Lozano v. City of Hazleton

DECISION

MUNLEY, District Judge.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Preliminary Issues.........................................................487

A. Standing..............................................................487

1. Constitutional standing..............................................487

a. Individual named plaintiffs.......................................488

b. Organizations..................................................491

c. Tenant plaintiffs................................................496

2. Prudential standing.................................................499

B. Anonymous Does ......................................................504

1. Factors favoring anonymity..........................................507

2. Factors favoring disclosure..........................................513

C. Amendments to the ordinances ..........................................515

II. Federal Constitutional Issues................................................517

A. Federal pre-emption....................................................517

1. Employment provisions .............................................518

a. Express pre-emption............................................518

b. Implied pre-emption............................................521

i. Field......................................................521

ii. Conflict....................................................525

2. Tenancy provisions.................................................529

a. Housing illegal aliens............................................529

b. Tenant registration ordinance....................................530

B. Procedural due process.................................................533

1. Employment provisions .............................................533

2. Landlord/tenant....................................................537

C. Equal Protection.......................................................538

D. Privacy rights.........................................................542

III. Federal Statutory Causes of Action...........................................545

A. Fan- Housing Act......................................................545

B. Section 1981 ...........................................................546

IV. State Law Causes of Action..................................................548

A. Pennsylvania municipality law...........................................548

B. Landlord/Tenant Law..................................................552

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C. Police powers................... ......................................553

Conclusion............................... ......................................554

Verdict.................................. ......................................555

Appendix................................ ......................................556

This case addresses Defendant City of Hazleton’s authority to enact ordinances that regulate the presence and employment of illegal aliens.

1

Before the court for disposition is plaintiffs’ complaint challenging the validity of those ordinances. Trial has been held on this matter, and the parties have filed briefs setting forth their respective positions. The matter is thus ripe for disposition.

Background including findings of fact

Defendant City of Hazleton is located in Luzerne County in northeastern Pennsylvania. The city’s executive is a mayor and the city’s legislature is a city council. Under Pennsylvania law, Hazleton is a City of the Third Class and operates under an Optional Plan B form of government. (Notes of trial testimony (hereinafter “N.T”) 3/15/07 at 204-05).

At the time of the 2000 census, Hazle-ton’s population was 23,000. (N.T. 3/16/07 at 145-46). Since 2000, Hazleton’s population has increased sharply, and now has an estimated 30,000 to 33,000 residents. (P-148, 2007 Budget Proposal, at 1-2; N.T. 3/19/07 at 163-64).

The increase in Hazleton’s population can be explained largely by a recent influx of immigrants, most of whom are Latino. (N.T. 3/16/07 at 146). After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, many Latino families moved from New York and New Jersey to Hazleton seeking a better life, employment and affordable housing. (N.T. 3/12/07 at 66-67; N.T. 3/14/07 at 29-30). Those moving to Hazleton included United States citizens, lawful permanent residents and undocumented immigrants. (N.T. 3/13/07 at 161; N.T. 3/14/07 at 29-30).

The number of undocumented immigrants in Hazleton is unknown. (N.T. 3/16/07 at 146). Immigrants, both legal and undocumented, support the local economy through consumer spending, paying rent and paying sales taxes. (N.T. 3/14/07 at 67-70).

Beginning on July 13, 2006, the City of Hazleton enacted numerous ordinances aimed at combating what the city viewed as the problems created by the presence of “illegal aliens.” On July 13, 2006, Ordinance 2006-10, the city’s first version of its “Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance” was passed. This ordinance prohibits the employment and harboring of undocumented aliens in the City of Hazleton. On August 15, 2006, the city passed the “Tenant Registration Ordinance,” Ordinance 2006-13 (“RO”). This ordinance requires apartment dwellers to obtain an occupancy permit. To receive such a permit, they must prove they are citizens or lawful residents.

On September 21, 2006, Hazleton enacted Ordinance 2006-18, entitled the “Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance” (“IIRA”) and Ordinance 2006-19, the “Official English Ordinance.” These two ordinances replaced the original Illegal Immigration Relief Act. On December 28, 2006, Hazleton enacted Ordinance 2006-40, which amended IIRA by adding an “implementation and process” section. During

*485

the trial of the above matter, the city enacted the final ordinance at issue in this case, Ordinance 2007-6, which made minor, but important, changes to the language of portions of IIRA.

2

At issue in the instant case are IIRA

3

and RO.

4

IIRA defines “illegal alien” as an “alien who is not lawfully present in the United States, according to the terms of United States Code Title 8, section 1101 et seq.” (IIRA § 3.D.). Title 8, section 1101,

et seq.

is commonly referred to as the Immigration and Nationality Act or “INA”. The INA provides no definition for the term “illegal alien” or the term “lawfully present.” (N.T. 3/19/07 at 130).

Generally, under federal law, aliens can be present in the country as: 1) lawfully admitted non-immigrants, i.e., visitors, those in the country temporarily; and 2) lawful immigrants, lawful permanent residents, referred to sometimes as “green card holders.” (N.T. 3/19/07 at 112-13). Lawfully admitted for permanent residence status can be attained in various ways, including family or employment characteristics, the “green card lottery” or relief such as asylum.

(Id.

at 112-13).

A third category of aliens present in the country are “undocumented aliens” who lack lawful immigration status. These aliens may have overstayed their time in the United States or entered the country illegally.

(Id.

at 113). The number of these individuals is approximately twelve million.

(IcL).

Hazleton’s use of the term “illegal alien” evidently is aimed at these individuals.

On August 15, 2006, plaintiffs filed the instant action to challenge the validity of the Hazleton ordinances. On October 30, 2006, an amended complaint was filed along with a motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order seeking to enjoin the defendant from enforcing the ordinances.

On October 31, 2006, the court granted the plaintiffs’ request for a Temporary Restraining Order. (Doc. 35). The court ordered that the Temporary Restraining Order remain in effect until November 14, 2006 and scheduled a hearing on the preliminary injunction motion for November 13, 2006. (Doc. 36). In order to conduct discovery and fully brief the issues raised in the amended complaint, the parties entered into a stipulation to extend the Temporary Restraining Order for 120 days or until trial and resolution of the matter. (Doc. 39).

On January 12, 2007, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. (Doc. 82). The second amended complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that IIRA and RO violate the Supremacy Clause, the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution of the United States. Plaintiffs also claim that the ordinances violate 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ; the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601

et seq.;

plaintiffs’ privacy rights; Pennsylvania’s Home Rule Charter Law, 53 Pa. Cons.Stat. §§ 2961;

et seq.,

the Landlord and Tenant Act 68 Penn. Stat. §§ 250.101 et seq.; and its police powers.

The following plaintiffs filed the second amended complaint:

— Pedro Lozano, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who immi

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grated from Colombia in January 2002 in search of a better life. (N.T. 3/12/07 at 161). He served as an official in the National Police force for thirty-five years in Colombia. (N.T. 3/12/07 at 162). He moved to Hazleton from New York City to find affordable housing and better employment. (N.T. 3/12/07 at 164).

— Jose Luis Lechuga and his wife, Rosa Lechuga, who immigrated illegally to the United States from Mexico in 1982 to forge a better life for themselves and their children. (N.T. 3/12/07 at 118-119). In the late 1980s, they received amnesty and became lawful permanent residents.. (N.T. 3/12/07 at 119-120). In 1991, the Lechu-gas moved to Hazleton for its employment opportunities. (N.T. 3/12/2007 at 122-123).

— Humberto Hernandez is listed in the complaint as a plaintiff. (Doc. 81, ¶¶ 3-4). Plaintiffs presented no testimony at trial regarding Hernandez; therefore, he will be dismissed.

— John Doe 1 has lived in Hazleton for six years, but was born in Mexico.

(See

Doc. 189, Dep. John Doe 1 at 12). John Doe 1 is not a United States citizen or legal permanent resident, though his father filed a document with the federal government seeking to change his immigration status.

(Id. ■

at 16, 19). John Doe 1 is unsure of his immigration status, though he thought that the federal government could order him removed from the country.

(Id.

at 22). John Doe 1 is also unsure of whether he has legal authorization to work.

(Id.).

— John Doe 3 moved to Hazleton four years ago. (Doc. 190, Dep. John Doe 3 at 8). He is not a U.S. citizen or a lawful permanent resident.

(Id.

at 11).

— Jane Doe 5 and John Doe 7 moved to Hazleton more than five years ago. (Doc. 191, Dep. Jane Doe 5 at 13). Neither is a U.S. citizen nor a lawful permanent resident. (Doc. 191, Dep. Jane Doe 5 at 15, Doc. 192, Dep. John Doe 7 at 10-11). They were both born in Colombia, where John Doe 7 worked as an architect, and have been married for over twenty-eight years. (Doc. 191, Dep. Jane Doe 5 at 16, Doc. 192, Dep. John Doe 7 at 9-11).

— Hazleton Hispanic Business Association is an organization comprised of approximately twenty-seven Hispanic business and property owners from the Hazleton area. (N.T. 3/12/07 at 77, 78, 80, 98). Members include landlords in the city of Hazleton.

(Id.

at 98).

— Pennsylvania Statewide Latino Coalition is a not-for-profit organization with a mission to promote the social, political, economic and cultural development of Pennsylvania Latinos and to develop leadership and create networks among Latino leaders and communities. (N.T. 3/12/07 at 20-22).

— Casa Dominicana de Hazleton, Inc. is an organization that provides assistance, orientation and education to the Latino community in Hazleton and attempts to unify ties between the Latino and non-Latino communities. (N.T. 3/14/07 at 7-9). It provides members with information, legal referrals and assistance with economic difficulties.

(Id.

at 8-9). It also works to keep youth from joining gangs. (Vol.3, 27-28).

5

Plaintiffs seek an injunction pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enjoining Hazleton from implementing or enforcing the ordinances. Additionally, plaintiffs seek the costs incurred in this litigation including attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 .

On January 23, 2007, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the second amended

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complaint. (Doc. 84). Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment on February 12, 2007. (Doc. 106). On February 22, 2007, we held a pretrial conference where we indicated that we would consolidate the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment into the trial. Defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to the summary judgment motion on March 2, 2007. (Doc. 150).

The court held a hearing on the preliminary injunction motion from March 12, 2007 through March 22, 2007. We notified the parties that this hearing would be the final trial on the injunctive matter.

See

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 65(a)(2)(“Before or after the commencement of the hearing of an application for a preliminary injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application.”). After the completion of the trial transcript on April 20, 2007, the parties submitted their post-trial briefs on May 14, 2007. (Doc. 218, 219). The matter is thus ripe for disposition.

Jurisdiction

As this case is brought pursuant to federal statutes and the federal constitution, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). We have authority to issue a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (explaining that “any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration[.]”). We have supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 .

Discussion

Before we address the merits of plaintiffs’ complaint we must address several preliminary matters. These matters include standing, the propriety of several plaintiffs proceeding anonymously and which version of the ordinances should be addressed.

I. Preliminary issues

A. Standing

Defendant argues that all plaintiffs lack standing to bring this lawsuit. Courts have identified two types of standing, constitutional and prudential, and defendant contends that plaintiffs fail to meet the requirements of either type. We will address each in turn.

1. Constitutional Standing

“No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,

426 U.S. 26, 37 , 96 S.Ct. 1917 , 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). Standing provides “justiciability: whether the plaintiff has made out a ‘case or controversy’ between himself and the defendant within the meaning of Art. III.”

Warth v. Seldin,

422 U.S. 490, 498 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). The Supreme Court has held that “the standing question in its Art. Ill aspect is whether the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.’ ”

Simon,

426 U.S. at 38 , 96 S.Ct. 1917 (quoting

Warth,

422 U.S. at 498-99 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 ). The Court has described three elements that comprise the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing.”

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 560 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 , 119 L.Edüd 351 (1992). A plaintiff must first “have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and

*488

particularized [citations omitted] and (b) ‘actual or imminent’, not ‘conjectural or hypothetical.’ ”

Id.

(quoting

Los Angeles v. Lyons,

461 U.S. 95, 102 , 103 S.Ct. 1660 , 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). The injury suffered by the plaintiff must also be causally connected to the conduct of which the plaintiff complains: “the injury has to be ‘fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... the result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’ ”

Id.

(quoting

Simon,

426 U.S. at 41-42 , 96 S.Ct. 1917 ). Finally, “it must be ‘likely’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’ ”

Id.

(quoting

Id.

at 38, 43 , 96 S.Ct. 1917 ).

“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden” of proof to demonstrate standing.

Lujan,

504 U.S. at 561 , 112 5.Ct. 2130. The level of proof required of a party conforms to “the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.”

Id.

In the initial stage of the litigation, when the plaintiff need only meet the pleading standards, “general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice.”

Id.

When the issue in question is summary judgment, though, “the plaintiff can no longer rest on such ‘mere allegations,’ but must ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts,’ which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken as true.”

Id.

(quoting Fed. R.CivP. 56(e)). At trial, “those facts (if controverted) must be ‘supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.’ ”

Id.

(quoting

Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,

441 U.S. 91 , 115 n. 31, 99 S.Ct. 1601 , 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979)).

a. Named Plaintiffs

i. Landlord Plaintiffs

Defendant argues that the landlord plaintiffs lack standing to bring this suit.

6

Those plaintiffs, defendant claims, did not suffer an injury caused by the ordinances which this court could redress. Plaintiff Pedro Lozano, a native of Columbia who is a legal resident of the United States, lives in Hazleton. (N.T. 3/12/07 at 161, 163). Lozano and his wife purchased a two-family home in Hazleton in April 2005.

(Id.

at 164). They planned to rent half of the house to “have assistance with the mortgage.”

(Id.

at 164). This rental property, Lozano insists, forms the basis for his standing in this case. The defendant disputes this assertion.

We reject the defendant’s position and find that Lozano has standing to sue regarding both the tenant registration and the employer portions of Hazleton’s ordinances. First, Lozano has suffered an injury that is both concrete and particular and actual or imminent. Lozano rented the property immediately after signing the mortgage, and continued to do so until the City passed the ordinances.

7

(Id.

at 165). Once the ordinances passed, Lozano had more difficulty renting the property, “and the tenants that were there ran away.”

*489

(Id.).

His tenants left after he informed them that they may have to obtain a permit from the City to rent the apartment.

(Id.

at 167). After the ordinances passed, Lozano “sporadically” rented the property, but the house was not occupied “continuously.”

(Id.

at 168). He showed the apartment to at least five or six people, who seemed interested in the property but failed to complete the transaction.

(Id.).

Lozano’s difficulties in renting the apartment constitute an injury.

Lozano also had hired others to do more complicated repairs on his property, such as roofing.

(Id.

at 175). He anticipated hiring a contractor to repair his roof sometime in the future.

(Id.).

He would thus be forced, as an employer of labor, to comply with the employer requirements of the IIRA, adding a burden of time and expense to his operations. Therefore, he has suffered an actual or imminent injury sufficient to meet the constitutional standing requirements.

