Opinion

In Re Fedex Ground Package System, Inc., Employment Practices Litigation

758 F. Supp. 2d 638
17 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 129
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134959
2010 WL 5094230

Court: District Court, N.D. Indiana
Filed: Dec 13, 2010
Status: Published
Author: Miller
On the bench: Miller
Cited by: 8 cases
Authority: More cited than 62.7%

“Florida courts consistently point out that no bright-line rule exists for applying these principles, and each case must be determined on its own facts and in light of the totality of the circumstances.”

How later courts described this case

“Florida courts consistently point out that no bright-line rule exists for applying these principles, and each case must be determined on its own facts and in light of the totality of the circumstances.”
applying Florida law to those provisions, practices, and procedures

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

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OPINION and ORDER

ROBERT L. MILLER, JR., District Judge.

The court today addresses all outstanding motions for summary judgment and disposes of all other pending cases in this FedEx Multidistrict Litigation docket. In August, this court granted FedEx’s motion for summary judgment in the Kansas case and ordered the parties to file five-page supplementary briefs for each of the outstanding class cases addressing why the outcome in those cases should be the same as or different from Kansas.

The court incorporates here the background and findings of fact contained in its Kansas decision and assumes the reader’s familiarity with the contents of that decision and other substantive decisions in this MDL litigation.

See generally

Op. and Ord., 734 F.Supp.2d 557 (N.D.Ind.2010) [Doc. No. 2097]

(“Kansas Decision

”).

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The court applies the summary judgment standard set forth in the

Kansas Decision,

734 F.Supp.2d at 583-584 .

When appropriate, the court will incorporate its reasoning from the Kansas decision. The reasoning for each of today’s dispositions is provided state by state in alphabetical order and, for ease of reference, an appendix at the end of this opinion and order summarizes today’s dispositions.

I. General Introduction

Before turning to the specifics of today’s decisions, the court addresses some common themes arising from the parties’ briefs in these FedEx MDL cases and offers some general comments that might help to understand these decisions.

These MDL Decisions Won’t Preclude Most Future Litigation Concerning Employment Status of FedEx Ground Drivers.

The plaintiff drivers in these FedEx MDL cases have entered into independent contractor agreements with FedEx Ground to provide package delivery services. Generally, the drivers seek determinations that they are employees under the various states’ laws and they seek reimbursement of business expenses and backpay for overtime and other wages. The nationwide character of this litigation makes it a truly unique set of cases, unlike anything that has appeared in the cases cited in the parties’ briefs.

Employment status questions typically arise when someone is physically harmed — either a third party or a worker. Courts developed the common law right to control test to determine whether an employer had reserved enough control over a worker to justify holding the employer liable for the worker’s tortious conduct towards a third party. Modern statutes have extended worker’s compensation protection to employees, sometimes using the common law right to control approach and sometimes broadly redefining the term “employee” to include a larger group of workers than the common law test would have included.

Today’s cases don’t involve physical harm to third parties or to the plaintiffs. Some of the states considered today have wage statutes that recognize the harm of illegal methods of paying wages to workers, such as not paying overtime, deducting business expenses from employees’ wages, and the like. Cases involving these wage statutes often involve state agencies seeking to penalize wayward employers and to vindicate workers’ statutorily created rights or the state’s statutory rights to collect employment taxes. Though it is less common, workers also may vindicate their rights in private causes of action by seeking to have a court declare that they are employees instead of independent contractors. In other states lacking these statutes — and in all the states in this MDL litigation — there remains these MDL plaintiffs’ generalized effort to be reclassified as employees so as to shift the balance of rights and duties in the working arrangement between themselves and FedEx: the plaintiff drivers then would have fewer duties and increased rights (but likely also decreased entrepreneurial opportunities with FedEx and decreased gross pay) and FedEx would face increased duties.

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Beyond the substantive character of these claims, the procedural uniqueness of these cases — an MDL proceeding consisting of class actions — is particularly noteworthy because this procedural posture has substantially limited the scope of evidence available to this court to decide the drivers’ generalized employment status question. Under the procedural posture of these cases, this court has considered evidence common to the drivers’ relationships with FedEx on a nationwide basis: the Operating Agreement and generally applicable Policies and Procedures. As a condition of class certification, the court excluded particularized evidence of actual control between FedEx and the drivers. This condition was appropriate to satisfy the commonality requirement for class certification, to satisfy the commonality and judicial economy considerations motivating the consolidation of these cases in an MDL court, and to address the very nature of these plaintiffs’ generalized claims.

The cases’ substantive nature and procedural posture might limit the preclusive effect of this court’s decisions in these cases. These decisions aren’t expected to preclude injured persons from seeking

respondeat superior

liability or worker’s compensation. Such personal injury cases would surely involve the review of much extrinsic and individualized evidence of a particular driver’s relationship with FedEx. Today’s decisions also don’t address what the outcomes of these cases might be if the classes were defined differently.

B. The Procedural Posture of These Cases Limits the Scope of Evidence Reviewed.

In their supplemental briefs, the drivers have complained at times that the court “refused” to consider extrinsic evidence of FedEx’s actual conduct towards them. The cases’ procedural posture limits the court to considering evidence truly common across the nation: the Operating Agreement and generally applicable Policies and Procedures. These cases might or might not come out differently under a different procedural posture allowing wider scope for review of extrinsic and particularized evidence, but that situation is not before the court today.

The drivers’ characterization of the court’s use of evidence, after the court indulged their strategy of coming before an MDL court as classes, isn’t well-taken. To disagree with the court’s rulings is fair (and is a matter better handled through a motion to reconsider or an appeal), but to say the court “refused” to do something when the court accepted the drivers’ own arguments on the matter isn’t accurate.

