Opinion

McKinzey v. Astrue

  • 641 F.3d 884
  • 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11200
  • 2011 WL 2162903
Court
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Filed
Jun 3, 2011
Status
Published
Author
Manion
On the bench
Manion, Manton, Evans, Hamilton
Cited by
748 cases
Authority
More cited than 99.5%

holding that ALJ’s credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, although she did not explain why she discounted plaintiff’s reasons for declining surgery, when ALJ relied on evidence of exaggerated symptoms and limitations as well as inconsistencies between subjective complaints and objective evidence.

How later courts described this case

  • holding that ALJ’s credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, although she did not explain why she discounted plaintiff’s reasons for declining surgery, when ALJ relied on evidence of exaggerated symptoms and limitations as well as inconsistencies between subjective complaints and objective evidence.
  • finding that the ALJ’s credibility determination was not patently wrong even though it “was not without fault” because two of the three reasons for discounting claimant’s credibility were invalid where the third reason was valid
  • stating that the ALJ must “explain her decision in such a way that allows [the court] to determine whether she reached her decision in a rational manner, logically based on her specific findings and the evidence in the record”
  • holding that the ALJ’s oversight in failing to consider a state agency physician’s opinion was harmless er- ror because we can say with great confidence that the ALJ would reach the same result on remand

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-2654

D EBRA M C K INZEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

M ICHAEL J. A STRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 09 CV 4024—Joe Billy McDade, Judge.

A RGUED F EBRUARY 10, 2011—D ECIDED JUNE 3, 2011

Before M ANION, E VANS, and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges.

M ANION , Circuit Judge. Debra McKinzey applied

for Social Security disability benefits in 2004, but an ad-

ministrative law judge found that she could perform

light work and was thus not disabled. She challenges

that determination. Despite some concerns over the

ALJ’s articulation of her reasons for denying McKinzey’s

claim, we find that the determination was amply sup-

2 No. 10-2654

ported by substantial evidence in the record and that

remanding for further articulation would serve no pur-

pose. We therefore affirm the decision of the district

court and the ALJ.

I.

In November 2004, McKinzey filed an application for

disability insurance benefits with the Social Security

Administration, alleging an onset date of February 27,

2003. Her claim was initially denied in April and again

on reconsideration in July 2005. She then requested a

hearing with an ALJ, which was held two-and-a-half

years later.

A. The Hearing

McKinzey testified that she was injured in 2001 while

working at an Eagles supermarket and that this injury

resulted in bilateral cubital tunnel syndrome—a compres-

sion of the ulnar nerve along the cubital tunnel on the

outside of the elbow—and ulnar neuropathy. These

injuries caused a 45% loss of use of one arm and 50% of

the other. For the next couple of years, she continued to

work at Eagles in less physically demanding positions.

Finally, in 2003, she was unable to perform a job as

a greeter and was laid off.

In 2004, she began a program to train as a dental hy-

gienist, but was dropped from the program after com-

pleting her prerequisites because of problems with her

No. 10-2654 3

hands. She then attempted a radiology technician pro-

gram, but could not pursue that either because she was

at an elevated risk from radiation due to her previous

bout with skin cancer. Finally, she enrolled in a program

in electroencephalography (EEGs) and sleep studies.

She was still enrolled in this program at the time of her

hearing, but she was having difficulty with the clinical

work due to problems with her hands and vision, and

was not sure that she would be able to continue.

McKinzey testified to numerous health problems and

stated that the biggest impediments to her work were

her fingers, her vision, and the loss of feeling in her

feet due to Raynaud’s syndrome, which limits the cir-

culation to extremities and can cause numbness.