See Pennell v. City of San Jose,

485 U.S. 1, 8 , 108 S.Ct. 849 , 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (finding that landlords who challenged zoning requirements related to hardship tenants had standing because “[t]he likelihood of enforcement, with the concomitant probability that a landlord’s rent will be reduced below what he or she would otherwise be able to, obtain in the absence of the ordinances, is a sufficient threat of actual injury to satisfy Art. Ill’s requirement that ‘a plaintiff who challenges a statute must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or enforcement.’ ”) (quoting

Babbitt v. Farm Workers,

442 U.S. 289, 298 , 99 S.Ct. 2301 , 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979)).

8

We disagree with the defendant that these injuries cannot be recognized by the law because they constitute a complaint about an inability to rent to illegal immigrants. The plaintiffs testified that they were unaware of the immigration status of their renters. No evidence, therefore, indicates that the renters they lost were illegal immigrants. Such tenants may have been legal residents who did not desire to live in a town that appeared (to them) to seek to exclude Spanish-speaking residents. Such tenants may also have concluded that they did not want to register with the town and provide private information to the City as a condition of residing there. Perhaps they found the fees required for a permit onerous. In any case, we will not assume that the renters plaintiff lost were necessarily illegal immigrants.

Further, Lozano’s injuries are caused by the defendant’s ordinances. Potential renters’ concerns with the registration requirements of the ordinances and the attitude towards immigrants their passage conveyed undermined Lozano’s ability to secure tenants. Lozano had informed the prospective tenants that the ordinance’s registration requirements mandated that they bring immigration documents to the City, and those prospective renters never returned. (N.T. 3/12/07 at 168). In addition, complying with the ordinances requires action that will cause him time and expense and expose Lozano to potential adverse enforcement actions. If the ordinances did not exist, the landlord plaintiffs would not be required to follow these procedures. The injury Lozano claims is therefore caused by the defendant’s actions.

See Lujan,

504 U.S. at 561-62 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 (holding that “[w]hen the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be averred (at the summary judgment stage) or proved (at the

*490

trial stage) in order to establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or foregone action) at issue. If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will address it.”).

Redressability is also apparent: if this court declares the ordinances unconstitutional and enjoins their enforcement, Loza-no and the other landlord plaintiffs will not be forced to comply with them. As a result, those plaintiffs will not be required to examine and ensure the immigration status of their tenants, facing the possibility of fines and other penalties from the City for failing to do so. The burdens they face from such compliance will not exist, and their injury will be eliminated.

ii. Rosa and Luis Lechuga

Defendant also challenges the standing of the plaintiffs Rosa and Luis Lechuga, who when they filed suit were business owners in the City. Plaintiff Jose Lechuga, a resident of Hazleton, had lived in the City of Hazleton with his wife Rosa and their five children for sixteen years. (N.T. 3/12/07 at 118). When he came originally to the United States from Mexico in 1982, he did not have legal authorization to do so, but he is now a legal permanent resident of the country.

(Id.

at 118-19). He and his wife used a 1980s federal amnesty program to adjust their immigration status.

(Id.

at 120).

Lechuga opened a store, Lechuga’s Mexican Products, in 2000.

(Id.

at 128). The store sold “[t]ortillas, cheese, chorizo, canned chiles, different canned products, [and] also sodas from Mexico.”

(Id.).

His family worked in the store with him, including his wife and children.

(Id.

at 129). The business was not always profitable; in 2005 the Lechugas “didn’t have much of a profit, but ... [were] still in business.”

(Id.

at 130). Business improved in 2006, but began decreasing after the City passed the ordinances.

(Id.

at 131). By early 2007, business had become “terrible,” and in February 2007, Lechuga closed the store.

(Id.).

Lechuga opened another business, a restaurant called Langria Lechuga, in February 2006.

(Id.

at 132). Lechuga’s wife Rosa operated that business, doing the cooking.

(Id.).

When he found the time, Lechuga helped by serving, taking orders, washing dishes and cleaning.

(Id.).

This business was no more successful than the Lechugas’ store.

(Id.

at 133). Lechuga blamed his lack of business on the City’s activities.

9

(Id.).

A police car was often parked across the street from the restaurant, and after a police officer paid a visit, “people began to comment that the police [were] there to take the clients away when they came to eat.”

(Id.

at 133). This made potential customers feel “intimidated, and that is the reason why we lost our business.”

10

(Id.).

In neither of these businesses did Lechuga employ anyone; he testified that he had never had any plans to employ anyone at either store.

(Id.

at 150-51).

Plaintiffs have suffered an injury here in the loss of business they experienced after the ordinances passed. To experience an injury sufficient to create standing, a plaintiff need not allege a large quantum of harm. The Third Circuit

*491

Court of Appeals, in

Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli,

343 F.3d 632 (3d Cir.2003), found that a plaintiff who complained that he could not afford a $100 filing fee to campaign for public office had stated an injury sufficient to confer standing.

Id.

at 640 . Plaintiff had only $50 in campaign funds and “paying the required fee would have completely depleted his campaign funds and required him to delve into his limited personal assets.”

Id.

(holding: “ ‘AH that the Article Ill’s injury-in-fact element requires is ‘an identifiable trifle’ of harm’ ”) (quoting

Joint Stock Soc’y v. UDV N. Am., Inc.,

266 F.3d 164, 177 (3d Cir.2001) (citation omitted)). The injury of which plaintiffs complain, like the potential injury in

Belitskus ,

is one that pushed their financial condition from bad to worse, contributing ultimately to disaster. Such an injury surely constitutes an “identifiable trifle.”

The Lechuga’s injury was caused at least in part by the defendant’s ordinances. While other factors apparently contributed to the decline of the Lechuga’s businesses, we find that they have presented evidence that Hazleton’s approval of the ordinances contributed at least in part to the decline of customers for Lechuga’s store and restaurant, and therefore, the injury they suffered is at least fairly traceable to the defendant.

Our decision on the constitutionality of the ordinances would not, however, allow the Lechugas redress from their injuries. Their businesses, unfortunately, have now closed. They did not testify that they planned to reopen their businesses pending resolution- of this lawsuit, and the plaintiffs do not seek monetary damages from the defendant.

11

Accordingly, no action by this court would provide relief to the Lechugas, and they lack standing to sue. The Lechuga’s lack of standing, however, does not mean that other business-owner plaintiffs, who will be forced to comply with the terms of the ordinances in order to operate their business in Hazle-ton, lack standing to sue, as we explain below.

b. Organizational Plaintiffs

Defendant argues that the organizational plaintiffs — Casa Dominicana of Hazle-ton, Inc., the Hazleton Hispanic Business Association and the Pennsylvania Statewide Latino Coalition- — -all lack standing. Defendant argues that none of the individual members of these associations have standing, and that the organizations cannot claim representational standing. Defendant also contends that none of the organizational plaintiffs can allege a concrete injury to their own interests, because any membership loss experienced by the organizations since the passage of the ordinances is connected by only a speculative thread to the ordinances themselves.

12

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Any claim of public hostility to the organizations generated by the ordinances is too generalized, defendant claims, to constitute an injury in fact. Defendant also contends that plaintiffs have not proved any causal connection between the ordinances and the injuries suffered by the plaintiff organizations. Finally, defendant insists that an injunction against the ordinances would not be likely to redress the injuries plaintiffs claim.

An organization seeking to participate in a lawsuit must demonstrate that it has standing to sue. While an organization can have standing in its own right, “an association may have standing solely as the representative of its members.”

Worth,

422 U.S. at 511 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 . Still, such standing “does not eliminate or attenuate the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy.”

Id.

Courts have found that an organization can have “representational standing” when “ T) the organization’s members would have standing to sue on their own, 2) the interests the organization seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, and 3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires individual participation by its members.’ ”

Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc.,

913 F.2d 64 , 70 (3d Cir.1990) (quoting

Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm’n,

432 U.S. 333 , 97 S.Ct. 2434 , 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977)).

Defendant challenges the standing of the Hazleton Hispanic Business Association (“HHBA”). Rudolfo Espinal, the president of the HHBA, testified at trial as a representative of that organization. (N.T. 3/13/07 at 77). Espinal testified that the HHBA, formed in August 2006, is “a group of Hispanic businessowners that got together in the City of Hazleton to work towards common goals,” especially to “promote the interest of our business members and to project the image of the Hispanic business community and to also help the community any way that we can.”

(Id.

at 77-78). Most of the businesses in the association are located in Hazleton, though some operate in the neighboring town of West Hazleton.

(Id.

at 78). The association promoted access to health insurance and accounting services, but also aimed to protest the anti-illegal immigration ordinances that the City had proposed.

(Id.

at 79). Twenty-seven members joined the organization.

(Id.

at 80). The passage of the ordinances harmed organization members; some lost their businesses or a significant portion of their patrons, and many members abandoned plans to expand their businesses.

13

(Id.

at 81). The organization also lost members, as “some of [them] didn’t want to be part of the organization anymore.”

(Id.

at 83). The HHBA lost resources, as members were required to pay $75 in dues and fewer dues-paying members remained.

(Id.

at 84).

Espinal himself lost business as a result of the ordinances. Espinal owned three rental properties in the City of Hazleton.

(Id.

at 90). At the time of trial, two of those units were undergoing repairs, and one was occupied.

(Id.)

That building consisted of four apartment units.

(Id.).

Es-pinal lived in one of those units and rented out two others.

(Id.).

The fourth sat vacant.

(Id.).

Espinal testified that after the City passed its ordinances “it is harder to rent apartments now, and besides that, I think that I lost tenants, potential tenants because of the ordinance.”

(Id.

at 92-93). After showing the apartment to pro

*493

spective tenants and discussing rental prices, those tenants had indicated a desire to rent the unit.

{Id.

at 93). Following a discussion with these prospective tenants of the registration requirements under , the ordinances, however, Espinal “didn’t hear from them.”

{Id.).

A similar process repeated itself with several other prospective renters.

{Id.

at 95). Espinal planned to offer his other properties for rent, but needed to perform repairs such as painting, carpeting and electrical work before doing so.

{Id.

at 96). Espinal intended to perform some of that work himself, but would also hire workers to perform “whatever area I don’t feel comfortable with.”

{Id.

at 96). As president of the HHBA, Espinal knew of other organization members who were landlords in Hazleton.

(Id.

at 98). These members had the same concerns for the effect of the ordinances on leasing their apartments.

{Id.).

Espi-nal also testified that he understood the ordinances to require that he obtain information on immigration status from tenants that he normally would not seek.

14

He had no “training in evaluating a person’s immigration status or their documents.”

{Id.

at 102).

The HHBA has representational standing in this case. Individual business owners who are members of the HHBA have standing to sue. Espinal, like Lozano, would have standing to sue as a landlord and as an employer. Espinal also testified that members of the HHBA would be required to comply with the procedures required for employers under the IIRA. They would then face onerous paperwork requirements created by the ordinances for maintaining their licenses. These injuries would be caused by the ordinances and could be redressed by enjoining their enforcement. .Since the HHBA is designed to protect the interests of Hispanic business owners in the city and the lawsuit attacks city-created regulations of business, the organization is seeking to protect interests germane to its purpose. Finally, the claim asserted here by the organization attacks the ordinances on their face; such an attack does not require the factual specificity or individual experience required of a lawsuit over a specific event. Accordingly, the participation of individual members is not required for the court to address adequately the issues raised by the lawsuit.

Defendant argues that the business-owner plaintiffs do not face an “actual or imminent risk” that the city will enforce the IIRA ordinance against them because these plaintiffs do not know if they have any illegal alien employees and cannot say they definitely will hire such employees in the future. In any case, defendant insists, plaintiffs have no legal right to employ illegal aliens and cannot have an injury from an ordinance that prevents such action. Becausé the law operates only prospectively, plaintiffs can suffer an injury from the ordinance only if they hire an unauthorized worker according to the defendant. Since no plaintiff has declared an intention to hire an undocumented alien, defendant contends, the plaintiffs have no injury. Plaintiffs who claim to have suffered a loss of business commerce as a result of the ordinances also cannot demonstrate an injury, defendant insists, since “[n]o-one has a legally cognizable interest in profiting from the continuing sales of products to aliens unlawfully present in the United States.” (Memorandum of law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doe. 87) at 18). Defendant further

*494

contends that the plaintiffs cannot prove that the alleged injuries to their businesses were caused by the ordinances and cannot meet the causation requirement for standing.

We reject this argument. The business-owner plaintiffs do not complain that the ordinances limit their ability to sell products to and hire illegal aliens. They complain that the City’s ordinances damage them by hindering the operation of their businesses and by requiring them to seek immigration information from employees in a way that violates federal law. Their injury comes in the operation and requirements of the ordinances, not in their inability to sell, hire or rent to undocumented persons.

Defendant also challenges the standing to sue of Casa Dominicana de Hazleton (“Casa”). At trial Manuel Salda-na, President of the organization, testified as a representative of the organization.

(See

N.T. 3/14/07 at 7). Casa is a not-for-profit corporation founded in August

2005.(Id).

The organization’s offices are located in Hazleton.

(Id.

at 10). Around fifty Casa members live in Hazleton.

(Id.

at 12). Twenty to twenty-three members may lack legal authorization to reside in the United States.

15

(Id.

at 21). Casa’s purpose is “[t]o offer assistance, orientation, education, keep the unity within the community and unify the ties between the Hazleton community and the Latin community.”

(Id.

at 7). Members of the organization included “[ijndividuals, people renting, employees, different businesses, owners of businesses, drivers, chauffeurs,” “a cross-section of the Hazleton community[.]”

(Id.

at 9-10). To its members, the organization provides services to help with orientation and education.

(Id.

at 8). Casa also sponsors concerts and raises money to assist members through periods of financial difficulty.

(Id.).

The organization also assists members with problems in their immigration status by directing them to attorneys and providing assistance through “orientation.”

(Id.

at 8-9).

Casa members petitioned the organization to participate in the instant lawsuit.

(Id.

at 11). They feared the impact of the ordinances.

(Id.

at 14). Members, both legal and illegal residents, expressed “fear of not being able to obtain housing at a moment when it was needed” as well as concerns about having to produce identification at work and the effect of the ordinances on their children at school.

16

(Id.).

The organization lost thirty-five members in August 2006, after the City passed its ordinances.

(Id.

at 17). One member who left the organization decided to leave Ha-zleton because “he found that the measures that were about to be approved were hateful and uncomfortable for him.”

(Id.

at 18). This loss of membership, Saldana testified, harmed the organization because it diminished the number of volunteers

*495

available to carry out the group’s activities and limited the number of services Casa could offer members.

(Id.

at 18-19).

Casa has representational standing. Members of the organization are both tenants and employees in Hazleton, and would be required to comply with the terms of the ordinances. They would have to participate in the rental registration program or lose their housing in the city. They would have to supply their employers with immigration information or face losing their jobs. Those injuries for individual members would be fairly traceable to the ordinances, which institute the registration and employment regulations. If we were to enjoin enforcement of the ordinances as the plaintiffs here seek, we could redress the Casa’s injuries in this case. Casa’s purpose, to promote the interests of Dominicans in their relationships in the Ha-zleton community, would be served by this litigation. Finally, since this case consists of a facial challenge to the City’s ordinances, the interests of the litigation can be advanced without requiring the participation of individual plaintiffs. Casa has representational standing for its members.

