Opinion

Brown v. Horell

  • 644 F.3d 969
  • 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14249
  • 2011 WL 2685580
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Jul 12, 2011
Status
Published
Author
Marbley
On the bench
Gould, Smith, Marbley
Cited by
82 cases
Authority
More cited than 88.7%

explaining that “[b]etween the issuance of Moses and the present, the Supreme Court has 25 not decided any case either ‘squarely address[ing]’ the discretionary exclusion of evidence and 26 the right to present a complete defense or ‘establish[ing] a controlling legal standard’ for 27 evaluating such exclusions.”

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that “[b]etween the issuance of Moses and the present, the Supreme Court has 25 not decided any case either ‘squarely address[ing]’ the discretionary exclusion of evidence and 26 the right to present a complete defense or ‘establish[ing] a controlling legal standard’ for 27 evaluating such exclusions.”
  • holding not to be unreasonable the state court’s determination that a habeas petitioner had not been coerced by a polygraph examiner’s statements that he would need to tell the truth in order to see his unborn child
  • noting 19 that, since the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Moses, “the Supreme Court has not 20 decided any case either ‘squarely address[ing]’ the discretionary exclusion of evidence and 21 the right to present a complete defense or ‘establish[ing] a controlling legal standard’ for 22 evaluating such exclusions.”
  • holding, under AEDPA, that the state court reasonably concluded that the exclusion of testimony from a false-confessions expert did not violate the constitutional right to present a complete defense

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LADELL DEANGELO BROWN, 

Petitioner-Appellant, No. 09-16643

v. D.C. No.

R. HORELL, Warden; ATTORNEY  2:07-cv-01994-

GENERAL OF THE STATE OF LKK-CHS

CALIFORNIA, OPINION

Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence K. Karlton, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 9, 2011—San Francisco, California

Filed July 12, 2011

Before: Ronald M. Gould and Milan D. Smith, Jr.,

Circuit Judges, and Algenon L. Marbley, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Marbley

*The Honorable Algenon L. Marbley, United States District Judge for

the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

9395

9398 BROWN v. HORELL

COUNSEL

Mark D. Eibert (argued), Half Moon Bay, California, for the

petitioner-appellant.

David A. Eldridge (argued), Deputy Attorney General, Sacra-

mento, California, for the respondent-appellee.

BROWN v. HORELL 9399

OPINION

MARBLEY, District Judge:

Appellant LaDell DeAngelo Brown is a state prisoner seek-

ing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. A Sacramento County Superior Court jury

convicted Brown in 2005 of first degree murder, attempted

murder, and attempted robbery with enhancements for firearm

use and prior convictions. He was sentenced to life without

the possibility of parole plus an additional term of 74 years to

life. In this appeal, we consider whether the district court

erred in denying Brown’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Brown contends that he is entitled to habeas relief on two

independent grounds: (1) his coerced and involuntary admis-

sions were improperly admitted into evidence at trial; and (2)

the trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony regarding the

interrogation methods used by law enforcement at his inter-

views prevented him from presenting a complete defense. For

the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court’s denial of

Brown’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Shooting

The following facts, presumed to be correct under 29

U.S.C. § 2254(e), are excerpted from the Court of Appeal of

California’s decision:1

Jaynelle Frank checked into room 106 at the Gold

Rush Inn in Sacramento on Monday, April 8, 2002.

[Brown], the father of Jaynelle’s unborn child, was

staying at the Inn with her. Jaynelle’s younger sister,

Johtell Frank, checked into room 108 at the Gold

1

People v. Brown, No. C050121, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5409

(Cal. Ct. App. June 23, 2006).

9400 BROWN v. HORELL

Rush Inn on the same day. With Johtell at the Inn

was her boyfriend and [Brown]’s best friend, Dante

Alexander.

The victims, Victor Jones and his wife Cheryl,

checked into room 207 at the Gold Rush Inn early

the following evening, Tuesday, April 9, 2002, at

approximately 5:00 or 6:00 p.m. Prior to meeting

[Brown], Victor purchased and consumed a quantity

of cocaine on G Parkway before returning to the Inn

around 12:00 a.m. on April 9. Victor met [Brown] in

the parking lot at about midnight on April 9 and

bought cocaine from him.

Later, in the early morning hours of April 10,

[Brown] sold Victor more cocaine. Over the next

several hours, Victor purchased approximately $100

worth of cocaine from [Brown] on credit. In

exchange for the extension of credit, Victor allowed

[Brown] to borrow his Kia van, which was on loan

from the dealership. [Brown] left in the van with

Dante and returned around 2:00 or 2:30 a.m. Victor

purchased more cocaine on credit and [Brown] kept

the car keys. When Victor went to [Brown]’s room

between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m. to ask for more cocaine,

[Brown] told him he had no more.

Around 8:00 a.m. on April 10, [Brown] and Jaynelle

accompanied Victor to pick up and cash his pay-

check. [Brown] saw Victor’s paycheck which was

over $500. Victor paid [Brown] what he owed for

the cocaine, and [Brown] asked if he could borrow

the van to take Jaynelle to her prenatal appointment.