After McKinzey testified, the ALJ questioned the voca-

tional expert, Dennis Gustafson. The ALJ asked him

whether there were any jobs for a hypothetical 45-year-

old with a high school education and some college, who

was capable of doing light or sedentary work, with the

ability to frequently lift 10 pounds and climb ramps or

stairs, but who was limited to only occasional handling,

fingering, or feeling with her hands, no climbing ladders,

ropes, or scaffolding, and who had to avoid moderate

exposure to vibrations and hazards. The ALJ and

Gustafson then discussed McKinzey’s testimony con-

cerning her vision and concluded that the proper class-

ification was a problem of visual accommodation

(meaning a problem shifting focus from near objects to

far) rather than visual acuity. The ALJ included this limita-

tion in her hypothetical. Gustafson testified that such

a hypothetical person would not be able to return to

4 No. 10-2654

any of McKinzey’s past work. And although some cus-

tomer service skills would be transferable, the hypo-

thetical manipulative limitations would rule out any

other work for such a person, absent specialized training.

The ALJ stated that she would need to go back through

the medical records to see if the limitations were war-

ranted and then ended the hearing.

B. Medical Records

The medical records reveal that McKinzey has sought

treatment for numerous health concerns. She has a

history of skin cancer, and partially unsuccessful surgeries

on her face and breast to remove the cancer have led

to several cosmetic surgeries. She had some vision prob-

lems stemming from surgery on her eyes using a laser

that was later recalled by the manufacturer. At various

times, McKinzey has been assessed with ulnar neuropathy,

cubital tunnel syndrome, mild degenerative joint disease

in the spine, fibromyalgia, Raynaud’s syndrome, fluctu-

ating vision, vasomotor rhinitis (chronic runny nose),

and depression and anxiety.

Her arm problems, which form the core of her evidence

of disability, go back through 2001. Shortly after her

work injury, McKinzey began seeing Dr. Thomas

VonGillern, an orthopaedic specialist, for symptoms of

constant tingling, numbness, cold fingers, and pain.

Dr. VonGillern noted impressions of mild bilateral

cubital tunnel. Following a nerve conduction study in

2002, McKinzey was assessed with mild to moderate

bilateral ulnar neuropathy. Dr. VonGillern scheduled

No. 10-2654 5

her for surgery on her right ulnar nerve at her elbow

and, in anticipation, gave her restrictions on bending,

lifting, twisting, pushing, tearing, pinching, gripping,

and squeezing. McKinzey, however, cancelled the

surgery and stopped seeing Dr. VonGillern. When the

ALJ questioned her on her decision to forego surgery,

she replied both that her other doctors did not agree

and that she had come to distrust Dr. VonGillern.

A few weeks after cancelling her surgery, McKinzey

began seeing a neurosurgeon, Dr. David Udehn. His

initial impression was that McKinzey had ulnar neuro-

pathy and was not responding to conservative therapy.

At that time, and again in June 2003, he recommended

that she proceed with surgery as Dr. VonGillern had

suggested. In November 2003, Dr. Udehn also recom-

mended that McKinzey proceed with a functional

capacity evaluation; that evaluation found that she

could lift 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasion-

ally, occasionally climb ladders and crawl, and fre-

quently bend, squat, kneel, and climb stairs. She

could repetitively perform simple grasping but not firm

grasping. In March 2004, Dr. Udehn again recommended

surgery and then in May he referred McKinzey to

Dr. Peter Pardubsky for a second opinion. Dr. Pardubsky

also recommended surgery.

In March 2005, an occupational evaluation found

that McKinzey had a full range of motion in the upper

extremities but had some limitations on fine manipula-

tions and that her gross manipulations might be limited

by her low grip strength. In April 2005, at the request of

6 No. 10-2654

the Social Security Administration, state agency

physician Dr. Francis Vincent performed a functional

capacity assessment based on McKinzey’s medical rec-

ords. He noted that McKinzey could occasionally lift

20 pounds, frequently lift 10 pounds, stand or walk

6 hours out of an 8-hour workday, and sit 6 hours out

of an 8-hour workday. Her ability to push and pull with

her upper extremities was limited and she could not

perform excessively repetitive movement of the elbows

and hands. In addition, Dr. Vincent opined that McKinzey

could only occasionally use her hands for feeling, fin-

gering, or handling. A second state agency physician,

Dr. William Conroy, affirmed Dr. Vincent’s assessment.