The defendant likewise challenges the standing to sue of plaintiff Pennsylvania Statewide Latino Coalition (“PSLC”). Jose Molina testified as representative of the PSLC during the trial in this case. PSLC “is a nonprofit organization that promotes social, financial, political and cultural development of the Latino community in the State of Pennsylvania,” (N.T. 3/13/07 at 20). The organization’s goal “is to have a network of Latinos” addressing the interests of Latino communities statewide.

(Id.

at 21). The organization was founded by volunteers from across the state.

(Id.).

Of

the

6,000 statewide PSLC members approximately twenty reside in Hazleton.

(Id.

at 52). Among the activities the PSLC has engaged in are lawsuits protesting discriminatory hiring practices for police officers and teachers, the promotion of professional certification for nurses and teachers from Puerto Rico, and promotion of voter registration and voters’ rights.

(Id.

at 23). The organization also promotes education for Latinos in the state.

(Id.

at 24). Before engaging in activities like litigation, PSLC representatives “sit down with residents and people that are affected.”

(Id.).

Such conversations are often initiated by these people, who reach out to the PSLC for help.

(Id.).

The PSLC became involved in the Ha-zleton litigation partly as a result of requests from Hazleton community activists.

(Id.

at 25). On July 30, 2006, the PSLC organized a meeting in Hazleton to discuss the ordinances.

(Id.

at 26). Between fifty and sixty people, including “homeowners ... business owners ... [and] landlords,” attended this meeting.

(Id.

at 27). The fears that attendees at this meeting expressed to Molina convinced him that the issues raised by the ordinances would affect people far beyond Hazleton’s borders.

17

(Id.

at 28-29). Members of the organization who expressed these concerns included several who lived in Hazleton and who “decided to join and become members right away in the thinking that this is something that may help us, because we want to stay in this community.”

(Id.

at

*496

30).

18

Among these members were Anna Arias, who rented out half of her home and “the Rubio family,” who owned a gift shop.

(Id.

at 65-66). Another member owned a barber shop, and Molina pointed to “a few more” members who were business owners.

(Id.

at 66).

The PSLC has representational standing. Members of the organization include residents of Hazleton who face actual or imminent injury from the ordinances because they are landlords or business owners who will be required to comply with the ordinances’ terms. They will have to register if they intend to rent apartments, providing personal and potentially confidential information to the City. If they are employees, they will also have to provide information about their immigration status. Similarly, members who are employers will be burdened with IIRA’s requirements and face liability if challenged on their employment practices. Accordingly, these plaintiffs have or will suffer an imminent injury from the ordinances. These injuries, since they are or would be caused by the operation of the ordinances, are fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions.

Finally, an injunction would prevent the plaintiffs from being required to comply with the terms of the ordinances, and would thus provide redress. Participation in the litigation would serve the purposes of the PSLC, since the social and financial interests of Latinos in Hazleton are threatened by the terms of the ordinances and the PSLC’s involvement in the litigation seeks to protect those interests. In addition, since this is a challenge to ordinances that involves constitutional concerns rather than litigation about a particular event or interest, the individual participation of the represented members is not required to insure that their interests are protected.

c. Tenant Plaintiffs

Defendant argues that the plaintiffs who are tenants in Hazleton, all of whom attempt to proceed anonymously, lack standing to sue. These plaintiffs, defendant contends, ground their claim in a belief that they may not obtain occupancy permits from the City and will, therefore, be required to leave Hazleton. Defendant insists that this injury is not one which the court can address. Those plaintiffs who are not lawfully present in the United States do not have a legal interest in residing in Hazleton or anywhere in the United States and cannot claim an injury from ordinances that seek to prevent their residence in the City. Defendant also argues that those tenant plaintiffs who are lawfully present in the United States cannot show that they will likely suffer any injury-in-fact. IIRA, after all, will not cause them to be removed from the City or be denied an occupancy permit. If a tenant can show proof of legal residency or citizenship, that tenant must receive a rental permit and will suffer no injury from the ordinance. Even if a resident filed a complaint against a legal resident, such a plaintiff would not be injured: “an alien lawfully present in the United States can have no reasonable expectation that the federal government would regard him as unlawfully present.” (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 87) at 20).

Plaintiff John Doe 1 testified by deposition on December 8, 2006.

(See

Doc. 189, Dep. John Doe 1). He has lived in Hazle-ton for six years, but was born in Mexico.

(Id.

at 12). John Doe 1 is not a United States citizen or legal permanent resident, though his father filed a document with the federal government seeking to change his immigration status.

(Id.

at 16, 19). He testified that he was unsure of his

*497

immigration status, though he thought that the federal government could order him removed from the country.

(Id.

at 22). John Doe 1 was also unsure whether he had legal authorization to work.

(Id.).

When he began working for his present employer, John Doe 1 presented identification that included an international driver’s license and a Social Security card.

(Id

at 27). John Doe 1 was forced to vacate one apartment after a landlord told him he would “have to move” after passage of the Hazleton ordinances.

(Id.

at 43). Though John Doe 1 thought he may be able to get a residency permit, his landlord told him “maybe, but he didn’t want to take the risk” of having to pay a fine.

(Id.

at 44). John Doe 1 felt that his landlord wished he could stay in the apartment “because I’m a good tenant and we’re family, but when he saw the ordinance, he was afraid.”

(Id.

at 53).

John Doe 3 likewise testified by deposition on December 8, 2006. (See Doc. 190, Dep. John Doe 3). He was born in Mexico and is a citizen of that country.

(Id.

at 17). He is a tenant in Hazleton, where he lives with his wife and two daughters.

(Id.

at 12-13). Joe Doe 3 is not a lawful permanent resident of the United States.

(Id.

at 24). He understands his immigration status to be “illegal.”

(Id.

at 26). If this court were to allow the Hazleton ordinances to go into effect, John Doe 3 fears that he will be evicted from his residence.

(Id.

at 31).

Jane Doe 5 testified by deposition on January 26, 2007.

(See

Doc. 191, Dep. Jane Doe 5). Jane Doe 5 rented an apartment in Hazleton, the city where she had lived for the past five years.

(Id.

at 12-13). She was born in Columbia, and is not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident.

(Id.

at 14-15, 56). She fears apprehension and removal by United States authorities if the City enforces its ordinances.

(Id.

at 56). Jane Doe 5 does not want to lose her residence, and for that reason hopes the ordinance will not be enforced.

(Id.

at 61-62). She did not want to speak to her landlord about the registration ordinance because she feared that the landlord would feel he had to ask her family to vacate their home.

(Id.

at 74). If the ordinances were enforced, Jane Doe 5 fears that she would have trouble finding a place to live in the City.

(Id.

at 81).

John Doe 7 testified by deposition on January 26, 2007.

(See

Doc. 191, Dep. John Doe 7). Like his wife, Jane Doe 5, John Doe 7 was born in Columbia.

(Id.

at 9). He is not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident.

(Id.

at 10). Trained as an architect, Doe 7 came to the United States in 2001.(/d). For the previous seven ' or eight months, Doe had worked as a gardener.

(Id.

at 12). He and his wife lived in a rented home in Hazleton.

(Id.

at 14-15). John Doe 7 testified that he had not spoken frequently with his landlord out of fear that “because of the ordinances, he’s going to ask them to leave the house, evict them from the house.”

(Id.

at 58). That would require him “to find another house and it’s going to be so difficult” to do so.

(Id.).

He fears he would be forced to leave Hazleton.

(Id.).

These plaintiffs claim that the rental registration requirements and harboring provisions of IIRA violate their rights under federal law and the United States Constitution, including their right to privacy. We find that the anonymous plaintiffs have standing to challenge Hazleton’s ordinances. They have suffered concrete and particularized injuries which are actual or imminent. These plaintiffs have either been forced from the property which they had rented or had been told by their landlords that they would have to be evicted due to the ordinances. The loss (or imminent loss) of one’s apartment and the ina

*498

bility to rent a new one is certainly an actual and concrete injury.

See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers,

442 U.S. 289, 298 , 99 S.Ct. 2301 , 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979) (holding that “[a] plaintiff who challenges a statute must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or enforcement [citation omitted] [b]ut [one] does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending that is enough.”). Similarly, plaintiffs would suffer an injury to their privacy rights if forced to turn over private information in order to gain a rental permit. Such an injury is imminent, as plaintiffs intend to remain in Hazleton and would be required to obey the ordinance if it is enforced.

The tenant plaintiffs also meet the causation requirements of constitutional standing. But for IIRA’s requirements that plaintiffs obtain a rental permit by presenting documentation that proves their legal immigration status, plaintiffs would not face the loss of their apartments or the exposure of potentially private information. Plaintiffs face eviction by their landlords only because of IIRA’s harboring provisions.

Plaintiffs’ injuries would also be redressed by a favorable decision in this case. If plaintiffs prevail here, this court will issue a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the ordinances that has caused their injuries. The tenant plaintiffs thus have constitutional standing to proceed in this case.

We reject defendant’s argument that these plaintiffs lack standing because they do not have authorization to reside in the United States and have not suffered an injury for which they could gain relief. First, the defendant appears to argue that because plaintiffs would be denied residency permits under the Hazleton ordinance they lack authorization to reside anywhere in the United States. No court has made such a determination for any of these plaintiffs. No evidence has been presented that removal orders exist for any of the anonymous tenant plaintiffs. None has ever been arrested, and none testified they were being sought by immigration authorities. In other words, as of the time of their depositions, none of these plaintiffs would have been forced by any determination of the federal government to leave the City. To find otherwise at this point would be to ignore every principle of due process. The tautology of this argument is likewise apparent: defendant contends that plaintiff would not be able to obtain a residency permit in the city and therefore cannot complain about being required to do so.

This argument appears to be a species of argument often heard in recent discussions of the national immigration issue: because illegal aliens broke the law to enter this country, they should not have any legal recourse when rights due them under the federal constitution or federal law are violated. We cannot say clearly enough that persons who enter this country without legal authorization are not stripped immediately of all their rights because of this single illegal act.

19

The

*499

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no State may “deprive any

person

of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny any

person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court has consistently interpreted this provision to apply to all people present in the United States, whether they were born here, immigrated here through legal means, or violated federal law to enter the country.

See Plyler,

457 U.S. at 210, 102 S.Ct. 2382 (holding that “[wjhatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”). The anonymous plaintiffs are persons, and they seek to vindicate rights guaranteed them under the federal constitution. They have standing to sue in this court.

2. Prudential Standing

Having found that all plaintiffs possess constitutional standing, we now address defendant’s argument that plaintiffs lack prudential standing.

Even if a court finds that plaintiffs meet the “threshold” requirements of constitutional standing, that court may nevertheless “impose” “a variety of prudential limits” on standing. 13 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure at § 3531. Courts have concluded that “the aim of this form of judicial self-governance is to determine whether the plaintiff is ‘a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute and the exercise of the court’s remedial powers.’ ”

Mariana v. Fisher,

338 F.3d 189, 204 (3d Cir.2003) (quoting

Oxford Assocs. v. Waste Sys. Auth. of E. Montgomery County,

271 F.3d 140, 145 (3d Cir.2001)). Courts invoking prudential standing analysis seek “ ‘to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim.’ ”

Davis v. Philadelphia Housing Auth.,

121 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting

Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co.,

22 F.3d 534, 538 (3d Cir.1994)). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has articulated a three-part test for prudential standing: 1) “a litigant [must] assert his or her own legal interests rather than those of a third party”; 2) “courts [should] refrain from adjudicating abstract questions of wide public significance amounting to generalized grievances”; and 3) “a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her interests are arguably within the ‘zone of interests’

*500

that are intended to be protected by the statute, rule, or constitutional provision on which the claim is based.”

Mariana,

338 F.3d at 205 ;

see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,

542 U.S. 1, 12 , 124 S.Ct. 2301 , 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004) (holding that “we have explained that prudential standing encompasses ‘the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.’ ”) (quoting

Allen v. Wright,

468 U.S. 737, 751 , 104 S.Ct. 3315 , 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)).

Defendant argues that none of the plaintiffs meet the requirements of prudential standing because they do not fall within the “zone of interests” of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

20

We note, first, that defendant faces a difficult burden to establish that these plaintiffs lack prudential standing, as they do not seek to assert the rights of others or to challenge the way that an agency has applied a particular law, but instead seek to challenge ordinances which they claim would violate their rights under federal and state law.

21

The United States Supreme Court has declared that “[wjhere a party champions his own rights, and where the injury alleged is a concrete and particularized one which will be prevented or redressed by the relief requested, the basic practical and prudential concerns underlying the standing doctrine are generally satisfied when the constitutional requisites are met.”

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,

438 U.S. 59, 80-81 , 98 S.Ct. 2620 , 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978).

22

Defendant insists that plaintiffs fall outside of the zone of interests protected by the statutes and constitutional provisions invoked in this lawsuit because the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) was not designed to protect “employers who

*501

unlawfully employee [sic] illegal aliens and landlords who harbor illegal aliens.” (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 87) at 9). Accordingly, “those who break federal immigration law by employing or harboring illegal aliens have no standing to raise a challenge that is based on federal immigration law.”

(Id.).

Similarly, illegal aliens, the defendant contends, do not fall within the zone of interests of the INA and lack standing to raise a preemption claim under that statute; an illegal alien, defendant insists, “does not have standing to invoke the protection of the INA in attempting to displace a state or local ordinance.”

23

(Id.

at 9).

The prudential standing doctrine indeed requires that “a plaintiffs grievance must arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee invoked in the suit.”

Bennett v. Spear,

520 U.S. 154, 163 , 117 S.Ct. 1154 , 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (Í997);

see also Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach,

322 F.3d 293, 300 (3d Cir.2003). In this suit, plaintiffs invoke several different statutory and constitutional provisions in their numerous claims seeking to prevent enforcement of Hazleton’s ordinances. Plaintiffs, for instance, charge that the ordinances violate their constitutional privacy rights and the equal protection and due process guaranteed them under the Fourteenth Amendment, They also allege that the ordinances violate rights granted them by federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S. § 1981, and Pennsylvania statutory and common law. Finally, plaintiffs claim that the regulatory scheme set out under federal immigration law pre-empts Hazleton’s efforts to control the presence of illegal immigrants in the City and the ordinances violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.

Our question, therefore, is whether these grievances fall within the zone of interests protected by the various constitutional and statutory provisions invoked by the plaintiffs in raising them. This case is different from most of the federal cases that invoke the zone of interests test, since the plaintiffs do not seek to challenge any application of a particular federal law.

24

*502

See, e.g., National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust Co.,

522 U.S. 479 , 118 S.Ct. 927 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1 (1998) (finding that private banks and the American Bankers Association were within the zone of interests of the Federal Credit Union Act and had standing to challenge a federal agency’s interpretation of that act’s membership restrictions); Asso

c. of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp,

397 U.S. 150 , 90 S.Ct. 827 , 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970) (finding that data processing companies were within the zone of interests of federal banking law and had standing to challenge the Comptroller of the Currency’s ruling that national banks could make data processing services available to other banks and bank customers);

Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp,

400 U.S. 45 , 91 S.Ct. 158 , 27 L.Ed.2d 179 (1970) (finding that travel agents had standing to challenge Comptroller of the Currency’s ruling that banks could offer travel services). While the courts have not foreclosed application of the zone of interests test to cases that do not involve a federal agency action, such cases nevertheless involve some sort of agency action against which the plaintiffs protest.