Victor agreed when [Brown] promised to sell him

more cocaine.

[Brown] took the van, and Victor and his wife stayed

at the Inn to smoke the cocaine. [Brown] checked in

BROWN v. HORELL 9401

with Victor from time to time, sold him more

cocaine, and left again with Dante in the van. Victor

received a telephone call from [Brown] around 6:00

p.m. on April 10 informing him that the van had

been stolen. Victor did not believe the story and told

[Brown] to return to the Inn.

When [Brown] returned to the Inn with Dante about

20 minutes later, Victor bought more cocaine. Victor

told [Brown] the explanation about the van was “bul-

lshit” and demanded to know how [Brown] planned

to make things right. When Victor suggested

[Brown] return the money he had already paid for

cocaine, [Brown] gave Victor $20 and a quarter

ounce of cocaine. Satisfied, Victor told [Brown] he

would pay for Jaynelle’s room so [Brown] would not

have to “hustle” that night for the money. Victor

walked with [Brown] and Dante to a liquor store

where Victor bought alcohol for all of them.

Shortly after Victor returned to his room, Dante’s

girlfriend Johtell appeared at his door. She claimed

an interest in the cocaine [Brown] had given Victor

as compensation for loss of the van. Victor verbally

rebuffed Johtell and later complained to Dante about

her conduct. Victor continued to smoke cocaine and

think about how he could get [Brown] to return the

van.

Around midnight, Johtell and Dante came to Victor’s

room and asked him to buy more liquor for them.

Victor agreed to walk to the store, but they insisted

on giving him a ride. Cheryl decided to go along.

Victor emptied his pockets of cash and illegal items

before leaving the room. Dante and Johtell went

downstairs ahead of Victor. Victor heard Jaynelle

say to Johtell, “You know what they about to do?

That’s fucked up.”

9402 BROWN v. HORELL

The four left the Inn with Johtell driving Dante’s car,

Cheryl next to her in the front seat, Dante in the back

seat on the driver’s side, and Victor in the back seat

on the passenger side. Instead of driving to the liquor

store, Johtell headed south on Highway 99 and

turned off the freeway at Sheldon Road in Elk

Grove. En route, Johtell ignored Victor’s repeated

demands to pull over and let him get out of the car.

Johtell was driving erratically while talking with

someone on her cell phone. Victor also observed

what he thought was a police car following them. It

flashed its high beams once they left the freeway.

Johtell drove east on Sheldon Road and stopped the

car on a dark, dead-end street. The second car pulled

up behind Dante’s car. Dante stepped out of his car,

turned toward Victor with what Victor described as

a .45-caliber handgun, and said, “Give me every-

thing you got.” Victor gave Dante $12, his wallet,

wrist watch and room key. [Brown] walked up with

an automatic rifle and ordered Cheryl and Victor out

of the car. He demanded to know where the narcotics

were. Victor explained he left the cocaine in the

room. Johtell confirmed that she had seen Victor

empty his pockets into a drawer before they left.

Victor tried to stay in front of Cheryl as they got out

of the car. He noticed a light in a nearby house. Vic-

tor began talking loudly and tried to maneuver in the

direction of the house. [Brown] told him to be quiet.

Victor continued to talk, offering to give [Brown]

more money later that day if he let Cheryl leave.

Finally, Victor charged past [Brown] and Dante.

Cheryl was supposed to run the opposite direction.

Dante shot Victor once as he ran, but Victor contin-

ued toward the house. Victor then heard both guns

firing and received two more wounds. He was close

to the front door of the house when his foot was shot

BROWN v. HORELL 9403

from under him. Victor looked back and saw

[Brown] use the rifle to shoot Cheryl.

Victor broke the windows around the front door of

the house and yelled for help. [Brown] approached

Victor on the porch, holding the handgun Dante had

in the car. [Brown] pointed the gun at Victor’s head.

One of the cars departed, leaving [Brown] behind.

After the gun misfired several times, [Brown] came

close to Victor and said, “You are a lucky mother

fucker.” Victor responded, “You are a dead mother

fucker, you understand.” [Brown] drove away.

Owen Autry, the occupant of the house, was awak-

ened by gunfire at 1:30 a.m., and immediately tele-

phoned 911. While Autry stayed on the line with the

911 operator, Victor yelled that the people who shot

him were in apartments 106 and 108.

Cheryl died at the scene. Based on the size of the

wounds, the pathologist testified the bullet was likely

fired at close range by a .223 assault rifle. Victor suf-

fered four bullet wounds, but survived. He viewed a

photo array six hours after the incident and identified

Dante as the man in room 108 who had the handgun.

He viewed more photos the following day and iden-

tified [Brown] as the man in room 106 who had the

rifle. Victor testified at trial.

