Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

MCCURN, Senior District Judge.

Table of Contents

Introduction.271

Background.272

I. Pre-Trial Motions .272

II. Jury Instructions.273

III. Verdict.273

Discussion.275

I. Verdict.275

II. Pre-Judgment Interest.284

A. Wickham Analysis.286

1. Full Compensation.286

*271

2. Nature of Statute. CO OO

3. ’’Other General Principles”. rH 05

4. Fairness of Relative Equities. CO G5

a. Burden of Proof. t-Oi

Historical Evidence.

I. Pre-Revolutionary War.■.

American Revolution.

A. Wyoming Valley.

B. Sullivan-Clinton Campaign.

C. Articles of Confederation.

D. Cayuga Factions .

E. 1784 Fort Stanwix Treaties.

F. Livingston Lease.

G. 1789 Treaty at Albany.

H. Nonintercourse Act.

I. Richardson Lease .

1793 State Statute. H

1.Aftermath of the 1793 Statute.

1794 Federal Treaty of Canandaigua. W

New York State’s 1795 Act and the Council of Revision r

1795 Treaty of Cayuga Ferry. g

1. State’s Awareness of Nonintercourse Act.

a. Pre-1795 Awareness.

b. 1795 Awareness.

2. Negotiation Process.

3. Commissioners’ Conflicts of Interests.

4. Sale of Former Cayuga Lands.

5. Adequacy of Consideration.

1807 Treaty.

1807 Onward.

1. ’’Bad Faith”.

2.Delay

Economic Evidence. OO

lO

CO

Conclusion. cc

Introduction

On January 18, 2000, the court commenced with jury selection in this historic land claim litigation. The court’s resolution of the liability issues,

1

left only one issue for the jury’s consideration — the amount of compensation, if any, to which the tribal plaintiffs, the Cayuga Indian Nation of New York and the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma (“the Cayuga”),

2

were

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entitled for the loss of their tribal lands over two centuries ago. Nineteen days, six witnesses, whose testimony comprises the nearly 3,000 page trial transcript, and approximately 130 exhibits later, on February 17, 2000, the jury rendered its verdict. It found the State of New York (“the State”)

3

liable to the Cayuga in the total amount of $36,911,672.62. Those damages were divided into two categories: (1) $1,911,672.62 for the fair rental value of the Cayuga’s former homeland for 204 years; and (2) an additional $35,000,000.00 in damages for future loss use and possession of that same land.

Background

No less than twenty years of litigation preceded that jury verdict. Assuming familiarity with the protracted and at times convoluted history of this action, the court will not repeat that entire history herein. To place the issue of prejudgment interest which now dominates this litigation in context, however, an overview of some of this court’s rulings in recent years, especially as to remedies, is in order.

I.

Pre-Trial Motions

Faced with several motions

in limine

seeking to “severely limit the remedies available to the Cayugas[,]” in

Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki,

No. 80-CV-930, 80-CV-960, 1999 WL 224615 , at *1 (N.D.N.Y. April 15, 1999)

(“Cayuga VIII”),

the issue of prejudgment interest first arose. Holding that federal rather than state law governs the issue of the availability of prejudgment interest, this court recognized its

“sweeping discretion

to decide whether to award prejudgment interest ..., as well as [its]

considerable latitude

in establishing both the rate of interest and the accrual date.”

Id.

at *17 (emphasis added). Ultimately, the court declined to decide whether the Cayuga were entitled to recover prejudgment interest because at that time the record was not sufficiently developed.

The court also was operating in a “legal vacuum” because the parties had not addressed the factors which the Second Circuit in

Wickham Contracting v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,

955 F.2d 831 (2d Cir.1992), had identified as relevant in deciding “whether to award prejudgment interest[.]”

See id.

at *19 and *21. After reciting the

Wickham

factors, the court stressed that an award of prejudgment interest was

not

a foregone conclusion.

Id.

at *16.

With a date for jury selection looming, the parties sought further clarification on a variety of issues including, yet again, prejudgment interest. The court held that it would not receive proof of present day value during Phase I. In a final round of motions

in limine

made in anticipation of Phase I, the U.S. sought,

inter alia,

to have the court “reserv[e] to [itself] all issues of law and equity, leaving only fact issues as to the amount of damages for the jury[.]”

Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki,

79 F.Supp.2d 78 , 86

*273

(N.D.N.Y.1999)

(“Cayuga XII”).

Adopting this approach, the court held that equitable issues such as laches would “be reserved to [it], and if necessary, the same may be the subject of post-trial motions and/or additional post-trial proceedings before the court, without a jury.”

Id.

at 92 .

II. Jury Instructions

At various points during Phase I the court instructed the jury in conformity with the pre-trial rulings outlined above. Among other things, in its preliminary instructions the court briefly explained the respective roles of the jury and the court,

ie.,

the court decides legal issues and the jury decides fact issues. Consistent with those different roles, the court further explained that the trial would occur in two phases. In Phase I the jury’s task was to resolve the issue of the amount of damages, if any, to which the Cayuga would be entitled. The court then explained that there would be another proceeding after the jury trial where the Court would resolve certain equitable issues, such as interest.

At the close of the proof the court reiterated these points, explaining that “interest on the amount of any damages you may award, conversion to present day value of any past damages you may award,” and “a possible reduction in any damages you may award to the plaintiffs due to their alleged failure to timely commence this action, that is, laches[,]” are all equitable issues outside the province of the jury.

See

Transcript (“Tr.”) at 2748^49. Thus, the jury was unequivocally advised, not once, but twice that it should not concern itself with equitable issues such as interest. Consistent with the foregoing, the jury was explicitly instructed that it “should [not] ... calculate an amount to compensate the plaintiffs for the fact that they did not have the use of the money between when the injury occurred and the present.”

Id.

at 2773-74. That particular charge concluded by advising the jury: “It has previously been decided that the Court will determine whether an award of same will or will not be made in connection with the amount you determine as damages.”

Id.

at 2774. The jury was further instructed that it

“should not make any adjustment for

the effect of

inflation or

the

loss

of

use

of the

money.” Id.

at 2773 (emphasis added). Presupposing that it would award damages in dollars for the year the injury was sustained, the jury also was instructed that it “should not, ... attempt to convert the value of the dollar at the time of the injury for which you have determined damages to an equivalent value in current dollars!.]”

Id.

Further, insofar as calculating lost rent, the jury was instructed, “you must determine ... the loss of the value of the use of the lands of the Cayugas for each of the 204 years they were wrongfully detained or prevented from the use of the land.”

Id.

at 2768-69.

III. Verdict

The verdict form was fairly lengthy, but the jury only had to answer two discrete questions. The first was:

What amounts, if any, do you find that plaintiffs have been damaged for loss of use and possession of the claim area from July 27, 1795 to date as measured by a fair rental value without improvements but with infrastructure in place, less credit, if any, to the State for payments made to plaintiffs?

Gov. exh. 21 at 1, ¶ 1 (footnote omitted). The verdict form also required the jury to indicate for each year from July 27, 1795, through “2000 to date,” the following: the “amount” of such loss; the “credit to the State[;]” and the “net amount.”

See id.

at 1. For the first designated time period, from July 27, 1795 to the end of that year,

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the jury found that the Cayuga had sustained losses in the amount of $7,148.69.

See id.

For every full year thereafter through 1999, the jury found that the Cayuga had sustained losses in the amount of $17,156.86 per year. For the year 2000, to the verdict date, February 17, 2000, the jury found that the Cayuga had sustained losses in the amount of $2,859.48.

See id.

at 10.

In accordance with a stipulation between the Cayuga and the State, the jury then credited the State for its annuity payments to the Cayuga for the years 1795 through 1999. After finding total rental losses in the amount of $3,510,007.61, and payments by the State totaling $1,598, 834.99, the jury concluded that the Cayuga were entitled to $1,911,672.62 for the fair rent value of the claim area over the 204 years.

See id.

After polling the jury, the court advised the parties that it would not enter a final judgment at that time because of the outstanding issues which needed to be resolved in Phase II. The parties were given the opportunity within sixty days of the verdict to file any motions in relation thereto, but no such motions were filed.

Anticipating Phase II, among other things, the parties filed their respective economists’ reports. On May 17, 2000, after reviewing the same, those reports revealed an “enormous disparity[]” as to the amount of prejudgment interest to which the Cayuga may be entitled, and the court was forced “to conclude that it [could not] properly assess the availability of prejudgment interest in the first instance without some context, beyond the mathematical calculations found in th[ose] ... reports.”

Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki,

Nos. 80-CV-930, 80-CV-960, 2000 WL 654963 , at *3 (N.D.N.Y. May 17, 2000),

amended on other grounds,

2000 WL 687901 (N.D.N.Y. May 22, 2000). Therefore, the court agreed to allow the parties’ witnesses to testify as to certain “equitable factors[.]”

See id.

The court went on to list several such factors, but it did not mention allowing any witness to testify as to what the jury actually intended when it rendered its verdict. In the end though, the court was extremely generous in terms of the proof which it permitted during Phase II, reasoning:

Because the stakes are simply too high, the experts’ views too antithetical, and the equities on all sides too important to disregard, ... the only way to proceed at this juncture is to make every effort to insure that all parties to this litigation have an equal opportunity to present their respective versions of history, and how those versions impact the remaining issues of prejudgment interest and lach-es.

Id.

at *4.

The Phase II trial was lengthy and the court’s task in analyzing the extensive proof adduced therein was an arduous one, to say the least. Under the best of circumstances analysis of the Phase II proof would have been difficult. But the court’s task was unnecessarily complicated by the fact that

all

of the parties frequently either cited to a document which did not support their contention, or equally disconcerting, would take a quote out of context. All too often this selective quoting meant that when the court consulted a source document or the transcript, the assertion was not actually supported therein.

4

*275

Moreover, when the court read such a quote in context the meaning was often times very different than that ascribed to it by the quoting party. The court is fully aware that lawyers have an obligation to represent their clients “zealouslyU”

see

N.Y. code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7, reprinted in N.Y. Jud. Law App. (McKinney Supp.2001); but there are limits to such zealousness and a lawyer does not do his or her client any great service by engaging in such tactics which distract from a party’s otherwise valid legal arguments and undermine a lawyer’s credibility to a certain extent.

Discussion

The issues the parties raise in connection with Phase II are legion. The first and in some ways perhaps most important issue pertains to the meaning of the jury verdict itself.

I. Verdict

More than four months

after

the jury rendered its verdict and more than four months

after

the jury’s discharge, the State raised for the first time the possibility of an inconsistent verdict. In its June 30, 2000, memorandum of law submitted prior to Phase II the State did not employ the phrase “inconsistent verdict.” Its economist Richard S. Grossman did not shy away from that concept in his report, unequivocally stating that the “verdict presents the Court with an inconsistency[.]”

See

St. exh. 721 at 10, ¶ 26. In the State’s view this alleged inconsistency arises because in Phase I the jury, colloquially speaking, impermissibly compared apples and oranges.

See

Pre-Tr. Memo at 74.

This supposedly impermissible comparison occurred, Grossman believes, because the jury did not distinguish between current and constant dollars as he defines and employs those terms. In Grossman’s report he wrote that from an economic standpoint there are “two types of dollars: ‘current dollars,’ which are merely the dollars of a particular year

in that year,

and ‘constant dollars,’ which are sums that are expressed in the dollars of one particular year (called the base year).” St. exh. 721 at 7, ¶ 18 (emphasis in original). When “compar[ing] quantities of dollars from different years,” Grossman declared that “[i]t is not possible to make an

economically

meaningful comparison between sums denominated in dollars of different years.”

Id.

at 8, ¶ 20 (emphasis added). Grossman therefore asserted “it makes

no economic

*276

sense

to add or to subtract sums denominated in dollars of different years[;]” yet that is precisely what the jury did Gross-man concludes.

Id.

(emphasis added). Such calculations are in Grossman’s view “completely unacceptable from an economic perspeetive[.]”

Id.

That type of calculation is “troublesomé” suggests Grossman because, for example, when subtracting 1999 and year 2000 dollars, those dollars “differ in value by 3 percent[.]”

Id.

Accordingly, a meaningful comparison of dollars in different years can only be had, Grossman contends, when those dollars are “denominated in the constant dollars of any given year.”

See id.

Grossman posits that the jury disregarded these general economic precepts by crediting the State with payments to the Cayuga through the years in “current dollars,” while at the same time using “constant dollars,” as he defines that term, in determining the amount of lost rent in any given year.

See id.

at 9, ¶¶ 22 and 23. To support his theory as to how the jury calculated lost rent damages, Grossman made two assumptions. First, because “the ‘credit to state’ column ... corresponds exactly to the amounts actually paid by the [State] to the plaintiffs in each year of the 204-year period[J” Grossman believes that “the figures stated in this column are clearly expressed in the dollars of the years in which they were paid, i.e., current dollars.”

Id.

at ¶ 22.

Second, in determining the amount due the Cayuga each year for lost rent, Gross-man hypothesizes that the jury used “constant” year 2000 dollars. To support this hypothesis, Grossman observes that the jury “award[ed] [a total of] $3.5 million divided up into 204 equal payments (since $3.5 million divided by 204 equals $17,156.86 exactly).”

Id.

at ¶ 23. Further, Grossman observes that the $3.5 million in lost rent damages, as found by the jury is (not coincidentally in Grossman’s view), equivalent to exactly ten percent of the $35 million which the jury awarded the Cayuga for future loss of use and possession of the claim area. Given what Grossman deems to be this obvious correlation between the total rental value damages and the current fair market value of the land, and the fact that rents are identical in each' year from 1795 to 2000, he concludes that “it is... clear that the jury expressed the lost rents in current dollars.” Id.

Grossman also relies upon the court’s instruction to the jury not to adjust the award or “attempt to convert the value of a dollar at the time of the injury[ ]”

see

Tr. at 2773, to support his conclusion “that the jury’s verdict in the ‘amount’ column is expressed in dollars of the year 2000.”

See

St. exh. 721 at 9, ¶ 23. Additionally, Grossman opines that the dollars in the “amount” column cannot be expressed in current dollars because prices have not stayed constant over the past 204 years.

See id.

at 9, ¶ 24. Finally, Grossman believes in part that because the jury was instructed not to make adjustments for inflation, it “gave its verdict in the dollars it ... knows best: constant 2000 dollars.”

See id.

at 10, ¶ 25.

In light of the foregoing, instead of accepting the verdict on its face, the State maintains that the court should “adjust[ ]” the verdict “by either converting the annual rent to historical damages for each year

or

by converting the State payments to present-day dollars.” State Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of their Request to Examine the Economic Witnesses on the Jury’s Award for Fair Market Rental Value of the Claim Area at 2 (emphasis added);

see also

St. Posb-Tr. Memo, at 70. The State argues that adjusting the jury verdict in this way is entirely proper because where, as the State believes occurred here, “the verdict

*277

is not clear on its face, it is appropriate to look at how the verdict was constructed[.]” Tr. at 6116. Once the court makes such an adjustment or conversion, the State wants the court to recalculate the jury verdict using those adjusted figures. The State contends that this process, as opposed to the process outlined by Gross-man, which the State suspects the jury employed, will “yield a meaningful total net rental figure” from which the court can then compute prejudgment interest.

See id.

In contrast to the State’s approach, which requires interpreting the jury verdict, both the Cayuga’s and the U.S.’ respective economists, while arriving at different conclusions as to the amount of prejudgment interest, accept the verdict “at face value.” See Cayugas’ Post-Trial Memorandum (“Cay.Post-Tr.Memo.”) at 22. Dr. Berkman, the U.S.’ economist, acknowledged that his calculations were based upon “the numbers presented on the jury verdict form[.]” See Tr. at 6053-54. The Cayuga’s economist, Dr. Temin, similarly testified that in terms of yearly rent payments, he “started from the jury verdict form[.]” See

id.

at 5809. Thus Drs. Temin and Berkman assumed, in conformity with the charge, that the jury expressed

both

the State’s credit payments and the fair rental value “in

dollars

of the

particular year

in which they were incurred.” U.S. Post-Tr. Memo, at 60 (emphasis added). Any other reading of the verdict amounts to improper “second-guessing” of the jury’s intent, according to the Cayuga.

See

Cay. Post-Trial Memo, at 20. Finally, characterizing Grossman’s suggested “adjustments” to the verdict as “tampering” with the same, the Cayuga are taking the position that there is no need, and indeed it would be improper for the court to make the adjustments which the State is urging because such adjustments would “lead[ ] to a complete nullification of the jury’s award[.]” Cayugas’ Posh-Trial Reply Memorandum (“Cay.Reply”) at 8 (citations omitted);

see also

U.S. Post-Trial Memo, at 65.

Given these conflicting views as to the meaning of the jury verdict, the first issue which this court must consider is whether it is proper, in hindsight, to reexamine the verdict in an effort to ascertain how the jury arrived at the final damage figure for 204 years of lost rent. More specifically, in calculating prejudgment interest, should the court, as the State urges, “adjust” the dollar amounts as found by the jury, or should it simply make any prejudgment interest calculation it deems proper using the dollar figure, unadjusted, found on the verdict form.