See

2 Am Jur 2d Administrative Law § 430 (arguing that “[t]he zone-of-interests test is relevant only where the action under attack is that of a government agency.”).

Here, the action against which the plaintiffs protest is a local legislative enactment which they contend violates rights guaranteed them in a variety of ways under state and federal law. Plaintiffs do not claim that the application or interpretation of a law by some state or local agency to which they have no connection is inappropriate but instead claim that their legal rights are violated by a legislative enactment aimed directly at the operation of their businesses or their ability to work or rent property in the City of Hazleton.

25

Accordingly, plaintiffs arguably fall within the zone of interests of the statutes at the center of this lawsuit, and they have prudential standing to sue.

Defendant’s use of

INS v. Legalization Assistance Project of the L.A. County Fed’n of Labor,

510 U.S. 1301 , 114 S.Ct. 422 , 126 L.Ed.2d 410 (1993), to argue that plaintiffs do not fall within the zone of interests here is misplaced. In that case,

*503

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, sitting as a Circuit Justice,

26

considered the then Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (“INS”) request for a stay pending appeal of a district court’s order.

Id.

At issue in the litigation were the procedures that the INS used to determine whether immigrants in the country without legal authorization were eligible for an amnesty offered in the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”).

Id.; see

8 U.S.C. § 1255a. The respondents were “organizations that provide legal help to immigrants” who believed that the INS had interpreted IRCA too narrowly.

Id.

Justice O’Connor noted that these respondents sought court review of the actions of a federal agency, and that Congress “ha[d] explicitly limited such review to claims brought by ‘personfs] suffering legal wrong[s] because of agency action’ (not applicable to the respondent organizations involved here) or by persons adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.”

Id.

(citing 5 U.S.C. § 702 ). Justice O’Connor found that “only in cases brought by a person whose putative injuries are “within the “zone of interests” sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint’ ” did a plaintiff have standing to sue over an agency decision.

Id.

(quoting

Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,

497 U.S. 871, 883 , 110 S.Ct. 3177 , 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)). The organizations, Justice O’Connor found, did not fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute because “I RCA was clearly meant to protect the interests of undocumented aliens, not the interest of organizations such as respondents.”

Id.

Though IRCA had assigned such organizations a role in the process of determining amnesty eligibility, “there is no indication that IRCA was in any way addressed to their interests.”

Id.

Accordingly, Justice O’Connor found that those organizations did not fall within the zone of interests of IRCA.

Whatever precedential value we should assign to the stay of a district court order issued by a single Supreme Court Justice sitting as a Circuit Judge, we are not persuaded that this case leads to the conclusion that plaintiffs lack prudential standing under the zone of interests test. The decision addressed the standing of advocacy groups seeking to challenge the operation of the amnesty program established under IRCA, not the standing of employers or landlords seeking to determine whether the federal scheme of regulating immigration preempted a local ordinance. Like most zone of interest cases, the court in this case was required to consider whether a plaintiff had standing to challenge an interpretation of a federal statute that did not directly regulate that group. Defendant’s reading of the deci

*504

sion to state a general proposition that plaintiffs lack standing in cases involving preemption under the INA, therefore, is far too broad. Indeed, Justice O’Connor concluded that illegal immigrants seeking to adjust their status

were

within the IRCA’s zone of interests. Plaintiff organizations in

INS v. Legal Assistance Project

had sued the federal government. Here, by contrast, plaintiffs challenge local ordinances that would directly regulate their activities as employers, employees, landlords and tenants. Justice O’Connor’s opinion is not applicable to the situation here, and does not alter our determination that plaintiffs have prudential as well as constitutional standing.

Accordingly, we find that all of the plaintiffs in this case except Jose and Rosa Lechuga have both constitutional and prudential standing, and we will deny defendant’s motion to dismiss on that point. The landlord plaintiffs have standing to challenge the provisions of the ordinances related to housing, as well as the employment restrictions. The tenant plaintiffs also have standing to sue over the registration provisions of the housing ordinance, as well as for alleged violation of their privacy rights. They also have standing to challenge the employment provisions of IIRA. In short, plaintiffs have proved standing sufficiently for all of their claims to proceed.

B. Anonymous/Boe Plaintiffs

The defendant argues that the Doe Plaintiffs may not proceed anonymously. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a), defendant contends, requires that each complaint set forth the names of all the parties. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) mandates that every action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. These pleading requirements, defendant insists, are not satisfied by the “anonymous or generic” description provided for the anonymous parties in plaintiffs’ amended complaint. (Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 150) at 105). Additionally, defendant insists that plaintiffs did not seek leave from the court to proceed anonymously, as required by the federal rules. Defendant also argues that the disclosure of immigration status is not a matter so highly personal and sensitive that anonymity is required to protect a plaintiffs interest. Finally, defendant insists that “a court of the United States cannot recognize and affirm any Plaintiffs interest in evading the laws of the United States, particularly when such laws are not challenged in the ease before the court.”

(Id.

at 107).

27

We find no merit to the

*505

défendant’s arguments, but we shall address them all.

As set forth above, all of the John and Jane Doe plaintiffs have an uncertain immigration status. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure demand that litigants provide “the names of all the parties.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 10(a). The public nature of lawsuits and the public interest inherent in the rights vindicated in courtrooms makes open and transparent proceedings imperative to equitable outcomes.

See M.M. v. Zavaras,

139 F.3d 798, 803 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that “[l]awsuits are public events. A plaintiff should be permitted to proceed anonymously only in those exceptional cases involving matters of a highly sensitive and personal nature, real danger of physical harm, or where the injury litigated against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiffs identity. The risk that a plaintiff may suffer some embarrassment is not enough.”) (quoting

Doe v. Frank,

951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir.1992)). Courts have long recognized, however, that the circumstances of a case, particularly where litigants may suffer extreme distress or danger from their participation in the lawsuit, may require that plaintiffs proceed without revealing their true names. Courts have found that plaintiffs could proceed anonymously because they feared that revealing their true identities would lead to physical violence, deportation, arrest in their home countries and retaliation against the plaintiffs’ families for bringing suit.

Does v. Advanced Textile Corp.,

214 F.3d 1058 , 1063 (9th Cir.2000). They have also allowed children who were undocumented immigrants to proceed without revealing their true names in a suit seeking to overturn a law that prevented their access to schools in Texas.

Plyler,

457 U.S. at 202 , 102 S.Ct. 2382 . People seeking access to abortions at a time when they were generally illegal also received leave to proceed using pseudonyms.

See Roe v. Wade,

410 U.S. 113 , 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). Courts have allowed those suffering from mental illness to use pseudonyms.

See, e.g., Doe v. Colautti,

592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir.1979). Children bringing a controversial challenge to a school-sponsored religious program were also granted anonymity in the face of threatened harm for their views.

Doe v. Stegall,

653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir.1981).

Those federal courts which have ruled on the propriety of anonymous plaintiffs

*506

have held that “a district court must balance the need for anonymity against the general presumption that parties’ identities are public information and the risk of unfairness to the opposing party.”

Advanced

Textile, 214 F.3d at 1068. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, has noted that “we allow parties to use pseudonyms in the ‘unusual case’ when nondisclosure of the party’s identity ‘is necessary ... to protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment.’ ”

Id.

at 1067-68 (quoting

United States v. Doe,

655 F.2d 920 , 922 n. 1 (9th Cir.1981)). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly found that “[f]ederal courts traditionally have recognized that in some cases the general presumption of open trials — including identification of parties and witnesses by their real names — should yield in deference to sufficiently pressing needs for party or witness anonymity.”

James v. Jacobson,

6 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir.1993).

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has not articulated a standard to weigh litigants’ efforts to proceed anonymously. Federal district courts in the Third Circuit, however, have held that “[i]n determining whether a party may proceed under a pseudonym, the public’s right of access should prevail unless the party requesting pseudonymity demonstrates that her interests in privacy or security justify pseudonymity.”

Doe v. Evans,

202 F.R.D. 173, 175 (E.D.Pa.2001). They have also articulated factors weighing in favor and against the use of pseudonyms for plaintiffs. Those factors include: “(1) the extent to which the identity of the litigant has been kept confidential; (2) the bases upon which disclosure is feared or sought to be avoided, and the substantiality of these bases; (3) the magnitude of the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the litigant’s identity; (4) whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues presented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigant’s identities; (5) the undesirability of an outcome adverse to the pseudonymous party and attributable to his refusal to pursue the case at the price of being publicly identified; and (6) whether the party seeking to sue pseudonymously has illegitimate ulterior motives.”

Doe v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co.,

237 F.R.D. 545, 549 (D.N.J.2006) (quoting

Doe v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.,

176 F.R.D. 464, 467-68 (E.D.Pa.1997)). Factors against use of pseudonyms are: “(l)the universal level of public interest in access to the identities of the litigants; (2) whether, because of the subject matter of the litigation, the status of the litigant as a public figure, or otherwise, there is a particularly strong interest in knowing the litigant’s identities, beyond the public’s interest which is normally obtained; and (3) whether the opposition to pseudonym by counsel, the public, or the press is illegitimately motivated.”

Id.

at 550 (quoting

Id.

at 468 ).

We find that plaintiffs are entitled to proceed anonymously in this matter.

28

*507

We will consider each of the factors raised by district courts in the Third Circuit in addressing such matters.

1. Factors Favoring Anonymity

a. Preservation of Anonymity

The first factor is the extent to which the anonymity of the plaintiffs seeking to use pseudonyms has been preserved. In this case, plaintiffs have vigorously attempted to maintain their anonymity through the trial and deposition process, and no evidence suggests that those attempts have been unsuccessful. These plaintiffs have not given media interviews in which they revealed their names, they have not appeared in public in forums in which they could easily be recognized, and they did not testify live at trial. The record provides no indication that plaintiffs have waived their claim on anonymity by allowing others to discover their true names. This factor weighs in favor of plaintiffs’ attempt to proceed anonymously.

b. Bases for Request of Anonymity

Second, courts evaluate the bases for the claim that anonymity is necessary and the legitimacy of those bases. Here, plaintiffs seek to avoid disclosure of their identities because they fear the consequences of such public knowledge and are concerned that defendant may disclose their names to federal immigration authorities. The plaintiffs argue that they have “stated legitimate concerns that the public identification of the Doe Plaintiffs, amidst this highly publicized and controversial lawsuit, would make them easy targets of intense anti-immigrant and anti-Latino sentiment.” (Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 106) at 97). Plaintiffs also contend that such disclosure may affect “their basic rights to shelter, education, and a livelihood.”

{Id.

at 99). We find these compelling reasons for allowing plaintiffs to proceed anonymously.

In

Jane Doe 1 v. Merten,

the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia refused to allow plaintiffs who sought to challenge a Virginia law that prevented illegal immigrants from obtaining admission to state colleges and Universities to proceed anonymously. 219 F.R.D. 387 (E.D.Va.2004). The students had claimed: “[I]f they are required to reveal their identities, the federal government will seek to deport them or their families and they will thus likely decide not to proceed with this suit, effectively rendering them unable to vindicate their rights in this matter.”

Id.

at 390 . Defendant cites to this case to support its argument that plaintiffs should be required to reveal their identities, in part because the court in that case found that the plaintiffs seeking to proceed anonymously did not have a strong interest in keeping information

*508

about their immigration status confidential.

The court in

Merten

concluded that “unlawful or problematic immigration status is simply not the type of ‘personal information of the utmost intimacy’ that warrants abandoning the presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.”

Id.

We find that the facts and context of this case lead to a different assessment of the nature of information about one’s immigration status.

29

Unlike

Merten,

where plaintiffs were seeking admission to state colleges and universities, the plaintiffs in this case do not seek to receive any goods provided by the state. Further, their immigration status does not determine whether they will be subject to the terms of the ordinance. Accordingly, the individual identities and interests of the plaintiffs are not at issue in this case to the degree they were in

Merten

and are not necessary to reach the issues of constitutionality raised by the lawsuit. The intense public interest in this case makes the risks from exposing sensitive information about one’s identity exponentially more dire than in

Merten

and make more persuasive plaintiffs’ reasons for seeking to proceed without revealing their true names.

The manner in which public interest has manifested itself in this case demonstrates why anonymity is necessary for plaintiffs who lack a legal immigration status. Trial testimony indicated the intense public interest in the ordinances led at times to harassment and intimidation that created fear even among those with a more secure social and legal status than the anonymous plaintiffs. Dr. Agapito Lopez, a Hazleton resident who became a leader in the attempt to have the ordinances overturned, testified that he organized a candlelight vigil to be held on the steps of the building where the city council met the night before the ordinances had their second reading. (N.T. 3/12/07 at 73). Attendees at the meeting were very afraid of the consequences of their participation, particularly of the city officials who at Lopez’s request videotaped the crowd in an attempt to gather evidence in case of a potential disturbance.

30

The fear of those in his group

*509

came “because there was another group that was intimidating us at that time by showing their presence, shouting slogans, and a lot of tension in the area.”

(Id.

at 75). At the ordinance’s second reading the City’s supporters were “very, very tense with stares at the small group of Latinos that were there.”

(Id.).

While the City Council was conducting its business that evening a fight had broke out in the street between opponents and supporters of the ordinances.

(Id.

at 76-77). Lopez rushed back out to the street in front of the City Council building to find “[f|ederal justice agents, department of justice agents and policemen in the street dividing two groups.”

(Id.

77). The two groups, consisting of recent immigrants and another group of those supporting the ordinances had faced off, “and there was shouting from one side to the other side.”

(Id.).

The day before the vigil organized by opponents of the ordinances, Lopez received what he described as “hate mail” underneath the door of his office.

(Id.

at 73). The letter Lopez received purported to describe the effects of illegal immigration, contending that “European Americans are being dispossessed of their own nation. We are under invasion by millions of unskilled Mexicans who threaten to bankrupt us.” (N.T. 3/13/07 at 5). The letter further warned that “coloreds” would eventually take control of state governments, Congress and the presidency, and that “[w]hites will quickly be stripped of their rights with our wealth confiscated for redistribution to non-whites as is taking place in South Africa.”

(Id.

at 6).

After the ordinances had their second reading Lopez received two other pieces of offensive mail; this mail made him feel both fearful and “offended, because it was hate mail. It indicated hate against me as a person.” (N.T. 3/12/07 at 78-79).

31

The first piece of mail suggested that Lopez and his “cohort, that bold, brazen Anna Arias, should spend some time on a few streets in town before defending your (Latin Community).” (N.T. 3/13/07 at 7). After describing what the letter-writer saw as the waste and crime caused by the immigrant residents of Hazleton, the author declared that “[w]e think you and Anna [Arias] had better think twice before you speak.”

32

Lopez saw this letter as evidence of “the effect that the ordinance has had on the population,” which now

*510

failed to “distinguish between undocumented immigrants and Latinos. For them, they are all the same.”

(Id.

at 9). The final letter Lopez received

33

contained a clipping from a newspaper describing the effects of illegal immigration as* well as a picture of a “warrior” wearing “a huge Mexican hat.”

