Opinion

Stanton v. Sims

  • 571 U.S. 3
  • 24 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 473
  • 82 U.S.L.W. 4003
  • 134 S. Ct. 3
  • 187 L. Ed. 2d 341
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Nov 4, 2013
Status
Published
On the bench
Per Curiam
Cited by
581 cases
Authority
More cited than 98.6%

concluding that “[transfer 15 under 28 U.S.C. §] 1404(a) is merely a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens for 16 [a] subset of cases” and highlighting that “§ 1404(a) does not condition transfer on the initial 17 forum’s being ‘wrong’”

How later courts described this case

  • concluding that “[transfer 15 under 28 U.S.C. §] 1404(a) is merely a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens for 16 [a] subset of cases” and highlighting that “§ 1404(a) does not condition transfer on the initial 17 forum’s being ‘wrong’”
  • recognizing that the federal circuits are sharply divided on whether a necessary component of the hot-pursuit doctrine is the pursuit of a fleeing felon and that its own precedent was “equivocal” on the matter
  • holding an officer faced with a sharp divide between federal and state courts of last resort nationwide on the question of whether an officer with probable cause to arrest for a misdemeanor may enter a home in hot pursuit without a warrant was entitled to qualified immunity
  • noting, without resolving, “that federal and state. courts nationwide are sharply divided on the question whether an officer with probable cause to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor may enter a home without a warrant while in hot pursuit of that suspect,” and, therefore, reversing denial of qualified immunity to police officer based on second prong

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Estate of Sauceda v. City of North Las Vegas, 380 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (2019)

    On this basis, Stanton v. Sims , 571 U.S. 3, 134 S.Ct. 3, 187 L.Ed.2d 341 (2013), upon which Defendants rely, is readily distinguishable.
    District Court, D. NevadaMar 30, 2019Read it

The opinion

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2013) 1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MIKE STANTON, PETITIONER v. DRENDOLYN SIMS

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 12–1217. Decided November 4, 2013

PER CURIAM.

Around one o’clock in the morning on May 27, 2008,

Officer Mike Stanton and his partner responded to a call

about an “unknown disturbance” involving a person with a

baseball bat in La Mesa, California. App. to Pet. for

Cert. 6. Stanton was familiar with the neighborhood, known

for “violence associated with the area gangs.” Ibid. The

officers—wearing uniforms and driving a marked police

vehicle—approached the place where the disturbance had

been reported and noticed three men walking in the street.

Upon seeing the police car, two of the men turned into a

nearby apartment complex. The third, Nicholas Patrick,

crossed the street about 25 yards in front of Stanton’s car

and ran or quickly walked toward a residence. Id., at 7,

17. Nothing in the record shows that Stanton knew at the

time whether that residence belonged to Patrick or some-

one else; in fact, it belonged to Drendolyn Sims.

Stanton did not see Patrick with a baseball bat, but

he considered Patrick’s behavior suspicious and decided

to detain him in order to investigate. Ibid.; see Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). Stanton exited his patrol car,

called out “police,” and ordered Patrick to stop in a voice

loud enough for all in the area to hear. App. to Pet. for

Cert. 7. But Patrick did not stop. Instead, he “looked

directly at Stanton, ignored his lawful orders[,] and quickly

went through [the] front gate” of a fence enclosing Sims’

front yard. Id., at 17 (alterations omitted). When the gate

closed behind Patrick, the fence—which was more than six

feet tall and made of wood—blocked Stanton’s view of the

2 STANTON v. SIMS

Per Curiam

yard. Stanton believed that Patrick had committed a

jailable misdemeanor under California Penal Code §148 by

disobeying his order to stop;* Stanton also “fear[ed] for

[his] safety.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 7. He accordingly

made the “split-second decision” to kick open the gate in

pursuit of Patrick. Ibid. Unfortunately, and unbeknownst

to Stanton, Sims herself was standing behind the gate

when it flew open. The swinging gate struck Sims, cutting

her forehead and injuring her shoulder.