5

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To support its argument that the court should “look behind” the jury verdict, the State relies heavily upon

Sharkey v. Lasmo (AUL Ltd.),

214 F.3d 371 (2d Cir.2000). According to the State,

Sharkey

stands for the proposition “that where the verdict is not clear on its face, it is appropriate to look at how the verdict was constructed[.]” Tr. at 6116. It is also “appropriate” under

Sharkey ,

argues the State, for the court to consider evidence regarding the jury’s intent in rendering its verdict.

See id.

at 6117.

In

Sharkey ,

a case brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), the plaintiff argued “that because he did not include lost pension benefits in his calculations of damages ... or attempt to quantify his lost benefits ..., the jury must not have included them it its award[;]” hence the district court erred in denying an award of prejudgment interest and pension benefits.

Sharkey,

214 F.3d at 375 . The defendant countered that because the evidence included references to pension benefits offered to plaintiffs colleagues, when the jury awarded plaintiff “damages for [his]

total

financial losses[,]” it included the value of his lost pension benefits in the verdict.

See id.

(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant also pointed to the fact that the jury had been instructed that plaintiff was entitled to recover his “economic loss[;]” and that he “was entitled to recover lost salary and benefits, including ... fringe benefits.”

Id.

Finally, the defendant noted that the jury was also instructed that it “may award [plaintiff] an amount equal to the salary and benefits he would have received ... less the amount of salary and benefits he received after he left the employ of the defendants, including severance payments,

'pension benefits

and amounts from other employers ....”

Id.

(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Given the ambiguous state of the record as to whether the jury included the value of lost pension benefits in its verdict for “.‘total financial losses[,]’ ” the Second Circuit concluded that it was impossible to definitively say whether the jury included the value of such benefits in making its award.

See id.

Therefore, the Court instructed the district court on remand to “make a determination whether the jury’s award included the value of lost pension benefits.”

Id.

On remand the Second Circuit also instructed the district court “to apportion the jury’s award[]” to determine what part was attributable “to stock rights and options and the value of lost pension benefits[J”

Id.

Such apportionment was necessary according to the Second Circuit because an award of “prejudgment interest

*280

may be inappropriate on the portion attributable to the value of lost pension benefits, if any.”

Id.

Sharkey

does not mandate the conclusion that this court should, after-the-fact, in effect rewrite the jury verdict here. There is a fundamental distinction between

Sharkey

and the present case — a distinction which the State conveniently disregards. In

Sharkey

the district court’s task on remand was to ascertain the scope of the jury’s award and to apportion it. Here, the State is asking the court to engage in a far different task — a task which would, as will be seen, result in usurping the jury’s function. In the present case it is not simply a matter, as it was in

Sharkey ,

of ascertaining the scope of the jury’s award and then apportioning it. Rather, analyzing the verdict in the manner which the State is advocating would require this court to examine the Phase I evidence in its entirety, as well as the jury instructions, and then speculate as to how the jury derived damages for fair rental value. The analysis which the State proffers through Grossman would also require the court to improperly assume that the jury disregarded the court’s instructions. Plainly such an analysis goes far beyond any contemplated by the

Sharkey

Court.

Of equal if not more import is that in

Sharkey

the possibility of an inconsistent verdict was never raised; but the State is raising that possibility now. Therefore, this court’s obligations differ significantly from those of the district court in

Sharkey .

Because the State is claiming that the verdict is potentially inconsistent, this court has an obligation to harmonize the verdict where possible — an obligation which did not arise in

Sharkey .

In short, given the obvious differences between

Sharkey

and the present case, the court declines to rely upon the latter as justification for, as the State insists, ascertaining “how the verdict was constructed[.]”

See

Tr. at 6116.

In addition to

Sharkey ,

to support its assertion that the court should scrutinize this verdict and adjust it in the manner which Dr. Grossman is urging, the State cites to

Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc.,

983 F.2d 1204 (2d Cir.1993). Claiming that the district court’s award of equitable relief, in the form of ordering plaintiffs promotion upon her reinstatement, “went far beyond making [her] whole, as mandated by the ADEA[,]” on appeal the defendant employer sought,

inter alia,

to set aside that relief for an abuse

of

discretion.

See id.

at 1214 . The Second Circuit in

Malarkey

did observe that the district court had

“surmised

[that] the jury awarded plaintiff $65,000 by comparing her salary to that of ... [another employee who was given the secretarial position to which plaintiff claim[ed] she was entitled].”

Id.

(emphasis added).

Relying upon the just quoted language from

Malarkey ,

the State urges this court to “surmise” that the jury calculated its award in the manner which Dr. Grossman posits. The court will not do that because

Malarkey

presents an entirely different situation than does the present case. In exercising its “broad” discretion to fashion relief under the ADEA by ordering plaintiffs promotion, the district court in

Malarkey

was drawing what the Second Circuit implicitly found to be a “logical extension” of the jury’s award “express ... findings[J”

See id.

In sharp contrast with what the State is asking this court to do, the district court in

Malarkey

did not adjust or rewrite the jury’s factual findings; nor did it supplant those jury findings with its own — both of which would happen if this court were to adopt the Statens argument. Analyzing the verdict as the State’s economist suggests would require more than a “logical

*281

extension” of the jury’s verdict. It would require this court to completely transform the Phase I verdict, so much so that it would result in substantially altering if not completely reversing that verdict. Clearly, such a readjustment of the jury’s factual findings is not what the Second Circuit had in mind in

Malarkey

when it implicitly approved of the fact that the district court had surmised how the jury arrived at a back pay award. Because

Malarkey

is readily distinguishable from the present case, it does not advance the State’s argument in any way. Accordingly,

Malarkey

does not, as the State contends, support this court reexamining and ultimately readjusting the jury’s verdict as to fair rental value. In sum, the State has not brought to the court’s attention any legal authority to support its argument that the court should essentially rewrite the jury’s findings as to lost rent damages.

This omission by the State is all the more glaring given the plethora of case law set forth below pertaining to the sanctity of a jury’s verdict and a court’s duty to reconcile a purportedly inconsistent verdict. Typically that case law centers on situations where courts are confronted with potentially inconsistent verdicts in the context of either a motion for a new trial or a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Although the State is

not

seeking a new trial, those cases are instructive at this juncture nonetheless, particularly in the absence of any case law directly on point.

In this Circuit “ ‘[w]hen confronted with a potentially inconsistent jury verdict, the court must ‘adopt a view of the case, if there is one, that resolves any seeming inconsistency.’ ’ ”

Densberger v. United Technologies Corporation,

125 F.Supp.2d 585, 598 (D.Conn.2000) (quoting

Turley v. Police Dep’t of the City of N.Y.,

167 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir.1999)) (other citation omitted). Thus “ ‘[bjefore a court may set aside a special verdict as inconsistent and remand the case for a new trial, it must make every attempt ‘to reconcile the jury’s findings, by exegesis if necessary.’ ’ ”

Id.

(quoting

Turley,

167 F.3d at 760 ) (other citations omitted). “ ‘[A]nd[,] if there is any way to view a case that makes the jury’s answers to the special verdict form consistent with one another, the court must resolve the answers that way even if the interpretation is strained.’”

Wright,

194 F.R.D. at 57 (quoting

McGuire v. Russell Miller, Inc.,

1 F.3d 1306, 1311 (2d Cir.1993)) (other citation omitted). The mere fact that a trial court may disagree with a jury’s verdict does not provide a basis for granting a motion for a new trial based upon an alleged inconsistent verdict.

See Wright,

194 F.R.D. at 57 (citing

Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co.,

707 F.2d 671, 679 (2d Cir.1983)).

In assessing whether a given verdict is inconsistent, a court is not limited to examining “ ‘just the [jury] answers themselves.’ ”

See Densberger,

125 F.Supp.2d at 598 (quoting

McGuire,

1 F.3d at 1311 ) (citations omitted). The court “ ‘should refer to the entire case[,]’ ”

see id.,

including jury instructions.

See Finnegan v. Fountain,

915 F.2d 817 , 820 n. 3 (2d Cir.1990) (citing

Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.,

372 U.S. 108, 118-22 , 83 S.Ct. 659 , 9 L.Ed.2d 618 (1963)). “This duty ‘derives from the Seventh Amendment’s obligation on courts not to recast factual findings of a jury, ..., and is based on the notion that ‘juries are not bound by what seems inescapable logic to judges.’ ’ ”

Densberger,

125 F.Supp.2d at 598 (quoting

Indu Craft,

47 F.3d at 497) (other citations omitted).

In attempting to reconcile a seemingly inconsistent verdict, the Second Circuit has held that “[w]here ‘the district

*282

court properly instructed the jury ..., [t]here is a strong presumption that the jury in reaching its verdict complied with those instructions.’ ”

Id.

Given that “strong presumption,” the Second Circuit has held that “[a] jury’s verdict reached after proper instructions must be upheld where there is a reasonable explanation for the jury’s seemingly inconsistent answers.”

Bonner v. Guccione,

178 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In fact, the Second Circuit has expressly stated that “[g]iven correct instruction on the law and no clear disregard for that instruction on the face of the verdict, a jury verdict must remain immune from questioning by the district court.”

Id.

at 588 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As the foregoing principles show, the Second Circuit “has been aggressive in [its] efforts to harmonize inconsistent jury verdicts.” Shaun P. Martin,

Rationalizing the Irrational: The Treatment of Untenable Federal Civil Jury Verdicts,

28 Creighton L.R.683, 717 (1995).

It is fundamental that “ ‘[w]hen a jury returns a verdict by means of answers to special interrogatories [under Rule 49(a) ], the findings must be consistent with one another, as they form the basis for the ultimate resolution of the action.’ ”

Densberger,

125 F.Supp.2d at 598 (quoting

Crockett v. Long Island R.R.,

65 F.3d 274, 278 (2d Cir.1995)). Furthermore, “where the special verdict answers appear to be inconsistent but there is a ‘view of the ease that makes the jury’s answer[s] ... consistent, they must be resolved that way.’ ”

Tolbert v. Queens College,

242 F.3d 58, 74 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting

Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd.,

369 U.S. 355, 364 , 82 S.Ct. 780 , 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962)). Here, because the jury was asked to make certain, specific factual findings as to the amount of damages, and because it was not asked to determine liability, this is a “special” verdict under Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(a). The present verdict further conforms with a Rule 49(a) verdict in that it “did not offer the jury the ultimate choice normally called for by a general verdict — the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for a specified amount of damages, or the defendant is not liable to the plaintiff.”

See Bradway v. Gonzales,

26 F.3d 313, 317 (2d Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Consequently, in analyzing whether or not this verdict is inconsistent, the court will treat the same as a “special verdict” in accordance with Rule 49(a).

The State, through its economist Grossman, is claiming that the verdict is inconsistent because purportedly when calculating fair rental damages, the jury uniformly employed year 2000 dollars in determining the yearly lost rent, but from those amounts it subtracted dollars in the year in which the State made payments. It is conceivable that the jury did in effect, as the State maintains, subtract apples from oranges. It is “equally rational to believe,” however, that the jury did

not

engage in such a comparison.

See Indu Craft,

47 F.3d at 497. In fact, keeping with its “ ‘duty ... to attempt to harmonize the jury’s answers, if it is at all possible under a fair reading of the responses[,]’ ” the court has little difficulty finding that this verdict is

not

inconsistent.

See Densberger,

125 F.Supp.2d at 598 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Examining both the verdict form and the relevant jury instructions, as the court must,

see Finnegan,

915 F.2d at 820 n. 3 (citation omitted), it can be readily determined that the jury found the amount of lost rent using dollars in the years in which that rent was lost — not as the State urges in year 2000 dollars. Any other reading of the verdict would require the

*283

court to assume that the jury disregarded the court’s explicit instruction that it “should not, ... attempt to convert the value of the dollar at the time of the injury for which you have determined damages to an equivalent value in

current

dollars[.]” Tr. at 2773 (emphasis added). In other words the jury was instructed, albeit implicitly, to award fair rent damages for each of the 204 years in the year those damages were sustained and

not

to convert the same to an equivalent value in year 2000 dollars — the year of the verdict.

Because “there is no indication to the contrary, it must be assumed that the jury followed [that] instruction[ ][.]”

See Gierlinger v. Gleason,

160 F.3d 858, 875 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). By following the instruction not to convert, it is obvious that the jury found the amount due for lost rent in each of the 204 years in the dollars of those particular years. There is no dispute that the jury then subtracted dollars of each particular year in which the State made payments to the Cayuga.

See, e.g.,

U.S. Posh-Trial Memo, at 60; and Tr. at 6357. Thus, the jury

did

subtract like dollars. Consequently, there

is

a plausible explanation for the jury’s answers regarding lost rent which eliminates the State’s claimed inconsistency for that aspect of the jury’s award.

The confusion here arises over the definition of “current.” Grossman’s definition of “current” is different than the meaning which the court, the lawyers and the jury attributed to “current” in connection with the instruction not to convert. According to Grossman, economically speaking “current” refers to “dollars of a particular year

in that year[.]” See

St. exh. 721, at 7, ¶ 18 (emphasis in original). Therefore, when Grossman read the instruction not to convert “to an equivalent value in current dollars[,]” he defined “current” differently,

i.e.,

as “dollars of a particular year in that year.”

See

St. exh. 721 at 7, ¶ 18. Applying that definition to the instruction not to convert, Grossman surmised that the jury calculated lost rent in year 2000 dollars and in keeping with his reading of that instruction, the jury did

not

convert those dollars to the years in which those losses were sustained. However, in the context of the court’s instruction not to convert, “current” actually meant year 2000 dollars. Based upon that definition, the jury was instructed that it was

not

to convert the dollar at the time of injury,

i.e.,

a 1795 dollar to current or year 2000 dollars.

The State is overlooking the fact, however, that “[ljogical, not economic consistency is the touchstone[ ]” in evaluating a potentially inconsistent verdict.

Webb v. GAF Corp.,

936 F.Supp. 1109, 1125 (N.D.N.Y.1996) (citing,

inter alia, Crockett,

65 F.3d at 278 ). Thus, although a jury’s verdict

might

be inconsistent from an economic standpoint, it does not necessarily follow,

a fortiori,

that that verdict is legally inconsistent.

See id.

Having said that, the court recognizes that apparently to avoid the complex task of separating out specific rents for each of the 204 years at issue, the jury calculated lost rent by taking $3.5 million, or 10% of what it deemed to be the current value of the property ($35 million) and dividing it by each of the 204 years at issue. Presumably the jury found that that amount would adequately compensate the Cayuga for the accumulation of rental dollars for

all

of those 204 years. The effect of figuring lost rent in that way, when carried out over 204 years, according to the State, is to “overstate] the compensation in the early years and understat[e] it in the later years.” St. Pre-Tr. Memo, at 75;

see also

Tr. at 6356-66. Assuming that is so, consistent with the court’s explicit instruction

not

to consider interest because the

*284

court would do so at a later date, the jury recognized that it would be possible for the court to amend those rent figures and rectify that discrepancy through its award of prejudgment interest.

There is one additional reason for refusing to apply the State’s rigid economic analysis to the jury’s verdict which is that it would require the court to disregard firmly established legal principles — principles which were developed wholly apart from economic principles to preserve the efficient and fair administration of our judicial system. Adjusting the jury’s verdict in conformity with the State’s theory would require the court to find an inconsistency or conflict where none exists, which in turn would run afoul of the general notion that whenever possible a court must “reconcile and preserve even a seemingly inconsistent jury verdict.”

See Indu Craft,

47 F.3d at 497 (citations omitted). Furthermore, adopting the State’s interpretation of the jury verdict would thwart the “powerful” policy of deferring to a jury verdict — a policy which persists “even in cases in which the jury has taken action that is at first blush difficult to explain.”

See Gentile v. County of Suffolk,

926 F.2d 142, 154 (2d Cir.1991) (citing

Auwood,

850 F.2d at 891). This policy of preserving the sanctity of a jury’s verdict is especially compelling in a case of this magnitude which, as this court has previously recognized, “has so widely impacted every member, Indian and non-Indian alike, in the claim area community.”

See Cayuga XIV,

2000 WL 654963 , at *4.

II. Pre-Judgment

Interest

6

The issue of prejudgment interest first arose in this litigation in 1999 when

*285

through motions

in limine

the defendants sought to bar the Cayuga from recovering any prejudgment interest whatsoever.

See Cayuga VIII,

1999 WL 224615 , at *1. In addressing those motions, this court extensively discussed the guiding legal principles which courts should apply in deciding whether to allow an award of prejudgment interest.

See id.

at *15-*22. As part of that discussion, the court reiterated a number of factors which the Second Circuit identified in

Wickham,

955 F.2d 831 , as being relevant to whether to allow recovery of prejudgment interest:

[T]he award should be a function of (i) the need to fully compensate the wronged party for actual damages suffered, (ii) considerations of fairness and the relative equities of the award, (iii) the remedial purpose of the statute involved, and/or (iv) such other general principles as are deemed relevant by the court.... These other ‘general principles’ include ‘[t]he certainty of the damages due the plaintiffi,]’ and whether the statute itself already provides for ‘full compensation and punitive damages [.]’ ... In addition to the factors enumerated above, ‘[t]he speculative nature of the damages in question will always be relevant to a sound decision on a consideration of whether prejudgment interest should be awarded.’

Cayuga VIII,

1999 WL 224615 , at *19 (quoting

Wickham,

955 F.2d at 833-34, 835 ; and 836). In

Cayuga VIII ,

the court recognized that recovery of prejudgment interest has been allowed even when a federal statute is silent on that issue, as is the Nonintercourse Act, so long as those “discretionary awards ... ‘are fair, equitable and necessary to compensate the wronged party fully.’”

