Opinion

Adams v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina-Wilmington

  • 640 F.3d 550
  • 32 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1
  • 111 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1665
  • 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7036
  • 2011 WL 1289054
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Filed
Apr 6, 2011
Status
Published
Author
Agee
On the bench
Traxler, Niemeyer, Agee
Cited by
249 cases
Authority
More cited than 94.5%

holding a plaintiff is “required to plead sufficient facts” in asserting a claim under section 1983 for a violation of the equal protection clause, “to demonstrate that [s]he has been treated differently from others with whom [s]he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.”

How later courts described this case

  • holding a plaintiff is “required to plead sufficient facts” in asserting a claim under section 1983 for a violation of the equal protection clause, “to demonstrate that [s]he has been treated differently from others with whom [s]he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.”
  • recognizing that plaintiffs “own assertions of discrimination [are] insufficient to counter substantial evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for an adverse employment action” (internal quotation marks omitted)
  • noting that “topics such as academic freedom, civil rights, campus culture, sex, feminism, abortion, homosexuality, religion, and morality . . . plainly touch[] on issues of public, rather than private, concern”
  • applying Pickering to claims that a public university professor was retaliated against for his off-campus comments as well as his books and other publications

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL S. ADAMS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THE TRUSTEES OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA-

WILMINGTON; M. TERRY COFFEY;

JEFF D. ETHERIDGE, JR.; CHARLES

D. EVANS; LEE BREWER GARRETT;

JOHN A. MCNEILL, JR.; WENDY F.

MURPHY; LINDA A. PEARCE; R.

ALLEN RIPPY, SR.; GEORGE M.

TEAGUE; KRISTA S. TILLMAN;

DENNIS T. WORLEY; KATHERINE L.

GURGAINUS, all in their individual

and official capacities; ROSEMARY  No. 10-1413

DEPAOLO, individually and in her

official capacity as Chancellor of

the University of North Carolina-

Wilmington; DAVID P. CORDLE,

individually and in his official

capacity as Dean of the College of

Arts and Sciences at the

University of North Carolina-

Wilmington; KIMBERLY J. COOK,

individually and in her official

capacity as Chair of the

Department of Sociology and

Criminal Justice at the University

of North Carolina-Wilmington;

2 ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW

DIANE LEVY, individually and in 

her official capacity as former

interim Chair of the Department of

Criminology and Sociology at the

University of North Carolina-

Wilmington,

Defendants-Appellees.

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF

UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS; THOMAS

JEFFERSON CENTER FOR THE

PROTECTION OF FREE EXPRESSION;

FOUNDATION FOR INDIVIDUAL

RIGHTS IN EDUCATION,

Amici Supporting Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Greenville.

Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge.

(7:07-cv-00064-H)

Argued: January 26, 2011

Decided: April 6, 2011

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and

NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by published

opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge

Traxler and Judge Niemeyer joined.

ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW 3

COUNSEL

ARGUED: David Austin French, ALLIANCE DEFENSE

FUND, Columbia, Tennessee, for Appellant. Thomas J. Ziko,

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Joseph

J. Martins, Travis C. Barham, ALLIANCE DEFENSE FUND,

Columbia, Tennessee; Robert M. Schmidt, PATRICK

HENRY JUSTICE CENTER, Laurinburg, North Carolina, for

Appellant. Roy Cooper, North Carolina Attorney General,

John P. Scherer II, Assistant Attorney General, NORTH

CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North

Carolina, for Appellees. Martha S. West, General Counsel,

Rachel Levinson, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNI-

VERSITY PROFESSORS, Washington, D.C.; Robert M.

O’Neil, J. Joshua Wheeler, THE THOMAS JEFFERSON

CENTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF FREE EXPRES-

SION, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Amici Supporting Appel-

lant.

OPINION

AGEE, Circuit Judge:

Michael S. Adams appeals from the judgment of the Dis-

trict Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina awarding

summary judgment to the sixteen defendants (collectively

"Defendants"), each of whom is affiliated with Adams’

employer, the University of North Carolina-Wilmington

("UNCW" or "the University").1 Adams brought three claims

1

The defendants are UNCW’s Chancellor, Rosemary DePaolo; twelve

members of UNCW’s Board of Trustees; the Dean of the College of Arts

and Sciences, Dr. David Cordle; the former interim Chair of the Depart-

ment, Dr. Diane Levy; and the current Chair of the Department, Dr. Kim-

berly Cook. The defendants were each named in their individual and

official capacities.

4 ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW

against the Defendants alleging religious and speech-based

discrimination, as well as retaliation, in relation to the deci-

sion not to promote him to the position of full professor at

UNCW. The district court granted the Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on all claims, concluding they were enti-

tled to judgment as a matter of law. For the reasons set forth

below, we affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part the

judgment of the district court.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A.

In 1993, UNCW, a public university of the state of North

Carolina, hired Adams as an assistant professor of criminol-

ogy in the Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice

("the Department"). Over the next five years Adams earned

strong teaching evaluations from both peers and students.

During this period, he received two faculty awards, published

several articles, and was involved in numerous service-related

activities at UNCW and in the larger community. In 1998,

Adams was promoted to the tenured position of associate pro-

fessor.

In 2000, Adams became a Christian, a conversion that

transformed not only his religious beliefs, but also his ideo-

logical views. After his conversion, Adams became increas-

ingly vocal about various political and social issues that arose

within both the UNCW community and society at large. He

became a regular columnist for Townhall.com and appeared

on radio and televisions broadcasts as a commentator. In

2004, he published a book entitled Welcome to the Ivory

Tower of Babel: Confessions of a Conservative College Pro-

fessor, a collection of previously-published columns and new

material. Throughout this time, Adams continued to receive

strong teaching reviews from students and faculty.

