Opinion

Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co.

  • 654 F.3d 903
  • 25 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 119
  • 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17022
  • 2011 WL 3607014
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Aug 17, 2011
Status
Published
Author
Ikuta
On the bench
Rymer, Callahan, Ikuta
Cited by
601 cases
Authority
More cited than 99.5%

holding district court 13 did not abuse its discretion in dismissing state law claims where the balance of relevant pendent 14 jurisdiction factors did not tip in favor of retaining the state law claims after dismissal of the 15 ADA claim

How later courts described this case

  • holding district court 13 did not abuse its discretion in dismissing state law claims where the balance of relevant pendent 14 jurisdiction factors did not tip in favor of retaining the state law claims after dismissal of the 15 ADA claim
  • holding “a defendant’s voluntary removal of alleged barriers prior to trial 18 can have the effect of mooting a plaintiff’s ADA claim”
  • noting that, “[b]ecause a private 7 plaintiff can sue only for injunctive relief (i.e., for removal of the barrier) under the ADA, a 8 defendant's voluntary removal of alleged barriers prior to trial can have the effect of mooting a 9 plaintiff's ADA claim”
  • finding that the district court 22 || did not abuse its discretion in dismissing state law claims under the UCRA and CDPA 23 |/after losing original jurisdiction over ADA claim

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Gray v. Golden Gate National Recreational Area, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (2011)

    Plaintiffs counter that Defendants’ motion essentially repeats prior arguments made in opposition to class certification, that Oliver is inapplicable, and that in any event they have complied with its interpretation of Rule 8’s pleading requirements.
    District Court, N.D. CaliforniaNov 15, 2011Read it
  • Distinguished by Vallabharpurapu v. Burger King Corp., 276 F.R.D. 611 (2011)

    The Court notes, however, that Oliver is distinguishable as an individual action, as opposed to the putative class action pled here.
    District Court, N.D. CaliforniaOct 14, 2011Read it

The opinion

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

A. J. OLIVER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

No. 09-56447

v.

D.C. No.

RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY, DBA  3:07-cv-02301-

Food 4 Less No.780; CYPRESS JLS-POR

CREEK CO., LP, DBA PTC

OPINION

Investments Company,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 7, 2011—Pasadena, California

Filed August 17, 2011

Before: Pamela Ann Rymer, Consuelo M. Callahan, and

Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Ikuta

10881

10884 OLIVER v. RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY

COUNSEL

Lynn Hubbard, III, Chico, California, for plaintiff/appellant

A.J. Oliver

Scottlynn J. Hubbard, Chico, California, for plaintiff/appellant

A.J. Oliver

Gregory F. Hurley, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Irvine, Califor-

nia, for defendant/appellee Ralphs Grocery Company

Spencer C. Skeen, Fisher & Phillips, LLP, San Diego, Cali-

fornia, for defendant/appellee Cypress Creek Company, LP.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

A.J. Oliver is a disabled individual who requires the use of

a motorized wheelchair to get around. On December 7, 2007,

Oliver filed a lawsuit against Ralphs Grocery Company

(“Ralphs”) and Cypress Creek Company (“Cypress Creek”)

alleging that a Food 4 Less grocery store in Chula Vista, Cali-

fornia did not comply with the Americans with Disabilities

Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 12213, and certain

state laws.1 The district court granted summary judgment to

the defendants on Oliver’s ADA claim and dismissed his state

law claims without prejudice. We affirm.

1

Ralphs owned and operated the store in question, and defendant

Cypress Creek owned the retail center in which the store was located.

OLIVER v. RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY 10885

I

A

In order to address Oliver’s arguments, it is first necessary

to understand the requirements imposed by the ADA. Title III

of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability

in the “full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facili-

ties, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place

of public accommodation” with a nexus in interstate com-

merce. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(b), 12182(a).2 Compliance with

the ADA requires that new facilities be “readily accessible to

and usable by individuals with disabilities,” unless this would

be “structurally impracticable.” § 12183(a)(1).3

In general, a facility is “readily accessible to and usable by

individuals with disabilities” if it meets the requirements pro-

mulgated by the Attorney General in the “ADA Accessibility

Guidelines” or the “ADAAG,” which is essentially an ency-

clopedia of design standards. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.406; see also

28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A; Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.),

Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); United

States v. AMC Entm’t, Inc., 549 F.3d 760, 763 (9th Cir. 2008).4

If a particular architectural feature of a place of public accom-

modation is inconsistent with the ADAAG, a plaintiff can

bring a civil action claiming that the feature constitutes a bar-

2

Unless otherwise noted, all statutory citations in this opinion are to title

42 of the U.S. Code.

