requirement and residency restriction.

During his second prison term, Plaintiff filed this action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking both monetary and

injunctive relief. He alleges that the Department violated his

constitutional rights by imposing the GPS monitoring

requirement and residency restriction as parole conditions and

by enforcing those conditions in an arbitrary or

discriminatory manner. The district court reasoned that, as a

parolee, Plaintiff was “in custody” within the meaning of the

federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. It further

reasoned that, under the Heck doctrine, a habeas petition is

the exclusive means by which Plaintiff can challenge a

condition of his parole. Accordingly, the district court

dismissed the claim.

Plaintiff timely appeals. We review de novo the legal

issues presented here. Barker v. Riverside Cnty. Office of

Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009).

DISCUSSION

A. Immunity

Plaintiff’s claims against the Governor, the Secretary of

Corrections, and a Parole Unit Supervisor are limited to

injunctive relief. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citing Eleventh Amendment

considerations and holding that § 1983 does not permit suits

for damages against states); Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l

Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that “state

officials sued in their official capacities are not ‘persons’

within the meaning of § 1983” except when “sued for

12 THORNTON V. BROWN

prospective injunctive relief”). Neither absolute nor qualified

immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims against those defendants.

See, e.g., Buckwalter v. Nev. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 678 F.3d

737, 747 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Absolute immunity is not a bar to

injunctive or declaratory relief.”); Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d

1083, 1091 n.10 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] defense of qualified

immunity is not available for prospective injunctive relief.”).

Absolute immunity does bar Plaintiff’s claims for

damages against his parole officers for imposing allegedly

unconstitutional parole conditions. We have held that

absolute immunity “extend[s] to parole officials for the

‘imposition of parole conditions’” because that task is

“integrally related to an official’s decision to grant or revoke

parole,” which is a “quasi-judicial” function. Swift v.

California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting

Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1983)). Both

parole conditions currently in effect were imposed through

particularized and discretionary decisions by parole officers.

The GPS condition was imposed pursuant to the

Department’s discretionary authority under section 3010 of

the California Penal Code,2 and the residency restriction

“mirrors” section 3003.5(b), which, as interpreted by the

California courts, permits such a condition only “after

consideration of a parolee’s particularized circumstances.”

Taylor, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 83–84. Accordingly, the parole

officers are absolutely immune with respect to Plaintiff’s

2

Although sections 3000.07(a) and 3004(b) of the Penal Code require

the Department to impose a GPS monitoring condition for any parolee

convicted of a “registerable sex offense” under section 290(c), that

subsection lists only crimes under California law. Thus, Plaintiff’s

condition, which relates to a conviction under Tennessee law, reflects an

exercise of the Department’s discretion under section 3010.

THORNTON V. BROWN 13

claims for damages arising from the imposition of those

conditions.

Absolute immunity does not extend, though, to Plaintiff’s

claim that the parole officers enforced the conditions of his

parole in an unconstitutionally arbitrary or discriminatory

manner. Parole officers’ “immunity for conduct arising from

their duty to supervise parolees is qualified.” Anderson,

714 F.2d at 910. Plaintiff’s allegation that the officers

enforced the residency restriction against him but not against

similarly situated parolees relates to the manner in which

Defendants implemented that condition—an element of their

supervisory function. Absolute immunity therefore does not

apply to Plaintiff’s enforcement-based claim. However, the

district court also dismissed this claim as barred by qualified

immunity. On appeal, Plaintiff does not challenge that ruling

except to the extent that it bars him from pursuing injunctive

relief. Because qualified immunity does not bar injunctive

relief, Vance, 345 F.3d at 1091 n.10, Plaintiff may assert his

non-monetary claim arising from the allegedly discriminatory

enforcement of his parole conditions.

B. Heck Doctrine

With respect to his claims for injunctive relief, the

question remains whether Plaintiff appropriately brought

those claims under § 1983 instead of through a petition for

habeas corpus.

Persons subject to state custody generally “have two

potential avenues to remedy violations of their federal

constitutional rights: a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254, and a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Osborne v.