B. Brown’s Interrogations

Sacramento County Sheriff’s Detectives Bill Bayles and

Grant Stomsvik picked Brown up on a parole violation on

April 12, 2002. After Brown’s arrest, Detectives Bayles and

Stomsvik interviewed Brown three times. The first interview

occurred on April 12, 2002. On that date, Detective Bayles

advised Brown of his Miranda rights and began questioning

Brown about the homicide in Elk Grove. Brown initially

9404 BROWN v. HORELL

denied being at the Gold Rush Inn the week of the homicide

or knowing Victor. The detectives confronted Brown with a

surveillance photo of Brown and Victor together at a 7-Eleven

store, and Brown admitted that he knew Victor, that he spent

time at the Gold Rush Inn, that Victor owed him money for

cocaine, and that he had borrowed and wrecked Victor’s van.

The detectives pushed Brown further to stop lying. They

told him that Dante had already identified Brown as Cheryl’s

shooter and the mastermind of the robbery; Brown denied

these allegations. Brown also denied that he was present at the

scene of the homicide, claiming instead that he was at his

mother’s boyfriend’s house. Then

[t]he detectives told [Brown] they knew he was at

the scene of the shootings. Thereafter, [Brown]

admitted he followed Dante’s car with someone

named Anthony who told him they were going to get

their money back. When they pulled onto a dark

street off Highway 99, everyone got out of the cars

except [Brown]. [Brown] heard gunfire and saw

sparks coming from Dante’s gun. Someone yelled, “I

missed him” or “I hit him” or “He’s still alive.”

[Brown] saw Victor run toward a house, but did not

see anyone chase him. [Brown] never saw the

woman. Anthony got back in the car, made a U-turn,

and dropped [Brown] off at his mother’s boyfriend’s

house.

The detectives continued to accuse [Brown] of lying

about his involvement in the shooting. They told

[Brown] that Victor had identified him as one of the

shooters. [Brown] eventually admitted he made up

the name Anthony and that Sirrano Haywood drove

the car he rode in to the scene of the crime. [Brown]

also admitted he got out of the car with Haywood.

He said he immediately got back into the car because

BROWN v. HORELL 9405

he was scared and denied he was involved in the

shooting.

The following exchange occurred near the end of the inter-

rogation:

“DET. STOMSVIK: [W]hat do you want to do now?

You’re involved up to your eyeballs in a murder,

attempt[ed] robbery.

“[BROWN]: I wish I can go home and just lay down

with my—with my girl. [¶] . . . [¶] And hold her

stomach and kiss—and kiss her stomach and talk to

my baby through her stomach.”

Detective Stomsvik did not acknowledge [Brown]’s

reference to Jaynelle and his baby. Instead, Stomsvik

asked if [Brown] was willing to take a polygraph

test. [Brown] stated that he was.

Brown took the polygraph on April 15, 2002, while still in

police custody:

Detective Bayles introduced [Brown] to Jeanie Over-

all, a polygraph examiner employed by the Attorney

General’s Office. Overall advised [Brown] of his

Miranda rights and explained he could not be forced

to take the polygraph. [Brown] affirmatively agreed

to speak to Overall and take the polygraph examina-

tion.

Overall asked [Brown] several questions about his

background. In response to a question regarding his

marital status, [Brown] stated he was excited that his

girlfriend Jaynelle was pregnant with his first child.

He said he “was hoping [he’d] be there to see her

have it.” Overall answered, “That would be nice,”

and went on to another question. Later, when Overall

9406 BROWN v. HORELL

asked, “What’s the best thing that’s happened to you

in your life?” [Brown] responded, “Probably my girl

being pregnant.” Overall turned to a different topic.

With respect to the polygraph test, Overall cautioned

[Brown]: “There’s all different types and kinds of

polygraph tests that people can take. The one that

you’re scheduled to take this evening is . . . termed

a specific because it’s dealing with a specific thing

that’s happened. In this case it’s the murder of

Cheryl Jones. . . . [¶] . . . [¶][T]his is the type or kind

of test that this polygraph instrument was originally

built and designed for. It’s at its utmost accuracy and

capability in this type of test. Now due to that, I very

straightforwardly advise everybody that comes in

with me, if you’re not gonna pass your polygraph, do

not take it. As long as everything you tell me about

this case is one hundred percent the truth, you ought

to take the test and show that what you’re saying is

true. . . . If somebody really wants to, quote, beat a

polygraph, the way to do it is stand up, walk out and

don’t take the test.” Overall explained that based on

the results of the polygraph, she would report to the

Sheriff’s Office if she believed [Brown] was telling

the truth. She also confirmed that although her report

became part of [Brown]’s permanent case file, the

polygraph result could not be used in court. Overall

then reiterated, “Now, I’ve been doing homicide

polygraphs for a long time, and when I tell you that

it requires you to be one hundred percent truthful, I

really can’t stress that enough. This thing does not

measure deception in degrees. . . .”