As Adams cultivated his conservative standing beyond the

UNCW campus, some tension evolved within the UNCW

ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW 5

community. Some UNCW employees indicated discomfort

with Adams’ views and his manner of expressing them. From

time to time, UNCW officials fielded complaints from mem-

bers of the Board of Trustees, the faculty and staff, and the

general public about Adams’ public expressions of his views.

Correspondence about the complaints indicates that while

UNCW officials, some of whom are named Defendants, occa-

sionally expressed personal disagreement with the content of

Adams’ columns, they uniformly recognized that the First

Amendment and principles of academic freedom protected

Adams’ writings and other expressions of his views. At one

point, defendant Levy, then interim chair of the Department,

suggested that Adams alter the tone of his speech to be less

"‘caustic’" and more "‘cerebral’" "like William F. Buckley" in

order to "‘make things a whole lot more pleasant around the

office.’" (J.A. 43.)

In 2004, Adams applied for promotion to the position of

full professor. At UNCW, the promotion process is self-

initiated, meaning that Adams could apply at any time and

there was not an advertised "opening" for the position. The

UNCW Faculty Handbook ("the Handbook") described the

criteria for a promotion. Applicants are "evaluated in four

areas: teaching, research or artistic achievement, service, and

scholarship and professional development" and an applicant’s

record "should demonstrate evidence of steady growth and

maturation." (J.A. 649.) Moreover, "excellence in teaching

and in artistic achievement or research . . . rank highest

among the criteria for tenure and promotion decisions." (J.A.

649.) The Handbook specifically notes that "meeting any

quantifiable measures provided does not guarantee the award

of tenure or promotion." (J.A. 649-50.) Rather, the applicant

must "provide persuasive documentation that qualitative

criteria as well as any quantifiable accomplishments have

been met." (J.A. 649.)

The Handbook also contains specific explanations of the

requirements for promotion to full professor. For the teaching

6 ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW

component, "excellence is expected" and "will be reflected in

teaching performance and content and in teaching activities

outside the classroom," as well as in the sharing of teaching

skills. (J.A. 651.) With respect to research accomplishment,

faculty are "expected to demonstrate a tangible record of

professionally-reviewed substantial contributions to one’s dis-

cipline" including "more tangible evidence of accomplish-

ment than that of the associate professor rank, [although] the

difference in artistic and research expectations for a full pro-

fessor is not solely quantitative. Greater quality, maturity, sig-

nificance and originality . . . are expected at this rank." (J.A.

651.) For the service component, the criterion is as generally

described above, except that candidates "must show evidence

of leadership in . . . various service areas." (J.A. 653.) "Schol-

arship and professional development are continuing expecta-

tions of every faculty member," and are demonstrated

"primarily in growth and improvement in teaching, research

accomplishments[,] . . . and service contributions." (J.A. 653.)

Adams’ application included standard information regard-

ing his education and professional history, as well as his aca-

demic status at UNCW, including courses taught, information

about advisees, committees, and boards he had served on at

UNCW, the results of recent peer evaluations, and honors and

awards he had earned during his time at UNCW. Adams also

listed ten authored or co-authored "[r]efereed publications

(including juried or peer-reviewed . . . writings)" that had

been published since 1992, and one additional article of this

type that had been accepted for publication. (J.A. 155-56.)

Relevant to the issues in this case, Adams’ application also

cited some of the external writings and appearances he had

made since his conversion experience in 2000. Adams also

listed non-refereed publications as part of his research and

scholarship, including his book Welcome to the Ivory Tower

of Babel and another book he had co-authored that was under

consideration for publication, Indoctri-Nation: How universi-

ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW 7

ties are destroying America.2 Under the "Service" heading,

J.A. 162, in the "Optional subcategories" subheading, J.A.

163, Adams included the following:

Please note that my informal advising to student

organizations, especially Christian groups, is also a

prominent part of my service activities. . . .

Also note that I use my national column (pub-

lished on TownHall.com and sometimes in Human

Events) to help Christian groups fight discrimina-

tion. One prominent example is a Florida college

that tried to ban a Christian group from showing The

Passion of the Christ. My column revealed that the

school had falsely claimed to have a ban on showing

"R" rated movies. When I discovered they had

showed secular "R" rated movies in the past, the

school reversed its position. I routinely expose such

cases of anti-religious bigotry on our campuses.

(J.A. 164.) And under the "other" subheading for "Service,"

J.A. 165, Adams referred to being "an activist in the campus

free speech movement[, which has] generated a good deal of

publicity for UNCW," and he included a positive quote about

himself from "nationally syndicated talk show host Neal

Boortz." (J.A. 165.) As part of his community service, Adams

listed numerous speeches on "Academic Freedom" as well as

conservative issues, which he had given to conservative orga-

nizations and at universities, as well as radio and television

interviews. We will refer collectively to the foregoing materi-

als listed in his application, which were not primarily devoted

to purely academic subjects in his field, as Adams’ "speech."

It is this speech which is a primary focus of Adams’ claims.

2

Although mentioned in his application, a copy of Welcome to the Ivory

Tower of Babel was not included with the application.

