noting that “[e]ven for latent defects, the seller’s duty terminated when a new owner discovered or should reasonably have discovered and had a reasonable opportunity to abate the condition”
How later courts described this case
- noting that “[e]ven for latent defects, the seller’s duty terminated when a new owner discovered or should reasonably have discovered and had a reasonable opportunity to abate the condition”
- “The applicable standard of proof for punitive damages is preponderance of the evidence, which the Supreme Court held suffices even in civil suits involving ‘proof of acts that expose a party to criminal prosecution.’”
- "The applicable standard of proof for punitive damages is preponderance of the evidence....”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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DECISION AND ORDER
CURTIN, District Judge.
I.
INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
In 1979, plaintiffs State of New York (“State”) and the United States of America (“United States”) brought suit against defendant Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corporation (“Hooker,” “OCC,” or “the Company”)
1
to recover the costs of cleaning up and insuring the safety of the Love Canal area pursuant to Section 107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (“CERC
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LA”), and New York common law of public nuisance. Between 1942 and 1954, the site was used by Hooker as a landfill for toxic chemical wastes from its Niagara Falls plant. In 1953, the Company transferred the site to the City of Niagara Falls School Board (“School Board” or “Board”), and an elementary school was built in the central section the next year. A State Health Emergency was declared in 1978 when a noticeable quantity of the chemical residues began surfacing and seeping into neighboring homes.
The case was bifurcated into two phases: Phase I — to determine the liability of all parties and the principles of contribution or indemnification; and Phase II — -to determine the nature and amount of the remedy. Item 741 at ¶¶ 2
&
7. Prior to trial on the Phase I issues, this court granted summary judgment against the defendant for joint and -several liability under both § 107 of CERCLA and the common-law public nuisance claim.
United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.,
680 F.Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y.1988) (Supplemental Order 20);
United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.,
722 F.Supp. 960 (W.D.N.Y.1989) (Supplemental Order 41).
2
The State’s claim for punitive damages, based upon OCC’s creation of a public nuisance at Love Canal in allegedly reckless disregard of the health, safety, and property of the local residents, as well as various counterclaims and cross-claims, remained for trial, which began on October 24, 1990. Testimony was heard through June 25, 1991, and the parties made closing arguments on January 7, January 29, February 11, and February 12,1992. The following decision pertains solely to the punitive damages claim. The balance of the issues covered by the Phase I trial will be addressed separately in future orders.
3
The State claims that OCC is liable for punitive damages for Hooker’s activities and omissions regarding the method of waste disposal at Love Canal, the site’s transfer to the School Board in 1953, and a subsequent failure to respond adequately to the problems and potential hazards which arose once Hooker relinquished control of the Canal area. In its proposed conclusions of laws (Item 1175 at 363), the State asserts that Hooker acted with reckless or wanton disregard for the health and safety of others in each of five particulars:
1. Knowingly dumping tons of toxic chemicals in a canal used as a recreational area by children, with knowledge of actual and potential exposure of these children, and others, to harm;
2. Failing to fence a contaminated swimming and recreational area or to institute other protective measures, including warnings, in the face of knowledge of actual and potential exposure of children, and others, to harm;
3. Abandoning an insecure toxic landfill knowing children and an increasing population of residents abutting the
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Canal would be exposed to toxic chemicals as a result of subsidence and subsurface migration;
4. Transferring a toxic waste dump to an inappropriate custodian, the Board of Education of the City of Niagara Falls, while imparting insufficient information of hazards to the School Board given Hooker’s special knowledge of toxicity of its own waste materials;
5. Failing to reassume responsibility for the maintenance of a transferred toxic waste dump after exposure of the public to the wastes had become recurrent and widespread.
The heart of the case presented by the State to meet its burden of proof and the rebuttal evidence of OCC lies in the transfer of the site to the School Board. Indeed, the State asserted that if Hooker had kept control over Love Canal, there would not have been a punitive damages claim. Item 1186 at 34. Thus, the following discussion focuses on that event, but an examination of the transfer and its attendant problems also necessitates a description of the area and its history before, during, and after Hooker’s tenure.
Before setting forth the factual findings, a few general remarks should be made about the unusual difficulties facing the litigants and the court in this case. While a trial which lasts over 70 days is in itself not extraordinary, such a lengthy trial, coupled with voluminous, weighty documents and conflicting scientific evidence made reaching a fair conclusion an arduous task. The difficulty was increased by the fact that almost all of the evidence concerned events which occurred 40 to 50 years ago, and the authors of most of the documents were unavailable for examination to help interpret their content.
The testimony at trial and in deposition came from employees and contractors of Hooker, School Board members, area residents, and experts. However, many of the individuals who were in executive positions at Hooker or who were on the School Board at the time of transfer died before trial or deposition. Of those who did testify, some found it difficult to recall exactly what occurred, or were not in a position to control policy or to know exactly why certain decisions were made. My assessment of both parties’ witnesses is that their recollection was often influenced by the passage of time, rumor, subsequent conversations, media coverage, and their interest in the outcome of the case.
Therefore, despite the large number of witnesses overall, the parties offered little reliable testimony in support of their positions on several crucial issues. Occasionally, both parties offered the same testimony, but with different interpretations. For example, Jerome Wilkenfeld, a long-time Hooker employee, was called as a witness by both the State and OCC. He started working for Hooker in 1935, functioned as a junior executive in the 1940s and early 1950s, and eventually rose to a senior management position. Hooker relied on his testimony to prove that it acted responsibly, while the State offered the same testimony to show that Hooker acted recklessly. At the time of the disposal operation in the 1940s and the transfer in the early 1950s, Wilkenfeld was not at the decision-making level. He did not know how the top management arrived at certain essential decisions, but was able to provide background and the result of investigations which he was ordered to make. He gave his personal opinion as to the worth of certain Hooker decisions, but he was not privy to all the information known to management and how those in charge reached their decisions.
For some events, no live testimony was presented. For example, no School Board members who were intimately connected with the transfer were available. In other instances, it was difficult to assess the reliability of the testimony. The witnesses who had lived in the Canal area and described the events of the 1940s and 1950s were often in their early teens or younger during the relevant time period. Some only recalled one or two particular events and had difficulty pinpointing when they occurred, creating problems when timing became important in the context of the ease. Many of these witnesses had little reason to remember the events precisely, and their testimony often differed
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from those who actually participated in the digging and disposal operation. For all these reasons, the testimony must be approached cautiously.
The court was frequently asked to rely on contemporaneous letters and documents of Hooker employees and management. In almost every case, the writer was not available for cross-examination. Even when an author did testify, the circumstances surrounding the writing of the document, the reason why it was written, the writer’s position in the Company, and the source of his information were often difficult to reconstruct. When the accuracy of the document could not be tested by examination, its credibility was necessarily limited.
Difficulty in pinning down the State’s legal theory concerning Hooker’s liability for punitive damages added to the evidentiary problems. Although the State asserted that its principal claim related to the transfer, both parties devoted considerable attention in their briefs and during oral arguments to Hooker’s dumping practice at the landfill, the conditions there during and after disposal, and the ultimate leaking of leachate to the surrounding area.
The importance of risk assessment, a scientific method of estimating how a given population’s past and current exposure to toxic wastes might affect future health, was debated. Before trial, the State objected to the receipt of risk-assessment evidence; but its introduction was permitted because the court thought that it might have some bearing on Hooker’s knowledge and intent and might be of assistance in resolving the cross-claims and counterclaims. Much time was spent in listening to this complicated and conflicting testimony. At the conclusion of trial, all agreed that this evidence was not helpful.
See
Closing Arguments of January 7, 1992. The State’s motion to preclude risk assessment evidence, denied prior to trial, is hereby granted.
OCC argued that its actions had to be judged within the context of industry practice of the time. While the advances in science and engineering made since the 1940s would lead contemporary environmentalists to condemn many of the practices used by Hooker at Love Canal, it would be unfair to judge the Company by the application of knowledge obtained after the disposal and transfer were completed. Therefore, an effort was made to ascertain the disposal methods of the industry and extent of Hooker’s knowledge compared to its competitors.
Many difficult legal questions had to be considered. Did the State have the authority or standing to press a civil punitive damages claim instead of charging a violation of criminal law? If so, what was the proper legal standard? Did the statute of limitations foreclose suit after the passage of many years? After intensive study and debate in the years following Hooker’s waste disposal at Love Canal, both state and federal governments enacted environmental statutes providing for civil and criminal sanction. However, not a single piece of legislation provides for punitive damage. Under these circumstances, should the State be permitted to rely upon the common law in seeking punitive relief, especially as the authority for a government to seek punitive damage is scant?
An array of questions regarding the appropriate legal standard and the type of evidence necessary to sustain the burdens of proof was also considered. What was the appropriate burden of proof? What was the state and applicability of property and products liability law at the time of the transfer? What responsibilities did Hooker have after the transfer? Should the eventual sub-migration of leachate in the late 1970s be considered in this phase?
As a result, a discussion of the legal standard concludes Part I, prefacing the factual findings in this decision. It is hoped that an exposition of the standard will put the facts in context and explain the relative weight given to certain events and details. Part II, the factual section, begins with a brief history of Hooker Chemical Corporation in Niagara Falls and the factors precipitating the need for a waste disposal site, followed by a description of the means by which the Company obtained and prepared the site and ran its disposal operation between 1941 and 1954. Parts III and IV recount the transfer of the site to the School Board and the post-trans
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fer events of the 1950s and 1960s, including the activities of third parties at the site. Part V summarizes the investigation which led to State and Federal intervention at Love Canal in 1978 and reviews the geological and stratigraphical evidence which explains the chemical migration off the site. Hooker’s knowledge of the hazards of disposal and the state of industry practice is explored in Part VI. In Part VII the legal analysis is applied to these facts.
This is not the full story of Love Canal. Much of the information reported in books and through the media which form the basis of public opinion was not included in the trial for punitive damages. In particular, the court was presented with no evidence of any serious personal injury in this phase of the proceedings. The large number of exhibits and the length of the testimony forced the court to rely heavily on the parties to identify and emphasize those aspects which they deemed important. Many marked exhibits and much testimony taken at trial were never mentioned again, or only given slight attention at briefings. Further, the evidence was limited to the problems which arose at the site and in the houses on the immediate perimeter (Ring I homes), risk assessment was not considered, and the theory of punitive damages urged by the State focused the trial on Hooker’s knowledge of the potential for harm rather than the actual harm which may have occurred. With these limitations, the court has attempted to sift carefully through the voluminous documentary evidence and witness testimonies to determine what occurred and to reach a fair conclusion. The findings of fact and conclusions should be accepted in this light.
B. LEGAL STANDARD OVERVIEW
The Second Circuit’s standard for what constitutes the requisite showing for an award of punitive damages was defined in
Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
378 F.2d 832 (1967). “[P]unitive damages may be awarded if the defendant’s conduct was determined to be ‘wanton and reckless’ [or] ... ‘done in such a manner and under such circumstances as to show heedlessness of or utter disregard of the effect upon the rights and safety of others....’”
Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp.,
901 F.2d 277, 282 (2d Cir.1990) (reaffirming Roginsky). While each state employs its own specific language to describe conduct warranting punitive damages, most Circuits relying on state standards include the same or equivalent terms as those in Simpson.
4
See, e.g. Borden v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.,
935 F.2d 370 (1st Cir.1991) (Rhode Island — willfulness, recklessness or wickedness which for the good of society and warning to the individual ought to be punished);
Marshall v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
874 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir.1989) (Oklahoma — wanton or reckless disregard for rights of plaintiff);
Ingram v. Acands, Inc.,
977 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.1992) (Oregon — wanton disregard for the health, safety and welfare of others);
Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork Co.,
946 F.2d 1085, 1097 (5th Cir.1991),
cert. denied,
— U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1778 , 118 L.Ed.2d 435 (1992) (Alabama — acting willfully, maliciously, intentionally, or with heedless and reckless disregard for plaintiffs rights). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (1965), defines a reckless disregard of safety as follows:
The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
The State claims that OCC is liable for punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages under New York State common law for the public nuisance created by the chemical residues which surfaced and the leachate which flowed out of the Love Canal landfill. The State argues that punitive damages are appropriate in this case to punish OCC and serve as a warning to others.
Home Insurance Co. v. American Home
*1002
Products Corp.,
75 N.Y.2d 196, 203 , 551 N.Y.S.2d 481 , 550 N.E.2d 930 (1990). Environmental actions are “a fair field for punitive damages.”
Doralee Estates v. Cities Service Oil Co.,
569 F.2d 716, 722 (2d Cir.1977). “[Tjhose who have been given authority to avert environmental damage should be given some incentive to do so. ‘Smart money’ is the traditional way....”
Id.
The State further asserts that there is no requirement that serious injury or damage occur in order to warrant punitive damages. “Although a defendant has inflicted no harm, punitive damages may be awarded because of, and measured by, his wrongful purpose or intent....” 4 Restatement of Torts 2d. § 908 (1979). This court agreed prior to the Phase I trial that “evidence of actual adverse health effects is ... unnecessary to the question of proof of a health threat.” Supp.Order 16, Item 573 at 6. However, in all the cases involving environmental polluters submitted by the State in support of an award of punitive damages, the defendant corporations had prior knowledge that serious harm had occurred or had been cited for violations of health codes or regulations and had failed to respond.
See, e.g., Doralee Estates,
569 F.2d at 716 ;
Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.,
855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir.1988);
Exxon v. Yarema,
69 Md.App. 124 , 516 A.2d 990 (1986), cert
denied,
309 Md. 47 , 522 A.2d 392 (1987). In fact, the State did not present a single case in which punitive damages were awarded absent actual serious injury.
Prior to trial, the court denied OCC’s motion for partial summary judgment on the punitive damages claim, postponing a final determination of whether punitive damages were available to the State until a more complete record was made.
U.S. v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.,
748 F.Supp. 67 (W.D.N.Y.1990). In its post-trial brief, OCC reiterated some of the arguments made in its pretrial motion, once again urging the court to reject the punitive damages claim as a matter of law.
5
OCC asserts that (1) the Penal Code provides the State with the sole punitive remedy for criminal nuisance, superseding any common-law punishment, and (2) there is neither statutory authority nor case law precedent sanctioning recovery of punitive damages by the State, as opposed to a private party. Analogous federal statutes provide the government with the option of criminal sanctions, but not punitive damages. OCC argues strongly that the State had the recourse to use criminal penalties provided by the Penal Code, and that awarding punitive damages to a government entity for creation of a public nuisance would provide a remedy that had never been envisioned.
The State counters that these issues were fully briefed and argued prior to the denial of OCC’s motion to dismiss (Supp.Order 52); but following oral argument, the court directed the parties to rebrief them. As it had previously, the State cited
City of New York v. Taliaferrow,
158 A.D.2d 445 , 551 N.Y.S.2d 253 (2d Dept.1990), in support of the right of government entities to recover punitive damages under the common law theory of public nuisance. It could produce no additional authority on this important question. The de
*1003
fendant and the court were similarly unsuccessful.
In
Taliafetroiv,
a civil action was brought by the City of New York under the local Nuisance Abatement Law to enjoin the use of certain premises for prostitution and to seek damages. In a prior action, an injunction had issued barring the use of the premises for such purposes. The defendant argued that relief of punitive damages should be denied because the Code provided the exclusive remedy and did not include punitive damage. The court rejected the defendant’s argument, finding that the section’s language authorizing enforcement “without prejudice to the use of procedures under existing ... laws” permitted the additional imposition of punitive damage. 158 A.D.2d at 446 , 551 N.Y.S.2d 253 .
Strangely, this is the sole authority for the State’s position. Although punitive damage is an ancient remedy, it evidently has not been relied upon in the past by governmental entities seeking punitive relief. In
Taliaferroiv,
the court was able to use favorable statutory language to help justify its authority to impose additional relief. In this case, the State’s punitive damage claim is based solely on common law.
The court is also troubled by the fact that in all the state and federal environmental legislation considered and enacted in the last several decades, punitive damage relief is never included as a remedy. If the legislatures believed that additional relief should have been afforded to the State or federal government in these cases, they could have easily provided for it. The State correctly argues that there is nothing in the New York Penal Code or any other federal or state statute which precludes the State from seeking punitive damages for the tort of public nuisance in the same way that a private plaintiff could. However, OCC is also correct in countering that no New York or federal statute explicitly gives the State the right to seek punitive damage under these circumstances.