Overall questioned [Brown] about how he got

involved in the homicide, and [Brown] repeated the

story of his innocent presence at the scene of the

shootings. She told [Brown] once more that she

BROWN v. HORELL 9407

would “give a report to the people here at the sher-

iff’s office on [his] truthfulness and [his] honesty.”

During a pretest, [Brown] answered “No” to the fol-

lowing questions: (1) “Did you shoot Cheryl Jones

April the 11th in Elk Grove?” (2) “Did you shoot

anyone in Elk Grove [on] the 11th?” (3) “Do you

know where the gun is located that was used to shoot

Cheryl Jones?” [Brown] responded in the same man-

ner when asked the same questions during the poly-

graph examination. His responses were the same on

the second and third tests.

Overall informed [Brown] that the polygraph test

showed he was lying when he responded “No” to the

key questions. She continued, “[T]here is no way,

Ladell, with these charts that I can do anything but

report to these detectives here that you’re not telling

the truth about this shooting.” Emphasizing that

[Brown] was involved in “some heavy stuff,” Over-

all told [Brown], “I wish your life could have been

different, and I still think you can make it different.

. . . I want you to see that—that baby be born. I don’t

know why, but I feel like it’s a boy.” [Brown] con-

firmed that someone else had told him the same

thing.

Overall urged [Brown] to tell her the truth about

what happened. “I don’t know if you don’t tell me

what the truth is. I’m not a mind reader. . . . You

have a choice you can tell the truth and try to get this

mess straightened out and let me go out there and

talk to those detectives and try to do whatever I can

for you, and I want to tell your side of what hap-

pened. I can’t do that if you won’t tell me.” She

offered several possible explanations for [Brown]’s

involvement as a shooter.

9408 BROWN v. HORELL

....

[Brown] offered another version of the events. He

said he “was tryin’ to talk to Victor for nothin’ to

happen” and placed himself between Victor and

Cheryl so the two gunmen could not shoot them.

According to this account, Cheryl pushed [Brown],

causing him to stumble. [Brown] ran to the car when

the guns started going off. He repeated he “[d]idn’t

shoot nobody.”

Overall suggested she could pack up and go home.

She told [Brown], The “only reason I’m talkin’ to

you is cuz you got a baby on the way, and I’d like

to see you get to be with that baby, and these [detec-

tives] have got a case they have to work.” [Brown]

said, “I wish I could be there for my baby.” Overall

responded, “I want to see you be there for your baby.

. . . I can’t get your side of what happened out there

if you don’t tell me. Do you want me to go get them?

Do you want to let it go down like this? Or do you

want to do the right thing for yourself, for your girl-

friend and for your baby?” [Brown] repeated that he

wanted to “be able to see the baby born.” Overall

said, “Okay. I want—I want that, too. . . . [¶][W]e

need to tell them that. I can’t go out there and talk

to them for you if you’re not going to tell me what

happened.” [Brown] continued to deny he had a fire-

arm or shot Cheryl.

Overall suggested that Victor, a security guard,

might have had a gun or tried to hurt [Brown] in

some way. [Brown] agreed that Victor charged him

and he shot at Victor with the 9-millimeter hand gun

to scare him into stopping. [Brown] added he was

not trying to hit Victor. He maintained someone else

shot Cheryl after she pushed against [Brown]’s

shoulder.

BROWN v. HORELL 9409

After admitting that he had shot Victor, [Brown]

said, “This accident is gonna cost me my life.” He

told Overall he had lied because he was scared. He

continued: “Scared for my baby. I want to be there

for my baby. I wish I could go to my baby right now.

. . .” After asking [Brown] if he had seen Jaynelle

since his arrest, she changed the subject and asked if

he wanted the detectives to return.

Overall summarized the results of the polygraph, and

the substance of her interview with [Brown], for

Detectives Bayles and Stomsvik. She indicated,

“[H]e does want to be able to see his baby, and I told

him I felt certain that he is gonna be able to.” Stoms-

vik responded, “I wouldn’t see why not.” When

Overall left the room, she said: “Ladell, good luck to

you. You keep tellin’ the truth, okay, and you’re

gonna see that baby.”

Before continuing the interrogation, Detective

Bayles confirmed that [Brown] was going to jail for

murder. [Brown] then repeated his story to Bayles

and Stomsvik. He maintained he heard gunshots

when Cheryl pushed him and caused him to stumble.

[Brown] said he tried to shoot at Victor’s legs when

Victor charged at him. He saw Dante do some shoot-

ing and “supposed” that Sirrano fired some shots.

[Brown] denied that he or anyone else followed Vic-

tor up to the house after he was shot. [Brown] stated

that Dante gave the rifle to Sirrano before they left

the scene. At the end of the interrogation, [Brown]

asked the detectives for a “big favor.” He told them

he wanted to kiss his girl’s stomach and talk to his

baby. Detective Bayles responded, “Well, you know,

you’re probably not gonna get to actually touch your

girl—it’s gonna be a while. . . . We’d be lying if we

told you something different. I don’t think you’re

gonna get any kind of contact visit until this whole

9410 BROWN v. HORELL

thing is settled and you’re either out or—or trans-

ferred and locked up where you’re gonna be locked

up for, you know, more time. I don’t think you’re

gonna get it at the jail you’re goin’ to here.”

