Lamont v. New Jersey

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 09-1845

_____________

ANGELIKA LAMONT,

Administrator Ad Prosequendum of the

Estate of Eric J. Quick,

Appellant

v.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY;

NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT;

MARK MANZO;

CHRISTOPHER MODARELLI;

KEITH MOYER,

JOHN DOES, A-Z, fictitious names, police officers,

supervisors, trainers, instructors, employees, agents and/or

servants of the STATE OF NEW JERSEY and/or NEW

JERSEY STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT, jointly,

severally, individually and/or in the alternative

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

District Court No. 1-04-cv-02476

District Judge: The Honorable Noel L. Hillman

Argued January 25, 2011

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

and STEARNS, District Judge*

(Filed: March 4, 2011)

Andrew M. Smith (argued)

Amanda J. Houpt

Smith, Marcino & Bowman

208 North Easton Road

Willow Grove, Pennsylvania 19090

Counsel for Appellant

John C. Connell (argued)

John P. Kahn

Archer & Greiner

One Centennial Square

P.O. Box 3000

Haddonfield, New Jersey 08033

Counsel for Appellees

________________

OPINION

________________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

*

The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge

for the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

2

This civil-rights case was filed after law enforcement

officers shot and killed a suspected car thief during a standoff.

Immediately prior to the shooting, the suspect had been

standing with his right hand concealed in his waistband and

appeared to be clutching an object. After being ordered both

to show his hands and to freeze, the suspect suddenly pulled

his right hand out of his waistband—not as if he were

surrendering—but as though he were drawing a gun. The

sudden movement prompted the officers to open fire, leading

to the suspect’s death. The officers fired their guns for 10

solid seconds, shooting a total of 39 rounds. Eighteen bullets

hit the suspect, 11 of them from behind. It turned out that the

suspect was not clutching a weapon; he was holding a crack

pipe.

The administrator of the suspect’s estate filed this suit

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the officers’ use of

force was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment.

In due course, the District Court granted a defense motion for

summary judgment, holding that the officers acted reasonably

as a matter of law. To the extent that the District Court held

that the suspect’s abrupt, threatening movement justified the

officers’ initial use of deadly force, we agree. However, we

conclude that a jury should decide whether the force became

unreasonable some time thereafter—i.e., whether the officers

should have ceased firing their weapons before they did.

Accordingly, we will affirm in part and reverse in part.

3

I1

The events surrounding the deadly shooting took place

shortly after 10:00 p.m. on July 21, 2003. New Jersey State

Troopers Christopher Modarelli, Mark Manzo, Keith Moyer,

Joseph Carson, and Thomas Hollywood were at the Bellmawr

State Police Station when the radio dispatcher reported that

local police were in pursuit of a stolen vehicle on Interstate

295 near Route 30. The location is within the Bellmawr

station’s jurisdiction, so the troopers drove out to the scene.

When they arrived, they were advised that the suspect, a

white male wearing a white t-shirt, dark sweat pants, and no

shoes, had abandoned the vehicle and fled into the woods

bordering the interstate. They were also told that local police

officer Robert Swanson had gone after him. Modarelli,

Moyer, Manzo, and Carson went into the woods to provide

backup for Swanson. Hollywood stayed behind.

The woods were dark and dense. The officers needed

their flashlights just to see in front of them. At one point,

Modarelli stumbled upon the suspect who was hiding under

some brush. Modarelli ordered him to show his hands and

surrender, but the suspect disregarded the commands and ran

away. Modarelli, now joined by Moyer, followed after him.

During the chase, the suspect got caught in a thicket.

1

As we must, we recount the facts and draw all reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the party who

opposed summary judgment. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378

(2007).

4

Trapped, he turned and faced Modarelli and Moyer, who

drew their guns. Modarelli and Moyer shouted, “Don’t make

me shoot you,” and (inconsistently) ordered the suspect to

show his hands and to freeze. Swanson, Carson, and Manzo

heard the commotion and joined Modarelli and Moyer.

Manzo unholstered his gun.

The officers were standing between five and eight feet

from the suspect, and had their flashlights trained on him.

They repeatedly ordered the suspect to show his hands and to

freeze. Modarelli, Moyer, and Manzo had their guns drawn

and pointed at the suspect. Although facing the officers, the

suspect’s body was not square. He was standing at an angle,

with his right shoulder forward. His left hand was positioned

above his forehead (apparently to shield his eyes from the

light), while his right hand was tucked into the left side of his

waistband and appeared to be clutching an object.