8 ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW

Under standard UNCW procedure, Dr. Cook, the Depart-

ment Chair, after consultation with senior Department faculty,

was responsible for determining whether to recommend

Adams for promotion to full professor. If she did not recom-

mend him, the application process ended. If she did recom-

mend him, then the process would continue to the next level

of consideration.

Upon receiving Adams’ application, Cook forwarded it to

the senior Department faculty, asking for their initial impres-

sions prior to a meeting at which they would discuss the

application more formally. Cook then compiled the individual

comments into a "document summarizing the major themes

raised in the initial senior faculty review" with the goal of cre-

ating "a document for discussion in the meeting of senior fac-

ulty." (J.A. 513.) Participants in the meeting that followed,

some of whom voted in favor of Adams’ promotion and some

of whom did not, uniformly described the process as "profes-

sional" and lacking rancor or hostility toward either the con-

tent of Adams’ speech or his political or religious beliefs. To

the extent that Adams’ columns and book were discussed, the

conversation centered on how to evaluate the materials for

"scholarliness" because they were not peer-reviewed or tradi-

tional academic writing related to his academic discipline. In

the end, the senior faculty voted 7-2 to oppose Adams’ pro-

motion. Dr. Cook undertook her own review, but in part

because she looks for "overwhelming support from the senior

faculty," which she found lacking, she agreed with their deci-

sion, and did not recommend Adams for promotion to full

professor. (J.A. 514.)

Following this decision, Adams asked Dr. Cook for a writ-

ten explanation. Her draft response noted that Adams had an

"adequate" record though there were concerns as to each

criteria for promotion, and that "the area of research" was "in-

adequate to merit promotion to Professor at this time" because

Adams’ scholarly productivity was "too thin." (J.A. 704.) Dr.

Cook subsequently edited this explanation. In the correspon-

ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW 9

dence she eventually sent to Adams, Dr. Cook explained that

the decision "was based exclusively on the promotion applica-

tion and supplementary materials you submitted and [Cook’s]

consultation with the senior faculty in accordance with exist-

ing UNCW . . . policies and procedures." (J.A. 181.) She indi-

cated an "overwhelming consensus" of the senior faculty did

not support the promotion and found "the lack of support

from the senior faculty" provided "compelling" evidence that

Adams’ "record [did] not merit promotion to professor at this

time." (J.A. 181.)

When asked about certain differences between her initial

draft and the final explanation, Dr. Cook explained that while

Adams’ teaching and service were "adequate," that did not

mean that they were sufficient to "equal the significant stan-

dards required for promotion" and that what she meant was

that while there were concerns in all three criteria, "the areas

of concern in [Adams’] teaching or service record would not

have kept him from promotion" had his research record been

stronger. (J.A. 519.) When Adams requested an additional

explanation, Dr. Cook expressed reservations that "distilling

the reasons for denial into one sentence (as you requested ear-

lier) runs the risk of being incomplete." (J.A. 184.) She reiter-

ated the criteria for the rank of professor and concluded:

The overriding concern regarding your record to date

is in the area of scholarly research productivity. The

scholarly criterion for promotion to professor

requires that a "tangible record of research" is

accomplished to merit promotion. Since your last

promotion in 1998 [to tenured associate professor],

your scholarly productivity in peer-reviewed venues

does not demonstrate a cumulative "tangible" pattern

of academic expertise in sociology, criminology

and/or criminal justice to merit promotion to profes-

sor at this time. The teaching criterion for promotion

to professor requires one to have documented "dis-

tinguished accomplishment" in that professional

10 ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW

arena. While your teaching record is the strongest

aspect of your application for promotion thus far, it

does not satisfy this standard. The service criterion

requires a "significant record" of service . . . . Your

service record to the university and to the academic

disciplines . . . is judged to be insufficient for promo-

tion.

(J.A. 184-85.)

Additional facts relevant to each argument on appeal are

discussed in context below as we review the district court’s

holding as to each claim.

B.

After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Adams

filed his complaint in the district court asserting claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment Retaliation and View-

point Discrimination, Denial of Equal Protection under the

Fourteenth Amendment, and religious discrimination under

Title VII.3 The complaint named the Defendants in their indi-

vidual and official capacities.

The Defendants first moved to dismiss the complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court

granted the motion as to monetary claims against the Defen-

dants in their official capacities and as to Adams’ Title VII

claims for religious discrimination against the Defendants in

their individual capacities.4

Following discovery, the Defendants moved for summary

judgment. The district court granted the motion and entered

judgment in favor of the Defendants as to all claims. Adams

3

The operative pleading is Adams’ first amended verified complaint,

which we will refer to as the "complaint."

4

Adams does not contest any aspect of that order.

ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW 11

noted a timely appeal, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291.

II. Standard of Review

We review an award of summary judgment de novo. Hawk-

spere Shipping Co. v. Intamex, S.A., 330 F.3d 225, 232 (4th

Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is only appropriate "if the

pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and

any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We construe the evi-

dence in the light most favorable to Adams, the party oppos-

ing the Defendants’ summary judgment motion, and draw all

reasonable inferences in his favor. Hill v. Lockheed Martin

Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 283 (4th Cir. 2004) (en

banc).

III. Overview

Adams’ complaint alleged, in essence, three causes of

action: (1) religious discrimination, in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"); (2) viewpoint discrimination

and retaliation for protected expression, in violation of the

First Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3)

denial of equal protection, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and the Fourteenth Amendment. On appeal, Adams argues the

grant of summary judgment to the Defendants on each of

these claims was erroneous either because material facts were

in dispute or the district court made substantive errors of law

in analyzing the claims.