The parties have heaped numerous insults

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upon each other’s arguments and reasoning in their various briefs, and the court has patiently overlooked their excursions into the land of uncivil arguments, exaggerations, and mischaracterizations (and the court has avoided wasting time on listing citations to all the foul balls the parties pitched in their arguments); the court is less patient with mischaracterizations of its own efforts to rule fairly on the issues in this litigation.

The drivers have known at least since this court’s first order granting class certification that the scope of evidence would, under the approach taken by the drivers, be limited to the Operating Agreement and generally applicable Policies and Procedures.

See generally

Op. and Ord., Mar. 25, 2008, 273 F.R.D. 424 , 2008 WL 7764456 [Doc. No. 1119]. In July 2005, the drivers argued to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in Denver that their cases were appropriate for MDL centralization and that they could satisfactorily litigate their case based on common evidence. The drivers’ ensuing briefs seemed to indicate that they were perfectly comfortable with, and felt they could win their case based on, the use of common evidence. The court tried to remind the drivers that their cases would be decided on the basis of common evidence.

See, e.g.,

Op. and Ord., 662 F.Supp.2d 1069 , 1104 n. 5 (N.D.Ind.2009) [Doc. No. 1770] (“The court notes that the plaintiffs may have indicated a desire to introduce anecdotal evidence to support their claims in this action. If the plaintiffs intend to introduce anecdotal evidence of FedEx’s actual exercise of control to support their claims, they should inform the court immediately because this may require reevaluation of class certification.”); Ord., Apr. 22, 2008 [Doc. No. 1152].

As the court stated in the

Kansas Decision:

The court sets forth the facts from the perspective of what control FedEx has the right to exercise over its drivers and not necessarily what control FedEx actually exercises on a daily basis. While FedEx managers might exercise more control than what is retained in the Operating Agreement and commonly applicable policies and procedures, the class was certified on the basis of right to control, not actual exercise of control. The plaintiffs reiterated to this court during class certification that they could show right to control by reliance solely on the Operating Agreement and applicable policies and procedures and wouldn’t go beyond those documents to prove their case. In short, the issue for today’s purposes is what control FedEx had the right to exert pursuant to the parties’ contractual relationship.

* * *

FedEx might actually exercise more control than authorized, but as explained, the court is limited to determining whether FedEx retained the right to control. The court relies on the policies and procedures to the extent they show how FedEx implemented its authority as retained by the Operating Agreement.

Kansas Decision,

734 F.Supp.2d at 560, 589 .

C. Collateral Estoppel Issue

The California court of appeals affirmed the

Estrada

trial court’s decision finding FedEx Single Work Area (SWA) drivers to be employees.

Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc.,

154 Cal. App.4th 1 , 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 327 (2007). The

Estrada

trial court held that the FedEx Multiple Work Area (MWA) plaintiff driver before it was an independent contractor, and that decision wasn’t appealed. SWA drivers own and operate a single delivery route for FedEx, while MWA drivers own

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and operate two or more delivery routes. On the evidence before it, the

Estrada

trial court found that the MWA driver was subject to the same “strict controls” as the SWA drivers and that the MWA driver and SWA drivers were all integral to FedEx’s business.

Estrada v. FedEx Ground,

No. BC 210130, at *17, 2004 WL 5631425 (Cal.Super.Ct. July 26, 2004) [Exh. B to Pltfs’ Req. for Judicial Notice, Apr. 24, 2008]. Although the

Estrada

trial court held SWA drivers to be employees, it held the MWA driver to be an independent contractor based on his opportunity for profit as a MWA driver. MWA drivers testified at trial “as to their enthusiasm for their entrepreneurial opportunities for making good money,” and the court noted that “a MWA has the opportunity to hire drivers and slowly but surely create a little financial empire under the aegis of FEG.”

Id.

at *18. The opportunity for profit, and not how much profit the MWA plaintiff made, was dispositive.

Id.

The plaintiff drivers have argued vigorously throughout this litigation that

Estrada’s

SWA finding should be given preclusive effect in all these MDL cases. This court has addressed the drivers’ argument and denied granting preclusive effect to the

Estrada

decision.

See generally

Op. and Ord., Apr. 21, 2010, 2010 WL 1652863 [Doc. No. 2029]. The court denied collateral estoppel because

Estrada

involved facts specific to the California class in that case. The facts before the

Estrada

court and those before this court are dissimilar insofar as the facts available to this court don’t go beyond the Operating Agreement and generally applicable Policies and Procedures.

See

Op. and Ord., Apr. 21, 2010, at 25-29 [Doc. No. 2029]. Also, the SWA class in

Estrada

was markedly different from the classes before this court because the MDL classes lump together SWA and MWA drivers. Thus, though the parties litigated a right to control issue in

Estrada,

the issue decided in

Estrada

isn’t identical to issue before this court.

The drivers never addressed how the collateral estoppel issue might differ for the California class as distinct from other states’ classes, even though California adds an economic realities twist to the common law right to control test and other states in this centralized docket don’t add such a twist. Also, in the interest of fairness, the court hasn’t precluded FedEx from litigating the right to control factor in today’s cases when the drivers haven’t addressed the potential preclusive effect of the

Estrada

trial court’s finding that a MWA driver was an independent contractor under the California test. Op. and Ord., Apr. 21, 2010, at 41. Indeed, the drivers have all but ignored the

Estrada

trial court’s MWA finding and have hardly addressed this court’s findings in the

Kansas Decision

relating to their entrepreneurial opportunities. It can’t work both ways: the drivers can’t argue persuasively that

Estrada

should have preclusive effect on the California class (and other states’ classes) while ignoring the

Estrada

trial court’s MWA finding. As in

Estrada,

this court has found the drivers’ entrepreneurial opportunities to be highly persuasive evidence indicating independent contractor status. Unlike

Estrada,

and because of the classes defined in these MDL cases, the court has no occasion to distinguish between SWA and MWA drivers. To repeat the Order denying the grant of preclusive effect to

Estrada,

the court doesn’t apply the finding of a right to control in

Estrada

to these cases, but rather analyzes the right to control again.