See id.

at *20 (quoting

Wickham,

955 F.2d at 835 ). But, as this court further acknowledged, recovery of prejudgment interest has been disallowed in a number of situations, including: “ ‘when the defendant acted innocently and had no reason to know of the wrongfulness of his actions, ... when there is a good faith dispute between the parties as to the existence of any liability, or ... when the plaintiff is responsible for the delay in recovery.’ ”

Id.

at *20 (quoting

Cruz v. Local Union Number 3 of the Int’l Bdh. Of Elec. Workers,

No. CV89-4240, 1995 WL 374401 , at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.17, 1995)) (other citation omitted).

Summarizing the import of this prejudgment interest body of case law, in

Cayuga VIII

this court commented: “What should be obvious by now is that ‘[ijnterest is not recovered according to a rigid theory of compensation for money withheld, but is given in response to considerations of fairness.’ ”

Id.

(quoting

Blau v. Lehman,

368 U.S. 403, 413 , 82 S.Ct. 451 , 7 L.Ed.2d 403 (1962)). When the defendants’ motions

in limine

were before this court, the record was far from complete. Thus, the court declined to “make a prejudgment interest determination in [the] factual and legal vacuumf ]” which existed at that time.

See id.

at *21. Recognizing the possibility of an abuse of discretion if it were to do so, the court denied those motions

in limine

to the extent they sought to preclude the Cayuga from recovering prejudgment interest altogether.

See id.

at *25.

*286

Following Phase II, a five-week non-jury trial which included the testimony of a number of expert witnesses, the record is now fully developed as to the prejudgment interest issues which this litigation raises. The parties have also had ample opportunity to brief those issues. Accordingly, as Fed.R.Civ.P. 52 requires, the following constitutes the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in this regard.

A. Wickham Analysis

The initial determination for the court is whether the Cayuga are entitled to an award of prejudgment interest in the first place. Only after making that determination will the court be in a position to consider the amount, if any, of such an award. In undergoing its

Wickham

analysis, the court will address the second factor listed therein, “fairness and relative equities,” last because, as will be seen, the court is convinced that that factor is relevant not only to the issue of a party’s entitlement to prejudgment interest, but also to the issue of the amount of any such award.

1. Full Compensation

Among other things, a prejudgment interest “award should be a function of ... the need to fully compensate the wronged party, for actual damages suffered.”

See Wickham,

955 F.2d at 833 . In arguing that a prejudgment interest award is necessary to fully compensate it, the Cayuga contend that they must be compensated for the lost “opportunity” cost, or, as the U.S. puts it, for the “time value of money[,]”

see

Pre-Trial Memorandum of the Plaintiff-Intervenor, U.S. (“U.S.Pre-Tr.Memo.”) at 11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); that is, for not having the stream of rental income available to them over the past two centuries. The Cayuga also contend that the jury verdict was relatively low and hence prejudgment interest is necessary to assure that they are fully compensated. The State agrees that full compensation in the context of

Wickham

encompasses a “plaintiff receiving] the full value of ... money over the time during which plaintiff was deprived of that sum[,]” but it disagrees that “ ‘full compensation ]’ ... is ... a function of the amount of damages a jury awards[.]”

See

St. Pre-Tr. Memo. 33.

Case law discussing “full compensation” as that phrase is used in

Wickham

is scant and not particularly instructive in this context. However, lost opportunity cost as a part of full compensation is a widely accepted concept from a legal standpoint. Case law is replete with references to the time value of money.

See, e.g., Osterneck v. Ernst & Whitney,

489 U.S. 169, 176 , 109 S.Ct. 987 , 103 L.Ed.2d 146 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (“[W]e have repeatedly stated that prejudgment interest is an element of [plaintiffs] complete compensation.”);

Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Sherman,

2 F.2d 165, 166 (S.D.N.Y.1924) (Hand, J.) (“The present use of my money is itself a thing of value, and, if I get no compensation for its loss, my remedy does not altogether right my wrong.”);-

Prager v. New Jersey Fidelity & Plate Glass Ins. Co.,

245 N.Y. 1, 5-6 , 156 N.E. 76 (1927) (Cardozo, J.) (“While the dispute as to the value was going on, the defendant had the benefit of the money, and the plaintiff was without it. Interest must be added if we are to make the plaintiff whole.”). Courts’ recognition of the time value of money is based upon the following reasoning, as succinctly put by one legal commentator:

If justice were immediate, there would never be an award of prejudgment interest. The injured party would receive an enforceable judgment immediately, with no loss in value from the time value of money. Because justice often takes

*287

many years to achieve, interest is added to the original judgment to ensure that compensation is complete.

Michael S. Knoll,

Primer on Prejudgment Interest,

75 Tex. L.Rev. 298, 294 (Dec. 1996) (footnotes omitted).

Furthermore, although the three economists who testified during Phase II differed greatly in their conclusions as to the proper amount of prejudgment interest which this court might award, they agreed as to the meaning of opportunity cost and its relationship to prejudgment interest in this case. As the Cayuga’s economist Dr. Temin defined it, “opportunity cost ... [is] an economic term for the cost of [an] alternate aetivity[.]” Tr. at 5734. In terms of the Cayuga’s lost opportunity cost in particular, Dr. Temin expounded:

If the Cayugas had not been injured at that time in the amounts the jury determined for each year, they theoretically would have had the amounts for each year which the jury awarded, and could have used or invested those funds .... Without that property or money, they incur the opportunity cost of property or money.... If we compensate for an injury in 1795 (or other past year) as if it took place today, we ignore the opportunity cost of this injury. We compensate the injured party for the dollar amount of the injury, but not for the foregone use of the injury sustained as the injury at the time of loss.

Nat. exh. 64 at 6, ¶¶ 16 and 17. In a similar vein, the U.S.’ economist Dr. Berk-man explained:

[I]f the jury found that there was a loss to the tribe, ... as a consequence of actions in 1795 and they’ve identified those stream of losses, those losses by themselves don’t compensate [the Cayugas] for those losses, ... because it fails to recognize this opportunity cost ..., that they, in addition to having those moneys, could have used those moneys for a variety of purposes or invested them, and we have to account for the fact that they would have benefited from those incomes and prejudgment interest captures that additional benefit that they would have received, and that’s the missing piece to make them whole.

Tr. at 5929. And although the State’s economist, Dr. Grossman, radically departed from the other two economists insofar as his conclusion as to the amount of prejudgment interest which should be awarded here, he too agreed that the Cayuga had sustained a lost opportunity cost or, as he put it, the “missed opportunity of being able to invest.” Tr. at 6087.

The economists are thus in agreement that in addition to sustaining monetary damages for the loss of their homeland over the past two centuries, the Cayuga have sustained monetary losses because they did not have that money available to them for investment or other purposes over the years. Such loss makes prejudgment interest necessary here to fully compensate the Cayuga. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the jury was explicitly instructed

not

to include prejudgment interest in its award, and as previously explained, it followed that instruction.

See National Communications Association, Inc. v. Telephone and Telegraph Col,

No. 92-CIV. 1735(LAP), 1999 WL 258263 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. April 29, 1999) (plaintiff did not receive full compensation where no evidence suggested that the jury calculated and added such interest). Therefore, the Cayuga did not receive “complete compensation,” which the Supreme Court has, as recently as June of this year, repeatedly defined as including such interest.

See State of Kansas v. State of Colorado,

— U.S. -, -, 121 S.Ct. 2023, 2029 , 150

*288

L.Ed.2d 72 (2001) (citations omitted) (“Our cases since 1933 have consistently acknowledged that a monetary award does not fully compensate for an injury unless it includes an interest component”)-

The Cayuga point out, as the court has noted, that the jury verdict of nearly $37 million was less than the $335 million suggested by the U.S.’ real estate appraisal expert.

See Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki,

Nos. 80-CV-930 and 80-CV-960, slip op. at 8 n. 4 (N.D.N.Y. April 19, 2000). The verdict also was less than that suggested by the State’s real estate appraisal expert who “testified that total damages ranged from approximately 62 million dollars to approximately 40 million dollars.”

See id.

In light of the foregoing, in the absence of prejudgment interest the Cayuga assert that the $37 million jury award “does not constitute full or sufficient compensation ... for the loss of their homeland.”

See,

Cayugas’ Pre-Trial Memorandum (“Cay.Pre-Tr. Memo.”) at 26. The court agrees with the Cayuga that prejudgment interest is necessary for full compensation; but the court is highly skeptical that such interest should be used as a vehicle to augment or increase the jury’s verdict.

The Cayuga have not cited to any authority wherein a court has held that prejudgment interest is necessary to fully compensate a plaintiff based upon the supposed inadequacy of the verdict. What authority there is pertaining to how, if at all, verdict size impacts prejudgment interest is contradictory and does not involve a

Wickham

analysis. In

In Design v. K-Mart Apparel Corp.,

13 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 1994), the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s

denial

of prejudgment interest in a copyright case because there was a “sizable damage award” of $632,000.00.

See id.

at 569 . The Second Circuit reached the opposite result, however, in

Sharkey v. Lasmo (AUL Ltd.),

214 F.3d 371 (2d Cir.2000), where it held that in denying prejudgment interest the district court improperly relied upon its belief that “the jury’s award was already surprisingly] genero[u]s[.]” Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Given the lack of directly relevant precedent, the court finds that regardless of the size of the verdict, the underlying purpose of prejudgment interest, to make the plaintiff whole again,

see City of Milwaukee v. Cement Division, National Gypsum Co.,

515 U.S. 189, 196 , 115 S.Ct. 2091, 2096 , 132 L.Ed.2d 148 (1995), would best be served by an award of prejudgment interest in this case.

2. Nature of

Statute

7

Another

Wickham

factor which impacts an award of prejudgment interest “is whether the federal statute under which damages have been obtained is remedial or punitive in nature.”

See NuLife Construction Corp. v. Board of Education of the City of New York,

789 F.Supp. 103, 104 (E.D.N.Y.1992). Where a statute is remedial, such as Title VII, which aims “to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination^]”

see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,

422 U.S. 405, 418 , 95 S.Ct. 2362 , 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975), an award of prejudgment interest is appropriate.

See, e.g., O’Quinn v. New York University Medical Center,

933 F.Supp.

*289

341, 344 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (Title VII plaintiff entitled to prejudgment interest on back pay award given,

inter alia,

the “obvious remedial purposes” of that statute);

National Communications Association,

1999 WL 258263 , at *5 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1982)) (remedial purpose of Communications Act which “provides that a carrier which has violated th[at] Act ‘shall be hable to the person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of any such violation!]”’ required prejudgment interest award). On the other hand, “where the statute itself already provides for full compensation or punitive damages,” as do the antitrust laws, the Second Circuit has “suggested that prejudgment interest is improper[.]”

See Wickham,

955 F.2d at 835 (citing,

inter alia, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes,

449 F.2d 51, 80 (2d Cir.1971)) (prejudgment interest unnecessary given Clayton Act’s treble damage provision, combined with absence of congressional intent as to prejudgment interest),

rev’d on other grounds,

409 U.S. 363 , 93 S.Ct. 647 , 34 L.Ed.2d 577 (1973).

Naturally the plaintiffs and the State strongly disagree as to the nature of the statute at issue herein — the Nonintercourse Act. The Cayuga argue that because the purpose of that statute is to “prevent Indians from improvident dispositions of their lands and becoming ‘homeless chargesf,]’ ” it is remedial, thus mandating an award of prejudgment interest thereunder.

See

Cay. Post-Trial Memo, at 4 (quoting

Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Cuomo,

565 F.Supp. 1297, 1323 (N.D.N.Y.1983)

(“Cayuga II”)).

Echoing this argument, the U.S. declares that “the oft-recognized protective purposes of the Nonintercourse Act against alienation of Indian lands easily encompasses the invocation of prejudgment interest in this case.” U.S. Pre-Tr. Memo. at 28; and U.S. Post-Tr. Memo, at 7. The State’s view of the Nonintercourse Act is the antithesis of the Cayuga’s. The State deems that Act to be “prohibitory,” and hence this court should refuse to award prejudgment interest.

See

St. Pre-Tr. Memo, at 50.

The Nonintercourse Act does not fit neatly into the category of either a remedial or a punitive statute. That statute

may,

as the State urges, be prohibitory in that broadly speaking it proscribes the acquisition of Indian lands without the Federal Government’s approval. However, that prohibition does not necessarily render the Nonintercourse Act punitive. In fact, this court has previously recognized as much, albeit in a slightly different context, when in

Cayuga II

it held that it could not “accept the view that ... the Noninter-course Act ... imposes a ‘penalty’ or ‘punishment’!.]”

See Cayuga II,

565 F.Supp. at 1327 . This court went on to explain that the Nonintercourse Act “declares that certain transactions in land are of no validity in law or equity!;]” and “[t]he purpose of this restraint against alienation, ..., was to protect Indian possessory rights.”

Id.

In concluding that the Nonintercourse Act was “not penal!,]” this court further reasoned “[tjhough enforcement could work great hardship upon those who claim title through a transaction which is invalid under the Act, it is ... manifest that the statutory disability was established

not to punish,

but to accomplish ‘some other legitimate governmental purpose.’ ”

Id.

at 1328 (quoting

Trop v. Dulles,

356 U.S. 86, 96 , 78 S.Ct. 590 , 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958)) (emphasis added). In light of the foregoing, the State’s argument that the Nonin-tercourse Act is prohibitory or punitive is misplaced.

The absence of a punitive damage provision in the Nonintercourse Act lends further credence to the view that that statute

*290

is not punitive. Moreover, as this court thoroughly explained in

Cayuga II,

there is a “judicial consensus” as to the purpose of the Nonintercourse Act, which is that Congress intended “ ‘to protect the lands of the Indian tribes in order to prevent fraud and unfairness.’ ”

Id.

at 1322 (quoting

In Joint Tribal Council of the Passa-maquoddy Tribe v. Morton,

388 F.Supp. 649, 656 (D.Me.1975)). As the case law outlined in

Cayuga II

shows, that protective purpose is “rather self-evident.”

Id.

at 1323. In fact, in recognizing an implied private cause of action under that statute, the Second Circuit acknowledged the availability of a concomitant damage remedy, even in the absence of statutory language to that effect.

See Oneida Indian Nation of New York State v. County of Oneida,

719 F.2d 525, 540 (2d Cir.1983). Consequently, even though “the Nonintercourse Act of 1793 did

not

establish a comprehensive remedial plan for dealing with violations of Indian property rights,” and even though it “contains

no

remedial provision[,]”

Oneida County, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Etc.,

470 U.S. 226, 239 , 105 S.Ct. 1245 , 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985)

(“Oneida II”)

(emphasis added), that lack of a remedial framework does not undermine the fact that at its core the Nonintercourse Act is remedial in nature.

Neither the silence of the Noninter-course Act as to prejudgment interest, nor the fact that it does not expressly provide for “full” or “just” compensation alters the court’s view that fundamentally this statute is remedial. The fact that there is no mention of prejudgment interest in the Nonintercourse Act does not mean, as the State suggests, that such interest is not recoverable thereunder. Indeed, in

Wick-ham

the Second Circuit catalogued a number of Supreme Court decisions wherein recovery of prejudgment interest was allowed “under a variety of federal laws,

despite the silence

of the laws on the subject of interest.”

See Wickham,

955 F.2d at 834 (and cases cited therein) (emphasis added).

Wickham

itself was such a case; there, the Second Circuit upheld an award of prejudgment interest under the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), even though that statute is silent on the issue of such interest.

See id.

at 933-936 ;

see also Securities & Exch. Comm’n v. First Jersey Sec., Inc.,

101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir.1996) (affirming prejudgment interest award of approximately $52 million despite,

inter alia,

the absence of explicit statutory authorization).

This court is fully aware, as the State notes, that it is possible to infer intent to deny prejudgment interest from a statute’s silence. Pursuant to

Wickham ,

such intent may be inferred “from (i) the state of the law on prejudgment interest, for the type of claim involved, at the time the statute was passed, and (ii) consistent denial by the courts of prejudgment interest under the statute and failure by Congress, despite amendments to the statute, to address prejudgment interest awards.”

Wickham,

955 F.2d at 834 (citing

Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Morgan,

486 U.S. 330, 336-39 , 108 S.Ct. 1837 , 100 L.Ed.2d 349 (1988)). Neither of those criteria are met in the present case however. Despite the vast record and the voluminous briefs, there is absolutely nothing before this court regarding the state of the law with respect to prejudgment interest when the Nonintercourse Act was first enacted in 1790. The State attempts to make much of the fact that the Noninter-course Act has gone through a number of permeations with no mention of prejudgment interest. As already discussed though, that silence is irrelevant because prejudgment interest is recoverable even when a statute is silent on that issue.

In any event, the second criteria for inferring intent to deny recovery of

*291

prejudgment interest is also absent here. There is no history of denial of prejudgment interest under the Nonintercourse Act. Therefore, the Nonintercourse Act’s silence regarding prejudgment interest is of little consequence in determining whether to allow the recovery of same here, and certainly does not foreclose such an award in this case.

