Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2010 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.,

ET AL. v. BROWN ET UX., CO-ADMINISTRATORS OF

THE ESTATE OF BROWN, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 10–76. Argued January 11, 2011 —Decided June 27, 2011

Respondents, North Carolina residents whose sons died in a bus acci

dent outside Paris, France, filed a suit for wrongful-death damages in

North Carolina state court. Alleging that the accident was caused by

tire failure, they named as defendants Goodyear USA, an Ohio corpo

ration, and petitioners, three Goodyear USA subsidiaries, organized

and operating, respectively, in Luxembourg, Turkey, and France. Pe

titioners’ tires are manufactured primarily for European and Asian

markets and differ in size and construction from tires ordinarily sold

in the United States. Petitioners are not registered to do business in

North Carolina; have no place of business, employees, or bank ac

counts in the State; do not design, manufacture, or advertise their

products in the State; and do not solicit business in the State or sell

or ship tires to North Carolina customers. Even so, a small percent

age of their tires were distributed in North Carolina by other Good

year USA affiliates. The trial court denied petitioners’ motion to

dismiss the claims against them for want of personal jurisdiction.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the

North Carolina courts had general jurisdiction over petitioners,

whose tires had reached the State through “the stream of commerce.”

Held: Petitioners were not amenable to suit in North Carolina on

claims unrelated to any activity of petitioners in the forum State.

Pp. 6–14.

(a) The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause sets the

outer boundaries of a state tribunal’s authority to proceed against a

defendant. The pathmarking decision of International Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U. S. 310, provides that state courts may exercise

2 GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.

v. BROWN

Syllabus

personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has “certain

minimum contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of the

suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.’ ” Id., at 316. Endeavoring to give specific content to the “fair

play and substantial justice” concept, the Court in International Shoe

classified cases involving out-of-state corporate defendants. First,

the Court recognized that jurisdiction could be asserted where the

corporation’s in-state activity is “continuous and systematic” and

gave rise to the episode-in-suit. Id., at 317. It also observed that the

commission of “single or occasional acts” in a State may be sufficient

to render a corporation answerable in that State with respect to those

acts, though not with respect to matters unrelated to the forum con

nections. Id., at 318. These two categories compose what is now

known as “specific jurisdiction.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom

bia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408, 414, n. 8. International Shoe distin

guished from cases that fit within the “specific jurisdiction” catego

ries, “instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a

state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit

against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct

from those activities.” 326 U. S., at 318. Adjudicatory authority so

grounded is now called “general jurisdiction.” Helicopteros, 466 U. S.,

at 414, n. 9. Since International Shoe, this Court’s decisions have

elaborated primarily on circumstances that warrant the exercise of

specific jurisdiction. In only two decisions postdating International

Shoe has this Court considered whether an out-of-state corporate de

fendant’s in-state contacts were sufficiently “continuous and system

atic” to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over claims unre

lated to those contacts: Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342

U. S. 437; and Helicopteros, 466 U. S. 408. Pp. 6–9.

(b) Petitioners lack “the kind of continuous and systematic general

business contacts” necessary to allow North Carolina to entertain a

suit against them unrelated to anything that connects them to the

State. Helicopteros, 466 U. S., at 416. The stream-of-commerce cases

on which the North Carolina court relied relate to exercises of specific

jurisdiction in products liability actions, in which a nonresident de

fendant, acting outside the forum, places in the stream of commerce a

product that ultimately causes harm inside the forum. Many state

long-arm statutes authorize courts to exercise specific jurisdiction

over manufacturers when the events in suit, or some of them, oc

curred within the forum State. The North Carolina court’s stream-of

commerce analysis elided the essential difference between case

specific and general jurisdiction. Flow of a manufacturer’s products

into the forum may bolster an affiliation germane to specific jurisdic

tion, see, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S.

Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 3

Syllabus

286, 297; but ties serving to bolster the exercise of specific jurisdic

tion do not warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the fo

rum has general jurisdiction over a defendant. A corporation’s “con

tinuous activity of some sorts within a state,” International Shoe

instructed, “is not enough to support the demand that the corporation

be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.” 326 U. S., at 318.