A chiropractic evaluation shortly after Dr. Vincent’s

opinion also stated that McKinzey was limited in the

use of her hands.

After a May 2005 examination, Dr. Pardubsky again

noted an impression of bilateral cubital tunnel syndrome

and unstable ulnar nerves. But now he recommended

surgery only if McKinzey’s symptoms continued to

worsen. Then, when Dr. Pardubsky saw her again in

August 2005, his opinion changed significantly. He still

noted an impression of bilateral ulnar neuropathy, but

found McKinzey’s examination benign, did not find

further diagnostic work-up necessary, and now recom-

mended against surgery. While he noted that she might

have discomfort in her limbs, he did not see any progres-

sive disabling process that would limit her. Moreover,

he found that she could use her arms to the fullest

extent possible.

No. 10-2654 7

In March 2006, McKinzey underwent a neurological

evaluation with Dr. Robert Segura, which showed

some evidence of ulnar nerve irritation bilaterally. The

exam was followed by an electrodiagnostic nerve study

of McKinzey’s upper and lower limbs. The study showed

no evidence of cubital tunnel syndrome (i.e., ulnar en-

trapment at the elbows). Other than a nerve entrapment

near her ankle, McKinzey had no significant nerve con-

duction abnormalities.

In February 2007, McKinzey returned to Dr. Pardubsky

with complaints of thumb pain. Dr. Pardubsky noted

that McKinzey had full motion of her fingers, thumb,

wrist, elbow, and shoulder. Although McKinzey was

hesitant to move her thumb in some directions, after

encouragement she demonstrated full motion. In

addition, Dr. Pardubsky stated that McKinzey com-

plained of an “intermittent tremor that appears to be

voluntarily present when she discussed exam of her

hands but is absent at rest.” He concluded that

McKinzey’s ongoing subjective complaints were incon-

sistent with objective findings. Without any evidence

of serious underlying pathology, he recommended

against any further diagnostic or surgical intervention

and suggested that McKinzey simply treat her symptoms.

C. ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ issued an unfavorable written decision in

April 2008. She proceeded through the familiar five-step

analysis. At step one, she found that McKinzey had not

engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged

8 No. 10-2654

onset date of February 27, 2003. At steps two and three,

she found that McKinzey had a severe combination

of impairments—including fibromyalgia, degenerative

disc disease, bilateral mild ulnar neuropathy, a history

of multiple eye surgeries with dry eye syndrome, and

monovision—but that her impairments did not meet or

medically equal one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526. The ALJ then

found that McKinzey had the residual functional capacity

to perform light work: she could lift up to 10 pounds

frequently; she could not do work activity involving

climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and could only

frequently climb stairs or ramps; she could only occasion-

ally bend, stoop, crouch, crawl, or kneel; she was limited

to no more than frequent handling, fingering, and

feeling with both hands; she was limited to moderate

exposure to vibrations or hazards; and she required

frequent accommodations for vision problems.

In making this residual functional capacity finding,

the ALJ found that there was an underlying medically

determinable physical impairment that could be ex-

pected to produce McKinzey’s pain and other symptoms.

But she also found that McKinzey was exaggerating her

claims concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting

effects of her symptoms. Specifically, the ALJ found it

inconsistent that McKinzey pursued several voluntary

cosmetic surgeries but did not pursue surgery that three

different specialists recommended to alleviate the symp-

toms of ulnar neuropathy and cubital tunnel syn-

drome. The ALJ also found McKinzey’s functioning con-

siderably greater than alleged: although her impairment

No. 10-2654 9

was essentially unchanged since the injury in 2001, she

had worked for two years before the alleged onset

date; further, she had maintained a level of activity since

2003 that was inconsistent with her alleged inability to

work. Finally, the ALJ noted that “the record includes

evidence strongly suggesting that the claimant has exag-

gerated symptoms and limitations.”

