holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2002), is constitutional”; rejecting Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1308 (M.D.Fla.2011), in which federal court held that section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2004), “violates the due process clause and that the statute is unconstitutional on its face”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2002), is constitutional”; rejecting Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1308 (M.D.Fla.2011), in which federal court held that section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2004), “violates the due process clause and that the statute is unconstitutional on its face”
- holding “section 89.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2002), is constitutional,” and rejecting Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1308 (M.D.Fla.2011), in which federal court held section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2004), “violates the due process clause and that the statute is unconstitutional on its face”
- holding that section 893.13, Florida Statutes, as amended by section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2002) is constitutional
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
Rejecting the holding of
Shelton v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs.,
802 F.Supp.2d 1289 (M.D.Fla.2011) and
State v. Washington,
No. F11-11019 (Fla. 11th Cir.Ct. Aug. 17, 2011), we hold, as we explicitly did in
Taylor v. State,
929 So.2d 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)
1
, that section 893.13, as
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amended by section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2002), is constitutional. Accord, e.g.
Parker v. State,
77 So.3d 707 , 2011 WL 5375081 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (per curiam affirmance citing Taylor);
Holcy v. State,
— So.3d -, 2011 WL 5299328 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (per curiam affirmance citing
Flagg); Edwards v. State,
77 So.3d 676 , 2011 WL 5061344 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (per curiam affirmance citing Taylor);
Flagg v. State,
74 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011);
Johnson v. State,
37 So.3d 975 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), rev. denied 51 So.3d 465 (Fla.2010);
Miller v. State,
35 So.3d 162 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010);
Harris v. State,
932 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006);
Tolbert v. State,
925 So.2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006);
Smith v. State,
901 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005);
Burnette v. State,
901 So.2d 925 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005);
Wright v. State,
920 So.2d 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Accordingly, the order under review denying postconviction relief is
Affirmed.
1
. Taylor states:
The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine. We reject his primary contention for reversal that section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2003), which overruled
Chicone v. State,
684 So.2d 736 (Fla.1996), and eliminated knowledge of the unlawful nature of the offending substance as an element of the crime, is unconstitutional. As was correctly held in
Tolbert v. State,
925 So.2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA, 2006),
Wright v. State,
920 So.2d 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005),
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review denied, 915 So.2d 1198 (Fla.2005),
Smith v. State,
901 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), review denied, 928 So.2d 336 (Fla.2006), and
Burnette v. State,
901 So.2d 925 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), however, it is not.
929 So.2d at 665 .