Dist. Attorney’s Office, 423 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005)

14 THORNTON V. BROWN

(citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 480). In Preiser, the Supreme Court

addressed “‘the extent to which § 1983 is a permissible

alternative to the traditional remedy of habeas corpus,’”

Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500), and held that § 1983

implicitly excludes from its coverage claims that lie “within

the core of habeas corpus,” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487–88.3

Thus, a person who is in state custody may not use § 1983 to

challenge “the very fact or duration of . . . confinement” by

seeking “a determination that he is entitled to immediate

release or a speedier release from that imprisonment”—for

example, an injunction requiring prison officials to grant

good-time credits that would shorten his prison term. Id. at

499–500. In Heck, the Court elaborated on the exception set

forth in Preiser, holding that a state prisoner may not

maintain a § 1983 claim for damages if “a judgment in favor

of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence” with respect to a prior judgment that

has not been nullified previously. Heck, 512 U.S. at 484,

487.

Not all claims that are cognizable in habeas are precluded

from § 1983’s scope under that standard; rather, there are

“instances where the same constitutional rights might be

redressed under either form of relief.” Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974); see also Osborne, 423 F.3d at 1055

(rejecting “the notion that a claim which can be brought in

3

The Supreme Court rested this conclusion on its observation that “the

language of the habeas statute is more specific, and the writ’s history

makes clear that it traditionally ‘has been accepted as the specific

instrument to obtain release from [unlawful] confinement.’” Wilkinson v.

Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Preiser,

411 U.S. at 486–87).

THORNTON V. BROWN 15

habeas must be brought in habeas”).4 Thus, the fact that a

§ 1983 plaintiff is “in custody” and therefore may file a

habeas petition challenging the unlawfulness of that custody

does not, by itself, determine whether the § 1983 claim is

available. Instead, a claim that meets the statutory criteria of

§ 1983 may be asserted unless its success would release the

claimant from confinement or shorten its duration, Preiser,

411 U.S. at 500, or would necessarily imply the invalidity of

the conviction or sentence, Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. See also

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) (explaining that

Preiser and Heck bar a § 1983 claim only if that claim will

either result in a “speedier release” from custody or “a

judicial determination that necessarily implies the

unlawfulness of the State’s custody”).5

A state parolee is “in custody” for purposes of the federal

habeas statute, Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243

(1963), and may challenge parole conditions imposed by a

state correctional department through a habeas petition under

28 U.S.C. § 2241, Bagley v. Harvey, 718 F.2d 921, 922–23

(9th Cir. 1983). But neither we nor the Supreme Court has

addressed previously whether, or under what circumstances,

4

See also Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499 (noting that habeas and § 1983 may

provide alternative means to challenge prison conditions); Skinner v.

Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2011) (raising, without deciding, the

question whether “habeas [is] the sole remedy, or even an available one,”

for certain types of claims).

5

We discern little, if any, disagreement between our and the dissent’s

understandings of these governing principles. The dissent discusses the

facts of Dotson in some detail, but we do not find those facts particularly

relevant to this case. In Dotson, the plaintiffs were prisoners who sought,

in a § 1983 action, relief that would have entitled them to a new parole

hearing. They did not challenge any parole conditions that might

accompany their eventual release from prison.

16 THORNTON V. BROWN

Heck’s implicit exception to § 1983 applies to such a claim.

Here, we hold that Plaintiff’s claims, which challenge two

parole conditions, do not fall within that exception, because

a judgment enjoining enforcement of his GPS monitoring

requirement and residency restrictions will neither affect the

“fact or duration” of his parole nor “necessarily imply” the

invalidity of his state-court conviction or sentence.

The only federal court of appeals to have decided how

Heck applies to the conditions of a non-physical form of

custody is the Seventh Circuit, which addressed the issue in

Drollinger, 552 F.2d 1220. In dismissing a state

probationer’s § 1983 claim challenging a condition of her

probation, that court identified the crux of the issue:

“Because probation is by its nature less confining than

incarceration, the distinction between the fact of confinement

and the conditions thereof is necessarily blurred.”6 Id. at

1225. However “blurred” this line might appear at first blush,

in California a parolee’s status is legally and factually distinct

from his conditions of parole. “In California, parolee status

carries distinct disadvantages when compared to the situation

of the law-abiding citizen.” People v. Lewis, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d

231, 236 (Ct. App. 1999). A parolee remains a “prisoner”

under California law and is subject at all times to the

jurisdiction of the Department, which may impose or alter

6

It bears noting that Drollinger involved a challenge to a condition of

probation, a status that the Supreme Court has held to be less akin to

imprisonment than parole. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 & n.2

(2006) (“As we noted in [United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119

(2001)], parolees are on the ‘continuum’ for state-imposed punishments.