3

For existing facilities, discrimination includes “a failure to remove

architectural barriers . . . where such removal is readily achievable.”

§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). “Existing facilities,” as defined in the ADA, are not

at issue in this case.

4

Because the Attorney General developed the ADAAG pursuant to an

express delegation of authority by Congress, § 12186(b), courts must give

ADAAG “controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or mani-

festly contrary to the statute.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S.

837, 843-44 (1984); see Does 1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th

Cir. 1996).

10886 OLIVER v. RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY

rier that denies the plaintiff full and equal enjoyment of the

premises in violation of the ADA. See §§ 2000a-3(a),

12188(a)(2). Because a private plaintiff can sue only for

injunctive relief (i.e., for removal of the barrier) under the

ADA, see id., a defendant’s voluntary removal of alleged bar-

riers prior to trial can have the effect of mooting a plaintiff’s

ADA claim. See Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d

1134, 1145 (S.D. Cal. 2006); cf. Am. Cargo Transp., Inc. v.

United States, 625 F.3d 1176, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2010). The

ADA provides for attorneys’ fees and costs for prevailing

plaintiffs, however, see § 12205, and ADA plaintiffs fre-

quently seek damages by bringing parallel claims under appli-

cable state civil rights laws.

B

On December 7, 2007, Oliver filed a complaint in federal

district court alleging that he had visited the Chula Vista Food

4 Less store and “encountered barriers (both physical and

intangible) that interfered with—if not outright denied—his

ability to use and enjoy the goods, services, privileges, and

accommodations offered” at the facility. The complaint also

stated that, “[t]o the extent known by Oliver, the barriers at

the Food 4 Less included, but [we]re not limited to” 18 sepa-

rate architectural features.5 Claiming that the existence of

5

The 18 architectural features listed in the complaint were:

• The tow away signage provided at the facility is incorrect;

• The signage in the van accessible stall is incorrect;

• There is no stop sign painted on the pavement where the

accessible route crosses the vehicular way;

• There are no detectable warnings where the accessible route

crosses the vehicular way;

• The pay point machine is mounted too high and out of reach;

• There is no directional signage leading to the accessible rest-

rooms;

OLIVER v. RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY 10887

these barriers amounted to discrimination against him on the

basis of his disability, Oliver sought injunctive relief, attor-

neys’ fees, and legal expenses under the ADA, as well as

money damages through two parallel state law claims.6

Shortly after receiving Oliver’s complaint, Ralphs began

renovations at the store. During this process, Ralphs removed

• The signage at the men’s restroom’s entrance door is incor-

rect;

• The door into the men’s restroom requires too much force to

operate and does not completely close;

• The stall door is not self closing;

• The handle and lock on the stall door requires pinching and

twisting to operate;

• The side grab bar is mounted more than 12 inches from the

back wall;

• The side grab bar does not extend 24 inches beyond the toilet

tissue dispenser;

• The toilet tissue dispenser protrudes into the clear floor space

needed at the water closet;

• The trash receptacle protrudes into the clear floor space

needed at the water closet;

• The pipes underneath the lavatory are not wrapped to prevent

burns;

• The handles to operate the lavatory controls require twisting

and grasping;

• The soap dispenser’s operable part is mounted at more than

40 inches from the floor; and,

• The operable part of the hand dryer is mounted at more than

40 inches from the floor.

Cypress Creek asserts that only the first four features listed in the com-

plaint relate to areas under its control.

6

Oliver’s complaint alleged violations of the Disabled Persons Act, see

Cal. Civil Code § 54, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, see Cal. Civil Code

§ 51.

