Meekins v. Thompson

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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m 00-31057

Summary Calendar

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BRENDA MEEKINS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

ROBERT P. THOMPSON,

DIRECTOR, FAMILY INDEPENDENCE WORK PROGRAM;

LAURA PEASE,

DIRECTOR, FAMILY INDEPENDENCE WORK PROGRAM;

LAURA BECK,

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, FAMILY INDEPENDENCE WORK PROGRAM,

Defendants-Appellants.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

(98-CV-2047-J)

_________________________

April 4, 2001

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, Brenda Meekins sued, among others,

and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:* *

(...continued)

determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the

*

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.

(continued...) 47.5.4.

Robert P. Thompson, Laura Pease, and Laura found Meekins’s complaint, augmented by her

Beck in their individual and official capacities rule 7(a) reply, sufficient to assert a cause of

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 for action under §§ 1981 and 1983 and denied the

alleged civil rights violations. Asserting qual- motion to dismiss.

ified immunity as a defense, those three

defendants appeal the denial of their motion to Meekins then filed a motion to amend her

dismiss for failure to state a claim. Because complaint to assert claims against defendants

the district court correctly found Meekins’s in their individual capacities, which a

allegations sufficient to survive the motion to magistrate denied, whereupon Meekins filed a

dismiss, we dismiss the appeal for want of separate action in the district court, asserting

jurisdiction. the individual capacity claims. The court

consolidated the actions and dismissed the

I. second action without prejudice.

Meekins was employed as a Family Security

Program Specialist II in the Family Before consolidation, the defendants

Independence Work Program (“FIND”) of the perfected an interlocutory appeal to this court;

Louisiana Department of Social Services. Her we dismissed the monetary claims on the

employment was terminated, so she sued, ground of sovereign immunity, leaving intact

complaining that her termination was the claims for injunctive relief. Meekins v.

retaliatory, in violation of the First Amend- Foster, No. 99-30583, at 6-7 (5th Cir. April 3,

ment. 2000) (unpublished). We declined, however,

to rule on the individual capacity claims, be-

Meekins’s original complaint sought in- cause they had not been consolidated with the

junctive and monetary relief, naming appellants original action until after the defendants had

and other officials in their official capacities filed their notice of appeal. Id. at 6.

only. The defendants, claiming qualified

immunity, filed a motion seeking either On remand and after consolidation,

dismissal or judgment on the pleadings, or defendants moved for dismissal of the

alternatively, a more definite statement of the individual capacity claims, and the court

claims. In response, and pursuant to Schultea dismissed the claims against all defendants

v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995) (en except appellants, with respect to whom the

banc), the district court ordered Meekins to

submit a reply under FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a)

1

addressing qualified immunity.1 The court (...continued)

When a public official pleads the af-

firmative defense of qualified immunity in

1

Schultea established the use of a rule 7(a) his answer, the district court may, on the

reply to resolve the inherent conflict between the official’s motion or on its own, require the

Federal Rules’ notice pleading procedures and the plaintiff to reply to that defense in detail.

substantive right of qua lified immunity, which By definition, the reply must be tailored to

requires that a plaintiff allege with particularity the assertion of qualified immunity and

those facts necessary to overcome a qualified im- fairly engage its allegations.

munity defense:

(continued...) Shultea, 47 F.3d at 1433.

2

court denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

that support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch.

after a fair reading of the Complaint as a Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999)

whole and plaintiff’s Schultea reply, (quoting Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42

plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995)).

state a claim for violation of her civil

rights. She alleges that she was fired be- With respect to claims against which

cause she spoke out about welfare and qualified immunity can be a defense, however,

welfare reform, and was critical of the we require a heightened standard of pleading,

way the state handled welfare reform. whereby the plaintiff must allege specific

conduct giving rise to a constitutional

II. violation. Id. Such allegation “must be

Although the denial of a motion to dismiss pleaded with factual detail and particularity,

is normally not appealable, we review de novo not mere conclusionary allegations.” Jackson

the denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified v. Widnall, 99 F.3d 710, 715-16 (5th Cir.

immunity grounds; such a denial is considered 1996) (quotation marks omitted). Specifically,

an appealable collateral order when rendered “the plaintiff must identify defendants who

on an issue of law. Shipp v. McMahon, 234 were either personally involved in the

F.3d 907, 910 (5th Cir. 2000), petition for constitutional violation or whose acts are

cert. filed (U.S. Mar 5, 2001) (No. 00-1392). causally connected to the constitutional

We do not have jurisdiction in this posture to violation alleged.” Woods v. Edwards, 51

review the evidentiary sufficiency of the alle- F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1995). In addition, the

gations, however. Steadman v. Tex. Rangers, plaintiff must allege a violation of a “clearly