Brown’s third and final interrogation occurred on April 18,

2002, with Detectives Bayles and Stomsvik. After the detec-

tives advised Brown of his Miranda rights, Brown retracted

his admissions of April 15. He denied that he had a gun and

denied shooting either Victor or Cheryl. He claimed that he

gave a false confession because he had heard that Sirrano

Haywood had threatened to shoot Jaynelle. Detective Bayles

told Brown that he did not believe Brown’s retraction, but

Brown persisted. Brown admitted that he knew about the rob-

bery plan in advance of its execution but denied that he had

a firearm. Detectives Bayles again told Brown that he did not

believe Brown’s retraction.

C. The Suppression Hearing and Trial

Brown’s defense counsel moved to suppress Brown’s April

15, 2002 admission that he shot Victor, as well as the other

statements he made during his three interviews. In support of

his motion, defense counsel presented video and audio record-

ings of the interviews and the testimony of Dr. Richard Ofshe,

a retired professor of social psychology. Dr. Ofshe testified

about the methods by which modern interrogation techniques

produce false confessions. With respect to Brown’s interroga-

tions, “Ofshe opined that Overall induced [Brown] to admit

he shot Victor accidentally or in self-defense by leading [him]

to believe he would receive leniency.” Dr. Ofshe “did not

offer an opinion on whether [Brown]’s statements were true

or false,” but defense counsel relied upon Dr. Ofshe’s testi-

mony to argue that Brown’s “confession was coerced by

Overall’s promise that [Brown] would be able to see the birth

of his baby if he admitted he shot Victor accidentally or in

self defense.”

BROWN v. HORELL 9411

The trial court denied Brown’s motion to suppress because

it found that his admissions were voluntary. As summarized

by the appellate court, the trial court cited several factors

upon which it relied in reaching its conclusion:

First, the court cited Dr. Ofshe’s reference to a study

that showed “the strength of the evidence that the

police bring to bear upon [Brown] is the best predic-

tor of when a guilty person will confess.” Here, the

deputies had talked to Victor and Autry. They told

[Brown] “right up front” that he was going to be

arrested for murder regardless of his statements. Sec-

ond, [Brown] stated the sole reason he lied about

having a gun and participating in the shooting was

Sirrano’s threat to shoot Jaynelle. [Brown] made no

reference to Overall’s interrogation methods or the

alleged promise of preferential treatment when he

retracted his earlier admissions. Third, the court

found none of the interrogation methods employed

by Overall “were . . . of the type likely to lead to an

untrue statement.”

The government played redacted videotapes of the inter-

views of April 12, 2002, and April 15, 2002, and the redacted

audiotape of the interview of April 18, 2002, on three of the

five days in which evidence was presented at Brown’s jury

trial in May 2005. The jury also heard Victor’s account of the

shootings. Victor testified that he saw both Brown and Dante

shoot him and that he saw Brown shoot Cheryl with the long

gun.

Defense counsel sought to call Dr. Ofshe to the stand for

questioning regarding interrogation methods that tend to pro-

duce false confessions. Although the trial court found that Dr.

Ofshe qualified as an expert, it nevertheless excluded his testi-

mony. Recognizing that “the question was whether the expert

testimony ‘would be helpful to the jurors’ as they assessed the

credibility of [Brown]’s statements,” the court concluded that

9412 BROWN v. HORELL

“the reason [Brown] gave for making false statements—that

Sirrano threatened to kill someone close to him—was within

the common experience of a jury.” The defense rested without

presenting any evidence.

The trial court instructed the jury on felony murder as the

only theory of first degree murder. The jury convicted Brown

of first degree murder, attempted murder, and attempted rob-

bery, and the court sentenced Brown to life without the possi-

bility of parole plus an additional term of seventy-four years

to life.

II. JURISDICTION

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253 following the district court’s issuance of a certificate

of appealability.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Brown’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed after

April 24, 1996, and is therefore governed by the Anti-

Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See

Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 852 (9th Cir. 2003). Under

AEDPA, Brown can prevail on his petition only if he can

show that the state court adjudication “(1) resulted in a deci-

sion that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appli-

cation of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A decision can be “con-

trary to” federal law in one of two ways: if it “applies a rule

that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme

Court] cases,” or if it “confronts a set of facts that are materi-

ally indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court]

and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] prece-

dent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)

BROWN v. HORELL 9413

(O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 73 (2003); Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 834

(9th Cir. 2009). A decision involves an “unreasonable appli-

cation” of federal law “if it correctly identifies the governing

rule but unreasonably applies it to a new set of facts, or fails

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context

in a way that is unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 852 (inter-

nal citations omitted). The application must be “objectively

unreasonable,” and we may only consider our Circuit prece-

dent as “relevant persuasive authority in determining whether

a state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Id. (inter-

nal quotations omitted).