10888 OLIVER v. RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY

several of the barriers Oliver had identified in his complaint.

At a pre-trial scheduling conference on May 14, 2008, Oliver

stated his intention to amend his complaint to allege the exis-

tence of additional architectural features at the store which

violated the ADA. The parties agreed on June 13, 2008 as the

deadline for filing amended pleadings, and the magistrate

judge issued a scheduling order to that effect.

Oliver did not file an amended complaint by the June 13,

2008 deadline. Rather, on June 30, 2008, after the deadline for

filing amended pleadings had passed, Oliver filed a motion to

modify the scheduling order and a motion to amend his com-

plaint to identify six additional architectural features at the

store that allegedly violated the ADA. The district court deter-

mined that Oliver had failed to show good cause to modify

the scheduling order, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b), and denied

Oliver’s motion. A little over four months later, Oliver filed

an expert report identifying approximately 20 “architectural

barriers” at the Food 4 Less store. This expert report provided

additional detail concerning some of the barriers already iden-

tified in Oliver’s complaint, but also added several additional

barriers that had not been listed in the complaint (e.g., tele-

phone and transaction counter accessability issues).7

The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary

judgment, and the district court granted summary judgment to

Ralphs and Cypress Creek. In doing so, the court ruled that

it would not consider the barriers listed in Oliver’s expert

report, because they were not properly before the court. The

court then reviewed each of the 18 architectural barriers listed

in the complaint and ruled against Oliver on all of them. Spe-

cifically, the court: (1) ruled that Oliver had conceded sum-

7

Oliver’s counsel later explained that his delays in identifying the barri-

ers at the facility were part of his legal strategy: he purposely “forces the

defense to wait until expert disclosures (or discovery) before revealing a

complete list of barriers,” because otherwise a defendant could remove all

the barriers prior to trial and moot the entire case.

OLIVER v. RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY 10889

mary judgment as to some of the barriers, (2) granted

summary judgment to the defendants as to others, and (3)

found that others were moot because they had already been

remedied. Finally, the district court declined to exercise sup-

plemental jurisdiction over Oliver’s state law claims and dis-

missed them without prejudice.

II

On appeal, Oliver challenges three of the district court’s

rulings. First, he contends that the district court erred in refus-

ing to consider the allegations in his expert report.8 Second,

he argues that the district court erred in granting summary

judgment to the defendants as to the barriers he claimed vio-

lated California’s Manual on Uniform Traffic Control

Devices (MUTCD), which was based on the district court’s

conclusion that violations of the California MUTCD are not

per se violations of the ADA. Finally, he contends that the

district court abused its discretion in declining to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.

A

Before we can reach these issues, however, we must

address a threshold question: whether in light of our recent

decision in Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports, Oliver adequately

established his standing to bring this action. Although neither

Ralphs nor Cypress Creek raised the issue of standing before

the district court or on appeal, we “must[ ] resolve any doubts

about this constitutional issue sua sponte.” City of L.A. v.

Cnty. of Kern, 581 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2009).

The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing”

includes three elements: (1) injury in fact; (2) causation; and

8

He does not challenge the court’s refusal to consider the allegations in

his proposed amended complaint or the court’s decision to deny him leave

to amend the complaint.

10890 OLIVER v. RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY

(3) redressability. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). In Chapman, we explained that a

disabled person suffers an injury in fact when he “encoun-

ter[s] a barrier” at a place of public accommodation “that

deprives him of full and equal enjoyment of the facility due

to his particular disability.” 631 F.3d at 944. Chapman’s com-

plaint did not adequately allege such an injury in fact, how-

ever, because it merely included a lengthy list of alleged

barriers without identifying which barriers Chapman had

encountered or establishing how they had affected his specific

disability. Id. at 955. Because Chapman did not cure this

jurisdictional defect later in the litigation, id. at 954, we

vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions for the

district court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. See

id. at 955.

[1] The jurisdictional allegations in Oliver’s complaint are

almost identical to those we found deficient in Chapman.