Measured against Helicopteros and Perkins, North Carolina is not

a forum in which it would be permissible to subject petitioners to

general jurisdiction. In the 1952 Perkins case, general jurisdiction

was appropriately exercised over a Philippine corporation sued in

Ohio, where the company’s affairs were overseen during World War

II. In Helicopteros, however, the survivors of U. S. citizens killed

when a helicopter owned by a Colombian corporation crashed in Peru

could not maintain wrongful-death actions against that corporation

in Texas, where the company’s contacts “consisted of sending its chief

executive officer to Houston for a contract-negotiation session; accept

ing into its New York bank account checks drawn on a Houston bank;

purchasing helicopters, equipment, and training services from [a

Texas enterprise]; and sending personnel to [Texas] for training.”

466 U. S., at 416. These links to Texas did not “constitute the kind of

continuous and systematic general business contacts . . . found to ex

ist in Perkins,” and were insufficient to support the exercise of juris

diction over a claim that neither “ ‘ar[o]se out of’ . . . no[r] related to”

the defendant’s activities in Texas. Id., at 415–416. This Court sees

no reason to differentiate from the ties to Texas held insufficient in

Helicopteros, the sales of petitioners’ tires sporadically made in North

Carolina through intermediaries. Pp. 9–13.

(c) Neither below nor in their brief in opposition to the petition for

certiorari did respondents urge disregard of petitioners’ discrete

status as subsidiaries and treatment of all Goodyear entities as a

“unitary business,” so that jurisdiction over the parent would draw in

the subsidiaries as well. Respondents have therefore forfeited this

contention. Pp. 13–14.

199 N. C. App. 50, 681 S. E. 2d 382, reversed.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 10–76

_________________

GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.,

ET AL., PETITIONERS v. EDGAR D. BROWN,

ET UX., CO-ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE

OF JULIAN DAVID BROWN, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF

NORTH CAROLINA

[June 27, 2011]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the jurisdiction of state courts over

corporations organized and operating abroad. We address,

in particular, this question: Are foreign subsidiaries of a

United States parent corporation amenable to suit in state

court on claims unrelated to any activity of the subsidiar

ies in the forum State?

A bus accident outside Paris that took the lives of two

13-year-old boys from North Carolina gave rise to the liti

gation we here consider. Attributing the accident to a

defective tire manufactured in Turkey at the plant of a

foreign subsidiary of The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Com

pany (Goodyear USA), the boys’ parents commenced an

action for damages in a North Carolina state court; they

named as defendants Goodyear USA, an Ohio corporation,

and three of its subsidiaries, organized and operating,

respectively, in Turkey, France, and Luxembourg. Good

year USA, which had plants in North Carolina and regu

larly engaged in commercial activity there, did not contest

2 GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.

v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

the North Carolina court’s jurisdiction over it; Goodyear

USA’s foreign subsidiaries, however, maintained that

North Carolina lacked adjudicatory authority over them.

A state court’s assertion of jurisdiction exposes defen

dants to the State’s coercive power, and is therefore sub

ject to review for compatibility with the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause. International Shoe

Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945) (assertion of

jurisdiction over out-of-state corporation must comply with

“ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ ”

(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463 (1940))).

Opinions in the wake of the pathmarking International

Shoe decision have differentiated between general or all

purpose jurisdiction, and specific or case-linked jurisdic

tion. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall,

466 U. S. 408, 414, nn. 8, 9 (1984).

A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign

(sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any

and all claims against them when their affiliations with

the State are so “continuous and systematic” as to render

them essentially at home in the forum State. See Interna

tional Shoe, 326 U. S., at 317. Specific jurisdiction, on the

other hand, depends on an “affiliatio[n] between the forum

and the underlying controversy,” principally, activity or an

occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is

therefore subject to the State’s regulation. von Mehren &

Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analy

sis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1136 (1966) (hereinafter von

Mehren & Trautman); see Brilmayer et al., A General

Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 Texas L. Rev. 721, 782

(1988) (hereinafter Brilmayer). In contrast to general, all

purpose jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is confined to

adjudication of “issues deriving from, or connected with,

the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” von

Mehren & Trautman 1136.