D. Intent Wasn’t Dispositive in the Kansas Decision.

In their supplemental briefs, the drivers characterize the

Kansas Decision

as placing dispositive weight on the clearly expressed intent in the Operating Agreement

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that an independent contractor relationship exist between themselves and FedEx. The court stated that this “factor weighs strongly in favor of independent contractor status.”

Kansas Decision,

734 F.Supp.2d at 589 . But among all the other factors, the intent factor weighed “strongly” because the intent expressed in the contracts was so clear, not because the intent factor had special status or carried dispositive weight. The court never said this factor was dispositive, and the court never believed this factor to be dispositive. The laws of every state considered in these cases generally require courts to look beyond contractual labels, and the court has done so by examining the Operating Agreement and generally applicable Policies and Procedures in their entirety, vis-avis the comprehensive list of factors that Kansas uses to determine employment status — the

Kansas Decision

would have been far shorter were it otherwise.

Most important in Kansas — and most important under the common law and Restatement tests generally — is the right to control, which typically is the weightiest factor. States often treat the right to discharge at will as the second most important factor. This court held that there was no reasonable inference that FedEx retained the right to control the methods and means of the drivers’ work on a class-wide basis.

See Kansas Decision,

734 F.Supp.2d at 589 . This finding came in light of the distinction between control of means and control of results. In most states, control of results doesn’t indicate employee status; control of means used to achieve contracted-for results does indicate employee status. Drawing the line between means and results is a challenging, highly contextual and fact-specific task. Bright-line rules prove elusive here. This court held that the controls reserved to FedEx were results-oriented: FedEx provides work to and pays contractor-drivers to provide the specific result of timely and safely delivered packages to FedEx customers.

See

Op. and Ord., 734 F.Supp.2d at 588, 589, 591, 592-593, 594, 594, 595, 600 . The totality of the circumstances and review of all the relevant facts and factors led to this results-oriented conclusion. Buttressing this conclusion, FedEx has no right to discharge drivers at will. FedEx can non-renew a contract or cancel a contract for breach, but these are unexceptional rights common to any contractee in an independent contractor relationship; notably, FedEx is contractually unable to discharge a driver at a whim and on the spot the way an employee in an at-will employment relationship could be discharged.

In addition to the right to control and right to discharge factors, the court found the drivers’ entrepreneurial opportunities to be highly probative of independent contractor status. Also, the plaintiff drivers are responsible for acquiring their own equipment, such as their own delivery trucks (and nothing suggests that the drivers aren’t paid accordingly to cover these expenses), though the equipment factor generally weighs less heavily in indicating independent contractor status. The court repeats here what it stated in the

Kansas Decision-.

Upon review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the only reasonable inference is that FedEx hasn’t retained the right to direct the manner in which drivers perform their work. FedEx supervises the drivers’ work and offers numerous suggestions and best practices for performance of assigned tasks, but the evidence doesn’t suggest that FedEx has the authority under the Operating Agreement to require compliance with its suggestions. Further, other factors strongly weigh in favor of independent contractor status; in particular, the parties intended to create an independent contractor arrange

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ment,

the drivers have the ability to hire helpers and replacement drivers, they are responsible for acquiring a vehicle and can use the vehicle for other commercial purposes, they can sell their routes to other qualified drivers, and FedEx doesn’t have the right to terminate contracts at-will.

Although some facts weigh in favor of employee status, after considering all the relevant factors, the court finds that the plaintiffs are independent contractors as a matter of [Kansas] law.

Kansas Decision,

734 F.Supp.2d at 559-560 (emphasis added).

The drivers’ supplemental briefs gave little importance to their entrepreneurial opportunities with FedEx. Generally, employees can’t sell their jobs, and they can’t hire other people to do their jobs for them. The drivers call these entrepreneurial opportunities a “sham,” but they haven’t shown the court on the common evidence that these opportunities are but a sham. After considering a wealth of extrinsic testimonial evidence, the trial court in

Estrada

held a Multiple Work Area driver (a driver who took advantage of the entrepreneurial opportunities available to him with FedEx by owning multiple delivery routes) to be an independent contractor. This court made its own findings using the common evidence available to it in the

Kansas Decision.

To characterize the

Kansas Decision

as finding a contractual label to be dispositive is to fundamentally misunderstand this court’s reasoning.

E. Kansas Law is Typical of the States’ Laius Reviewed Today.

The drivers’ supplemental briefs make a strong effort to distinguish Kansas law as being unique, while FedEx seizes on language from the

Kansas Decision

to say that what’s true in Kansas must be true elsewhere. These approaches have resulted in some jarringly inconsistent arguments between the summary judgment briefs and supplemental briefs, making it difficult for the court to accept the parties’ statements on what the law is. For example, in the Arkansas case, FedEx argued in its summary judgment response brief that Arkansas courts require each and every Restatement factor to favor either employee or independent contractor status for summary judgment to be appropriate. The drivers’ reply challenged this view of Arkansas law and persuasively distinguished the cases on which FedEx relied. In a move that reflects the parties’ parries in this litigation as a whole, the drivers’ post-Kansas supplemental brief now urges the very argument they previously condemned: that all Restatement factors must support independent contractor status in Arkansas for FedEx to win, and the drivers’ supplemental brief relies exclusively on the very cases the drivers had persuasively argued held dubious value for this docket.