Although Oliver’s complaint stated that he had encountered

barriers at the store and provided a list of alleged barriers, it

did not specify which (if any) Oliver had personally encoun-

tered or explain “how his disability was affected by [any of]

them so as to deny him . . . ‘full and equal’ access” to the

store. Id. at 954. Thus, Oliver’s complaint, like the complaint

in Chapman, was “jurisdictionally defective.” Id.

[2] Nevertheless, we need not dismiss Oliver’s action. In

Chapman, not only were Chapman’s jurisdictional allegations

insufficient, but the necessary jurisdictional facts were absent

from the record. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain,

490 U.S. 826, 832 (1989) (noting that appellate courts can

“remedy inadequate jurisdictional allegations” under 28

U.S.C. § 1653, but not “defective jurisdictional facts”). In this

case, by contrast, there is sufficient evidence in the record to

establish that Oliver suffered an injury in fact. In support of

his cross-motion for summary judgment, for example, Oliver

filed a sworn declaration stating that he had visited the Food

4 Less in question at least ten times between October 2007

OLIVER v. RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY 10891

and August 2008, and that on one of these visits, he discov-

ered that it was difficult to use the accessible stall in the

men’s restroom because the door lacked the proper hardware,

the position of the grab bar behind the toilet made it difficult

to transfer from his wheelchair to the toilet, and the soap dis-

penser and hand dryer were mounted too high for him to

reach. These undisputed facts demonstrate that Oliver person-

ally encountered barriers at the Food 4 Less store that

impaired his full and equal enjoyment of the facility due to his

particular disability. See Chapman, 631 F.3d at 955. There-

fore, under the standard we articulated in Chapman, Oliver

had standing to sue as to those barriers as well as all “other

barriers related to his disability.” Id. at 944. Considering that

Oliver filed his defective complaint before we issued our

decision in Chapman, we see little value in vacating the dis-

trict court’s judgment and remanding this case for dismissal.

We therefore exercise our discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1653

to deem the complaint’s defective allegations of jurisdiction

amended and the jurisdictional defect cured, see Blue Ridge

Ins. Co. v. Stanewich, 142 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 1998),

and proceed to consider the merits of Oliver’s appeal.

B

We now turn to Oliver’s argument that the district court

erred in refusing to consider the barriers that were identified

in his expert report but not alleged in his complaint. We

review de novo whether the district court erred in interpreting

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 as precluding consideration

of these additional barriers. In re Dominguez, 51 F.3d 1502,

1508 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

[3] Rule 8 states that a civil complaint “must contain . . .

a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The

Supreme Court has interpreted the “short and plain statement”

requirement to mean that the complaint must provide “the

defendant [with] fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

10892 OLIVER v. RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY

grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Where the claim is one of discrimination

under the ADA due to the presence of architectural barriers at

a place of public accommodation, we have held that the rele-

vant “grounds” are the allegedly non-compliant architectural

features at the facility. Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc.,

457 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, in order for the com-

plaint to provide fair notice to the defendant, each such fea-

ture must be alleged in the complaint. See id.

[4] In Pickern, for example, the plaintiff’s complaint listed

a number of barriers that were “illustrative of the kinds of bar-

riers a disabled person may confront,” but did not allege that

any of those barriers existed at the facility in question. Id. at

968-69. We held that such a complaint does not provide a

defendant with fair notice concerning the grounds upon which

the plaintiff bases the claim of discrimination because it does

not identify the specific barriers for which the plaintiff seeks

injunctive relief. Id. at 969. Nor was the plaintiff’s expert

report identifying the barriers at the facility sufficient to con-

stitute “fair notice” under Rule 8 because it did not specify

“what allegations [the plaintiff] was including in the suit” and

was “not filed and served until after the discovery deadline.”

Id.

[5] Applying the principles of Pickern to this case, Oliver

did not give the defendants fair notice that the barriers listed

for the first time in the expert report were grounds for his

claim of discrimination under the ADA. Oliver attempts to

distinguish Pickern on the basis that Oliver filed his expert

report before the close of discovery, unlike the plaintiff in

Pickern. This distinction is unavailing. The issue underlying

Pickern, as in this case, is whether the defendant had fair

notice as required by Rule 8. In general, only disclosures of

barriers in a properly pleaded complaint can provide such

notice; a disclosure made during discovery, including in an

expert report, would rarely be an adequate substitute. Here,

OLIVER v. RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY 10893

for example, Oliver’s expert report included the allegation

that the exterior public telephone at the Food 4 Less store

lacked an International Symbol of Accessibility, but Oliver

did not seek summary judgment regarding this alleged barrier.

