Daimler AG v. Bauman

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2013 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 11–965. Argued October 15, 2013—Decided January 14, 2014

Plaintiffs (respondents here) are twenty-two residents of Argentina who

filed suit in California Federal District Court, naming as a defendant

DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft (Daimler), a German public

stock company that is the predecessor to petitioner Daimler AG.

Their complaint alleges that Mercedes-Benz Argentina (MB Argenti-

na), an Argentinian subsidiary of Daimler, collaborated with state se-

curity forces during Argentina’s 1976–1983 “Dirty War” to kidnap,

detain, torture, and kill certain MB Argentina workers, among them,

plaintiffs or persons closely related to plaintiffs. Based on those alle-

gations, plaintiffs asserted claims under the Alien Tort Statute and

the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, as well as under California

and Argentina law. Personal jurisdiction over Daimler was predicat-

ed on the California contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA),

another Daimler subsidiary, one incorporated in Delaware with its

principal place of business in New Jersey. MBUSA distributes Daim-

ler-manufactured vehicles to independent dealerships throughout the

United States, including California. Daimler moved to dismiss the

action for want of personal jurisdiction. Opposing that motion, plain-

tiffs argued that jurisdiction over Daimler could be founded on the

California contacts of MBUSA. The District Court granted Daimler’s

motion to dismiss. Reversing the District Court’s judgment, the

Ninth Circuit held that MBUSA, which it assumed to fall within the

California courts’ all-purpose jurisdiction, was Daimler’s “agent” for

jurisdictional purposes, so that Daimler, too, should generally be an-

swerable to suit in that State.

Held: Daimler is not amenable to suit in California for injuries alleged-

ly caused by conduct of MB Argentina that took place entirely outside

the United States. Pp. 6–24.

2 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

Syllabus

(a) California’s long-arm statute allows the exercise of personal ju-

risdiction to the full extent permissible under the U. S. Constitution.

Thus, the inquiry here is whether the Ninth Circuit’s holding com-

ports with the limits imposed by federal due process. See Fed. Rule

Civ. Proc. 4(k)(1)(A). P. 6.

(b) For a time, this Court held that a tribunal’s jurisdiction over

persons was necessarily limited by the geographic bounds of the fo-

rum. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714. That rigidly territorial focus

eventually yielded to a less wooden understanding, exemplified by

the Court’s pathmarking decision in International Shoe Co. v. Wash-

ington, 326 U. S. 310. International Shoe presaged the recognition of

two personal jurisdiction categories: One category, today called “spe-

cific jurisdiction,” see Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v.

Brown, 564 U. S. ___, ___, encompasses cases in which the suit

“arise[s] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the fo-

rum,” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U. S.

408, 414, n. 8. International Shoe distinguished exercises of specific,

case-based jurisdiction from a category today known as “general ju-

risdiction,” exercisable when a foreign corporation’s “continuous cor-

porate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a na-

ture as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from

dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” 326 U. S., at 318.

Since International Shoe, “specific jurisdiction has become the cen-

terpiece of modern jurisdiction theory.” Goodyear, 564 U. S., at ___.

This Court’s general jurisdiction opinions, in contrast, have been few.

See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437, Helicopte-

ros, 466 U. S., at 416, and Goodyear, 564 U. S., at ___. As is evident

from these post-International Shoe decisions, while specific jurisdic-

tion has been cut loose from Pennoyer’s sway, general jurisdiction has

not been stretched beyond limits traditionally recognized. Pp. 6–14.

(c) Even assuming, for purposes of this decision, that MBUSA qual-

ifies as at home in California, Daimler’s affiliations with California

are not sufficient to subject it to the general jurisdiction of that

State’s courts. Pp. 14–23.

(1) Whatever role agency theory might play in the context of

general jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals’ analysis in this case can-

not be sustained. The Ninth Circuit’s agency determination rested

primarily on its observation that MBUSA’s services were “important”

to Daimler, as gauged by Daimler’s hypothetical readiness to perform

those services itself if MBUSA did not exist. But if “importan[ce]” in

this sense were sufficient to justify jurisdictional attribution, foreign

corporations would be amenable to suit on any or all claims wherever

they have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome that would

sweep beyond even the “sprawling view of general jurisdiction” re-

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2013) 3

Syllabus

jected in Goodyear. 564 U. S., at ___. Pp. 15–17.

(2) Even assuming that MBUSA is at home in California and

that MBUSA’s contacts are imputable to Daimler, there would still be

no basis to subject Daimler to general jurisdiction in California. The

paradigm all-purpose forums for general jurisdiction are a corpora-

tion’s place of incorporation and principal place of business. Good-

year, 564 U. S., at ___. Plaintiffs’ reasoning, however, would reach

well beyond these exemplar bases to approve the exercise of general

jurisdiction in every State in which a corporation “engages in a sub-

stantial, continuous, and systematic course of business.” Brief for

Respondents 16–17, and nn. 7–8. The words “continuous and sys-

tematic,” plaintiffs and the Court of Appeals overlooked, were used in

International Shoe to describe situations in which the exercise of spe-

cific jurisdiction would be appropriate. See 326 U. S., at 317. With

respect to all-purpose jurisdiction, International Shoe spoke instead

of “instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a

state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit . . . on

causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those ac-

tivities.” Id., at 318. Accordingly, the proper inquiry, this Court has

explained, is whether a foreign corporation’s “affiliations with the

State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially

at home in the forum State.” Goodyear, 564 U. S., at ___.

Neither Daimler nor MBUSA is incorporated in California, nor

does either entity have its principal place of business there. If Daim-

ler’s California activities sufficed to allow adjudication of this Argen-

tina-rooted case in California, the same global reach would presuma-

bly be available in every other State in which MBUSA’s sales are

sizable. No decision of this Court sanctions a view of general juris-

diction so grasping. The Ninth Circuit, therefore, had no warrant to

conclude that Daimler, even with MBUSA’s contacts attributed to it,

was at home in California, and hence subject to suit there on claims

by foreign plaintiffs having nothing to do with anything that occurred

or had its principal impact in California. Pp. 18–21.

(3) Finally, the transnational context of this dispute bears atten-

tion. This Court’s recent precedents have rendered infirm plaintiffs’

Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victim Protection Act claims. See Ki-

obel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. ___, ___, and Mohamad

v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U. S. ___, ___. The Ninth Circuit, more-

over, paid little heed to the risks to international comity posed by its

expansive view of general jurisdiction. Pp. 22–23.

644 F. 3d 909, reversed.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN, JJ.,

joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 11–965

_________________

DAIMLER AG, PETITIONER v. BARBARA

BAUMAN ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[January 14, 2014]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the authority of a court in the United

States to entertain a claim brought by foreign plaintiffs

against a foreign defendant based on events occurring

entirely outside the United States. The litigation com-

menced in 2004, when twenty-two Argentinian residents1

filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the

Northern District of California against DaimlerChrysler

Aktiengesellschaft (Daimler),2 a German public stock

company, headquartered in Stuttgart, that manufactures

Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany. The complaint

alleged that during Argentina’s 1976–1983 “Dirty War,”

Daimler’s Argentinian subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argen-

tina (MB Argentina) collaborated with state security

forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill certain MB

——————

1 One plaintiff is a resident of Argentina and a citizen of Chile; all

other plaintiffs are residents and citizens of Argentina.

2 Daimler was restructured in 2007 and is now known as Daimler AG.

No party contends that any postsuit corporate reorganization bears on

our disposition of this case. This opinion refers to members of the

Daimler corporate family by the names current at the time plaintiffs

filed suit.

2 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

Opinion of the Court

Argentina workers, among them, plaintiffs or persons

closely related to plaintiffs. Damages for the alleged

human-rights violations were sought from Daimler under

the laws of the United States, California, and Argentina.

Jurisdiction over the lawsuit was predicated on the Cali-

fornia contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA),

a subsidiary of Daimler incorporated in Delaware with

its principal place of business in New Jersey. MBUSA

distributes Daimler-manufactured vehicles to independ-

ent dealerships throughout the United States, including

California.

The question presented is whether the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the Dis-

trict Court from exercising jurisdiction over Daimler in

this case, given the absence of any California connection

to the atrocities, perpetrators, or victims described in the

complaint. Plaintiffs invoked the court’s general or all-

purpose jurisdiction. California, they urge, is a place

where Daimler may be sued on any and all claims against

it, wherever in the world the claims may arise. For exam-

ple, as plaintiffs’ counsel affirmed, under the proffered

jurisdictional theory, if a Daimler-manufactured vehicle

overturned in Poland, injuring a Polish driver and passen-

ger, the injured parties could maintain a design defect suit

in California. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 28–29. Exercises of

personal jurisdiction so exorbitant, we hold, are barred by

due process constraints on the assertion of adjudicatory

authority.

In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown,

564 U. S. ___ (2011), we addressed the distinction between

general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific or conduct-

linked jurisdiction. As to the former, we held that a court

may assert jurisdiction over a foreign corporation “to hear

any and all claims against [it]” only when the corporation’s

affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are

so constant and pervasive “as to render [it] essentially at

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 3

Opinion of the Court

home in the forum State.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 2). In-

structed by Goodyear, we conclude Daimler is not “at

home” in California, and cannot be sued there for injuries

plaintiffs attribute to MB Argentina’s conduct in Argentina.

I

In 2004, plaintiffs (respondents here) filed suit in the

United States District Court for the Northern District of

California, alleging that MB Argentina collaborated with

Argentinian state security forces to kidnap, detain, tor-

ture, and kill plaintiffs and their relatives during the

military dictatorship in place there from 1976 through

1983, a period known as Argentina’s “Dirty War.” Based

on those allegations, plaintiffs asserted claims under the

Alien Tort Statute, 28 U. S. C. §1350, and the Torture

Victim Protection Act of 1991, 106 Stat. 73, note following

28 U. S. C. §1350, as well as claims for wrongful death and

intentional infliction of emotional distress under the laws

of California and Argentina. The incidents recounted in

the complaint center on MB Argentina’s plant in Gonzalez

Catan, Argentina; no part of MB Argentina’s alleged col-

laboration with Argentinian authorities took place in Cali-

fornia or anywhere else in the United States.