Despite the slim support for this cause of action, the court has decided not to alter its prior holding that as a matter of law, the State is not prohibited from seeking punitive damages on a common-law theory of public nuisance. While OCC correctly points out the dearth of case law directly addressing this issue, it has not offered either new argument or precedent precluding a grant of punitive damages
per se
under New York State law. Further, the evidence received on the punitive damage claim is pertinent to the resolution of the cross-claims and counterclaims. Therefore, the court will proceed on the theory that punitive damages are available to the State. However, the meager case law and lack of statutory support for such a determination behooves the court to approach the overall evaluation of the merits and any actual award of punitive damages with care.
OCC has raised again the question of the proper standard and burden of proof. Those issues were also dealt with in my prior decision, and I see no reason to modify them. The applicable standard of proof for punitive damages is preponderance of the evidence, which the Supreme Court held suffices even in civil suits involving “proof of acts that expose a party to criminal prosecution.”
United States v. Regan,
232 U.S. 37, 49 , 34 S.Ct. 213, 217 , 58 L.Ed. 494 (1914), most recently affirmed by
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1 , 111 S.Ct. 1032 , 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991). While both Supreme Court decisions involved private parties, this case still involves a civil remedy and does not merit the standard of proof reserved for criminal cases.
The legal standard by which Hooker’s conduct should be measured in order to determine whether in fact it acted in a wanton or reckless manner has not yet been addressed. After trial, the court asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the legal nature of OCC’s responsibility in terms of both existing property law and duty-to-warn products liability case law. Of particular concern were the obligations of a seller to inform the purchaser of the condition of the property at the time of purchase, the post-transfer duties to warn and remedy defects, and any impact the status of the buyer or seller may have on these duties (Supp.Order 66). Property law at the time of the transfer
*1004
required the seller to disclose dangerous latent conditions about which it had knowledge.
McCabe v. Cohen,
294 N.Y. 522 , 63 ,N-E.2d 88 (1945). However, the extent of Hooker’s legal responsibility under this standard, including the nature of the disclosure, the state of Hooker’s knowledge when the transfer occurred, the degree to which the Company’s duty continued after it relinquished ownership is necessarily factually based. An analysis of Hooker’s duty to the Board will be discussed in more detail after the facts have been presented.
II.
WASTE DISPOSAL AT LOVE CANAL A. HOOKER’S EARLY GROWTH
Hooker was formed in 1905, and its Niagara Falls plant began operating the following year. By 1910, the Niagara Falls plant was producing 20 tons of caustic soda and 42 tons of bleach per day. Ex. 2786, p. 25. In the Company’s early days, the plant employed a process of electrolyzing salt to form chlorine, which was then reacted with other chemicals to form the finished products. T. 4514-15 (Wilkenfeld). The Company sold its products to the chemical industry for use in many consumer items. T. 5153-55 (Cull).
In 1915, in response to World War I shortages, Hooker built the first monochlorobenzol plant in the United States. By the end of the war, Hooker’s monochlorobenzol production was the largest in the world, exceeding 1.5 million pounds a month.
Id.
After World War I, the Company started to diversify with other organic and inorganic compounds. By the beginning of World War II, Hooker was well known as a manufacturer of diversified chemicals, primarily based on chlorine and caustic. T. 4514-16 (Wilkenfeld).
The Company grew substantially during World War II because of the demands of the United States government and defense contractors. From 1940 until 1953, its sales grew from $7.1 million to $38.7 million. Ex. 2823, T. 1540-42 (Cull). This dramatic growth continued, and by 1970 its annual sales reached $450 million. T. 4542-43 (Bryant).
Until Hooker began its wartime production, it was able to sewer and dispose of chemicals on-site. Increased volume of chemical waste, combined with growing opposition to open dumping in streams, forced Hooker to consider alternative means of waste disposal. Incineration could not handle the anticipated heavy waste disposal demands. In-ground disposal developed as a viable alternative.
Hooker became interested in the nearby Love Canal site as a landfill for wastes from its Niagara Falls plant in 1941 and obtained permission from the owner, the Niagara Power Development Corporation, to use the site without the expense of an outright purchase. None of the executives who were involved in the decision to bury Hooker’s wastes or in the efforts to locate a landfill area were available for trial, and the written record is quite sparse. Thus, it is very difficult to reconstruct the process by which the Company decided to use Love Canal as a landfill. However, the site posed several obvious advantages. Its proximity to the Niagara Falls plant reduced transport costs and avoided the difficulty of moving odorous chemicals long distances by truck. There was a general perception, held by Hooker executives and residents in the Niagara Falls area, that the soils at Love Canal were com- ■ posed largely of clay. Lastly, there were no zoning restrictions on the Canal’s use, although the Company realized that the operation of a landfill would require measures to keep people and animals from coming in contact with the wastes. Ex. 8.
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE SITE
1. Historical Development
The Love Canal site is a roughly rectangular, 16-acre parcel of land located in the City of Niagara Falls, New York. It is bounded to the west and to the east by what became the rear property lines of homes on 97th and 99th Streets, to the north by Colvin Boulevard, and to the south by what became Frontier Avenue. At the time it was acquired by Hooker, Love Canal was situated on the outskirts of the City, close to the eastern border at 102nd Street. The “northern section” of
*1005
Love Canal refers to that portion extending south from the northern boundary along Colvin Boulevard to Reed Avenue, the “central section” to that portion extending south from Reed Avenue to Wheatfield Avenue, the “southern section” to that portion extending south from Wheatfield Avenue to the southern boundary line along Frontier Avenue.
See
Appendix A-l, Ex. 1433.
The Canal was developed in the 1890s by an entrepreneur named William Love, who hoped to create an industrial community which would use the Canal as a source of electric power and as a means of transportation. Love planned to connect the upper and lower Niagara River, bypassing Niagara Falls. He began excavating the Canal in 1894, but abandoned the project when he lost financial backing. Thereafter, the site remained unused, except for informal recreation by people living in the area. Evidently without objection by the owner, it was used for swimming, fishing, trapping, and ice-skating.
The unfinished Canal, located near the center of the parcel, was approximately 3,000 feet long and varied from 8 to 16 feet deep and from 60 to 80 feet wide over most of its length. In 1941, there were mounds of excavated earthen material located along most of the east and west banks of the Canal. The size of mounds varied in height from 10 to 20 feet, and in width from 30 to 40 feet. They were comprised of a mix of clay and silty sand and were covered and surrounded by various forms of vegetation, brush, and grass.
The general area was best described by two expert witnesses on photographic interpretation: Robert Colwell for the State and Samuel Gowan for OCC. They examined aerial photographs of the Canal and its environs taken between 1927 and 1979. Ex. 1216; T. 2980-3067, 3977-4055. The area portrayed was bounded by Colvin Avenue to the north, Frontier Avenue to the south, 93rd Street to the west, and 102nd Street to the east. It encompassed 250 acres, with an average of one residence per acre, including the Griffin Manor Housing Project, which was about 400 feet from the northern section of the Canal to the west. The photographs picture a mostly rural and agricultural landscape with open fields and orchards, with six homes and a church near Frontier Avenue, along what would eventually be 99th Street. T. 2991 (Colwell).
By 1928, the land immediately west and east of the Canal had been subdivided into building lots; by 1939, the City had planned the installation of Reed and Wheatfield Avenues across the Love Canal site. Before 1940, the population of Niagara Falls had been gradually spreading eastward toward and past Love Canal. This development is apparent from the aerial photographs. Still, by 1954, over 75 percent of the houses were on the east side of 99th Street.
6
Only a few homes had been built adjacent to the site when Hooker began its operations, and new street development did not materialize until much later.
The area to the east of Love Canal began to develop after 1950, when the City rezoned the east side of 99th Street (the side furthest from the Canal) from an “unclassified” to a “second residence” district. Ex. 3626 ¶ 16. Only one house was built on the west side of 99th Street during the time of Hooker’s disposal operations. T. 417 (Voorhees), Ex. 1216. By 1954, 33 of the 40 homes under construction were on the rezoned east side of the Canal. Ex. 176.
See
Appendix A-2 (Ex. 1394).
*
On the west side of the Canal, the Griffin Manor Housing Project was under construction by 1942, but there were no houses or streets built between the housing project and Love Canal during the period when Hooker was dumping in the northern sector. Ex. 1216. By World War II, Griffin Manor had about 750 apartments. When disposal operations began in the northern section, the near
*1006
est house was approximately 400 feet away. Ex. 1216.
2. Soil and Drainage Conditions
Charles Adams, who began trapping in the area in the 1930s, summed up the local knowledge of the soil at the Canal. He said there was a natural well in the middle which provided a continuous flow of water. The topsoil was eight to ten inches deep, underlain by soil which was half clay and half dirt, below which was what he called Tonawanda clay, identifiable by its bluish cast. The clay was very hard and good for brick-making, but it was difficult to dig through below the surface. Generally, the soil was very poor for farming, with very little topsoil and with clay underneath. T. 37-41. Several Hooker employees confirmed that the soils were basically clay, T. 4184, 4153 (Wilkenfeld), T. 1180 (Schultz), Ex. 1704 (Colpoys), and (Ex. 119) (Klaussen), as did John Boddecker, a civil engineer employed by the City of Niagara Falls, who observed the construction of the Reed Avenue sewer in 1958. T. 10053. However, William Wagner, a contractor for Hooker who was employed in the actual disposal operation at the site, described the sides of the Canal as sandy loam. T. 815.
The drainage at Love Canal was described by Robert Cohen, one of the main hydro-geologist witnesses for the State. His report stated:
The Love Canal landfill and area are characterized by poor natural drainage due to several factors including: A) the relatively flat topography, B) the presence of sub-soils of low permeability, C) the shallow depth of the nearby river and streams, D) the rate of precipitation, E) the absence of a well-developed natural drainage network. As a result, the Love Canal site has historically experienced a high water table and both subsurface and surface drainage problems.
Ex. 718A, Finding 21. For the most part, this is a fair assessment of drainage. However, as Mr. Cohen noted, the rate of precipitation must also be taken into account. Evidence from several witnesses leads to the conclusion that the water table fluctuated. Sometimes the water in the Canal was six feet below the banks. At other times, it rose much higher, averaging two or three feet below ground level, or even at ground level, depending upon the time of the year and the rainfall. Ex. 161.
Ditches draining water into the Canal from the surrounding area, mainly from properties to the east, remained in place until about 1951. Water drained from the Canal through a swale or natural drainage way which flowed out of the Canal in a northerly direction, first to the northwest, then north, and finally northeast back across the northern edge of the site toward Black Creek. Dr. Gowan observed from aerial photographs four ditches flowing into the Canal and three flowing to the swale. Ex. 1216. Generally, the area was flat, with poor drainage. During rainy spells, the fields bordering the Canal were often wet, with puddling sometimes occurring.
Hooker’s analysis of the soil and drainage conditions at the time it decided to use the Canal as a landfill was probably no more sophisticated than the descriptions given by laymen who testified. F. Leonard Bryant, who was assistant plant superintendent in 1948, testified that Hooker management did not believe there would be any difficulty with groundwater contamination, because Love Canal was looked upon as a large bathtub lined with clay through which nothing would ever go. T. 4566. The Company apparently believed that the barrier was sufficient to prevent migration of chemicals and did not seek advice from geologists.
C. DISPOSAL OPERATIONS
OCC offered evidence of the Company’s preparations for use of the site. In a plan dated December 19, 1941, Hooker’s Engineering Department depicted how the northern section of Love Canal would be used for disposal operations. The plan took note of the principal features of the area, including property lines, topography of the site, existing drainage ditches, surface-water flow patterns, and berms up to 13 feet high along the sides of the Canal. It also showed the proposed location of dams 60 feet long and 16 feet wide which spanned the width of the Canal, dammed-off disposal areas in the Ca
*1007
nal, a fence which enclosed the northern disposal areas, an access road with a gate, and a culvert under the road to maintain natural drainage. T. 5199-5205 (Cull); Ex. 1197A, 2002.
In April 1942, Hooker obtained an operating license from the Niagara Power Development Corporation to begin waste disposal operations. Shortly thereafter, the Company acquired title of the property. Hooker continued to send waste materials from its Niagara Falls plant to the Canal until 1954. At trial, most of the evidence about • disposal practices was given by Hooker employees, with some reference to Hooker records. No one lived near the northern section of .the Canal while Hooker was using it as a dump site, and only six to ten houses had been built close to the southern section prior to 1954, when building on 97th and 99th Streets began. For this reason, the non-Hooker witnesses who testified about the disposal operation were primarily individuals who had played at the site as children.
The evidence supports a finding that, except for the erection of a fence, the Engineering Department’s plan was carried out with only slight modification. The plan provided for construction of at least two earthen dams across the northern part of the Canal before disposal operations began. The purpose of the dams was to prevent contaminated liquids from flowing from disposal areas into the rest of the Canal and nearby creeks and the swale. Ex. 46 at 1; Ex. 1216; T. 4628-29 (Gowan). At the same time, dams prevented water from adjoining areas of the Canal from entering disposal areas. Ex. 7124, No. 13 (State-OCC Stip.); Ex. 1216; T. 5096-97 (Fekete); T. 5204-05 (Cull); T. 2631 (Owens); T. 826-27 (Wagner). In addition, the dams allowed water to be pumped out of a disposal cell, if appropriate, immediately prior to waste burial. T. 826-27 (Wagner); T. 5096-98 (Fekete). The dams, which were constructed from the surrounding soil, were wide enough to accommodate vehicle traffic. T. 5096 (Fekete); T. 5204 (Cull); T. 4154-55 (Wilkenfeld); Ex. 1216. They thus created disposal cells up to 60 feet wide, several hundred feet long, and 10 feet deep.
Id.
Hooker deepened and widened portions of the Canal for waste disposal. In addition, the Company dug disposal pits between the Canal and the rear property lines of residential lots on the east side of 97th Street and the west side of 99th Street.
7
The pits were generally 30 to 50 feet in diameter, 20 to 30 feet deep, and took some time to fill. In most cases, if there was water in the pit, it was pumped out before disposal began, leaving only a small amount in the bottom. Following these practices, Hooker’s early dumping operations proceeded south from the northern end of the Canal.
An internal Hooker memorandum indicated that the Company had determined that there were no legal restrictions on dumping “so long as the property is either owned or leased by the party doing the dumping.” However, “the property should be adequately protected so as to prevent the possibility of persons or animals coming in contact with the dumped materials.” Ex. 8. Therefore, the original plan included the installation of a fence that would enclose all areas in which chemical wastes were to be dumped. The fence was to run across the northern entrance, down the east and west sides of the northern section, and across the southernmost portion of the northern section where dumping was to occur. Ex. 2002. T. 6762-63. However, the general consensus among the witnesses was that the area was not fenced. While at least one internal Hooker memorandum refers to a fence around a portion of the northern section,
8
those most familiar with the area could not recall any
*1008
fence along the sides of the landfill, but only one at the northern tip of the Canal designed merely to prevent other dumpers from using the site. T. 820.
In 1946, Hooker finished the bulk of its northern section dumping and began waste disposal operations at the extreme southern end of the site near Frontier Avenue, moving northward toward the point where Wheat-field Avenue would later be built.
See
Appendix A-l. As it had done in the north, Hooker constructed dams to facilitate disposal. The northernmost dam in the southern section was located just south of the eventual location of the 99th Street Elementary School and near Wheatfield Avenue. Hooker also had widened and deepened portions of the Canal and dug pits outside the Canal to a much greater degree than had been done in the northern section in order to accommodate the volume of chemical wastes being transported to the dump.
Jerome Wilkenfeld visited the site in 1948 when he was a young engineer assigned to Hooker’s process study group. He began working for Hooker in 1945 and was curious to find out how waste disposal was carried out. He recalled that a truck carrying waste drums proceeded to the south end of the Canal on the west side. The drums in the truck were not leaking. He noticed a large earthen dam substantial enough to permit earth-moving equipment to drive over it. The dam across the Canal created a deep pit which had been pumped almost dry, with a few feet of water at the bottom. The water in the unused portion of the Canal looked clean. There was a substantial berm on the west side of the Canal, extending for some distance to the north. Looking further north, he could see another dam, and beyond that a stretch of leveled earth. To the south, dumping was evidently finished and the earth was filled in and covered, but there were signs of settling. He thought that the method of disposal was reasonable. T. 4150-55 (Wilkenfeld).