Thus, Ralphs and Cypress Creek would have had to guess

which of the items listed in the expert report were grounds for

Oliver’s claim, and which, like the exterior public phone,

were not. Further, an expert report is typically filed later in

the litigation process, after the defendant has already taken

steps to investigate and defend against the claims in the com-

plaint. Cf. Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d

1149, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming the district court’s

denial of leave to amend a complaint because allowing an

amendment “at this late date” would prejudice the defendant,

who had “already incurred substantial litigation costs” in

investigating and defending against the plaintiff’s original

theory of the case).

Notwithstanding Pickern, Oliver argues that the complaint

need not give the defendant notice of every barrier for which

the plaintiff seeks relief, because a disabled plaintiff who has

encountered at least one barrier at a facility can sue to remove

all the barriers at the facility related to his specific disability.

See Doran v. 7-Eleven, 524 F.3d 1034, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008).

But Doran does not help Oliver, because it speaks only to

constitutional standing; it sheds no light on what a plaintiff’s

complaint must include to comply with the fair notice require-

ment of Rule 8.

[6] In sum, for purposes of Rule 8, a plaintiff must identify

the barriers that constitute the grounds for a claim of discrimi-

nation under the ADA in the complaint itself; a defendant is

not deemed to have fair notice of barriers identified else-

where. Therefore, the district court did not err in refusing to

consider the barriers that Oliver identified only in his expert

report.

10894 OLIVER v. RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY

C

We next turn to Oliver’s argument that because the ADA

incorporates the standards of the California MUTCD, any

architectural features in his complaint that were noncompliant

with the California MUTCD also violated the ADA. We

review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. See

United States v. Begay, 622 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2010).

[7] The federal MUTCD is a regulation promulgated by

the Department of Transportation (DOT) that sets “the

national standard for all traffic control devices installed on

any street, highway, or bicycle trail open to public travel.” 23

C.F.R. § 655.603(a); see 23 C.F.R. part 655 subpart F. The

federal MUTCD states that it is issued by the agency “in

accordance with” 23 U.S.C. § 109(d) and § 402(a). 23 C.F.R.

§ 655.603.9 In order to remain eligible for federal highway

and highway safety program funds, a state must adopt the fed-

eral MUTCD as a state regulation, adopt a state MUTCD that

is approved by the Secretary of Transportation as being in

“substantial conformance” with the federal MUTCD, or adopt

the federal MUTCD in conjunction with a state supplement.

See 23 U.S.C. §§ 109(d), 402(c); 23 C.F.R. § 655.603(b)(3).

California elected to adopt a state MUTCD, and in 2006, the

Secretary approved the California MUTCD as being in “sub-

stantial conformance” with the 2003 federal MUTCD. See

Cal. Dep’t of Transp., California MUTCD 2006 (ARCHIVE),

online at http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/traffops/signtech/

9

Section 109(d) gives the Secretary of Transportation the authority to

approve the “location, form and character of informational, regulatory and

warning signs, curb and pavement or other markings, and traffic signals”

on any highway project involving the use of federal funds. 23 U.S.C.

§ 109(d). Section 402(a) mandates that each state create “a highway safety

program . . . designed to reduce traffic accidents and deaths, injuries, and

property damage resulting therefrom” and requires that each state program

be “in accordance with uniform guidelines promulgated by the Secretary.”

23 U.S.C. § 402(a).

OLIVER v. RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY 10895

mutcdsupp/ca_mutcd.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2011); see also

Cal Vehicle Code § 21400.