179 F.3d 360, 365 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that established constitutional right.” Shipp, 234

we have jurisdiction to review only “legal” is- F.3d at 911.2

sues under the collateral order doctrine and A plaintiff who states a First Amendment

noting that “[a]n order is not ‘legal’ where it claim sufficiently alleges the violation of a

resolves a fact-related dispute of ‘evidence clearly established right. Kennedy, 224 F.3d at

sufficiency.’”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1115 377. The plaintiff must establish that the

(2000). asserted protected speech addressed a matter

of public concern; if he does so, “the court

A motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) “is

viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.” 2

Shipp, 234 F.3d at 910 (quoting Kaiser If a plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to show

Aluminum & Chem. Sales v. Avondale that the defendants violated a clearly established

right, the court must inquire “whether the

Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir.

defendants’ conduct was objectively reasonable in

1986)). Surviving a motion to dismiss is light of ‘clearly established’ law at the time of the

generally not a high hurdle for a plaintiff: We alleged violation.” Kennedy v. Tangipahoa Parish

liberally construe the complaint in favor of the Library Bd. of Control, 224 F.3d 359, 377 (5th

plaintiff, and we take as true all facts in the Cir. 2000). Appellants, however, contend only that

complaint; a motion to dismiss should not be Meekins has failed to show that they violated a

granted “unless it appears beyond doubt that clearly established right, so the second stage of the

inquiry is not before us.

3

must strike ‘a balance between the interests of alia, that she was fired in retaliation for

the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting revealing the misconduct of the officials in the

upon matters of public concern [against] the FIND program.3 In her rule 7(a) reply, she

interest of the State, as an employer, in sets forth many specific allegations of

promoting the efficiency of the public services misconduct and alleged attempts to report that

it performs through its employees.’” Click v. misconduct to higher officials, to buttress her

Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 111 (5th Cir. 1992) claim of whistleblower retaliation.

(quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.

563, 568 (1968)). A public employee has “a clearly

established right to speak on matters of public

Appellants contend that they fired Meekins concern, on matters of public safety, and on

for insubordination and inappropriate contact matters of official misconduct.” Kennedy, 224

with Southern University of New Orleans F.3d at 376 (citations omitted) (compiling

(“SUNO”) and other potential contractors un- cases). Likewise, allegations of corruption, if

der the FIND program. Meekins disagrees true, “are matters of public concern and

with the characterization of her contact with outweigh the government’s interest in efficien-

SUNO, contending that her relationship with cy.” Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150,

it constituted protected activity under the First 157 n.10 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 52

Amendment, because she participated “in pub- (2000).

lic speech on issues of welfare reform and

welfare related matters at [SUNO] . . . .” Although Breaux focused on the objective

Moreover, Meekins contends in her complaint, truth of the plaintiff’s allegations in finding

the true reason for her dismissal was her that they were matters of public concern, that

refusal to participate inSS and, more case was decided after a jury trial. In the

importantly, disclosure ofSSthe misconduct of context of a motion to dismiss, we must accept

Appellants, the managers of the FIND as true Meekins’s allegations of misconduct.

program: “Thompson, Pease, and Beck have Thus, her claims not only allege speech on a

conspired to unlawfully terminated [sic] plain- matter of public concern; they also, at least for

tiff from her position because she exercise [sic] purposes of the motion to dismiss, establish by

rights protected by the First Amendment to the their nature that Meekins’s interest outweighs

United States Constitution and because she the government’s. Meekins also has alleged

has been a whistleblower and has complained that all three appellants were intimately

of illegal practices of the Department’s Office involved both in the purported misconduct and

of Family Support Orleans Region.” in her allegedly improper termination, meeting

the requirement that the named defendants be

Appellants argue that Meekins’s claims al- somehow causally connected to the alleged

lege facts insufficient to overcome the constitutional violation.

qualified immunity defense. Specifically, they

argue, Meekins has shown neither that she en-

gaged in a protected activity nor that her in- 3

We need not address whether Meekins’s other

terest in pursuing that activity outweighs the alleged protected speechSSher discussions of

government’s interest, as required by Picker- welfare reform at SUNOSSrelated to a matter of

ing. Meekins, however, has alleged, inter public concern, because we find that her allegations

of whistleblower retaliation are sufficient.

4

Meekins therefore alleges sufficient facts to

survive the motion to dismiss. On remand, the

district court may find that Meekins’s al-

legations of misconduct and retaliation have no

evidentiary support; we have no jurisdiction,

however, to address that issue now. We may

reverse the order only if Meekins did not

allege facts that, if true, would defeat a

qualified immunity defense. She has done so,

and we therefore are without jurisdiction to

entertain this appeal.

DISMISSED.

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