No fencing was installed around the southern and central sections of Love Canal where 75 percent of the dumping occurred. T. 837 (Wagner). Hooker did not construct fencing along the residential property lines bordering the west and east sides of the site, nor did it post any warning signs. T. 295 (Corp).
Although the focus of its disposal operations shifted to the southern section in 1946, Hooker continued to dispose of wastes in the central and northern sections even after
1952. In the central section, Hooker’s dumping extended to an area near Wheatfield Avenue. At least two large pits, one south and the other east of the eventual location of the school, were dug and filled with waste before the school was constructed (Exs. 180, 1442, and 1445). In the northern section, Hooker dumped mostly trash after 1950, but small quantities of chemicals were deposited in the swale area. T. 3062-63 (Colwell); T. 4634-35 (Gowan).
The frequency of dumping at Love Canal varied. Some witnesses reported that wastes were hauled from the plant several times a week. However, Hooker’s general practice was to accumulate between 500 to 2,000 drums of chemical wastes at its plant before hauling them to Love Canal. That occurred on roughly a monthly basis, although at times there were longer intervals between these relatively large-scale dumping operations.
Hooker usually stored chemical wastes at its plant in 55-gallon metal or fiberboard drums, each of which weighed between 200 and 500 pounds when full. The drummed residues included both liquid and solid chemical wastes. When the disposal operation began, the contents of the waste barrels could not be discerned by looking at the barrels. T. 5088. Later on, Hooker began a practice of marking the drums with different-colored dots of paint in order to distinguish materials believed to be reactive from those considered nonreactive. T. 4159-60. The plan was to keep reactive, highly odorous, and fuming material away from populated areas. However, the marking practice was often not followed.
The drums were used or reconditioned rather than new. Some witnesses who visited the dump site described the drums as rusty and leaking. However, William Wagner, who worked at Love Canal from 1948 to 1953, testified that most of the drums were in
*1009
pretty good shape and did not leak. Only four or five drums per day would break open when they were rolled into the Canal. T. 826-31 (Wagner). Sometimes liquid wastes went directly to the Canal from tank trucks. Other laborers confirmed Wagner’s recollections. T. 909 (Fekete). Wagner worked at the Canal almost every day, and his memory seemed reliable. T. 844. He said that when a drum broke open, the material would be covered right away. T. 832.
To prepare for the dumping of drums, the crew dug a hole 20 to 30 feet deep and about 30 to 40 feet wide. T. 826 (Wagner); Ex. 180. The contractor built a small dam made of flyash and dirt to keep water out of the digging area. Then, the workers pumped most of the water out of the excavated part, leaving only a foot of liquid at the bottom of the pit. The pits extended out from the Canal to about 25 feet from property lines. After a pit was dug, 600 to 1,000 drums could be buried in one day and cover placed over the pit. T. 829-30 (Wagner).
Evidence about Hooker’s disposal practice was also given by Frank Fekete. Along with Mr. Wagner, he worked at the site almost daily. Fekete was employed by Hooker for 37 years, beginning as a yard laborer in 1940. During the 1940s, he delivered and dumped steel, paper, and drums into the Canal. He testified that when the trucks reached the Canal, they were driven to a dammed off area of the Canal or to one of the excavated pits, at which point drums would simply be dumped or rolled directly from the trucks. At times, a crane was also used to deposit drums at the site. The drums were neither segregated by content nor stacked, but instead were randomly dumped.
9
T. 5088-94.
Several witnesses testified about the degree and quality of the cover of the landfill. William Wagner said that when he first came to the northern section, he put in fill, including cinders, clay, and loam, graded the surface, and built up a mound three to four feet above grade. He was told to form a mound in the center so that rainwater would run off to the east and west sides. By 1951, the cover was a series of hummocks. T. 818-20, 860 (Wagner). ' As Wagner continued to work in the northern section, he noticed that the ground was settling. T. 841. Although Wagner said that a cover was put over material on the same day it was dumped, there was no attempt to cover the drums completely or grade the surface until the pit was filled. This meant that some drums usually' remained uncovered at the end of each day. Ex. 1708; Cohen, T. 2950; A. Yoorhees, Dep. 126.
During its disposal operations, Hooker dumped drums to within one-half to four feet of the original ground surface. The plan was to have at least a four-foot cover, but often this goal was either not attained or not maintained. On many occasions, the cover was only one-half foot deep (T. 840 (Wagner)), thus placing the drums within the most permeable portion of the Canal stratigraphy.
See
Part V, Section C,
infra.
Furthermore, Hooker did not place topsoil, seed, or vegetation on the cover. In the southern section, there often was virtually no buffer zone between the Ring I properties and the wastes dumped in the disposal pits. Ex. 718a, F. 7. Pits were dug outside of the Canal itself and quite close to the rear property lines. Ex. 1442; (Gibson); Aileen Voorhees Dep., 121.
Some Hooker workers and contractors experienced firsthand the dangers of contact with the chemical wastes being dumped at the site. Occasionally, when drums broke during disposal operations, men would be splashed and burned by chemicals, sometimes forcing them to seek help from nearby residents to wash off. Chemicals often burned holes in their clothing. In one vivid example, a former worker gave the following account of the corrosiveness of some of the chemical residues being dumped:
[0]n one occasion I had purchased a new pair of workboots and during that day they
*1010
became wetted with chemicals from the dump. That evening prior to entering my home I removed the boots and left them sitting in the garage overnight. The next morning in preparation to return to work I found only the soles and heels of the boots remaining. The uppers were entirely eaten away.
Ex. 6510.
D. CHEMICAL COMPOSITION OF THE WASTE MATERIAL
The parties agree that about 25,000 tons of chemical wastes, plus flyash and general refuse from the plant, were deposited at Love Canal from the time Hooker began to use the site in the early 1940s until it ceased operations in 1954. The available records made it difficult to determine the types and quantities of the wastes sent to Love Canal. Thus, estimates of the amount and concentration of the individual chemicals buried at the landfill differed widely.
The principal testimony concerning the nature of the chemicals deposited at Love Canal was supplied by Jay Cull, a chemical engineer employed by OCC. Mr. Cull has a B.C.E. from Brooklyn Polytech and an M.B.A. from the University of Buffalo. He has worked for Hooker and OCC in various capacities from 1953 to the present, interrupted only by military service. In 1975, he became technical manager of the plant and head of a staff whose job it was to become familiar with the details of the various processes used in the plant and make suggestions for improving the efficiency of the chemical production. In 1978, he was assigned to gather information about the nature and quantities of the wastes that had been sent to Love Canal. To carry out this assignment, he examined written records and questioned individuals knowledgeable about disposal practices in the 1940s.
Mr. Cull’s investigation was greatly hampered by the lack of accurate waste disposal records available. In the 1940s, the materials sent to Hooker’s landfills were recorded in what the Company called “level books.” By 1980, these records were no longer available. Moreover, many of the people who were involved in Hooker’s disposal operations during the 1940s and who had the most exact information were either deceased or ill and unable to be of much assistance.
Sales records were available for two of the twelve years during which Love Canal was used for waste disposal. From the sales figures, Cull was able to estimate the quantities of the chemicals produced in those years. His understanding of the chemical production processes then enabled him to estimate the volume of waste generated. Further information was obtained through the Love Canal Interagency Task Force, which had been formed by the State and federal governments in 1978 to investigate and propose solutions to the problems created by the landfill. Ex. 2725.
See
Part V, Section A,
infra.
Mr. Cull admitted that there were so many variables in his procedure that he was precluded from testifying with certainty about which chemicals were sent to Love Canal in what volumes. Nevertheless, his was the best estimate presented to the court. The State did not offer any comparable analysis.
Cull’s estimates of the total amount of waste materials generated by Hooker during the 1940s and early 1950s are summarized in Exhibit 2218. These estimates were based on the information he gathered during his own investigation, combined with figures from several other reports which were unknown or unavailable to him during his investigation. At page 2 of the exhibit, a table details the waste categories, the total amount of waste produced by Hooker, and the amount sent to Love Canal. At Cull’s cross-examination, some minor changes were made in these figures.
Most of the chemical wastes transported by Hooker to Love Canal were soluble in water and are known as aqueous-phase liquids (“APL”). As much as 3,000 tons of the wastes were relatively insoluble in water and are known as nonaqueous-phase liquids (“NAPL”). About 2,100 tons of the NAPL were in the form of denser-than-water nonaqueous-phase liquids (“DNAPL”). Other waste material took the form of less-dense-than-water nonaqueous-phase liquids (“LNAPL”), which tended to rise toward the surface of the landfill. T. 5170 (Cull).
*1011
The chemical found in the largest quantity was benzene hexachloride (“BHC”), in an amount estimated at 7,159 tons.
See
description of BHC residues or “spent cake” below. The second-largest deposit was of the chlorobenzenes (mono-, orthodi-, tri-, and tetra-) (3,506 tons), followed by dodecyl mercaptan (“DDM”) (2,090 tons), sulfides (1,951 tons), benzyl chloride (1,757 tons), and benzoyl chloride (1,230). The remainder of the estimated 22,000 tons of chemical residues buried at the Canal included: thionyl chloride, trichlorophenol (“tep”), metal chlorides, liquid disulfide (“Ids”), monchlorotolunene (“met”), and miscellaneous acid chlorides and chlorination products and other unidentified residues. Ex. 2218A.
E. TOXICITY AND DISPOSAL METHODS FOR SPECIFIC CHEMICALS
Many of the chemicals used by Hooker during the production process were highly toxic and hazardous. The State’s accusation of reckless disregard for public safety is premised on the danger posed by chemical wastes both during and after disposal. Several specific chemicals and their waste products were the subject of special attention during the trial because potentially hazardous disposal methods were employed, there were recurring incidents of exposure, or the substances continued to cause problems during or after the disposal operations.
The following section sets out a general description of the dangerous properties of the chemicals handled by Hooker.
10
Next, the problems associated with disposing of the waste materials of several chemicals are reviewed. Particular chemicals which were discussed at length during trial or were the subject of concern during or after the landfill operation are highlighted. The section ends with the State’s argument that Hooker’s disposal procedures were unsafe and a brief discussion of the viability of alternative methods such as incineration.
Dr. Kelley Ann Brix gave expert testimony for the State regarding the toxic chemicals which Hooker used or produced in its Niagara Falls plant as well as a review of the extent of the Company’s knowledge about the dangers associated with these chemicals. Dr. Brix is a public health physician for the Bureau of Environmental & Occupational Epidemiology of New York State Department of Health, Director of the Master of Public Health Degree Program at SUNY Albany, and consultant to physicians about clinical care patients who have been exposed to environmental agents. She received an M.S. in zoology (1974) and an M.D. (1978) from the University of Michigan. She also has a Master of Public Health degree (1980) from the University of Illinois. Ex. 1128.
Dr. Brix was asked by the State to review internal Hooker memoranda and reports, operating and first-aid manuals, product warning labels, and reports and journals issued by organizations such as the Manufacturing Chemists’ Association, the National Safety Council, the American Industrial Hygiene Association, the United States Department of Labor, and the American Medical Association. She focused primarily on the time period prior to 1954, but included some post-1954 materials.
Dr. Brix discussed Hooker’s knowledge of the dangers posed by these chemicals as raw or finished commercial products. Her report (Ex. 1335) covers 17 chemicals or classes of chemicals, including those listed above, and relates a considerable amount of toxicological information. See Appendix B for her “Executive Summary” of this report. She determined that Hooker “definitely recognized that these materials were toxic.” Exhibit 1335 at 1. She also concluded the following:
[Hooker] recognized a broad spectrum of serious toxic effects, including damage to the majority of major organ systems, which could be caused by these substances. Hooker also contracted for animal toxicity tests on some of these materials, while obtaining other information from other chemical manufacturers, trade associations, academic institutions and, on occasion, governmental agencies. Hooker appears to have referred to and relied upon
*1012
the toxicological literature of the time (both texts and periodicals). Hooker was also aware of several factors which contributed to wide variation in individual susceptibilities to these toxic materials.
Id.
at 1. However, very few documents covered in the report refer to the content or potential harm from exposure to the
waste materials or residues
created by Hooker’s processes. Dr. Brix also could not testify about Hooker’s knowledge of the possible hazards of burying toxic wastes because this information was not included in the documents she reviewed. She is not an expert in waste disposal, hydrology, or geology. T. 425-31.
The disposal methods of four of the chemicals reviewed by Dr. Brix — thionyl chloride, TCP, dioxin, DDM — were discussed at length during the trial because of the exposure problems which occurred during Hooker’s landfill operations at the Canal. Although the parties did not give the disposal of spent cake, the waste product of lindane, a great deal of attention, it is also included in this section because it was deposited in enormous quantities at the landfill and was the subject of several reports of surface exposure after the site had been transferred.
I. Lindane and Spent Cake
Between 1946 and 1953, Hooker manufactured large quantities of lindane
11
, the commercial name for the gamma isomer of hexachlorocyclohexane (“HCH”), also known as benzene hexachloride (“BHC”). Waste residues generated in the production of lindane, which was widely used as an insecticide, were variously called “spent cake,” “BHC spent cake,” “spent BHC,” “FBHC spent cake,” “HGI residue,” “HGI cake,” and “ A’ cake.” Spent cake made up between J4 and $ of all chemical waste products buried at Love Canal. Although it contained only a small percentage of lindane, the most acutely toxic of the HCH isomers, spent cake consisted very largely of the alpha, beta, and delta isomers, all of which are also toxic.
Lindane or high gamma isomer (“HGI”) was isolated from an industrial mixture of HCH which included 13.5-14 percent gamma. Ex. 1515. The isolation process seems to have involved at least two steps which produced residues. The first step produced “fortified BHC” (FBHC), which contained about 40 percent gamma isomer. The second isolated the gamma isomer (99 percent gamma) from the FBHC. This two-step process left large quantities of spent cake, rich in HCH/BHC isomers other than gamma. The various names for spent cake appear to have been used interchangeably even though residues produced in the second stage of isolation probably differed in the proportions of the isomers to those produced in the first stage.
12
These residues were produced in very large quantities. By the summer of 1950, Hooker was dumping them at a rate of close to 300 tons (600,000 lbs.) per month. Ex. 951. Jay Cull testified that far more “BHC,
*1013
otherwise known as hexachlorocyclohexane,” was deposited at Love Canal than any other chemical. He estimated that by the time Hooker had finished its disposal operation at the Canal, the landfill contained some 6,000-7.000 tons (12-14 million lbs.) of BHC spent cake, most or all of which was buried in the southern section of the Canal. T. 2187, 5437-5438 (Cull).
Two methods of disposal of spent cake were described. In one method, the spent cake was dumped into pits 12 to 15 feet deep and covered by cinder and ash. Ex. 1516.
See also,
T. 5437 (Cull). Impurities later found in this material consisted of dirt particles approximately the same size as the cake particles. Ex. 962. In the other method, spent cake which may have been the residue from the later stage of the process when lindane was present in higher concentrations, was first packaged in wax-coated fiber drums. This was once described as “ ‘A’cake,” a substance which looked similar to chalk and contained approximately 11 percent “volatiles” or materials other than HCH/ BHC. Ex. 962.
By 1950, the Company’s top management officials were well aware that spent cake contained very large quantities of undegraded (though gamma-depleted) HCH/BHC isomers. This knowledge is demonstrated in a August 1950 memorandum detailing a proposal discussed by Hooker management to install the equipment necessary to convert HCH/BHC present in spent cake into up to 250.000 lbs. per month of pyrolytic triehlorobenzene (“PTCB”) by high temperature degradation or pyrolysis. Exs. 951 & 1515. Hooker management apparently found this proposal attractive because PTCB could be produced at a much lower cost than trichlorobenzene prepared by chlorination of ben: zene.
13
Exs. 951, 1514, and 1515. The proposal was approved by Hooker’s president and senior management in September 1950. Ex. 1515.
According to Cull,' Hooker installed the necessary equipment and began converting some or all of the spent cake produced in the FBHC process to PTCB in 1951 or 1952, thereby drastically reducing the amount of waste generated from HGI production. T. 5190. In early 1953, however, the Company cut FBHC production. Ex. 1516. Hooker’s production personnel were concerned that there would be insufficient “BHC spent cake” available from the FBHC process to meet the demand for PTCB.