Suddenly, the suspect pulled his right hand out of his

waistband, not as if he were surrendering, but quickly and as

if he were drawing a pistol. As the suspect made the sudden

movement, Modarelli, Moyer, and Manzo opened fire. As the

first shots were fired, Carson’s flashlight was hit by a

projectile (later determined to be a ricochet from one of the

troopers’ shots), and he fell to the ground. Swanson went to

his aid, and after determining that he was unwounded, helped

him up. Meanwhile, Modarelli, Moyer, and Manzo continued

firing at the suspect. At some point, the suspect turned away

from the officers, yet they kept firing, shooting him in the

legs and buttocks. The suspect finally fell to the ground,

landing on his stomach and facing away from the officers.

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Swanson approached the suspect and determined that he had

no pulse. He was later pronounced dead.

In all, Modarelli, Moyer, and Manzo fired

continuously for ten seconds, shooting a total of 39 rounds.

Modarelli and Moyer each fired 14 shots (thus emptying their

magazines), and Manzo fired 11 times. Eighteen bullets

struck the suspect, and 11 hit him from behind. A medical

examiner identified two bullets that were likely fatal, both of

which struck the suspect in the chest. The examiner could

not, however, determine when during the course of the

shooting the fatal bullets hit the suspect.

The suspect was later determined to be Eric Quick. It

turned out that Quick did not have a gun in his right hand; he

held only a crack pipe. The pipe was shaped like a

cigarette—two inches long, cylindrical, and clear. A

toxicology report suggests that Quick was under the influence

of cocaine and heroin at the time of the incident.

II

The plaintiff is the administrator ad prosequendum of

Quick’s estate. On April 14, 2004, she filed this lawsuit in

state court. In relevant part, the complaint asserts Fourth

Amendment excessive-force claims against Modarelli,

Moyer, and Manzo. The troopers removed the case to the

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on

May 27, 2004. In 2005, the case was stayed pending the

outcome of a grand jury investigation into the troopers’

conduct. The grand jury ultimately declined to indict the

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troopers, and the case was resumed. On May 22, 2008, the

troopers moved for summary judgment, asserting the defense

of qualified immunity.

The District Court granted the motion on February 25,

2009. The Court first rejected the plaintiff’s argument that

the use of force was necessarily unreasonable because the

troopers’ decision to pursue Quick into the woods—rather

than set up a perimeter and use a K-9 to flush him out—was

unreasonable. This argument lacks merit, the Court

explained, because “the act that presumably justified the use

of deadly force was not the [troopers]’, but rather Quick’s.

The troopers did not resort to deadly force until Quick

suddenly ripped his right hand from his waistband.” JA 15.

The Court next concluded that Quick’s sudden, threatening

movement justified the troopers’ initial use of deadly force.

Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that there

is a triable issue on whether the use of force, even if initially

justified, became unreasonable as the events transpired. The

Court opined, “When Quick made a sudden movement and

ripped his right hand from his left waistband, the troopers,

believing Quick had a gun, all fired at the same time and

stopped once Quick was no longer a threat.” Id. at 22. The

Court acknowledged that “the number of bullets fired appears

‘excessive’ in laymen’s terms,” but stressed that “[t]here is no

evidence that any of the troopers fired mindlessly or paused

and then resumed firing after Quick was on the ground face-

down.” Id. at 22–23. The Court explained further that,

although “eleven bullets struck Quick in the posterior of his

body[,]” this “does not, standing alone, show that” the

troopers continued firing after “Quick was no longer a

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threat.” Id. at 22 n.14.

The plaintiff appealed.

III

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§

1331 and 1343. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1291. Our review of a district court’s grant of summary

judgment is plenary. Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 544 F.3d

279, 285 (3d Cir. 2008).

IV

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary

judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Facts that could

affect the outcome are “material facts,” and a dispute about a

material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is sufficient to

permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-

moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23

(1986).

Because “the victim of deadly force is unable to

testify,” Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 294 (3d Cir. 1999),

we have recognized that a court ruling on summary judgment

in a deadly-force case “should be cautious . . . to ‘ensure that

the officer[s are] not taking advantage of the fact that the

8

witness most likely to contradict [their] story—the person

shot dead—is unable to testify,’” id. (quoting Scott v.

Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994)). Thus, a court

should avoid simply accepting “‘what may be a selfserving

account by the officer[s]. It must also look at the

circumstantial evidence that, if believed, would tend to

discredit the police officer[s’] story, and consider whether this

evidence could convince a rational fact finder that the

officer[s] acted unreasonably.’” Id. (quoting Scott, 39 F.3d at

915).