Rather than helping the court to understand the law, some arguments have bordered on simple misrepresentations of the law. In any event, as today’s decisions will show, the court’s own review of the law of the various states has led to the conclusion that Kansas law is not strangely alien or

sui generis,

but rather is very typical of the states’ laws on determining employment status.

One of the drivers’ characterizations of the court’s understanding of Kansas law requires mention. The drivers try to distinguish the

Kansas Decision

by arguing that it carved out an exception in Kansas law: if an employer requires a worker to do a certain amount of work within customer-based time boundaries, that worker still can be considered an independent contractor if the employer (in this case, FedEx) is contractually bound to provide full days of work to the drivers. Without the employer’s exceptional contractual obli

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gation — so the drivers’ argument goes — • the worker would be considered an employee.

As today’s considerations of the various states’ laws should make clear, resolution of employment status at common law doesn’t allow for bright-line rules. Statutory redefinitions of the scope of employee status sometimes create clearer bright-line rules, unmistakably broadening the scope of who is an employee (often called “statutory employees”).

But at common law, the test is the right to control the means and methods of achieving results; control of the results doesn’t indicate employee status. Determining the line between means and methods, and results, is context specific and requires considering multiple factors and examining the totality of the circumstances of a given working relationship.

The

Kansas Decision

carved out no exceptions to Kansas law: this court isn’t in a position to declare what Kansas law is when Kansas itself hasn’t declared what its law is or what its law most likely would be. Rather, the

Kansas Decision,

and today’s decisions, take into consideration all the circumstances of the FedEx/driver working relationship and conclude that customer-based constraints on the drivers are results-oriented controls that don’t indicate employee status.

The drivers complain that FedEx makes them do so much work within so much time, which they say indicates control of means and methods. But the numerous cases across the states reviewed by the court indicate that “so much work within so much time” doesn’t, by itself, indicate employee status — subcontractors often agree to get a job done within a specified time. The

Kansas Decision

pointed out that FedEx is contractually bound to give drivers work. The parties agreed to something: FedEx would provide work, and the drivers would do that work. This type of agreement is common and unexceptional in all working relationships, whether of the employee or independent contractor variety, and is unexceptional to states’ laws differentiating between employee and independent contractor status. The court doesn’t agree that it created an exception in Kansas law, and the court doesn’t agree that Kansas law is alien and unique compared to the rest of the states’ laws relevant to today’s decisions.

F. FedEx’s Requests for Summary Judgment sua sponte.

In eleven of the states with pending summary judgment motions filed by the drivers,

FedEx didn’t file motions for summary judgment and instead argued in its summary judgment response briefs that the laws of those eleven states inflexibly required a trial on the employee vs. independent contractor question. The court held under Kansas law that the facts were susceptible to only one reasonable conclusion: on a class-wide basis, FedEx hasn’t retained the right to control the details of the drivers’ methods and means of doing their work.

Kansas Decision,

734 F.Supp.2d at 589 . FedEx now urges the court to apply this same conclusion to these eleven states and enter judgment

sua sponte

in its favor.

“[District courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgments

sua sponte,

so long as the losing party was on notice that [it] had to come forward with all of [its] evidence.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 326 ,

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106 S.Ct. 2548 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Generally,

sua sponte

entry of judgment is a “hazardous procedure, ... warrants special caution and is often unnecessary,” but it is permissible.

Jones v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.,

302 F.3d 735, 740 (7th Cir.2002). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(1), which became effective December 1, 2010, specifically authorizes granting summary judgment for a nonmovant — what the Rule calls “Judgment Independent of the Motion” — after notice and a reasonable time to respond. The drivers’ supplemental briefs make clear that they knew FedEx would seek such judgments. The drivers didn’t ask for additional briefing; instead, they explained their disagreement with FedEx’s view of the law and argued that judgment in favor of FedEx wouldn’t be appropriate. Thus, the court concludes the drivers have had a reasonable opportunity for response.

FedEx argues that judicial economy would best be served by entering what is now called judgment independent of the motion in its favor in these eleven states. The parties have fully litigated these MDL cases within their procedural posture. The evidence before the court — the Operating Agreement and generally applicable Policies and Procedures — isn’t in dispute, and the drivers didn’t take the position that this evidence contains ambiguous terms. The drivers’ presentation of facts is common and repeated across the board in these cases, and their arguments about how the court should view the facts don’t materially change from one state to the next.

FedEx’s about-face on the appropriateness of summary judgment in these cases seizes attention, but this court’s duty is to decide these cases as the states’ highest courts (or, in the absence of guidance from the highest courts, as the appellate courts) would decide them.

E.g., Home Valu, Inc. v. Pep Boys,

213 F.3d 960, 963 (7th Cir.2000). As set forth in the decisions in this opinion, the court has reviewed the laws of these eleven states and finds that resolution of the employment status question without a trial is appropriate in these states when the facts are undisputed and lend themselves to but one inference. The court hesitates to grant FedEx a windfall, but because the drivers had full opportunity to present their position, judicial economy is best served by granting judgment to FedEx in these states if the states’ laws favor FedEx as did Kansas law. Also, insofar as it is most fair to give parties an answer to a question when the question is ripe and has been pending for quite some time, fairness to the parties is best served by answering now the general question presented in these MDL cases.