Plaintiffs’ operative complaint names only one corporate

defendant: Daimler, the petitioner here. Plaintiffs seek to

hold Daimler vicariously liable for MB Argentina’s alleged

malfeasance. Daimler is a German Aktiengesellschaft

(public stock company) that manufactures Mercedes-Benz

vehicles in Germany and has its headquarters in

Stuttgart. At times relevant to this case, MB Argentina

was a subsidiary wholly owned by Daimler’s predecessor

in interest.

Daimler moved to dismiss the action for want of personal

jurisdiction. Opposing the motion, plaintiffs submitted

declarations and exhibits purporting to demonstrate the

presence of Daimler itself in California. Alternatively,

4 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

Opinion of the Court

plaintiffs maintained that jurisdiction over Daimler could

be founded on the California contacts of MBUSA, a dis-

tinct corporate entity that, according to plaintiffs, should

be treated as Daimler’s agent for jurisdictional purposes.

MBUSA, an indirect subsidiary of Daimler, is a Dela-

ware limited liability corporation.3 MBUSA serves as

Daimler’s exclusive importer and distributor in the United

States, purchasing Mercedes-Benz automobiles from

Daimler in Germany, then importing those vehicles, and

ultimately distributing them to independent dealerships

located throughout the Nation. Although MBUSA’s prin-

cipal place of business is in New Jersey, MBUSA has

multiple California-based facilities, including a regional

office in Costa Mesa, a Vehicle Preparation Center in

Carson, and a Classic Center in Irvine. According to the

record developed below, MBUSA is the largest supplier of

luxury vehicles to the California market. In particular,

over 10% of all sales of new vehicles in the United States

take place in California, and MBUSA’s California sales

account for 2.4% of Daimler’s worldwide sales.

The relationship between Daimler and MBUSA is delin-

eated in a General Distributor Agreement, which sets

forth requirements for MBUSA’s distribution of Mercedes-

Benz vehicles in the United States. That agreement

established MBUSA as an “independent contracto[r]”

that “buy[s] and sell[s] [vehicles] . . . as an independent

business for [its] own account.” App. 179a. The agree-

ment “does not make [MBUSA] . . . a general or special

agent, partner, joint venturer or employee of

DAIMLERCHRYSLER or any DaimlerChrysler Group

Company”; MBUSA “ha[s] no authority to make binding

obligations for or act on behalf of DAIMLERCHRYSLER

or any DaimlerChrysler Group Company.” Ibid.

——————

3 At times relevant to this suit, MBUSA was wholly owned by Daimler-

Chrysler North America Holding Corporation, a Daimler subsidiary.

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 5

Opinion of the Court

After allowing jurisdictional discovery on plaintiffs’

agency allegations, the District Court granted Daimler’s

motion to dismiss. Daimler’s own affiliations with Cali-

fornia, the court first determined, were insufficient to

support the exercise of all-purpose jurisdiction over the

corporation. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C–04–

00194 RMW (ND Cal., Nov. 22, 2005), App. to Pet. for

Cert. 111a–112a, 2005 WL 3157472, *9–*10. Next, the

court declined to attribute MBUSA’s California contacts to

Daimler on an agency theory, concluding that plaintiffs

failed to demonstrate that MBUSA acted as Daimler’s

agent. Id., at 117a, 133a, 2005 WL 3157472, *12, *19;

Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C–04–00194 RMW

(ND Cal., Feb. 12, 2007), App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a–85a,

2007 WL 486389, *2.

The Ninth Circuit at first affirmed the District Court’s

judgment. Addressing solely the question of agency, the

Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs had not shown the

existence of an agency relationship of the kind that might

warrant attribution of MBUSA’s contacts to Daimler.

Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F. 3d 1088, 1096–

1097 (2009). Judge Reinhardt dissented. In his view, the

agency test was satisfied and considerations of “reason-

ableness” did not bar the exercise of jurisdiction. Id., at

1098–1106. Granting plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing, the

panel withdrew its initial opinion and replaced it with one

authored by Judge Reinhardt, which elaborated on reason-

ing he initially expressed in dissent. Bauman v. Daimler-

Chrysler Corp., 644 F. 3d 909 (CA9 2011).

Daimler petitioned for rehearing and rehearing en banc,

urging that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over

Daimler could not be reconciled with this Court’s decision

in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564

U. S. ___ (2011). Over the dissent of eight judges, the

Ninth Circuit denied Daimler’s petition. See Bauman v.

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F. 3d 774 (2011) (O’Scannlain,

6 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

Opinion of the Court

J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

We granted certiorari to decide whether, consistent with

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

Daimler is amenable to suit in California courts for claims

involving only foreign plaintiffs and conduct occurring

entirely abroad. 569 U. S. ___ (2013).

II

Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determin-

ing the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons. See Fed.

Rule Civ. Proc. 4(k)(1)(A) (service of process is effective to

establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant “who is

subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction

in the state where the district court is located”). Under

California’s long-arm statute, California state courts may

exercise personal jurisdiction “on any basis not incon-

sistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United

States.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §410.10 (West 2004).

California’s long-arm statute allows the exercise of per-

sonal jurisdiction to the full extent permissible under the

U. S. Constitution. We therefore inquire whether the

Ninth Circuit’s holding comports with the limits imposed

by federal due process. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 464 (1985).

III

In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878), decided shortly

after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the

Court held that a tribunal’s jurisdiction over persons

reaches no farther than the geographic bounds of the

forum. See id., at 720 (“The authority of every tribunal is

necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State

in which it is established.”). See also Shaffer v. Heitner,

433 U. S. 186, 197 (1977) (Under Pennoyer, “any attempt

‘directly’ to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons

or property would offend sister States and exceed the

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 7

Opinion of the Court

inherent limits of the State’s power.”). In time, however,

that strict territorial approach yielded to a less rigid un-

derstanding, spurred by “changes in the technology of

transportation and communication, and the tremendous

growth of interstate business activity.” Burnham v. Supe-

rior Court of Cal., County of Marin, 495 U. S. 604, 617

(1990) (opinion of SCALIA, J.).

“The canonical opinion in this area remains Interna-

tional Shoe [Co. v. Washington], 326 U. S. 310 [(1945)], in

which we held that a State may authorize its courts to

exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defend-

ant if the defendant has ‘certain minimum contacts with

[the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not

offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.” ’ ” Goodyear, 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6) (quot-

ing International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 316). Following

International Shoe, “the relationship among the defend-

ant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually

exclusive sovereignty of the States on which the rules of

Pennoyer rest, became the central concern of the inquiry

into personal jurisdiction.” Shaffer, 433 U. S., at 204.

International Shoe’s conception of “fair play and sub-

stantial justice” presaged the development of two catego-

ries of personal jurisdiction. The first category is repre-

sented by International Shoe itself, a case in which the in-

state activities of the corporate defendant “ha[d] not only

been continuous and systematic, but also g[a]ve rise to the

liabilities sued on.” 326 U. S., at 317.4 International Shoe

recognized, as well, that “the commission of some single or

occasional acts of the corporate agent in a state” may

sometimes be enough to subject the corporation to jurisdic-

——————

4 International Shoe was an action by the State of Washington to

collect payments to the State’s unemployment fund. Liability for the

payments rested on in-state activities of resident sales solicitors en-

gaged by the corporation to promote its wares in Washington. See 326

U. S., at 313–314.

8 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

Opinion of the Court

tion in that State’s tribunals with respect to suits relating

to that in-state activity. Id., at 318. Adjudicatory author-

ity of this order, in which the suit “aris[es] out of or

relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum,” Heli-

copteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U. S.

408, 414, n. 8 (1984), is today called “specific jurisdiction.”

See Goodyear, 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (citing von

Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Sug-

gested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1144–1163 (1966)

(hereinafter von Mehren & Trautman)).

International Shoe distinguished between, on the one

hand, exercises of specific jurisdiction, as just described,

and on the other, situations where a foreign corporation’s

“continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so

substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against

it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely dis-

tinct from those activities.” 326 U. S., at 318. As we have

since explained, “[a] court may assert general jurisdiction

over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations

to hear any and all claims against them when their affilia-

tions with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as

to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”

Goodyear, 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2); see id., at ___

(slip op., at 7); Helicopteros, 466 U. S., at 414, n. 9.5

——————

5 Colloquy at oral argument illustrated the respective provinces of

general and specific jurisdiction over persons. Two hypothetical scenar-

ios were posed: First, if a California plaintiff, injured in a California

accident involving a Daimler-manufactured vehicle, sued Daimler in

California court alleging that the vehicle was defectively designed, that

court’s adjudicatory authority would be premised on specific juris-

diction. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11 (Daimler’s counsel acknowledged

that specific jurisdiction “may well be . . . available” in such a case, de-

pending on whether Daimler purposefully availed itself of the forum).

Second, if a similar accident took place in Poland and injured Polish

plaintiffs sued Daimler in California court, the question would be one of

general jurisdiction. See id., at 29 (on plaintiffs’ view, Daimler would

be amenable to such a suit in California).