Moreover, the extremely limited history of prejudgment interest recovery under the Nonintercourse Act is to the contrary. As the Cayuga note, in

Oneida II,

another eastern land claim case brought pursuant to the Nonintercourse Act, the district court did “award[] the Oneidas damages in the amount of $16,694,

plus interest

[.]”

See

470 U.S. at 230 , 105 S.Ct. 1245 (emphasis added). As outlined in

Cayuga X,

given the posture of that case on appeal, “[t]he propriety of an interest award was not before either the Second Circuit or the Supreme Court[ ]” in that case.

See Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Cuomo,

1999 WL 509442 , at *17 (N.D.N.Y.1999) (“Cayuga X”). Therefore, the court rejects the Cayuga’s argument that the

Oneida

district court’s award of prejudgment interest for a mere two years, on damages less than $20,000.00, somehow provides justification for an award of prejudgment interest in this case where, among other differences, the damages span two centuries.

Likewise, the court does not give much credence to the State’s argument that because the Nonintercourse Act does not contain explicit language authorizing “just” or “entire” compensation thereunder, the Cayuga should not be allowed to recover prejudgment interest. It is the presence, not the absence, of such language which augurs against an award of prejudgment interest. In a similar vein, because the Nonintercourse Act does not provide for exemplary damages or other excess recovery, the

Wickham

Court’s admonition against the recovery of prejudgment interest under those circumstances is inapplicable here.

See Webb v. GAF Corp.,

949 F.Supp. 102, 106 (N.D.N.Y.1996) (citing

Wickham,

955 F.2d at 839 ).

To conclude, the court agrees with the Cayuga that the Nonintercourse Act’s silence does

not

bar prejudgment interest here. Nor does the fact that that statute does not expressly provide for full or just compensation prevent the recovery of prejudgment interest. Furthermore, on balance the court is convinced that the Nonin-tercourse Act is essentially remedial, so that if otherwise appropriate, prejudgment interest should be allowed thereunder.

3. “Other General Principles”

As mentioned at the beginning of this court’s

Wickham

analysis, among the “other general principles” which courts have deemed relevant to the issue of whether to award prejudgment interest in any given case are “[t]he certainty of the damages due the plaintiff[,]” and conversely “[t]he speculative nature of the damages in question[.]”

See Wickham,

955 F.2d at 835 and 836. The former factor, the certainty of the damages, “is the progeny of the old common law rule that forbade prejudgment interest when the damages were un-liquidated or unascertainable up until the time of judgment.”

Webb,

949 F.Supp. at 106 (citing 5 Corbin On Contracts § 1048 (1964)). That rule has been relaxed, however, and “[pjrejudgment interest is now commonly awarded in cases where the loss cannot be determined with certainty at the time of injury, but is susceptible to calculation by the time of trial or judgment, e.g., wrongful termination cases, securities fraud cases, [and] patent infringement cases.”

See Thomas v. City of Mount Vernon,

No. 89 Civ. 0552, 1992 WL 84560 , at *1 (S.D.N.Y. April 10, 1992) (citing

*292

Wickham,

955 F.2d at 835-36 ). On the other hand, where damages awarded to a plaintiff in a section 1983 action for her false arrest were “unliquidated and inherently speculative!,]” in that they were based “exclusively” on her “emotional injuries[,]” and she had not sustained any “economic injury[,]” the court denied her motion for prejudgment interest.

See Sulkowaska v. City of New York,

No. 99 Civ. 4228, 2001 WL 428253, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. April 25, 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Only the State addressed these “other general principles” which are relevant to a “sound decision” as to whether or not to award prejudgment interest.

See Wick-ham,

955 F.2d at 836 . Prior to Phase I the State baldly declared “that a damages calculation which rests upon estimates of fair market value and rental or cash value of what was in effect wilderness land over 200 years ago is highly uncertain and speculative.” State of New York Defendants’ Trial Memorandum (St. Ph. I Tr. Memo.) at 66. Thus, reasoned the State, application of prejudgment interest “to such an award [would] severely exacerbate[ ] this inherent weakness in the damage calculation.”

Id.

After the jury verdict and prior to Phase II, the State refined its argument. Given the admittedly “contradictory testimony” as to the proper methodology for valuing the subject property, and the experts’ “widely divergent opinions as to the ultimate value of lost rents for property in the claim area[,]” the State now asserts that the jury’s

methodology

for calculating damages was speculative, and hence it “caution[s]

against

an award of prejudgment interest where the other factors tip in favor of the State.” St. Pre-Tr. Memo, at 53 and 52 (emphasis added).

The State’s argument does not carry much weight with this court. Given the extraordinarily unique nature of this litigation, obviously the damages awarded by the jury were not as readily quantifiable as, for example, a back pay award in a Title VII case.

See, e.g., McIntosh v. Irving Trust Co.,

873 F.Supp. 872, 882 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (emphasis added) (amount of back pay award in Title VII action “calculable by reference to the

specific amounts

of

money

the plaintiff has lost and the defendant has withheld! ]”). By the same token, however, the damages awarded in this case are not “so conjectural that prejudgment interest should not be awarded.”

See Wickham,

955 F.2d at 836 . To illustrate, this is not a situation such as that presented in

Thomas,

1992 WL 84560 , at *3, wherein the court observed that even if it had the discretion to award prejudgment interest, it would not because “plaintiff sustained no economic injury; he was not deprived of money he would have otherwise earned but for the wrongdoing of the defendants.” Plaintiffs injuries in

Thomas

“were, for the most part, intangible and defendants’ unconstitutional behavior did not enable them to obtain any financial benefits from their wrongdoing.”

Id.

at *4 (citation omitted).

Accord McIntosh v. Irving Trust Co.,

873 F.Supp. 872, 882 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (citations omitted) (refusing to award prejudgment interest under New York CPLR § 5001 for pain and suffering because those damages were “not so easily calculated and represented] the jury’s translation into monetary terms of a loss that is difficult to quantify[ ]” — a loss “not easily divided into specific periods like back pay and [which] does not represent an amount that the defendant has withheld from the plaintiff in the same way that awards in contract or property actions do[ ]”).

By contrast, in the present case there is no dispute that the Cayuga sustained economic loss as a result of being deprived of their homeland for more than 200 years, and the jury so found. Undoubtedly the

*293

fair rental value damages in particular were difficult for the jury to calculate given the conflicting and varying methodologies offered by the real estate appraisal experts during Phase I. That difficulty does not render the damages inherently speculative, however. After all, the Cayugas did sustain a tangible loss — their property. The difficulty or complexity of calculating damages “should not obscure the fact that there was a reasonable basis in the evidence to support the jury’s award[,]” and “the overall basis for the damage award was [not] so speculative as to render it invalid.”

See National Communications Association,

1999 WL 258263 , at *4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Moreover, as the

Wickham

Court astutely recognized, “while the presence of abstruse inquiries and difficult questions of proof in the calculation of damages are factors to be considered carefully, these problems must be considered

together

with other factors that may favor prejudgment interest.”

Wickham,

955 F.2d at 836 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). Here, the other

Wickham

factors discussed to this point favor an award of prejudgment interest. So, while admittedly there is a “degree of speculation” in trying to ascertain the fair rental value of the subject property across a 200 plus year time frame, the court will not rale out a prejudgment interest award on the basis of this factor alone.

Furthermore, the State misses the mark when it focuses upon the purportedly speculative nature of the method by which the jury calculated damages. It is the speculative or conjectural nature of the damages themselves which potentially could impact an award of prejudgment interest — not the method by which those damages were calculated. Finally, as should be evident by now, the court wholeheartedly disagrees with the State that the

Wickham

factors discussed in the preceding sections weigh in its favor, and thus the purportedly speculative nature of the damages herein should weigh against an award of prejudgment interest. That is not to say, however, that the relative uncertainty of the damages will not enter into this court’s calculation of the amount of prejudgment interest due here. It

may

be that, in taking into account the fairness and relative equities of a prejudgment interest award, the relative uncertainty of the damages, could be a basis, among others, for reducing the amount of any such interest which the court may award in this case.

4. Fairness and Relative Equities

“Considerations of fairness and relative equities” dominated Phase II.

See Wick-ham,

955 F.2d at 834 . Here, analysis of this particular

Wickham

factor has centered on the State’s claim that at all relevant times it acted in good faith in its treatment of the Cayuga, and the related claim that the Cayuga delayed in bringing this action. For now the court will focus on the State’s claim of good faith which was one of the most significant and contentious issues of Phase II, as is evidenced by the extensive historical proof.

Before considering how the State’s good faith or lack thereof impacts the issue of prejudgment interest, there is a need for some clarification. The U.S. insists that in examining the fairness and relative equities, the court should concentrate on the jury award itself. As

Wickham

makes clear, however, the focus is on the fairness and relative equities of the prejudgment interest award, not the jury award.

See Wickham,

955 F.2d at 834 . With that in mind, the court will next address the parties’ arguments as to what role fairness and relative equities should play in analyzing the prejudgment interest issue.

*294

By arguing that “the State’s claim of ‘good faith’ does

not

affect prejudgment interest!,]” and that “[njeither [that asserted] ‘good faith’ nor ‘laches’ present an obstacle to an award of prejudgment interest in this case,” the Cayuga are taking the position that despite

Wickham

and its progeny, this court should

not

weigh the relative equities in deciding whether to award such interest.

See

Cay. Pre-Tr. Memo, at 31. Similarly, the U.S. maintains that “notions of ‘fairness’ and the ‘equities,’ ...

cannot be seen as justification for a

... decision to

deny or limit

prejudgment interest on monies historically owing ..., to the Cayugas.” U.S. Pre-Tr. Memo, at 18-19 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The U.S. further reasons that “assuming,

arguendo,

that either the State was acting in good faith,

or

... that the Cayugas were less than innocent in all of these proceedings, the propriety for an award of prejudgment interest here would not change.”

Id.

at 18 (citing

City of Milwaukee,

515 U.S. 189 , 115 S.Ct. 2091 , 132 L.Ed.2d 148 (1995)) (emphasis added). In other words, the plaintiffs are arguing that regardless of whether or not the State acted in good faith, and regardless of whether or not the Cayuga delayed in bringing this action, they are entitled to an award of prejudgment interest. The court’s reading of the relevant case law does not support these arguments.

In arguing that fairness and relative equities have no place in this court’s analysis of prejudgment interest, the plaintiffs are effectively arguing that

Wickham

is no longer good law. In support of that proposition, the plaintiffs heavily rely upon two Supreme Court cases,

West Virginia v. United States,

479 U.S. 305 , 107 S.Ct. 702 , 93 L.Ed.2d 639 (1987), and

City of Milwaukee,

515 U.S. 189 , 115 S.Ct. 2091 , 132 L.Ed.2d 148 , which they contend substantially erode the notion of balancing the equities in the context of prejudgment interest.

To be sure, in

West Virginia,

the Supreme Court did reject the view “that whether [prejudgment] interest had to be paid depended on a balancing of equities between the • parties!.]”

See West Virginia,

479 U.S. at 311 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. 702 . It is likewise true that in

City of Milwaukee ,

the Supreme Court explained that by reading

West Virginia

“as disapproving of a ‘balancing of the equities’ as a method of deciding whether to allow prejudgment interest!,]” ..., the Seventh Circuit “deepened an existing Circuit split regarding the criteria for denying prejudgment interest in maritime collision cases.”

City of Milwaukee,

515 U.S. at 193 , 115 S.Ct. 2091 (citations omitted). The Court in

City of Milwaukee

further explained that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases, “subject to a limited exception, for ‘peculiar’ or ‘exceptional’ circumstances.”

Id.

at 195 , 115 S.Ct. 2091 (citations omitted). That limited exception does not include “the existence of a legitimate difference of opinion on the issue of liability” because such a dispute “is merely a characteristic of most ordinary lawsuits!;] [i]t is not an extraordinary circumstance that can justify denying prejudgment interest.”

Id.

at 198 , 115 S.Ct. 2091 (citation omitted). In holding,

inter alia,

that a good faith dispute over liability does not justify denying prejudgment interest, and indeed that such a dispute “carries little weighty” the Supreme Court reasoned that “[i]f interest were awarded as a penalty for bad-faith conduct of the litigation, the City’s argument would be well taken. But prejudgment interest is not awarded as a penalty; it is merely an element of just compensation.”

Id.

at 197 , 115 S.Ct. 2091 .

This court is fully cognizant of the Supreme Court’s rulings in both

West Virgi

*295

nia

and

City of

Milwaukee,

8

Those two cases are readily distinguishable from the present case. In finding that

City of Milwaukee

does not govern this court’s analysis of prejudgment interest, the court first notes that

City of Milwaukee

involved a maritime collision where there is a “traditional hospitality to prejudgment interest[.]”

See City of Milwaukee,

515 U.S. at 196 , 115 S.Ct. 2091 . In fact, the observation has been made that “[ajdmiralty courts have long been more sympathetic to the award of prejudgment interest than have the law courts[,]” and “have developed an independent approach to the prejudgment interest problem.”

See

Comment,

Prejudgment Interest: Survey and Suggestion,

(“Survey”), 77 Nw. U.L.Rev. 192, 193 and 214 (1982) (footnote omitted).

Moreover, the prejudgment interest award in

City of Milwaukee

was calculated for a mere 18 years between the date of the accident and the entry of judgment. The present land claim litigation is a far cry from a typical admiralty case such as

City of Milwaukee .

Here, the initial injury occurred in 1795, and hence there is a potential for prejudgment interest spanning over two centuries. Also in sharp contrast to admiralty cases where the time between injury and judgment is relatively short, in this land claim action there is no precedent for remedies, let alone a “traditional hospitality to prejudgment interest[.]”

See City of Milwaukee,

515 U.S. at 196 , 115 S.Ct. 2091 . Given the obvious factual distinctions between

City of Milwaukee

and the current action, the court does not read that case as broadly as do the Cayuga,

i.e.,

indicating that it is

never

appropriate for a court to balance the equities in deciding whether or not to award prejudgment interest.

Likewise,

West Virginia,

479 U.S. 305 , 107 S.Ct. 702 , 93 L.Ed.2d 639 , is easily distinguishable from the present case. Again, the Court’s rejection in

West Virginia

of a balancing of the equities approach to prejudgment interest was in an entirely different context than here. The issue in

West Virginia

was whether a state was obligated to pay prejudgment interest to the Federal Government, and the Court held that it was. The propriety of a prejudgment interest award in a dispute between a state and the Federal Government implicate very different policy concerns than those here. In

West Virginia,

the Court was guided by the fundamental principle that “States have no sovereign immunity as against the Federal Government[.]”

West Virginia,

479 U.S. at 313 , 107 S.Ct. 702 . Obviously that policy has no bearing on the present litigation which in its current posture pits the Cayuga and the U.S. against the State of New York.

The temporal relationship between

West Virginia

and

Wickham

also militates against a finding that

West Virginia

governs the issue of prejudgment interest herein.

West Virginia

preceded the Second Circuit’s decision in

Wickham

by almost exactly five years. Thus, if the Second Circuit deemed

West Virginia

to have altered the standards by which prejudgment interest should be awarded in this Circuit, surely it would have mentioned that Supreme Court decision in

Wickham ,

but it did not. And although

City of Milwaukee

was decided several years after

Wickham ,

that does not necessarily mean that the former case undermines the continuing vitality of

Wickham .

That is especially so given that

City of Milwaukee

was a maritime collision case and arguably limited to that context. Thus, despite the

*296

Cayuga’s arguments to the contrary, nothing in either

City of Milwaukee

or

West Virginia

persuades this court to abandon its earlier views, as expressed in

Cayuga VIII ,

that fairness and relative equities including the State’s asserted good faith are relevant to an analysis of prejudgment interest.

See Cayuga VIII,

1999 WL 224615 , at *20-*21.

In arguing against balancing the equities, time and again the Cayuga harken back to the compensatory nature of prejudgment interest. The court is keenly aware of this aspect of prejudgment interest.

See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission v. Tome,

638 F.Supp. 638, 640 (S.D.N.Y.1986),

aff'd on other grounds,

833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir.1987) (quoting

Norte & Co. v. Huffines,

416 F.2d 1189, 1191 (2d Cir.1969)). The court is equally cognizant, however, that the Second Circuit has recognized more than once, that these “compensatory principles

must be tempered by an assessment

of the

equities.” See Lodges 713 and 1716, Etc. v. United Aircraft,

534 F.2d 422, 447 (2d Cir.1975) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Tempering the compensatory nature of prejudgment interest with the equities is critical in this unique lawsuit for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the conclusion of the Cayuga’s economist that they are entitled to recover $1.7 billion in prejudgment interest.

To summarize, the court finds no merit in the Cayuga’s argument that in deciding whether to award prejudgment interest, the court need not consider the equities. Indeed, considerations of fairness and relative- equities will factor into the court’s initial determination as to the propriety of awarding the Cayuga prejudgment interest, as well as into the court’s calculation of such award, if any.

Even though the court will consider fairness and relative equities, the court does not agree with the State that those equities are “dispositive” and require

denying

an award of prejudgment interest.

See

St. Pre-Trial at 35. More specifically, the State contends that its “level of ... culpability” is a “determinative factor[;]” and because in the State’s view there has been no showing of culpable conduct on its part with respect to any aspect of the underlying treaties, the court should deny prejudgment interest altogether to the Cayuga.

See id.

at 38.