II. Disposition of FedEx MDL Cases

A. Alabama

(1) 8:06-cv-428, Floyd

The

Floyd

drivers allege violations of the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act and fraud; they seek an accounting, rescission, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. The drivers didn’t move to certify the ADTPA and fraud claims, but they don’t indicate that their claims turn on anything other than a determination of their employment status under Alabama law.

See

Memo, in Support of Mot. to Certify Class (Alabama), Apr. 2, 2007, at 1 [Doc. No. 583]. Only the drivers filed a motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the court denies the drivers’ motion and grants judgment independent of the motion to FedEx. Because the Alabama claims stand or fall on the common question of whether FedEx Ground misclassified its drivers as independent contractors, judgment will be entered for FedEx on all claims in this Alabama (Floyd) case.

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As noted, FedEx didn’t move for summary judgment against the Alabama class. In its supplemental brief, FedEx asks the court to enter judgment

sua sponte

(now called judgment independent of the motion) in its favor. As set forth in the general introduction to today’s decisions, the court takes this request seriously because summary judgment is appropriate under Alabama law, the drivers’ employment status can be examined today without prejudice to the plaintiffs, and answering now the question of the plaintiff drivers’ employment status under Alabama law will conserve judicial resources.

FedEx’s summary judgment response brief argued that summary judgment on the employment status question is “practically unavailable” in Alabama. Yet Alabama courts have been perfectly willing to enter judgment on employment status without a trial when the facts are undisputed.

See, e.g., Dickinson v. City of Huntsville,

822 So.2d 411, 416 (Ala.2001) (affirming summary judgment finding independent contractor status where no substantial evidence was presented to show employee status);

In re Curry v. Interstate Express, Inc.,

607 So.2d 230, 233 (Ala.1992) (reversing lower court and finding worker to be employee);

Atchison v. Boone Newspapers, Inc.,

981 So.2d 427, 434 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (affirming summary judgment finding worker to be independent contractor);

see also Lankford v. Gulf Lumber Co., Inc.,

597 So.2d 1340, 1344 (Ala.1992) (“[Wjhether a defendant reserved the right of control is generally a question of fact to be decided by the jury

if the evidence is in dispute

....” (emphasis added)).

In Alabama “for one to be an employee, the other party must retain the right to direct the manner in which the business shall be done, as well as the result to be accomplished or, in other words, not only what shall be done, but how it shall be done.”

Atchison v. Boone Newspapers,

981 So.2d at 431 (citations omitted). Alabama courts “look[] to the reserved right of control rather than the actual exercise of control.”

Id. (quoting Turnipseed v. McCafferty,

521 So.2d 31, 32 (Ala.Civ.App.1987));

see also In re Curry v. Interstate Express,

607 So.2d at 232 (“In the last analysis, it is the reserved right of control rather than its actual exercise that provides the answer.”). If the right of control extends no further than directing what is ultimately to be accomplished, employee status isn’t indicated.

See Lankford v. Gulf Lumber Co.,

597 So.2d at 1343 (finding right to supervise loggers was merely to ensure contracted-for results and didn’t indicate employee status);

Williams v. Tennessee River Pulp and Paper Co.,

442 So.2d 20, 21-22 (Ala.1983) (finding the only reasonable inference from work site inspections was that company was supervising conformity with contract requirements, which didn’t indicate employee status);

Atchison v. Boone Newspapers,

981 So.2d at 431 ;

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. D & G Trucking, Inc.,

966 So.2d 266, 268 (Ala.Civ.App.2006).

Alabama courts consider four factors to decide whether an employer has retained the right to control the manner of contract performance: (1) direct evidence of the right or exercise of control; (2) the method of payment used; (3) whether the alleged principal had the right to terminate employment; and (4) the right to control another’s time.

Dickinson v. City of Huntsville,

822 So.2d 411, 416 (Ala. 2001);

see also Williams v. Tennessee River Pulp & Paper Co.,

442 So.2d at 21 (“[T]he crucial factor is the right of Tennessee Paper to control the manner of Mauldin’s performance.”). Alabama courts sometimes consider the furnishing of equipment instead of the right to control

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another’s time.

Atchison v. Boone Newspapers,

981 So.2d at 432 .

The

Floyd

plaintiffs argue that if a company “controlled what loads [the driver] picked up and where he picked them up,” then Alabama views such control as establishing an employee relationship. Pltfs’ Supp. Brief (Alabama), Sept. 24, 2010, at 2 [Doc. No. 2161]

(quoting In re Curry v. Interstate Express,

607 So.2d at 233 , and

citing Liberty Mut. Ins. v. D & G Trucking,

966 So.2d at 269 (“Trucking personnel decide which driver to dispatch ... [and] [o]nce that driver has accepted a load, he or she is not permitted by D & G Trucking to run a personal errand that might involve significant travel beyond the pickup and delivery.”)). The presence of “some controls,” the drivers argue, is direct evidence of the right to control. Pltfs’ Supp. Brief, at 2-3

(quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. v. D & G Trucking,

966 So.2d at 270 ).

The drivers are right that at some point, “some control” amounts to enough control to indicate an employee relationship. But not here.

In re Curry

and

Liberty Mutual

are distinguishable from the case before the court today.

The

In re Curry

court didn’t find a right to control simply because “Interstate controlled what loads [Curry] picked up and where he picked them up, as well as the place of delivery of the cargo.”

In re Curry v. Interstate Express,

607 So.2d at 233 . Interstate ordered Mr. Curry to transport his load of dog food even after Mr. Curry expressed his concern that the load wasn’t properly secured, which led to Mr. Curry’s injury.

Id.

Reasonably, in light of the order to transport a load known to be improperly secured, Interstate should be responsible to Mr. Curry for worker’s compensation.