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 9

Opinion of the Court

Since International Shoe, “specific jurisdiction has be-

come the centerpiece of modern jurisdiction theory, while

general jurisdiction [has played] a reduced role.” Good-

year, 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (quoting Twitchell,

The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 610,

628 (1988)). International Shoe’s momentous departure

from Pennoyer’s rigidly territorial focus, we have noted,

unleashed a rapid expansion of tribunals’ ability to hear

claims against out-of-state defendants when the episode-

in-suit occurred in the forum or the defendant purposefully

availed itself of the forum.6 Our subsequent decisions

have continued to bear out the prediction that “specific

jurisdiction will come into sharper relief and form a con-

siderably more significant part of the scene.” von Mehren

& Trautman 1164.7

——————

6 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 204 (1977) (“The immediate

effect of [International Shoe’s] departure from Pennoyer’s conceptual

apparatus was to increase the ability of the state courts to obtain

personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.”); McGee v. Interna-

tional Life Ins. Co., 355 U. S. 220, 222 (1957) (“[A] trend is clearly

discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction

over foreign corporations and other nonresidents.”). For an early

codification, see Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act

§1.02 (describing jurisdiction based on “[e]nduring [r]elationship” to

encompass a person’s domicile or a corporation’s place of incorporation

or principal place of business, and providing that “any . . . claim for

relief ” may be brought in such a place), §1.03 (describing jurisdiction

“[b]ased upon [c]onduct,” limited to claims arising from the enumerated

acts, e.g., “transacting any business in th[e] state,” “contracting to

supply services or things in th[e] state,” or “causing tortious injury by

an act or omission in th[e] state”), 9B U. L. A. 308, 310 (1966).

7 See, e.g., Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano

Cty., 480 U. S. 102, 112 (1987) (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (specific juris-

diction may lie over a foreign defendant that places a product into the

“stream of commerce” while also “designing the product for the market

in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing chan-

nels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or

marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as

the sales agent in the forum State”); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.

10 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

Opinion of the Court

Our post-International Shoe opinions on general juris-

diction, by comparison, are few. “[The Court’s] 1952 deci-

sion in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co. remains the

textbook case of general jurisdiction appropriately exer-

cised over a foreign corporation that has not consented to

suit in the forum.” Goodyear, 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at

11) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The

defendant in Perkins, Benguet, was a company incorpo-

rated under the laws of the Philippines, where it operated

gold and silver mines. Benguet ceased its mining opera-

tions during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in

World War II; its president moved to Ohio, where he kept

an office, maintained the company’s files, and oversaw the

company’s activities. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining

Co., 342 U. S. 437, 448 (1952). The plaintiff, an Ohio

resident, sued Benguet on a claim that neither arose in

Ohio nor related to the corporation’s activities in that

State. We held that the Ohio courts could exercise general

jurisdiction over Benguet without offending due process.

——————

Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 297 (1980) (“[I]f the sale of a product of a

manufacturer or distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply

an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer

or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product

in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of

those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the

source of injury to its owner or to others.”); Calder v. Jones, 465 U. S.

783, 789–790 (1984) (California court had specific jurisdiction to hear

suit brought by California plaintiff where Florida-based publisher of a

newspaper having its largest circulation in California published an

article allegedly defaming the complaining Californian; under those

circumstances, defendants “must ‘reasonably anticipate being haled

into [a California] court’ ”); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S.

770, 780–781 (1984) (New York resident may maintain suit for libel in

New Hampshire state court against California-based magazine that

sold 10,000 to 15,000 copies in New Hampshire each month; as long as

the defendant “continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hamp-

shire market,” it could reasonably be expected to answer a libel suit

there).

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 11

Opinion of the Court

Ibid. That was so, we later noted, because “Ohio was the

corporation’s principal, if temporary, place of business.”

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770, 780, n. 11

(1984).8

——————

8 Selectively referring to the trial court record in Perkins (as summa-

rized in an opinion of the intermediate appellate court), JUSTICE

SOTOMAYOR posits that Benguet may have had extensive operations in

places other than Ohio. See post, at 11–12, n. 8 (opinion concurring in

judgment) (“By the time the suit [in Perkins] was commenced, the

company had resumed its considerable operations in the Philippines,”

“rebuilding its properties there” and “purchasing machinery, supplies

and equipment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also post, at

7–8, n. 5 (many of the corporation’s “key management decisions” were

made by the out-of-state purchasing agent and chief of staff ). JUSTICE

SOTOMAYOR’s account overlooks this Court’s opinion in Perkins and the

point on which that opinion turned: All of Benguet’s activities were

directed by the company’s president from within Ohio. See Perkins v.

Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437, 447–448 (1952) (company’s

Philippine mining operations “were completely halted during the

occupation . . . by the Japanese”; and the company’s president, from his

Ohio office, “supervised policies dealing with the rehabilitation of the

corporation’s properties in the Philippines and . . . dispatched funds to

cover purchases of machinery for such rehabilitation”). On another

day, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joined a unanimous Court in recognizing: “To

the extent that the company was conducting any business during and

immediately after the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, it was

doing so in Ohio . . . .” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v.

Brown, 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 11). Given the wartime

circumstances, Ohio could be considered “a surrogate for the place of

incorporation or head office.” von Mehren & Trautman 1144. See also

ibid. (Perkins “should be regarded as a decision on its exceptional facts,

not as a significant reaffirmation of obsolescing notions of general

jurisdiction” based on nothing more than a corporation’s “doing busi-

ness” in a forum).

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR emphasizes Perkins’ statement that Benguet’s

Ohio contacts, while “continuous and systematic,” were but a “limited

. . . part of its general business.” 342 U. S., at 438. Describing the

company’s “wartime activities” as “necessarily limited,” id., at 448,

however, this Court had in mind the diminution in operations resulting

from the Japanese occupation and the ensuing shutdown of the com-

pany’s Philippine mines. No fair reader of the full opinion in Perkins

could conclude that the Court meant to convey anything other than

12 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

Opinion of the Court

The next case on point, Helicopteros, 466 U. S. 408,

arose from a helicopter crash in Peru. Four U. S. citizens

perished in that accident; their survivors and representa-

tives brought suit in Texas state court against the helicop-

ter’s owner and operator, a Colombian corporation. That

company’s contacts with Texas were confined to “sending

its chief executive officer to Houston for a contract-

negotiation session; accepting into its New York bank

account checks drawn on a Houston bank; purchasing

helicopters, equipment, and training services from [a

Texas-based helicopter company] for substantial sums;

and sending personnel to [Texas] for training.” Id., at 416.

Notably, those contacts bore no apparent relationship to

the accident that gave rise to the suit. We held that the

company’s Texas connections did not resemble the “con-

tinuous and systematic general business contacts . . .

found to exist in Perkins.” Ibid. “[M]ere purchases, even

if occurring at regular intervals,” we clarified, “are not

enough to warrant a State’s assertion of in personam

jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a cause of

action not related to those purchase transactions.” Id., at

418.

Most recently, in Goodyear, we answered the question:

“Are foreign subsidiaries of a United States parent corpo-

ration amenable to suit in state court on claims unrelated

to any activity of the subsidiaries in the forum State?” 564

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1). That case arose from a bus

accident outside Paris that killed two boys from North

Carolina. The boys’ parents brought a wrongful-death suit

in North Carolina state court alleging that the bus’s tire

was defectively manufactured. The complaint named as

defendants not only The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Com-

——————

that Ohio was the center of the corporation’s wartime activities. But cf.

post, at 9 (“If anything, [Perkins] intimated that the defendant’s Ohio

contacts were not substantial in comparison to its contacts elsewhere.”).

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 13

Opinion of the Court

pany (Goodyear), an Ohio corporation, but also Goodyear’s

Turkish, French, and Luxembourgian subsidiaries. Those

foreign subsidiaries, which manufactured tires for sale in

Europe and Asia, lacked any affiliation with North Caro-

lina. A small percentage of tires manufactured by the

foreign subsidiaries were distributed in North Carolina,

however, and on that ground, the North Carolina Court of

Appeals held the subsidiaries amenable to the general

jurisdiction of North Carolina courts.

We reversed, observing that the North Carolina court’s

analysis “elided the essential difference between case-

specific and all-purpose (general) jurisdiction.” Id., at ___

(slip op., at 10). Although the placement of a product into

the stream of commerce “may bolster an affiliation ger-

mane to specific jurisdiction,” we explained, such contacts

“do not warrant a determination that, based on those ties,

the forum has general jurisdiction over a defendant.” Id.,

at ___ (slip op., at 10–11). As International Shoe itself

teaches, a corporation’s “continuous activity of some sorts

within a state is not enough to support the demand that

the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that

activity.” 326 U. S., at 318. Because Goodyear’s foreign

subsidiaries were “in no sense at home in North Carolina,”

we held, those subsidiaries could not be required to submit

to the general jurisdiction of that State’s courts. 564 U. S.,

at ___ (slip op., at 13). See also J. McIntyre Machinery,

Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (GINSBURG, J.,

dissenting) (slip op., at 7) (noting unanimous agreement

that a foreign manufacturer, which engaged an independ-

ent U. S.-based distributor to sell its machines throughout

the United States, could not be exposed to all-purpose

jurisdiction in New Jersey courts based on those contacts).

As is evident from Perkins, Helicopteros, and Goodyear,

general and specific jurisdiction have followed markedly

different trajectories post-International Shoe. Specific

jurisdiction has been cut loose from Pennoyer’s sway, but

14 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

Opinion of the Court

we have declined to stretch general jurisdiction beyond

limits traditionally recognized.9 As this Court has increas-

ingly trained on the “relationship among the defendant,

the forum, and the litigation,” Shaffer, 433 U. S., at 204,

i.e., specific jurisdiction,10 general jurisdiction has come

to occupy a less dominant place in the contemporary

scheme.11

IV

With this background, we turn directly to the question

——————

9 See generally von Mehren & Trautman 1177–1179. See also

Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 610, 676

(1988) (“[W]e do not need to justify broad exercises of dispute-blind

jurisdiction unless our interpretation of the scope of specific jurisdiction

unreasonably limits state authority over nonresident defendants.”);

Borchers, The Problem With General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. Chi. Legal

Forum 119, 139 (“[G]eneral jurisdiction exists as an imperfect safety

valve that sometimes allows plaintiffs access to a reasonable forum in

cases when specific jurisdiction would deny it.”).