Before undertaking our analysis, it is important to under-

score the context in which we consider Adams’ claims. Fol-

lowing the Supreme Court’s directive, courts have been

reluctant

12 ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW

to trench on the prerogatives of state and local edu-

cational institutions [because of the courts’] respon-

sibility to safeguard their academic freedom, a

special concern of the First Amendment. If a federal

court is not the appropriate forum in which to review

the multitude of personnel decisions that are made

daily by public agencies, far less is it suited to evalu-

ate the substance of the multitude of academic deci-

sions that are made daily by faculty members of

public educational institutions — decisions that

require an expert evaluation of cumulative informa-

tion and [are] not readily adapted to the procedural

tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking.

Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226

(1985) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see

also Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 409-10, 412 (4th Cir.

2000) (en banc) (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence

regarding "academic freedom," observing that it is a "term

that is often used, but little explained, by federal courts," and

noting that the Supreme Court has not established "a First

Amendment right of academic freedom that belongs to the

professor as an individual," but rather "to the extent [the

Supreme Court] has constitutionalized a right of academic

freedom at all, [it] appears to have recognized only an institu-

tional right of self-governance in academic affairs").

For this reason

[u]niversity employment cases have always created

a decisional dilemma for the courts. Unsure how to

evaluate the requirements for appointment, reappoin-

tment and tenure, and reluctant to interfere with the

subjective and scholarly judgments which are

involved, the courts have refused to impose their

judgment as to whether the aggrieved academician

should have been awarded the desired appointment

or promotion. Rather, the courts review has been

ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW 13

narrowly directed as to whether the appointment or

promotion was denied because of a discriminatory

reason.

Smith v. Univ. of North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 345-46 (4th

Cir. 1980) (internal citations omitted). It is with this well-

established understanding of the limited review courts may

undertake in cases involving employment decisions of aca-

demic institutions that we consider Adams’ claims.

IV. Title VII Claim

Adams asserted the Defendants violated Title VII’s protec-

tion against religious discrimination by "subjecting [him] to

numerous, intrusive, and harassing investigations, asking him

to terminate his First Amendment activities, and refusing to

promote him to full professor because of his outspoken Chris-

tian and conservative beliefs." (J.A. 51.) The district court

granted summary judgment to the Defendants based on its

conclusion that Adams had not brought forth direct or indirect

evidence of religious discrimination. Viewing Adams’ argu-

ments as "surmises" and "conjecture," the court held Adams

failed to produce any record evidence that reflected a discrim-

inatory attitude which bore directly on the contested employ-

ment decision, as required under Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d

373 (4th Cir. 2001). (J.A. 1378.) Furthermore, the district

court found Adams failed to establish a material factual dis-

pute under the burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Adams contends on appeal that he produced direct and

indirect evidence of religious discrimination that created a tri-

able issue of fact as to the reason for denying him promotion

to full professor. Adams points to his widely-known religious

and conservative views and the senior faculty’s comments

about his publications as direct evidence that he was denied

a promotion based on those views. As indirect evidence of

discrimination, Adams asserts he was the only professor with

14 ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW

his credentials to be denied a promotion to full professor in

the past twenty-five years. In addition, he cites idiosyncrasies

and misrepresentations during the promotion decision process

as evidence of pretext.

Title VII makes it "an unlawful practice for an employer

. . . to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such

individual’s . . . religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). To prove

his claim, Adams had to "demonstrate that [the Defendants]

treated [him] differently than other employees because of

[his] religious beliefs." Chalmers v. Tulon Co., 101 F.3d

1012, 1017 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasis omitted). Adams satis-

fies this "burden at the summary judgment stage if [he] estab-

lishes that [his] job performance was satisfactory and

‘provides direct or indirect evidence’ whose cumulative pro-

bative force supports a reasonable inference’" that the

employment decision was discriminatory. Id. (quoting Law-

rence v. Mars, Inc., 955 F.2d 902, 905-06 (4th Cir. 1992); see

also Hill, 354 F.3d at 284-85.

Having reviewed the record in the light most favorable to

Adams, we agree with the district court that he failed to set

forth direct evidence of religious discrimination. To do so,

Adams was required to show that religion was a "motivating

factor" in the decision not to promote him. Hill, 354 F.3d at

285 (quotation omitted). Adams did not make such a showing

on this record, and his arguments demand pure speculation.

There is simply no direct evidence that the Defendants treated

Adams differently based on his religious beliefs.

We also conclude the district court properly held that

Adams failed to satisfy his burden for proving discrimination

using the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas. To

demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination, Adams had

to show that: (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he suf-

fered an adverse employment action; (3) at the time of the

adverse action, he was performing his job at a level that met

his employer’s legitimate expectations and was qualified for

ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW 15

the promotion; and (4) he was rejected under circumstances

giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Taylor

v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 230 (4th Cir. 1999), abro-

gated on other grounds as recognized by Hill, 354 F.3d at

284. "If a prima facie case is presented, the burden shifts to

the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-

son for the adverse employment action." Hill, 354 F.3d at

285. If the employer meets that burden of production, "the

burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that the employer’s stated reasons were not its

true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Id. (inter-

nal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The district court found, and the Defendants do not contest,

that Adams met the first two McDonnell-Douglas prongs. The

district court assumed without deciding that Adams also satis-

fied the third prong and was qualified for promotion to full

professor. Although the Defendants do contest this point, we

will also assume Adams was qualified for promotion because

the last McDonnell-Douglas prong is dispositive of Adams’

claim.