Liberty Mutual

involved a worker’s compensation insurance premium dispute where a company reclassified drivers as independent contractors without making significant changes to the company’s actual relationship with the drivers.

Liberty Mut. Ins. v. D & G Trucking,

966 So.2d at 269-270 . Besides the reclassification, D & G Trucking continued to control drivers as it had before and continued to own the trucks the drivers drove. In both cases, the defendants’ orders concerning the identity of loads and timing of pick up and delivery were not, by themselves, dis-positive facts: those facts were surrounded by a larger context favoring employee status. Neither case involved facts that overlap in a compelling way with the facts before this court. Also, Alabama doesn’t treat any single fact as dispositive; employment status is a fact-intensive inquiry.

See Hooker Constr., Inc. v. Walker,

825 So.2d 838, 843-844 (Ala.Civ.App.2001) (“[T]he retention of control necessary to establish employee status is determined on a case-by-case basis. No one fact by itself can create an employer-employee relationship .... When taken as a whole, the evidence supports the trial court’s finding.” (citation omitted)).

The court incorporates here its reasoning in the

Kansas Decision.

As previously held, FedEx’s controls are results-oriented, and FedEx’s supervision exists to ensure contracted-for results. Such controls don’t indicate employee status in Alabama. “After reviewing the common undisputed

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evidence offered by the parties, the only reasonable inference that can be drawn is that FedEx hasn’t retained the right to control the details of the contractors’ work methods on a class-wide basis.”

Kansas Decision,

734 F.Supp.2d at 589 .

As in the

Kansas Decision,

Alabama drivers don’t negotiate their pay: FedEx controls their pay. Some Alabama courts view control of pay as weighing in favor of employee status.

See In re Curry v. Interstate Express,

607 So.2d at 233 (finding Interstate controlled payment where Interstate determined percentage driver received). Other courts don’t view it this way, but rather are satisfied that payment without deducting taxes and with provision of 1099 Forms weighs in favor of independent contractor status.

See Atchison v. Boone Newspapers,

981 So.2d at 430, 432 . Also, as in the

Kansas Decision,

FedEx doesn’t have the right to terminate Alabama drivers at will, and FedEx doesn’t have the right to control Alabama drivers’ time insofar as contractors can hire assistants and replacement drivers and can develop profitable package delivery businesses in contract with FedEx. Finally, Alabama drivers are fully responsible for obtaining their own equipment — even though FedEx makes fulfilling this responsibility easier through its Business Support Package, the drivers have the ultimate responsibility of obtaining equipment with or without FedEx’s help.

See Keebler v. Glenwood Woodyard, Inc.,

628 So.2d 566, 568-569 (Ala.1993) (noting that enabling contractor to work by providing equipment and insurance wasn’t the same as controlling the manner in which he worked). For these reasons, and the reasons stated in the

Kansas Decision,

the

Floyd

drivers are independent contractors under Alabama law.

(2) 3:07-cv-191, Gentle

Bruce and Stephanie Gentle present the same claims as the

Floyd

drivers — violations of the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act and fraud — and seek an accounting, rescission, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. The Gentles haven’t filed a motion for summary judgment, but today’s decision in

Floyd

applies to Bruce Gentle’s claims because he is a member of the Alabama class. The court has no information on whether Stephanie Gentle is a member of the Alabama class; if she isn’t, the transferor court will decide how much weight to give to today’s procedurally distinct decision in

Floyd

when deciding her case. The court will suggest remand of the Gentles’ case to its transferor court for further disposition.

The court instructs the parties to file a joint proposed pretrial order with this court within twenty-one days of entry of this order. In addition to summarizing the history of this case, including significant orders and their docket numbers (including, but not limited to, evidentiary, class certification, and dispositive orders), the parties should provide a detailed description of the claims that remain outstanding, without arguing the merits of those claims, and should outline for the court and the transferor court how they anticipate resolving those claims.

B. Arizona (3:07-cv-272, Gibson)

The

Gibson

drivers allege violations of Arizona’s wage withholding statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-352 , and seek rescission, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. All claims are class certified; only the drivers filed a summary judgment motion. For the reasons stated below, the court denies the plaintiffs’ motion and grants judgment independent of the motion to FedEx. Because the Arizona claims stand or fall on the common question of whether FedEx Ground misclassified its drivers as independent contractors, judgment will be entered in FedEx’s favor on all claims in

Gibson.

*665

As noted, FedEx didn’t file a motion for summary judgment against the Arizona class. In its supplemental brief, FedEx asks the court to enter judgment

sua sponte

(now called judgment independent of the motion) in its favor. As set forth in the general introduction to today’s decisions, the court takes this request seriously because summary judgment is appropriate under Arizona law, the drivers’ employment status can be examined today without prejudice to the plaintiffs, and answering now the question of the plaintiff drivers’ employment status under Arizona law will conserve judicial resources.

FedEx insisted in its summary judgment response brief that Arizona law requires a trial on the employment status question. As in other states, summary judgment is appropriate in Arizona where the material facts are undisputed and only one inference can be drawn from those facts.

Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.,

164 Ariz. 505 , 794 P.2d 138, 141 (1990). The

Kansas Decision

held that “[ajfter reviewing the common undisputed evidence offered by the parties, the only reasonable inference that can be drawn is that FedEx hasn’t retained the right to control the details of the contractors’ work methods on a class-wide basis.”

Kansas Decision,

734 F.Supp.2d at 589 . For purposes of this case, Arizona law doesn’t materially differ from Kansas law.

The parties agree that Arizona’s common law test for employment status provides the definition of “employee” under Arizona’s wage withholding statute. “The right to control or supervise the method of reaching a specific result determines whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor.”