At step four, the ALJ found that McKinzey was unable

to perform any past relevant work. Finally, at step five,

the ALJ consulted the medical vocational guidelines

(known as the grids) and determined that there were

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national

economy for someone with McKinzey’s age, education,

work experience, and residual functional capacity. Al-

though she recognized the presence of some non-exer-

tional limitations not accounted for in the grids, the ALJ

found that those limitations had “little or no effect on

the occupational base of light unskilled work.” The

ALJ thus concluded that McKinzey was not disabled

and denied her application.

The Appeals Council denied McKinzey’s request for

review of the ALJ’s decision in February 2009. In

April 2009, McKinzey filed this suit against the Commis-

sioner of Social Security in the district court, seeking

review of the decision of the Social Security Administra-

tion under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In May 2010, the district

court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision and entered

judgment against McKinzey. McKinzey appeals.

10 No. 10-2654

II.

When the Appeals Council denies a request for review,

as it has here, we review the ALJ’s determination as the

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.

Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir. 2009). We

review de novo the district court’s decision, and reverse

an ALJ’s determination only where it is not supported

by substantial evidence, which means “such relevant evi-

dence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.” Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836,

841 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Although we do not “reweigh evi-

dence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility,

or substitute our own judgment for that of the Commis-

sioner,” we nonetheless conduct a critical review of the

evidence. Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535,

539 (7th Cir. 2003). The ALJ must adequately discuss

the issues and must build an “accurate and logical

bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.” Id.

McKinzey argues that the ALJ’s discussion of the evi-

dence was deficient in three respects. First, she argues

that the ALJ did not discuss an opinion by a state

agency physician regarding her limitations on her use

of her hands. Second, she claims that the ALJ failed to ac-

count for non-exertional limitations (principally her

vision impairments, but also environmental limitations

and others) in determining that there were jobs she

could do in the national economy. Finally, she argues

that the ALJ’s negative credibility determination is based

on mischaracterizations of the evidence and unrea-

sonable inferences. We review each issue in turn.

No. 10-2654 11

A. McKinzey’s Credibility

We start with McKinzey’s last argument, that the ALJ

erred in finding that McKinzey’s account of the intensity

and frequency of her symptoms lacked credibility. The

ALJ did conclude that the objective medical evidence

in the record could produce the symptoms of which

McKinzey complained. And given the testimony of the

vocational expert that there would be no jobs that a per-

son with McKinzey’s reported symptoms could do, the

ALJ’s credibility judgment was the determinative issue

in this case. Had the ALJ found McKinzey credible, the

decision would most likely have been favorable. Although

we find some deficiencies in the ALJ’s discussion of

McKinzey’s credibility, we conclude that the ALJ has

pointed to sufficient evidence in the record to justify

her negative determination.

Like any determination by the ALJ, the findings con-

cerning McKinzey’s credibility must be supported by sub-

stantial evidence. Further, the ALJ must explain her de-

cision in such a way that allows us to determine

whether she reached her decision in a rational manner,

logically based on her specific findings and the evidence

in the record. See Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 505

(7th Cir. 2004); Brindisi ex rel. Brindisi v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d

783, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2003). As long as the ALJ has ex-

plained her decision, this court “will not overturn an

ALJ’s credibility determination unless it is ‘patently

wrong.’ ” Skarbek, 390 F.3d at 504.

McKinzey argues that the reasons that the ALJ gave

for discounting her testimony regarding the severity of

12 No. 10-2654

her symptoms were defective. Specifically, she attacks

the ALJ’s credibility determination in three places.

First, she argues that the ALJ improperly counted her de-

cision to forego surgery against her. Second, she claims

that the ALJ drew unreasonable inferences from the so-

called cosmetic surgeries she underwent over the years.

