Opinion

Matter of Solerwitz

  • 601 A.2d 1083
  • 1992 D.C. App. LEXIS 24
  • 1992 WL 14948
Court
District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Filed
Jan 31, 1992
Status
Published
On the bench
Ferren, Steadman, King
Cited by
5 cases
Authority
More cited than 79.8%

grand larceny; New York statute

How later courts described this case

  • grand larceny; New York statute

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PER CURIAM:

By two indictments in Nassau County, New York, respondent was charged with various crimes. On April 2, 1990, respondent entered guilty pleas to two counts of Grand Larceny in the Second Degree in violation of New York Penal Law § 155.40. Upon consideration of a certified copy of the judgment from the County Court of Nassau County, this court suspended respondent from the practice of law in the District of Columbia on August 16, 1990 pursuant to D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 10(c) (1989).

By the same order, we directed the Board on Professional Responsibility to institute a formal proceeding to determine the nature of the final discipline to be imposed; we requested the Board specifically to review the elements of the crime for which respondent was sentenced to determine whether or not the crime involved moral turpitude within the meaning of D.C.Code § ll-2503(a) (1989).

The Board on Professional Responsibility has concluded that grand larceny as defined by the State of New York

1

is a crime involving moral turpitude

per se,

requiring disbarment under

In re Colson,

412 A.2d 1160, 1164 (D.C.1979) (en banc) (once court

*1084

determines that respondent’s crime involves moral turpitude, disbarment pursuant to D.C.Code § ll-2503(a) must follow).

See In re Boyd,

593 A.2d 183 (D.C.1991) (attorney convicted in New York of grand larceny disbarred pursuant to § 11-2503(a)). Bar Counsel has indicated agreement with the Board’s recommendation, and respondent has filed no objection.

We agree with the Board on Professional Responsibility that disbarment is required by the statute and by

Colson .

Accordingly, respondent is hereby disbarred from the practice of law in the District of Columbia effective thirty days from the date of this Order.

So ordered.

1

. Respondent entered a guilty plea to two counts of grand larceny in the second degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § 155.40 (1991), which provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of grand larceny in the second degree when he [or she] steals property and when: 1. The value of the property exceeds fifty thousand dollars....” The State of New York defines larceny as follows: "A person steals property and commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself [or herself] or a third person, he [or she] wrongfully takes, obtains, or withholds such property from an owner thereof." N.Y.Penal Law § 155.05(1) (1991). Felonious intent is an element of the offense.

See People v. Gorton,

60 Misc.2d 833 , 304 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1969) (removing magazine from library because it contained what defendant regarded as obscene passage lacked felonious intent necessary to establish larceny).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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