On this continuum, parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than

probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation

is to imprisonment.”

THORNTON V. BROWN 17

conditions at will for the duration of the term of parole.7 Id.

The conditions imposed by the Department, like those

challenged here, are simply an exercise of that jurisdiction,

which remains unaffected by even a successful challenge to

particular conditions placed on the parolee.8

Moreover, the distinction between the “fact” and

“duration” of imprisonment, on the one hand, and the

“conditions” of imprisonment, on the other hand, is a

distinction that Supreme Court precedent has created: a

prisoner may challenge the “fact” or “duration” of

imprisonment only through a habeas proceeding, but may

challenge “conditions” of confinement in an action under

§ 1983. Heck, 512 U.S. at 480–81; Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500.

Nor is it difficult to apply that distinction in most cases. See,

e.g., Roles v. Maddox, 439 F.3d 1016, 1017–18 (9th Cir.

2006) (holding that a challenge to the confiscation of

magazines in prison pertains to a condition of confinement,

which is properly brought under § 1983, and collecting

cases); Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“It has been clear for over thirty years that a state prisoner

seeking injunctive relief against the denial or revocation of

7

See, e.g., California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

Operations Manual 81010.16.1–19.1 (Jan. 1, 2013) (providing that a

parole agent has the authority to modify or impose new special conditions

orally, at any time, as long as written notice is provided to the parolee

within five days).

8

Indeed, a contrary view would lead to an arbitrary incongruity in the

scope of available remedies: Prisoners would have two potential means

to challenge aspects of their custody, whereas parolees would have only

one. We see no need to allow the Preiser exception to swallow the rule

that § 1983’s broad text provides a remedy for unlawful conditions of

confinement.

18 THORNTON V. BROWN

good-time credits must proceed in habeas corpus, and not

under § 1983.”); Bennett v. King, 293 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th

Cir. 2002) (holding that a claim concerning harassment by

prison guards is a challenge to a condition of confinement,

which is properly brought under § 1983). The same line must

be drawn for parole as for incarceration because, as explained

above, in California parole is simply a less onerous form of

imprisonment and the parolee is still considered a prisoner.

Here, Plaintiff does not challenge his status as a parolee

or the duration of his parole and, even if he succeeds in this

action, nearly all of his parole conditions will remain in

effect. Those conditions include drug and alcohol testing and

treatment; psychiatric and behavioral counseling; limitations

on travel, employment, association with certain individuals,

patronage of certain businesses, and the use of motor

vehicles; a curfew; numerous sex-offender registration

requirements; a duty not to contact his robbery victim; and

other restrictions. In these circumstances, we hold that his

challenge to two parole conditions does not threaten his

“confinement” as a parolee. See Jones, 371 U.S. at 242–43

(explaining that a parolee’s “release” into the custody and

control of the Parole Board “involves significant restraints on

[the parolee’s] liberty because of his conviction and sentence,

which are in addition to those imposed by the State upon the

public generally”). Thus, even if the line between conditions

of confinement and the fact thereof may be “blurred” in some

cases, it is clear that Plaintiff’s claims in this case do not seek

“speedier release” from his confinement within the meaning

of Preiser’s exception to § 1983.9

9

We need not and do not decide whether we would reach a different

result were Plaintiff challenging all or a substantial portion of his parole

conditions. The dissent declares our holding “unworkable” because a

THORNTON V. BROWN 19

Moreover, because Plaintiff challenges only the

discretionary decisions of the Department in imposing the

GPS monitoring and residency restrictions, his success would

not imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. The

focus of the Supreme Court’s inquiry in Heck was whether a

plaintiff’s success on a § 1983 claim would call into question

a state court’s judgment. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484–86 & n.4

(relying on a common-law rule against “collateral attack on

[a criminal] conviction through the vehicle of a civil suit” and

determining that Ҥ 1983, which borrowed general tort

principles, was not meant to permit such collateral attack”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). We have held that a

claim does not “necessarily imply” the invalidity of a

conviction or sentence under Heck unless its success will

“inevitably” call into question the state court judgment that

led to the plaintiff’s custody. Osborne, 423 F.3d at 1055

(citing Dotson, 544 U.S. at 78–82). Consistent with this

view, the Seventh Circuit, in Drollinger, concluded that

habeas relief was the exclusive relief available to challenge

a probation condition imposed under Indiana law only after

determining that, under state law, the challenged condition

was part of the sentence imposed by the state court:

Our analysis of the Indiana statutes

authorizing the granting of probation

demonstrates [that] . . . [i]n placing a

defendant on probation the trial court is

parolee’s challenge to 5, 7, or more parole conditions arguably could

amount to a challenge to the fact of his or her parole itself. Like the

dissent, we eschew a numerical approach, and we do not rely on the

number of conditions challenged to reach our holding. We merely note

that Plaintiff’s challenge is quite narrow and is focused on the nature of

specific conditions of parole, rather than on his parole’s existence or its

duration.

20 THORNTON V. BROWN

required to impose conditions concerning the

manner in which the defendant must conduct

himself. . . . [The plaintiff’s] challenge to the

conditions of her probation is, therefore, an

attack on the sentence of the trial court.

552 F.2d at 1224–25 (citations omitted).10

This case is distinguishable from Drollinger, though,

because the parole conditions that Plaintiff challenges were

not imposed as part of a court judgment. Rather, the

Department imposed the GPS monitoring requirement

pursuant to its discretionary authority under section 3010 of

the Penal Code, and the Department imposed the residency

restriction pursuant to the individualized assessment

permitted by section 3000.5(b), as interpreted in Taylor,

147 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 67–68. Even if successful, Plaintiff’s

claims will have no effect on his criminal sentence, including

the duration of his parole. Because Plaintiff challenges only

the discretionary decisions of an administrative body, it is

unlike the Indiana probation condition considered in

Drollinger.11 And because a judgment in Plaintiff’s favor

10

Drollinger was decided before the Supreme Court issued Heck, so the

Seventh Circuit did not have the benefit of that later decision, which

explained Preiser in light of a policy of preventing implicit collateral

attack on state criminal judgments. But the Seventh Circuit limited its

holding to probation conditions that, under state law, were part of the

sentencing court’s judgment. Thus, Drollinger is consistent with Heck.

11

The Seventh Circuit’s statement in Williams that Preiser probably

barred a § 1983 challenge to numerous parole conditions extended

Drollinger’s rule for probation conditions to the parole context without

explaining why that extension was justified. Williams, 336 F.3d at

579–80. In particular, in Williams, the court concluded without discussion

that under the state law in question, parole did not exist apart from its

THORNTON V. BROWN 21

would neither shorten nor alter any sentence or judgment of

a state court, it is unlike the administrative proceedings

relating to good-time credits that were at issue in Preiser. Cf.

Dotson, 544 U.S. at 82 (holding that Preiser’s exception does

not bar a § 1983 claim seeking “relief that will render invalid

the state procedures” that relate to a prisoner’s custody but

would not necessarily require early release from the prison

sentence). Because his challenge to discretionary decisions

of the Department will not affect his court-imposed prison

term or result in release from parole, Plaintiff’s possible

success in this action would not “necessarily imply” the

invalidity of any state-court judgment.12 We need not and do

conditions. But as noted, under California law, the status of parole does

exist, and has legal consequences, wholly apart from conditions imposed

by the Department. Moreover, the court in Williams did not address

whether the conditions that the parolee challenged were part of the state

court’s judgment or were instead, as in this case, discretionary conditions

imposed by an executive authority. To the extent that our holding is in

tension with the Seventh Circuit’s decisions in Drollinger and Williams,

we simply are not persuaded by them.

12

The dissent interprets California law, as we do, to provide the

Department with the discretionary authority to choose and impose parole

conditions. Amended dissent at 27–28; see also Kevin R. v. Superior

Court, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 549, 554 (Ct. App. 2010) (“The power to grant

parole, including setting parole conditions, is vested in the board, not the

courts.”). Unlike us, though, the dissent concludes that in challenging

those discretionarily selected parole conditions, Plaintiff “is challenging

a statutorily-mandated component of his sentence.” Amended dissent at

28. We do not agree that such a conclusion follows. Just as authority is

vested in the Department to administer prisons and set prison conditions,

so, too, the Department has the authority to administer the parole system,

including the imposition and modification of parole conditions. This

authority is wholly distinct from the sentencing authority of a state court

and does not per se implicate any state court judgment. See In re Coca,

149 Cal. Rptr. 465, 471 (Ct. App. 1978) (noting that a court would usurp

22 THORNTON V. BROWN

not decide whether we would reach a different result had the

Department merely implemented a parole condition that was

required by statute as a direct consequence of a court’s

judgment of conviction or sentence.