Id.
This led to a proposal that the Company’s Process Study group investigate the practical problems that might be involved in recovering spent cake from “the dump,” in quantities of up to 190 tons per month, for use in PTCB production.
Id.
Such a study was performed
(see
Exs. 961 and 962), and a recommendation was made that “facilities be provided for return of spent cake from the dump.... ” Ex. 962. Nothing in the record indicates whether spent cake was ever actually recovered on a large scale.
The proposal to recover spent cake from “the dump” for use in PTCB production demonstrates that in 1953, Hooker’s production personnel understood (1) that HCH/BHC isomers were present in “the dump” in very large amounts, (2) that the HCH/BHC isomers remained in the ground in an undegraded state, suitable as raw material for PTCB production, and (3) that they were in the ground in a sufficiently concentrated form that they could be readily “mined,” cleaned up, and utilized.
Dr. Brix testified that Hooker knew that all four isomers of BHC were toxic by 1953. Her report reviewed at least 18 documents obtained from Hooker files which relate to the toxicity of BHC. Ex. 1335 at 44-54; T. 522-542. In addition to several internal memoranda, she noted a 1951 article in the
Journal of the American Medical Association
(Ex. 1159) which described lindane, the gamma isomer, as the most acutely toxic form of BHC, but warned of the ill effects of all the isomers. The article reported that the estimated fatal oral dose of lindane in adult humans was less than a quarter of an
*1014
ounce. The alpha and delta isomers had been found to be about % and ]é as potent, respectively, as lindane in single-dose acute toxicity tests on laboratory animals. The beta isomer is the least acutely toxic of the four isomers but the most chronically toxic, meaning that it could be stored and built up in the body over a long period of time. The article described the pathological effects of cutaneous absorption (absorption through the skin) in laboratory animals as “liver necrosis, ... hyaline granular degeneration of the renal convoluted tubular epithelium as well as mild changes in the bone marrow, lymphoid tissues, adrenal cortex, and cerebrum.” Ex. 1159.
Dr. Brix testified that she examined both internal documents and scientific articles found in Hooker’s files which discussed the toxicity of the BHC/HCH isomers. She concluded:
Hooker Chemical Company recognized the toxicity of HCH isomers as early as 1945.... Fatal poisonings [of humans] due to gamma HCH were reported as early as 1951. Poisonings could occur through ingestion or skin absorption. Symptoms of acute poisonings could include loss of consciousness and grand mal convulsions. As early as 1953 chronic poisonings were reported which included symptoms [such as] severe anemia and easy bleeding, probably due to decreased platelets. Hooker exchanged information on the toxicity of HCH isomers with other companies, kept apprised of the toxicological literature, was familiar with research at academic institutions, recommended several safety precautions for its employees exposed to HCH isomers, and closely followed the concern of regulatory agencies in gamma HCH.
T. 540-42; Ex. 1335 at 53-54.
2. Dioxin and Trichlorophenol
The State urges that Hooker’s method for disposal of trichlorophenol (“TCP”) and dioxin wastes and its attitude toward the employees who handled these chemicals demonstrate its negligence and malicious intent. Dioxin is a byproduct of the manufacture of TCP. It was buried at Love Canal and detected in sump pumps of Ring I homes in 1978.
Dr. Brix testified that between 1949 and 1952, about 200 tons of TCP were dumped in Love Canal. She calculated that the TCP residue contained about 300 parts per billion, or 120 pounds, of dioxin. Ex. 446; T. 605. The amount of dioxin which migrated to the area of the homes cannot be ascertained. The State contends that by 1941, Hooker knew that workers exposed to TCP could develop chloracne, a serious skin disease which was difficult to cure. T. 552 (Brix). During the 1940s, some Hooker employees did suffer from this condition, but their condition was caused by handling chlordiphenyloxide and related chemicals, rather than TCP. Hooker did not start the production of TCP until 1949. Before it embarked upon the chemical’s manufacture, the Company was advised that TCP “is by a wide margin the least toxic of the chlorinated phenols.” Exs. 66 and 69. The Company manufactured TCP from about 1949 to 1960, but did not learn until 1957 that dioxin was a byproduct. T. 5194 (Cull). Dr. O’Keefe, a chemical expert testifying for the State, said that the 2,3,7,8 TCDD (dioxin) isomer was not isolated until 1980. Hooker was aware in the 1950s that workers could develop chloracne from TCP production, but did not understand precisely what caused the condition.
While Hooker’s protection of its workers is not at issue in this case, the court will consider the steps the Company took to protect the health and safety of its employees and whether it was careless. In the early 1940s, Hooker consulted with governmental and other experts to find out how to prevent chloracne (Exs. 66, 97, 778, 1219, and 2502). The Company modified mechanical, ventilating, and operating procedures to improve industrial hygiene. T. 4264-66. In the latter part of the decade and the early 1950s, the incidence of chloracne continued to decline. The State’s view that Hooker did not attempt to protect its employees from the harmful exposure is not supported by the evidence.
3. Thionyl Chloride
Thionyl chloride, another highly toxic chemical deposited at Love Canal, was used
*1015
extensively in the chemical, dyestuff, and pharmaceutical industries. Ex. 1196 at 160. Brix explained that this substance is “very irritating to skin, eyes, nose.... [I]t caused burning and blistering of skin, and the odor was suffocating.” T. 580. Mr. Schultz described this residue as “miserable and dangerous.” T. 1152.
Thionyl chloride reacts vigorously with water to produce hydrochloric acid and sulfur dioxide. It is not dangerous in diluted form and it dissipates quickly. T. 4557 (Bryant). Accordingly, when drums containing thionyl chloride waste arrived at the Love Canal, they were first punctured and then rolled into a disposal pit that had water at the bottom. The contents of the drum reacted with the water, and the resulting gas quickly dissipated. In this way, the toxic effect of any remaining thionyl chloride in the waste barrels was simply and efficiently neutralized.
This method succeeded in dissipating most of the toxic material, but occasionally barrels were buried without first being punctured or with rework residue which still contained traces of thionyl chloride. T. 157; Item 1021, ¶ 309. The residue would then continue to react slowly with water and eventually burst the drum, releasing hydrochloric acid (HCL) and sulfur dioxide (S02), and whatever traces of thionyl .chloride or purifiers like toluene were left. T. 1078-79,1085 (Schultz).
Nevertheless, Hooker engineer Jerome Wilkenfeld said he felt this was the best way to dispose of the highly reactive material when questioned about the safety of this procedure. If the drums had simply been buried in the soil, water would eventually leak in and react with the chemical, causing the drums to expand and then burst. T. 4130. Wilkenfeld’s opinion was seconded by Dwight Metzler, one of the experts called by OCC to review the disposal operation.
14
From the time Hooker started disposing of thionyl chloride in 1941, it worked continuously to improve production methods to reduce waste from this process. T. 1173 (Schultz). The waste material from the initial process used was highly acidic and reacted strongly with water. A high degree of sulfuric acid remained. The second method employed toluene, which is similar to benzene but less toxic, less volatile, and less flammable, to remove further impurities. The resultant waste product was a mixture of tars and oils containing some toluene derivatives, sulfur monochloride, and some traces of thionyl chloride itself, although the exact composition is unknown because analysis of waste materials for chemical structure at that time was very difficult and therefore rarely done. T. 1078-79 (Schultz). By the end of the disposal period, Hooker had perfected a manufacturing process for thionyl chloride which left very little waste. T. 1085.
J.
Dodecyl Mercaptan or DDM
The State also highlighted the dangers of dodecyl mercaptan (“DDM”), waste products from lauryl chloride production, a DDM precursor, and some other small-volume-related compounds. Hooker knew by 1945 that DDM residues were lighter than ground water and could rise to the ground surface when it seeped out of the drums. Ex. 34. The State claims that the Company continued to the dump the DDM residues into the Canal without regard for the hazards posed by the chemical.
Dr. Brix testified that mercaptans are similar to hydrogen sulfide, which is one of the most toxic gases in existence. In her report, she discussed the various hazards associated with mercaptans and quoted a 1944 publication of the Rubber Reserve Company which said that methyl and ethyl mercaptan could cause “convulsion and paralysis and finally death.” Exs. 26, 1335 at 66; T. 564-71 (Brix). OCC chemical engineer Jay Cull countered that the highly toxic chemical Brix described was not dodecyl mercaptan, but rather methyl mercaptan, which was never manufactured by Hooker. Cull’s opinion is supported by the documents. Ex. 26, 44. While all mercaptans are toxic to a degree, the description of the toxic propensities of methyl and ethyl mercaptan did not apply to DDM. T. 5191. Butyl, isobutyl, and propyl mercaptan were listed as harmless in a Rubber Reserve Company report referenced by
*1016
Brix, and dodecyl mercaptan was not mentioned at all. This did not mean that DDM was harmless. A Hooker memorandum instructed men loading tank cars with DDM to use adequate ventilation and to wear a respirator. Ex. 44. It was clear that DDM was a substance to be treated with respect, but it did not have the highly dangerous qualities of methyl mercaptan.
Hooker disposed of drums of DDM residue at Love Canal between 1942 and 1953. (Stipulations of Fact (OCC-State), 25). At some point in 1944, Hooker realized that DDM was seeping out of drums and rising to the ground surface. Ex. 34B. After a failed attempt to incinerate the residue, the Company returned to landfilling and there were no further reports of DDM migrating to the surface after 1945. Ex. 2218; T. 4138, 4398 (Cull).
5.
Incineration of Wastes
At various times during trial, the possibility was raised that incineration could have been used by Hooker as an alternative to landfilling. The State contends that during the 1940s, incineration was a more efficient way to dispose of wastes than landfilling, and that Hooker chose landfilling only because it was cheaper. OCC admits that incineration was more expensive but asserts that there were better reasons to opt for burial of wastes. A review of the effectiveness of incineration techniques at the time of waste disposal at Love Canal reveals that it was not a viable alternative for Hooker.
Hooker’s records show that it considered incineration on several occasions. In 1944, Mr. Van Horn, who was supervisor of the Hooker Process Study Department, stated in an annual report that:
With the expansion of the DDM plant, this became a major item. The thionyl chloride incinerator was altered to burn organic residues. Up to this time, we had buried our residues at Luve [sic] Canal but this is creating a potential future hazard. DDM residue being lighter than water rose to the ground surface as it seeped out of the drums. The author feels that an adequate incinerator for burning all organic residue should be built. It costs about
twice as much to burn the residues as it does to bury them but I feel that eventually we will have a quagmire at the Luve [sic] Canal which will be a potential source of law suits in the future.
Ex. 778, p. 8737; T. 4136-37.
Van Horn repeated this recommendation in 1945 (Ex. 34), and again in 1949 (Ex. 946). Mr. Bentley of the Hooker Yard Department urged greater use of incinerators in 1953 (Ex. 174), and other Hooker personnel suggested that incinerators be developed (T. 5356-57).
In response to these suggestions from Van Horn and others, Hooker made several attempts to use incineration in the 1940s. For example, in about 1944, the Company paid the Army approximately $5,700 for an incinerator, which was used for a short time to burn thionyl chloride and DDM wastes. T. 5351-52. This operation was suspended because it was inefficient and unable to comply with pollution ordinances. T. 5240.
To explain why incineration was abandoned in these early attempts, OCC offered the testimony of Jay Cull, Hooker’s principal witness on the use and development of incinerators who was well qualified to give an opinion. After receiving a chemical engineering degree in 1953, he joined Hooker; and in 1957, Hooker gaye him the task of designing an incinerator adequate to handle Hooker’s wastes. Before attempting to design an incinerator, he examined Company records and interviewed personnel who were familiar with the use of incinerators in the 1940s. Although the complete history was not available, Cull was able to determine that Hooker was faced with many problems. T. 5351, 5354. Chlorinated organic chemicals, including DDM and thionyl chloride, discussed above, manufactured by Hooker were very difficult to destroy by incineration. T. 5228. In the 1940s, good thermal technology and effective air pollution control did not exist to control gas emissions. Severe air pollution resulted, causing a corrosive impact on the surroundings and on nearby electrical equipment. T. 4137. Cull noted that the scrubbing of hot incineration gases is a complex engineering problem (T. 5369-72, Ex.
*1017
1502), and the construction materials needed to overcome corrosion were not available in the 1940s. T. 5229. For these reasons, incineration was abandoned. T. 5228.
Jerome Wilkenfeld, another Hooker manager, corroborated Cull’s testimony. He recalled that the incinerator installed during the 1940s did not run for more than one year. The residual substance it produced was gummy and difficult to handle, and the discharge caused considerable corrosion to other machinery. T. 4125. For these reasons, Hooker ceased incineration of thionyl chloride waste in about 1944. Some thionyl chloride waste was sent to Love Canal between 1945 and 1948 (Ex. 2218), but most ended up in the “S” Area Landfill. T. 4137, 4146 (Wilkenfeld).
Other companies engaged in chemical manufacturing encountered similar difficulties. For example, an incinerator operated by DuPont was shut down by the City of Niagara Falls in 1942 because precipitators were not in place to keep particles out of the air.' Ex. 3089; T. 5230, 5234, 5367.
Hooker was not able to use incineration for the type of wastes it buried at Love Canal until 1961, when Cull finally came up with a successful design. His device introduced steam into the residues (T. 5236, 5150; Ex. 2820), and his concept is still used by OCC to destroy Hyde Park NAPL at the Niagara plant (T. 5236). However, the Cull device only permitted incineration of liquid, not solid, waste. Good air pollution control for solid waste was not developed until 1970. Research and development into more efficient incinerators continues. T. 5151, 5236.
G. CHEMICAL EXPOSURE AT THE LANDFILL
Individuals who lived in the vicinity of the Canal during the disposal period testified about problems caused by chemical wastes. Only six homes had been built close to the site before 1954. The witnesses, many of whom were still children at the time, either lived adjacent to the site or went to the Canal area to play. Their testimony usually was brief, giving an overall impression or recalling a specific incident. Their credibility was not substantially challenged, but their testimony must be considered in the proper context. The events at issue occurred more than 40 years ago, often when the witnesses were quite, young; and in the intervening years, Love Canal has received considerable media coverage. There is little question that the incidents described occurred, but it is difficult to tell exactly when they took place, how often, and to what extent they created problems.
Some of the chemicals buried at Love Canal were flammable, and others had flash points of less than 100 degrees Fahrenheit. Ex. 921. As a result, there were frequent fires. The danger of fires was enhanced by the presence of chlorobenzenes and hexachlorocyclopentadiene (“C — 56”), which form phosgene if burned. In addition, deposits of sulfides and acids had the potential of forming hydrogen sulfide gas when mixed together. Moreover, the flammable character of some of the chemical residues sent by Hooker to Love Canal was such that it was impossible for workers at the site to compact the wastes once they were dumped, which contributed to the subsidence of the cover. Olotka Dep., T. 26-31.
One resident recalled that between 1947 and 1949, she observed fires from her backyard at least once a week. T. 93-49 (Wirth);
see also
A. Yoorhees, Dep. 326. Another witness recalled going to the banks of the Canal as a child to watch the fires, which at times would reoccur so frequently that the local fire department would give up trying to put them out. T. 274-75 (Corp). Some fires lasted several hours, with flames as high as 20 feet. T. 326 (Moriarty).
Hooker was contacted when the fires occurred. The fire department was called several times during the 1940s, and its records show responses to at least two calls in 1952 and 1953. T. 274-75(a) (Corp); Ex. 2231, 2237A. There is no evidence that the fires caused any injuries.
There were also explosions at the site. Dine Bouley, a former resident who lived on 100th Street, stated that explosions sometimes launched burning debris into the road in front of her house, and sometimes sent
*1018
debris as far as 102nd Street. Children would sometimes play with the cooled material (Bouley Dep. 28-29). Other witnesses recalled explosions, but none supported her recollection that burning pellets from the Canal were hurled that far.
When fires and subsurface explosions occurred, the covered soil was displaced, exposing previously buried drums and wastes. Gerald Craig recalled that when he was a teenager in the 1950s, the ground around buried drums subsided allowing him and his friends to play on the exposed tops. T. 102-17. June Craig Wirth, his sister, recalled that once when she touched a black liquid in the pit, it caused a burning sensation. T. 91-92; 95-96.