“We review the last reasoned state court opinion,” Mus-

ladin, 555 F.3d at 834, and presume that the state court’s fac-

tual findings are correct, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We review

de novo the district court’s denial of appellant’s petition for

habeas relief. Musladin, 555 F.3d at 834.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Involuntary Confession

In this appeal, Brown claims that the state trial court vio-

lated his constitutional rights when it allowed the government

to introduce his admissions of April 15, 2002, that he had shot

Victor. Brown’s position is that Overall’s promise that Brown

would be free to participate in his child’s birth if only he told

the truth coerced him into making an involuntary confession

and that the state appellate court unreasonably erred in con-

cluding otherwise.

The Court of Appeal of California analyzed the voluntari-

ness of Brown’s admissions under the totality of the circum-

stances. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693-94

(1993). It concluded that “Overall made no coercive or decep-

tive ‘promises’ ” and that the record supported the trial court’s

“finding that Overall’s tactics did not overcome [Brown]’s

9414 BROWN v. HORELL

exercise of free will.” It found that “[a]t no time did [Overall]

promise [Brown] he would be freed,” and that the fact that

Brown asked Detectives Bayles and Stomsvik at the end of

the interview for the “big favor” of being allowed to see his

girlfriend demonstrated that Brown did not take “Overall’s

statements as a promise he would be released for telling the

truth.” It also relied on the fact that Brown retracted his

admissions without reference to Overall’s tactics.

[1] Involuntary or coerced confessions are inadmissible at

trial, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 478 (1972), because

their admission is a violation of a defendant’s right to due

process under the Fourteenth Amendment, Jackson v. Denno,

378 U.S. 368, 385-86 (1964). A confession is involuntary if

it is not “ ‘the product of a rational intellect and a free will.’ ”

Medeiros v. Shimoda, 889 F.2d 819, 823 (9th Cir. 1989)

(quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307 (1963)); see

also Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960). A

“necessary predicate” to finding a confession involuntary is

that it was produced through “coercive police activity.” Colo-

rado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). Coercive police

activity can be the result of either “physical intimidation or

psychological pressure.” Townsend, 372 U.S. at 307, over-

ruled on other grounds in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S.

1 (1992); see also Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206 (“[C]oercion

can be mental as well as physical, and . . . the blood of the

accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inqui-

sition.”). Whether a confession is involuntary must be ana-

lyzed within the “totality of the circumstances.” Withrow, 507

U.S. at 693. The factors to be considered include the degree

of police coercion; the length, location and continuity of the

interrogation; and the defendant’s maturity, education, physi-

cal condition, mental health, and age. See id. at 693-94; Yar-

borough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004).

[2] The Supreme Court has twice before addressed the

admissibility of confessions extracted through threats or

promises relating to a suspect’s children. In Haynes v. Wash-

BROWN v. HORELL 9415

ington, the Court ruled that a written confession was coerced

and involuntary where the police obtained it through the

“threat of continued incommunicado detention” if the suspect

did not confess and the “promise of communication with and

access to family” if he did. 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963); see also

Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976) (per curiam) (holding

that confessions “ ‘obtained by any direct or implied prom-

ises, however slight’ ” may be involuntary (quoting Bram v.

United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)). Similarly, in

Lynum v. Illinois, the Supreme Court found that it was “abun-

dantly clear that the petitioner’s oral confession was made

only after the police had told her that state financial aid for

her infant children would be cut off, and her children taken

from her, if she did not ‘cooperate.’ ” 372 U.S. 528, 534

(1963). The Court held “that a confession made under such

circumstances must be deemed not voluntary, but coerced.”

Id.

[3] Haynes and Lynum demonstrate that threats and prom-

ises relating to one’s children carry special force. Interpreting

these cases, the Ninth Circuit has previously concluded that

“[t]he relationship between parent and child embodies a pri-

mordial and fundamental value of our society.” United States

v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1981). When interro-

gators “deliberately prey upon the maternal [or paternal]

instinct and inculcate fear in a [parent] that [he or] she will

not see [his or] her child in order to elicit ‘cooperation,’ they

exert the ‘improper influence’ proscribed by Malloy [v.

Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964)].” Tingle, 658 F.2d at 1336.

[4] The record reveals that, as in Haynes, Lynum, and Tin-

gle, Overall coerced Brown into confessing by conditioning

his ability to be with his child on his decision to cooperate

with the police. The connection between Brown’s truthfulness

and Brown’s ability to be with his girlfriend and child was a

major, if not the dominant, theme running throughout Over-

all’s interrogation. Picking up on Brown’s comment that his

girlfriend’s pregnancy was “the best thing that’s happened to

9416 BROWN v. HORELL

[him] in [his] life,” Overall returned again and again to the

subject of the pregnancy before Brown confessed:

OVERALL: . . . Now, you were involved in this

shooting, and I know you were. . . . I

wish your life could have been differ-

ent, and I still think you can make it

different. Nobody can make it differ-

ent but you. I want you to see that—

that baby be born. I don’t know why,

but I feel like it’s a boy.