Furthermore, because Plaintiff’s claim, had it been

brought in habeas, likely would proceed under § 2241, see

Bagley, 718 F.2d at 922–23, it is a type of habeas claim to

which no court has previously extended Preiser’s implicit

exception to the text of § 1983.13 We do not rely on this

technical distinction between § 2241 and § 2254 of the habeas

statute in reaching our decision, but we note that the same

consideration drives our reasoning: that Plaintiff does not

challenge a judgment of conviction or a sentence. Compare

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (providing habeas relief for unlawful

“custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court”) with id.

§ 2241(c) (providing relief for other forms of unlawful

the Department’s administrative authority to require, for example, new

prison facilities to be built).

13

Generally, decisions in which courts have applied Preiser to bar a

§ 1983 claim have specifically noted the applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

See, e.g., Heck, 512 U.S. at 480 (“This case lies at the intersection of . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983[] and . . . 28 U.S.C. § 2254.”); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 477

(“[T]he federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, clearly provides

a specific federal remedy.”); Osborne, 423 F.3d at 1053 (noting that the

claim at issue was cognizable under § 2254); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d

850, 854 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 823 (9th

Cir. 1997) (same); Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 304 (9th Cir. 1996)

(same); see also McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th

Cir. 2004) (noting the plaintiff’s concurrent § 2254 habeas action).

THORNTON V. BROWN 23

custody).14 We need not and do not decide whether the

availability of a § 2241 claim may ever bar a parolee from

proceeding under § 1983. It is sufficient that, here, the same

reasons that would place Plaintiff’s claim within the scope of

§ 2241 also demonstrate that it is not “a collateral attack on

[a] conviction [or sentence] through the vehicle of a civil

suit,” Heck, 512 U.S. at 484, and is therefore different in kind

from the types of habeas claims for which the Supreme Court

has determined that habeas relief is exclusive.

The dissent asserts that our decision will “muddle the

clear line Heck and Dotson drew,” and run contrary to

Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 n.12 (2011).

Amended dissent at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted).

What the dissent neglects is that the “clear line” that the

Supreme Court referred to in Skinner is the rule that Heck

bars a § 1983 action only if the action’s success will

necessarily imply the invalidity of a state court’s judgment.

Id. at 1298–99 (permitting a prisoner’s § 1983 claim that

sought potentially exonerating DNA testing because success

would not “necessarily” imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s

conviction); see also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 647

(2004) (“[W]e were careful in Heck to stress the importance

of the term ‘necessarily.’”). Here, we adhere to the Supreme

14

We have drawn a similar distinction between habeas claims by federal

prisoners against federal parole determinations and those that challenge

the original sentence. See Izsak v. Sigler, 604 F.2d 1205, 1206 n.1 (9th

Cir. 1979) (“Habeas corpus, an attack on the legality of incarceration and

not a collateral attack on judgment, is the proper vehicle for attacking

Parole Commission action. Andrino v. United States Board of Parole,

550 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1977) [(per curiam)]. A collateral attack on the

sentence imposed brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 will not lie.”); Andrino,

550 F.2d at 520 (holding that a habeas petition under § 2241 is the

appropriate vehicle for such attacks).

24 THORNTON V. BROWN

Court’s “clear line.” Because his success in this action would

not necessarily imply the invalidity of either his conviction or

sentence, Plaintiff may proceed under § 1983.

In sum, we hold that a state parolee may challenge a

condition of parole under § 1983 if his or her claim, if

successful, would neither result in speedier release from

parole nor imply, either directly or indirectly, the invalidity

of the criminal judgments underlying that parole term.

Because Plaintiff challenges two parole conditions, which

were imposed through a discretionary decision of the

Department, his success would do neither, and Heck does not

bar him from proceeding under § 1983.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

IKUTA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

As a matter of California law, Thornton’s challenges, if

successful, would necessarily demonstrate that a portion of

his underlying sentence was invalid. Because the Supreme

Court has held such challenges must be brought in a habeas

petition, not under § 1983, I would affirm the district court.

In holding otherwise, the majority misunderstands California

law, misapplies Supreme Court precedent, and creates a

circuit split with the Seventh Circuit.