This argument is disingenuous at best. Since its April 15, 1999, decision in

Cayuga VIII ,

the court has stressed that in all likelihood it would be guided by

Wickham ,

which involves not one, but a host of factors, in deciding the availability of prejudgment interest in any given case. Therefore, it should come as no surprise to the State that the court gives no credence to the notion that the level of a party’s culpability is somehow dispositive of the issue of whether to award prejudgment interest. Moreover, the thoroughly developed historical record in this case belies the State’s assertion that it did not engage in

any

culpable conduct insofar as the Cayuga are concerned. Even if the State could show that it acted in good faith, that would “not automatically render an award of interest improper.”

See Association of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters Within the City of New York v. State of New York,

772 F.Supp. 1412, 1418 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (citing

E.E.O.C. v. County of Erie,

751 F.2d 79 , 81 (2d Cir.1984)). Consequently, the State’s good faith, even if proven, would not be a sufficient basis upon which to bar an award of prejudgment interest especially where, as here, the other

Wickham

factors tip in favor of such an award.

In addition, the State is conveniently overlooking case law which contradicts its argument that it can avoid liability for

*297

prejudgment interest by proving its good faith. In

Webb,

949 F.Supp. 102 , the court rejected such an argument reasoning that because “prejudgment interest is compensatory, not punitive,... ‘wrongdoing by a defendant is not a prerequisite to an award[,]’ ” the “defendant’s good faith d[id] not shift the balance of equities away from a grant of prejudgment interest [.]”

Id.

(quoting

Lodges 743 and 1746,

534 F.2d at 447 ). Applying the same reasoning as the

Webb

court, in

Trapani v. Consolidated Edison Employees’ Mutual Aid Society, Inc.,

No. 85 CIV. 2690, 1988 WL 138129 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.14, 1988), the court rejected defendant’s argument that prejudgment interest “should be denied because [its] actions were at all times motivated by good faith and because defendant did not divert any of its funds for improper or venal purposes.”

See id.

at *1 (citations omitted).

Having determined that it is not only proper but necessary for the court to consider fairness and relative equities in resolving the issue of prejudgment interest, the court is compelled to comment briefly upon the scope of its equitable discretion. The State is arguing that if this court decides to award prejudgment interest, “[a]n assessment of the relative equities[,]” including the State’s alleged good faith, should have some bearing on the court’s calculation of that award.

See

St. Pre-Tr. Memo, at 35 n. 6. The Cayuga disagree, claiming that the “[c]ourt may

not

use the State’s purported good faith to reduce the [amount of] prejudgment interest rightfully due to the[m].” Cay. Post-Tr. Memo, at 26. The U.S. similarly maintains that “[t]he [c]ourt lacks discretion to

limit

prejudgment interest based on the equities.” U.S. Pre-Trial Memo, at 17 (emphasis added). The issue thus becomes whether the court may rely on fairness and relative equities in deciding the amount of any prejudgment interest which it may award herein, or whether those factors are only relevant to the decision as to the availability of such an award in the first place.

“[C]ourts have done little to sketch the limits of acceptable discretion[ ]” when it comes to the issue of prejudgment interest.

See Matter of Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz,

954 F.2d 1279, 1334 (7th Cir.1992). Keeping in mind that prejudgment interest is above all else an equitable remedy,

see Commercial Union Assur. Co., plc v. Milken,

17 F.3d 608, 614 (2d Cir.1994) (citation omitted), however, the court is of the conviction that its discretion encompasses not only the threshold decision as to whether to allow recovery of prejudgment interest, but also the discretion to determine the amount, which encompasses setting the rate, the accrual date and the methodology for computing such interest.

a. Burden of Proof

There is another issue — the burden of proof — which the court must address before scrutinizing the historical proof which is the cornerstone of the parties’ equitable arguments. There are two components to the burden of proof issue here. The first is which party bears the burden in terms of the prejudgment interest award itself. Resolution of that issue is relatively straightforward.

“Prejudgment interest, ..., is ‘an element of complete compensation.’”

Loeffler v. Frank,

486 U.S. 549, 558 , 108 S.Ct. 1965 , 100 L.Ed.2d 549 (1988) (quoting

West Virginia,

479 U.S. at 310 , 107 S.Ct. 702 ). As such, this court has previously held that “the Cayugas must shoulder the burden of proof with respect to damages!.]”

Cayuga VIII,

1999 WL 224615 , at *12. Consistent with the foregoing, the plaintiffs concede, and the State agrees, that they have the burden of estab

*298

lishing “the extent and scope of prejudgment interest[.]”

See

Plaintiff-Intervener United States’ Response to Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief (“U.S.Resp.”) at 22;

see also

St. PosL-Tr. Memo, at 62 (citations omitted) (“[A] plaintiff should bear the burden of establishing the existence and breadth of [its] entitlement to prejudgment interest[.]”).

That burden does not necessarily require that the Cayuga prove their initial entitlement to a prejudgment interest award. For one reason, prejudgment interest “is presumptively available to victims of federal law violations.”

Worthington v. City of New Haven,

No. 3:94-CV-00609, 1999 WL 958627 (D.Conn. Oet.5, 1999), at *17 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Cognizant of this presumption, the court in

Maney v. United Sanitation, Inc.,

No. 99 Civ. 8595, 2000 WL 1191235 , at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.21, 2000), exercised its discretion in favor of awarding plaintiff prejudgment interest in an action to confirm an arbitration award pursuant to the LMRA.

9

Arguably the Cayuga are presumptively entitled to recover prejudgment interest because this court has previously held that they were subject to Nonintercourse Act violations in 1795 and again in 1807. Second, and even more important even if the Cayuga are not entitled to the benefit of this presumption, arguably at this point they are entitled to an award of prejudgment interest because the three

Wickham

factors discussed so far all weigh in favor of such an award. As they recognized, however, the burden of proof still remains with the plaintiffs to establish the amount of prejudgment interest to which they may be entitled.

The second and more vigorously disputed burden of proof issue pertains to the State’s good faith or lack thereof. As previously noted, the parties’ equitable arguments are framed principally in terms of such good faith. The Cayuga assert that in the present case because the State claims that its good faith should relieve it from liability for any prejudgment interest award, or, alternatively, that its good faith should reduce the amount of such an award, the State must prove the same by a preponderance of the evidence. In terms of defining the scope of that good faith burden, without citing to any authority and without defining its terms, the Cayuga are taking the position that the State must prove that it “acted

affirmatively

in good faith.”

See

Cay. Reply at 23 (emphasis added).

On the other hand, the State contends that to establish their entitlement to prejudgment interest, the Cayuga bear the burden of proof, which according to the State, “includes showing that the State did not act in good faith.”

See

St. Pre-Tr. Memo, at 61; and St. Reply at 7. The court agrees with the Cayuga that because the State’s good faith argument is akin to an affirmative defense in that it is responding to the Cayuga’s claim for prejudgment interest,

see National Union Fire Ins. v. City Sav., F.S.B.,

28 F.3d 376, 393 (3rd Cir.1994), the burden lies with the State to prove the same. The court does not agree that the State has an obligation to show that it

affirmatively

acted in good faith, however.

This good faith/bad faith inquiry falls under the rubric of the second

Wickham

*299

factor — considerations of fairness and relative equities. There is limited case law expounding upon this particular

Wickham

factor. Recognizing that an award of prejudgment interest “should be based on fundamental considerations of fairness,” the Second Circuit in

Norte,

416 F.2d 1189 , a derivative stockholders’ action, remanded on the issue of prejudgment interest. In so doing, the Second Circuit directed the district court to “make specific findings, ..., on the personal wrongdoings” of the defendants.

Id.

at 1191 . Consistent with that directive of the

Norte

Court, the district court in

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Tome,

638 F.Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y.1986),

aff'd on other grounds,

833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir.1987), held,

inter alia,

that the equities did not weigh in favor of the defendant because he

“willfully violated

the securities

laws

and thereafter

attempted,

through lies and deceit, to

coverup

his role in the illegal activity]!]”

Id.

at 640 (emphasis added). The court also pointed to the fact that the defendant “remained outside the United States to avoid prosecution on related criminal charges.”

Id.

Likewise, in

S.E.C. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.,

837 F.Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y.1993), aff

'd on other grounds,

16 F.3d 520 (2d Cir.1994), the district court awarded prejudgment interest against two repeat offenders under the securities laws who had participated in a “blatant scheme to defraud,” and who had continuously refused to recognize the wrongfulness of their actions.

Id.

at 609 .

10

In examining fairness and relative equities, at least in the securities context, courts evaluate a defendant’s intent and the nature of the defendant’s wrongdoing.

Outside the securities law context a party’s intent has also been deemed relevant to an assessment of the fairness and relative equities of a prejudgment interest award. For example, in

Cruz,

1995 WL 374401 at *4 (emphasis added), the court granted an award of prejudgment interest because, among other reasons, the “relative equities” supported such an award in that the defendant “Union

did not act innocently nor was it unaware of its actions

with regard to its failure to fairly represent the plaintiffs.”

Id.

at *4 (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion, the district court observed that on an earlier appeal “[t]he Second Circuit [had] agreed that the evidence supported the jury’s finding that the Union failed,

arbitrarily,

to pursue the plaintiffs’ grievances.”

Id.

In fact, in

Wickham

itself the Second Circuit affirmed an award of prejudgment interest where, among other reasons, “there [wa]s

no basis

in the history of the dispute between Wickham and the union

for concluding

that the union

acted innocently or that

the

union’s actions

against Wickham were

taken in good faith.” Wickham,

955 F.2d at 839 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Second Circuit reasoned, “[t]here is every indication in this case that the union

knew

it was

clearly violating

a

specific statutory duty

erected by the LMRA.”

Id.

(emphasis added). Beyond this the Court did not elucidate what constitutes good faith for prejudgment interest purposes.

In light of the foregoing, in demonstrating its good faith the State must show more than simply the absence of bad faith. The court will examine the record to determine,

inter alia,

whether the State knew it was clearly violating the Nonintercourse

*300

Act and whether it willfully violated that statute. The court will also consider whether the record as it is presently constituted supports a finding that the State “acted innocently and had no reason to know of the wrongfulness of [its] actions,”

see Wickham,

955 F.2d at 884 (citing

Jackson County,

808 U.S. at 352-53, 60 S.Ct. 285 ), not just with respect to the Noninter-course Act, but in terms of all its dealings with the Cayuga as chronicled in the vast historical proof before the court. The State will not, however, be required to show that its actions were primarily directed to protect the Cayuga and their interests during the relevant time frames.

Historical Evidence

“What is history but a fable agreed upon?”

11

Napoleon Bonaparte

During Phase II the court heard the testimony of three experts regarding the historical aspects of this land claim litigation: Laurence M. Hauptman, Ph.D., currently a State University of New York (“SUNY”) Distinguished Professor of History at SUNY at New Paltz, on behalf of the Cayuga; Peter M. Whiteley, Ph.D., a cultural anthropologist, who is a professor at Sarah Lawrence College, on behalf of the U.S.; and Alexander von Gernet, Ph. D., an ethno-historian who is an assistant, non-tenured professor in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Toronto at Mississauga on behalf of the State of New York.

12

Before examining the substance of their testimony, the court has a few comments as to the nature of this proof generally.

Inevitably, as happened here, “disputes about controversial historical questions spill over into arguments about ideological motivation and methodological shortcomings.” Daniel A. Farber,

Adjudication of Things Past: Reflections on History as Evidence,

49 Hastings L.J. 1009 , 1026 (1998)

(“Reflections on History

”). Thus, in the present case, in an effort to diminish the credibility of opposing historians and to inflate the credibility of their own historians, each of the parties vigorously attacked the ideology and methodology of the opposing historians. This tactic often backfired though because the parties ended up engaging in vitriolic rhetoric, which unfortunately carried over into their post-trial memoranda. What is more, many of these attacks bordered on the petty or trivial, such as the Cayuga’s attack on Dr. von Gernet for not seeking tenure. These attacks were ineffective for two reasons. First, they only served to obscure those times when a party did have a legitimate dispute with a particular historian’s point of view or methodology. Second, the party engaging in this conduct did nothing to prove or further the objectivity of its own expert historian.

Nonetheless, after reviewing their respective reports and

curriculum vitaes,

listening to their testimony, including how they responded to direct challenges on cross-examination, the court finds that each historian had something of value to offer, and their differing perspectives aided the court in obtaining a more complete picture of the historical events at issue. In fact, as will be seen, the court’s findings as to the historical evidence are an amalgam of each of the differing viewpoints of these expert witnesses.

The court recognizes that “the task of any historian ... is a difficult one: if he

*301

[or she] inserts and stresses material detrimental to the reputation of his [or her] subject he [or she] is inevitably accused of bias in one direction, and if he [or she] omits such material he [or she] is open to the charge of bias in another direction.”

In re Long Island R. Co.,

91 F.Supp. 439, 444 (E.D.N.Y.1950). In any historical survey there is an “inherent subjective factor involved in the selection of ‘significant’ facts[.]”

See Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines,

121 F.2d 336, 346 (2d Cir.1941). Recognizing this inherent subjectivity, the court has a few observations about each expert historian which, to a certain extent, bear upon the weight which the court is willing to accord their testimony.

The State ridicules Dr. Hauptman’s report for being “a cut-and-paste package of recycled material from articles and books he wrote in other contexts in years gone by.”

See

St. Reply at 62, n. 32. Tr. at 3851. The court does not criticize Dr. Hauptman’s report for its form, as does the State, but the court does question the academic rigor of this report, in part because it contains many broad, rhetorical statements, not all of which find support in this historical record.

As will be more fully discussed below, the court is well aware that complete objectivity or neutrality in recounting these historical events is all but impossible to achieve. Perhaps more so than the other two historians who testified, however, Dr. Hauptman’s testimony seemed to be unduly influenced by two areas in which he has conducted extensive research over the years — New York State transportation policies and interests and land speculation vis-a-vis the Iroquois Confederacy. The culmination of this research is Dr. Haupt-man’s book entitled, “Conspiracy of Interests Iroquois Dispossession and the Rise of New York State.” Notably, the primary focus of this book is what Hauptman deems to be “two key Iroquois nations,” the Oneida and the Seneca.

See

Nat. exh. 1 at xvi. The Cayuga, and the 1795 and 1807 transactions in particular, receive only passing mention. In making these observations, the court is not challenging the merits of Dr. Hauptman’s scholarship, particularly as reflected in this book. The court is simply pointing out that because his research, especially in recent years, has focused heavily upon transportation interests and land speculation, naturally that is the lens through which he has viewed the historical events at issue in this lawsuit, and his perception of these events has been colored by that lens.

The U.S.’ expert historian, Dr. Whiteley, was not without his own bias. As with Dr. Hauptman, the court cannot dispute Dr. Whiteley’s credentials. The court is struck, however, by the fact that this is Whiteley’s first exposure to eastern land claims, which undisputably raise very different issues and concerns than typically arise in western land disputes, such as those involving the Hopi Indians, with which Dr. Whiteley has had so much firsthand experience.

13

Dr. Whiteley referred to himself as an “objective” historian, Tr. at 3408, who had done “an objective assessment of the historical record[ ]” in this case. Tr. at 3119. In contrast to Dr. Hauptman in particular, Whiteley was relatively candid in acknowledging the difficulty which any social scientist has in remaining completely neutral. Dr. Whiteley still had a tendency to place a modern construct on these centuries’ old events, and to portray the U.S. as the “good guy” and the State as the “bad guy.” Given

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that perspective, it is not surprising that throughout his testimony Whiteley consistently interpreted documents and events in a way which supports that rather simplistic version of the historical events at issue herein.

Insofar as the State’s history expert, Dr. von Gernet, is concerned, the court is acutely aware that his version of the historical events at issue admittedly is the “minority” view when compared to the other two testifying historians, as well as when compared to the views of well-recognized scholars in this area such as Dr. Barbara Graymont; and Dr. William Fen-ton, author of “A Political History of Iroquois Confederacy,” and “generally regarded in the academic community as the dean of Iroquois research.”

1

4

Tr. at 4855-56;

see also

St. exh. 623. While his scholarly views are not as “iconoclastic” as the Cayuga depict them,

see

Cay. Pre-Tr. Memo, at 55, it is fair to say, as Dr. von Gernet himself testified, that “[a]s of September 1999, [he] was the

only

scholar” who had arrived at the opinion that “New York treated the Cayugas fairly in 1795 and 1807[.]” Tr. at 4819-20 (emphasis added). Dr. von Gernet attributed this opinion, which is outside the “mainstream,” to the fact that he was “the

only

scholar who had looked into this in any great detail[.]”

Id.

at 4819 (emphasis added). To von Gernet “great detail” meant “looking] into the speeches in all of the primary sources[,]” an aspect of Dr. Fen-ton’s research with which von Gernet takes issue. The court is not in a position, nor would it be proper for it to compare the depth of Dr. von Gernet’s with that of other historians, especially those, like Fen-ton, who did not testify, von Gernet’s research was thorough, but that does not distinguish it from much of the other historical evidence before the court, including Dr. Whiteley’s report. What distinguishes Dr. von Gernet’s research here is the conclusions which he reached.

Naturally, each party tried to depict its respective historian as an objective scholar, researcher, and reporter of history. The court is mindful, however, that “[h]is-tory is not an exact scienee[;] [it is] more in the nature of an art[.]”