This is not to say that the summary judgment standard

should be applied with extra rigor in deadly-force cases. Rule

56 contains no separate provision governing summary

judgment in such cases. Cf. Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics,

Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997). Just as in a run-of-

the-mill civil action, the party opposing summary judgment in

a deadly-force case must point to evidence—whether direct or

circumstantial—that creates a genuine issue of material fact,

“and may not rely simply on the assertion that a reasonable

jury could discredit the opponent[s’] account.” Estate of

Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 514 (3d Cir. 2003); see

Thompson v. Hubbard, 257 F.3d 896, 899–900 (8th Cir.

2001); Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 644 (4th Cir. 1996);

Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460–61 (3d

Cir. 1989). Our conclusion on this score is reinforced by

decisions refusing to ratchet up the summary judgment

standard for other types of cases. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at

256–57 (defamation cases requiring a showing of malice);

Wallace, 103 F.3d at 1396 (employment-discrimination

cases); Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Medina, 834 F.2d 242, 247 (1st

9

Cir. 1987) (antitrust cases); see also Gordon v. United

Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 896 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook,

J., dissenting) (“[Rule 56 prescribes] a universally applicable

standard; there is no room for a thumb on the scale against

summary judgment in any class of cases.”).

V

The District Court held that the troopers were entitled

to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment excessive-

force claims. Government officials performing discretionary

functions are immune “from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982). To determine whether an officer is qualifiedly

immune from suit, we ask (1) whether the officer violated a

constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was clearly

established, such that “it would [have been] clear to a

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–

02 (2001); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987) (holding that, for purposes of the second question, the

right must have been clearly established in a particularized

sense, such that “a reasonable official would [have

understood] that what he [wa]s doing violate[d] that right”).

Although we have discretion to tackle the “clearly

established” issue first, Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808,

818 (2009), we will begin with the question whether the

troopers violated Quick’s Fourth Amendment rights.

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A

The Fourth Amendment safeguards “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable .

. . seizures.” To prevail on a Fourth Amendment excessive-

force claim, a plaintiff must show that a seizure occurred and

that it was unreasonable under the circumstances. Brower v.

County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989); Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–96 (1989). There is no dispute

that the troopers “seized” Quick when they shot and killed

him. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (holding

that “apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure”).

The question, instead, is whether the seizure was

unreasonable.

It is unreasonable for an officer to use deadly force

against a suspect unless the officer has good reason “to

believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or

serious physical injury to the officer or others.” Garner, 471

U.S. at 3. In determining whether this standard was violated,

we must remember that law enforcement officers “are often

forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances

that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the

amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”

Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Thus, “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a

particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of

a reasonable officer on the scene”; Monday morning

quarterbacking is not allowed. Id. at 396; see also Brown v.

United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (Holmes, J.)

(“Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of

an uplifted knife.”). Under this “standard of reasonableness

11

at the moment,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, an officer who

uses deadly force in the mistaken belief that a suspect is

armed will be forgiven so long as the mistake is reasonable

and the circumstances otherwise justify the use of such force.

See id. at 396; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205; Curley v. Klem, 298

F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 2002).

In this case, the troopers were advised that local police

were driving down the interstate in pursuit of a suspected car

thief, later determined to be Quick. Car theft is a relatively

serious (though not inherently violent) offense. When the

troopers arrived at the scene, they were told that Quick had

fled into the dark, thicket-filled woods bordering the

interstate. Once in the woods, Modarelli happened upon

Quick and ordered him to show his hands and surrender.

Quick fled. When they encountered Quick again, the troopers

repeatedly ordered him to show his hands and to freeze.

Quick refused to comply. Instead, he stood with his right

hand concealed in his waistband, apparently clutching an

object. He then suddenly pulled his right hand out of his

waistband—a movement uniformly described by those on the

scene as being similar to that of drawing a gun. At that point,

the troopers were justified in opening fire. “An officer is not

constitutionally required to wait until he sets eyes upon [a]

weapon before employing deadly force to protect himself

against a fleeing suspect who . . . moves as though to draw a

gun.” Thompson, 257 F.3d at 899. Waiting in such

circumstances could well prove fatal. Police officers do not

enter into a suicide pact when they take an oath to uphold the

Constitution. See also Krueger v. Fuhr, 991 F.2d 435, 439

(8th Cir. 1993) (shooting was reasonable where, during a foot

12

chase of an armed assault suspect, the suspect suddenly

reached into his waistband despite having been ordered to

freeze); Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 500–01 (5th Cir.

1991) (shooting was reasonable where officers approached

the vehicle of a robbery suspect and, after being ordered to

show his hands, the suspect reached under his seat multiple

times).