After a rainstorm, the surface area would become very muddy and swampy and would emit strong, noxious odors which pervaded the neighborhood. T. 274 (Corp); T. 133 (Moriarty); Bouley Dep. at 48A; Voorhees Dep. at 245. Timothy Moriarty recalled that once while walking across the Canal, he sank into the ground to his knees and had to pull his feet from his boots to escape. T. 133, 144-45. Dust, powder, and flyash flew from the dumpsite and from trucks into the neighborhood, soiling and sometimes damaging the paint on nearby properties. Bouley Dep. at 28, 48; Voorhees Dep. at 328-29; T. 187 (Wahl); T. 850 (Wagner).
In spite of these reportedly foul conditions, the residents, especially children, continued to swim and fish in the unfilled part of the Canal. Two witnesses remembered developing a rash or burning skin sensation after swimming. T. 190-91 (Wahl); T. 275 (Corp). However, there is no evidence that any serious or permanent injury resulted.
Throughout the disposal period, Hooker personnel and contractors observed that previously filled and covered areas of the landfill were settling and subsiding. The subsidence began to occur as early as 1942, exposing the tops of drums and waste material and increasing chemical odors and puddling. Ex. 781A, 35; T. 2836 (Cohen); T. 3334 (Pinder); T. 4155 (Wilkenfeld).
Hooker received complaints concerning chemical odors in 1950, and Mr. Wilkenfeld was directed to go to the site and investigate. He reported in a memo that the ground had settled enough in some places to open potholes and expose portions of buried drums. T. 4171; T. 4163-64; Ex. 96. His description of the area was similar to the recollection of the residents.
See
T. 131-33 (Moriarty); T. 91-92 (Wirth). He noticed that a thin, discontinuous oil slick with some globules had formed in the water of the dammed-off portion of the Canal. An odor was noticeable, although not at a distance. T. 4164. On cross-examination, he could not recall whether the slick was located south of Wheatfield Avenue, in the midst of an active disposal operation, or in the central area to the north. However, he testified that if the water in the rest of the Canal had been contaminated, he would have reported it. T. 4165, 4319. He did note in his memo that flyash was blowing toward the houses and ordered a bulldozer to level the area to prevent a reoccurrence.
Several Hooker executives expressed concern about the potential hazards posed by the Company’s disposal operations. Ansley Wilcox II, Hooker’s Secretary and General Counsel, visited the site in 1946 and wrote a memorandum to E.R. Bartlett, Hooker’s President, describing what he saw and offering recommendations for safety. Ex. 46. He wrote that there was a fence in the northern section but none in the southern end. The filled area was in good condition and did not constitute a hazard. However, he reported that to his “inexperienced eye,” the part of the Canal filled with water appeared contaminated. He heard that children swam there, and while he was there he saw youngsters with “what appeared to be bathing costumes in their hands.”
Id.
He felt strongly that Hooker would be “running a real hazard in not taking steps to prevent possible injuries to persons who may swim in the canal.”
Id.
Wilcox suggested that guards be placed on the property at times when the workers were not present to keep people out. Alternatively, he proposed that a fence be built around
*1019
the portion being used as a dump. He warned Bartlett about the potential liability facing the Company if someone were injured. 7d
15
Two subsequent memoranda showed that Hooker executives discussed Wilcox’s suggestions, but the fence was never built. Exs. 47, 48.
Wilkenfeld recalled that in 1953, the unfilled portion of the Canal was a few hundred feet long. By that time, Hooker had finished its disposal operations in the northern and southern sections, but it continued to dump chemical wastes, trash, and flyash in the central section through early February 1954. T. 4325. At the same time, the City disposed of trash and garbage in the central section. T. 4216. Overall, approximately 75 percent of the wastes disposed of at Love Canal by Hooker were deposited in the southern section and portions of the central section, with the majority in the southern section.
III.
THE TRANSFER OF THE LOVE CANAL SITE TO THE NIAGARA FALLS BOARD OF EDUCATION
By early August 1946, Hooker knew that the Niagara Falls Board of Education was interested in constructing a new public school in the vicinity of Love Canal in order to accommodate the area’s growing population. Toward that end, a representative of the Board expressed interest in acquiring a portion of the site, specifically the portion of the parcel that ran along Colvin Boulevard to the extreme north. The School Board’s interest, however, was contingent on additional frontage along Colvin Boulevard on property adjoining Hooker’s land. Ex. 45. Thus, the original plan was for school grounds extending along Colvin Boulevard, using property both to the east and to the west of Love Canal.
*1020
In early 1952, the Board again expressed an interest in obtaining a portion of the Love Canal property. Hooker also learned that a developer had voiced interest in purchasing the entire site. Thomas Willers,
16
who served as Hooker’s Comptroller in the early 1950s, attended a management meeting, in which Vice President R.W. Hooker announced that he had been approached by the Board of Education to discuss Hooker’s willingness to sell the Love Canal property to the Board.
17
Over the course of the year, there were several discussions about the Board’s proposal.
18
During the first discussion in early 1952, Willers recalled that Bjorn Klaussen, Hooker’s Executive Vice President, and Hiram Young
19
, Works Manager, immediately reacted to the proposal by stating that they thought the transfer to a school was undesirable. Mr. Young, who was responsible for waste disposal, said that Hooker needed the Canal property and had no immediate substitute for it. Both Klaussen and Young also questioned the desirability of land “which had been put to the use that Hooker had put it to being used for any other purpose, frankly, than what it was being used for.” Ex. 1703 ■ at 23 (Willers Dep.). Willers remembers that R.W. Hooker, who was handling the communications with the Board because he was a friend of William Small, the Superintendent of Schools, was told to communicate to the Board
very early in the game ... that the Hooker Company felt that [a sale] ... was inappropriate, regardless of our need for it, because of the toxic nature of some of the materials that were being dumped there and [it] wouldn’t be right for utilization for other than commercial or industrial development.
Id.
at 101. At the next discussion with the Management Committee, Hooker reported a further conversation with Small, in which he informed the Superintendent of the Company’s negative attitude toward the purchase.
A March 27, 1952, memorandum from Klaussen to Vice President Young discussed the requests to sell Love Canal and explained the Company’s refusal to consider transferring even a portion of the property:
About a month ago Architect Russell Larke said that a certain party was interested in purchasing Love Canal for the purpose of building low-cost houses and asked if we were interested in selling it, which I told him we were not.
Just a few days ago, Superintendent of Schools Bill Small called at this office and explained that the school board is planning to erect a large school in the general locality of the Love Canal and he asked if we would be willing to sell our property.
Wilcox [the Company’s attorney] and I discussed this with Small for some time and we pointed out that we used the Love Canal for
plant refuse containing some chemicals
which were buried approximately
six feet
underground and covered. We informed Mr. Small that we were not in a position to sell the property and that
the property was not suitable for the erection of school buildings.
At a later date Mr. Small asked if we might sell part of the property for a school ground and I again gave a negative answer.
It is rather clear that the territory on each side of the Love Canal will be used rapidly to provide buildings or a school and it may be advisable for us to discontinue using the Love Canal property for a dumping ground.
It is also rather clear to me that we should not sell the property in order to avoid any risks.
Ex. 118 (emphasis added). Klaussen went on to state that the purpose of the letter was to
*1021
suggest that Young look for another site suitable for dumping, to ask Operations to prepare a map of the Canal dump, and “suggest ways and means and costs to prepare the property in such a way that it will not create a nuisance.”
Id.
He also suggested filling in the property and creating gardens for the employees, “possibly with a lease which would protect us from any damage.”
Id.
The memorandum was distributed, among others, to E.R. Bartlett, Hooker’s Chairman of the Board; R.L. Murray, Hooker’s President; R.W. Hooker and J.H. Babcock, both Hooker Vice Presidents; and Wilcox.
See
Appendix C.
Within a month, however, at least some members of Hooker management had changed their minds. An April 25, 1952, memorandum written by Klaussen to Hooker’s President, R.L. Murray, told Murray that he and Ansley Wilcox, the Company’s attorney, had talked several times with 'Superintendent Small and a representative of the City Planning Board for Niagara Falls about the Board’s desire to build a school on or near the Love Canal property. After noting that he and Wilcox had initially opposed the idea, Klaussen wrote: “The more we thought about it, the more interested Wilcox and I became in the proposition and finally came to the conclusion that the Love Canal property is rapidly becoming a liability because of housing projects in the near vicinity of our property.” Ex. 119.
Klaussen and Wilcox eventually “became convinced that it would be a wise move to turn the property over to the schools provided we would not be held responsible for future claims or damages resulting from underground storage of chemicals.”
Id.
Klaussen suggested that a school could be built on a portion of the central section that had not been filled, and that areas to the north and south that had been filled with chemicals could be used for school grounds and athletic fields. Klaussen added that Hooker would feel free to continue dumping chemicals at Love Canal, but indicated that only flyash would be dumped in the area contemplated for the school.
Id.
Several reasons for this sudden shift have been suggested. OCC insists that the reason for the transfer was Hooker’s belief that the Board intended condemnation proceedings if the Company refused to convey title voluntarily. T. 670, 673-74 (Willers); T. 4177-78 (Wilkenfeld); T. 4560-61 (Bryant); T. 5118-20 (Chambers); T. 1178 (Schultz), Ex. 256. Willers remembered Hooker reporting to the committee that the Board “might have to insist in some legal way of having us give up the property” (Ex. 1703 at 100), such as condemning it for public use. Mr. Young reportedly told his assistant that because the School Board was insistent and had threatened to start condemnation proceedings, the Company decided to donate the site instead, making sure the Board understood the hazards and attaching clear language about the hazards in the deed. Bryant Dep., Ex. 1697 at 238. Jerome Wilkenfeld remembered someone telling him that the decision to give Love Canal to the Board was made because:
The School Board had threatened legal action ... to take the property from us under eminent domain.... And that Hooker is a good local citizen and was not going to get involved in that kind of fight with the School Board and would deed it to them for $1 and include some advisory on ... the fact that the site had buried chemicals on it.
Ex. 1702 at 595. Willers also recalled that the management committee members were indignant when they heard of the threat but did not think it had any impact or effect on the ultimate decision.
20
Ex. 1703 at 317.
The attitude of Hooker’s executives may also have been, affected by the results gathered from test holes dug on April 19 and 20, 1952. The digging was done to determine whether the chemical wastes had moved through the soil. In his memorandum to President Murray, Klaussen reported that ten deep holes had been dug at the site in order to test for subsurface chemical migration, and “in no case were chemicals found
*1022
nor was soil saturated with chemicals up to within twelve inches of the excavation.” Ex. 119. A map purporting to show the location of the test holes was given to Small and Collins, the City representative. On the map there is a note, apparently in Klaussen’s handwriting, saying that there was no evidence that wastes were migrating from the site.
See
Appendix D-1,
**
Ex. 2019; Exs. 119, 3626 ¶ 18 (City-0CC Stip); T. 4187 (Wilkenfeld). Klaussen noted in his memo that the “whole matter was discussed freely with Small and Collins.” Ex. 119. The Board told Hooker that it still wanted the property, but Klaussen felt that Hooker would have to study the soil conditions further before it could consider a transfer.
Id.
The evidence concerning the number and locations of holes dug to test the soil is inconclusive. OCC’s contention that Hooker dug ten test holes is based on Klaussen’s memo and a map of the Canal which identifies the location of the ten holes.
21
William Beck, who joined Hooker in 1952 as part of the Process Study Group, an entering group for newly hired engineers, testified about the map. Although he was not at all involved in digging test holes, he used a blueprint map prepared in 1952 by an unidentified Hooker employee when he went to the Canal in 1957 at the request of the Group’s leader, Jerome Wilkenfeld, to determine where wastes were buried. T. 749-53, 755; Appendix D-2, Ex. 2044.
Several types of markings and notations had been added to the map prior to Beck’s use of it, including ten circular symbols, each with an “X” inside.
22
T. 770. Over objection, Beck read into record the handwritten notes which were already on the map when he first saw it:
Test holes were dug in this area on April 19-20, 1952. B.K. noted the following on the original drawing: “No evidence of chemicals any place digging down 10-feet right up to within 1 foot of the excavations.”
“In places where we have dumped chemicals the chemicals are almost unchanged in form and found 4 feet below surface.”
T. 760; Ex. 2044.
Mr. Wilkenfeld identified two other versions of this map. Exhibit 2019, which OCC contends is the map that Hooker provided to the Board,
23
includes the phrase, “Holes were dug on April 19th and 20th, supervised by Bentley. BK 4-21,” which was written in Klaussen’s handwriting. T. 4181. Wilkenfeld explained that Bentley was supervisor of the Yard Department in 1952-53. The second had a legend at the bottom explaining that the circles with the “X” inside symbolized: “test holes dug to determine underground seepage of chemicals, if any. There was none April 19, 20, 1952, except where noted.” Ex. 2045; Appendix D-2. Wilkenfeld explained that he had added “except where noted” because liquid chemical residue was found in the two holes dug inside the Canal where disposal occurred. T. 4272. This finding is shown on the map by two notations, one in the far north and the other in the far south of the Canal, stating, “chemicals contacted 4’ below grade.” Ex. 2045. Beck and Wilkenfeld agreed that the “BK” in the notations was Bjorn Klaussen, Hooker’s Executive Vice President in 1952. T. 760 (Beck);
See,
Appendix C. Wilkenfeld said that he did not know whether Klaussen went to the site in 1952, but the handwriting appeared to be Klaussen’s. T. 4180, 4364.
Despite this evidence, the State disputes OCC’s assertion that ten holes were dug and refers to the testimony of William Wagner, the only living witness who actually dug the holes. Wagner recalled that his supervisor, Mr. Bentley, told him to dig a test hole in the southern section in 1952 or early 1953. He
*1023
dug a pit close to the disposal area 8' by 12' and 15' deep. It was a dry day, and the hole was all dry. The soil consisted of sandy loam and red clay just above the blue clay. The pit was left open for 1)4-2 weeks and remained dry the whole time. Bentley was there while the pit was being dug and checked it later. T. 852-55. Wagner only knew of one other hole dug at that time — in the northern section. T. 880 (Wagner).
Although Wagner was only able to recall the digging of two holes, it is likely that the various maps with their circled “X” symbols marked the locations where Hooker tested for chemical seepage under Bentley’s supervision. When the holes outside the disposal site remained free of liquid chemical residues, Klaussen was able to report to the rest of Hooker’s management and to the School Board that there was no evidence of underground migration.
Hooker’s decision to transfer the site was probably most influenced by the understanding that the Company could not continue to use the Canal efficiently. At the same management meeting in which Mr. Hooker reported on the threat of condemnation, he stated that the Canal was nearing its exhaustion point, “on its capability of handling what we wanted to put in there ... [and that] there were real possibilities of substituting, either through new acquisition or expansion, the real estate needed to continue the dumping needed based on the current output.” Willers Dep., Ex. 1703 at 100. Mr. Young reported that in the long term, Love Canal was not as important for the disposal of residues as they had initially thought, and that they could cope with waste disposal at other sites. However, there was no change in the general opinion that the area in which chemical wastes were located had to be kept intact. “[I]t was made abundantly clear that the only condition or one of the' conditions ... if it was going to be used for a playground ... that the land could not be disturbed.”
Id.
at 109.
Hooker’s change of position regarding a transfer of Love Canal to the School Board caused concern within the Company. Robert Schultz, then an Assistant Technical Superintendent and Wilkenfeld’s supervisor, stated during his deposition that he had heard “around the office that ... our management or some of our executives were opposed to the sale.” Schultz Dep. 285, T. 1128. He reported that his immediate associates “were sort of concerned about the possible sale of the property because of its nature.” Dep. 289, T. 1133. He himself felt that “it was patently clear that anyone unknowingly] purchasing the property and using it could cause a hell of a problem.” Dep. 286, T. 1132.
However, when questioned about these statements at trial, Schultz gave somewhat conflicting testimony. He -claimed he was unaware that any of the executives opposed the transfer at the time it occurred, although he did learn of some opposition later. T. 1127; 1130. He explained that in 1952, he was a fairly low man in the organization and was not involved or privy to any of the negotiations with the Board. What he did know was simply gossip or hearsay. T. 1130. Through hearsay, he later came to understand that some executives were opposed to the sale, but he could not recall who they were. However, he did confirm that upon learning of the possible transfer, he and some of his associates were concerned that the property would not be used or maintained safely. They were anxious about maintaining the integrity of the property once someone started building on the site. He was afraid that if the cap was disturbed, chemical wastes could be spread and tracked around the school grounds, and children could end up playing in the wastes. It does not appear that Schultz conveyed his fears to management. T. 1133-36.