(Id.

at 10). Scrawled near this picture were the phrases, “[sjubhuman spic scum” and “[i]f it is brown, flush it down.”

34

.

(Id.).

Lopez interpreted this mail as an attempt to “silence” and “intimidate” him.

(Id.

at 11). He also “felt afraid” after receiving letters both at his office and at home; the mail let him know that “they know where I live and where I used to work and where my wife works.”

(Id.).

Public expressions of support for Hazle-ton’s ordinances have continued to lead to controversy and confrontations, as well as anger at those who challenge the City’s position. On June 3, 2007, several hundred ordinance supporters held a rally in Hazleton to express support for the city’s attempts to control illegal immigration. Nichole Dobo,

Barletta Backers Harass Writer,

Scranton Times-Tribune, June 5, 2007, at Al. Amilcar Arroyo, publisher of El Mensajero, a Hazleton-based Spanish-language newspaper, attempted to cover the event for his publication.

Id.'

Arroyo, an American citizen, is not involved in the lawsuit against the City.

Id.

Several members of the crowd at the rally began to shout at Arroyo after a rumor circulated that he was one of the plaintiffs in the lawsuit against the ordinances.

Id.

Confronting Arroyo, a few rally participants shouted at him to “ ‘get out of the country’ ” while others chanted “ ‘traitor.’ ”

Id.

Police escorted Arroyo from the rally for his own protection.

Id.

We find that this record of hostility to the plaintiffs in the lawsuit and the climate of fear and hostility surrounding the debate over the ordinances creates a justified fear about revealing the anonymous plaintiffs’ identities. Dr. Lopez and Mr. Arroyo faced public condemnation and" confrontation based on their real or perceived participation in the lawsuit, and they are United States citizens. Those with a more tenuous legal status have an exponentially greater concern over the dangers of participating in a lawsuit that has generated such intense sentiment.

In addition, we find that the defendant does not have a strong need to obtain the identity of the anonymous plaintiffs in order to defend against plaintiffs’ suit, thus adding to the reasonableness of plaintiffs’ request to keep their identity anonymous. Plaintiffs seek to keep their identities private largely because of their problematic immigration status; they fear the consequences of a public admission of unauthorized residence and employment in the United States. Courts have concluded that plaintiffs may refuse to turn over information on their immigration status when that status is not relevant to the lawsuit.

See Topo v. Dhir,

210 F.R.D. 76, 78 (S.D.N.Y.2002). Here, defendant has

*511

claimed to need information on the unnamed plaintiffs’ immigration status in order to determine whether they have standing to bring suit in the case. Plaintiffs have admitted that they lack legal authorization for their presence and employment in the country, and defendant therefore has all the information necessary to challenge the anonymous plaintiffs’ presence in the suit.

35

Defendant’s arguments about the standing of such undocumented plaintiffs are based not on the specific facts of each undocumented plaintiffs legal status, but instead on the notion that plaintiffs who are not legally in the United States cannot be injured by the ordinances. The information provided by the anonymous plaintiffs about their immigration status gives the defendant all the information necessary to make this standing claim.

Indeed, plaintiffs have expressed a legitimate fear that exposing their names could lead to adverse legal consequences that go beyond the public disapprobation they face. If threats of exposure of one’s legal status can intimidate plaintiffs and prevent them from participating in a lawsuit, the defendant’s own statements and actions have added weight to these fears. During discovery in this case, the parties disagreed over whether the anonymous plaintiffs should be required to turn over immigration documents to the defendant. After a telephone conference, this court ordered the parties to enter into a confidentiality agreement to protect the identities of the Doe plaintiffs.

(See

Order (Doc. 63)).

After the court issued this order, plaintiffs informed us that a local newspaper had quoted defendant’s attorney, who claimed that the order violated 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (c) by preventing the city from turning over to the federal government information on the plaintiffs immigration status.

See Munley’s IIRA Order Violates Federal Law, Attorney Says,

Standard Speaker, December 13, 2006 (attached to Motion for a Protective Order (Doc. 64)). The federal law “says no government entity, federal, state or local, may in any way restrict the transfer of information concerning an alien’s legal status to the federal government,” Hazleton’s attorney asserted.

(Id.).

The attorney expressed “surprise” at the order, which he claimed “violates federal law.”

(Id.).

Plaintiffs informed us of these statements as part of their motion seeking a protective order preventing disclosure of their identities and immigration status. Given these public statements and court filings, plaintiffs could legitimately fear that defendant was determined to expose their legal status to federal authorities. Such fears could cause plaintiffs to abandon their attempt to secure rights guaranteed them under federal law. We conclude, therefore, that plaintiffs have offered good and compelling reasons for not revealing their identities. The second factor, then, weighs heavily in favor of anonymity.

c. Magnitude of the Public Interest Involved in Maintaining Confidentiality

The third factor, the magnitude of the public’s -interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the litigants’ identities, also weighs in the anonymous plaintiffs’ favor. Hazleton’s ordinances have become the subject of wide public debate, and has also served as a model for other communities seeking to act against what they perceive to be the problem of illegal immigration.

See

Anabelle Garay,

Attempts to Curb Illegal Immigration Prove Costly,

Washing

*512

ton Post, May 6, 2007, at A12 (reporting that “[d]ozens of cities and counties have proposed or passed laws that prohibit landlords from leasing to illegal immigrants, penalize businesses that employ undocumented workers or train police to enforce federal immigration laws.”). The public has an interest in determining the constitutionality of ordinances like the one passed in Hazleton, and particularly in determining whether such ordinances violate the constitutional rights of immigrants who lack authorization to enter or work in the United States. Without the protection of anonymity, future such plaintiffs would likely decline to participate in the lawsuit, and the public’s interest in testing the constitutionality of certain aspects of such ordinances could remain unexplored.

d. Legal Nature of the Issues in the Case

The fourth factor, whether the purely legal nature of the issues in the case make for an atypically weak public interest in the actual identity of the litigants, also weighs in favor of anonymity. Because this case exists as a test of ordinances passed by Hazleton that seek to transform the role of municipalities in dealing with the presence of undocumented aliens in their jurisdictions, the issues in this case are largely related to the interaction between federal, state and local laws, the application of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the meaning of standing in federal jurisprudence and the limits of the privacy protections afforded by the Constitution. This case does not contain the complicated factual scenarios of the typical employment discrimination or prisoner civil rights action faced daily in every federal district court. The decision in this case does not turn on judgements about the credibility of particular witnesses, but instead on an assessment of the parties’ legal arguments. Indeed, the only reason defendant cites for needing to know the identity of the anonymous plaintiffs is to address their standing to sue. While standing is a clear constitutional requirement, it is also a preliminary question and one we find we can answer for the anonymous plaintiffs without discovery of their identities. Defendant makes no argument that other factual or legal issues in the case require knowing the identity of plaintiffs. Defendant, therefore, has less interest in the identity of the particular plaintiffs than in the resolution of the legal issues in this case. This factor clearly weighs against disclosure of the plaintiffs’ identities.

e. Danger of Adverse Outcome to Unnamed Plaintiffs

We find that the fifth factor, the undesirability of an outcome adverse to the pseudonymous parties and attributable to their refusal to pursue the case at the price of being publicly identified, has a neutral weight in our analysis. While an adverse outcome for the anonymous plaintiffs could have significant consequences, limiting their ability to find housing and secure employment, that adverse outcome would not be solely or even primarily attributable to the anonymous plaintiffs’ refusal to participate because of the possibility of being identified publicly This case, which will be decided largely by answering legal questions on issues like federal preemption, does not turn on the particular facts of the plaintiffs’ experience with the law. Other named litigants who could press the issue of the constitutionality of the ordinances would remain, and the outcome of the case would not be determined by the decision of the anonymous plaintiffs to abandon their lawsuit. This factor, therefore, does not weigh significantly for either side of the argument.

*513

f. Whether Plaintiffs Have Ulterior Motives for Seeking Anonymity

We find that the sixth factor, whether the plaintiffs seeking to proceed anonymously have illegitimate ulterior motives, weighs in favor of the plaintiffs’ anonymity. The reason for the plaintiffs’ desire to use pseudonyms in this case is clear: they wish to avoid the potential harm that will come from disclosure of their names to the defendant and to the public. They fear that disclosing their identities could expose them to danger and adverse legal action unrelated to the rights they seek to vindicate in this litigation. Defendant does not point to any improper motive of the plaintiffs in seeking to proceed without being identified.

36

We thus find no improper motive behind plaintiffs’ request to proceed without identifying themselves. This factor weighs in favor of anonymity.

2. Factors Favoring Disclosure

a. Public Interest in Plaintiffs’ Identities

Of the factors in favor of disclosure of the anonymous plaintiffs’ identities, we find that the first of those factors, the universal level of public interest in access to the identities of the litigants, does not support a need for disclosure. There is widespread public interest in this case, but that interest is focused not on the identities of the plaintiffs, but on the legal issues at the heart of the case. We find no evidence of a widespread, much less universal, public interest in the identities of the plaintiffs. The public’s interest in this case is in the right of Hazleton to press forward with its legislation, not in a dispute between the parties. Accordingly, the public’s interest in the identities of the individual plaintiffs is not so strong as to justify the danger of disclosing the identity of plaintiffs with a legitimate fear for the consequences of that disclosure.

a. Subject Matter of the Litigation

The next factor in favor of disclosure asks whether, because of the subject matter of the litigation, the status of the litigant as a public figure, or otherwise, there is a particularly strong interest in knowing the litigant’s identities, beyond the public’s normal interest. This factor too does not weigh in favor of disclosure. The subject matter of this litigation is primarily constitutional law, and the identities of the particular plaintiffs are not as important to the outcome of the litigation as the legal arguments they raise. In addition, the plaintiffs seeking anonymity here are not public figures, and thus there is scant public need to follow their activities in order to prevent abuse of some public trust.

c. Motivation for Seeking Identity

The final factor for the court to consider addresses whether the opposition to pseudonyms by counsel, the public, or the press is illegitimately motivated. While we do not find persuasive power in defendant’s argument that learning the identity of the anonymous plaintiffs is necessary to determine whether they have standing to sue, we have no evidence to indicate that defendant adopted this position for illegitimate reasons. We note, however, that federal courts have recognized that inquiries into immigration status can have an

in terro-rem,

effect, limiting the willingness of plaintiffs to pursue their rights out of fears

*514

of the consequences of an exposure of their position.

See Topo v. Dhir,

210 F.R.D. 76, 78 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (holding that “[c]ourts have generally recognized the

in terrorem

effect of inquiring into a party’s immigration status when irrelevant to any material claim.”);

Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan International, Inc.,

207 F.Supp.2d 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (finding that disclosing immigration status when not relevant to the case presents a “danger of intimidation [that] would inhibit plaintiffs in pursuing their rights.”). In this case, then, we lack evidence that defendant had illegitimate motives in challenging plaintiffs’ use of anonymity, but recognize the potential intimidation that accompanied that challenge. We find, therefore, that this factor weighs neither for nor against disclosure.

In sum, we find that the factors in favor of confidentiality for the plaintiffs who seek to proceed anonymously outweigh those that recommend disclosure. The highly legal nature of the issues here, combined with the intense public interest and strong level of emotion connected with the issue mean that the undocumented immigrants who seek to participate in this action face extraordinary circumstances that require anonymity if they hope to proceed without facing unsupportable burdens. The public’s interest in learning the identity of the litigants does not outweigh the anonymous plaintiffs concerns, and defendant can defend itself adequately without information about the anonymous plaintiffs’ identities. Accordingly, we find that the anonymous plaintiffs may proceed without identifying themselves.

We note, finally, that we find misplaced defendant’s concern that this court’s acknowledgment of the Doe plaintiffs’ right to proceed anonymously would “recognize” and “affirm” an “interest in evading the laws of the United States.” (Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 150) at 107). A venerable principle of constitutional law holds that all persons in the United States have rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, whether they are citizens or not.

37

See Plyler v. Doe,

457 U.S. 202, 210 , 102 S.Ct. 2382 , 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) (holding that “[w]hatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”);

Yick Wo v. Hopkins,

118 U.S. 356, 369 , 6 S.Ct. 1064 , 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (holding that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. It says: ‘Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’ These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.”). The Doe plaintiffs’ interest in this case is in vindicating rights they claim are guaranteed them under the Constitution, and' those rights exist whatever their status under the nation’s immigration laws.

*515

Allowing the Doe plaintiffs to proceed anonymously in the unique conditions of this case would not reward them for evading the country’s immigration laws.

38

It would instead provide them an opportunity to secure the rights guaranteed them by the Constitution of the United States.

C. Amendments to the Ordinance

On March 15, 2007, during this court’s trial of this matter, defendant introduced Ordinance 2007-6, which has since become law in the city.

See

Ordinance 2007-6 (Defense Ex. 251). This Ordinance Amended Sections 4B(2) and 5(B)(2) of IIRA.

Id.

As originally written, “a complaint which alleges a violation solely or primarily on the basis of national origin, ethnicity or race” would not be enforced. Ordinance 2006-18 at § 4B(2). The 2007 amendment removed the words “solely or primarily” from these provisions, meaning that “a complaint which alleges a violation on the basis of national origin, ethnicity or race shall be deemed invalid and shall not be enforced.” Ordinance 2007-6. The amendment also altered Section 4.A of the Ordinance by adding the word “knowingly” to a provision prohibiting the recruitment and hiring of illegal aliens. Id.;

see

Ordinance 2006-18 at § 4.A (establishing that: “It is unlawful for any business entity to knowingly recruit, hire for employment, or continue to employ, or to permit, dispatch, or instruct any person who is an unlawful worker to perform work in whole or part within the City.”). At the end of the hearing on the plaintiffs’ complaint, we asked the parties for briefs on the effect of this amendment on the instant litigation.

The parties agree that the court has jurisdiction to issue a decision on the current version of the ordinance. Plaintiffs argue, however, that we should also rule on the version of the ordinance that existed until the March amendment. Defendant amended the ordinance, plaintiffs argue, to avoid having this court rule on the constitutionality of the ordinance as it then existed. That amendment did not come, plaintiffs insist, because Defendant recognized that the previous version of the ordinance violated the constitution, but simply to improve defendant’s litigation position. Accordingly, the court could reasonably conclude that defendant will not cease the illegal practice embodied in the earlier version of the ordinance.

The dispute between the parties here is over whether we should also consider the version of the ordinance that was in effect through most of the litigation in this matter. We find that we do not have jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of a version of an ordinance that no longer exists, particularly when we have — as both sides admit — jurisdiction to examine the current version of that ordinance. The cases cited by the plaintiffs to argue that we should rule on that older version of IIRA all address whether a court has jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a practice or an ordinance that the defendant has voluntarily terminated, not whether a court has jurisdiction to address both the old and new versions of an amended ordinance.