BROWN: It is. How you know?

OVERALL: I don’t know. I just feel that way.

BROWN: Somebody else told me that.

OVERALL: Yeah. I feel like it—I feel like it’s a

boy, and I want to see you be with that

baby.

....

OVERALL: . . . You have a choice[:] you can tell

the truth and try to get this mess

straightened out and let me go out

there and talk to those detectives and

try to do whatever I can for you, and

I want to tell your side of what hap-

pened. I can’t do that if you won’t tell

me. That baby growing in your girl-

friend right now needs you. It’s gonna

need you a whole lot (unintelligible)

and I want to see you be able to be

with that child and have a life, but

only the truth is going to take you to

BROWN v. HORELL 9417

that place. What happened that night

out there?

....

OVERALL: And I know you know the right thing

to do. I know you know it, and I

believe you want to do the right thing.

BROWN: Just want to be there for my baby.

OVERALL: I want you to be there for your baby,

and what’s gonna take you there is the

truth. The truth is what’s gonna let you

be there for your baby, and I want that

baby the first time he—

BROWN: That’s all I want.

....

OVERALL: . . . You’re either gonna keep on lyin’,

or you’re gonna tell the truth. I have to

go give these detectives the results.

BROWN: They’re gonna think I’m lyin’, too.

OVERALL: Sure, they are, and I can’t imagine

what would keep you from telling the

truth with that little baby boy waitin’

to be born.

BROWN: I’m never gonna see my baby, and it

hurts. It hurts. You don’t know how I

feel.

OVERALL: I think you are going to see your baby.

I firmly believe that.

9418 BROWN v. HORELL

....

OVERALL: . . . Only reason I’m talking to you is

cuz you got a baby on the way, and I’d

like to see you get to be with that

baby, and these guys have got a case

they have to work.

BROWN: I wish I could be there for my baby.

OVERALL: I want to see you be there for your

baby . . . . I can’t get your side of what

happened out there if you don’t tell

me. Do you want me to go get them?

Do you want to let it go down like ths?

Or do you want to do the right thing

for yourself, for your girlfriend and for

your baby?

BROWN: Yes, I do.

OVERALL: Then, please, do that.

BROWN: I want to be able to see the baby born.

OVERALL: Okay. I want—I want that, too. I want

that, too

....

BROWN: No, my life is over.

OVERALL: No. It’s not over. Life is not over.

BROWN: (Unintelligible) my baby.

OVERALL: Yes, you will. Yes, you will.

BROWN v. HORELL 9419

BROWN: I’m never gonna be able to hold my

baby.

OVERALL: Yes, you will.

BROWN: No.

OVERALL: You will. He ran at you; is that what

he did? I need you to tell me, LaDell.

BROWN: Yes, ma’am.

Brown then admitted to having shot Victor twice with the

handgun. Overall questioned him further about the details of

that night before bringing Detectives Stomsvik and Bayles

back in and summarizing her interview with Brown:

OVERALL: And he does want to be able to see his

baby, and I told him I felt certain that

he is gonna be able to.

STOMSVIK: I wouldn’t see why not.

[5] Overall expressly conditioned Brown’s ability to be

with his child on his compliance with her questioning, saying

“I want to see you be able to be with that child and have a life,

but only the truth is going to take you to that place.” Like-

wise, she said, “I want you to be there for your baby, and

what’s gonna take you there is the truth. The truth is what’s

gonna let you be there for your baby . . . .” Rather than heed

the warnings in Haynes, Lynum and Tingle to tread cautiously

around the subject of familial attachments, Overall “deliber-

ately prey[ed] upon,” Tingle, 658 F.2d at 1336, Brown’s

expression of his overwhelming desire to witness his child’s

birth. In light of Brown’s limited education (he had not com-

pleted high school), relative youth (twenty-one years), and

lengthy custodial interrogations, the totality of the circum-

stances reveal that Brown’s admissions were involuntary.

9420 BROWN v. HORELL

[6] Were this case on direct review, the above analysis

would likely lead us to conclude that Overall’s tactics were

coercive under Haynes, Lynum and Tingle and that his admis-

sions should therefore have been suppressed. The question

before us on habeas review, however, is not whether we

believe the state court’s determination to be erroneous—

which we do—but whether it is unreasonable in light of

clearly established Supreme Court law. See Williams, 529

U.S. at 411 (“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judg-

ment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.”). As the

Supreme Court has recently noted, “even a strong case for

relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was

unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786

(2011). It is this exceedingly high bar that Brown fails to

meet.