Jerome Wilkenfeld, the supervisor of the Study Process Group working under Schultz in 1952, also testified about his response to the decision. During negotiations, Schultz assigned him to develop information for Hooker to give to the Board about the Canal property. At trial, he expressed a more strongly negative position about the transfer than did Schultz. The weight of his testimony on this issue, however, must be considered in proper context. In 1952, Wilkenfeld was only 33 years old. His position as a junior executive who had only joined the
*1024
Company in 1945 meant that he was not familiar with much of the information that management considered in deciding to convey the property.
Wilkenfeld testified that he was strongly opposed to transferring even a portion of the property to the School Board since he felt that a chemical dump site, even if enclosed and covered, was unfit “for public access or for anything to be built.” Ex. 1702 at 730. In his view, the chemical wastes could be dangerous if disturbed. As a result, the site had to be “carefully controlled.”
Id.
Excavation activities during development of the site might expose buried wastes. Although he felt that houses should not be built in the area surrounding the landfill, Wilkenfeld thought that the surface could safely be used for a playground if it was properly covered. He feared the consequences of subsidence, believing that corrosion of drums and settling would - continue. Leakage from the drums increased the danger of human exposure to the wastes; and once ownership of the property was transferred, Hooker would not be able to control or monitor its use. T. 4307-11, Ex. 1702 at 694-97. He recalled that other Hooker employees felt that transfer was not a good idea, but did not identify any of these individuals.
24
T. 4306.
Leonard Bryant, who would later become Hooker’s Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, was Plant Superintendent in 1952, reporting to Vice President Hiram Young.
See
Appendix C. He recalled being told by Young that the School Board had informed Mr. Klaussen that it wanted to acquire Love Canal in order to build a school. Bryant strongly agreed with Klaussen’s initial assessment that no part of the property should be transferred. He testified:
[T]here was a general knowledge that these organic chemical residues that we were disposing of was a mixture of all kinds of things, who knows what, and it was in the ground all mixed together and we just had a general feeling that, by golly, it better stay there and we better keep control of it to be sure it stayed there. That was just a general feeling that we all had.
Ex. 1697 at 246-47; T. 4592.
When Young told Bryant in a later discussion that the Company had decided to give the Canal site to the School Board, making sure the Board understood the hazards and attaching clear language about the hazards in the deed, Bryant remembered expressing his misgivings to Young. He explained that:
[w]hen you lose control of property, you never know what the new owner will do with it, the foolish things that he will do with it.... It’s not like a city garbage dump. These are chemicals and some of them last a long time and you would not build a building on it, put footings down into this kind of a landfill, no way---[W]e knew with what was there, the safe thing to do was keep it away from everybody forever.
Ex. 1697 at 250-51. Bryant recalled being surprised at the tone of the April memorandum, in which Klaussen changed his mind about conveying the property. He did not think that the property was suitable for school buildings or even a park. T. 4562.
Despite these misgivings within its ranks, Hooker decided to proceed with the transfer. In a May 1, 1952, memorandum, Wilcox informed Murray that Klaussen had notified Mr. Small that Hooker “would in all probability be willing to turn over part of the Love Canal property to the School Department.” Ex. 120. On October 16, 1952, Klaussen wrote to Small that Hooker was willing to donate the entire site even though the Board had been interested in purchasing only a portion of it, and that “we will be willing to donate the entire strip of property ... between Colvin Boulevard and Frontier Avenue” for the school. Ex. 141. He added that, “[w]ith the increasing growth of this area and its present lack of any park facilities, we understand that there is need for
*1025
areas devoted to this purpose.”
Id., see also
T. 4177-78, 4200-01 (Wilkenfeld); T. 5118 (Chambers); T. 6945-47 (Metzler); Ex. 256.
On October 22, 1952, the decision by the Company’s officers to donate the property was confirmed at a meeting of its Board of Directors. The Board’s minutes of the meeting recounted Chairman E.R. Bartlett’s report as follows:
[DJuring the year 1941 the Company purchased for the sum of $1500 a tract of land in the City of Niagara Falls, commonly known as the Love Canal, for the purpose of using the same as a dump for chemical residues and other waste materials. He stated that the property consisted of a strip of land 200 feet wide extending south from Colvin Boulevard for a distance of about 3000 feet approximately to the rights-of-way of the New York Central and Erie Railroad Companies and also an extension thereof south of Buffalo Avenue for approximately 1500 feet. He stated that at the time the property was purchased the land surrounding the same was all vacant and that in recent years residential properties had developed on the easterly and westerly side thereof, and it was, therefore, felt that the portion of the premises between Colvin Boulevard and the rights-of-way of the railroads, which had been used primarily for burying chemical refuses, was no longer suitable for this purpose. He further stated that the Company had been approached by the Board of Education of the City of Niagara Falls and had been advised that the Board had been making a survey of land available for construction of schools and had come to a conclusion that a portion of this property was the most desirable location for a school in this area, and the Board had asked whether the Company would be willing to sell a portion thereof to the Board of Education.
He further stated that the officers had given careful consideration to this proposition; that it had been ascertained that the proposed location of the school would be on a section of the premises on which no chemicals had been buried,' and that there would, therefore, be no difficulty in installing proper foundations. He also stated that the officers believed that the only purpose for which the balance of the premises between Colvin Boulevard and the railroads rights-of-way could be properly used would be for a park or playground purposes, since the existence of chemicals beneath the surface would make it very hazardous to erect any structures thereon. He further stated that the officers were convinced that it was desirable to abandon this property for use- in burying chemicals in view of the close proximity of residences which have been recently constructed, and in view of this fact, the officers had advised the Board of Education that the Company would be willing to donate the entire strip of land owned by it between Colvin Boulevard and the railroads rights-of-way with the understanding that a school should be erected on a portion of the property which had not been used for the burying of chemical refuses and that the balance of the property would be maintained as a park.
Ex. 145. The Board approved the transfer. Directors present: Bartlett, Murray, Babcock, Lutkins, Burnham.
Id.
Hooker conditioned its willingness to transfer, however, on the School Board’s acceptance of special deed provisions limiting the use of the property. Exs. 141, 261, and 7125. In turn, the School Board voted to accept Hooker’s offer and proposed restrictions conditioned on reviewing and approving the actual deed. Ex. 3535, ¶¶ 26-27. Wesley Kester, Chairman of the School Board’s Building and Grounds Committee, told the Board that Hooker believed the property was suitable for a school and park, but not for the erection of residences, and this was the reason for the special provisions sought by the Company. Ex. 2951. In a note to Hooker, the Board expressed its appreciation for the very generous offer and thanked the Company for helping to meet the City’s need for educational facilities. Ex. 2023; 3535 ¶26.
On November 20, 1952, the School Board asked the City through the Niagara Falls Planning Board to approve a site encompassing the central section of the Love Canal property and surrounding lots as the location for a new elementary school. Exs. 7125 at
*1026
262; 3535 at 31. Hooker had told the chairman of the City Planning Board that portions of the Canal property contained buried chemical wastes, and had provided a map showing their location.
25
Exs. 119; 3126 ¶ 18. On December 30, 1952, the City Planning Board approved the site. Exs. 150; 3626 ¶22.
The proposed deed sent to the Board specified that the property could only be used as a park, and that the school would be built near or next to the property but not on it. The deed provided in part: “This conveyance is made subject to the condition that the premises shall be used for park purposes only, in conjunction with a school building to be constructed upon premises in proximity to those above described____” Ex. 256. Hooker created a reverter clause in the proposed deed which allowed the Company to reassume control of the property if it was used for other than “park purposes.” Ex. 3535, p. 28; T. 1179 (Schultz); Ex. 256. The reverter clause provided that: “[U]pon the abandonment of said premises for such purposes, or
upon their use for any other purpose, the title
to said premises
shall revert
to the grantor, its successors or assigns.” Ex. 256 (emphasis added).
The School Board rejected Hooker’s proposed deed, because it was not within the Board’s purview to maintain park land. T. 1179 (Schultz); T. 4205 (Wilkenfeld); Ex. 3535 at 29. Hooker responded by removing the reverter clause and the affirmative covenant from the deed requiring the School Board to maintain a park. A new deed was prepared with an alternate paragraph expressly disclosing that the property contained chemical wastes and warning of the hazards. T. 4178 (Wilkenfeld).
By early 1953, the Board had begun to express interest in learning more about the nature of the materials that Hooker had dumped at Love Canal. In an internal memorandum dated February 12, 1953, Klaussen indicated to Bryant that the Company should closely watch any investigation pursued by the Board:
You are aware that we have offered to convey to the Board of Education of the City of Niagara Falls the Love Canal property between Colvin [Boulevard] and the railroad tracks, a great portion of which we have used for disposing of chemical residues. In order to protect the Company, the proposed conveyance to the Department of Education sets forth the fact that the property has been used for this purpose.
The School Department has raised certain questions as to the nature of the residues and has stated that they believe they should have tests made in order to ascertain as much information as possible before they ■ accept the deed to the property. They have indicated that they might have the tests made by the Buffalo Testing Laboratory.
We, of course, think it is quite proper for them to make such tests, for in any event they could so do after accepting the conveyance, and it seems to us if the tests are made in advance we might be able to avoid any erroneous conclusions. It would seem, therefore, that if and when these tests are to be made, we should have representatives on hand as observers to see what is done and we should also request the right to review the results of the tests before any report is made in order to be sure that they do not go far afield in their conclusions.
Ex. 153. It is not clear whether any further testing was in fact pursued by the Board.
By a deed dated April 28, 1953, Hooker conveyed the entire Love Canal property to the School Board in exchange for a payment of one dollar.
26
The deed contained the following provision:
Prior to the delivery of this instrument of conveyance, the grantee herein has been advised by the grantor that the premises
*1027
above described have been filled, in whole or in.part, to the present grade level thereof with waste products resulting from the manufacturing of chemicals by the grantor at its plant in the City of Niagara Falls, New York, and the grantee assumes all risk and liability incident to the use thereof. It is, therefore, understood and agreed that, as a part of the consideration for this conveyance and as a condition thereof, no claim, suit, action or demand of any nature whatsoever shall ever be made by the grantee, its successors or assigns, against the grantor, its successors or assigns, for injury to a person or persons, including death resulting therefrom, or loss of or damage to property caused by, in connection with or by reason of the presence of said industrial wastes. It is further agreed as a condition hereof that each subsequent conveyance of the aforesaid lands shall be made subject to the foregoing provisions and conditions.
Ex. 159.
The deed was reviewed for the Board by City of Niagara Falls Deputy Corporation Counsel Ralph A. Boniello. In a letter dated May 5, 1953, Boniello warned the Board that it was accepting “the risk and possible liability to persons and/or property injured or damaged as a result thereof arising out of the presence and existence of the waste products and chemicals upon the said lands....” Ex. 162. Boniello also warned the Board of possible liability arising out of Hooker’s continued dumping. He recommended a proper liability policy to protect the Board.
Id.
As a further condition of the transfer, Hooker reserved the right to continue dumping chemical wastes at Love Canal. In the cover letter to the Board sent along with the proposed deed, Wilcox confirmed that Hooker would continue to dump waste materials in unfilled portions of the property located north of Reed Avenue and south of Wheat-field Avenue. Hooker also agreed to the Board’s request to deposit flyash in the central section. Ex. 160.
Hooker informed the Board by the deed, accompanying letters, and oral communications that corrosive and hazardous materials had been buried at Love Canal. Details of the discussions between Hooker and the Board remain unknown, because none of the negotiators to the transfer were available at trial. Other than a deposition from Mr. Willers, the court was presented with no direct evidence from participants and was forced to rely on the written record and testimony of Hooker employees peripheral to the transaction such as Wilkenfeld, Bryant, and Schultz, who could not supply more than limited information. The Board was warned not to dig into the landfill, but to keep it contained and covered with topsoil and seeded with grass and other' vegetation. The. Board was also advised that the public should not be exposed to the -buried chemicals. T. 4178 (Wilkenfeld); Ex. 1702 at 725, 732-34; Ex. 2951. Wilkenfeld recommended that Hooker tell the Board to maintain good surveillance of the property, to keep sink holes filled in and the surface covered. Ex. 1702 at 730-31; Tr. 4173.
Hooker did not offer to provide specific technical data or analysis of the chemicals in the landfill. Ex. 1702 at 740-42. As discussed
infra
in Part VII (Industry Practice), the technology available at that time would have made such an analysis of many of the chemical residues unreasonably costly and difficult. Wilkenfeld felt that given the conditions and technology at the time, the cautions conveyed were adequate. “[A]t that time this was considered the best information we had. There was no attempt not to inform them as fully as we could of information about the materials and the hazards of the site.”
Id.
at 735-36.
Nevertheless, Hooker did know with some precision the composition and dangers of certain chemicals buried in the Canal and could easily have provided explanations of what they looked like, what dangers they presented, and how best to avoid exposure. The best example of such a chemical substance is the BHC (benzene hexaehloride) spent cake. As discussed in Part II, Hooker produced enormous quantities of lindane, the pure gamma form of BHC. The residues left after the pure lindane was extracted were largely a mixture of alpha, beta, and delta
*1028
BHC isomers, with small amounts of lindane still mixed in.
Hooker deposited between 6,000 and 7,000 tons of spent cake at the Canal. The material was readily identifiable as a whitish, chalky, crumbling substance. Based on the degree of subsidence already experienced by Hooker during the disposal operation, it would not have been difficult to predict that this substance would become exposed, as indeed it did after the transfer. Hooker could easily have informed the Board what the spent cake looked like, how it was dangerous, and what warnings should be given to school officials and neighborhood residences who might come in contact with it as well as giving the general suggestion that it be kept covered.
Wilkenfeld knew of no attempt by Hooker to ascertain whether the School Board had the resources, knowledge, and experience to undertake monitoring and maintenance of a chemical waste landfill. Moreover, he did not know whether the Board was aware of the degree of uncertainty Hooker had about the exact location of some of the wastes within Love Canal
(id.
at 744, 748-49), nor that some people within the Company opposed the transfer for safety reasons. Finally, Wilkenfeld did not think there was any discussion within the Company about informing the public that the Canal might not be a fit place for a school.
Id.
at 921. He admitted, however, that he was not present at any of the management meetings or privy to communications between Klaussen and the Board at the time of the transfer. And, there is no evidence that the Board ever sought more detailed information about the nature of the chemicals buried in the Canal.
Wilkenfeld returned to the site just prior to the transfer in 1953 and found the cover complete and somewhat raised. The City was disposing of municipal wastes in the remaining unfilled portion of the central section. The parts that had been filed with chemical wastes were fairly level and in safe condition for transfer. There was no sign of leaching of buried materials and no evidence of chemicals seeping into the water in the open portion of the Canal or of subsidence of the cover. He concluded that the cover was in good shape and that transfer could proceed. However, he only did a visual check during this visit, with no sampling of water or any other testing. Ex. 1702 at 711.
The Board hired Hough Soils Engineering Laboratories in early 1953 to investigate the site. The main purpose of the investigation was to determine the feasibility of construction. Hough’s report warned about the potential for instability, but concluded that construction was possible, albeit appearing “to involve somewhat more than ordinary expense.” Ex. 161. There was no discussion of chemical waste hazards or the need for maintenance of the cover.
Relying upon its agreement with the Board, Hooker continued to dump chemical wastes and flyash at the site during the initial phase of construction of the school through February, 1954. Ex. 174. When Hooker discontinued use of the site, it did not place topsoil, seed, or vegetation on the cover.
IV.
POST-TRANSFER EVENTS
Between the time Hooker transferred the Love Canal site to the School Board in 1953 and the governmental intervention in 1978, several problems arose. Waste exposure during excavation for the school in 1953 forced relocation of the foundations. There was a series of complaints about subsidence, the eruption of potholes, and chemical wastes and drums rising to the surface. There were also some reports of minor injuries from chemical burns. Approximately 15 of these incidents were called to Hooker’s attention at the time they occurred, but there is no evidence that the Company was informed of many others which were related at trial.