Finally, she asserts that the ALJ erred by holding

McKinzey’s pre-2003 work and her enrollment in col-

lege against her without taking into account the signifi-

cant accommodations she required to pursue, ulti-

mately unsuccessfully, those various vocations. McKinzey

argues that these three errors compel a remand because

the ALJ has not built the requisite logical bridge between

the evidence and her conclusions.

We disagree. The ALJ’s credibility determination was

not without fault. Indeed, we see some merit in two out

of three of McKinzey’s attacks.1 Despite her obligation

to consider McKinzey’s explanation for her failure to

seek surgery before drawing an adverse inference, S.S.R.

96-7p, the ALJ did not explain why she discounted

McKinzey’s facially valid reason for declining surgery,

namely that her physicians did not agree that it would

1

Regarding the third argument—that the ALJ improperly

considered what she labeled “cosmetic” surgeries against

McKinzey—the ALJ explicitly noted the logical connection

between McKinzey’s willingness to undergo rather extensive

surgery for non-disabling issues but her refusal to undergo

recommended surgery that might have alleviated her allegedly

severely disabling symptoms.

No. 10-2654 13

necessarily help, and could even hinder.2 Further,

McKinzey’s unsuccessful attempts to pursue various vo-

cations might just as easily provide corroboration that

her impairments significantly limited her ability to work,

as opposed to evidence that her ability was greater

than she alleged.

But what McKinzey’s account of the credibility deter-

mination leaves out is the final reason given by the

ALJ, namely that, “[i]n addition, the record includes evi-

dence strongly suggesting that claimant has exaggerated

symptoms and limitations.” This statement was sup-

ported by reference to Dr. Pardubsky’s 2007 medical opin-

ion, which in this case could be labeled a smoking gun:

“Objective findings at this time do not correlate with

[McKinzey’s] ongoing subjective complaints.” And—more

damning for McKinzey’s credibility—“she complains

of an intermittent tremor that appears to be voluntarily

present when she discussed exam of her hands but is ab-

sent at rest.” In other words, in the opinion of her own

treating specialist, McKinzey’s claimed symptoms were

contradicted by his clinical evaluation.

2

The Commissioner and the district court suggest that the

ALJ was justified in ignoring the explanation because, in their

view, it contradicts another reason she gave and because the

evidence in the record does not include opinions against

surgery. But it was the ALJ’s job, not the court’s, to articulate

the reasons for her decisions, as well as explore a claimant’s

asserted explanations for foregoing recommended treatments.

S.S.R. 96-7p. In any event, this oversight is not a determining

factor.

14 No. 10-2654

In light of the substantial evidence that McKinzey was

exaggerating her symptoms even to a treating physician,

we conclude that the ALJ’s credibility determination

was adequately supported by evidence in the record.

B. Dr. Vincent’s Opinion

Next, we consider McKinzey’s argument that the ALJ

failed to explain the weight she gave to the state agency

physician’s opinion that McKinzey could only occasion-

ally use her hands for handling, fingering, or feeling. Gen-

erally speaking, an ALJ’s “adequate discussion” of the

issues need not contain “a complete written evaluation of

every piece of evidence.” Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737,

744 (7th Cir. 2005). But when the evidence comes in the

form of a medical opinion from a state agency physician,

the agency’s own regulations and rules require that the

ALJ “not ignore these opinions and must explain the

weight given to the opinions in their decisions.” S.S.R. 96-

6p; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f).