10 Remarkably, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR treats specific jurisdiction as

though it were barely there. Given the many decades in which specific

jurisdiction has flourished, it would be hard to conjure up an example of

the “deep injustice” JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR predicts as a consequence of

our holding that California is not an all-purpose forum for suits against

Daimler. Post, at 16. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR identifies “the concept of

reciprocal fairness” as the “touchstone principle of due process in this

field.” Post, at 10 (citing International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 319). She over-

looks, however, that in the very passage of International Shoe on which

she relies, the Court left no doubt that it was addressing specific—

not general—jurisdiction. See id., at 319 (“The exercise of th[e]

privilege [of conducting corporate activities within a State] may give

rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are

connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which re-

quires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can,

in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.” (emphasis added)).

11 As the Court made plain in Goodyear and repeats here, general

jurisdiction requires affiliations “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to

render [the foreign corporation] essentially at home in the forum State.”

564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2), i.e., comparable to a domestic enterprise

in that State.

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 15

Opinion of the Court

whether Daimler’s affiliations with California are suffi-

cient to subject it to the general (all-purpose) personal

jurisdiction of that State’s courts. In the proceedings

below, the parties agreed on, or failed to contest, certain

points we now take as given. Plaintiffs have never at-

tempted to fit this case into the specific jurisdiction cate-

gory. Nor did plaintiffs challenge on appeal the District

Court’s holding that Daimler’s own contacts with Califor-

nia were, by themselves, too sporadic to justify the exer-

cise of general jurisdiction. While plaintiffs ultimately

persuaded the Ninth Circuit to impute MBUSA’s Califor-

nia contacts to Daimler on an agency theory, at no point

have they maintained that MBUSA is an alter ego of

Daimler.

Daimler, on the other hand, failed to object below to

plaintiffs’ assertion that the California courts could exer-

cise all-purpose jurisdiction over MBUSA.12 But see Brief

for Petitioner 23, n. 4 (suggestion that in light of Good-

year, MBUSA may not be amenable to general jurisdiction

in California); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae

16, n. 5 (hereinafter U. S. Brief) (same). We will assume

then, for purposes of this decision only, that MBUSA

qualifies as at home in California.

A

In sustaining the exercise of general jurisdiction over

Daimler, the Ninth Circuit relied on an agency theory,

determining that MBUSA acted as Daimler’s agent for

jurisdictional purposes and then attributing MBUSA’s

California contacts to Daimler. The Ninth Circuit’s agency

analysis derived from Circuit precedent considering

principally whether the subsidiary “performs services that

are sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if

it did not have a representative to perform them, the

——————

12 MBUSA is not a defendant in this case.

16 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

Opinion of the Court

corporation’s own officials would undertake to perform

substantially similar services.” 644 F. 3d, at 920 (quoting

Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F. 3d 915, 928 (CA9 2001); em-

phasis deleted).

This Court has not yet addressed whether a foreign

corporation may be subjected to a court’s general jurisdic-

tion based on the contacts of its in-state subsidiary. Daim-

ler argues, and several Courts of Appeals have held, that a

subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts can be imputed to its

parent only when the former is so dominated by the latter

as to be its alter ego. The Ninth Circuit adopted a less

rigorous test based on what it described as an “agency”

relationship. Agencies, we note, come in many sizes and

shapes: “One may be an agent for some business purposes

and not others so that the fact that one may be an agent

for one purpose does not make him or her an agent for

every purpose.” 2A C. J. S., Agency §43, p. 367 (2013)

(footnote omitted).13 A subsidiary, for example, might be

——————

13 Agency relationships, we have recognized, may be relevant to the

existence of specific jurisdiction. “[T]he corporate personality,” Interna-

tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), observed, “is a

fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a

fact.” Id., at 316. See generally 1 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of

Corporations §30, p. 30 (Supp. 2012–2013) (“A corporation is a distinct

legal entity that can act only through its agents.”). As such, a corpora-

tion can purposefully avail itself of a forum by directing its agents or

distributors to take action there. See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U. S., at 112

(opinion of O’Connor, J.) (defendant’s act of “marketing [a] product

through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the

forum State” may amount to purposeful availment); International Shoe,

326 U. S., at 318 (“the commission of some single or occasional acts of

the corporate agent in a state” may sometimes “be deemed sufficient to

render the corporation liable to suit” on related claims). See also Brief

for Petitioner 24 (acknowledging that “an agency relationship may be

sufficient in some circumstances to give rise to specific jurisdiction”). It

does not inevitably follow, however, that similar reasoning applies to

general jurisdiction. Cf. Goodyear, 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10)

(faulting analysis that “elided the essential difference between case-

specific and all-purpose (general) jurisdiction”).

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 17

Opinion of the Court

its parent’s agent for claims arising in the place where the

subsidiary operates, yet not its agent regarding claims

arising elsewhere. The Court of Appeals did not advert to

that prospect. But we need not pass judgment on invoca-

tion of an agency theory in the context of general jurisdic-

tion, for in no event can the appeals court’s analysis be

sustained.

The Ninth Circuit’s agency finding rested primarily on

its observation that MBUSA’s services were “important” to

Daimler, as gauged by Daimler’s hypothetical readiness to

perform those services itself if MBUSA did not exist.

Formulated this way, the inquiry into importance stacks

the deck, for it will always yield a pro-jurisdiction answer:

“Anything a corporation does through an independent

contractor, subsidiary, or distributor is presumably some-

thing that the corporation would do ‘by other means’ if the

independent contractor, subsidiary, or distributor did not

exist.” 676 F. 3d, at 777 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from

denial of rehearing en banc).14 The Ninth Circuit’s agency

theory thus appears to subject foreign corporations to

general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state sub-

sidiary or affiliate, an outcome that would sweep beyond

even the “sprawling view of general jurisdiction” we re-

jected in Goodyear. 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12).15

——————

14 Indeed, plaintiffs do not defend this aspect of the Ninth Circuit’s

analysis. See Brief for Respondents 39, n. 18 (“We do not believe that

this gloss is particularly helpful.”).

15 The Ninth Circuit’s agency analysis also looked to whether the

parent enjoys “the right to substantially control” the subsidiary’s

activities. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F. 3d 909, 924

(2011). The Court of Appeals found the requisite “control” demon-

strated by the General Distributor Agreement between Daimler and

MBUSA, which gives Daimler the right to oversee certain of MBUSA’s

operations, even though that agreement expressly disavowed the

creation of any agency relationship. Thus grounded, the separate

inquiry into control hardly curtails the overbreadth of the Ninth Cir-

cuit’s agency holding.

18 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

Opinion of the Court

B

Even if we were to assume that MBUSA is at home in

California, and further to assume MBUSA’s contacts are

imputable to Daimler, there would still be no basis to

subject Daimler to general jurisdiction in California, for

Daimler’s slim contacts with the State hardly render it at

home there.16

Goodyear made clear that only a limited set of affilia-

tions with a forum will render a defendant amenable to

all-purpose jurisdiction there. “For an individual, the

paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is

the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equiva-

lent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded

as at home.” 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (citing Bril-

mayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66

Texas L. Rev. 721, 728 (1988)). With respect to a corpora-

——————

16 By addressing this point, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR asserts, we have

strayed from the question on which we granted certiorari to decide an

issue not argued below. Post, at 5–6. That assertion is doubly flawed.

First, the question on which we granted certiorari, as stated in Daim-

ler’s petition, is “whether it violates due process for a court to exercise

general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based solely on

the fact that an indirect corporate subsidiary performs services on

behalf of the defendant in the forum State.” Pet. for Cert. i. That

question fairly encompasses an inquiry into whether, in light of Good-

year, Daimler can be considered at home in California based on

MBUSA’s in-state activities. See also this Court’s Rule 14.1(a) (a

party’s statement of the question presented “is deemed to comprise

every subsidiary question fairly included therein”). Moreover, both in

the Ninth Circuit, see, e.g., Brief for Federation of German Industries

et al. as Amici Curiae in No. 07–15386 (CA9), p. 3, and in this Court,

see, e.g., U. S. Brief 13–18; Brief for Chamber of Commerce of United

States of America et al. as Amici Curiae 6–23; Brief for Lea Brilmayer

as Amica Curiae 10–12, amici in support of Daimler homed in on the

insufficiency of Daimler’s California contacts for general jurisdiction

purposes. In short, and in light of our pathmarking opinion in Good-

year, we perceive no unfairness in deciding today that California is not

an all-purpose forum for claims against Daimler.

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 19

Opinion of the Court

tion, the place of incorporation and principal place of

business are “paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdic-

tion.” Id., at 735. See also Twitchell, 101 Harv. L. Rev., at

633. Those affiliations have the virtue of being unique—

that is, each ordinarily indicates only one place—as well

as easily ascertainable. Cf. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559

U. S. 77, 94 (2010) (“Simple jurisdictional rules . . . pro-

mote greater predictability.”). These bases afford plain-

tiffs recourse to at least one clear and certain forum in

which a corporate defendant may be sued on any and all

claims.

Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject

to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incor-

porated or has its principal place of business; it simply

typed those places paradigm all-purpose forums. Plaintiffs

would have us look beyond the exemplar bases Goodyear

identified, and approve the exercise of general jurisdiction

in every State in which a corporation “engages in a sub-

stantial, continuous, and systematic course of business.”

Brief for Respondents 16–17, and nn. 7–8. That formula-

tion, we hold, is unacceptably grasping.

As noted, see supra, at 7–8, the words “continuous and

systematic” were used in International Shoe to describe

instances in which the exercise of specific jurisdiction

would be appropriate. See 326 U. S., at 317 (jurisdiction

can be asserted where a corporation’s in-state activities

are not only “continuous and systematic, but also give rise

to the liabilities sued on”).17 Turning to all-purpose juris-

diction, in contrast, International Shoe speaks of “instances

in which the continuous corporate operations within a

state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify

——————

17 International Shoe also recognized, as noted above, see supra, at 7–8,

that “some single or occasional acts of the corporate agent in a state

. . . , because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their

commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable

to suit.” 326 U. S., at 318.