Home Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm’n,

123 Ariz. 348 , 599 P.2d 801, 803 (1979);

see also Hunt Bldg. Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n,

148 Ariz. 102 , 713 P.2d 303, 306 (1986) (same);

Hughes v. Industrial Comm’n,

113 Ariz. 517 , 558 P.2d 11, 12-13 (1976) (“[W]e must look to the right to control the method of reaching a desired result reposed in the employer. It is not the exercise of the power to supervise and control, but rather its existence which is to be considered.”).

Arizona doesn’t follow a single formula for its right to control test. Some courts have looked to the multi-factor Restatement test for employment status, discussed in the

Kansas Decision. See, e.g., Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers,

794 P.2d at 141

(citing

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220). Other courts have examined the right to control in light of other factors that also were discussed in the

Kansas Decision. See, e.g., id.

at 145 n. 6 (noting IRS list of twenty factors: instructions; training; integration; services rendered personally; hiring, supervising and paying assistants; continuing relationship; set hours of work; full time required; doing work on business premises; order of sequence set; reporting; payment by time, not job; payment of traveling expenses; furnishing of tools; investment; realization of profit or loss; working for more than one firm at a time; making service available to public; right to discharge; right to terminate without liability);

Home Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm’n,

599 P.2d at 803 (“These indicia ... include: duration of the employment; the method of payment; who furnishes necessary equipment; the right to hire and fire; who bears responsibility for workmen’s compensation insurance; the extent to which the employer may exercise control over the details of the work, and whether the work was performed in the usual and regular course of the employer’s business.”);

Dial-A-Messenger, Inc. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,

133 Ariz. 47 , 648 P.2d 1053, 1057-1059 (Ariz.Ct.App.1982) (discussing multiple factors: authority over an individ

*666

ual’s assistants; compliance with instructions; oral or written reports; personal performance; establishment of work sequence; right to discharge; set hours of work; training; amount of time; expense reimbursement; availability to the public; compensation on job basis; realization of profit or loss; significant investment). The common denominator is that the test is the alleged employer’s reserved right to control. Arizona courts consider the totality of the circumstances when evaluating the indicia of control, and no single factor is itself conclusive.

Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers,

794 P.2d at 143 ;

Hunt Bldg. Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n,

713 P.2d at 306 ;

Home Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm’n,

599 P.2d at 803 (“To determine the right to control, courts look to the totality of the facts and circumstances of each case, examining various indicia of control.... In undertaking an analysis none of the indicia is, in itself, conclusive.”).

The drivers’ supplemental brief highlights and relies on the use in some Arizona decisions of the disjunctive

“or”

to argue that a right to supervise eontractedfor results indicates an employee relationship in Arizona. See

Home Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm’n,

599 P.2d at 803 (noting employment status turns on “[t]he right to control

supervise the method of reaching a specific result” (emphasis added)). The language cited by the drivers doesn’t support their argument. The phrase doesn’t say that the right to supervise a result indicates employee status; the phrase says the right to supervise the method of reaching a specific result indicates employee status. This test is no different from other states using the right to control test, and it differentiates between results-oriented supervision of contracted-for rights and supervision and control of means and methods used to achieve those results.

If the drivers were correct, Arizona law would be radically different from Kansas law and Arizona cases would reflect their argument. But Arizona cases don’t interpret the “or” language as the drivers suggest. For example, the

Home Insurance

court, which used the disjunctive “or”, held that a hiring party could reasonably expect the worker’s compensation claimant to follow established departure and arrival times, and that he not deviate from well-recognized delivery routes, without creating an employment relationship.

Home Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm’n,

599 P.2d at 804 ;

see also Hunt Bldg. Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n,

713 P.2d at 306-307 (noting that applying Arizona’s right to control test “require[s] sufficient control over the method of reaching a desired result as opposed to merely controlling the end result of the work.”);

Central Mgmt. Co. v. Industrial Comm’n,

162 Ariz. 187 , 781 P.2d 1374, 1376-1377 (Ariz.Ct.App.1989) (“If the right of control of details goes no further than is necessary to ensure a satisfactory end result, it does not establish employment.” (citation omitted)).

The drivers also argue that the intent factor is “noticeably absent” from Arizona decisions. Arizona cases hardly mention intent at all. But, as discussed in the general introduction to today’s decisions, even though the intent factor weighs clearly in favor of an independent contractor relationship in states that weigh this factor, this factor wasn’t dispositive in the

Kansas Decision

and its absence from consideration under Arizona law doesn’t change today’s outcome.

The court has held that FedEx’s retained controls are results-oriented and there is no reasonable inference that FedEx has retained the right to control the methods and means of the plaintiff drivers’ work on a class-wide basis.

Kansas Decision,

734 F.Supp.2d at 589 . The

Kansas

*667

Decision

discussed nearly all the factors cited by Arizona courts, and the court incorporates that decision here. One factor not discussed in Kansas is the drivers’ availability to the public. The drivers are free to work for whomever else they wish, and, as discussed in the

Kansas Decision,

this freedom is far from illusory when the drivers take advantage of the entrepreneurial opportunities available to them. Their trucks, when covered with the FedEx logo, aren’t available to the public for service. Yet plumbers working at a job site aren’t available to the rest of the public when working a contract, so there’s nothing special in itself about a contractor or a van being tied up with a particular job. The availability factor could indicate employee status under numerous factual contexts, but in light of the drivers’ entrepreneurial opportunities, this factor doesn’t change the balance found by the court in its

Kansas Decision.

For the reasons stated here and in the

Kansas Decision,

the

Gibson

drivers are independent contractors under Arizona law.