I

In 2010, Thornton was convicted of robbery in California

state court. He was sentenced under California’s determinate

sentencing law, Cal. Penal Code § 1170, to a two-year

THORNTON V. BROWN 25

sentence for the robbery offense and a one-year consecutive

term for a prior offense. See id. §§ 211, 213 (robbery),

667.5(b) (consecutive term). As required by California law,

id. § 3000(b)(7), the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation (the CDCR) defined the term and

conditions of Thornton’s parole, which included a GPS

monitoring requirement and a residency restriction. Thornton

challenged these conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the

grounds that they violated his rights under the First, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments, and sought damages and

injunctive relief.

A

Section 1983 provides that: “Every person who, under

color of [state law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Because Thornton claims that the CDCR, under color of

California law, deprived him of his constitutional rights, the

plain language of the statute seems applicable.

But beginning with Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475

(1973), the Supreme Court carved out “an implicit exception

from § 1983’s otherwise broad scope for actions that lie

‘within the core of habeas corpus.’” Wilkinson v. Dotson,

544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487). In

Preiser, the Court reasoned that “even though the literal terms

of § 1983 might seem to cover” a claim, “because Congress

has passed a more specific act,” namely the federal habeas

statute, to cover state prisoners’ constitutional challenges to

their convictions and sentences, prisoners bringing such

26 THORNTON V. BROWN

claims are limited to habeas relief. 411 U.S. at 489. The

Court concluded that any prisoner complaint lying at “the

core of habeas corpus” cannot be pursued under § 1983. Id.

Following Preiser, the Court decided a series of cases

spelling out what actions lie within the “core of habeas

corpus” and therefore cannot be brought in a § 1983 action.

Dotson, 544 U.S. at 81–82. Among other limitations, relief

under § 1983 is not available for actions that would

“necessarily imply the unlawfulness of a (not previously

invalidated) conviction or sentence” or of “state

confinement.” Id. at 81 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 520 U.S.

477 (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997)).

Summing up, Dotson held that “a state prisoner’s § 1983

action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the

relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the

target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to

conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that

action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of

confinement or its duration.” Id. at 81–82. Applying these

considerations in the parole context, Dotson then analyzed

whether the prisoners’ challenges to certain parole procedures

would necessarily challenge the fact or duration of their

confinement. Id. at 82. Because the prisoners’ lawsuits, if

successful, would, at most, give them a new parole hearing,

Dotson determined their challenges did not necessarily imply

the invalidity of their sentence or confinement under Heck,

and therefore could proceed under § 1983. Id. at 82–84.

B

Here, if Thornton were successful in his challenge to the

parole conditions imposed by the CDCR, it would necessarily

imply the invalidity of a portion of his sentence.

THORNTON V. BROWN 27

We must look to California law to determine what

constitutes Thornton’s “sentence.” “States are independent

sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce their

own laws,” including the definition of crimes and

punishments, “as long as they do not infringe on federal

constitutional guarantees.” Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S.

264, 280 (2008); see also Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749,

754–55 (2004) (looking to state laws governing the effect of

prison disciplinary proceedings on good-time credits to

determine whether a § 1983 claim was barred under Heck).

Under section 3000 of the California Penal Code, every

sentence imposed on a defendant convicted under

California’s determinate sentencing law, Cal. Penal Code

§ 1170, must include a period of parole. Id. § 3000(a)(1) (“A

sentence resulting in imprisonment in the state prison

pursuant to Section 1168 or 1170 shall include a period of

parole supervision or postrelease community supervision,

unless waived, or as otherwise provided in this article.”)

(emphasis added). To effectuate this statutory requirement,

the CDCR “shall provide . . . the conditions of parole and the

length of parole up to the maximum period of time provided

by law.” Id. § 3000(b)(7);1 see also Kevin R. v. Super. Ct.,

1

Cal. Penal Code § 3000(b)(7) states, in pertinent part:

The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation shall

meet with each inmate at least 30 days prior to his or

her good time release date and shall provide, under

guidelines specified by the parole authority or the

department, whichever is applicable, the conditions of

parole and the length of parole up to the maximum

period of time provided by law.

Thus, the CDCR has a mandatory statutory obligation to define the

conditions and length of parole “under guidelines specified by the parole

authority or the department.”