20 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

Opinion of the Court

suit . . . on causes of action arising from dealings en-

tirely distinct from those activities.” Id., at 318 (emphasis

added). See also Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business

With Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. Chi. Legal

Forum 171, 184 (International Shoe “is clearly not saying

that dispute-blind jurisdiction exists whenever ‘continuous

and systematic’ contacts are found.”).18 Accordingly, the

inquiry under Goodyear is not whether a foreign corpora-

tion’s in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense

“continuous and systematic,” it is whether that corpora-

tion’s “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and

systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the

forum State.” 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2).19

Here, neither Daimler nor MBUSA is incorporated in

——————

18 Plaintiffs emphasize two decisions, Barrow S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170

U. S. 100 (1898), and Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259,

115 N. E. 915 (1917) (Cardozo, J.), both cited in Perkins v. Benguet

Consol. Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437 (1952), just after the statement that

a corporation’s continuous operations in-state may suffice to establish

general jurisdiction. Id., at 446, and n. 6. See also International Shoe,

326 U. S., at 318 (citing Tauza). Barrow and Tauza indeed upheld the

exercise of general jurisdiction based on the presence of a local office,

which signaled that the corporation was “doing business” in the forum.

Perkins’ unadorned citations to these cases, both decided in the era

dominated by Pennoyer’s territorial thinking, see supra, at 6–7, should

not attract heavy reliance today. See generally Feder, Goodyear,

“Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63

S. C. L. Rev. 671 (2012) (questioning whether “doing business” should

persist as a basis for general jurisdiction).

19 We do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case, see,

e.g., Perkins, described supra, at 10–12, and n. 8, a corporation’s opera-

tions in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal

place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to

render the corporation at home in that State. But this case presents no

occasion to explore that question, because Daimler’s activities in

California plainly do not approach that level. It is one thing to hold a

corporation answerable for operations in the forum State, see infra, at

23, quite another to expose it to suit on claims having no connection

whatever to the forum State.

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 21

Opinion of the Court

California, nor does either entity have its principal place

of business there. If Daimler’s California activities suf-

ficed to allow adjudication of this Argentina-rooted case in

California, the same global reach would presumably be

available in every other State in which MBUSA’s sales are

sizable. Such exorbitant exercises of all-purpose jurisdic-

tion would scarcely permit out-of-state defendants “to

structure their primary conduct with some minimum

assurance as to where that conduct will and will not ren-

der them liable to suit.” Burger King Corp., 471 U. S., at

472 (internal quotation marks omitted).

It was therefore error for the Ninth Circuit to conclude

that Daimler, even with MBUSA’s contacts attributed to

it, was at home in California, and hence subject to suit

there on claims by foreign plaintiffs having nothing to do

with anything that occurred or had its principal impact in

California.20

——————

20 To clarify in light of JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s opinion concurring in the

judgment, the general jurisdiction inquiry does not “focu[s] solely on the

magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.” Post, at 8. General

jurisdiction instead calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in

their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates

in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them. Other-

wise, “at home” would be synonymous with “doing business” tests

framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in the United States. See

von Mehren & Trautman 1142–1144. Nothing in International Shoe

and its progeny suggests that “a particular quantum of local activity”

should give a State authority over a “far larger quantum of . . . activity”

having no connection to any in-state activity. Feder, supra, at 694.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR would reach the same result, but for a different

reason. Rather than concluding that Daimler is not at home in Cali-

fornia, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR would hold that the exercise of general

jurisdiction over Daimler would be unreasonable “in the unique circum-

stances of this case.” Post, at 1. In other words, she favors a resolution

fit for this day and case only. True, a multipronged reasonableness

check was articulated in Asahi, 480 U. S., at 113–114, but not as a free-

floating test. Instead, the check was to be essayed when specific

jurisdiction is at issue. See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471

U. S. 462, 476–478 (1985). First, a court is to determine whether the

22 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

Opinion of the Court

C

Finally, the transnational context of this dispute bears

attention. The Court of Appeals emphasized, as support-

ive of the exercise of general jurisdiction, plaintiffs’ asser-

tion of claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28

U. S. C. §1350, and the Torture Victim Protection Act of

1991 (TVPA), 106 Stat. 73, note following 28 U. S. C.

§1350. See 644 F. 3d, at 927 (“American federal courts, be

they in California or any other state, have a strong inter-

est in adjudicating and redressing international human

rights abuses.”). Recent decisions of this Court, however,

have rendered plaintiffs’ ATS and TVPA claims infirm.

See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. ___,

___ (2013) (slip op., at 14) (presumption against extra-

territorial application controls claims under the ATS);

Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012)

——————

connection between the forum and the episode-in-suit could justify the

exercise of specific jurisdiction. Then, in a second step, the court is to

consider several additional factors to assess the reasonableness of

entertaining the case. When a corporation is genuinely at home in the

forum State, however, any second-step inquiry would be superfluous.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR fears that our holding will “lead to greater un-

predictability by radically expanding the scope of jurisdictional dis-

covery.” Post, at 14. But it is hard to see why much in the way of

discovery would be needed to determine where a corporation is at home.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s proposal to import Asahi’s “reasonableness” check

into the general jurisdiction determination, on the other hand, would

indeed compound the jurisdictional inquiry. The reasonableness factors

identified in Asahi include “the burden on the defendant,” “the interests

of the forum State,” “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief,” “the

interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient

resolution of controversies,” “the shared interest of the several States in

furthering fundamental substantive social policies,” and, in the inter-

national context, “the procedural and substantive policies of other

nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction.”

480 U. S., at 113–115 (some internal quotation marks omitted). Impos-

ing such a checklist in cases of general jurisdiction would hardly

promote the efficient disposition of an issue that should be resolved

expeditiously at the outset of litigation.

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 23

Opinion of the Court

(slip op., at 1) (only natural persons are subject to liability

under the TVPA).

The Ninth Circuit, moreover, paid little heed to the risks

to international comity its expansive view of general juris-

diction posed. Other nations do not share the uninhibited

approach to personal jurisdiction advanced by the Court of

Appeals in this case. In the European Union, for example,

a corporation may generally be sued in the nation in which

it is “domiciled,” a term defined to refer only to the loca-

tion of the corporation’s “statutory seat,” “central admin-

istration,” or “principal place of business.” European

Parliament and Council Reg. 1215/2012, Arts. 4(1), and

63(1), 2012 O. J. (L. 351) 7, 18. See also id., Art. 7(5), 2012

O. J. 7 (as to “a dispute arising out of the operations of a

branch, agency or other establishment,” a corporation may

be sued “in the courts for the place where the branch,

agency or other establishment is situated” (emphasis

added)). The Solicitor General informs us, in this regard,

that “foreign governments’ objections to some domestic

courts’ expansive views of general jurisdiction have in the

past impeded negotiations of international agreements on

the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments.”

U. S. Brief 2 (citing Juenger, The American Law of Gen-

eral Jurisdiction, 2001 U. Chi. Legal Forum 141, 161–

162). See also U. S. Brief 2 (expressing concern that

unpredictable applications of general jurisdiction based on

activities of U. S.-based subsidiaries could discourage

foreign investors); Brief for Respondents 35 (acknowledg-

ing that “doing business” basis for general jurisdiction has

led to “international friction”). Considerations of interna-

tional rapport thus reinforce our determination that sub-

jecting Daimler to the general jurisdiction of courts in

California would not accord with the “fair play and sub-

stantial justice” due process demands. International Shoe,

326 U. S., at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457,

463 (1940)).

24 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

Opinion of the Court

* * *

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is

Reversed.

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 1

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 11–965

_________________

DAIMLER AG, PETITIONER v. BARBARA

BAUMAN ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[January 14, 2014]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the Due Process

Clause prohibits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over

Daimler in light of the unique circumstances of this case.

I concur only in the judgment, however, because I cannot

agree with the path the Court takes to arrive at that

result.

The Court acknowledges that Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

(MBUSA), Daimler’s wholly owned subsidiary, has consid­

erable contacts with California. It has multiple facilities

in the State, including a regional headquarters. Each

year, it distributes in California tens of thousands of cars,

the sale of which generated billions of dollars in the year

this suit was brought. And it provides service and sales

support to customers throughout the State. Daimler has

conceded that California courts may exercise general

jurisdiction over MBUSA on the basis of these contacts,

and the Court assumes that MBUSA’s contacts may be

attributed to Daimler for the purpose of deciding whether

Daimler is also subject to general jurisdiction.

Are these contacts sufficient to permit the exercise of

general jurisdiction over Daimler? The Court holds that

they are not, for a reason wholly foreign to our due process

jurisprudence. The problem, the Court says, is not that

Daimler’s contacts with California are too few, but that its

2 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

contacts with other forums are too many. In other words,

the Court does not dispute that the presence of multiple

offices, the direct distribution of thousands of products

accounting for billions of dollars in sales, and continuous

interaction with customers throughout a State would be

enough to support the exercise of general jurisdiction over

some businesses. Daimler is just not one of those busi­

nesses, the Court concludes, because its California con­

tacts must be viewed in the context of its extensive “na­

tionwide and worldwide” operations. Ante, at 21, n. 20. In

recent years, Americans have grown accustomed to the

concept of multinational corporations that are supposedly

“too big to fail”; today the Court deems Daimler “too big for

general jurisdiction.”

The Court’s conclusion is wrong as a matter of both

process and substance. As to process, the Court decides

this case on a ground that was neither argued nor passed

on below, and that Daimler raised for the first time in a

footnote to its brief. Brief for Petitioner 31–32, n. 5. As

to substance, the Court’s focus on Daimler’s operations out­

side of California ignores the lodestar of our personal

jurisdiction jurisprudence: A State may subject a defend­

ant to the burden of suit if the defendant has sufficiently

taken advantage of the State’s laws and protections

through its contacts in the State; whether the defendant

has contacts elsewhere is immaterial.