Sims filed suit against Stanton in Federal District Court

under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging that

Stanton unreasonably searched her home without a war-

rant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District

Court granted summary judgment to Stanton, finding

that: (1) Stanton’s entry was justified by the potentially

dangerous situation, by the need to pursue Patrick as he

fled, and by Sims’ lesser expectation of privacy in the

curtilage of her home; and (2) even if a constitutional

violation had occurred, Stanton was entitled to qualified

immunity because no clearly established law put him on

notice that his conduct was unconstitutional.

Sims appealed, and a panel of the Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit reversed. 706 F. 3d 954 (2013). The

court held that Stanton’s warrantless entry into Sims’

yard was unconstitutional because Sims was entitled to

the same expectation of privacy in her curtilage as in her

home itself, because there was no immediate danger, and

because Patrick had committed only the minor offense of

disobeying a police officer. Id., at 959–963. The court also

found the law to be clearly established that Stanton’s

——————

* “Every person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any . . .

peace officer . . . in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of

his or her office or employment . . . shall be punished by a fine not

exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a

county jail not to exceed one year, or by both that fine and imprison-

ment.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. §148(a)(1) (2013 West Cum. Supp.).

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2013) 3

Per Curiam

pursuit of Patrick did not justify his warrantless entry,

given that Patrick was suspected of only a misdemeanor.

Id., at 963–964. The court accordingly held that Stanton

was not entitled to qualified immunity. Id., at 964–965.

We address only the latter holding here, and now reverse.

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects govern-

ment officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as

their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.’ ” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223,

231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800,

818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity gives government offi-

cials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken

judgments,” and “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent

or those who knowingly violate the law.’ ” Ashcroft v. al-

Kidd, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 12) (quoting

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 341 (1986)). “We do not

require a case directly on point” before concluding that the

law is clearly established, “but existing precedent must

have placed the statutory or constitutional question be-

yond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).

There is no suggestion in this case that Officer Stanton

knowingly violated the Constitution; the question is

whether, in light of precedent existing at the time, he was

“plainly incompetent” in entering Sims’ yard to pursue the

fleeing Patrick. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12). The Ninth

Circuit concluded that he was. It did so despite the fact

that federal and state courts nationwide are sharply di-

vided on the question whether an officer with probable

cause to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor may enter a

home without a warrant while in hot pursuit of that sus-

pect. Compare, e.g., Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.

3d 43, 45, 765 N. E. 2d 330, 332 (2002) (“We . . . hold today

that when officers, having identified themselves, are in

hot pursuit of a suspect who flees to a house in order to

avoid arrest, the police may enter without a warrant,

4 STANTON v. SIMS

Per Curiam

regardless of whether the offense for which the suspect is

being arrested is a misdemeanor”), and State v. Ricci, 144

N. H. 241, 244, 739 A. 2d 404, 407 (1999) (“the facts of this

case demonstrate that the police had probable cause to

arrest the defendant for the misdemeanor offense of dis-

obeying a police officer” where the defendant had fled

into his home with police officers in hot pursuit), with Mas-

corro v. Billings, 656 F. 3d 1198, 1207 (CA10 2011) (“The

warrantless entry based on hot pursuit was not justified”

where “[t]he intended arrest was for a traffic misdemeanor

committed by a minor, with whom the officer was well

acquainted, who had fled into his family home from which

there was only one exit” (footnote omitted)), and Butler v.

State, 309 Ark. 211, 217, 829 S. W. 2d 412, 415 (1992)

(“even though Officer Sudduth might have been under the

impression that he was in continuous pursuit of Butler for

what he considered to be the crime of disorderly conduct,

. . . since the crime is a minor offense, under these circum-

stances there is no exigent circumstance that would allow

Officer Sudduth’s warrantless entry into Butler’s home for

what is concededly, at most, a petty disturbance”).