See

Hume, 121 F.2d at 346 . Indeed, as one legal scholar has astutely observed, “the very subject matter of history is value loaded[.]”

Reflections on History

at 1028. In fact, “even the greatest believer in objective historical truth must admit that there are limits to historical knowledge.”

Id.

at 1027. Practically speaking, “[t]here are limits ... to the degree of objective truth we can expect to attain. When we seek to interpret documents, ascribe causes, assign probabilities, or reconstruct cultures,” all of which the expert historians in this case were asked to do, “we become involved in a complex web of fact and theory, making the establishment of a definitive answer more problematic.”

Id.

at 1031 (footnote omitted). Moreover, it is difficult to be a completely dispassionate historian because we are all humans who understandably view events through the unique lens of our own life experiences. Thus, the historians’ opinions expressed

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during Phase II were necessarily “colored” to a certain extent — colored by their experiences, both personally and professionally, and by the task which they were asked to perform.

Complete objectivity is an unobtainable goal as Dr. von Gernet recognized when he candidly testified that he does not think that it is “ever possible to have complete objectivity in any historical matter, particularly when you’re dealing with events so long ago.” Tr. at 5241. Nonetheless, in making the following findings as to the historical proof, the court is striving for relative objectivity, recognizing that “[a]s a practical matter, there are some events whose true facts will forever remain debatable because of the ambiguities in the historical record, and some facts whose import will always be subject to conflicting interpretations.”

See Reflections on History

at 1027.

The State’s view of the events at issue is, in short, that it did no wrong. The State contends that in the years before 1795 and for a time thereafter, it was the Cayuga who wanted to dispose of their land, and the State was simply accommodating them. Characterizing the State’s view of history as “parochial and narrow-minded!,]” the Cayuga respond that the State did not act in good faith and in fact, that its policy “toward Indians, including the Cayuga, was characterized by greed, duplicity and racism!.]” Cay. Pre-Tr. Memo, at 37 and 33. Consequently the “relative equities” tip decidedly in their favor, the Cayuga believe.

The U.S. criticizes the State for not only “ignoring] the[ ] damaging historical facts, but [for] rewriting] them!,]” U.S. Post-Tr. Memo, at 30; and in so doing “inventing] a revisionist, one-sided story that relies on out of context incidents and ‘sound bites’ and ignores any and all aspects of the historical record inconsistent with its general theory that only the Cayuga and the U.S. can be blamed for the State’s illegal actions in 1795 and 1807.” U.S. Resp. at 1. Believing that it has taken the proverbial “high road” in its recitation of the record, the U.S. cavalierly responds that “no argument can be made to deny that New York consistently and uniformly acted in bad faith toward the Cayugas for decades leading up to, during, and even after the illegal transactions.” U.S. Post-Tr. Memo, at 19. The U.S. goes so far as to assert that “[w]ithin mere generations, the State successfully implemented a plan to rob the Cayuga of the entirety of their age-old homeland.”

Id.

The U.S. makes this bold assertion despite the fact that the historical record affirms that the U.S. did little, if anything, to protect or defend the interests of their wards,

i.e.,

the Cayuga, up until 1992 when it intervened on their behalf in this lawsuit.

Without exception,

each

of the parties has to a certain extent overstated and oversimplified their respective versions of “history.” In some instances there are legitimate conflicting interpretations of these events. For example, the historical evidence proffered as to the State’s good faith, or lack thereof, in its dealings with the Cayuga is at times consistent, at times in conflict, and often not incapable of discernment with any degree of exactitude. The court will attempt, as best it can, to present the parties’ respective proffers with the objective of adopting that version of evidence in question that is best supported by the proof. To the extent possible, the court will rely upon the contemporaneous documents, keeping in mind that interpretations often vary, depending upon one’s point of view.

In analyzing the fairness and relative equities, the court cannot simply examine the circumstances immediately surrounding the 1795 and 1807 treaties. During

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Phase I of this litigation, where the issue was valuing the subject property, the old adage that real estate is “location, location, location,” was often-invoked. In a variation on that theme, as each of the historians made abundantly clear (and as is rather self-evident in any event), history is “context, context, context.” Therefore, before considering the 1795 and 1807 treaties themselves, it is necessary to examine in some detail the historical backdrop of those treaties.

I. Pre-Revolutionary War

The Cayuga’s method of governance; their protocols and their early history of dealings with the State are helpful to an understanding of the context of the 1795 and 1807 treaties. These earlier events can help shed some light on those treaties in terms of expectations and motivations, not just with respect to the Cayuga, but also with respect to the State and the U.S.

In “pre-European times[,]” Gov. exh. 362 at 8 n. 1;

see also

Tr. at 4394-95, the Cayuga, along with four other Iroquois based language nations (the Mohawk, the Oneida, the Onondaga and the Seneca), “were part of a confederacy variously known as the Five Nations Iroquois,

Hau-denosaunee,

League of the Iroquois, or Iroquois Confederacy.” St. exh. 623 at 7;

see also

Gov. exh. 362 at 8, n. 1. The Five Nations became the “Six Nations” in the early 18th century when the Tuscarora joined that confederacy.

See id.; see also

Tr. at 4401; and Tr. at 2842. Prior to the Revolutionary War, Cayuga territory comprised approximately 1700 square miles, spanning from Lake Ontario southward into Pennsylvania.

See

Gov. exh. 436; Tr. at 2841; 2846-47;

see also

Nat. exh. 61 at 6; St. exh. 623 at 7. And in 1771, also prior to the Revolutionary War, there were approximately 1,040 Cayuga in that area.

See

St. exh. 623 at 7.

In 1768, the British Crown and the Six Nations entered into a Treaty, which set the boundaries of the Nations’ territory. Tr. at 2843-44;

see also

Gov. exh. 435; Tr. at 4658. That Treaty provided,

inter alia,

that the Six Nations were “the true and absolute [Pjroprietors of the [Ljands northwest of a ... line that subsequently became known as the old line of property.”

Id.

at 2843 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);

see also

Tr. at 3132. In terms of the Cayuga territory in particular, this 1768 Treaty recognized the same because their territory was included within the Six Nations’ property boundaries.

See id.

at 2847. The Indians viewed this Treaty as “settling] a permanent boundary between the[y] and whites.” Gov. exh. 228 at 260.

In 1777, New York State adopted a Constitution. Stressing that it was “of great importance” to the State’s “safety” to “support[] and maintain!)]” “peace and amity with the Indians,” and also expressing awareness of “frauds too often practiced towards the ... Indians,” Article 37 of that Constitution expressly provided:

That

no purchases or contracts for the sale of lands

made since the 14th day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five, or which may hereafter be made

with or of the said Indians, within the limits of this state, shall be binding on said Indians, or deemed valid, unless made under the authority and with the consent of the legislature of this state.

See

Gov. exh. 491 at 185 (emphasis added). This appears to be a carryover from the second session of New York’s Colonial Assembly, held in 1684, which expressly required that “from henceforward noe Purchase of Lands from the Indians shall bee esteemed a good Title without Leave first had and obtained from the Governour.” St. exh. 623 at 8 (internal quotations marks

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and footnote omitted). Dr. von Gernet characterized this Constitution as “pro-vid[ing] for a protectionist philosophy, [while] at the same time a mechanism for alienation which involved the preemption right.” Tr. at 4661.

II. American Revolution

In the early stages of the American Revolution the Six Nations remained neutral.

See

Tr. at 2848-49; Nat. exh. 61. at 7; Gov. exh. 362 at 9; and St. exh. 623 at 10; and Tr. at 4484. In 1777, however, the Iroquois policy of military neutrality began to break down. As Anthony Wallace, one of the leading scholars in Iroquois history,

see

Tr. at 3837-38, wrote in his book, “The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca,” in the early summer of 1777, British agents formally requested that the Six Nations fight on behalf of the Crown.

See

Gov. exh. 324 at 132. Initially the Six Nations could not come to a consensus as to this request, with some concern being expressed that the Indians should not involve themselves in this “white man’s” feud.

See id.

at 133. Eventually, though, “[a] majority of the warriors passed a resolution” to support the British.

Id.

Despite that resolution, the Six Nations did not stay united in their support for Britain. The Cayuga, along with the Seneca, the Onondaga and the Mohawk, continued to side with the British Crown, even after a plea from Congress to join with the Americans. The Oneida and the Tuscarora split the Six Nations’ allegiance by supporting the Americans.

See

Gov. exh. 362 at 9; Tr. at 4835; Nat. exh. 61 at 7.

The U.S.’ historian, Dr. Whiteley, opined that it is an “oversimplifi[cation]” to characterize “the Cayuga Nation merely as enemies of the Patriots in the Revolutionary War[.]” Gov. exh. 362 at 10. As Dr. Whiteley testified, there is some indication in the record that not all Cayuga were staunch supporters of the British Crown; “evidently [some were] neutral or in sympathy with the Americans.”

Id.

at 9;

see also id.

at 10. Even though Dr. Whiteley admitted that he could not name or point “to a historic instance where somebody reported ... a band of Cayugas ... fighting alongside American forces[,]” Tr. at 3146, that does not significantly undermine his opinion that perhaps not

all

Cayuga were loyal to the British during the Revolutionary War. It is unrealistic to think that

every member

of any nation is

always

in agreement with the policies of that nation, especially when it comes to war; and certainly these divided loyalties were evident among

other

Iroquois member nations.

See

Gov. exh. 363 at 438-39;

see also

Tr. at 2850 (emphasis added) (“[Within

all tribes,

the historical record indicates that there was a division of views.”). At the end of the day though, the court agrees with the assessment of the State’s historian “that there is [in]sufficient evidence to overturn an academic consensus that the Cayuga were participants in the American Revolution on the British side.” Tr. at 4835.

There were a number of significant battles during the American Revolution. Two battles were prominent in the historical proof presented during Phase II — the battle at Wyoming Valley and the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign. The significance of the Wyoming Valley battle as will be seen, lies not so much in what transpired there as the fact that it was a major impetus for the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign.

A. Wyoming Valley

The battle at Wyoming Valley, part of the ongoing battles of the Revolutionary War was “the first major event of the 1778 fighting-season[.]”

See

Gov. exh. 324 at 137. Wyoming Valley was one of “two

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major and strictly military engagements[ ]”... “during which Iroquois warriors had participated as brothers-in-arms with British troops[.]”

See id.

at 137 and 138. Thus the battle at Wyoming Valley was by no means “primarily or exclusively a Native American battle.” Tr. at 4837. Insofar as Cayuga participation at Wyoming Valley is concerned, Dr. von Gernet stated that “[i]n June, 1778 a large party of Cayuga warriors joined Butler’s Rangers and other Indians in the devastating assault on the Wyoming Valley in Pennsylvania.” St. exh 634 at 10;

see also

Tr. at 4659. Although Dr. von Gernet did not cite a source for this statement, there is corroborating proof in the record that the Cayuga were among those Indians fighting at Wyoming Valley. In her book entitled “The Iroquois in the American Revolution,” Graymont indicates that of the Indians who participated at Wyoming Valley, they were

“mostly

of the Seneca and Cayuga tribes.” Gov. exh. 228 at 168 (emphasis added).

The attack by the British and the Iroquois warriors resulted in the Americans retreating, and the battle became a “rout[.]” See Gov. exh. 324 at 137. Thereafter, “[t]he settlements in the valley of Wyoming were ... burned and looted, and most of the inhabitants fled into the mountains.”

Id.

The fighting at Wyoming Valley had devastating consequences,

see, e.g.,

Gov. exh. 228 at 172, but it is widely accepted among historians that these events were greatly exaggerated.

See

Tr. at 3592-93. As Dr. von Gernet so astutely observed, “truth is the first casualty of war[,]” and so it was with the'Wyoming Valley battle.

See

St. exh. 623 at 10; and Tr. at 4659. Wallace, a leading Iroquois scholar, echoed this sentiment: “[A]l-though there was neither massacre nor torture of prisoners, the fleeing survivors spread lurid tales of atrocities; indeed, Wyoming became a symbol of Indian rapacity.” Gov. exh. 324 at 137-38;

see also

Gov. exh. 228 at 172; and Tr. at 3594 (“Almost as soon as the invaders left, the rumors began to fly, magnifying the horrors of the battle and fabricating atrocities.”). This depiction of the Wyoming Valley battle as a “massacre” stems, Gray-mont asserts, because “Whites have always been prone to label any overwhelming Indian victory a massacre and to call any of their own battle triumphs over Indians a great victory.” Gov. exh. 228 at 174. Regardless of how it is described, whether in more inflammatory terms as a massacre, or in more innocuous terms as a battle, the record clearly establishes that the British and the Indians, including the Cayuga soundly defeated the Americans at Wyoming Valley.

See id.

B. Sullivan-Clinton Campaign

The battle at Wyoming Valley was but one of a number of such raids by the Loyalists and the Iroquois warriors which prompted retaliation by the Americans.

See

Gov. exh. 324 at 141 (“The effectiveness of the Iroquois and Tory raiders in laying waste a fifty-to one-hundred-mile belt of frontier land, ... was by now a matter of major concern to the Continental commanders.”). This retaliation took the form of what is known as the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign, after its two military leaders. In an effort to show that it acted in good faith, the State attempts to depict that Campaign as exclusively an operation of the U.S. asserting that “[t]he physical displacement of the Cayuga from their homeland

was not at the hands of New York,

but the plaintiff-intervenor U.S.”

See

State Pre-Tr. Memo, at 2 (emphasis added). The State further asserts that “[sjuch displacement was the direct consequence of the Cayugas’ acts of war against the U.S., and it was achieved by [UN.] military forces carrying out [UN.] policy at the

*307

express direction

of

George Washington.” Id.

(emphasis added). Consistent with this view, the State takes the U.S. to task for making the “amazing assertion that the Sullivan Campaign was really a New York State action because it was ‘instigated’ by Governor George Clinton.” State Post-Tr. at 3 (citations omitted). In its attempt to distance itself from the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign, the State makes its own “amazing assertion” that that Campaign was solely within the powers of the U.S. Close examination of the record demonstrates that the State has oversimplified history.

15

The Sullivan-Clinton Campaign was

not

exclusively an enterprise of the U.S. or of the State of New York. Each had an integral role in that Campaign. As Dr. Whiteley testified, and as documents found in New York State’s Division of Archives and History establish, the U.S. is asserting “that New York was involved in promoting the campaign.” Tr. at 2857. Such promotion does not render the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign solely a New York State action, and the historical record belies that view. The Sullivan-Clinton Campaign was a joint effort between the U.S. and several states, one of which was New York.

The Sullivan-Clinton Campaign came about in part because in the aftermath of Wyoming Valley and other similar victories by the British and their Indian allies, “the appeals of the menaced patriots to Governor George Clinton, to the New York Legislature, to Washington and to Congress for protection became piteously insistent.”

See

Gov. exh. 417 at 9. Consequently, “Clinton promised that he would do everything within his power for the protection and the comfort of the frontiersmen.” Tr. at 2856 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Clinton “advised a winter attack on the Indian strongholds!,] ... that suggestion did not materialize, [but] the correspondence of Washington shows that he devoted a great deal of attention to the ‘Indian expedition’ during the winter and spring of 1778-79.”

Id.

On February 25, 1779, Congress voted to authorize “Washington’s plan for the ‘Indian expedition!,]’ ” and it appropriated “nearly a million dollars for equipment and supplies!.]” Gov. exh. 417 at 9 and 12. Washington appointed General John Sullivan to lead the Campaign.

See id.

at 9. “General James Clinton, the brother of [New York] Governor George Clinton, was regarded as second in command, and was given direct charge of the army which was assembled in New York!.]”

Id.

at 9-10;

see also

St. exh 623 at 10. For its part, “[o]n March 13, 1779, the Legislature of New York ordered 1000 men to be recruited to defend the frontier, and forts to be erected.”

Id.

Significantly, New York was not the only state to lend its support to this cause. “Officers and soldiers participated from ... Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New Hampshire and Massachusetts.”

Id.

at 12. Thus, the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign was a collaborative effort between the fledgling American government and several states, including New York. Not only does the historical evidence before the record establish this, but common sense dictates that it would have been practically impossible for any of these neophyte governments to have singlehandedly mounted what has been called “one of the largest offensive movements in the whole War of Independence.”

See

Gov. exh. 417 at 12.

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Under George Washington’s organization, there were four parts to the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign plan.

See

Gov. exh. 417 at 10. Two of those parts related directly to the Cayuga. The strategy behind the opening of that Campaign in the spring of 1779 was to “permit the leaders ... to devote all their attention to the Cayugas and Senecas.”

Id.

at 12. Then, during “[t]he main body of the expedition under General Sullivan[,]” the Continental troops were to “move up into the Cayuga and Seneca territory[ ]” in anticipation of breaking the power of those two nations.

See id.

Broadly stated, the purpose of this Campaign was to “attack and destroy the Iroquois enemies in their homeland, to destroy as many towns and the resources of those towns as possible and thereby deal a very powerful blow against the British and their most significant allies.” Tr. at 2852 and 2854. Dr. Whiteley’s interpretation of the purpose of the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign is borne out by the writings of Washington himself. In “instructions” to Major-General Sullivan, in late spring of 1779, Washington wrote:

The expedition you are appointed to command is to be directed against the hostile tribes of the Six Nations of Indians, with their associates and adherents. The

immediate objects

are the

total destruction and devastation of their settlements,

and the capture of as many prisoners of every age and sex as possible. It will be essential to ruin their crops now in the ground & prevent their planting more[.]