To be sure, the plaintiff’s brief suggests that Quick

was simply complying with the order that he show his hands

when he pulled his hand out of his waistband. See Pl.’s Br. at

10. But, as the plaintiff seemed to acknowledge at oral

argument, the undisputed evidence shows that Quick pulled

his hand out of his waistband, not as if he were surrendering,

but abruptly and as though he were drawing a pistol. Given

the state of the record, we are compelled to hold that the

troopers reasonably believed that Quick was drawing a gun,

not complying with their command that he show his hands.

B

The plaintiff argues that there is a triable issue on

whether the troopers’ continued use of force, even if initially

justified, became excessive as the events unfolded. We agree.

Even where an officer is initially justified in using force, he

may not continue to use such force after it has become

evident that the threat justifying the force has vanished. See

Lytle v. Bexar County, Tex., 560 F.3d 404, 413 (5th Cir.

2009) (observing that “an exercise of force that is reasonable

at one moment can become unreasonable in the next if the

justification for the use of force has ceased”); Waterman v.

13

Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 481 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[F]orce justified

at the beginning of an encounter is not justified even seconds

later if the justification for the initial force has been

eliminated.”); Abraham, 183 F.3d at 294 (“A passing risk to a

police officer is not an ongoing license to kill an otherwise

unthreatening suspect.”); Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 247

(7th Cir. 1993) (“When an officer faces a situation in which

he could justifiably shoot, he does not retain the right to shoot

at any time thereafter with impunity.”).

Here, the troopers opened fire as Quick yanked his

right hand out of his waistband. At that point, the troopers

reasonably believed that Quick was pulling a gun on them.

But after Quick made this sudden movement, his right hand

was visible to the troopers, who were standing between five

and eight feet away and had their flashlights trained on him.

(Indeed, Modarelli has stated that he could see Quick’s right

hand while firing his weapon.) Although Quick’s weaponless

right hand was fully visible immediately after the troopers

began firing, the troopers continued to fire for roughly 10

seconds, shooting a total of 39 rounds. On these facts, a

reasonable jury could conclude that the troopers should have

recognized that Quick was unarmed and stopped firing

sooner.

We have not overlooked the fact that, just as the

troopers began firing, Carson’s flashlight was struck by a

projectile, causing him to fall to the ground. We assume that

the troopers could reasonably have believed that the flashlight

was hit by return fire, thus justifying the further use of deadly

force. But the evidence shows that the flashlight was hit as

14

the first shots were fired. In our view, a jury could find that

the troopers should have realized that Quick did not have a

weapon some time thereafter and ceased fire.

We are, moreover, concerned by the fact that 11 of the

18 bullets that struck Quick hit him from behind. The

troopers try to explain this by saying that Quick spun around

and fell to the ground as the final shots were fired. Frankly,

this explanation sounds a bit far-fetched. If the troopers’

account were accurate, one might expect to discover that a

small number of bullets hit Quick from behind. In fact, more

than half of the 18 bullets that struck Quick hit him from

behind. In these circumstances, a jury may find that the

troopers improperly continued firing after Quick had turned

away from them and no longer posed a threat. See Bing v.

City of Whitehall, 456 F.3d 555, 571–72 (6th Cir. 2006); Carr

v. Castle, 337 F.3d 1221, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2003); Gardner

v. Buerger, 82 F.3d 248, 253–54 (8th Cir. 1996); Ellis, 999

F.2d at 247; Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1332–

33 (11th Cir. 1988).2

Having determined that a jury could find that the

troopers’ use of force reached excessive proportions, we now

move to the second qualified immunity question: whether the

right at issue was clearly established. See Saucier, 533 U.S.

at 201. We conclude that it was. As explained, the evidence

2

On the current record, the timing of the fatal shots is unknown, so

the troopers have not suggested that Quick had already died by the

time any excessive shots were fired.

15

would permit the conclusion that the troopers continued firing

at Quick after a reasonable officer would have realized that he

did not pose a serious threat and stopped shooting. Assuming

(as we must) that this view of the evidence is the one that

ultimately will prevail, the troopers clearly are not entitled to

qualified immunity. It has long been the law that an officer

may not use deadly force against a suspect unless the officer

reasonably believes that the suspect poses a threat of serious

bodily injury to the officer or others. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3,

11; Abraham, 183 F.3d at 294. In short, the dispute in this

case is about the facts, not the law. The doctrine of qualified

immunity is therefore inapposite. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at

205 (qualified immunity excuses reasonable “mistake[s] as to

what the law requires”).