See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc.,

455 U.S. 283, 289 , 102 S.Ct. 1070 , 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982) (finding that voluntarily abandoning a challenged practice does not moot answering the question raised by the lawsuit, since “the city’s re

*516

peal of the objectionable language would not preclude it from reenacting precisely the same provision if the District Court’s judgement were vacated.”);

United States v. Government of the Virgin Islands,

363 F.3d 276, 286 (3d Cir.2004) (finding that “when a party does not change its ‘substantive stance’ as to the validity of the contract but merely terminates it for allegedly purely practical reasons (such as avoiding litigation), the termination of the contract does not render the case moot” because nothing would prevent the defendant from engaging in the same or similar contracts);

Penny Saver Pubs., Inc. v. Village of Hazel Crest,

905 F.2d 150 (7th Cir.1990)

39

;

Reynolds v. City of Valley Park,

No. 06-CC-3802, 2007 WL 857320 (St. Louis County, MO Circuit Court, March 12, 2007) (available at http:// clearinghouse.wustl.edu/ehDocs/public/IM-M0-0001-0017.pdf).

40

Those courts did not address whether a court could decide on two versions of the same ordinance, the second of which amended the first. Instead, they addressed whether repealing an ordinance or terminating a contract necessarily made a plaintiffs’ case against that ordinance or contract moot. Like those courts, we conclude that the amendment of the IIRA did not moot the case; our duty is to address IIRA as it now stands.

In any case, the controversy over the earlier version of IIRA is moot. That ordinance no longer exists, and plaintiffs’ complaints about that former ordinance are no longer operative.

See, e.g., Nextel Partners,

286 F.3d at 693 (holding that “[I]f a claim no longer presents a live case or controversy, the claim is moot, and a federal court lacks jurisdiction to hear it.”). In addition, because we have before us a version of IIRA in which plaintiffs find constitutional infirmities similar to those in the previous IIRA, little danger exists that our decision not to rule on the previous IIRA would allow defendant to evade review and reenact that earlier ordinance.

See City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha,

531 U.S. 278 , 283 n. 1, 121 S.Ct. 743 , 148 L.Ed.2d 757 (2001) (holding

*517

that “a party should not be able to evade judicial review, or to defeat a judgment, by temporarily altering questionable behavior.”);

City of Mesquite,

455 U.S. at 289 , 102 S.Ct. 1070 (determining that repeal of a statute did not moot the lawsuit because “the city’s repeal of objectionable language would not preclude it from reenacting precisely the same provision if the District Court’s judgment were vacated.”). Though courts have recognized that “a matter is not necessarily moot simply because the order attacked has expired; if the underlying dispute between the parties is one ‘capable of repetition’, yet evading review, it remains a justiciable controversy within the meaning of Article III.”

New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Jersey Central Power and Light,

772 F.2d 25, 31 (3d Cir.1985). Here, the fact that we will rule on the successor to the Ordinance that provoked the original suit demonstrates that the issues raised by the first set of ordinances are available for review, and we find no need to rule on the previous versions.

Now that the preliminary matters have been disposed of, we will address the underlying merits of the plaintiffs’ case. Plaintiffs’ complaint raises federal constitutional issues, federal statutory issues and state law issues. We shall address each in turn.

II. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Plaintiffs first three causes of action and the eighth cause of action are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter “section 1983”) for constitutional violations. In pertinent part, section 1983 provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983 .

Thus, to establish a claim under section 1983, two criteria must be met. First, the conduct complained of must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law. Second, the conduct must deprive the complainant of rights secured under the Constitution or federal law.

Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,

142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir.1998).

In the instant case, no question exists as to whether the defendant acted under the color of state law in enacting the ordinances at issue. The only issue with regard to section 1983, therefore, is whether the ordinances violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Plaintiffs assert that the defendant violated the United States Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause and privacy guarantees. We will address each separately.

A. Federal Pre-emption

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint asserts that Hazleton’s ordinances violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that federal law is the supreme law of the land. (Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 82) (hereinafter “Compl.”) ¶¶ 100-131). In particular, the Constitution provides:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any

*518

Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2.

Accordingly, “[t]he Supremacy clause of the United States Constitution invalidates state laws that ‘interfere with or are contrary to’ federal law.”

New Jersey Payphone Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of West New York,

299 F.3d 235 (3d Cir.2002) (quoting

Gibbons v. Ogden,

22 U.S. 1 , 9 Wheat. 1 , 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824)). This invalidation is termed federal pre-emption. Federal preemption can be either express or implied.

Olde Discount Corp. v. Tupman,

1 F.3d 202, 216 (3d Cir.1993). We will discuss each in turn. As the ordinances at issue have two distinct provisions, one directed to employment issues and one aimed at landlord/tenant issues, we will discuss each topic separately with regard to pre-emption beginning with the employment provisions.

41

1. Employment provisions of IIRA

a. Express pre-emption

Initially, plaintiffs assert that the federal law expressly pre-empts IIRA. Under federal law, “Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law.”

English,

496 U.S. at 78, 110 S.Ct. 2270 . Preemption is “express” when a statute explicitly commands that state law be displaced.

Green v. Fund Asset Management, L.P.,

245 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir.2001) (citing

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

504 U.S. 374, 382 , 112 S.Ct. 2031 , 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992)).

Plaintiffs assert that the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (hereinafter “IRCA”), which deals with the employment of unauthorized aliens, contains an express pre-emption clause that pre-empts the employer portions of IIRA. Defendant argues that IIRA does not fall within IRCA’s express preemption clause. After a careful review, we agree with the plaintiffs that IIRA’s employment provisions are expressly preempted.

IRCA is a “comprehensive scheme” that prohibits the employment of unauthorized workers in the United States.

Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,

535 U.S. 137, 147 , 122 S.Ct. 1275 , 152 L.Ed.2d 271 (2002). “IRCA ‘forcefully’ made combating the employment of illegal aliens central to ‘[t]he policy of immigration law.’”

Id.

-(citing

INS v. National Center for Immigrants’ Rights, Die.,

502 U.S. 183, 194 , and n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 551 , 116 L.Ed.2d 546 (1991)).

The law prohibits the employment of aliens who are 1) not lawfully present in the United States; and 2) not lawfully authorized to work in the United States. 8

*519

U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3). In order to prevent the employment of unauthorized workers, IRCA requires that employers verify the identity and eligibility for work of all new hires. This verification is accomplished with the employer’s review of specified documents. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(b). An employer cannot hire an alien who is unable to present proper documentation. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(1).

Under IRCA, where an employer unknowingly hires an unauthorized alien or if an employee becomes unauthorized, the employer must discharge the employee when his status becomes known. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2). Violations of IRCA by employers is punishable by civil fines and criminal prosecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1342a(e)(4)(A); 1324a(f)(l). Prospective employees are subject to criminal prosecutions and fines for providing fraudulent documents. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a).

IRCA contains an express pre-emption clause that pre-empts State or local laws dealing with the employment of unauthorized aliens. The preemption clause provides: “The provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2).

The plaintiffs assert that this section expressly pre-empts IIRA. Defendant disagrees, contending that it has followed 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) with “exacting precision.” (Doc. 87, Def. Brief at 37). According to Hazleton, it has “eschewed the imposition of criminal or civil penalties and has instead taken those actions expressly permitted by Congress.”

(Id.).

Instead of criminal and civil sanctions, IIRA penalizes a business for employing an unauthorized alien by suspending its business permit. Such a business permit suspension amounts to “licensing and similar laws” as provided by the IRCA preemption section according to the defendant. In other words, Hazleton interprets the statute so as to allow regulation of employers with regard to hiring unauthorized workers as long as instead of a criminal or civil sanction, the sanction that is imposed is the suspension of the employer’s business permit.

We reject Hazleton’s interpretation of the express pre-emption provision. Under Hazleton’s interpretation of the provision, a state or local municipality properly can impose any rule they choose on employers with regard to hiring illegal aliens as long as the sanction imposed is to force the employer out of business by suspending its business permit — what we could call the “ultimate sanction.” This interpretation is at odds with the plain language of the express pre-emption provision, which is concerned with state and local municipalities creating civil and criminal sanctions against employers. It would not make sense for Congress in limiting the state’s authority to allow states and municipalities the opportunity to provide the ultimate sanction, but no lesser penalty. Such an interpretation renders the express preemption clause nearly meaningless.

In addition to being counterintuitive to the plain language of the provision, Hazle-ton’s interpretation is contrary to its legislative history. In House Report No. 99-682(1), the United States Congress provides its interpretation of the type of “licensing” permitted under the statute. The “licensing” that the statute discusses refers to revoking a local license for a violation of the federal I RCA sanction provisions, as opposed to revoking a business license for violation of local laws.

The Report authored by the House Committee on the Judiciary states:

The penalties contained in this legislation are intended to specifically preempt

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any state or local laws providing civil fines and/or criminal sanctions on the hiring, recruitment or referral of undocumented aliens. They are not intended to preempt or prevent lawful state or local processes concerning the suspension, revocation or refusal to reissue a license to any person who has been found to have violated the sanctions provisions in this legislation. Further, the Committee does not intend to preempt licensing or “fitness to do business laws,” such as state farm labor contractor laws or forestry laws, which specifically require such licensee or contractor to refrain from hiring, recruiting or referring undocumented aliens.

H.R. No. 99-682(1) at 5662.

Therefore, the express pre-emption clause applies generally, except for state or local laws dealing with “suspension, revocation or refusal to reissue a license” to an entity found to have violated the sanction provisions of IRCA.

In the instant case, Hazleton suspends the business permit of those who violate its Ordinance, not those who violate IRCA.

42

Thus, the licensing exception to State and local pre-emption is not applicable.

The other express pre-emption exception is for “fitness to do business laws” such as state farm labor contractor laws or forestry laws. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2). Hazleton’s ordinances are not “fitness to do business laws such as state farm labor contractor laws or forestry laws.” Fitness to do business laws generally deal with a person’s character as it relates to his or her ability to be engaged in a certain business activity. An example of such a law is the California statute describing the prerequisites for issuance or renewal of a farm labor contractor license. Cal. Labor Code § 1684 (West 2006). This statute requires that those seeking such a license must,

inter alia:

provide a statement that they possess the character, competency and responsibility to conduct the operations of the business; provide a bond based upon the amount of their payroll; take part in certain training; and not be found in violation of certain laws and regulations.

43

Id.

By way of comparison, IIRA is aimed at preventing employers from hiring undocumented aliens. Thus, they are not fitness to do business laws. Therefore, this exception to pre-emption does not apply.

As the exceptions to pre-emption do not apply, IRCA expressly preempts the employment provisions of IIRA.

Additionally, IIRA provides more than the sanction of business permit suspension. It creates a cause of action for discharged employees. IIRA makes it an “unfair business practice” for an employer to discharge a worker who is not “unlawful” if, at the time, it employs an unlawful worker. (IIRA § 4.E.1). It provides that such a discharged worker may commence a private cause of action against the business and seek treble damages, attorney’s fees and costs. (IIRA § 4.E.2(a) and (b)). Without providing any cogent analysis, defendant asserts that this sanction is similar to licensing, and therefore, is not preempted. We are unconvinced. This sanction certainly falls within the express preemption clause. It does not involve licensing or anything similar to licensing.

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For all of the above reasons, we find that IRCA’s express preemption provision applies to IIRA’s employment provisions. Thus, the Ordinance’s employment provisions violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.

b. Implied pre-emption

Although we find IIRA is expressly preempted, for purposes of completeness we will also discuss implied pre-emption. Even if Congress places an express pre-emption clause in a statute, implied pre-emption may still be applicable.

Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,

514 U.S. 280, 288-89 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 , 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995). Plaintiffs allege that IIRA unconstitutionally conflicts with federal immigration law. Implied pre-emption can be found where the scope of the federal law at issue “indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy the field exclusively” or where state or local laws conflict with federal laws.

Id.

at 287 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 . Implied pre-emption thus includes two separate concepts, field preemption and conflict preemption. We will discuss each.

i. Field pre-emption

Field pre-emption occurs where Congress has occupied a given subject area to the preclusion of State or local laws. Where field preemption is present “the subject matter of the federal and local laws is such that the two laws or regulatory schemes must inherently either conflict or be duplicative”. That is, under this test it is impossible to have local regulation in the subject area that does not conflict with or duplicate federal regulation.

Rogers v. Larson,

563 F.2d 617, 621 (3d Cir.1977). Field preemption exists where the federal regulatory scheme is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,

331 U.S. 218, 230 , 67 S.Ct. 1146 , 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947). Field pre-emption is present where 1) “the pervasiveness of the federal regulation precludes supplementation by the States”; 2) “the federal interest in the filed is sufficiently dominant” or 3) “the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it reveal the same purpose.”

Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co.,

485 U.S. 293, 300 , 108 S.Ct. 1145 , 99 L.Ed.2d 316 (1988).

In the instant case, the first two of these situations are met, and we shall discuss them separately.

aa. Federal interest in the field

The first factor we will consider is the dominance of the federal interest in the field of immigration. The history of federal regulation of immigration is one of the creation of an intricate and complex bureaucracy that restricted who could immigrate to the United States and under what terms. Those immigration regulations have also come to define the conditions under which aliens can find employment in the country. The creation of this complex federal bureaucracy not only altered the role of the federal government in relation to immigration. It also transformed the status of immigrants in American society. A foreign-born person in the United States in 1870 had a presumptively legal statutes; no careful legal inquiry was required to determine whether that person had a right to reside in the country. By 1990, however, determining whether a foreign-born person enjoyed a legal right to remain in the United States demanded a detailed legal examination that involved numerous federal status, several adjudicatory bodies, and a number of appeals and exceptions. More than one hundred years of federal regulation have made the federal supremacy over immigration an intricate affair. We provide here a general summary of nature of federal immigration regulation since the first such regulation appeared at the end of the nineteenth century. For a

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more detailed examination of the history of federal immigration regulation, see the appendix to this decision.

The federal government possesses an especially strong interest in immigration matters. The United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization[J” U.S. CONST, art. I, sect. 8, cl. 4. Thus, “[t]he power to regulate immigration-an attribute of sovereignty essential to the preservation of any nation-has been entrusted by the Constitution to the political branches of the Federal Government.”

United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,

458 U.S. 858, 864 , 102 S.Ct. 3440 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). The

Valenzuela-Bemal

Court states that “[o]ne cannot discount the importance of the Federal Government’s role in the regulation of immigration.”

Id.

(citing

Mathews v. Diaz,

426 U.S. 67, 81 , 96 S.Ct. 1883 , 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976)) (“For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government”);

Galvan v. Press,

347 U.S. 522, 531 , 74 S.Ct. 737 , 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954) (“that the formulation of [immigration] policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government”).

Conversely, the individual states, or municipalities located in those states, do not have a strong interest in immigration. The Supreme Court has explained that

“[t]he States enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens”.

See Hines v. Davidowitz,

312 U.S. 52 , 61 S.Ct. 399 , 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). This power is “committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.”

Mathews[v. Diaz],

426 U.S. [67], at 81, 96 S.Ct. 1883 , 48 L.Ed.2d 478 [1976], Although it is “a routine and normally legitimate part” of the business of the Federal Government to classify on the basis of alien status,

id.,

at 85 , 96 S.Ct., at 1894, and to “take into account the character of the relationship between the alien and this country,”

id.,

at 80, 96 S.Ct., at 1891, only rarely are such matters relevant to legislation by a State.

See Id.,

at 84-85, 96 S.Ct., at 1893-1894;

Nyquist v. Mauclet,

432 U.S. 1, 7, n. 8 , 97 S.Ct. 2120, 2124, n. 8 , 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977).

Plyler v. Doe, 457

U.S. 202, 225, 102 S.Ct. 2382 , 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982).