Because the episode-in-suit, the bus accident, occurred

Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 3

Opinion of the Court

in France, and the tire alleged to have caused the accident

was manufactured and sold abroad, North Carolina courts

lacked specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals so acknowledged.

Brown v. Meter, 199 N. C. App. 50, 57–58, 681 S. E. 2d

382, 388 (2009). Were the foreign subsidiaries nonetheless

amenable to general jurisdiction in North Carolina courts?

Confusing or blending general and specific jurisdictional

inquiries, the North Carolina courts answered yes. Some

of the tires made abroad by Goodyear’s foreign subsidiar

ies, the North Carolina Court of Appeals stressed, had

reached North Carolina through “the stream of com

merce”; that connection, the Court of Appeals believed,

gave North Carolina courts the handle needed for the

exercise of general jurisdiction over the foreign corpora

tions. Id., at 67–68, 681 S. E. 2d, at 394–395.

A connection so limited between the forum and the for

eign corporation, we hold, is an inadequate basis for the

exercise of general jurisdiction. Such a connection does

not establish the “continuous and systematic” affiliation

necessary to empower North Carolina courts to entertain

claims unrelated to the foreign corporation’s contacts with

the State.

I

On April 18, 2004, a bus destined for Charles de Gaulle

Airport overturned on a road outside Paris, France. Pas

sengers on the bus were young soccer players from North

Carolina beginning their journey home. Two 13-year-olds,

Julian Brown and Matthew Helms, sustained fatal inju

ries. The boys’ parents, respondents in this Court, filed a

suit for wrongful-death damages in the Superior Court of

Onslow County, North Carolina, in their capacity as ad

ministrators of the boys’ estates. Attributing the accident

to a tire that failed when its plies separated, the parents

alleged negligence in the “design, construction, testing,

4 GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.

v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

and inspection” of the tire. 199 N. C. App., at 51, 681 S. E.

2d, at 384 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Goodyear Luxembourg Tires, SA (Goodyear Luxem

bourg), Goodyear Lastikleri T. A. S. (Goodyear Turkey),

and Goodyear Dunlop Tires France, SA (Goodyear

France), petitioners here, were named as defendants.

Incorporated in Luxembourg, Turkey, and France, respec

tively, petitioners are indirect subsidiaries of Goodyear

USA, an Ohio corporation also named as a defendant in

the suit. Petitioners manufacture tires primarily for sale

in European and Asian markets. Their tires differ in size

and construction from tires ordinarily sold in the United

States. They are designed to carry significantly heavier

loads, and to serve under road conditions and speed limits

in the manufacturers’ primary markets.1

In contrast to the parent company, Goodyear USA,

which does not contest the North Carolina courts’ personal

jurisdiction over it, petitioners are not registered to do

business in North Carolina. They have no place of busi

ness, employees, or bank accounts in North Carolina.

They do not design, manufacture, or advertise their prod

ucts in North Carolina. And they do not solicit business in

North Carolina or themselves sell or ship tires to North

Carolina customers. Even so, a small percentage of peti

tioners’ tires (tens of thousands out of tens of millions

manufactured between 2004 and 2007) were distributed

within North Carolina by other Goodyear USA affiliates.

These tires were typically custom ordered to equip special

ized vehicles such as cement mixers, waste haulers, and

boat and horse trailers. Petitioners state, and respondents

——————

1 Respondents portray Goodyear USA’s structure as a reprehensible

effort to “outsource” all manufacturing, and correspondingly, tort

litigation, to foreign jurisdictions. See Brief for Respondents 51–53.

Yet Turkey, where the tire alleged to have caused the accident-in-suit

was made, is hardly a strange location for a facility that primarily

supplies markets in Europe and Asia.

Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 5

Opinion of the Court

do not here deny, that the type of tire involved in the

accident, a Goodyear Regional RHS tire manufactured

by Goodyear Turkey, was never distributed in North

Carolina.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the claims against them

for want of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied

the motion, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals af

firmed. Acknowledging that the claims neither “related

to, nor . . . ar[o]se from, [petitioners’] contacts with North

Carolina,” the Court of Appeals confined its analysis to

“general rather than specific jurisdiction,” which the court

recognized required a “higher threshold” showing: A de

fendant must have “continuous and systematic contacts”

with the forum. Id., at 58, 681 S. E. 2d, at 388 (internal

quotation marks omitted). That threshold was crossed,

the court determined, when petitioners placed their tires

“in the stream of interstate commerce without any limita

tion on the extent to which those tires could be sold in

North Carolina.” Id., at 67, 681 S. E. 2d, at 394.