C. Arkansas (3:06-cv-209, Harris)

The

Harris

drivers allege violations of Arkansas’ Wage and Hour Law, breach of contract, misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, conversion, quantum meruit, and violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act; they seek declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The drivers didn’t seek class certification on the breach of contract, misrepresentation, or FLSA claims, but they represented that “[a]t the heart of the Arkansas claims is the common ‘overarching issue’ of whether FXG improperly labels these drivers as independent contractors.” Memo, in Support of Mot. to Certify Class (Arkansas), Apr. 23, 2007, at 1 [Doc. No. 603]. Only the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the court denies the drivers’ summary judgment motion and grants judgment independent of the motion to FedEx on the state law claims only. To the extent the drivers’ claims depend upon Arkansas state law, the court decides their claims today because they turn on the central question of the drivers’ employment status under Arkansas law. The FLSA claim hasn’t been briefed and requires further development with individualized evidence.

See

Op. and Ord., 662 F.Supp.2d at 1080-1083 [Doc. No. 1770]. The court will suggest remand of the FLSA-related claims for further disposition.

FedEx didn’t file a summary judgment motion with respect to the Arkansas class. In its supplemental brief, FedEx asks the court to enter judgment

sua sponte

(now called judgment independent of the motion) in its favor. As set forth in the general introduction to today’s decisions, the court takes this request seriously because summary judgment is appropriate under Arkansas law, the drivers’ employment status can be examined today without prejudice to the plaintiffs, and answering now the question of the plaintiff drivers’ employment status under Arkansas law will conserve judicial resources. Summary judgment is appropriate in Arkansas when the facts are undisputed and only one inference can reasonably be drawn from them.

Howard v. Dallas Morning News, Inc.,

324 Ark. 91 , 918 S.W.2d 178, 185 (1996);

see also Dickens v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Arkansas,

315 Ark. 514 , 868 S.W.2d 476 (1994) (affirming summary judgment finding independent contractor status).

Arkansas follows the multi-factor Restatement test for employment status discussed in the

Kansas Decision. See

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220. The right to control is the most important factor, and the right to control, not actual control, determines the relationship. Because a fact intensive inquiry is required, each case must be decided on its own facts,

*668

under the totality of the circumstances.

See ConAgra Foods, Inc. v. Draper,

372 Ark. 361 , 276 S.W.3d 244, 249 (2008);

Arkansas Transit Homes, Inc. v. Aetna Life

Casualty,

341 Ark. 317 , 16 S.W.3d 545, 547-548 (2000);

Howard v. Dallas Morning News,

918 S.W.2d at 182-183 .

Arkansas follows the distinction between controlling results and controlling methods and means used to obtain those results:

It is not enough that the employer has merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to employers, but does not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail. Thei’e must be a retention of a right of supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work his own way.

ConAgra Foods v. Draper,

276 S.W.3d at 250

(quoting Williams v. Nucor-Yamato Steel Co.,

318 Ark. 452 , 886 S.W.2d 586, 587 (1994) (alterations omitted)).

[I]n contracts for the performance of work, the inclusion of such phrases as, “work is to be done in accordance with instructions,” “under direction and supervision,” and the like does not relate to the method or manner in which work is to be done, and does not govern the details of the physical means by which the work is to be performed, or change the status of independent contractor to that of master and servant.

ConAgra Foods v. Draper,

276 S.W.3d at 250 (discussing

Moore v. Phillips,

197 Ark. 131 , 120 S.W.2d 722 (1938)).

Arkansas courts construe employee status more broadly in situations involving

respondeat superior

liability or worker’s compensation. Among all the states’ cases this court has examined, Arkansas courts have given special emphasis to the rule that although one entrusts work to an independent contractor, one may yet be liable for harm the contractor causes to others to the extent one has retained control of any part of the contractor’s work— even though the contractor still is generally considered an independent contractor and not an employee.

Elkins v. Arkla, Inc.,

312 Ark. 280 , 849 S.W.2d 489, 490 (1993)

(citing

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414). As the Arkansas Supreme Court put it, “[W]hen one is sought to be held responsible for the tortious act of another under the principle of

respondeat superior,

the question of responsibility will not depend entirely upon the existence of some actual contractual relationship of master and servant. It is sometimes allowable to prove the relation of master and servant by the fact that one performs service for another.”

ConAgra Foods v. Draper,

276 S.W.3d at 249, 250 (discussing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414);

Howard v. Dallas Morning News,

918 S.W.2d at 184 ;

but see Blankenship v. Overholt,

301 Ark. 476 , 786 S.W.2d 814, 816 (1990) (finding no liability even where employer provided numerous specifications to contractor). Still, personal injury caused by an independent contractor doesn’t automatically result in liability for the employer; when no factor supports a finding of employee status, no

respondeat superior

liability will attach.

See Williams v. Nucor-Yamato Steel Co.,

886 S.W.2d at 587 (stating that where there’s no exercise of actual control or retained right of control, there’s no liability for a company toward the injured employee of independent contractor). Yet Arkansas appears to give wider scope to employer liability in

respondeat superior

cases involving independent contractors, which has caused this court to read Arkansas

respon

*669

deat superior

cases with caution because today’s case involves no personal injury issues.

Additionally, Arkansas policy is to liberally construe the scope of employee status in worker’s compensation cases.

See, e.g., Franklin v. Arkansas Kraft, Inc.,

12 Ark. App. 66 , 670 S.W.2d 815, 816 (1984) (“It is well settled that the determination whether, at the time of injury, a person was an employee or an independent contractor, is a factual one, and the Commission is required to follow a liberal approach, resolving doubts in favor of employment status for the [injured] worker.” (citation omitted));