Other courts have concluded that police officers are at

least entitled to qualified immunity in these circumstances

because the constitutional violation is not clearly estab-

lished. E.g., Grenier v. Champlin, 27 F. 3d 1346, 1354

(CA8 1994) (“Putting firmly to one side the merits of

whether the home arrests were constitutional, we cannot

say that only a plainly incompetent policeman could have

thought them permissible at the time,” where officers

entered a home without a warrant in hot pursuit of mis-

demeanor suspects who had defied the officers’ order to

remain outside (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)).

Notwithstanding this basic disagreement, the Ninth

Circuit below denied Stanton qualified immunity. In its

one-paragraph analysis on the hot pursuit point, the panel

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2013) 5

Per Curiam

relied on two cases, one from this Court, Welsh v. Wiscon-

sin, 466 U. S. 740, 750 (1984), and one from its own, United

States v. Johnson, 256 F. 3d 895, 908 (2001) (en banc)

(per curiam). Neither case clearly establishes that Stan-

ton violated Sims’ Fourth Amendment rights.

In Welsh, police officers learned from a witness that

Edward Welsh had driven his car off the road and then

left the scene, presumably because he was drunk. Acting

on that tip, the officers went to Welsh’s home without a

warrant, entered without consent, and arrested him for

driving while intoxicated—a nonjailable traffic offense

under state law. 466 U. S., at 742–743. Our opinion first

noted our precedent holding that hot pursuit of a fleeing

felon justifies an officer’s warrantless entry. Id., at 750

(citing United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42–43

(1976)). But we rejected the suggestion that the hot pur-

suit exception applied: “there was no immediate or contin-

uous pursuit of [Welsh] from the scene of a crime.” 466

U. S., at 753. We went on to conclude that the officers’

entry violated the Fourth Amendment, finding it “im-

portant” that “there [was] probable cause to believe that

only a minor offense . . . ha[d] been committed.” Ibid. In

those circumstances, we said, “application of the exigent-

circumstances exception in the context of a home entry

should rarely be sanctioned.” Ibid. But we did not lay

down a categorical rule for all cases involving minor of-

fenses, saying only that a warrant is “usually” required.

Id., at 750.

In Johnson, police officers broke into Michael Johnson’s

fenced yard in search of another person (Steven Smith)

whom they were attempting to apprehend on five misde-

meanor arrest warrants. 256 F. 3d, at 898–900. The

Ninth Circuit was clear that this case, like Welsh, did not

involve hot pursuit: “the facts of this case simply are not

covered by the ‘hot pursuit’ doctrine” because Smith had

escaped from the police 30 minutes prior and his where-

6 STANTON v. SIMS

Per Curiam

abouts were unknown. 256 F. 3d, at 908. The court held

that the officers’ entry required a warrant, in part because

Smith was wanted for only misdemeanor offenses. Then,

in a footnote, the court said: “In situations where an officer

is truly in hot pursuit and the underlying offense is a

felony, the Fourth Amendment usually yields [to law

enforcement’s interest in apprehending a fleeing suspect].

See [Santana, supra, at 42–43]. However, in situations

where the underlying offense is only a misdemeanor, law

enforcement must yield to the Fourth Amendment in all

but the ‘rarest’ cases. Welsh, [supra, at 753].” Johnson,

supra, at 908, n. 6.

In concluding—as it must have—that Stanton was

“plainly incompetent,” al-Kidd, 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,

at 12), the Ninth Circuit below read Welsh and the foot-

note in Johnson far too broadly. First, both of those cases

cited Santana with approval, a case that approved an

officer’s warrantless entry while in hot pursuit. And

though Santana involved a felony suspect, we did not

expressly limit our holding based on that fact. See 427

U. S., at 42 (“The only remaining question is whether [the

suspect’s] act of retreating into her house could thwart an

otherwise proper arrest. We hold that it could not”).