Regrettably, these errors are unforced. The Court can

and should decide this case on the far simpler ground that,

no matter how extensive Daimler’s contacts with Califor­

nia, that State’s exercise of jurisdiction would be unrea­

sonable given that the case involves foreign plaintiffs

suing a foreign defendant based on foreign conduct, and

given that a more appropriate forum is available. Because

I would reverse the judgment below on this ground, I

concur in the judgment only.

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 3

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

I

I begin with the point on which the majority and I agree:

The Ninth Circuit’s decision should be reversed.

Our personal jurisdiction precedents call for a two-part

analysis. The contacts prong asks whether the defendant

has sufficient contacts with the forum State to support

personal jurisdiction; the reasonableness prong asks

whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable

under the circumstances. Burger King Corp. v. Rudze-

wicz, 471 U. S. 462, 475–478 (1985). As the majority

points out, all of the cases in which we have applied the

reasonableness prong have involved specific as opposed to

general jurisdiction. Ante, at 21, n. 20. Whether the

reasonableness prong should apply in the general jurisdic­

tion context is therefore a question we have never decided,1

and it is one on which I can appreciate the arguments on

both sides. But it would be imprudent to decide that

question in this case given that respondents have failed to

argue against the application of the reasonableness prong

during the entire 8-year history of this litigation. See

Brief for Respondents 11, 12, 13, 16 (conceding application

——————

1 The Courts of Appeals have uniformly held that the reasonableness

prong does in fact apply in the general jurisdiction context. See Metro-

politan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F. 3d 560, 573 (CA2

1996) (“[E]very circuit that has considered the question has held,

implicitly or explicitly, that the reasonableness inquiry is applicable to

all questions of personal jurisdiction, general or specific”); see also, e.g.,

Lakin v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 348 F. 3d 704, 713 (CA8 2003);

Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC “Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory,”

283 F. 3d 208, 213–214 (CA4 2002); Trierwelier v. Croxton & Trench

Holding Corp., 90 F. 3d 1523, 1533 (CA10 1996); Amoco Egypt Oil Co.

v. Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F. 3d 848, 851, n. 2 (CA9 1993); Donatelli v.

National Hockey League, 893 F. 2d 459, 465 (CA1 1990); Bearry v.

Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F. 2d 370, 377 (CA5 1987). Without the

benefit of a single page of briefing on the issue, the majority casually

adds each of these cases to the mounting list of decisions jettisoned as a

consequence of today’s ruling. See ante, at 21, n. 20.

4 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

of the reasonableness inquiry); Plaintiffs’ Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion to Quash Service of Process and to

Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction in No. 04–

00194–RMW (ND Cal., May 16, 2005), pp. 14–23 (same).

As a result, I would decide this case under the reasonable­

ness prong without foreclosing future consideration of

whether that prong should be limited to the specific juris­

diction context.2

We identified the factors that bear on reasonableness in

Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano

Cty., 480 U. S. 102 (1987): “the burden on the defendant,

the interests of the forum State,” “the plaintiff ’s interest

in obtaining relief ” in the forum State, and the interests of

other sovereigns in resolving the dispute. Id., at 113–114.

We held in Asahi that it would be “unreasonable and

unfair” for a California court to exercise jurisdiction over a

claim between a Taiwanese plaintiff and a Japanese de­

fendant that arose out of a transaction in Taiwan, particu­

larly where the Taiwanese plaintiff had not shown that it

would be more convenient to litigate in California than in

Taiwan or Japan. Id., at 114.

The same considerations resolve this case. It involves

Argentine plaintiffs suing a German defendant for conduct

that took place in Argentina. Like the plaintiffs in Asahi,

respondents have failed to show that it would be more

convenient to litigate in California than in Germany, a

——————

2 While

our decisions rejecting the exercise of personal jurisdiction

have typically done so under the minimum-contacts prong, we have

never required that prong to be decided first. See Asahi Metal Industry

Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U. S. 102, 121 (1987)

(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (rejecting

personal jurisdiction under the reasonableness prong and declining to

consider the minimum-contacts prong because doing so would not be

“necessary”). And although the majority frets that deciding this case on

the reasonableness ground would be “a resolution fit for this day and

case only,” ante, at 21, n. 20, I do not understand our constitutional

duty to require otherwise.

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 5

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

sovereign with a far greater interest in resolving the

dispute. Asahi thus makes clear that it would be unrea­

sonable for a court in California to subject Daimler to its

jurisdiction.

II

The majority evidently agrees that, if the reasonable­

ness prong were to apply, it would be unreasonable for

California courts to exercise jurisdiction over Daimler in

this case. See ante, at 20–21 (noting that it would be “exor­

bitant” for California courts to exercise general jurisdiction

over Daimler, a German defendant, in this “Argentina­

rooted case” brought by “foreign plaintiffs”). But instead

of resolving the case on this uncontroversial basis, the

majority reaches out to decide it on a ground neither argued

nor decided below.3

We generally do not pass on arguments that lower

courts have not addressed. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson,

544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005). After all, “we are a court of

review, not of first view.” Ibid. This principle carries even

greater force where the argument at issue was never

pressed below. See Glover v. United States, 531 U. S. 198,

205 (2001). Yet the majority disregards this principle,

basing its decision on an argument raised for the first time

——————

3 The majority appears to suggest that Daimler may have presented

the argument in its petition for rehearing en banc before the Ninth

Circuit. See ante, at 5 (stating that Daimler “urg[ed] that the exercise

of personal jurisdiction . . . could not be reconciled with this Court’s

decision in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U. S.

___ (2011)”). But Daimler’s petition for rehearing did not argue

what the Court holds today. The Court holds that Daimler’s Califor-

nia contacts would be insufficient for general jurisdiction even assum­

ing that MBUSA’s contacts may be attributed to Daimler. Daimler’s

rehearing petition made a distinct argument—that attribution of

MBUSA’s contacts should not be permitted under an “ ‘agency’ theory”

because doing so would “rais[e] significant constitutional concerns”

under Goodyear. Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc in No.

07–15386 (CA9), p. 9.

6 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

in a footnote of Daimler’s merits brief before this Court.

Brief for Petitioner 32, n. 5 (“Even if MBUSA were a divi­

sion of Daimler AG rather than a separate corporation,

Daimler AG would still . . . not be ‘at home’ in California”).

The majority’s decision is troubling all the more because

the parties were not asked to brief this issue. We granted

certiorari on the question “whether it violates due process

for a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over a

foreign corporation based solely on the fact that an indi­

rect corporate subsidiary performs services on behalf of

the defendant in the forum State.” Pet. for Cert. i. At no

point in Daimler’s petition for certiorari did the company

contend that, even if this attribution question were de­

cided against it, its contacts in California would still be in-

sufficient to support general jurisdiction. The parties’ merits

briefs accordingly focused on the attribution-of-contacts

question, addressing the reasonableness inquiry (which

had been litigated and decided below) in most of the space

that remained. See Brief for Petitioner 17–37, 37–43;

Brief for Respondents 18–47, 47–59.

In bypassing the question on which we granted certio­

rari to decide an issue not litigated below, the Court leaves

respondents “without an unclouded opportunity to air

the issue the Court today decides against them,” Comcast

Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (GINSBURG and

BREYER, JJ., dissenting) (slip op., at 3). Doing so “does

‘not reflect well on the processes of the Court.’ ” Ibid.

(quoting Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767, 772 (1967)

(Harlan, J., dissenting)). “And by resolving a complex and

fact-intensive question without the benefit of full briefing,

the Court invites the error into which it has fallen.” 569

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3).

The relevant facts are undeveloped because Daimler

conceded at the start of this litigation that MBUSA is

subject to general jurisdiction based on its California

contacts. We therefore do not know the full extent of those

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 7

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

contacts, though what little we do know suggests that

Daimler was wise to concede what it did. MBUSA imports

more than 200,000 vehicles into the United States and

distributes many of them to independent dealerships in

California, where they are sold. Declaration of Dr. Peter

Waskönig in Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 04–

00194–RMW (ND Cal.), ¶ 10, p. 2. MBUSA’s California

sales account for 2.4% of Daimler’s worldwide sales, which

were $192 billion in 2004.4 And 2.4% of $192 billion is

$4.6 billion, a considerable sum by any measure. MBUSA

also has multiple offices and facilities in California, in­

cluding a regional headquarters.

But the record does not answer a number of other

important questions. Are any of Daimler’s key files main­

tained in MBUSA’s California offices? How many employ­

ees work in those offices? Do those employees make

important strategic decisions or oversee in any manner

Daimler’s activities? These questions could well affect

whether Daimler is subject to general jurisdiction. After

all, this Court upheld the exercise of general jurisdiction

in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437,

447–448 (1952)—which the majority refers to as a “text­

book case” of general jurisdiction, ante, at 10—on the basis

that the foreign defendant maintained an office in Ohio,

kept corporate files there, and oversaw the company’s

activities from the State. California-based MBUSA em­

ployees may well have done similar things on Daimler’s

behalf.5 But because the Court decides the issue without a

——————

4 See DaimlerChrysler, Innovations for our Customers: Annual Report

2004, p. 22, http://www.daimler.com/Projects/c2c/channel/documents/

1364377_2004_DaimlerChrysler_Annual_Report.pdf (as visited on Jan. 8,

2014, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).

5 To be sure, many of Daimler’s key management decisions are un­

doubtedly made by employees outside California. But the same was

true in Perkins. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min. Co., 88 Ohio App.

118, 124, 95 N. E. 2d 5, 8 (1950) (per curiam) (describing management

8 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

developed record, we will never know.

III

While the majority’s decisional process is problematic

enough, I fear that process leads it to an even more trou­

bling result.