[7] Other courts considering the effect of leveraging a sus-

pect’s familial affections on the voluntariness of that suspect’s

confession have not unanimously concluded that Haynes and

Lynum compel a rule that exploiting an accused’s relation-

ships to induce cooperation renders the resulting confession

involuntary. In United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, the Elev-

enth Circuit upheld the admission of a confession obtained

after customs officials told the defendant that “something can

happen to your family” if he did not confess. 963 F.2d 1467,

1475 (11th Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Cole-

man v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir. 1992). Similarly,

in United States v. Charlton, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the

trial court’s admission of a confession obtained after police

told the defendant that they had arrested his son and that, if

he wanted to keep his son “out of the case,” the defendant

would have to confess. 565 F.2d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1977). The

Sixth Circuit reasoned that, absent any other indica of coer-

cion, the defendant’s confession was merely a rational and

voluntary decision to protect his son. Id. at 89; see also

United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1517 (11th Cir. 1994)

BROWN v. HORELL 9421

(per curiam) (finding “no coercion” in law enforcement’s

comment to defendant that his girlfriend “would continue to

be considered a suspect” unless defendant explained her par-

ticipation); United States v. Ponce Munoz, 150 F. Supp. 2d

1125, 1135-36 (D. Kan. 2001) (concluding that “officers’ dis-

cussion of realistic penalties for cooperative and non-

cooperative defendants does not render the defendant’s con-

fession . . . involuntary,” and admitting confession obtained

after police told defendant that they had probable cause to

arrest defendant and his wife, leaving defendant’s child in

custody of the state). But see United States v. Finch, 998 F.2d

349, 356 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding confession to be involuntary

where police made baseless threats to arrest members of sus-

pect’s household because “threats to arrest members of a sus-

pect’s family may cause a confession to be involuntary”).

[8] These cases reveal that lower federal courts do not

always interpret Lynum to mean that threats or promises relat-

ing to one’s children or family warrant special caution, as we

have in Tingle, but only that such threats or promises may be

considered as part of the totality of the circumstances. In light

of these differences, we cannot say that there is “no possibil-

ity fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s

decision conflicts with [Supreme Court] precedents.” Har-

rington, 131 S.Ct. at 786. We therefore affirm the district

court’s denial of Brown’s habeas corpus petition on the

ground of the admission of involuntary statements.

B. Right to Present a Complete Defense

[9] Brown next contends that the exclusion of Dr. Ofshe’s

testimony violated his constitutional right to present a com-

plete defense. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690

(1986). The trial court excluded Dr. Ofshe’s testimony under

California Evidence Code § 801, which states that experts

may only be permitted to testify on matters “sufficiently

beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert

9422 BROWN v. HORELL

would assist the trier of fact.” The appellate court upheld that

ruling.

This case is analogous to Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742

(9th Cir. 2009). There, a defendant on trial for murder

attempted to introduce the testimony of an expert witness who

specialized in depression and who would have testified that

the victim exhibited a number of risk factors for suicide, sup-

porting the defense that the defendant was not guilty of mur-

der because the victim killed herself. Id. at 749. The state trial

court did not dispute the witness’s qualification as an expert

but nevertheless excluded the testimony under Rule 702 of the

Washington Rules of Evidence as within the province of the

jury, as cumulative, and as more prejudicial than probative.

Id. at 750. The defendant challenged that ruling in state appel-

late court, lost, and sought habeas relief in federal district

court. Id. The district court denied the petition, and we

affirmed. Id. We considered the defendant’s challenge to the

state court’s discretionary exclusion of the expert in light of

Supreme Court precedent on the intersection of constitutional

rights and state evidentiary rules, concluding as follows:

[T]he Supreme Court’s cases have focused only on

whether an evidentiary rule, by its own terms, vio-

lated a defendant’s right to present evidence. These

cases do not squarely address whether a court’s exer-

cise of discretion to exclude expert testimony vio-

lates a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to

present relevant evidence. Nor do they clearly estab-

lish “a controlling legal standard” for evaluating dis-

cretionary decisions to exclude the kind of evidence

at issue here. Therefore, the state appellate court’s

determination that the trial court’s exercise of discre-

tion to exclude expert testimony under Rule 702 did

not violate Moses’s constitutional rights cannot be

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established Supreme Court precedent.

BROWN v. HORELL 9423

Id. at 758-59 (citations omitted).

[10] Between the issuance of Moses and the present, the

Supreme Court has not decided any case either “squarely

address[ing]” the discretionary exclusion of evidence and the

right to present a complete defense or “establish[ing] a con-

trolling legal standard” for evaluating such exclusions.

Brown, therefore, cannot—as the petitioner in Moses could

not—show that the state appellate court’s ruling was either

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly estab-

lished Supreme Court precedent. We, therefore, affirm the

district court’s denial of Brown’s petition for a writ of habeas

corpus for the violation of his right to present a complete

defense.

V. CONCLUSION

[11] Under the “highly deferential standard” that we must

apply to the state appellate court’s determinations under

AEDPA, Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997),

Brown’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was correctly

denied. Neither the state court’s rulings on the constitutional-

ity of the admission of Brown’s confession nor the constitu-

tionality of the exclusion of Dr. Ofshe’s testimony are

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly estab-

lished Supreme Court law. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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