Oliver’s argument that the substantive standards of the Cal-

ifornia MUTCD are incorporated in the ADA is based on

three premises. First, Oliver argues that the ADA incorporates

the standards contained in the Rehabilitation Act10 and regula-

tions issued pursuant to it. For this proposition, Oliver relies

on § 12201(a) of the ADA, which states that “nothing in this

chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the

standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973 or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant

to such title.” 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a). Second, Oliver argues

that the federal MUTCD is a regulation issued pursuant to the

Rehabilitation Act because the DOT revised the federal

MUTCD pursuant to a 1991 “[s]elf-evaluation” regulation

that called for all DOT operating units to bring their policies

and practices into conformance with the Rehabilitation Act.

See 49 C.F.R. § 28.110. Third, he argues that because the Sec-

retary of Transportation has approved the California MUTCD

as being in “substantial conformance” with the federal

MUTCD, the state standard likewise qualifies as a regulation

promulgated pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act.

[8] This argument fails on multiple grounds. For present

purposes, it suffices to say that the federal MUTCD is not a

regulation issued pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. As noted

above, the federal MUTCD was issued pursuant to 23 U.S.C.

§ 109(d) and § 402(a), which are statutes authorizing the Sec-

retary to establish national standards for traffic control

devices. See Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Locke, 568 F.3d 757,

10

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 mandates nondiscrimination and affir-

mative action by federal employers and federal contractors, see 29 U.S.C.

§§ 791, 793, and nondiscrimination and reasonable accommodation

among recipients of federal financial assistance (such as higher education

programs, public facilities, state transportation programs, and state health

and welfare services), see 29 U.S.C. § 794.

10896 OLIVER v. RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY

764-65 (9th Cir. 2009) (indicating that a regulation should be

considered “issued pursuant” to the statute that grants the

agency the authority to regulate in that area). Further, contrary

to Oliver’s argument, the DOT did not revise the federal

MUTCD to bring it into conformance with the Rehabilitation

Act. In 1991, DOT promulgated comprehensive regulations to

implement the Rehabilitation Act’s prohibition on “discrimi-

nation on the basis of handicap in programs or activities con-

ducted by Executive agencies,” 49 C.F.R. § 28.101; see also

29 U.S.C. § 794(a). These regulations included the “self-

evaluation” regulation on which Oliver relies, 49 C.F.R.

§ 28.110, which required the DOT to evaluate and make nec-

essary changes to any policies and practices that did not meet

the requirements of part 28 of title 49 of the CFR. Part 28

covers: (1) the participation of disabled individuals in DOT

programs, activities, or employment; (2) the accessibility of

DOT-run facilities; (3) DOT communications; and (4) the

DOT complaint process. Because no policy or practice in the

federal MUTCD is related to these issues, the self-evaluation

requirement did not affect the federal MUTCD. In other

words, § 28.110 neither required nor authorized a revision of

the federal MUTCD. Not surprisingly, nothing in the federal

MUTCD mentions either 49 C.F.R. § 28.110 or the Rehabili-

tation Act.11

[9] We therefore affirm the district court’s conclusion: an

architectural feature that is inconsistent with the California

MUTCD is not a per se violation of the ADA. Thus, the dis-

trict court properly granted partial summary judgment to

Ralphs and Cypress Creek regarding those of Oliver’s allega-

11

Because we reject Oliver’s incorporation theory on this basis, we need

not address his other arguments. We note, however, that our case law

interpreting § 12201(a) does not support Oliver’s argument that the ADA

incorporates the substantive standards contained in the Rehabilitation Act

and its regulations, and the Secretary of Transportation’s approval of the

California MUTCD as being in “substantial conformance” with the federal

MUTCD does not transform that state regulation into a federal regulation

for purposes of § 12201(a).

OLIVER v. RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY 10897

tions premised on noncompliance with the California

MUTCD rather than the ADAAG.

D

[10] We turn finally to Oliver’s argument that the district

court erred in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over his state law claims. By granting summary judgment to

Ralphs and Cypress Creek on Oliver’s ADA claim, the district

court properly disposed of “all claims over which it ha[d]

original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because the

balance of the factors of “judicial economy, convenience, fair-

ness, and comity” did not “tip in favor of retaining the state-

law claims” after the dismissal of the ADA claim, Sanford v.

MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (quot-

ing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cahill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7

(1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted), the district court

did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Oliver’s state law

claims without prejudice.

AFFIRMED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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