A

Until today, our precedents had established a straight­

forward test for general jurisdiction: Does the defendant

have “continuous corporate operations within a state” that

are “so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit

against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely

distinct from those activities”? International Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 318 (1945); see also Helicop-

teros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408,

416 (1984) (asking whether defendant had “continuous

and systematic general business contacts”).6 In every case

where we have applied this test, we have focused solely on

the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts, not the

relative magnitude of those contacts in comparison to the

defendant’s contacts with other States.

In Perkins, for example, we found an Ohio court’s exer­

——————

decisions made by the company’s chief of staff in Manila and a purchas­

ing agent in California); see also n. 8, infra.

6 While Helicopteros formulated the general jurisdiction inquiry as

asking whether a foreign defendant possesses “continuous and system­

atic general business contacts,” 466 U. S., at 416, the majority correctly

notes, ante, at 19, that International Shoe used the phrase “continuous

and systematic” in the context of discussing specific jurisdiction, 326

U. S., at 317. But the majority recognizes that International Shoe

separately described the type of contacts needed for general jurisdiction

as “continuous corporate operations” that are “so substantial” as to

justify suit on unrelated causes of action. Id., at 318. It is unclear why

our precedents departed from International Shoe’s “continuous and

substantial” formulation in favor of the “continuous and systematic”

formulation, but the majority does not contend—nor do I perceive—that

there is a material difference between the two.

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 9

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

cise of general jurisdiction permissible where the presi­

dent of the foreign defendant “maintained an office,” “drew

and distributed . . . salary checks,” used “two active bank

accounts,” “supervised . . . the rehabilitation of the corpo­

ration’s properties in the Philippines,” and held “directors’

meetings,” in Ohio. 342 U. S., at 447–448. At no point did

we attempt to catalog the company’s contacts in forums

other than Ohio or to compare them with its Ohio con­

tacts. If anything, we intimated that the defendant’s Ohio

contacts were not substantial in comparison to its contacts

elsewhere. See id., at 438 (noting that the defendant’s

Ohio contacts, while “continuous and systematic,” were

but a “limited . . . part of its general business”).7

We engaged in the same inquiry in Helicopteros. There,

we held that a Colombian corporation was not subject to

general jurisdiction in Texas simply because it occasion­

ally sent its employees into the State, accepted checks

drawn on a Texas bank, and purchased equipment and

services from a Texas company. In no sense did our anal­

ysis turn on the extent of the company’s operations beyond

——————

7 The majority suggests that I misinterpret language in Perkins that I

do not even cite. Ante, at 11, n. 8. The majority is quite correct that it

has found a sentence in Perkins that does not address whether most of

the Philippine corporation’s activities took place outside of Ohio. See

ante, at 11, n. 8 (noting that Perkins described the company’s “wartime

activities” as “necessarily limited,” 342 U. S., at 448). That is why I did

not mention it. I instead rely on a sentence in Perkins’ opening para­

graph: “The [Philippine] corporation has been carrying on in Ohio a

continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general business.”

Id., at 438. That sentence obviously does convey that most of the

corporation’s activities occurred in “places other than Ohio,” ante, at 11,

n. 8. This is not surprising given that the company’s Ohio contacts

involved a single officer working from a home office, while its non-Ohio

contacts included significant mining properties and machinery operated

throughout the Philippines, Philippine employees (including a chief of

staff), a purchasing agent based in California, and board of directors

meetings held in Washington, New York, and San Francisco. Perkins,

88 Ohio App., at 123–124, 95 N. E. 2d, at 8; see also n. 8, infra.

10 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

Texas.

Most recently, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,

S. A. v. Brown, 564 U. S. ___ (2011), our analysis again

focused on the defendant’s in-state contacts. Goodyear

involved a suit against foreign tire manufacturers by

North Carolina residents whose children had died in a bus

accident in France. We held that North Carolina courts

could not exercise general jurisdiction over the foreign

defendants. Just as in Perkins and Helicopteros, our

opinion in Goodyear did not identify the defendants’ con­

tacts outside of the forum State, but focused instead on the

defendants’ lack of offices, employees, direct sales, and

business operations within the State.

This approach follows from the touchstone principle of

due process in this field, the concept of reciprocal fairness.

When a corporation chooses to invoke the benefits and

protections of a State in which it operates, the State ac­

quires the authority to subject the company to suit in its

courts. See International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 319 (“[T]o the

extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of con­

ducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and

protection of the laws of that state” such that an “obliga­

tio[n] arise[s]” to respond there to suit); J. McIntyre Ma-

chinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (plurality

opinion) (slip op., at 5) (same principle for general

jurisdiction). The majority’s focus on the extent of a corpo­

rate defendant’s out-of-forum contacts is untethered from

this rationale. After all, the degree to which a company

intentionally benefits from a forum State depends on its

interactions with that State, not its interactions else­

where. An article on which the majority relies (and on

which Goodyear relied as well, 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,

at 7)) expresses the point well: “We should not treat de­

fendants as less amenable to suit merely because they

carry on more substantial business in other states . . . .

[T]he amount of activity elsewhere seems virtually irrele­

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 11

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

vant to . . . the imposition of general jurisdiction over a

defendant.” Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General

Jurisdiction, 66 Texas L. Rev. 721, 742 (1988).

Had the majority applied our settled approach, it would

have had little trouble concluding that Daimler’s Califor­

nia contacts rise to the requisite level, given the majority’s

assumption that MBUSA’s contacts may be attributed to

Daimler and given Daimler’s concession that those con­

tacts render MBUSA “at home” in California. Our cases

have long stated the rule that a defendant’s contacts with

a forum State must be continuous, substantial, and sys­

tematic in order for the defendant to be subject to that

State’s general jurisdiction. See Perkins, 342 U. S., at 446.

We offered additional guidance in Goodyear, adding the

phrase “essentially at home” to our prior formulation of

the rule. 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2) (a State may

exercise general jurisdiction where a defendant’s “affilia­

tions with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as

to render [the defendant] essentially at home in the forum

State”). We used the phrase “at home” to signify that in

order for an out-of-state defendant to be subject to general

jurisdiction, its continuous and substantial contacts with a

forum State must be akin to those of a local enterprise

that actually is “at home” in the State. See Brilmayer,

supra, at 742.8

——————

8 The majority views the phrase “at home” as serving a different

purpose—that of requiring a comparison between a defendant’s in-state

and out-of-state contacts. Ante, at 21, n. 20. That cannot be the correct

understanding though, because among other things it would cast grave

doubt on Perkins—a case that Goodyear pointed to as an exemplar of

general jurisdiction, 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11). For if Perkins

had applied the majority’s newly minted proportionality test, it would

have come out the other way.

The majority apparently thinks that the Philippine corporate defend­

ant in Perkins did not have meaningful operations in places other than

Ohio. See ante, at 10–11, and n. 8. But one cannot get past the second

sentence of Perkins before realizing that is wrong. That sentence reads:

12 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

Under this standard, Daimler’s concession that MBUSA

is subject to general jurisdiction in California (a concession

the Court accepts, ante, at 15, 17) should be dispositive.

For if MBUSA’s California contacts are so substantial and

the resulting benefits to MBUSA so significant as to make

MBUSA “at home” in California, the same must be true of

Daimler when MBUSA’s contacts and benefits are viewed

as its own. Indeed, until a footnote in its brief before this

Court, even Daimler did not dispute this conclusion for

eight years of the litigation.

B

The majority today concludes otherwise. Referring to

——————

“The corporation has been carrying on in Ohio a continuous and sys­

tematic, but limited, part of its general business.” 342 U. S., at 438.

Indeed, the facts of the case set forth by the Ohio Court of Appeals

show just how “limited” the company’s Ohio contacts—which included a

single officer keeping files and managing affairs from his Ohio home

office—were in comparison with its “general business” operations

elsewhere. By the time the suit was commenced, the company had

resumed its considerable mining operations in the Philippines, “ ‘re­

building its properties’ ” there and purchasing “ ‘machinery, supplies

and equipment.’ ” 88 Ohio App., at 123–124, 95 N. E. 2d, at 8. More­

over, the company employed key managers in other forums, including a

purchasing agent in San Francisco and a chief of staff in the Philip­

pines. Id., at 124, 95 N. E. 2d, at 8. The San Francisco purchasing

agent negotiated the purchase of the company’s machinery and supplies

“ ‘on the direction of the Company’s Chief of Staff in Manila,’ ” ibid., a

fact that squarely refutes the majority’s assertion that “[a]ll of Ben­

guet’s activities were directed by the company’s president from within

Ohio,” ante, at 11, n. 8. And the vast majority of the company’s board of

directors meetings took place outside Ohio, in locations such as Wash­

ington, New York, and San Francisco. 88 Ohio App., at 125, 94 N. E.

2d, at 8.

In light of these facts, it is all but impossible to reconcile the result in

Perkins with the proportionality test the majority announces today.

Goodyear’s use of the phrase “at home” is thus better understood to

require the same general jurisdiction inquiry that Perkins required: An

out-of-state business must have the kind of continuous and substantial

in-state presence that a parallel local company would have.

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 13

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

the “continuous and systematic” contacts inquiry that has

been taught to generations of first-year law students as

“unacceptably grasping,” ante, at 19, the majority an­

nounces the new rule that in order for a foreign defendant

to be subject to general jurisdiction, it must not only pos­

sess continuous and systematic contacts with a forum

State, but those contacts must also surpass some unspeci­

fied level when viewed in comparison to the company’s

“nationwide and worldwide” activities. Ante, at 21, n. 20.9

Neither of the majority’s two rationales for this propor­

tionality requirement is persuasive. First, the majority

suggests that its approach is necessary for the sake of

predictability. Permitting general jurisdiction in every

State where a corporation has continuous and substantial

contacts, the majority asserts, would “scarcely permit out­

of-state defendants ‘to structure their primary conduct

with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct

will and will not render them liable to suit.’ ” Ante, at 21

(quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U. S., at 472). But there

is nothing unpredictable about a rule that instructs multi­

national corporations that if they engage in continuous

and substantial contacts with more than one State, they

will be subject to general jurisdiction in each one. The

majority may not favor that rule as a matter of policy, but

such disagreement does not render an otherwise routine

——————

9 I accept at face value the majority’s declaration that general juris­

diction is not limited to a corporation’s place of incorporation and

principal place of business because “a corporation’s operations in a

forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of

business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the

corporation at home in the State.” Ante, at 20, n. 19; see also ante, at

19. Were that not so, our analysis of the defendants’ in-state contacts

in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437 (1952), Helicop-

teros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408 (1984), and

Goodyear would have been irrelevant, as none of the defendants in

those cases was sued in its place of incorporation or principal place of

business.