The district court did not err in concluding Adams failed to

satisfy the fourth prong of establishing his prima facie case –

that he was denied a promotion under circumstances giving

rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Adams con-

tends such an inference arises from the fact that "he is the

only Christian conservative in his Department" and "the only

professor in the past twenty-five years to be denied the rank

of full professor at the Department level with teaching awards

and ten or more refereed publications on his application."

(Appellant’s Opening Br. 66.) As the district court observed,

this argument fails in several respects. Although Adams con-

tends he is the only "conservative Christian," his Title VII

claim rests on evidence of religious discrimination rather than

political or social ideology and Adams "forecasts no evidence

that he is the [D]epartment’s only Christian." (J.A. 1380.)

Furthermore, Adams’ comparison of his qualifications to

16 ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW

those of others in the Department cannot, by itself, meet his

burden. There must be some additional tie to a religious

motive for the decision not to promote him and Adams failed

to make that showing. Although some of his writings con-

tained religious content and were considered during the deci-

sionmaking process, that fact, in and of itself, does not give

rise to an inference of discrimination. Adams’ conjecture

links the two, but nothing more substantial does.

But even if we assume that Adams had established a prima

facie case, the Defendants satisfied their burden to "articulate

a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employ-

ment action." Cf. Hill, 354 F.3d at 285. The Defendants

offered numerous legitimate reasons for the decision not to

promote Adams, including the small number of peer-reviewed

single author publications since Adams’ last promotion.

Consequently, even if the burden then shifted back to

Adams to show pretext, we hold that he has failed to raise a

genuine issue of material fact that the Defendants’ explana-

tion is purely pretextual. "A plaintiff alleging a failure to pro-

mote can prove pretext by showing that he was better

qualified, or by amassing circumstantial evidence that other-

wise undermines the credibility of the employer’s stated rea-

sons." Heiko v. Colombo Sav. Bank, 434 F.3d 249, 259 (4th

Cir. 2006). Due to the nature of Adams’ promotion, i.e., he

was not competing against someone else who got the position,

he cannot show he was more qualified than another applicant

who was promoted. Adams posits instead that he was as qual-

ified as other individuals who had previously been promoted

to full professor. Adams’ attempt to compare qualifications

ignores "the inevitable element of subjectivity" involved in

promotion decisions in the university setting. See Smith, 632

F.2d at 342. Subjectivity in such promotion decisions is per-

mitted so long as it lacks discriminatory intent. Id. at 345-46

(quoting Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1156-57

(2d Cir. 1978) ("[T]he law does not require, in the first

instance, that employment be rational, wise, or well-

ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW 17

considered—only that it be nondiscriminatory.")). Purely

numerical comparisons are thus insufficient to demonstrate

pretext in this context. Id. at 345 ("[S]ince professors are indi-

viduals and perform different roles within a department, it is

difficult to compare the reasons for promoting one faculty

member with the reasons for promoting or not promoting

another.").

Importantly, in demonstrating the Defendants’ decision was

pretext, Adams had to prove "both that the reason was false,

and that discrimination was the real reason." Jiminez v. Mary

Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 1995) (quotation

omitted). Adams cannot rely on his "own assertions of dis-

crimination[, which] in and of themselves are insufficient to

counter substantial evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory

reasons for an adverse employment action." Williams v. Cer-

beronics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 456 (4th Cir. 1989). In light of

Adams’ burden of proof, we find no error in the district

court’s determination that the record lacked evidence to sup-

port Adams’ allegations of religious discrimination. Accord-

ingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to the Defendants on Adams’ Title VII claim.

V. First Amendment Claims

Adams separately argues the district court erred in granting

summary judgment to the Defendants on his First Amendment

retaliation and viewpoint discrimination claims. To begin our

examination of this argument, we review well-established

principles that guide our analysis.

The First Amendment protects not only the affirmative

right to speak, but also the "right to be free from retaliation

by a public official for the exercise of that right." Suarez

Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 685 (4th Cir. 2000).

While government employees do not lose their constitutional

rights at work, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the

government may impose certain restraints on its employees’

18 ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW

speech and take action against them that would be unconstitu-

tional if applied to the general public. See City of San Diego

v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391

U.S. 563, 568 (1968) ("[T]he State has interests as an

employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ

significantly from those it possesses in connection with regu-

lation of the speech of the citizenry in general."); see also

Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 406 ("[T]he state, as an employer,

undoubtedly possesses greater authority to restrict the speech

of its employees than it has as sovereign to restrict the speech

of the citizenry as a whole.").

In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968),

and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), the Supreme

Court analyzed the competing interests at play between the

public employee, "as a citizen, in commenting upon matters

of public concern" and the government, "as an employer, in

promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs

through its employees." Connick, 461 U.S. at 142 (quoting

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). In McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271

(4th Cir. 1998), we explained that Pickering and Connick bal-

ance those competing interests in the context of a claim for

retaliation by requiring the court to determine:

(1) whether the public employee was speaking as a

citizen upon a matter of public concern or as an

employee about a matter of personal interest; (2)

whether the employee’s interest in speaking upon the

matter of public concern outweighed the govern-

ment’s interest in providing effective and efficient

services to the public; and (3) whether the employ-

ee’s speech was a substantial factor in the employ-

ee’s [adverse employment] decision.

157 F.3d at 277-78 ("the McVey test"); see also Lee v. York

Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 693-94 (4th Cir. 2007).