Second, to repeat, neither Welsh nor Johnson involved hot

pursuit. Welsh, supra, at 753; Johnson, supra, at 908.

Thus, despite our emphasis in Welsh on the fact that the

crime at issue was minor—indeed, a mere nonjailable civil

offense—nothing in the opinion establishes that the seri-

ousness of the crime is equally important in cases of hot

pursuit. Third, even in the portion of Welsh cited by the

Ninth Circuit below, our opinion is equivocal: We held not

that warrantless entry to arrest a misdemeanant is never

justified, but only that such entry should be rare. 466

U. S., at 753.

That is in fact how two California state courts have read

Welsh. In both People v. Lloyd, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1425,

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2013) 7

Per Curiam

1430, 265 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425 (1989), and In re Lavoyne

M., 221 Cal. App. 3d 154, 159, 270 Cal. Rptr. 394, 396

(1990), the California Court of Appeal refused to limit the

hot pursuit exception to felony suspects. The court stated

in Lloyd: “Where the pursuit into the home was based on

an arrest set in motion in a public place, the fact that the

offenses justifying the initial detention or arrest were

misdemeanors is of no significance in determining the

validity of the entry without a warrant.” 216 Cal. App. 3d,

at 1430, 265 Cal. Rptr., at 425. It is especially troubling

that the Ninth Circuit would conclude that Stanton was

plainly incompetent—and subject to personal liability for

damages—based on actions that were lawful according

to courts in the jurisdiction where he acted. Cf. al-Kidd,

supra, at ___ (KENNEDY, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2–4).

Finally, our determination that Welsh and Johnson are

insufficient to overcome Stanton’s qualified immunity is

bolstered by the fact that, even after Johnson, two differ-

ent District Courts in the Ninth Circuit have granted

qualified immunity precisely because the law regarding

warrantless entry in hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemean-

ant is not clearly established. See Kolesnikov v. Sacra-

mento County, No. S–06–2155, 2008 WL 1806193, *7 (ED

Cal., Apr. 22, 2008) (“since Welsh, it has not been clearly

established that there can never be warrantless home

arrests in the context of a ‘hot pursuit’ of a suspect fleeing

from the commission of misdemeanor offenses”); Garcia v.

Imperial, No. 08–2357, 2010 WL 3834020, *6, n. 4 (SD

Cal., Sept. 28, 2010). In Garcia, a case with facts similar

to those here, the District Court distinguished Johnson as

a case where “the officers were not in hot pursuit of the

suspect, had not seen the suspect enter the neighbor’s

property, and had no real reason to think the suspect was

there.” 2010 WL 3834020, *6, n. 4. Precisely the same

facts distinguish this case from Johnson: Stanton was in

hot pursuit of Patrick, he did see Patrick enter Sims’

8 STANTON v. SIMS

Per Curiam

property, and he had every reason to believe that Patrick

was just beyond Sims’ gate. App. to Pet. for Cert. 6–7, 17.

To summarize the law at the time Stanton made his

split-second decision to enter Sims’ yard: Two opinions of

this Court were equivocal on the lawfulness of his entry;

two opinions of the State Court of Appeal affirmatively

authorized that entry; the most relevant opinion of the

Ninth Circuit was readily distinguishable; two Federal

District Courts in the Ninth Circuit had granted qualified

immunity in the wake of that opinion; and the federal and

state courts of last resort around the Nation were sharply

divided.

We do not express any view on whether Officer Stan-

ton’s entry into Sims’ yard in pursuit of Patrick was con-

stitutional. But whether or not the constitutional rule

applied by the court below was correct, it was not “beyond

debate.” al-Kidd, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 9). Stanton

may have been mistaken in believing his actions were

justified, but he was not “plainly incompetent.” Malley,

475 U. S., at 341.

The petition for certiorari and respondent’s motion for

leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted, the judg-

ment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

It is so ordered.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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