27
*1029
The incidents Hooker learned about are examined in detail, because the focus of this discussion is to understand Hooker’s attitude toward the possibility of hazard to the community resulting from the chemical landfill. To illustrate the consequences of the Company’s alleged recklessness in transferring the site, the State also offered evidence of occasions when subsidence or a similar event occurred which were not called to Hooker’s attention. These latter events are recounted briefly but cannot be given much weight probative of Hooker’s intent.
A. INCIDENTS WHICH WERE REPORTED TO HOOKER
A review of the post-transfer evidence presented shows that Hooker offered help or advice for every documented incident of which it received notification, while consistently maintaining that it was under no legal obligation to do so. T. 3185-86 (Cohen). The court was offered no evidence of any occasion during the 25 years after the transfer when the Board, any other party, or any individual demanded that Hooker take further action after it responded to a problem. Hooker was most often called to help with the potholes caused by subsidence.
28
Id.
Occasionally, it was asked to identify a chemical that had surfaced and analyze its potential harm or give advice in treating an injury. This assistance was requested both when residents accidently came in contact with chemical residue and when the City and the State were engaged in activities which contributed to the exposure of waste at the Canal. The following is a chronology of these incidents.
1. Chemicals at School Construction Site
Wastes located in the central section began to cause trouble during construction of the 99th Street School even before Hooker stopped dumping at Love Canal. In a letter dated January 21, 1954, Charles Thiele, an architect hired by the School Board, reported to the Chairman of the Board’s Building Committee that during excavation for the original proposed site for the school, the contractor hit a “soft spot in the ground”, at the southwest corner. Ex. 180. Material in a filled drain trench gave off a strong chemical odor. Upon further investigation, the excavator made contact with a pit filled with chemicals. The general contractor then learned that there were “two dump pits approximately 30 feet wide and 40 feet long and about 20 feet deep ... filled with chemical waste, some of which was in 55 gallon drums.”
Id.
Thiele commented that:
We were informed that no record was kept of the exact location of these pits....
We believe it is poor policy to attempt to build over this soil as it will be a continuous source of odors and until more information is available regarding the material dumped in this area, we must assume that it might be a detriment to the concrete foundations....
A test pit was also dug some 4 feet deep east of thé approximate location of the north dump pit to make sure that the building would miss this particular hazard.
Id.
At the Company’s direction, Mr. Wilkenfeld went to the site, where the contractor told him that he was concerned about “some black water that they saw around the foundations that had just been installed for the school building. They were concerned that this might be chemicals and might attack the foundation.” T. 4222. Wilkenfeld looked at the black liquid and tested it for acidity or alkalinity by tasting it. It had no taste, and he informed the contractor that, “I didn’t think that it was acid or alkaline, and it probably wouldn’t attack the foundation. He was satisfied with that, and I left.” T. 4223. Wilkenfeld also described what he found as “black water. It could have been fly ash, it could have been just from the color of the soil, but the water was black and that didn’t surprise me.” T. 4330. He did not rule out
*1030
the possibility that the water contained chemicals, but he doubted that there were chemicals there because “there was no odor to it and no sign of free organics in it.”
Id.
When questioned about the information he gave to the contractor, Wilkenfeld replied that he merely discussed the pH factor of the material because that was all the contractor asked about. T. 4328-31.
As a result of this discovery, the location of the school was moved approximately 85 feet north of the originally planned location. T. 2901 (Cohen). During closing arguments, OCC agreed that the materials found during the excavation for the school were chemical wastes in pits not shown on any map. OCC concedes that it made a mistake by not finding and including the pits on the map it prepared for the School Board. Truitt, Closing Arguments, January 7, 1992, at p. 111. However, OCC claims there is no evidence that the Company knowingly withheld the location and existence from the Board. Rather, the Company believed there were no chemicals buried where the school was to be built. Nevertheless, the failure of Hooker to inform the Board and the contractor about the location of these wastes is inexcusable. Fortunately, an investigation by the County Health Department in 1976 revealed no evidence of chemicals at the school or on the neighboring surface in the schoolyard, and in 1978 a State investigation came to the same conclusion. Exs. 2102, 487; T. 1268, 1275, 6650.
'
2. Complaints About Odors: 1955
In early 1955, in response to complaints about odors, Mr. Wilkenfeld and Colonel Arnold Arch, the City of Niagara Falls Pollution Control Department Director, visited the Canal. Colonel Arch, who was deceased at the time of trial, previously had been in charge of the Army Chemical Control Laboratory in Niagara Falls. Wilkenfeld recalled that toward the southern end of the Canal, they noticed odors which were rather general and typical of those present throughout Niagara Falls. He did not notice any subsidence, and the Canal appeared to be covered. Wilkenfeld recommended that topsoil be put on the ground and vegetation planted to absorb the odors. Tr. 4224-25.
3. Crater in The Playground: 1955
Later in 1955, Mr. Wilkenfeld learned that a large hole exposing chemical wastes had developed in a playground area where a child had been burned by the residues. Wilkenfeld had difficulty recalling the details of this visit, but he agreed with the memorandum dated May 20, 1955, prepared by Colonel Arch describing the incident to the Acting City Manager:
This report ... concerns the accident which is reported to have happened at the “Hooker Dump” last night.
The source of my information is Mr. Jerome Wilkenfeld, Assistant Technical Superintendent of the Hooker Electrochemical Company. Approximately 20 yards southwest of the 99th Street School the ground crumbled in an area about 25 feet square, uncovering some drums of chemicals which had been placed in the area when the dump belonged to the Hooker Electrochemical Company. Some of the school children noticing a slight odor began puddling in the material, splashing it in one of the children’s eyes. The Principal of the 99th St. School phoned the Hooker Electrochemical Company for advice as to what the material contained. Mrs. Frank Dennis, Supervisor of the Hooker hospital, and Mr. Wilkenfeld proceeded at once to the school and recommended first-aid treatment for the student. The child has fully recovered.
Mr. Wilkenfeld arranged for approximately ten trucks of fill to cover the exposed area and also sent a bulldozer out to the scene of the cave-in to level and grade the area. Mr. Wilkenfeld also recommended that the recommendations given to the Board of Education by him and the writer last year be carried out with the least practicable delay. The recommendations consist of grading and landscaping the whole area with vegetation in order to absorb and decrease any odor level of residual chemicals....
*1031
Ex. 201.
29
U. Proposed Sale of Property: 1957
In 1957, the School Board considered a plan to sell a portion of the property to developers for the construction of homes. Upon learning of this development, Hooker sent one of its attorneys, Arthur Chambers, to the Board’s regularly scheduled meeting on November 7, 1957, to advise against such a transfer. Mr. Chambers was deceased at the time of trial, but his deposition was read. T. 5110-41. The record of his meetings with the School Board is set forth in correspondence between the parties, the School Board minutes, the testimony of Mr. Wilkenfeld, who was present at the meetings, and the Chambers deposition.
At the November 7 meeting, Chambers told the Board of Hooker’s opinion that the property should not be divided for the purpose of building homes. He told the Board that Hooker felt a moral obligation to warn against a sale of the property for subdivision and home construction. Ex. 253. In his preparatory notes for the meeting, Chambers wrote: “Then if someone is hurt and we, Hooker, escape liability, that does not heal the injured party.” Ex. 252.
The official minutes of the Board for its meeting of November 7, 1957, described Chambers’ advice:
Mr. Arthur Chambers appeared as a representative of the Legal Department of Hooker Electrochemical Company____ He reminded the Board that, due to chemical waste having been dumped in that area, the land was not suitable for construction where underground facilities would be necessary. He stated that his company could not prevent the Board from selling the land or from doing anything they wanted to with it but, however, it was their intent that this property be used for a school and for parking. He further stated that they feel the property should not be divided for the purpose of building homes and hoped that no one will be injured.
Ex. 253. Mr. Chambers also told the Board that prior use of the land made it “unsuitable for construction in which basements, water lines, sewers and such underground facilities would be necessary.”
Id., see also
Ex. 255.
Earlier that day, Chambers had called E.C. Jackson, insurance agent for the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, to ask about insurance coverage available to Hooker for any potential liability for chemicals buried at Love Canal that “would retain their corrosive and possibly unhealthy properties for a great number of years.” Ex. 254. Jackson said that Hooker’s policy would provide coverage from claims brought by reason of the dumping of chemicals, but that if any actions were brought, it could affect Hooker’s experience rating.
Id.
Chambers’ action appears to be that of a routine inquiry by corporate counsel.
One week later on November 14, Chambers talked to William Salacuse, the attorney for the Board who had been a member of the Board at the time of transfer. Salacuse asked Chambers about the possibility of selling part of the Canal property to developers, what tests Hooker recommended as a precaution before sale, and whether Hooker would cooperate in the tests. Chambers told Salacuse that Hooker was primarily concerned with preventing injury or property damage; but if the Board was determined to sell, Hooker would cooperate in testing the subsurface areas. In a letter of November 21, 1957, Chambers reviewed his conversation with Salacuse and also sent him a copy of the letter which Wilcox had sent to the Board. Exs. 256, 257. Chambers returned to the Board on November 21 to reemphasize the potentially hazardous conditions that made home construction inadvisable but to explain that because 4 to 5 feet of fill covered the chemicals, use of the land as a park or playground would not be dangerous. Ex. 261.
Ansley Wilcox II, General Counsel for Hooker, wrote to Dr. Charles Brent, President of the Board, on the day of the second meeting to amplify on Chambers’ remarks. Ex. 256. Reviewing the history of the transfer, he noted that when the Board came to Hooker looking for a site to build a school, the Company decided to give the property to
*1032
the Board providing “it would be necessary ... to incorporate in the deed a recital as to the use of the property and restrict the same to the erection of a school at a particular location which had not been used for the purpose of burying residues and that the balance of the property should be maintained for a park or recreational purposes.”
Id.
The deed restriction which Hooker proposed stated that the conveyance was to be used “for park purposes only, in conjunction with a school building.... [UJpon the abandonment of said premises for such purposes, or upon their use for any other purpose, the title ... shall revert to the grantor.”
Id.
Wilcox explained that the Board rejected the deed restriction requiring the reversion to Hooker, because the Board itself had no facilities for maintaining a park and “was reluctant to accept a conveyance containing an affirmative agreement to do so.”
Id.
Since only the City was in the position to carry out this maintenance, “some agreement would have to be made with the City” to take care of it.
Id.
30
Wilcox expressed Hooker’s concern that as time passed, possible hazards at the Canal might be overlooked, with the result that people could be hurt. He urged the Board to use the property only for park or recreational purposes.
Id.
The State describes Wilcox’s letter as a lawyerly effort to protect the Company concerning something that was becoming a very controversial issue. Nevertheless, the letter fairly recounted the history of the transfer. Chambers sent a copy of Wilcox’s letter to William Salaeuse, telling him that Hooker would cooperate with the Board to help locate possible areas of danger and to advise the Board with respect to length and depth of any test trenches to be dug. Ex. 257.
The State emphasizes that in the course of these discussions, Hooker never mentioned the history of drums corroding and leaking, nor that subsidence would continue to expose drums and chemicals. In the four years since the transfer, Hooker had already been called upon several times to help handle these very problems, yet apparently no one at the meeting raised the possibility that, even if left in the Board’s possession, the cover could not be maintained effectively. On November 7, the date of Mr. Chambers’ first meeting with the Board, William Beck, a member of the Process Study Group, went to the Canal at Jerome Wilkenfeld’s request to determine approximately where Hooker had buried its wastes. He was accompanied by Gilbert Johnson, who was head of the Yard Department, who relied on his memory to help Beck prepare a map, noting the location of various types of waste products. T. 749-57 (Beck); Appendix D-2, Ex. 2044. Yet, there is no evidence that the Board was ever given a copy of this map, which was presumably Hooker’s best estimate of where the wastes were located.
The State also calls attention to the remarks of Board member Wesley Kester, which were reported in the
Niagara Falls Gazette
on November 8, 1957. Ex. 261. After the meeting, he said, “There’s something fishy someplace. Now- they tell us it shouldn’t be used.” His comments are difficult to understand, for he and four other members of the 1957 Board were also on the Board at the time of the transfer in 1953. Hooker officials told Board members Kester, Brent, and Bialecks in 1953 that homes could not be built at the Canal site, that it was filled with chemical wastes and had to be properly maintained. T. 4211-12, 4198, 4523-26 (Wilkenfeld); Ex. 2028. When Chambers told the Board what information Hooker had given the Board in 1953, no one contradicted him.
In 1957, after the School Board graded and filled low spots in the southern sector, Board members inspected it. Ex. 3535, Nos. 84, 85. Erna Runals, one of the Board members, testified that she understood then that the buried wastes should not be disturbed by digging into the ground. Ex. 7138 (Runals Dep.). Hooker officials on their own initiative had gone to the School Board not once, but twice, to remind them of their agreement to maintain the security of the site and strongly advised against selling any portion
*1033
of the property to developers. Moreover, the dumping at Love Canal was observed by various employees and officials of the City. T. 5011-14, 5018 (Penque); T. 11590 (Ventry).
After the meetings, the Board voted to send a letter to Hooker expressing appreciation for sending a representative to the Board meeting “to explain the conditions of the soil near the Ninety-Ninth Street School when there was no legal obligation on their part to do so.” Exs. 253, Ex. 2048. In spite of the explicit warnings given to the Board by Hooker’s lawyers, the Board sold the southern end of the Canal to a private individual a short time later.
5. Problems During Road Construction: 1958
In 1958, Hooker learned of -complaints about subsidence and children being burned by exposed chemicals. In June of 1958, Wilkenfeld wrote to R.F. Schultz, then Hooker’s Works Manager, that three or four children had been burned by material at the Canal. Wilkenfeld noted that R. Fadel, Inspector for the City Engineering Department, reported he “had been down there inspecting a new road that was being constructed near the 99th Street School and gave Mr. Arch the impression that these children were burned while playing on earth excavated in the construction of this new road.” Ex. 264. Despite the warnings Hooker had given earlier to the Board about the dangers of digging into the ground, the contractor was either not informed about the nature of the chemicals underground or, if warned, took no steps to prevent spreading the waste material in the surrounding area.
Wilkenfeld told Schultz that Beck and Johnson had subsequently visited the area and noticed that just south of the road construction, where dumping had occurred, “the ground had subsided and the ends of some drums which may have been thionyl residue drums were exposed and south of the school there is an area where benzene hexaxhloride [sic] spent cake was exposed.”
Id.
Beck and Johnson told Wilkenfeld that “if children had been burned it was probably by getting in contact with this material.”
Id.
They reported that “the entire area is being used by children as a playground even though it is not officially designated for that purpose,” and suggested that these areas be recovered to avoid any further contact.
Id.
■
Mr. Beck said he saw as many as a dozen small pieces of spent cake. T. 773-77. He remembered surmising that the children “picked some of these pieces up and played with them and got some irritation as a result. ... I think that would be a natural reaction of children who saw these white chunks, attractive-looking, lying on the ground. I think a tendency would be to pick it up, look at it, maybe play with it for a while, then throw it away.” Tr. 806. Wilkenfeld advised the City Air Pollution Control Board that these areas should be covered (T. 4229-31 Exs. 264, ,2045, 3626), and similar information was given to the Board. T. 4234. In addition, in July 1958 Wilkenfeld gave another map to the Board showing where wastes were buried. T. 4234; Ex. 2045.
As discussed in Part II,
supra,
Hooker was fully aware that the spent cake that Mr. Beck found lying on the ground posed a great danger to these children. Ingestion of this material could be fatal. Exs. 1159, 1335 at 50. Although the spent cake only contained small amounts of lindane, the most acutely toxic form of BHC, the beta isomer and the most chronically toxic form of BHC, was present in much greater quantities. It could be absorbed through the skin, stored, and accumulated in the body, eventually damaging the liver and other organs.
Id.
Mr. Beck also found thionyl chloride residue drums exposed to the surface. While the methods Hooker used in disposing of the thionyl residue dissipated most of the toxic liquid
(see
Part II, Section E,
supra),
occasionally a barrel which had not been punctured or still contained rework residue with traces of thionyl chloride would continue to react slowly with water and eventually burst, releasing hydrochloric acid (HCL) and sulfur dioxide (S02) and whatever traces of thionyl chloride or purifiers like toluene were left. T. 157; Item 1021, ¶309; T. 1078-79, 1085 (Schultz). The vapors of these chemicals could be irritating to the skin, eyes, nose,
*1034
throat, and respiratory system. T. 572 (Brix); Exs. 1335 at 70; 1141.