Bearing in mind the interests of the local government versus the federal government in the areas of immigration, we proceed to our analysis of whether the federal government has pervasively regulated this field.

44

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bb. Pervasiveness of regulations

The second factor we consider is the pervasiveness of the federal regulations.

Schneidemnd,

485 U.S. at 300, 108 S.Ct. 1145 . Congress has occupied the field of employment of unauthorized aliens with IRCA. The Supreme Court has noted that IRCA is “a comprehensive scheme prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens in the United States.”

Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,

535 U.S. 137 , 122 S.Ct. 1275, 1282 , 152 L.Ed.2d 271 (2002) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has explained IRCA as follows:

As we have previously noted, IRCA “forcefully” made combating the employment of illegal aliens central to “[t]he policy of immigration law.”

INS v. National Center for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc.,

502 U.S. 183, 194 , and n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 551 , 116 L.Ed.2d 546 (1991). It did so by establishing an extensive “employment verification system,” § 1324a(a)(l), designed to deny employment to aliens who (a) are not lawfully present in the United States, or (b) are not lawfully authorized to work in'the United States, § 1324a(h)(3). This verification system is critical to the IRCA regime. To enforce it, IRCA mandates that employers verify the identity and eligibility of all new hires by examining specified documents before they begin work. § 1324a(b). If an alien applicant is unable to present the required documentation, the unauthorized alien cannot be hired. § 1324a(a)(l).

Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,

535 U.S. 137, 147-48 , 122 S.Ct. 1275 , 152 L.Ed.2d 271 (2002)(footnote omitted).

IRCA occupies the field to the exclusion of State or local laws regarding employers hiring, employing, recruiting or referring for a fee for employment unauthorized aliens. Congress has indicated that one of the central features of federal immigration policy is controlling the employment of unauthorized workers.

Id.

IRCA provides for the prohibition of employing unauthorized workers and explains the manner in which an employer may be found liable for violating the statute and also how the employer can seek review of adverse decisions.

See generally,

8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e). It provides for various penalties. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(5) (providing for civil fines); 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(providing a criminal’ penalty); 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (providing penalties for document fraud). IRCA also contains a section that prohibits unfair immigration-related employment practices. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b.

Thus, IRCA is a comprehensive scheme. It leaves no room for state regulation. As explained more fully below, where we discuss conflict preemption, any additions added by local governments would be either in conflict with the law or a duplication of its terms — the very definition of field pre-emption.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Ordinance as it applies to employers is field pre-empted. Immigration is a national issue. The United States Congress has provided complete and thorough regulations with regard to the employment of unauthorized aliens including anti-immigration discrimination provisions. Allowing States or local governments to legislate with regard

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to the employment of unauthorized aliens would interfere with Congressional objectives.

The case that defendant primarily relies upon as controlling precedent is

DeCanas v. Bica,

424 U.S. 351 , 96 S.Ct. 933 , 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976).

DeCanas

addressed a California statute that provided “(n)o employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers.”

Id.

at 352 , 96 S.Ct. 933

quoting

California Labor Code Ann. § 2805(a). A trial court in California found that federal law pre-empted the California statute.

Id.

at 353, 96 S.Ct. 933 . The California Court of Appeal found the statute to be an attempt to regulate the conditions for admission of foreign nationals.

Id.

Congress has exclusive authority over immigration and naturalization, thus, the statute was preempted according to the California court.

Id.

The Supreme Court of California denied review, and the United States Supreme Court granted

cer-tiorari. Id.

at 354, 96 S.Ct. 933 .

The Supreme Court disagreed with the California courts. It concluded that the “[pjower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”

Id.

at 354 , 96 S.Ct. 933 . The Court explained, however, that just because a statute touches upon immigration, does not make it an impermissible regulation of immigration. Not “every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted.”

Id.

at 355 , 96 S.Ct. 933 . A “regulation of immigration ... is essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.” Id.

45

The Court proceeded to discuss field pre-emption. With regard to field preemption, the Court reviewed the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) and found its central concern is “with the terms and conditions of admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.”

Id.

at 359 , 96 S.Ct. 933 . The Court noted that although the statute provided a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of immigration and naturalization “without more” it could not conclude that the employment of illegal aliens was within the “central aim” of the law.

Id.

The Court only found a peripheral concern with the employment of illegal entrants in the INA.

Id.

at 360 , 96 S.Ct. 933 . This peripheral concern was evidenced in a proviso to one of the statute’s sections that indicated employment of an illegal entrant was not harboring.

Id.

Thus, field pre-emption with regard to the employment of illegal aliens was inapplicable.

46

Since,

DeCanas ,

however, Congress has passed IRCA. Instead of employment being only addressed in a proviso to one section of the INA, a complete statutory scheme has now been enacted that addresses the employment of unauthorized workers. Therefore, defendant’s reliance on

DeCanas

is misplaced.

47

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As set forth in detail above, Congress has in fact enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme with regard to the employment of unauthorized aliens and occupies the field to the exclusion of state law.

See Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc.,

181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir.1999) (finding implied field pre-emption with regard to air safety standards as the Federal Aviation Act and other federal regulations establish complete and thorough safety standards for interstate and international air transportation).

48

ii. Conflict pre-emption

The final form of pre-emption is conflict pre-emption.

49

Conflict preemption exists where either (1) the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” or (2) it is “impossible for a ... party to comply with both state and federal law.”

Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.,

529 U.S. 861, 899 , 120 S.Ct. 1913 , 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000).

IIRA and IRCA have similar purposes in that both address the employment of unauthorized aliens. For example, IRCA makes it unlawful “to hire, or to recruit or

*526

refer for a fee for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien (as defined in subsection (h)(3)) with respect to such employment” or to hire for employment an .individual without first complying with the act’s verification requirements. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(l).

Likewise, IIRA provides: “It is unlawful for any business entity to recruit, hire for employment, or continue to employ, or to permit, dispatch, or instruct any person who is an unlawful worker to perform work in whole or part within the City [of Hazleton].” (IIRA § 4.A.)

Although the federal and local laws have a similar goal, the means to reach that goal are different. Under federal law, to establish that they are not hiring unauthorized workers, employers can utilize the 1-9 Employment Eligibility Verification Form. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(a);

Getahun v. Office of Chief Administrative Hearing Officer,

124 F.3d 591 , 596 (3d Cir.1997). In addition to completing this form prospective employees must present documents to establish both their identity and their employment eligibility.

50

The employer must examine these documents to determine if they reasonably appear on their face to be genuine. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(l)(A)(ii).

Under the Hazleton Ordinance, an employer must collect from the employee “identification papers” and provide them to the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office.

51

The Code Enforcement Office then verifies with the federal government whether the employee is an unauthorized worker. (IIRA § 4.B.(3)). The primary conflict in this area is that under federal law, the employer has the responsibility to review the documents, and in the Hazleton Ordinance, the employer is required to present the documents to the Code Enforcement Office, which contacts the federal government to determine the status of the worker. The Hazleton Ordinance, therefore, supplements the requirements of federal law.

IIRA also conflicts with federal law in that under federal law, employers need not verify the immigrant status of certain categories of workers. For example, casual domestic workers and independent contractors are not covered by the federal requirements. 8 C.F.R. § 2741 a.l. IIRA contains no such exclusions.

IRCA prohibits employers from

knowingly

hiring or

knowingly

continuing to employ aliens who are unauthorized to work in America.

See 8

U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(l)(A). Initially plaintiffs pointed out that IIRA does not require the element of knowledge. (IIRA § 4.A.). A last minute amendment during the trial of this matter added the element of knowledge to section 4.A. Nonetheless, IIRA still provides for strict liability, without the element of knowledge, with regard to the civil cause of action that it creates.

See

IIRA § 4. E. The federal IRCA statute does not create such a cause of action.

IIRA also conflicts with IRCA in its treatment of the Basic Pilot Program. “The Basic Pilot Program is a voluntary, experimental program created by Congress to permit employers to electronically

*527

verify workers’ employment eligibility with the U.S. Dep. Of Homeland Security and the Social Security Administration.” Note following 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. Under federal law, participation in the Basic Pilot Program is not mandatory. Under IIRA, participation in the Basic Pilot Program is at times mandatory.

See

IIRA § 4.C. (providing that all Hazleton city agencies must participate in the Basic Pilot Program); § 4.D. (requiring that all businesses that seek a City contract or grant must participate in the Basic Pilot Program).

Another conflict exists in the time frames utilized by each enactment. Under IRCA, an employee can contest a noncon-formance (that is an initial finding that he is unauthorized to work) by the Basic Pilot Program within eight (8) days. 62 C.F.R. 48309(IV)(B)(2)(a). The Social Security Administration and federal immigration officials have ten (10) federal work days to respond.

(Id.)

The employer may not terminate the employee or take other adverse action against him based upon his employment eligibility status during this time period.

(Id.).

Under IIRA, no appeal right is provided to the employee, and in fact, the employer must terminate the employee within three (3) business days. (IIRA § 4.B.3). Thus, in direct conflict with IRCA, Hazleton seeks to force an employer to terminate an employee where under federal law the employer is prohibited from terminating that employee. Additionally, under the Hazleton Ordinance, the only appeal right appears to be held by the employer who may toll the three (3) day termination period. (IIRA § 7.C.(2)). Without providing any appeal rights to the employee, IIRA is in conflict with the federal law.

Thus, this case is analogous to

Rogers v. Larson,

563 F.2d 617 (3d Cir.1977).

Rogers

dealt with a Virgin Islands law relating to the admission and employment of non-immigrant aliens. The law called for the termination of a nonimmigrant’s employment if a qualified resident worker was available for the position.

Id.

at 619 . Although federal law also addressed the employment of nonimmigrant aliens, the federal law provided more protection for the nonimmigrant aliens than the Virgin Islands law did. Nonimmigrant aliens challenged the law as federally preempted. The court noted that both the federal laws and- the Virgin Island law had the same purposes of “assuring an adequate labor force ... and to protect the jobs of citizens[.]”

Id.

at 626 . However, in order to serve both these goals, “any statutory scheme ... must inevitably strike a balance between the two goals.”

Id.

In that case, as the Virgin Islands and the United States had struck the balance between the goals differently, the Virgin Islands’ law amounted to “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of the” federal law.

Id.

Likewise in the instant case, although it appears that the goals of the two laws may be similar, a different balance between the rights of businesses and workers and the goal of preventing illegal employment is struck and IIRA ultimately ignores one of IRCA’s main objectives. A bit of a background on immigration enforcement is helpful to understand this issue.

Under federal law there are two types of immigration enforcement: border enforcement, which is keeping unauthorized persons from entering the country; and interior enforcement, which is distinguishing between legal and undocumented immigrants already in the country and removing the latter. (N.T. 3/15/07 at 14). In interior enforcement, officials must strike a balance between finding and removing undocumented immigrants without accidentally removing immigrants and legal citizens, all without imposing too much of a

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burden on employers and workers.

(Id.

at 15). Too stringent of an enforcement system will result in the wrongful removal of United States citizens and legal immigrants.

(Id.)

United States foreign relations is affected by the manner in which the balance is struck. Excessive enforcement jeopardizes our alliances and cooperation with regard to matters such as immigration enforcement, drug interdiction and counter-terrorism investigations.

(Id.

at 16-17). Accordingly, the United States political system places the responsibility for striking this balance with the United States Congress and the executive branch.

(Id.

at 15). In discussing the ordinances in the instant case, city council and the may- or did not consider the implications of the ordinances on foreign policy. (N.T. 3/14/07 at 87-89). Their only concern, as might be expected, was for Hazleton.

(Id.)

Thus, IRCA and IIRA share a similar purpose: to prevent the employment of persons not authorized to work in the United State while not overburdening the employer in determining whether an employee or perspective employee is an authorized worker. The two laws, however, strike a different balance between these interests. The laws, therefore, conflict.

IRCA also seeks to prevent discrimination against legally admitted immigrants. The law makes it an unfair immigration-related employment practice to discriminate against a person with respect to hiring, recruitment or referral for a fee because of a person’s national origin or because of an individual’s citizenship status. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b. IIRA has no anti-discriminatory provisions, and this omission represents another conflict.

This case is also analogous to

Hines v. Davidowitz,

312 U.S. 52 , 61 S.Ct. 399 , 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). In

Hines ,

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania enacted an Aien Registration Act, which required aliens 18 years of age or older to register once a year, provide certain information, pay a registration fee and receive an alien identification card that they had to carry at all times.

Id.

at 56 , 61 S.Ct. 399 . The law further required aliens to present the identification card whenever demanded by a police officer or agent of the Department of Labor and Industry, and present the card before obtaining a driver’s license or buying an automobile.

Id.

Violators of the act were subject to possible fines and imprisonment.

Id.

at 60 , 61 S.Ct. 399 . The federal government also had in effect an alien registration statute. This law required a single registration of aliens fourteen (14) years of age and older, certain information and fingerprinting.

Id.

at 60 , 61 S.Ct. 399 . It also provided for the secrecy of the federal files, and it did not require the aliens to carry a registration card or require them to exhibit it to the police or others.

Id.

60-61 , 61 S.Ct. 399 . Violators of the act were subject to possible fines and imprisonment.

Id.

at 61 , 61 S.Ct. 399 .

The Pennsylvania law was challenged as precluded by the federal alien registration scheme. The Supreme Court held: “[Wjhere the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement the federal law, or enforce additional auxiliary regulations.”

Id.

at 66 , 61 S.Ct. 399 . In finding that the law was unconstitutional, the Court noted: “And it is ... of importance that this legislation deals with the rights, liberties and personal freedoms of human beings[.]”

Id.

at 68 , 61 S.Ct. 399 .

In support of its position that its Aien Registration Act was constitutional, Penm sylvania cited numerous cases where state legislation was upheld although it applied

*529

to aliens only.

Id.

at 69 n. 23, 61 S.Ct. 399 . The Court noted, however, that in these cases Congress had not passed legislation on the subject of the various acts.-

Id.

In

Hines

as well as the instant case, however, Congress passed legislation aimed at the very issue addressed by the State or local law. Specifically, in this case, the federal government in exercising its superior authority in the field of immigration has enacted a complete scheme of regulation on the subject on the employment of unauthorized aliens. Hazleton cannot conflict, interfere, curtail or complement this law. As set forth above, Ha-zleton’s Ordinance does conflict, interfere with and complement IRCA. It is therefore conflict pre-empted.

Defendant seems to argue that the law is constitutional because it is aimed at illegal aliens who have no right to be in the United States. Defendant’s position fails to acknowledge that the law will affect more than illegal aliens. It will affect every employer, every employee who is challenged as an illegal alien and every prospective employee especially those who look or act as if they are foreign. As noted above, the Ordinance, unlike its superior federal counterpart, contains no antidiscrimination provisions.