C

Finally, the plaintiff argues that the troopers’ decision

to pursue Quick into the woods violated standard police

procedures and was unreasonable. According to a police

expert retained by the plaintiff, the troopers should have set

up a perimeter around the woods and used a K-9 to flush

Quick out. If the decision to enter the woods was

unreasonable, the plaintiff reasons, then any force employed

once in the woods was necessarily unreasonable, too, because

the force would not have been used had the troopers not gone

into the woods. We reject this argument, as it is premised on

a flawed understanding of the doctrine of proximate

causation.

Like a tort plaintiff, a § 1983 plaintiff must establish

16

both causation in fact and proximate causation. See Brower,

489 U.S. at 599; Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285

(1980); Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 2000);

Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).

A superseding cause breaks the chain of proximate causation.

Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 1993); Warner

v. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1071 (2d Cir.

1997) (noting that “in cases brought under § 1983 a

superseding cause, as traditionally understood in common law

tort doctrine, will relieve a defendant of liability”); Hector v.

Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2000) (Nygaard, J.,

concurring) (observing, in a § 1983 case, that the “causal

chain traced by a proximate cause analysis can be broken by a

. . . superseding cause”); see generally Restatement (Second)

of Torts §§ 440–453 (1965).

In Bodine, for example, police officers entered the

plaintiff’s home to arrest him. According to the officers, the

plaintiff reacted violently, thus requiring them to use force to

effect the arrest. 72 F.3d at 395. The district court held that

the officers’ entry into the plaintiff’s home was unreasonable

and violated the Fourth Amendment. Having so concluded,

the court held that any force used once in the home, even if

ostensibly justified, was necessarily unreasonable. Id. at 395–

96. We disagreed with this analysis, explaining that it

misapplied the doctrines of proximate and superseding

causation. To illustrate, then-Judge Alito offered the

following hypothetical, which is instructive here:

Suppose that three police officers go to a

suspect’s house to execute an arrest warrant and

17

that they [enter illegally.] Once inside, they

encounter the suspect, identify themselves,

show him the warrant, and tell him that they are

placing him under arrest. The suspect,

however, breaks away, shoots and kills two of

the officers, and is preparing to shoot the third

officer when that officer disarms the suspect

and in the process injures him. Is the third

officer necessarily liable for the harm caused to

the suspect on the theory that the illegal entry . .

. rendered any subsequent use of force

unlawful? The obvious answer is “no.” . . . .

The suspect’s conduct would constitute a

“superseding” cause . . . that would limit the

officer’s liability.

Id. at 400. In other words, as long as “the officer[’s] use of

force was reasonable given the plaintiff’s acts, then despite

the illegal entry, the plaintiff’s own conduct would be a

[superseding] cause that limited the officer[’s] liability.”

Hector, 235 F.3d at 160 (describing Bodine); see also

Brower, 489 U.S. at 599; Young v. City of Killeen, Tex., 775

F.2d 1349, 1352–53 (5th Cir. 1985). But see Espinosa v. City

and Cnty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 538–39 (9th Cir.

2010).

The D.C. Circuit engaged in a similar analysis in

Hundley v. District of Columbia, 494 F.3d 1097 (D.C. Cir.

2007). There, an off-duty police officer observed two people

having sex inside a parked car. The officer tapped on the

window of the car as he walked past. Irritated, the driver

18

attempted to run the officer over. The officer jumped out of

the way, drew his gun, and ordered the occupants out. Once

outside, the driver made a threatening movement towards the

officer, whereupon the officer shot and killed him. 494 F.3d

at 1099–1100. In the ensuing civil suit, the plaintiff advanced

the theory that, if the officer had acted unreasonably in

initiating the encounter, the officer was necessarily liable for

the shooting, regardless of whether it was done in self-

defense. The D.C. Circuit rejected this theory, holding that

the suspect’s threatening movement was a superseding cause

that broke the causal chain between the initial stop and the

shooting. Id. at 1104–05 & n.5.

Based on Bodine and Hundley, we conclude that the

troopers’ decision to enter the woods did not proximately

cause Quick’s death. Rather, Quick’s noncompliant,

threatening conduct in the woods was a superseding cause

that served to break the chain of causation between the entry

and the shooting. Holding otherwise would, as noted in

Hundley, tend to deter police officers “from approaching and

detaining potentially violent suspects.” 494 F.3d at 1105.

VI

The District Court correctly determined that the

troopers’ initial use of deadly force was permissible. But the

Court erred in ruling for the troopers on the plaintiff’s claim

that the force became excessive as the events transpired. It

may be that the troopers were justified in their use of force at

all times, but it will be up to a jury to make that decision. The

District Court’s judgment will be affirmed in part and

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reversed in part, and the case will be remanded for further

proceedings.

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