St. exh. 725 at 460;

see also

Tr. at 3157-58 (emphasis added).

Washington’s objectives were achieved. Prior to the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign, the Cayuga practiced a “mixed economy,” consisting of “agriculture, hunting!,] •.. gathering!,] ... fishing, and a pastoral economy.” Tr. at 2860. The Sullivan-Clinton Campaign “completely destroyed” that economy.

Id.; see also

Gov. exh. 417 at 15-16 (“The hostile Senecas and Cayugas were terribly punished. Their homes were burned, their vast cornfields and gardens were all destroyed, and their orchards were cut down or killed.”). As military journals from the time show, a number of Cayuga villages on the east and west sides of Cayuga Lake also were destroyed.

See generally

Gov. exh. 422; and Tr. at 2861-2864;

see also

Nat. exh. 61 at 7; Gov. exh. 324 at 143 and 144 (“[S]ulli-van’s army ... succeeded in laying waste [to] ... all the main Cayuga settlements!.]” “[W]ith the conclusion of the summer of 1779, ... Cayuga towns had all been destroyed or abandoned!.]”) The destruction of the Cayuga’s villages and resources was devastating, “fundamentally displacing] [the Cayuga] from their homes.”

See

Tr. at 2870. Indeed, “the majority of the Cayugas never returned to Cayuga Lake to live!,]” and “although the figures aren’t as complete as one would like!,] • • • Wallace, ..., records that the Six Nations population declined by half from immediately prior to the Revolutionary War to the early 1790s.”

Id.

at 2870 and 2871.

The court does not credit the State’s argument that it had little or no role in the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign, and thus the State acted in good faith at that time. Nor does the court credit State’s implied argument that the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign was somehow justified by the atrocities which preceded it at Wyoming Valley, and other similar battles where the British and Iroquois prevailed over the Americans. Wyoming Valley and the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign demonstrate nothing-more that then, as now, warfare is brutal and can have devastating consequences for all concerned. Furthermore, the court cannot overlook the fact that these battles were part of a larger picture — the Ameri

*309

cans’ efforts to defeat the British in the War for Independence.

C. Articles of Confederation

In 1781 the states adopted the Articles of Confederation.

See

Gov. exh. 362 at 14; Gov. exh. 362 at 267; and Tr. at 2872. One clause of Article IX gives Congress “the sole and exclusive right and power of determining peace and war” and of “entering into treaties and alliances.” Gov. exh. 228 at 268 (citation omitted). Clause four of that same Article also gives Congress “the exclusive right of ‘regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the states,

provided that the legislative right of any state within its own limits be not infringed or violated.’

”

Id.

(emphasis added). In what a former Assistant Attorney General for New York, describes as “two-faced” language, Gov. exh. 438 at 24, “[t]he Articles of Confederation [thus] left the question of jurisdiction [over Indian affairs] up in the air.” Gov. exh. 218 at 604. Graymont identifies the constitutional issues raised by the inherent tension between the two clauses quoted above: “Were the Iroquois to be considered members of New York State: And what did the term ‘members of any states’ mean?”

See

Gov. exh. 228 at 268.

Dr. von Gernet declined to “enter[ ] into this fray,” as to “how the Indian-related clauses in the Articles of Confederation should be interpreted.” St. exh. 623 at 15 n. 41. When Whiteley was questioned as to his interpretation of the Articles of Confederation he took the position that Congress had the

sole

right to negotiate Indian treaties thereunder.

See

Tr. at 3138-39. Suffice it to say for present purposes that the issue of New York’s treaty making activities at the time “was one of great complexity and delicacy, involving the matter of states rights versus federal powers.”

See id.

at 269. As will be seen, New York’s governor, George Clinton, clearly aligned himself with the anti-federalists— those favoring,

inter alia,

state jurisdiction over the Indians, believing them to be “members” of New York State.

See

Tr. at 3167-69; and Gov. exh. 218 at 604. Clinton “wanted to retain control over Indian affairs within the state.”

Id.

at 3170. The federalists, on the other hand, advocated centralized control over Indian affairs by the new confederal government.

Given these differing interpretations to the Articles of Confederation, arguably it was reasonable, at least at this particular juncture, for New York to believe that it was permissible for it to deal in land matters with the Cayuga to the exclusion of the Federal Government. Indeed, some 200 years thereafter, this court held, in an opinion affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, that Article IX, Clause TV of the Articles of Confederation gave the states the power to purchase Indian land within their borders and extinguish Indian title to such land so long as such activity did not interfere with Congress’s paramount powers over war and peace with the Indians.

See Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. New York,

649 F.Supp. 420 (N.D.N.Y.1986) (McCurn, J.),

aff'd

860 F.2d 1145 , 1154 (2d Cir.1988).

D. Cayuga Factions

During and after the American Revolution the Cayuga dispersed producing roughly three separate enclaves.

See

Nat. exh. 61 at 8. The first faction, which the court will refer to as the “Buffalo Creek Cayuga” or the “Cayuga majority,” was led by Cayuga Chief Fish Carrier, who was the “principal spokesperson” for that Cayuga.

See

St. exh. 623 at 21(footnote omitted); Tr. at 2896. After the War, Fish Carrier along with “many other Cayuga chose to settle south of Fort Niagara

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at Buffalo Creek where they associated themselves with a large Seneca community.” St. exh. 623 at 20; and Tr. at 4671-72. The second group, referred to by von Gernet as a “splinter group,” was led by Steel Trap until his death in 1794.

See

St. exh. 623 at 21. Like Fish Carrier, Steel Trap fled to Niagara after the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign; but unlike Fish Carrier, Steel Trap returned to the eastern side of Cayuga Lake after the war.

See id.; see also

Tr. at 4672. The court will refer to this group as the “Cayuga Lake faction,” or the “Cayuga minority.” A third group fled to Canada after the war, residing on the Six Nations reserve which the British established.

See

Nat. exh. 61 at 8; and Tr. at 2895.

The majority and minority Cayuga factions had diverse interests. Fish Carrier and the Cayuga majority were “determined to dispose” of their former homelands, whereas Steel Trap and the Cayuga minority “wanted to maintain at least some of those homelands as territories where they would continue to live, and he was interested in ... encouraging the Cayuga Nation to return to th[os]e homelands.”

See

Tr. at 4673. It is these divergent interests which, in part, contributed to confusion in later years as to the intent of the Cayuga Nation as a whole with respect to their lands.

E. 1784 Fort Stanwix Treaties

In 1783 a general peace accord Treaty was reached between the U.S. and Britain, The Treaty of Paris, ending the American Revolution.

See

Tr. at 3166-67. That Treaty did not address the status of the Iroquois post-war, however,

see id.

at 3167; and Tr. at 4674, leaving the U.S. and individual states to each attempt to exert their authority over Indian Nations, such as the Cayuga.

Peace efforts in the aftermath of the American Revolution included two separate treaties both entered into at Fort Stanwix in 1784 — New York instigated one of those treaties, and the Federal Government the other. Given the inherent tension in the Articles of Confederation, in 1783 Congress was preparing to exercise its “exclusive” right to manage Indian affairs under the Indian Commerce Clause by entering into a peace treaty, which included land cessions with the Six Nations.

See

Gov. exh. 438 at 24;

see also

Tr. at 3226. Even though the State and the Federal Government were each proceeding in accordance with the Articles of Confederation, there was an undeniable tension between those two governments.

New York was motivated not only by trying to achieve peace with the Six Nations, but also because it was in competition with other states such as Massachusetts and Connecticut for land within its borders.

See

Gov. exh. 438 at 24-25; Tr. at 2873; 3225; and 3227-28; and Gov. exh. 362 at 14. Just after the Revolutionary War there was also “a tide of land speculators who formed companies to try and acquire large tracts of land in the area.” Tr. at 2873. Thus, insofar as the State was concerned, its

“primary object, ...

was not only to conclude a peace but to

obtain a land cession.”

Gov. exh. 228 at 267 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The U.S., on the other hand, while also motivated to make peace with the Six Nations,

see

Gov. exh. 228 at 266, was concerned with, among other things “extinguishing] Indian title, including any claims held by the Iroquois tribes of New York[,]” and “punishing] the hostile tribes [of which the Cayuga was one][.]” Gov. exh. 211 at 55. Another concern of the U.S. was the possibility of another Indian war “if the ... State of New York should insist upon expelling the Six Nations from all the country they inhabited previous to

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the [Revolutionary] war, within their territory[.]” Gov. exh. 438 at 46 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);

see

also Tr. at 2879 and 2880-81. Thus, while the State at this juncture was motivated more by a desire to acquire Indian lands, the motivation of the U.S. was more political in nature. Given these differing objectives, and also because of the newness of the Republic, the State and the confederal governments each sought to independently negotiate peace with the Indians following the American Revolution.

Because “New York ... was a step or two ahead of Congress, ..., and, concerned for its own interests,” it was the first to enter into a Treaty with the Indians at Fort Stanwix in 1784.

See

Gov. exh. 228 at 267;

see also

Tr. at 4890-91. The State met with representatives of “the five core members of the Iroquois Confederacy.” Tr. at 4959. Even though the State was interested in land cessions, it was unable to procure any.

See

Gov. exh. 211 at 53;

see also

Gov. exh. 363 at 449 (“[N]o land had passed out of the possession of the Indians, as Clinton had hoped.”). Nor was the State able to obtain recognition of its sovereignty.

See

Gov. exh. 211 at 53. Instead, the State’s Treaty simply “re-established some terms of peace and provided for the possibility of commerce[.]”

See

Tr. at 3223.

The second Fort Stanwix Treaty of 1784 was between the U.S. and the Six Nations.

See

St. exh. 727. Like the State Treaty, this Treaty too was an effort to make peace with the Six Nations following the American Revolution.

See

Tr. at 2871. But unlike the State Treaty, this confederal Treaty involved a cession of “[p]robably millions of acres of land.” Tr. at 3238. More specifically, the “principal” term of this Treaty “involved a cession

of

lands west of Lake Erie and south of the Pennsylvania line, to the U.S., in return for which the U.S. recognized Iroquois possession of their lands in what became New York State.”

Id.

at 2871-72;

see also

Tr. at 4888.

New York’s Governor Clinton was invited to participate in this federal Treaty, but he refused.

See

Tr. at 3172; Tr. at 5364-65; and Tr. at 2883. Despite the fact that the State refused to formally participate in the confederal Treaty negotiations, it had a presence there. To further its own interests, in September, 1784, Governor Clinton instructed Major Peter Schuyler and Peter Ryckman to remain behind after the State negotiations at Fort Stanwix to “observe the Conduct of the Commissioners of Congress in their proposed Treaty,” and to discern the U.S.’ objectives. Clinton further instructed Schuyler and Ryckman to

“use

[their]

most undivided influence to Counteract and frustrate

[ ] any actions by the U.S.” which “may [eventually proved [d]etrimental to [it.]”

See

Gov. exh. 425 at 379 (emphasis added);

see also

Tr. at 2881^85. In response the U.S. posted sentinels.

See

Tr. at 2885; and Tr. at 4892-93. As historian Graymont so aptly wrote, this is one “graphic example of the ... rivalries and jealousies between the states and the Congress in the early years of the Republic.” Gov. exh. 228 at 272 (footnote omitted); and Tr. at 4892.

The U.S. attributes bad faith, or at the very least a lack of good faith, to the State in connection with the U.S.’ Fort Stanwix Treaty because purportedly New York “wanted to expel the Cayuga,” and it “attempted] to ‘[e]ounteract and [frustrate’ Congress’ peace Treaty.” U.S. Post-Tr. Memo, at 21. In an effort to demonstrate its good faith, the State responds by criticizing the U.S. for its method of treaty making, asserting that the U.S. was “arrogant” in its treatment of the Iroquois at Fort Stanwix because supposedly it “dispensed with customary diplomatic proto

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cols and sought to impose upon the defeated tribes (including the Cayuga) the [U.S.]’ terms of peace.” St. Posb-Tr. Memo, at 8; and St. Pre-Tr. Memo, at 3. The court will address these arguments in reverse order.

There was an abundance of testimony, especially from Dr. von Gernet, regarding the contrasting negotiation styles of the state and confederal governments at Fort Stanwix. von Gernet depicts the U.S. as adopting an “uncompromising” tone.

See

Tr. at 4887;

see also

Tr. at 4665. In contrast, von Gernet characterized Clinton’s style as one of “rekindling] forest diplomacy[,]” by “allud[ing] to all of the typical Iroquois metaphors that ha[d] become part of the standard parlance of the time[,]” such as “nation ... council fire or ... brethren, sachems, [and] warriors.”

Id.

at 4663-65. Clinton also “reminded the Iroquois of the longstanding relationship that they had with one another that preceded the Revolution by well over a century, and he stressed the state’s preemption right and basically asked the Iroquois to abide by this ‘ancient rule and custom.’ ”

Id.

at 4666;

see also

Gov. exh. 375 at 115. The issue of this undisputed difference in negotiating styles, which the State raises, does not bear directly on the issue of its good faith. The State’s good faith cannot be determined simply by showing that it acted at least partially in accordance with Iroquois protocols and the U.S. did not. The State’s method of negotiating, as a basis for finding good faith, is further weakened by record evidence that even assuming those protocols were strictly adhered to prior to the American Revolution (a highly doubtful supposition), after the war, that was not the case.

Likewise, the court is unwilling to find bad faith on the part of New York simply because at the end of the Revolutionary War its interests were antithetical to those of the U.S. And although Governor Clinton did instruct Schuyler and Ryekman to “frustrate[ ]” the Congressional Treaty, that in and of itself does not support a finding of bad faith, especially considering that in the end the State was not successful in thwarting the U.S.’ treaty efforts. After all, the U.S. obtained a significant land cession from the Iroquois without paying any consideration. The actions of the State and confederal governments before and during the Fort Stanwix treaties amounted, in this court’s opinion, to nothing more than those governments each trying to assert their respective sovereignty muscles over the Iroquois — a theme which was to occur in the years follow.

F. Livingston Lease

Evidently in an effort to circumvent the New York State Constitution,

16

which required that any “purchase[ ] or contraet[ ]” for the sale of Indian lands be “made under the authority and with the consent

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of the [state] legislature^]”

see

Gov. exh. 491 at 185, in 1787 a group of private individuals entered into a 999 year lease, known as the Livingston Lease, with the Six Nations.

See

St. exh. 35 at 120-22. The Livingston Lease “ceded

all

of the [Iroquois] lands.. .west of the old line of property in New York State except those lands that the sachems and chiefs chose to reserve.”

Id.

at 2888 (emphasis added);

see also

Tr. at 3308 and St. exh. 623. Those who entered into that Lease were land speculators operating as the New York Genesee Company of Adventurers (“Genesee Company”). Among the prominent members of that group were a former Commissioner of Indian Treaties, a New York State Senator, and numerous past, present and future State Assembly members.

See

Gov. exh. 324 at 153; and St. exh. 35 at 120;

see also

Tr. at 2889; and Gov. exh. 362 at 21. Indeed, Peter Ryck-man, one of those instructed by Clinton to frustrate the 1784 Congressional Treaty at Fort Stanwix, was one of the principals in the Genesee Company.

See

Tr. at 2895.

The Livingston Lease purports to be with “the Chiefs or Sachems of the Six Nations[,]” but actually only four member Nations were signatories, one of which was the Cayuga under Fish Carrier’s leadership.

See

St. exh. 35 at 120 and 122. The Cayuga Lake minority, under Steel Trap’s leadership, did not agree to this lease.

See

Tr. at 2909; and Tr. at 3358. According to the State’s historian, the Cayuga majority was motivated to agree to the terms of this Livingston Lease because they “regarded this as part of their long-term goal to convert their former territories into a source of revenue[.]” Tr. at 4678. Not completely inconsistent with this view, the U.S.’ historian testified that the Cayuga were willing to enter into this lease because they were in “desperate straits and they needed any sort of economic support they could get.” Tr. at 2887; and Gov. exh. 362. Under the terms of the Livingston Lease the signatory Nations were to receive “an annual rent or ... annuity, [which] would have been a source of income in very difficult circumstances.”

Id.

The total of this annuity was $2,000, St. exh. 35 at 121 n. 1; and Tr. at 3257; and assuming that it was divided evenly among the four signatory Nations, “at the very most, each one would [have] be[en] entitled to $500[.]” Tr. at 466-67.

The State of New York was

not

a party to the Livingston Lease. Moreover, none of the Genesee Company individuals were acting on behalf of the State when they entered into that lease.

See

Tr. at 3243. Despite the State’s lack of participation in that Lease, the Cayuga majority perceived the Genesee Company as “legitimate representatives of the [S]tate[.]”

See

Tr. at 2889. Fish Carrier explained to Governor Clinton

17

that the Cayuga majority “doubted ... the [propriety of [proposals by the Genesee Company],” because the majority suspected that those proposals were contrary both to the State law and to the Cayuga’s ancient customs.

See

St. exh. 35 at 415; and Tr. at 4915-17. The majority’s concerns were allayed, however, by assurances from the Genesee Company that the Governor and other “Chiefs of State had ‘authorized’ this lease proposal to the Cayuga.”