14 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

test unpredictable.

Nor is the majority’s proportionality inquiry any more

predictable than the approach it rejects. If anything, the

majority’s approach injects an additional layer of uncer­

tainty because a corporate defendant must now try to

foretell a court’s analysis as to both the sufficiency of its

contacts with the forum State itself, as well as the relative

sufficiency of those contacts in light of the company’s

operations elsewhere. Moreover, the majority does not

even try to explain just how extensive the company’s

in-state contacts must be in the context of its global oper-

ations in order for general jurisdiction to be proper.

The majority’s approach will also lead to greater unpre­

dictability by radically expanding the scope of jurisdic­

tional discovery. Rather than ascertaining the extent of a

corporate defendant’s forum-state contacts alone, courts

will now have to identify the extent of a company’s con­

tacts in every other forum where it does business in order

to compare them against the company’s in-state contacts.

That considerable burden runs headlong into the major-

ity’s recitation of the familiar principle that “ ‘[s]imple

jurisdictional rules . . . promote greater predictability.’ ”

Ante, at 18–19 (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U. S.

77, 94 (2010)).

Absent the predictability rationale, the majority’s sole

remaining justification for its proportionality approach is

its unadorned concern for the consequences. “If Daimler’s

California activities sufficed to allow adjudication of this

Argentina-rooted case in California,” the majority la­

ments, “the same global reach would presumably be avail­

able in every other State in which MBUSA’s sales are

sizable.” Ante, at 20.

The majority characterizes this result as “exorbitant,”

ibid., but in reality it is an inevitable consequence of the

rule of due process we set forth nearly 70 years ago, that

there are “instances in which [a company’s] continuous

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 15

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

corporate operations within a state” are “so substantial

and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes

of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those

activities,” International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 318. In the

era of International Shoe, it was rare for a corporation to

have such substantial nationwide contacts that it would be

subject to general jurisdiction in a large number of States.

Today, that circumstance is less rare. But that is as it

should be. What has changed since International Shoe is

not the due process principle of fundamental fairness but

rather the nature of the global economy. Just as it was

fair to say in the 1940’s that an out-of-state company could

enjoy the benefits of a forum State enough to make it

“essentially at home” in the State, it is fair to say today that

a multinational conglomerate can enjoy such extensive

benefits in multiple forum States that it is “essentially

at home” in each one.

In any event, to the extent the majority is concerned

with the modern-day consequences of International Shoe’s

conception of personal jurisdiction, there remain other

judicial doctrines available to mitigate any resulting un­

fairness to large corporate defendants. Here, for instance,

the reasonableness prong may afford petitioner relief. See

supra, at 3–4. In other cases, a defendant can assert the

doctrine of forum non conveniens if a given State is a

highly inconvenient place to litigate a dispute. See Gulf

Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 508–509 (1947). In still

other cases, the federal change of venue statute can pro­

vide protection. See 28 U. S. C. §1404(a) (permitting

transfers to other districts “[f]or the convenience of parties

and witnesses” and “in the interests of justice”). And to

the degree that the majority worries these doctrines are

not enough to protect the economic interests of multina­

tional businesses (or that our longstanding approach to

general jurisdiction poses “risks to international comity,”

ante, at 22), the task of weighing those policy concerns

16 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

belongs ultimately to legislators, who may amend state

and federal long-arm statutes in accordance with the

democratic process. Unfortunately, the majority short

circuits that process by enshrining today’s narrow rule of

general jurisdiction as a matter of constitutional law.

C

The majority’s concern for the consequences of its deci­

sion should have led it the other way, because the rule

that it adopts will produce deep injustice in at least four

respects.

First, the majority’s approach unduly curtails the

States’ sovereign authority to adjudicate disputes against

corporate defendants who have engaged in continuous and

substantial business operations within their boundaries.10

The majority does not dispute that a State can exercise

general jurisdiction where a corporate defendant has its

corporate headquarters, and hence its principal place of

business within the State. Cf. Hertz Corp., 559 U. S., at

93. Yet it never explains why the State should lose that

power when, as is increasingly common, a corporation

“divide[s] [its] command and coordinating functions among

officers who work at several different locations.” Id., at

95–96. Suppose a company divides its management func­

tions equally among three offices in different States, with

one office nominally deemed the company’s corporate

headquarters. If the State where the headquarters is

located can exercise general jurisdiction, why should the

——————

10 States will of course continue to exercise specific jurisdiction in

many cases, but we have never held that to be the outer limit of the

States’ authority under the Due Process Clause. That is because the

two forms of jurisdiction address different concerns. Whereas specific

jurisdiction focuses on the relationship between a defendant’s chal­

lenged conduct and the forum State, general jurisdiction focuses on the

defendant’s substantial presence in the State irrespective of the loca­

tion of the challenged conduct.

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 17

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

other two States be constitutionally forbidden to do the

same? Indeed, under the majority’s approach, the result

would be unchanged even if the company has substantial

operations within the latter two States (and even if the

company has no sales or other business operations in the

first State). Put simply, the majority’s rule defines the

Due Process Clause so narrowly and arbitrarily as to

contravene the States’ sovereign prerogative to subject to

judgment defendants who have manifested an unqualified

“intention to benefit from and thus an intention to submit

to the[ir] laws,” J. McIntyre, 564 U. S., at ___ (plurality

opinion) (slip op., at 5).

Second, the proportionality approach will treat small

businesses unfairly in comparison to national and multi­

national conglomerates. Whereas a larger company will

often be immunized from general jurisdiction in a State on

account of its extensive contacts outside the forum, a small

business will not be. For instance, the majority holds

today that Daimler is not subject to general jurisdiction in

California despite its multiple offices, continuous opera­

tions, and billions of dollars’ worth of sales there. But

imagine a small business that manufactures luxury vehi­

cles principally targeting the California market and that

has substantially all of its sales and operations in the

State—even though those sales and operations may

amount to one-thousandth of Daimler’s. Under the major­

ity’s rule, that small business will be subject to suit in

California on any cause of action involving any of its activ­

ities anywhere in the world, while its far more pervasive

competitor, Daimler, will not be. That will be so even if

the small business incorporates and sets up its headquar­

ters elsewhere (as Daimler does), since the small business’

California sales and operations would still predominate

when “apprais[ed]” in proportion to its minimal “nation­

wide and worldwide” operations, ante, at 21, n. 20.

Third, the majority’s approach creates the incongruous

18 DAIMLER AG v. BAUMAN

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

result that an individual defendant whose only contact

with a forum State is a one-time visit will be subject to

general jurisdiction if served with process during that

visit, Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin,

495 U. S. 604 (1990), but a large corporation that owns

property, employs workers, and does billions of dollars’

worth of business in the State will not be, simply because

the corporation has similar contacts elsewhere (though the

visiting individual surely does as well).

Finally, it should be obvious that the ultimate effect of

the majority’s approach will be to shift the risk of loss

from multinational corporations to the individuals harmed

by their actions. Under the majority’s rule, for example, a

parent whose child is maimed due to the negligence of a

foreign hotel owned by a multinational conglomerate will

be unable to hold the hotel to account in a single U. S.

court, even if the hotel company has a massive presence in

multiple States. See, e.g., Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd.,

288 F. 3d 1264 (CA11 2002).11 Similarly, a U. S. business

that enters into a contract in a foreign country to sell its

products to a multinational company there may be unable

to seek relief in any U. S. court if the multinational com­

pany breaches the contract, even if that company has

considerable operations in numerous U. S. forums. See,

e.g., Walpex Trading Co. v. Yacimientos Petroliferos

Fiscales Bolivianos, 712 F. Supp. 383 (SDNY 1989).12

——————

11 See also, e.g., Woods v. Nova Companies Belize Ltd., 739 So. 2d

617, 620–621 (Fla. App. 1999) (estate of decedent killed in an overseas

plane crash permitted to sue responsible Belizean corporate defendant

in Florida courts, rather than Belizean courts, based on defendant’s

continuous and systematic business contacts in Florida).

12 The present case and the examples posited involve foreign corpo­

rate defendants, but the principle announced by the majority would

apply equally to preclude general jurisdiction over a U. S. company that

is incorporated and has its principal place of business in another U. S.

State. Under the majority’s rule, for example, a General Motors auto­

worker who retires to Florida would be unable to sue GM in that State

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 19

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

Indeed, the majority’s approach would preclude the plain­

tiffs in these examples from seeking recourse anywhere in

the United States even if no other judicial system was

available to provide relief. I cannot agree with the major-

ity’s conclusion that the Due Process Clause requires these

results.

* * *

The Court rules against respondents today on a ground

that no court has considered in the history of this case,

that this Court did not grant certiorari to decide, and that

Daimler raised only in a footnote of its brief. In doing so,

the Court adopts a new rule of constitutional law that is

unmoored from decades of precedent. Because I would

reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the narrower

ground that the exercise of jurisdiction over Daimler

would be unreasonable in any event, I respectfully concur

in the judgment only.

——————

for disabilities that develop from the retiree’s labor at a Michigan parts

plant, even though GM undertakes considerable business operations in

Florida. See Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 Harv. L.

Rev. 610, 670 (1988).