To avoid summary judgment on his retaliation and view-

point discrimination claims, Adams was required to adduce

ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW 19

evidence sufficient to show material facts in dispute as to each

of the three prongs of the McVey test. The district court, in

granting summary judgment to the Defendants, considered

only the first McVey prong, whether Adams’ speech was that

of "a citizen [speaking] upon a matter of public concern." The

court made no ruling as to the other McVey factors. Accord-

ingly, we examine whether the district court erred in awarding

summary judgment based on the first McVey prong.

Citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), for the

proposition that "when a public employee makes a statement

pursuant to his ‘official duties,’ he does not ‘speak as a citi-

zen,’" the district court observed that it "must focus not on the

content of the speech but on the role the speaker occupied

when he said it." (J.A. 1385.) The court then concluded that

when Adams listed his columns, publications, and public

appearances in his promotion application, he "implicit[ly]

acknowledge[d] that they were expressions made pursuant to

his professional duties—that he was acting as a faculty mem-

ber when he said them." (J.A. 1385.) As a consequence, the

district court concluded that Adams’ speech was not protected

by the First Amendment because Adams’ "inclusion of the

speech in his application for promotion trumped all earlier

actions and marked his speech, at least for promotion pur-

poses, as made pursuant to his official duties." (J.A. 1386.)

As we explain below, the district court misread Garcetti.

The district court’s decision rests on several fundamental

errors including its holding that protected speech was con-

verted into unprotected speech based on its use after the fact.

In addition, the district court applied Garcetti without

acknowledging, let alone addressing, the clear language in

that opinion that casts doubt on whether the Garcetti analysis

applies in the academic context of a public university. See

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. Nor did the district court take into

20 ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW

consideration the only Fourth Circuit case addressing a simi-

lar issue, Lee, 484 F.3d at 694 & n.11.5

A.

The district court’s initial error lies in its conclusion that

Adams’ speech, which the Defendants agree was protected

First Amendment speech when initially given, was converted

into unprotected speech based on factors that came into play

only after the protected speech was made. Although the dis-

trict court framed the issue properly by noting it must focus

"not on the content of the speech but on the role the speaker

occupied when he said it," J.A. 1385, the court’s subsequent

analysis ignores the role Adams occupied when he "spoke."

Instead, the court’s basis for determining the First Amend-

ment did not protect Adams’ speech was Adams’ subsequent

inclusion of past protected speech as part of his promotion

application. In effect, the district court held that Adams’

speech in his columns, books, and commentaries, although

undoubtedly protected speech when given, was somehow

transformed into unprotected speech because Dr. Cook and

others read the same items from a different perspective long

after Adams’ speech was uttered.

The district court cited no precedent for this determination,

that protected speech can lose its First Amendment protected

status based on a later reading of that speech. Although the

Defendants understandably agree with the district court’s

holding, they also provide no precedent for the phenomenon

of converting protected speech to unprotected speech after the

fact. Nor does the district court’s analysis find any support in

Garcetti, which focused on the nature of the employee’s

speech at the time it was made. See 547 U.S. at 421-22. Noth-

ing about listing the speech on Adams’ promotion application

5

See infra Part IV.B.

ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW 21

changed Adams’ status when he spoke or the content of the

speech when made.6

We do not agree with the district court’s observation that

its holding was required because otherwise it

would allow those in [Adams’] position to place

employers in a double bind: either neglect employee

requests and refuse to look at material, fueling alle-

gations of free speech violations grounded in the

refusal; or consider the material, knowing that doing

so will open them up, in the event of an adverse out-

come, to claims of free speech violations for basing

denials on protected speech.

(J.A. 1386.) This purported catch-22 is illusory. Adams’

inclusion of the speech at issue as part of his application pro-

cess asked the Defendants to consider it not according to the

content qua speech, but as factoring into the sweeping

requirements of scholarship and service necessary to support

his promotion to full professor. The Defendants were not pre-

cluded from examining the materials for a permissible pur-

pose using lawful criteria. At the same time, their review of

those materials can be examined for an impermissible dis-

criminatory use. This "bind" is no different than the common-

place consideration of criteria that govern all university

employment decisions. It does not open the Defendants up to

an insurmountable dilemma as misidentified by the district

court.

Accordingly, we find the district court’s conclusion that

Adams’ speech was converted from protected to unprotected

speech to be error as a matter of law.

6

For the reasons set forth in infra Parts IV.B and C, Adams’ speech was

entitled to First Amendment protection at the time it was initially made.

22 ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW

B.

We are also persuaded that Garcetti would not apply in the

academic context of a public university as represented by the

facts of this case. Our conclusion is based on the clear reser-

vation of the issue in Garcetti, Fourth Circuit precedent, and

the aspect of scholarship and teaching reflected by Adams’

speech.

In Garcetti, the Supreme Court conducted a specific analy-

sis associated with the first prong of the McVey test and the

Pickering-Connick factors, to determine whether a public

employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.

The plaintiff, Ceballos, wrote a memorandum as part of his

official duties as a deputy district attorney asserting various

perceived inaccuracies in an affidavit used to obtain a search

warrant in a pending criminal case. 547 U.S. 413-15. Cebal-

los’ employer, the county district attorney’s office, subse-

quently altered Ceballos’ duties, and Ceballos sued alleging

retaliation based on his memo. Id. at 415. The Supreme Court

determined that Ceballos’ claim failed because he was not

speaking as a citizen when he wrote the memo. In so doing,

the Court concluded, "[r]estricting speech that owes its exis-

tence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does

not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as

a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer

control over what the employer itself has commissioned or

created." Id. at 421-22. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held

the First Amendment does not "protect[ ] a government

employee from discipline based on speech made pursuant to

the employee’s official duties." Id. at 413.