Nothing in the record, the court observed, indicated

that petitioners “took any affirmative action to cause tires

which they had manufactured to be shipped into North

Carolina.” Id., at 64, 681 S. E. 2d, at 392. The court

found, however, that tires made by petitioners reached

North Carolina as a consequence of a “highly-organized

distribution process” involving other Goodyear USA sub

sidiaries. Id., at 67, 681 S. E. 2d, at 394. Petitioners, the

court noted, made “no attempt to keep these tires from

reaching the North Carolina market.” Id., at 66, 681 S. E.

2d, at 393. Indeed, the very tire involved in the accident,

the court observed, conformed to tire standards estab

lished by the U. S. Department of Transportation and bore

markings required for sale in the United States. Ibid.2 As

——————

2 Such markings do not necessarily show that any of the tires were

destined for sale in the United States. To facilitate trade, the Solicitor

6 GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.

v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

further support, the court invoked North Carolina’s “inter

est in providing a forum in which its citizens are able to

seek redress for [their] injuries,” and noted the hardship

North Carolina plaintiffs would experience “[were they]

required to litigate their claims in France,” a country to

which they have no ties. Id., at 68, 681 S. E. 2d, at 394.

The North Carolina Supreme Court denied discretionary

review. Brown v. Meter, 364 N. C. 128, 695 S. E. 2d 756

(2010).

We granted certiorari to decide whether the general

jurisdiction the North Carolina courts asserted over peti

tioners is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. 561 U. S. ___ (2010).

II

A

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

sets the outer boundaries of a state tribunal’s authority to

proceed against a defendant. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S.

186, 207 (1977). The canonical opinion in this area re

mains International Shoe, 326 U. S. 310, in which we held

that a State may authorize its courts to exercise personal

jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if the defendant

has “certain minimum contacts with [the State] such that

the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id., at 316

(quoting Meyer, 311 U. S., at 463).

Endeavoring to give specific content to the “fair play and

substantial justice” concept, the Court in International

Shoe classified cases involving out-of-state corporate

defendants. First, as in International Shoe itself, jurisdic

tion unquestionably could be asserted where the corpora

——————

General explained, the United States encourages other countries to

“treat compliance with [Department of Transportation] standards, in

cluding through use of DOT markings, as evidence that the products

are safely manufactured.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 32.

Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 7

Opinion of the Court

tion’s in-state activity is “continuous and systematic” and

that activity gave rise to the episode-in-suit. 326 U. S., at

317. Further, the Court observed, the commission of

certain “single or occasional acts” in a State may be suffi

cient to render a corporation answerable in that State

with respect to those acts, though not with respect to

matters unrelated to the forum connections. Id., at 318.

The heading courts today use to encompass these two

International Shoe categories is “specific jurisdiction.” See

von Mehren & Trautman 1144–1163. Adjudicatory au

thority is “specific” when the suit “aris[es] out of or relate[s]

to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Helicopteros,

466 U. S., at 414, n. 8.

International Shoe distinguished from cases that fit

within the “specific jurisdiction” categories, “instances in

which the continuous corporate operations within a state

[are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit

against it on causes of action arising from dealings en

tirely distinct from those activities.” 326 U. S., at 318.

Adjudicatory authority so grounded is today called “gen

eral jurisdiction.” Helicopteros, 466 U. S., at 414, n. 9. For

an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of

general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a

corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the

corporation is fairly regarded as at home. See Brilmayer

728 (identifying domicile, place of incorporation, and

principal place of business as “paradig[m]” bases for the

exercise of general jurisdiction).