The United States Supreme Court has noted: “Opposition to laws permitting invasion of the personal liberties of law-abiding individuals, or singling out aliens as particularly dangerous and undesirable groups, is deep-seated in this country. Hostility to such legislation in America stems back to our colonial history[.]” Id. at 70 , 61 S.Ct. 399 . The Court further noted: “As early as 1641, in the Massachusetts ‘Body of Liberties’, we find the statement that ‘Every person within this Jurisdiction, whether Inhabitant or foreigner, shall enjoy the same justice and law that is generally for the plantation * * *.’ ” Id. at 71 n. 27, 61 S.Ct. 399 .

In conclusion, the employment provisions of IIRA differ from and conflict with IRCA. It is thus in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.

2. Tenancy provisions

The Hazleton ordinances contain two sets of provisions affecting tenancy in the city. The first is a “harboring” provision of the IIRA that prohibits the housing of certain aliens. (IIRA §§ 5 and 7.B.) The second is the Tenant Registration Ordinance, (hereinafter “RO”), which requires all occupants of rental units to obtain an occupancy permit.

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In order to receive such a permit, an applicant must provide “proof of legal citizenship and/or residency.” (RO § 7.b.l.g). We will discuss the provisions of these two laws separately and then analyze the pre-emption arguments.

a. Housing illegal aliens

Plaintiffs assert that the “harboring” portion of IIRA is conflict preempted because it is directly at odds with the federal immigration system. It prohibits landlords from “harboring” “illegal aliens.” (IIRA § 5.A.) “Harboring” is defined as letting, leasing or renting a dwelling unit to an illegal alien or permitting the occupancy of a dwelling unit by an “illegal alien” knowingly or in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien has come to,, entered or remains in, the United States in violation of the law.

(Id.).

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Generally, IIRA provides a complaint procedure where a Hazleton official, business entity or resident can file a written complaint that a landlord is harboring an “illegal alien.” (IIRA § 5.B.(1)). The Code Enforcement Office next obtains “identity data” from the owner regarding the tenant. (IIRA § 5.B.(3)). The Code Enforcement Office then consults with the federal government to determine the tenant’s immigration status. If the verification reveals that the owner is in violation of the harboring provisions, he must correct the violation or face fines and suspension of his rental license. (IIRA § 5.B.(4)

&

§ 5.B.(8)).

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b. Tenant Registration Ordinance

The second housing provision at issue, RO, requires,

inter alia,

that each person who seeks to occupy a rental dwelling obtain an “occupancy permit” from Hazle-ton.

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In order to obtain a permit, a potential tenant must supply to the Code Enforcement Office “proper identification showing proof of legal citizenship and/or residency.” (RO § 7.b.l.g). A landlord is prohibited from allowing occupancy of a rental unit unless all the occupants have obtained an occupancy permit. (RO § 7.b.).

If a landlord allows a tenant who does not have an occupancy permit to occupy a rental unit he faces a $1,000.00 fine “for each Occupant that does not have an occupancy permit and $100 per Occupant per day for each day that the Owner or Agent continues to allow each such Occupant to occupy the Rental Unit without an occupancy permit after Owner or Agent is given notice of such violation!/]” (RO § 10.b.).

If a tenant has an occupancy permit, but he allows other occupants to reside at the premises who do not have permits, he is in violation of the ordinance and faces the same $1,000.00/$100 per occupant per day fine.

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(RO § 10.b.).

Plaintiffs argue that the housing provisions of IIRA and RO are conflict preempted. As set forth above, a local ordinance is conflict preempted where either (1) the local ordinance “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” or (2) it is not possible to comply with both the federal and state law.

Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.,

529 U.S. 861, 899 , 120 S.Ct. 1913 , 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000).

Plaintiffs assert that the IIRA and RO are in direct conflict with federal law because they are based upon the assumption that: 1) the federal government seeks the removal of all aliens who lack legal status and 2) “a conclusive determination by the federal government that an individual may not remain in the United States can somehow be obtained outside of a formal removal hearing.” (Doc. 106, PI. Br. at 11). After a careful review, we agree.

Initially, we note that it is completely within the discretion of the federal officials to remove persons from the country who are removable.

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Indeed, the federal gov-

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eminent permits several categories of persons who may not be technically lawfully present in the United States to work and presumably live here. For example, the following can receive permission from the federal government to work in the United States: 1) aliens who have completed an application for asylum or withholding of removal; 2) aliens who have filed an application for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident; 3) aliens who have filed an application for suspension of deportation; 4) aliens paroled into the United States temporarily for emergency reasons or reasons deemed strictly in the public interest; 5) aliens who are granted deferred action “an act of administrative convenience to the government which gives some cases lower priority!.]” 8 C.F.R. § 274a. 12(c) ¶¶ 8-11, 14. Additionally, aliens who have a final order of deportation against them but are released on an order of supervision may obtain permission to work. Id. ¶ 18; see also 8 C.F.R. § 274a.l2(a) ¶¶ 11-13; 18-20, 22, 24) (listing more categories of aliens who may be violating immigration laws but may nonetheless obtain permission to work in the United States by the federal government). In addition, aliens who have final orders of removal against them may be ordered released from detention by the courts if there is no likelihood of their removal in the foreseeable future.

See Zadvydas v. Davis,

533 U.S. 678 , 121 S.Ct. 2491 , 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001). Although these aliens are permitted to work and implicitly to remain in the United States, they would be denied housing in Hazleton under the IIRA and RO. The ordinances thus conflict with federal law.

Furthermore, changing status from authorized to unauthorized is complex. For example, some individuals can affirmatively apply for regularization of status. In other-instances, regularization of status is only available after an individual has been placed in removal proceedings by the federal government (even if the operative facts' justifying relief predate the commencement of the removal hearing). (N.T. 3/19/07 at 118-121). It may take months or years for an applicant to adjust status, obtain relief or otherwise regularize status. (N.T. 3/19.97 at 128-129). Submitting an application does not change an individuars immigration status, even if the application is bona fide and will ultimately be approved. (N.T. 3/19/07 at 116-117). A person who is proceeding through the procedure to adjust his immigration status but who currently lacks immigration status frequently will not have any documents to indicate whether he has a valid claim to remain in the country.

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(N.T. 3/19/07 at 121).

The ordinances also conflict with federal law in that they assume that the federal government seeks the removal of all undocumented aliens. As the Supreme Court has noted:' “An illegal entrant might

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be granted federal permission to continue to reside in this country, or even to become a citizen.”

See, e.g.,

8 U.S.C. §§ 1252 , 1253(h), 1254 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV).

Plyler,

457 U.S. at 226 , 102 S.Ct. 2382 . The United States government, however, determines whether to remove an alien only through formal procedures set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § § 1101

et seq.

and related regulations. Furthermore, the federal process provides procedural safeguards that include administrative appeal and judicial review.

See

8 U.S.C. § 1229a; 8 C.F.R. 240,1240.

Even if an alien is deemed removable after removal proceedings, they may nonetheless be allowed to stay in the United States. For example, relief from removal may be obtained by spouses and other relatives of United States citizens, 8 U.S.C. § 1154 ; 8 U.S.C. § 1229b; victims of domestic violence, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2); and those seeking protection from persecution or torture under the Convention Against Torture, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § § 208.16-18.

Additionally, under 8 U.S.C. 1229b, the United States Attorney General

may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien—

(1)has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years,

(2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status, and

(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.

8 U.S.C. § 1229b.

Hence, the federal immigration rules and the decision whether an alien should be removed are very complex. More than resorting to the Basic Pilot Program or the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (“SAVE”)

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is necessary to determine if federal government seeks the removal of an individual from the United States.

As Supreme Court Justice Blackmun noted: “[T]he structure of the immigration statuses makes it impossible for the State to determine which aliens are entitled to residence, and which eventually will be deported.”

Plyler,

457 U.S. at 236 , 102 S.Ct. 2382 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Additionally, Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell stated: “Until an undocumented alien is ordered deported by the Federal Government, no State can be assured that the alien will not be found to have a federal permission to reside in the country.”

Plyler,

457 U.S. at 241 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 2382 (Powell, J., concurring).

Hazleton’s ordinances burden aliens more than federal law by prohibiting them from residing in the city although they may be permitted to remain in the United States. The ordinances are thus in conflict with federal law and pre-empted.

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RO is additionally in conflict with federal law because it calls upon the employees of the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office to examine the paperwork of those seeking permits and determine if they are properly in the country. This procedure is in direct conflict with federal law. Immigration status can only be determined by an immigration judge. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(l) (“An immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or de-portability of an alien.”). Further, the proceeding before the immigration judge is the “sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (emphasis added).

Thus, for all the reasons set forth above, the housing provisions of the IIRA and the Tenant Registration Ordinance are preempted by federal law and are unconstitutional.

B. Procedural Due Process

Plaintiffs’ second cause of action asserts that the ordinances at issue violate the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause found in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Compl.1ffi 132-145). The Due Process Clause prohibits a deprivation of “life, liberty or property” without due process of the law.

Plaintiffs assert that the ordinances at issue impinge on both their property and liberty interests and provide only illusory process. Defendant argues that the plaintiffs have no legitimate interest at stake, and regardless, the ordinances provide sufficient process. After a careful review, we agree with the plaintiffs. We will address first the interests that are at stake and then examine the process provided by the ordinances. Once -again we will address the employment provisions and housing provisions of the ordinances separately.

1. Employment Provisions

a. Protected interest

In order to determine whether the protections of the due process clause apply, we must first determine whether the interests involved are encompassed in the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty or property.

Baraka v. McGreevey,

481 F.3d 187, 205 (3d Cir.2007). “ ‘Liberty’ and ‘property’ are broad and majestic terms. They are among the ‘(g)reat (constitutional) concepts ... purposely left to gather meaning from experience ... (T)hey relate to the whole domain of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well that only a stagnant society remains unchanged.’ ”

National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,

337 U.S. 582, 646 , 69 S.Ct. 1173 , 93 L.Ed. 1556 (1949) (Frankfurter J., dissenting)

quoted in The Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 571 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). .The analysis of the interests asserted in the instant case is not overly complex; the appellate courts have already discussed interests similar to those asserted by the plaintiffs.

The employer plaintiffs, including the members of the Hazleton Hispanic Business Association, possess Fourteenth Amendment property and liberty interests in running their businesses. “[A] business is an established property right entitled-to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.”

College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,

131 F.3d 353, 361 (3d Cir.1997). Additionally, the individual plaintiffs have an interest in their employment. The United States Supreme Court has explained that “the significance of the private interest in retaining employment cannot be gainsaid.

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We have frequently recognized the severity of depriving a person of the means of livelihood.”

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,

470 U.S. 532, 543 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). The Court further noted: “While a fired worker may find employment elsewhere, doing so will take some time and is likely to be burdened by the questionable circumstances under which he left his previous job.”

Id.

In a case dealing with an Arizona state statute that discriminated against aliens, the Court further noted: “It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure.”

Truax v. Raich,

239 U.S. 33, 41 , 36 S.Ct. 7 , 60 L.Ed. 131 (1915). These rights are both “liberty” and “property” rights.

Greene v. McElroy,

360 U.S. 474, 492 , 79 S.Ct. 1400 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959)

cited in Piecknick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

36 F.3d 1250, 1259 (3d Cir.1994). Defendant argues that employers have no right to enter into employee contracts with unauthorized workers; therefore, no protected interests are at stake. Defendant’s argument is unconvincing. The argument presupposes that the Ordinance will affect only unauthorized workers. Actually, however, the IIRA affects all who are challenged under the law and all employers who have employees challenged.

Regardless, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to all “ ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”

Kamara v. Attorney General of U.S.,

420 F.3d 202, 216 (3d Cir.2005) (quoting

Zadvydas v. Davis,

533 U.S. 678, 693 , 121 S.Ct. 2491 , 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001));

see also Plyler v. Doe,

457 U.S. 202, 210 , 102 S.Ct. 2382 , 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982)(“Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”).

As significant constitutional due process rights are at issue, the question then becomes whether the Ordinance provides sufficient procedural safeguards to protect these important interests. In other words, we now must determine whether the Ordinance provides process sufficient to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment.

b. Process due

“The fundamental requirements of due process are notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, but the concept is flexible, calling for procedural protection as dictated by the particular circumstances.”

Harris v. City of Philadelphia,

47 F.3d 1333, 1338 (3d Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “ ‘[D]ue process’ is a flexible concept ... the processes required by the Clause with respect to the termination of a protected interest will vary depending upon the importance attached to the interest and the particular circumstances under which the deprivation may occur.”

Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors,

473 U.S. 305, 320 , 105 S.Ct. 3180 , 87 L.Ed.2d 220 (1985).

Accordingly, we must examine the process available under the ordinances to determine whether adequate notice and hearing are provided. With regard to the employment provisions of the Ordinance, enforcement commences with the filing of a complaint alleging that a business entity employs unlawful worker(s) with the Ha-zleton Code Enforcement Office. (IIRA § 4.B.(1)). A complaint can be filed by

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“any official, business entity, or City resident.”

Id.

Next, the city determines if the complaint is valid. The Ordinance does not indicate how the validity of a complaint is determined, it merely states that a complaint alleging a violation based upon national origin, ethnicity, or race is invalid.

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Once a complaint is. deemed valid, the city obtains “identity information” within three days from the business entity and verifies with the federal government the immigration status of the challenged employee under 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (c). (IIRA § 4.B.(3)). The term “identity information” is not defined in the Ordinance.

If the employer fails to provide the identity information within three (3) days, the Code Office must suspend the employer’s business permit. (IIRA § 4.B.3). This suspension is mandatory and it is not dependent upon a finding that an “unlawful worker” has been hired.

If the employer fails to provide the identity information, and the challenge to the worker is that he is an unauthorized alien as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3), the Code Office must “submit the identity data required by the federal government to verify, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, section 1373, the immigration status of such person(s)[.]” 4.B.3. The Ordinance does not provide a procedure for such verification besides reference to 8 U.S.C. § 1373 , which does not establish a verification mechanism.- It merely requires the Immigration and Naturalization Service to respond to inquiries from federal, state and local government seeking the citizenship or immigration status of individuals.

Once the verification is completed, the Code Office provides the results to the employer. (IIRA § 4.B.3). If the employer is in violation of IIRA, it must correct the violation within three (3) business days. (IIRA § 4.B.4). Such correction includes either a) termination (or attempted termination) of the worker’s employment; b) acquiring from the worker additional information and requesting a secondary or additional verification from the federal government of the worker’s authorization. (IIRA § 7.C). If the employee challenges his termination in a Pennsylvania court, the three (3) day period is tolled. (IIRA § 7.C.(3)).

If the employer fails to correct the violation within the required time frame, the Code Office must suspend the entity’s business permit. (IIRA § 4.B.(4)). If, however, the business had previously used the federal government’s “Basic Pilot Program” to verify the worker’s status, the Code Office will not suspend the business’s permit. (IIRA § 4.B.(5)).

If a business license is suspended, it can be restored in one business day after a

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sworn affidavit is provided stating that the violation ended. (IIRA § 4.B.(6)). The affidavit must provide the name, address and other “adequate identifying information” of the unlawful worker. (IIRA § 4.B.(6)(a)). If the appropriate authorities verify that the business entity employed two or more workers who are unlawful due to being “unauthorized aliens” as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a, the business entity also must provide documentation that it has enrolled and will participate in the Basic Pilot Program. (IIRA § 4.B.(6)(b)). Where a business entity violates t

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