Toward the conclusion of its analysis, and in response to

Justice Souter’s dissent, the Supreme Court stated:

There is some argument that expression related to

academic scholarship or classroom instruction impli-

cates additional constitutional interests that are not

ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW 23

fully accounted for by this Court’s customary

employee-speech jurisprudence. We need not, and

for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis

we conduct today would apply in the same manner

to a case involving speech related to scholarship or

teaching.

Id. at 425. As other courts of appeals have noted, this caveat

has left unclear the applicability of Garcetti in the context of

"speech related to scholarship or teaching." E.g., Gorum v.

Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 186 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2009) (comment-

ing on the uncertain implications of the Supreme Court’s

statement, citing law review articles discussing the dilemma,

and comparing the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Lee to the Sev-

enth Circuit’s decision in Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769

(7th Cir. 2008), which applied Garcetti in an academic set-

ting).

The plain language of Garcetti thus explicitly left open the

question of whether its principles apply in the academic genre

where issues of "scholarship or teaching" are in play. We rec-

ognized this fact in Lee, the only Fourth Circuit case to dis-

cuss Garcetti’s applicability in this area:

The Supreme Court in Garcetti held that when pub-

lic employees make statements pursuant to their offi-

cial duties, the employees are not speaking as

citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Con-

stitution does not insulate their communications

from employer discipline. The Court explicitly did

not decide whether this analysis would apply in the

same manner to a case involving speech related to

teaching. Thus, we continue to apply the Pickering-

Connick standard . . . to this appeal.

484 F.3d at 694 n.11 (citations and quotation omitted).

Although Lee concerned a public high school teacher’s First

Amendment rights in the classroom, its basis for using the

24 ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW

Pickering-Connick analysis as opposed to Garcetti is equally

— if not more — valid in the public university setting, which

is the specific arena that concerned both the majority and the

dissent in Garcetti. Therefore, we are not compelled by Gar-

cetti to extend its principles to the case at bar.

There may be instances in which a public university faculty

member’s assigned duties include a specific role in declaring

or administering university policy, as opposed to scholarship

or teaching. In that circumstance, Garcetti may apply to the

specific instances of the faculty member’s speech carrying out

those duties. However, that is clearly not the circumstance in

the case at bar. Defendants agree Adams’ speech involves

scholarship and teaching; indeed, as we discuss below, that is

one of the reasons they say Garcetti should apply – because

UNCW paid Adams to be a scholar and a teacher regardless

of the setting for his work. But the scholarship and teaching

in this case, Adams’ speech, was intended for and directed at

a national or international audience on issues of public impor-

tance unrelated to any of Adams’ assigned teaching duties at

UNCW or any other terms of his employment found in the

record. Defendants concede none of Adams’ speech was

undertaken at the direction of UNCW, paid for by UNCW, or

had any direct application to his UNCW duties.7

Applying Garcetti to the academic work of a public univer-

sity faculty member under the facts of this case could place

beyond the reach of First Amendment protection many forms

of public speech or service a professor engaged in during his

employment. That would not appear to be what Garcetti

intended, nor is it consistent with our long-standing recogni-

tion that no individual loses his ability to speak as a private

citizen by virtue of public employment. In light of the above

factors, we will not apply Garcetti to the circumstances of this

case.

7

Defendants agree independent third parties paid Adams for his col-

umns, books, commentaries and speeches.

ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW 25

The Defendants nonetheless contend that because Adams

was employed as an associate professor, and his position

required him to engage in scholarship, research, and service

to the community, Adams’ speech constituted "statements

made pursuant to [his] official duties." Cf., Garcetti, 547 U.S.

at 421. In other words, the Defendants argue Adams was

employed to undertake his speech. This argument underscores

the problem recognized by both the majority and the dissent

in Garcetti, that "implicates additional constitutional interests

that are not fully accounted for" when it comes to "expression

related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction." Id.

at 425; see also id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("I have to

hope that today’s majority does not mean to imperil First

Amendment protection of academic freedom in public col-

leges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and

write ‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’"). Put simply, Adams’

speech was not tied to any more specific or direct employee

duty than the general concept that professors will engage in

writing, public appearances, and service within their respec-

tive fields. For all the reasons discussed above, that thin

thread is insufficient to render Adams’ speech "pursuant to

[his] official duties" as intended by Garcetti.

C.

Instead, a review of Adams’ speech utilizes the Pickering-

Connick analysis for determining whether it was that of a pub-

lic employee, speaking as a citizen upon a matter of public

concern. See McVey, 157 F.3d at 277-78. This analysis per-

mits a nuanced consideration of the range of issues that arise

in the unique genre of academia. Under that analysis, "[t]o

determine whether speech involves a matter of public con-

cern, we examine the content, form, and context of the speech

at issue in light of the entire record." Kirby v. City of Eliza-

beth City, 388 F.3d 440, 446 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Connick,

461 U.S. at 147-48). "Speech involves a matter of public con-

cern when it involves an issue of social, political, or other

interest to a community." Id. (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at

26 ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW

146); see also City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 83-84 (observ-

ing that "public concern is something that is a subject of legit-

imate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and

of value and concern to the public at the time of publication").

For purposes of this inquiry, it does not matter "how interest-

ing or important the subject of an employee’s speech is," and

"the place where the speech occurs is [also] irrelevant." Urof-

sky, 216 F.3d at 407.