Since International Shoe, this Court’s decisions have

elaborated primarily on circumstances that warrant the

exercise of specific jurisdiction, particularly in cases in

volving “single or occasional acts” occurring or having

their impact within the forum State. As a rule in these

cases, this Court has inquired whether there was “some

act by which the defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of

the privilege of conducting activities within the forum

8 GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.

v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its

laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 253 (1958). See,

e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S.

286, 287, 297 (1980) (Oklahoma court may not exercise

personal jurisdiction “over a nonresident automobile re

tailer and its wholesale distributor in a products-liability

action, when the defendants’ only connection with Okla

homa is the fact that an automobile sold in New York to

New York residents became involved in an accident in

Oklahoma”); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S.

462, 474–475 (1985) (franchisor headquartered in Florida

may maintain breach-of-contract action in Florida against

Michigan franchisees, where agreement contemplated on

going interactions between franchisees and franchisor’s

headquarters); Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court

of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U. S. 102, 105 (1987) (Taiwanese

tire manufacturer settled product liability action brought

in California and sought indemnification there from Japa

nese valve assembly manufacturer; Japanese company’s

“mere awareness . . . that the components it manufac

tured, sold, and delivered outside the United States would

reach the forum State in the stream of commerce” held

insufficient to permit California court’s adjudication of

Taiwanese company’s cross-complaint); id., at 109 (opinion

of O’Connor, J.); id., at 116–117 (Brennan, J., concurring

in part and concurring in judgment). See also Twitchell,

The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 610,

628 (1988) (in the wake of International Shoe, “specific

jurisdiction has become the centerpiece of modern jurisdic

tion theory, while general jurisdiction plays a reduced

role”).

In only two decisions postdating International Shoe,

discussed infra, at 11–13, has this Court considered

whether an out-of-state corporate defendant’s in-state

contacts were sufficiently “continuous and systematic” to

justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over claims

Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 9

Opinion of the Court

unrelated to those contacts: Perkins v. Benguet Consol.

Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437 (1952) (general jurisdiction

appropriately exercised over Philippine corporation sued

in Ohio, where the company’s affairs were overseen during

World War II); and Helicopteros, 466 U. S. 408 (helicopter

owned by Colombian corporation crashed in Peru; survi

vors of U. S. citizens who died in the crash, the Court

held, could not maintain wrongful-death actions against the

Colombian corporation in Texas, for the corporation’s

helicopter purchases and purchase-linked activity in

Texas were insufficient to subject it to Texas court’s gen

eral jurisdiction).

B

To justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over peti

tioners, the North Carolina courts relied on the petition

ers’ placement of their tires in the “stream of commerce.”

See supra, at 5. The stream-of-commerce metaphor has

been invoked frequently in lower court decisions permit

ting “jurisdiction in products liability cases in which the

product has traveled through an extensive chain of distri

bution before reaching the ultimate consumer.” 18 W.

Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations §8640.40,

p. 133 (rev. ed. 2007). Typically, in such cases, a nonresi

dent defendant, acting outside the forum, places in the

stream of commerce a product that ultimately causes

harm inside the forum. See generally Dayton, Personal

Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce, 7 Rev. Litiga

tion 239, 262–268 (1988) (discussing origins and evolution

of the stream-of-commerce doctrine).

Many States have enacted long-arm statutes authoriz

ing courts to exercise specific jurisdiction over manufac

turers when the events in suit, or some of them, occurred

within the forum state. For example, the “Local Injury;

Foreign Act” subsection of North Carolina’s long-arm

statute authorizes North Carolina courts to exercise per

10 GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.

v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

sonal jurisdiction in “any action claiming injury to person

or property within this State arising out of [the defen

dant’s] act or omission outside this State,” if, “in addi

tion[,] at or about the time of the injury,” ”[p]roducts . . .

manufactured by the defendant were used or consumed,

within this State in the ordinary course of trade.” N. C.