28 THORNTON V. BROWN

191 Cal. App. 4th 676, 684 (2010) (stating that “[t]he

[CDCR] has expansive authority to impose any parole

conditions deemed proper” in determining this part of a

defendant’s sentence).2

Because Thornton was sentenced under section 1170 for

his 2010 robbery offense, his sentence necessarily included

the term and conditions of parole set by the CDCR, Cal.

Penal Code § 3000(a)(1), (b)(7). In challenging his parole

conditions, then, Thornton is challenging a statutorily-

mandated component of his sentence, and if he is successful,

it would necessarily imply the invalidity of a portion of his

sentence. Therefore, under the rules explained in Dotson, he

may not bring this challenge under § 1983. See 544 U.S. at

81–83.

C

Accordingly, the majority errs in concluding that the

discretionary conditions imposed by the CDCR are not part

of Thornton’s sentence. Am. maj. op. at 20–22. The root of

the majority’s error is its ill-founded attempt to distinguish

between the status of parole and its conditions. The majority

analogizes the distinction between the “status” and

2

The majority observes that the CDCR “may impose or alter conditions

at will for the duration of the term of parole,” citing the CDCR’s

operations manual. Am. maj. op. at 16–17 n.7. While it is true that,

pursuant to a regulation promulgated under the authority granted by

sections 3052 and 5076.2 of the Penal Code, the CDCR must “establish

and impose the special conditions of parole” for prisoners sentenced under

the determinate sentencing law, like Thornton, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 2510, that is irrelevant to whether, if successful, his challenges to some

of his parole conditions would necessarily imply the invalidity of a portion

of his sentence.

THORNTON V. BROWN 29

“conditions” of parole to the distinction between the status of

being a prisoner and the conditions of confinement, and

asserts that a parolee’s “status” exists regardless of whether

the CDCR has imposed or altered conditions. Am. maj. op.

at 17–18. Merely restating this argument shows its flaw: A

prisoner is confined in prison regardless of any particular

condition of confinement, while a parolee is not confined or

restricted at all in the absence of parole conditions. Rather,

due to the nature of parole, “[t]he elimination or substitution”

of one condition would free the parolee “substantially from

[his] confinement; figuratively speaking, one of the ‘bars’

would be removed from [the parolee’s] cell.” Drollinger v.

Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220, 1225 (7th Cir. 1977). A person’s

technical “status” as a parolee has little or no meaning if all

the prison bars have been removed.

More important, California courts have not recognized a

distinction between the status and conditions of parole.

Under California law, a parolee in California is confined and

“constructively a prisoner” because of the conditions of

parole. People v. Lewis, 74 Cal. App. 4th 662, 669 (1999).

The California Supreme Court has explained that “[a]lthough

a parolee is no longer confined in prison his custody status is

one which requires . . . restrictions which may not be imposed

on members of the public generally.” People v. Burgener,

41 Cal. 3d 505, 531 (1986) (in bank). The United States

Supreme Court views the requirement that “the prisoner abide

by certain rules” while released from physical custody as

“[t]he essence of parole,” Samson v. California, 547 U.S.

843, 850 (2006) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,

477 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted), because the

conditions of parole “significantly confine and restrain” a

parolee’s freedom to the point where a parolee is “in custody”

for habeas purposes like a person confined by prison walls.

30 THORNTON V. BROWN

Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). A parolee

possesses “not . . . the absolute liberty to which every citizen

is entitled, but only . . . the conditional liberty properly

dependent on observance of special parole restrictions.”

Lewis, 74 Cal. App. 4th at 670 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S.

at 477, 480) (internal quotation marks omitted). In sum,

California considers parole to be “custody” because of the

conditions imposed on the parolee, so there is no basis to

conclude that the “status” of being a parolee is part of a

defendant’s sentence but parole conditions are not. See id.

Perhaps recognizing that the “status” of parole necessarily

evaporates if a released prisoner is no longer subject to any

“conditions” of parole, the majority offers a second and

inconsistent reason that Thornton’s challenge to two

conditions may proceed under § 1983: such an action is

permissible because “nearly all of [Thornton’s] parole

conditions will remain in effect” even if Thornton is

successful. Am. maj. op. at 18; see also am. maj. op. at 16

(emphasizing that Thornton “challenge[s] two parole

conditions”); am. maj. op. at 24 (same). Indeed, the majority

hints it might “reach a different result were [Thornton]

challenging all or a substantial portion of his parole

conditions.” Am. maj. op. at 18 n.9. Yet logically, if the

“status” of parole is distinct from the conditions of parole, it

should be irrelevant how many conditions Thornton

challenges. See Am. maj. op. at 16–17 (indicating that it is the

CDCR’s “jurisdiction” that makes the parolee a prisoner,

regardless of whether the parolee has successfully challenged

any or all of the conditions of parole). Moreover, the

majority’s focus on the number of challenged parole

conditions is entirely arbitrary. Would Thornton have been

barred from bringing a § 1983 action if he had challenged

five parole conditions, instead of only two?