See id.

“[I]nduced” into believing the Genesee Company, the Cayuga majority agreed to the Livingston Lease, not believing that they were doing anything “wrong” or “disagreeable” to the

*314

State.

Id.

at 415-16. The Cayuga were also “induce[d]” into entering into the Livingston Lease because they were under the impression that unless they agreed to that Lease, the State would cede all the Cayuga land to others with no payment in return.

See

St. exh. 35 at 416-17;

see also

Tr. at 5233.

After execution of the Livingston Lease, the Genesee Company sought ratification by the Legislature, but it refused.

18

See

Tr. at 3248. The State quashed the Livingston Lease for several reasons. First, the State believed that that Lease violated the State’s right of preemption, which gave the State the first right of refusal or to purchase Indian lands.

See id.

at 2890-91; and 2910; and Tr. at 4913. Further, the State believed that the Livingston Lease violated the New York State Constitution, which implicitly proscribed such private leases.

Id.

at 4913. Also, the State was concerned about a secessionist movement by the Genesee Company.

See

Tr. at 2890-9; and 2910; and Tr. at 4918. Besides quashing the Livingston Lease on March 17, 1788, the State Legislature enacted a statute to punish “infractions” of Article 37 of the New York State Constitution which prohibited purchase of Indian lands without the Legislature’s approval.

See

St. exh. 35 at 438-440 n. 1; and Tr. at 3249-50.

Not surprisingly, the import of the Livingston Lease is vastly different depending upon which of the parties is viewing it. The Cayuga assert that the Livingston Lease was significant “because it is the first of many instances in which the Iroquois, including the Cayuga, sought to give a lease, as opposed to an outright surrender of title, in exchange for funds to sustain their people.” Cay. Posh-Tr. Memo, at 35. Further, the Cayuga assert that the lease “presages the recurring refusal of the State to refuse to consider any arrangement that would permit the Iroquois to retain title to their lands.”

Id.

In a similar vein, the U.S. contends that the Livingston Lease is important to understanding the context of the 1795 and 1807 treaties because it “set the standards for State attempts to acquire cessions of Iroquois lands.”

See

U.S. Pre-Tr. Memo at 3; and U.S. Post-Tr. Memo, at 21; and Gov. exh. 362 at 22 and 23.

Instead of focusing on the motivation of the private individuals, the State paints the Livingston Lease as an effort by the Cayuga “to skirt” New York’s Constitution and “dispose of all of their lands through 999-year leases for less consideration than they could later receive from New York in 1789 and 1795.” St. Pre-Tr. Memo, at 4. Somewhat ironically, the State then goes on to assert that in effect, by quashing this Lease, the State was protecting the Cayuga from themselves:

“Only by virtue of New York’s intervention

were the private speculators and the Cayuga foiled in their efforts to alienate all of their lands in New York.”

Id.

(emphasis added). New York’s motivation was not altogether altruistic. Less than a month after quashing the Livingston Lease, “in reaction to what was going on in the previous months[,]” including that Lease, the State enacted a statute appointing commissioners to enter into treaties with the Six Nations. Tr. at 4922;

see also

Tr. at 2891.

G. 1789 Treaty at Albany

In July, 1788, New York ratified the U.S. Constitution which gives Congress

*315

the sole right to enter into treaties. Article I, § 10, ¶ 1 of the Constitution expressly provides:

“No State

shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation [.]”

See

Gov. exh. 363 at 458 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). “And Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 2 specifically grants the Treaty making power to the President of the [U.S.], by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.”

Id.

Ignoring this unequivocal language, the State forged ahead on its own in 1788 and 1789, making several treaties with various constituents of the Six Nations, including the Cayuga.

See id.

at 458-60.

In September 1788, through two separate treaties, the State obtained “major land cessions” from the Oneida and the Onondaga.

Id.

at 459. As will be seen, there are striking similarities between those treaties and the one which the State later entered into with the Cayuga in February 1789. As with the Cayuga, relatively small Reservations were set aside for the Oneida and the Onondaga, and each received some compensation plus an annuity.

See id.

Also as with the Cayuga, the State dealt with the minority factions of the Onondaga and Oneida.

See

Tr. at 2899.

The State and the U.S. agree that it is necessary to explore in some detail the 1789 New York Treaty with the Cayuga at Albany because this Treaty “providefs] the most central background of all for an understanding of the Treaty of Cayuga Ferry in 1795, and for the purchase of remaining Cayuga lands in 1807[ ]” — the two transactions are at the heart of this litigation.

The 1789 Treaty of Albany was relatively short, containing only five paragraphs, and its terms were fairly straightforward. In the first decretal paragraph it succinctly stated that “[t]he Cayugas do cede and grant

all

their lands to the People of the State of New York forever.” St. exh. 728 at 216, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). This cession represented approximately 1600 square miles.

See

Tr. at 2893. The 1789 Treaty allowed the Cayuga to retain a portion of this land, however, “for their own use and cultivation but not to be sold, leased or in any other manner aliened or disposed of to others[.]”

Id.

at 216, ¶ 2. This portion is roughly 64,000 acres, or about 100 square miles, located at the north end of Cayuga Lake, and it is the subject of this lawsuit.

See

Tr. at 2892-93.

In consideration for this land cession, the State agreed to pay the Cayuga “five hundred dollars in Silver,” payable at that time; an additional $1,625.00 payable the following year; and an annual payment of “five hundred dollars in silver[ ]” in “posterity forever[.]”

See

St. exh. 728 at 217, ¶ 4. The Cayuga could elect, however, to receive all or part of the annuity payment in the form of “clothing or provisions!,]”

see id.

which, according to Whiteley indicates that the Cayuga Lake faction was very bad off economically “and willing to treat for the cession of their lands in order to sustain themselves.” Tr. at 2893.

As “further consideration” the State granted to the Cayuga’s “adopted child Peter Ryckman,”

inter alia,

a one mile square tract of land located within the area reserved to the Cayuga.

See id.

at 217, ¶ 4;

see also

Tr. at 2895. This is the same Peter Ryckman who was one of the principals in the Livingston Lease, and who was instructed by Governor Clinton to “frustrate” the 1784 Congressional Treaty at Fort Stanwix. Although Ryckman was mentioned by name in the Treaty, other settlers who were not named therein also were permitted to remain on the Reservation after the 1789 Treaty. John Richardson, “who had direct ties to the Genesee Company!,]” and who was “one of the State’s four Commissioners at the Treaty

*316

of Cayuga Ferry in 1795,” and others with a connection to Richardson and the Livingston lessees also were allowed to settle on the Reservation.

See

Gov. exh. 362 at 29 and 30. Seemingly at odds with allowing settlers to remain on Cayuga lands, in this Treaty the State pledged that it would protect the Cayuga on the Reservation from encroachment.

See

St. exh. 728 at 217-18, ¶ 5;

see also

Tr. at 2899-2900.

The 1789 Treaty negotiations took place at Denniston’s Tavern in Albany.

See

Tr. at 2892; and St. exh. 35 at 272. The Treaty was between the State and the Cayuga Lake, or minority faction, led by Steel Trap.

See

Tr. at 2897 and 2909; and Tr. at 3250. Although invited, the Cayuga majority from Buffalo Creek was

not

present and did not participate in those negotiations.

The documents which provide the most helpful understanding of the 1789 Treaty negotiations and their repercussions are several letters between Governor Clinton and various Five Nation Chiefs, and recorded speeches of the Cayuga Lake faction. Obviously there is no way for the court to gain first-hand knowledge of these ancient Treaty negotiations; nonetheless, the court finds these documents to be particularly compelling evidence of what transpired in terms of the 1789 Treaty.

In a June 2, 1789, letter, the Buffalo Creek Cayuga leader, along with others, advised Governor Clinton that they were aware of “the Purchases,”

i.e.

the 1789 Treaty with the Cayuga Lake faction, and they expressed concern that the “individuals” who entered into the treaty earlier that year were

“without Authority

” to do so.

See

St. exh. 35 at 331 (emphasis added);

see also

Tr. at 2898. That letter further states: “We did not expect that you, after advising us to shun private Treaties with Individuals and avoid selling our Lands to your disobedient [sic] Children, ... would yourself purchase Lands from a few of our wrong headed young Men, without the Consent or even the Knowledge of the Chiefs[.]”

See id.;

and Tr. at 2902-03. The court concurs with Dr. Whiteley’s interpretation that these few “wrong headed young Men” refer to the Steel Trap minority from Cayuga Lake.

See

Tr. at 2903. It is less clear from the context, however, that, the reference to “Chiefs” means “the properly instituted 'chiefs of the Six Nations[,]” Tr. at 2903, but the fact that that letter was signed by representatives from the Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca and Mohawk Nations is supportive of this view.

See

St. exh. 35 at 331-32. In any event, despite those apprehensions about the manner in which the State negotiated the 1789 Treaty, the Chiefs go on to state that they do

not

“have any Objections to [Governor Clinton] •... having the Lands[,]” but the majority faction wants what it perceives to be its “fair share” of the monies to be paid thereunder.

See id.

at 331.

In direct response to that June 2nd letter, on July 14, 1789, Governor Clinton first expressed concern that the 1789 Treaty “should create any Uneasiness in your Minds[.]”

Id.

at 336. The Governor then explained that prior to the negotiation of the 1789 Treaty, “[i]nvitations were ... sent agreeable to ancient Usage, to the

different Nations

[.]”

Id.

(emphasis added). When “some of the Nations” could not attend at the proposed time, the meeting was postponed and “Notice [given] to our Brethern.”

Id.

The Onondaga and Oneida attended, but even after “many [d]ays” the Cayuga did not show up.

Id.

Before leaving, according to Clinton, “[[Invitations” were “again” sent to the Cayuga “to attend at a Council Fire which we purposed [sic] to kindle at this Place in the Winter.”

Id.

at 337. Clinton wrote, “[t]he Cayugas accordingly came, and the same

*317

Reasons which influenced our Treaties with the Oneidas

&

Onondagas, produced a similar Agreement with us and the Cayugas for their Lands.”

Id.

Next, responding to the Cayuga majority’s complaint about not receiving any of the Treaty funds, Clinton indicated that he had advised “[distribution of the Money among those of their Nation who are intitled [sic] to it, as is consistent with Justice and the Usage among the Indian Nations.”

Id.

The Cayuga majority was not the only faction dissatisfied with the 1789 Treaty. Following directly on the heels of the majority’s June 2nd letter to Clinton, on June 3, 1789 Steel Trap, the Cayuga minority spokesperson, delivered a speech to the Governor wherein he implored Clinton to keep his pledge under the 1789 Treaty to prevent encroachment onto the Reservation by outsiders.

See

St. exh. 35 at 325. In that speech, Steel Trap also reminded Clinton that Clinton had “[[promised]” the Cayuga Lake minority that he would enlarge “[their] Reserve.”

Id.

at 326. Steel Trap wanted a larger Reservation in anticipation of the Buffalo Creek faction returning to Cayuga Lake.

See

Tr. at 4684.

Not satisfied with Clinton’s July 14th response, the Cayuga majority and others sent a second letter to him dated July 30, 1789. This letter was signed by Fish Carrier, along with nine other majority Chiefs, as well as various other Nation Chiefs. The Chiefs advised Clinton that they had “endeavored to explain to [him] that [he] had not treated with the Chiefs, nor with Persons authorised by them to dispose of [their] Country[.]” St. exh. 35 at 340. The Chiefs further expressed that they were “now sorry to find [Clinton] did not wish to be convinced of an Error, which [he] took no previous Steps to avoid.”

Id.

at 340.

The Chiefs then directly challenged Clinton’s view that the 1789 Treaty “gave great satisfaction to the Indians and would be much to their Advantage[:]”

Undoubtedly a large Sum of Money to a few Indians,

void of Principal,

would be pleasing, and their Ideas of Advantage are but momentary and never discend to Posterity, and they are too blind to see the Traps laid to disunite the Nations to which they belong. What you mean by offering your Assistance to see the Money fairly divided among those of their Nations who are entitled to receive it, we do not understand, unless you think none entitled to it but those who remain in the reserved

Trap

and who are entirely in your Power. Our Ancestors made no Distinction in a Nation; they held their Lands in common, and we do not wish to deviate from their Customs.

Id.

(emphasis in original). Again the majority attacked Clinton for dealing with the minority Cayuga Lake faction:

[I]t was not the Custom of our Ancestors to call a Council and treat on Business of importance to their Nations and Posterity, without the presence or Knowledge of the Chiefs, nor was it the Custom of yours to require it; therefore we now see clearly what we before had only a glimmering View of, and that your solemn Deliberations were the dictates of Policy and

your Determination was to effect a Disunion, which would terminate in our Ruin.

Id.

at 341 (emphasis added).

Despite their bitter complaints that the State had improperly dealt with the Cayuga Lake minority when it entered into the 1789 Treaty, the Cayuga majority Chiefs ended that letter in a more conciliatory tone: “It is equal to us who possess the Country, as we have sold it according to our Customs fairly and now only wish to have the Money paid that we may divide it amongst the People who are entitled to receive it; and as for the Reservation we

*318

seek no more than we made at Buffaloe Creek.”

Id.

The Chiefs did, however, request Congressional intervention, reasoning that “[pjerhaps self Interest throughout your State is too prevalent to admit of impartial Decision in a Matter where they are so deeply interested.”

Id.

at 342. The Chiefs closed: “We ..., see more clearly the

Attempt on our Disunion,

and again request that neither your Surveyors nor Settlers proceed further till an Accommodation takes Place.”

Id.

(emphasis added). The State postulates that the Cayuga majority’s real concern was that it did not want the State to proceed with surveying under the Treaty because it might “jeopardize[ ] their own private land deals with the [Livingston] lessees.” Tr. at 4974.

In a subsequent speech to the Cayuga, Clinton gave the State’s version of how it came to be that the 1789 Treaty was between the State and the Cayuga minority, instead of between the State and the Cayuga majority. Clinton reiterated that two years prior he had “proposed kindling a Council fire at this Place, and [he] invited

my Brethem of the 5 Nations

to attend it in the Beginning of June.”

Id.

at 410 (emphasis added). In fact, Clinton “intreated” all of them to attend.

See id.

When be became aware that Congress had also proposed a similar meeting with the Five Nations, Clinton postponed his and “renewed my Invitation to my

Brethem of the 5 Nations

to attend there.”

Id.

(emphasis added). When he arrived, only the Onondaga were there; so he waited 14 days and then proceeded. Even with those invitations, Clinton explained that

“the Cayugas,

the only remaining Nation with whom we had Business to transact,

did not attend.” Id.

(emphasis added). After waiting a long time for the Cayuga’s arrival and their not showing up, Clinton sent them yet another “Letter of Invitation ... to attend a Council Fire which [he] proposed to kindle at Albany in the beginning of the Winter.”

Id.

In keeping with that invitation, Clinton went to Albany and after waiting “a long time,” finally a “[n]umber” of Cayuga arrived.

Id.

Clinton forestalled negotiations, though, because he had “some Hopes that a greater Number of their Nation would attendf.]”

Id.

Eventually Clinton began negotiating, “finding our Embarrassments to the Westward increasing by an additional Number of People going to settle there, and despairing that any other of our Brethern of the Cayugas would meet us[J”

Id.

Significantly, Clinton proceeded with negotiations because he had been “previously assured by the Cayugas who attended, that having taken all Circumstances into consideration

they were sufficiently authorized and would stand justified to their Nation in entering into an Agreement with us

[.]”

Id.

(emphasis added);

see also

Tr. at 4967.

By entering into a Treaty with the Cayuga Lake minority faction in “[d]isre-gard[ ][of] well-known Iroquois protocols,” the Cayuga contend that the State did not act in good faith.

See

Cay. Post-Tr. Memo, at 35. The U.S. takes this argument one step farther, calling New York’s 1789 Treaty “duplicitous and fraudulent.”

See

U.S. Post-Tr. Memo, at 22 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the U.S. accuses the State of engaging in a “divide-and-rule effort[] to break the Cayuga Nation[J” Gov. exh 362 at 32. As further evidence of the State’s lack of good faith, the U.S. points to the fact that this 1789 Treaty violated the U.S.’ Constitution, which the State had ratified just seven months earlier and which expressly prohibits states from entering into treaties.

Retorting that this 1789 Treaty

was

negotiated in good faith by Clinton, the State asserts that “[although the entire Cayuga leadership had been invited to the Treaty session, Fish Carrier and his followers did not show up.” St. Post-Tr. Memo, at 14.

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Countering the U.S.’ allegations that the State “pursued a deliberate divide-and-rule strategy with the two Cayuga groups[,]” U.S. Pre-Tr. Memo, at 4, the State claims that Clinton “was uninformed in 1789 as to the extent of disunion within the Cayuga Nation.” St. Post-Tr. Memo, at 14 (footnote omitted).

As detailed above, prior to the 1789 Treaty negotiations, in keeping with Iroquois protocol pre-Revolutionary War, the State invited

all

of the Five Nations to attend. In fact, Clinton postponed his originally scheduled session when he learned that Congress had proposed a similar session; and upon learning of that conflict he sent a second invitation — again, to all Five Nations. When the Cayuga did not attend, he sent another invitation, and when finally only a few arrived, he forestalled

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