Gen. Stat. Ann. §1–75.4(4)(b) (Lexis 2009).3 As the North

Carolina Court of Appeals recognized, this provision of the

State’s long-arm statute “does not apply to this case,” for

both the act alleged to have caused injury (the fabrication

of the allegedly defective tire) and its impact (the accident)

occurred outside the forum. See 199 N. C. App., at 61,

n. 6, 681 S. E. 2d, at 390, n. 6.4

The North Carolina court’s stream-of-commerce analysis

elided the essential difference between case-specific and

all-purpose (general) jurisdiction. Flow of a manufac

turer’s products into the forum, we have explained, may

bolster an affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction. See,

e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S., at 297 (where “the

sale of a product . . . is not simply an isolated occurrence,

but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distribu

tor to serve . . . the market for its product in [several]

——————

3 Cf. D. C. Code §13–423(a)(4) (2001) (providing for specific jurisdic

tion over defendant who “caus[es] tortious injury in the [forum] by an

act or omission outside the [forum]” when, in addition, the defendant

“derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed . . . in the

[forum]”).

4 The court instead relied on N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §1–75.4(1)(d), see

199 N. C. App., at 57, 681 S. E. 2d, at 388, which provides for jurisdic

tion, “whether the claim arises within or without [the] State,” when the

defendant “[i]s engaged in substantial activity within this State,

whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise.”

This provision, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held, was “in

tended to make available to the North Carolina courts the full juris

dictional powers permissible under federal due process.” Dillon v.

Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N. C. 674, 676, 231 S. E. 2d 629, 630

(1977).

Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 11

Opinion of the Court

States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one

of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has

there been the source of injury to its owner or to others” (em

phasis added)). But ties serving to bolster the exercise

of specific jurisdiction do not warrant a determination

that, based on those ties, the forum has general jurisdic

tion over a defendant. See, e.g., Stabilisierungsfonds Fur

Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distributors Pty. Ltd., 647 F. 2d

200, 203, n. 5 (CADC 1981) (defendants’ marketing ar

rangements, although “adequate to permit litigation of

claims relating to [their] introduction of . . . wine into

the United States stream of commerce, . . . would not be

adequate to support general, ‘all purpose’ adjudicatory

authority”).

A corporation’s “continuous activity of some sorts within

a state,” International Shoe instructed, “is not enough to

support the demand that the corporation be amenable to

suits unrelated to that activity.” 326 U. S., at 318. Our

1952 decision in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.

remains “[t]he textbook case of general jurisdiction appro

priately exercised over a foreign corporation that has not

consented to suit in the forum.” Donahue v. Far Eastern

Air Transport Corp., 652 F. 2d 1032, 1037 (CADC 1981).

Sued in Ohio, the defendant in Perkins was a Philippine

mining corporation that had ceased activities in the Phil

ippines during World War II. To the extent that the com

pany was conducting any business during and immedi

ately after the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, it

was doing so in Ohio: the corporation’s president main

tained his office there, kept the company files in that

office, and supervised from the Ohio office “the necessarily

limited wartime activities of the company.” Perkins, 342

U. S., at 447–448. Although the claim-in-suit did not arise

in Ohio, this Court ruled that it would not violate due

process for Ohio to adjudicate the controversy. Ibid.; see

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770, 779–780,

12 GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.

v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

n. 11 (1984) (Ohio’s exercise of general jurisdiction was

permissible in Perkins because “Ohio was the corporation’s

principal, if temporary, place of business”).

We next addressed the exercise of general jurisdiction

over an out-of-state corporation over three decades later,

in Helicopteros. In that case, survivors of United States

citizens who died in a helicopter crash in Peru instituted

wrongful-death actions in a Texas state court against the

owner and operator of the helicopter, a Colombian corpo

ration. The Colombian corporation had no place of busi

ness in Texas and was not licensed to do business there.

“Basically, [the company’s] contacts with Texas consisted

of sending its chief executive officer to Houston for a

contract-negotiation session; accepting into its New York

bank account checks drawn on a Houston bank; purchas

ing helicopters, equipment, and training services from [a

Texas enterprise] for substantial sums; and sending per

sonnel to [Texas] for training.” 466 U. S., at 416. These

links to Texas, we determined, did not “constitute the kind

of continuous and systematic general business contacts . . .

found to exist in Perkins,” and were insufficient to support

the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim that neither

“ar[o]se out of . . . no[r] related to” the defendant’s activi

ties in Texas. Id., at 415–416 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Helicopteros concluded that “mere purchases [made in

the forum State], even if occurring at regular intervals,

are not enough to warrant a State’s assertion of [general]

jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a cause of

action not related to those purchase transactions.” Id., at

418. We see no reason to differentiate from the ties to

Texas held insufficient in Helicopteros, the sales of peti

tioners’ tires sporadically made in North Carolina through

intermediaries. Under the sprawling view of general

jurisdiction urged by respondents and embraced by the

North Carolina Court of Appeals, any substantial manu

Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 13

Opinion of the Court

facturer or seller of goods would be amenable to suit, on

any claim for relief, wherever its products are distributed.