The State contends that even though Hooker was well aware of the dangers associated with exposure to these chemicals, it never shared this information with those affected by the wastes. Indeed, Chambers advised Wilkenfeld during the 1958 incident that Hooker “should not do anything unless requested by the School Board.” Ex. 264. According to Wilkenfeld, it was the belief of Hooker management that the Company did not have a continuing duty to maintain the property after the transfer. T. 4232, 4238-39; Ex. 286. In fact, Hooker believed that it had no right to correct problems at the site without permission of the current owners. T. 4232.
However, those who were most affected by the exposure were the children who lived, played, and went to school at the Canal site. Once Hooker was notified that children were playing with the spent cake and had access to thionyl chloride residues from the drums exposed to the surface, they had at least some responsibility to these children or their parents to make known to them the extent of the danger and the measures which needed to be taken should a child, despite warnings, touch, inhale, or ingest any of these toxic substances. There is no evidence on record that any such effort was considered or carried out.
6. Board Offers Property to the City: 1958-1959
By August 1958, the northern and southern sectors had been graded and recovered. There was also some grading behind the school. Ex. 2800; T. 4653, 3052-53. When Mr. Boddecker, a city engineer, inspected the area in late 1958, he found that the property was relatively flat and that there were no exposed drums or waste material. T. 10,046-47.
At some point in 1958, the School Board offered a portion of property to the City in order to “develop ball diamonds and other play facilities.” Ex. 531A. At first, the City refused to take land north of the 99th Street School “because of the tremendous holes being created due to the chemical reaction in the land.” Ex. 531. The City considered the area south of the school toward Frontier Avenue to be “in worse shape insofar as ‘sink holes’ and things [like] that are concerned.”
Id.
T. 2841-43 (Cohen); Ex. 1445, 531. No one asked Hooker to attend to this condition.
However, when the Board offered the land a second time in May 1959, the Council recommended that the City Manager look into the possibility of transfer. Ex. 531A. He requested the Director of Parks to meet with the City Engineering Department to see if the Love Canal property could be used for a playground. After the Manager and his staff, along with Hooker representatives, inspected the property, the City and Board agreed to develop a playground behind the school for use by the school during the school year and by the City during the summer. Ex. 273. The City Manager suggested that the remainder of the property to the north and south of the school be “transferred to the Junior Chamber of Commerce for their long range development of this property for recreation purposes.”
Id.
In June 1960, the City accepted a deed from the Board for Canal property north of Reed Avenue to be developed as a playground by the Junior Chamber. Ex. 296.
7. Eruption of Thionyl Chloride Container: 1961
In September 1961, the Niagara Falls Fire Department contacted Hooker about an exposure of thionyl chloride residue. When Hooker was asked for advice in disposing of the material, J.E. Dillman, Hooker’s supervisor for Technical Control, inspected the area. In a memorandum he reported:
I found that a buried drum of Thionyl Chloride rework residue had apparently exploded, spewing residue over an area of about 10 [square] yds. The explosion was confirmed by a neighbor as having taken place around 9 a.m. Sunday, September 3. The residue was still fairly intact on Monday morning when inspected by the Fire Department, but by Tuesday it had hydrolysed and decomposed to a yellow stain
*1035
over the soil. The soil was dry and strongly acid.
Ex. 286.
As discussed above, Mr. Wilkenfeld explained at trial that the drum was probably not sufficiently perforated when it was dumped in the disposal pit, so that some thionyl chloride remained. When enough water leaked in, there “was just an over-pressuring of a drum that was probably weakened and just broke open. It could make noise, it could throw some of the earth in the air a little ways as it released the pressure.” T. 4132. Mr. Dillman told the Fire Department to cover the area with clean soil to prevent persons from coming in contact with the contaminated soil. He also informed the fire captain that while Hooker would be available for any further advice, it was no longer legally responsible for the property.
31
Interestingly, just prior to this incident, Hooker’s Works Manager Maynard L. Parker had received a memorandum from C.M. Olson, Health
&
Safety Supervisor, chronicling a series of health problems related to this same residue. Ex. 1180. Olson entitled his memo “Thionyl Chloride Residues” and reported that workers had been sprayed on August 2, 6, & 9 from drums that “let go” or were shot out because they were “badly bulged.”
Id.
One man suffered an eye injury as a result despite the fact that he wore eye protection. In another case, an entire building was evacuated.
Id.
Olson concluded that “[i]t would appear to me that safe and final disposal of this problem merits being considered a major project.”
Id.
Apparently, Hooker’s concern about the hazard this chemical residue posed was not relayed to the Board.
8. City Excavation at Wheatfield Avenue
At some point during the excavation of Wheatfield Avenue, which took place between 1959 and 1962, the City asked Hooker for assistance. A backhoe digging a ditch on Canal property had run through the drums buried there. T. 120. Mr. Parker went to the excavation site. Upon arrival, Parker saw some construction workers at Wheatfield Avenue in a ditch across the Canal about 5 or 6 feet deep. He recalled: “I saw a bunch of poor fellows down there in hip boots wading around in swill ...” T. 123. When he was asked what they could do, he told them to “crib up the sides of this ditch ... and put some planks down there so you don’t need to wade too deep in it, and when you get through, will you please fill it up with clay instead of slag.”
Id.
They had been using limestone for fill. The liquid in the ditch was black and smelled of chemicals. T. 126, 129 (Parker Dep. at 102-16).
Mr. Parker did not return to the site (T. 129-30), and apparently Hooker gave no further advice to the City regarding this incident. There is no evidence that any further aid was sought. City engineers should have been well aware that a large amount of chemical waste had been buried in this location and must take responsibility for any excavation undertaken without proper precaution.
9. Proposed Sale of the 102d Street Landfill 1962
On December 4, 1962, Mr. Parker, by then a Production Manager, wrote a confidential internal memorandum opposing the possible sale of the nearby 102nd Street landfill to the City for the enlargement of a park. Ex. 293. He noted that the characteristics of the fill were not conducive to park development, reminding Mr. Coey that Hooker was still plagued with problems at Love Canal in spite of their best efforts to shed responsibility. He said, “Geography in this area is a scarce commodity. Hooker may want this property for its own development in the future.”
Id.
In his testimony at deposition, Mr. Parker explained that when he said Hooker was “plagued,” he was referring to the prior incidents in which children were burned. Parker Dep. at 148-49. He also explained that he had been
against the use of any landfill for recreational purposes [because] if you’re going to have children on a playground or — we had learned from some past experiences ... that it isn’t a wise idea to have chil
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dren playing over any place where there’s anything buried, “cause they have a tendency to dig.”
Id.
10. Problems During Construction of LaSalle Highway: 1968
In 1968, the State began construction of the LaSalle Arterial Highway. As part of the project, the State acquired an approximately 55-foot-wide strip of the southern tip of the Love Canal property in order to relocate Frontier Avenue as requested by the City rather than close the road as originally planned. During the course of the planning for the project, Hooker expressed opposition to certain proposed ramp locations but did not warn the State of any potential dangers associated with excavating on or near its former landfill. Yet, the State never explained why their planning failed to take into account the obvious presence of the landfill.
On March 15 of that year, State contractors encountered chemical residues during excavation for a storm sewer trench being dug as part of the relocation of Frontier Avenue. Phillip Goodman, the Assistant State Engineer in charge, testified that prior to that date, he had never noticed any exposed chemicals, parts of drums, or odors during excavation. T. 4757. As soon as Goodman asked for assistance, Hooker sent representatives to the site to take samples of the material for analysis. T. 4765; Exs. 331, 1625. Fred Olotka, a Hooker employee, immediately told Mr. Goodman that the material should be covered, because if it dried out it might ignite. T. 4766.
After analyzing the material, Hooker prepared an internal report dated March 21 which described the sample as “an ‘oily’ like residue that burned like a 4th of July ‘sparkler.’” Ex. 1267. On May 9, apparently after a second request for information was made, Hooker reported to the State that the material was composed of “small amounts of chlorotoluenes, trace benzoyl chlorides and approximately 5% benzoic acid.... ” However, the State’s report did not include the description of oily residue which burned like a sparkler. Exs. 333, 1289. The State claims this omission was an attempt by Hooker to withhold information. OCC contends that the State reads too much into this transaction, since both the County Health Department and the State were aware that the material should be handled carefully, and the Health Department closely supervised the movement of the material. OCC asserts that the State did not ask for the report until after the County requested it and had no need earlier for a more detailed chemical analysis. Exs. 2074, 2076.
It is important to mention that during construction of the highway, the State’s performance was equal to or worse than anything for which it upbraids Hooker. Contractors left many truckloads of excavated wastes unattended at the site for some time. Removal did not happen until after nearby residents and the County DOH complained about the strong odors. Hooker agreed to take the residue at its Hyde Park landfill, but most of these wastes were ultimately dumped at the Nash Road landfill in the Town of Wheatfield. T. 4796, 4811. After moving about 1,000 cubic yards of material, the contractor used permeable material such as broken stone, gravel, excavated street asphalt, and broken concrete mixed with clay to backfill. T. 4792; T. 4806.
32
The State and County DOH inspected the Nash Road landfill before using it and determined the site was “acceptable” because its soils were “impervious.” Exs.2080, 2082. The soils at the Nash Road site were similar to those at Love Canal. The landfill was never fenced. Many years later, it was discovered that the wastes in the Nash Road landfill were leaking, contaminating the groundwater and threatening residents because of poor cover maintenance. Ironically, the State criticizes Hooker severely for placing waste in what the Company believed was a secure site in 1942; and 25 years later the State itself is caught up in a similar predicament. At the time of trial, the Nash Road site was on the State’s list of hazardous waste disposal sites. T. 4815 (Goodman).
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11. Report of Children Playing with Chemical Residue: 1970
In late April or early May 1970, Hooker was notified by the Niagara County DOH of a complaint that children had been playing with chalk-like residue that had surfaced at Love Canal, and that water at the location was rust-colored. T. 2843 (Cohen). There was no report of an injury. Ex. 351. Two Hooker representatives investigated the complaint with Mr. Pasqualichio of the DOH. At the site, they discovered exposed drums as well as discolored water in an area near 753 97th Street. J.M. Brogard, one of the Hooker employees, took samples from the drums and the water, tested them, and reported to the Health Department that they contained nothing harmful.
Id.
This apparently satisfied Pasqualichio, for no further inquiry was made. During the trial, Mr. Brogard was employed in the New York office of EPA but not called as a witness.
12. Complaint of Odors: 1971
In the spring of 1971, when a nearby resident complained about odors, several Hooker employees walked the length of the Canal and found exposed drums, fiber containers, and potholes. T. 2844, Ex. 1445. The resident was directed to contact the City.
13. Complaints of Eye Irritation: 1971-72
In July 1971, Hooker learned that a child’s eyes had been burned by exposed BHC wastes on the surface of the northern section near the back lot lines of 97th Street. Hooker employee Fred Olotka talked to the child’s mother and went to the area where the incident had occurred. He observed lumps of white powder about the size of a fist on the ground and an exposed fiber drum about two feet in diameter and four feet tall. Olotka was told that the children were touching or throwing the lumps and had received irritation burns. He had several pictures taken which showed exposed chemical residue and the fiber drum, and reported that a landscaper had been working in the area and it appeared that some of the topsoil had been scraped away. Olotka Dep. 23-24, 37; Exs. 368, 1453 ¶¶ 273-276. Hooker’s attorney notified the Board, and the City suggested that additional soil be placed in the area. Ex. 2087.
33
In May 1972, Debra Gallo, 11 years old, while playing near swings at the school, found some stone-like material which crumbled into powder. She rubbed her eyes and was taken to the emergency room for treatment. Ex. 376. Upon investigation Hooker learned that several young girls had burned their eyes and faces after using dry chunks of exposed residues from Love Canal as chalk to write on a sidewalk. Ex. 378. When informed of the Gallo incident by the Fire Department, Mr. Brierly, Hopker’s safety supervisor, went to the site and identified wastes found near the south side of the school as benzene hexachloride (“BHC”). He also learned that two young boys had been treated for burns to their face caused by contact with chemicals. All recovered. Ex. 378. The Fire Department hosed the area down.
34
U. Aliphatic Acid in Hole Where Children Were Playing: 1976
There was a complaint in 1976 about discolored water in a hole several feet deep and about three feet in diameter which had been dug by neighborhood children. Exs.2095, 1453. A sample was taken, and it was found to contain aliphatic acids. Ex. 2096.
35
Hooker told the Niagara County Health Department to have someone fill the hole and tell the children not to play in the area. Ex. 1453.
36
*1038
B. INCIDENTS NOT REPORTED TO HOOKER
In addition to the incidents just discussed, the State presented evidence of other problems to demonstrate the conditions in the area. These incidents are only reviewed briefly, because there is no indication that Hooker ever knew of their occurrence or was asked for assistance.
1. Subsidence in the School Play Area: 1956
In October 1956, Mr. Thiele, the architect for the school building, wrote the following letter to one of the contractors about the need to alter site plans due to the discovery of chemical residues:
We wish to point out that due to the existing conditions of the subgrading in certain areas, particularly south and south west of the building, certain changes were made to the original plans. These changes were discussed with school authorities pri- or to doing the work. The Kindergarten play area was moved to parallel the concrete walk south of the south entrance. This was done because a chemical dump occurred at the originally located play area.
As these chemical pits are continuously settling,
we felt it advisable to raise the finished grade at such areas. The grade of the south west corner of the property was also raised in order to provide adequate cover of the rubbish and fly ash previously deposited.
Ex. 234 (emphasis added). Although this information was given to school authorities, no one called it to Hooker’s attention. Evidently, the architect and the school authorities believed they could handle the problem adequately without Hooker’s help.
2. Land Collapse in School Parking Lot: 1960
A 1976 issue of the
Niagara Gazette
printed an interview with the school principal, who reported that in 1960 the land collapsed in an area near the teachers’ parking lot, leaving a hole about two or three feet deep extending over an area about 15 by 30 feet. The principal also reported that a hole two feet in diameter suddenly appeared in the ball field, and part of a metal barrel could be seen. William Howell, who moved to the Canal area in 1956 when he was six years old, also testified that subsidence took place at this ball field where he and his friends were playing. T. 171.
S. Puddling at the School: 1961
In 1960 or 1961 June Wirth, who lived on 99th Street, suggested at a PTA meeting that boards be placed on the ground near the school because chemical-laden water collected in puddles in an area where children who lived on the western side of the school had to wade through the puddles when walking to and from school during rain storms. This grade school was attended by children as young as six and seven. T. 97-98, 100-01.
L Chemical Residue Exposure during Street Construction: Early 1960s
William Howell also recalled an incident which occurred while he and a friend were watching workers construct Reed Avenue across the Canal. When they peered into a trench which was about 15 or 20 feet deep, they saw metal drums, including at least one that had broken. The exposed materials emitted such a powerful stench that he became ill and was confined at home for three days. T. at 173-74.
5.
Emission at the Ball Field: 1969
Peter Bulka, a former resident who had been employed briefly at Hooker testified that, while managing a little-league team on a baseball diamond located on the Love Canal property near Colvin Boulevard, a boy came running in from the outfield shouting that there were “volcanoes” on the field. When he went into the outfield to investigate, he found two mounded areas on the ground that were spewing grey fumes. He described the fumes as smelling like thionyl. T. 105-07.
These events, occurring after Love Canal was taken over by the School Board and prior to 1976, when increasing evidence of chemical exposure and migration began the process which culminated in government ac
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tion, include only relatively minor noticeable injury or property damage. The recurring instances of subsidence did put Hooker on notice that the Board could not prevent all exposure to the chemical wastes buried in the Canal but, from the record before the court, it is apparent that neither Hooker nor the Board ever believed the Company had a responsibility to ameliorate this problem.
In every documented instance of chemical exposure of which Hooker was notified, it responded with some type of assistance. However, there is no evidence that the Company conveyed its knowledge about the particular dangers of the chemical wastes. The extent of Hooker’s knowledge about the chemical resi
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