Having reviewed the record, we conclude Adams’ speech

was clearly that of a citizen speaking on a matter of public

concern. Adams’ columns addressed topics such as academic

freedom, civil rights, campus culture, sex, feminism, abortion,

homosexuality, religion, and morality. Such topics plainly

touched on issues of public, rather than private, concern. E.g.,

Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-148 (holding that a questionnaire

almost entirely addressing internal office matters involved a

matter of private concern); Boring v. Buncombe County Bd.

of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (holding

that a teacher’s selection of a play to be presented at a public

school constituted a matter of private concern).

The Defendants’ arguments to the contrary rest on the same

fallacy engaged by the district court, and focus not on the

nature of Adams’ speech at the time it was made, but on his

inclusion of those materials in the "private" context of his pro-

motion application. Nothing in the district court’s analysis or

the Defendants’ contentions rebut the conclusion that Adams’

speech was that of "a citizen speaking on a matter of public

concern."

D.

For the aforementioned reasons, we hold that the district

court erred as a matter of law in determining Adams failed to

satisfy the first prong of the McVey test. We further hold that

under the Pickering-Adams analysis, Adams has satisfied the

first McVey prong as a matter of law. Because the district

ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW 27

court has never addressed whether the second and third

prongs of the McVey test are met in this case, we remand the

case for further proceedings relevant to that determination.8

As a final matter, we note that remand is appropriate

despite the Defendants’ alternative argument that the district

court erred in denying their defense of qualified immunity.

The Defendants assert they were entitled to immunity as to

Adams’ First Amendment claim because their conduct did not

violate a "clearly established constitutional right" given the

uncertain state of the law in the area of what protection should

be afforded to public university teacher’s speech following Gar-

cetti.9 We disagree. Garcetti provided an additional compo-

nent to the McVey test and the Pickering-Connick analysis

traditionally applied in assessing whether the First Amend-

ment protects a public employee’s speech. However, the

underlying right Adams asserts the Defendants violated —

that of a public employee to speak as a citizen on matters of

public concern — is clearly established and something a rea-

sonable person in the Defendants’ position should have

8

The district court also granted the Defendants summary judgment on

what it identified as Adams’ four retaliation claims that did not involve his

promotion. Because the court’s "official duties" analysis did not apply to

the retaliation claims, the court found that those claims failed because

Adams failed "to forecast evidence sufficient to withstand summary judg-

ment on the McVey test’s requirement of a causal nexus between the

speech and any of the alleged retaliatory employment actions." (J.A.

1387.) Although Adams’ opening brief mentioned the four purported retal-

iatory actions, he never addresses the court’s dispositive finding as to

those claims. Accordingly, Adams has abandoned those claims and we do

not address them on appeal. See Fed. R. App. Pro. 28(a)(9)(A); see also

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 18 F.3d 269, 276-77 (4th Cir. 1994),

rev’d on other grounds, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).

9

To determine whether the Defendants were entitled to immunity, the

Court must (1) identify the right allegedly violated, (2) consider whether

at the time of the alleged violation the right was clearly established, and

(3) determine whether a reasonable person in the Defendants’ position

would have known that their actions violated that right. Wilson v. Layne,

141 F.3d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

28 ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW

known was protected. As such, the Defendants are not entitled

to qualified immunity, and the proper course is to remand

Adams’ claims for further consideration under the second and

third prongs of the McVey test.

VI. Equal Protection

Adams lastly contends that the district court erred in grant-

ing the Defendants summary judgment on his Equal Protec-

tion claim. As noted, the district court concluded Adams

failed to bring forth any evidence that the Defendants’ actions

were based on Adams’ Christian beliefs or that any evidence

forecast that he was treated "differently than a similarly situ-

ated professor on any other basis." (J.A. 1389.) Adams con-

tends this was error because the evidence in the record creates

a genuine issue of fact as to whether the Defendants discrimi-

nated against his conservative religious viewpoint in favor of

faculty who expressed "left-leaning viewpoints." (Appellant’s

Opening Br. 70.)

Public employees are entitled to bring § 1983 actions

asserting claims based on equal protection violations. See

Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 382-83 (4th Cir. 2003). To

succeed on such a claim, Adams was required to plead suffi-

cient facts to "‘demonstrate that he has been treated differ-

ently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that

the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purpose-

ful discrimination.’" Williams v. Hansen, 326 F.3d 569, 576

(4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d

648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001)). Having reviewed the record, we

agree with the district court’s conclusion that Adams’ evi-

dence creates no issue of disputed fact that the Defendants’

decision to deny his promotion was the result of intentional or

purposeful discrimination based on his religious beliefs, or

that he was treated differently from others with whom he was

similarly situated. As discussed in detail above, we are reluc-

tant to revisit the "subjective and scholarly judgments"

involved in university tenure and promotion decisions by

ADAMS v. TRUSTEES OF UNCW 29

engaging in the sort of comparisons to other promotion deci-

sions that Adams would have us undertake. Cf. Smith, 632

F.2d at 345-46. Accordingly, the district court did not err in

granting the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on

this claim.

VII.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s

grant of summary judgment as to Adams’ First Amendment

claims of viewpoint discrimination and retaliation. We affirm

the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Adams’

Title VII and Equal Protection claims. Accordingly, we

remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion as to the viewpoint discrimination and retaliation

claims.

AFFIRMED IN PART,

REVERSED IN PART,

AND REMANDED

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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