But cf. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S., at 296 (every

seller of chattels does not, by virtue of the sale, “appoint

the chattel his agent for service of process”).

Measured against Helicopteros and Perkins, North Caro

lina is not a forum in which it would be permissible to

subject petitioners to general jurisdiction. Unlike the

defendant in Perkins, whose sole wartime business activ

ity was conducted in Ohio, petitioners are in no sense at

home in North Carolina. Their attenuated connections to

the State, see supra, at 4–5, fall far short of the “the con

tinuous and systematic general business contacts” neces

sary to empower North Carolina to entertain suit against

them on claims unrelated to anything that connects them

to the State. Helicopteros, 466 U. S., at 416.5

C

Respondents belatedly assert a “single enterprise” the

ory, asking us to consolidate petitioners’ ties to North

Carolina with those of Goodyear USA and other Goodyear

entities. See Brief for Respondents 44–50. In effect,

——————

5 As earlier noted, see supra, at 6, the North Carolina Court of Ap

peals invoked the State’s “well-recognized interest in providing a forum

in which its citizens are able to seek redress for injuries that they have

sustained.” 199 N. C. App., at 68, 681 S. E. 2d, at 394. But “[g]eneral

jurisdiction to adjudicate has in [United States] practice never been

based on the plaintiff’s relationship to the forum. There is nothing in

[our] law comparable to . . . article 14 of the Civil Code of France (1804)

under which the French nationality of the plaintiff is a sufficient

ground for jurisdiction.” von Mehren & Trautman 1137; see Clermont

& Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58 Me. L. Rev. 474, 492–495 (2006)

(French law permitting plaintiff-based jurisdiction is rarely invoked

in the absence of other supporting factors). When a defendant’s act

outside the forum causes injury in the forum, by contrast, a plaintiff’s

residence in the forum may strengthen the case for the exercise of

specific jurisdiction. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U. S. 783, 788 (1984); von

Mehren & Trautman 1167–1173.

14 GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.

v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

respondents would have us pierce Goodyear corporate

veils, at least for jurisdictional purposes. See Brilmayer &

Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal

Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 Cal.

L. Rev. 1, 14, 29–30 (1986) (merging parent and subsidiary

for jurisdictional purposes requires an inquiry “compara

ble to the corporate law question of piercing the corporate

veil”). But see 199 N. C. App., at 64, 681 S. E. 2d, at 392

(North Carolina Court of Appeals understood that peti

tioners are “separate corporate entities . . . not directly re

sponsible for the presence in North Carolina of tires that

they had manufactured”). Neither below nor in their brief

in opposition to the petition for certiorari did respondents

urge disregard of petitioners’ discrete status as subsidiar

ies and treatment of all Goodyear entities as a “unitary

business,” so that jurisdiction over the parent would draw

in the subsidiaries as well.6 Brief for Respondents 44.

Respondents have therefore forfeited this contention, and

we do not address it. This Court’s Rule 15.2; Granite Rock

Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 16).

* * *

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the North Caro

lina Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

——————

6 In the brief they filed in the North Carolina Court of Appeals, re

spondents stated that petitioners were part of an “integrated world

wide efforts to design, manufacture, market and sell their tires in the

United States, including in North Carolina.” App. 485 (emphasis

added). See also Brief in Opposition 18. Read in context, that assertion

was offered in support of a narrower proposition: The distribution of

petitioners’ tires in North Carolina, respondents maintained, demon

strated petitioners’ own “calculated and deliberate efforts to take

advantage of the North Carolina market.” App. 485. As already

explained, see supra, at 12–13, even regularly occurring sales of a

product in a State do not justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim

unrelated to those sales.