McKinzey argues that the ALJ did fail to explain her

treatment of these opinions, and that this failure alone

requires us to remand the matter to the agency for

further consideration. We agree with the former claim

but not the latter. Dr. Vincent concluded, based solely on

a review of the medical records to date, that McKinzey

had the following exertional limitations: she could lift

20 pounds not more than occasionally and 10 pounds

not more than frequently, could stand or sit no more

than 6 hours in the course of an 8-hour day, and could

not handle excessively repetitive activity. In addition,

No. 10-2654 15

Dr. Vincent found that McKinzey could only occasionally

use her hands to handle, finger, or feel.3

While the ALJ was not required to follow Dr. Vincent’s

opinion, there is no indication in the record that she was

even aware that a state agency physician—two, actu-

ally—had opined that McKinzey had significant limita-

tions with her hands, much less that she gave this opinion

proper consideration. The ALJ thus violated S.S.R. 96-6p,

which is binding on ALJs, see Lauer v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 489,

492 (7th Cir. 1999), and leaves no room for doubt that the

ALJ was required to consider Dr. Vincent’s opinion. This

was error.

But administrative error may be harmless: we will not

remand a case to the ALJ for further specification

where we are convinced that the ALJ will reach the

same result. Spiva v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir.

2010). That would be a waste of time and resources

for both the Commissioner and the claimant. Thus, we

look at the evidence in the record to see if we can

predict with great confidence what the result on remand

will be. We note (yet again, see Spiva, 628 F.3d at 353 and

the critical discussion therein) that the harmless error

standard is not, as the Commissioner and district court

3

Dr. Vincent also checked the box indicating that no manipula-

tive limitations had been established, but this was very likely

inadvertent in light of the specific limitations entered immedi-

ately thereafter. In any event, the ALJ did not discuss either

“finding” of Dr. Vincent, so we have no way to know what

the ALJ thought of the inconsistencies in the opinion.

16 No. 10-2654

seem to believe, an exercise in rationalizing the ALJ’s de-

cision and substituting our own hypothetical explana-

tions for the ALJ’s inadequate articulation. We have al-

ready concluded that the ALJ erred. The question before

us is now prospective—can we say with great confidence

what the ALJ would do on remand—rather than retro-

spective.

Here, a review of the records convinces us that no rea-

sonable ALJ would reach a contrary decision on remand

regarding McKinzey’s manipulative limitations. While

Dr. Vincent’s opinion is entitled to consideration as a non-

examining source, it does not carry significant weight

in comparison to the opinion of a treating specialist like

Dr. Pardubsky. 20 C.F.R. § 1527(d). Dr. Vincent reviewed

only medical records, and notably could not have taken

into account Dr. Pardubsky’s opinion, based on his per-

sonal observation just a few months after Dr. Vincent’s

opinion, that McKinzey had no significant limitations in

the use of her hands. Dr. Pardubsky’s history of treating

McKinzey, both before and after his August 2005 opinion,

give his opinion singular weight and importance.

Had the opinions been reversed—with Dr. Pardubsky

opining that McKinzey was significantly limited in the use

of her hands—we have no doubt that the ALJ would

not have been free to prefer a contrary opinion from a

state agency physician. See Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408,

415 (7th Cir. 2008) (outlining treating physician rule). In

short, we find the ALJ’s oversight harmless because al-

though she failed to articulate her reasons for rejecting

a portion of Dr. Vincent’s opinion (or failed to notice that

portion, whatever the case may be) the proper place

No. 10-2654 17

of that opinion in the context of the other evidence is

clear. It would serve no purpose to remand this case to the

ALJ for a statement of the obvious.

C. Vision Impairments

Finally, we turn to McKinzey’s argument that the ALJ

erred in determining that jobs exist in the national econ-

omy that McKinzey could perform. The medical voca-

tional guideline grids provide a means for ALJs to deter-

mine whether a person with a particular claimant’s ex-

ertional limitation—standing, walking, lifting, and the

like—can perform any jobs in the national economy.

(20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 provides the

grids and an introduction to their use). The presence

of other, non-exertional limitations, not factored into the

grids, may preclude an ALJ from relying on the grids

and require a consultation with a vocation expert, but

only when the non-exertional limitations “substantially

reduce a range of work an individual can perform.”

Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687, 691, 692 (7th Cir. 1994).

The ALJ found that McKinzey’s additional non-exertional

limitations “have little or no effect on the occupational

base of unskilled light work” and did not consult a voca-

tional expert. McKinzey argues that this was error;

she points to a number of non-exertional limitations,

but only her claim concerning her vision impairment mer-

its discussion.

At the heart of this challenge is the ALJ’s unexplained

finding that McKinzey “requires frequent accommoda-

tion for vision problems.” This finding, claims McKinzey,

18 No. 10-2654

is inconsistent with the ALJ’s subsequent assertion that

such “frequent accommodation” would have little or no

effect on the light unskilled jobs available. Yet again,

while we agree with McKinzey that the ALJ’s decision

was deficient in certain respects—we are left to guess

at what “frequent accommodation” means 4 —we cannot

conclude that any error here warrants a remand.

We would certainly prefer that the ALJ had pro-

vided some detail of what specific vision limitations

and accommodations she found that McKinzey had. But

here it appears obvious why the ALJ concluded that de-

parting from the grids was unnecessary—and thus

equally obvious that any remand would lead to the same

result: nothing in the medical records or even in Mc-

Kinzey’s own testimony suggests the type of visual im-

pairment that would have reasonably caused an ALJ to

consult a vocational expert.

The two Social Security rulings most on point here, 83-

14 and 85-15, suggest that in most cases, only visual im-

pairments severe enough to cause safety concerns will

have a significant impact on the occupational base of

light unskilled work. S.S.R. 83-14 states that visual impair-

ments that would cause a claimant “to be a hazard to self

4

Some confusion may stem from the use of the term “accom-

modation” in a distinct sense at McKinzey’s hearing: there, the

vocational expert and the ALJ, having heard McKinzey describe

her vision impairment, concluded she had limits on her

visual “accommodation”—i.e., her ability to shift focus from

near to far quickly—rather than problems of visual acuity.

No. 10-2654 19

and others—usually a constriction of visual fields rather

than a loss of acuity—the manifestation of tripping over

boxes while walking, inability to detect approaching per-

sons or objects, difficulty in walking up and down stairs,

etc. will indicate to the decisionmaker that the remaining

occupational base is significantly diminished for light

work.” S.S.R. 85-15 appears to go even slightly further: “as

long as [a person] retains sufficient visual acuity to be

able to handle and work with rather large objects (and has

the visual fields to avoid ordinary hazards in a work-

place), there would be a substantial number of jobs re-

maining across all exertional levels.”

The visual impairments suggested by the medical rec-

ords and McKinzey’s own testimony are hardly of the

type or severity contemplated in the relevant Social Secu-

rity rulings. The medical records cited monovision (one

of her eyes was corrected to see distance and the other

up close) and dry eye syndrome as causes for her fluctu-

ating vision throughout the day, which the vocational ex-

pert and the ALJ took to mean difficulty shifting focus

from near to far. McKinzey’s own example of how

she was limited by her vision was that she required extra

time to take measurements during clinical work for her

EEG and sleep study program. Moreover, McKinzey

drove herself to the hearing with the ALJ, suggesting

that her visual impairments did not render her a danger

to self and others. Based on the criteria outlined in the

relevant Social Security rulings, no ALJ would reasonably

find that McKinzey’s need for extra time to shift focus

from near to far would “significantly impact” the occupa-

tional base for light unskilled work.

20 No. 10-2654

III.

Although we have noted some problems with the

way the ALJ articulated her unfavorable determina-

tion—especially in her failure to acknowledge that Dr.

Vincent’s opinion was contrary to her finding and ex-

plain the weight she gave to that opinion—we have

also concluded that remanding this case to the agency

would serve no purpose in light of the overwhelming evi-

dence supporting the ALJ’s decision. Accordingly, we

A FFIRM the district court’s judgment and the ALJ’s deter-

mination.

6-3-11

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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