THORNTON V. BROWN 31

Alternatively, the majority suggests that Thornton’s

§ 1983 action is permissible because Thornton’s “challenge

is quite narrow and is focused on the nature of specific

conditions of parole.” Am. maj. op at 19 n.9. But the

majority fails to explain what differences in the “nature of

specific conditions” are important, and how courts should

weigh the import of these differences. Here, for instance,

Thornton challenges the conditions allowing the CDCR to

monitor all of his movements by means of a GPS tracker, and

barring him from living in certain geographical areas. These

constraints on Thornton’s physical movements are akin to the

fact of actual confinement, Am. maj. op at 17, yet the

majority asserts that Thornton’s success on these claims

“would not imply the invalidity” of his sentence, Am. maj.

op. at 19.

District courts will have no idea what to make of the

majority’s Delphic guidance as they confront § 1983 suits

challenging various kinds and permutations of parole

conditions. Indeed, the majority’s ruling will require the sort

of case-by-case analysis that the Supreme Court recently

rejected in Skinner v. Switzer, where it advised courts not “to

muddle the clear line Heck and Dotson drew” between

challenges that could be brought under § 1983, and those that

could not. 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 n.12 (2011).

Finally, the majority’s holding is inconsistent with the

only other circuit to have considered this issue. See Williams

v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576, 579–80 (7th Cir. 2003);

Drollinger, 552 F.2d at 1224–25. In Williams, the Seventh

Circuit held that a parolee could not bring a § 1983 action to

challenge a travel restriction imposed as a condition of his

parole. 336 F.3d at 579–80. According to the court, because

“the ‘conditions’ of parole are the confinement,” the

32 THORNTON V. BROWN

parolee’s challenge to the travel restriction constituted a

collateral attack on his parole, and had to be brought in a

petition for habeas corpus. Id. at 579. In so holding, the

Seventh Circuit relied on its earlier opinion in Drollinger,

which held that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action could challenge

her probation conditions (which under state law were part of

her sentence) only by means of a habeas petition. 552 F.2d

at 1225.

The majority attempts to distinguish Drollinger because

the conditions in that case were imposed “as part of a court

judgment.” Am. maj. op. at 20; see also am. maj. op. at 21

n.12. But the Supreme Court has not indicated that it makes

any difference under Heck whether an agency, rather than a

court, establishes the parole conditions that are imposed as

part of a sentence under state law, and the majority does not

explain why this is significant. Moreover, Drollinger itself

did not rely on this factor or deem it relevant in its analysis.3

The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning is directly on point here, and

to be consistent with our sister circuit, we should apply the

California parole statutes at face value and hold that

3

Nor is there any merit to the majority’s statement that the Seventh

Circuit “extended Drollinger’s rule for probation conditions to the parole

context without explaining why that extension was justified,” Am. maj.

op. at 20 n.11. The majority ignores the obvious reason behind the

extension: the essence of both probation and parole is that, in exchange for

freedom from the physical confinement of prison, an offender must

comply with conditions restricting his liberty. Williams, 336 F.3d at 579

(“For parolees, . . . the ‘conditions’ of parole are the confinement.”);

Drollinger, 552 F.2d (explaining that a probationer was “in custody”

under Jones, 371 U.S. at 243, which addressed parole as “custody,”

because “we can discern no significant difference between the statutes of

parole and probation with regard to the question of custody”).

THORNTON V. BROWN 33

Thornton’s challenges to the GPS requirement and residency

restriction are likewise cognizable only in habeas.

II

In sum, Thornton’s challenges to his parole conditions

would necessarily imply the partial invalidity of his sentence

because parole is a required part of a determinate sentence in

California. Therefore, his challenge cannot be brought under

§ 1983. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion

to the contrary, which conflicts with Supreme Court

precedent and sister circuit authority.