Dana Ault v. Leslie Speicher

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-2104

D ANA A ULT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

L ESLIE S PEICHER,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:07-c-398—David R. Herndon, Chief Judge.

A RGUED D ECEMBER 6, 2010—D ECIDED M ARCH 3, 2011

Before B AUER and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and

M C C USKEY, District Judge. Œ

M C C USKEY, District Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Dana

Ault (Plaintiff) sued Defendant-Appellee Leslie Speicher

(Defendant), an Illinois Department of Children and

Œ

The Honorable Michael P. McCuskey, United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

2 No. 09-2104

Family Services (DCFS) Child Welfare Specialist, for

violating her rights to familial association under the

First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution.

Plaintiff claims that Defendant interfered with her

parental rights during a DCFS investigation in 2004-2005.

The district court granted Defendant’s motion for sum-

mary judgment. The court found that Defendant did not

infringe on Plaintiff’s right to familial association

because Plaintiff had the option of disagreeing with the

service plan prepared by DCFS and could challenge

Defendant’s authority in state court. The district court

concluded that summary judgment was proper because

Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity.

Plaintiff has appealed, arguing (1) the district court

misconstrued evidentiary facts; (2) there are material

facts in dispute regarding Defendant’s restrictions on

Plaintiff’s relationship with her children; and (3) the

district court improperly granted summary judgment on

qualified immunity. Because we find that the district

court properly granted summary judgment based on

qualified immunity, the judgment of the district court

is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is the mother of four children (SY and KY from

her first marriage, and TM and CM from her second

marriage). Defendant is employed by the DCFS as a Child

Welfare Specialist, serving as a caseworker assigned to

No. 09-2104 3

coordinate and provide services for families in need. At

the time of the incident Plaintiff was divorced and in a

relationship with Eric Ogle (whom she later married).

On September 1, 2004, DCFS received a hotline tip of

suspected physical abuse of Plaintiff’s 4-year old, TM, at

the hands of Ogle. DCFS commenced an investiga-

tion, and Plaintiff chose to have all four children reside

with her mother and stepfather, Teresa and Tommy

Samsil, rather than risk having her children placed in

foster care. The next day DCFS created a “safety plan,”

to which Plaintiff agreed, that set as conditions an ar-

rangement for her children to continue residing with

the Samsils. The plan expired on September 16, 2004.

DCFS’s investigation “indicated” Ogle for physical

abuse of TM. The case was an “intact family case”

meaning that the family unit remained intact and DCFS

did not have any legal relationship with Plaintiff’s chil-

dren. Once the investigation was completed Defendant

was assigned as a caseworker for Plaintiff’s family

because Ogle was indicated for abusing TM and Plaintiff

continued to maintain a relationship with him. Defendant

developed the first service plan with Plaintiff and Ogle

on October 21, 2004, which Plaintiff voluntarily signed.

The first service plan included the following pro-

visions: (1) the children would continue to reside with

the Samsils at least through the 2004-2005 school year;

(2) they would continue to reside with the Samsils at

least until such time that all counselors involved

agreed that it would not be detrimental to the children’s

safety for the family to reunite; (3) Plaintiff and Ogle

4 No. 09-2104

would attend counseling and parenting classes; (4) Ogle

would attend substance abuse counseling; (5) Ogle’s

contact with Plaintiff’s children would be supervised;

and (6) Plaintiff’s two oldest children (SY and KY) would

attend counseling.

The plan included information regarding the service

appeal process if Plaintiff did not agree with any of the

provisions. Plaintiff could write down her disagree-

ments and send it to Defendant’s supervisor. Plaintiff

believed that if she did not sign the DCFS service plans,

DCFS could come with the police and take away her

children.

In December 2004 domestic battery charges were filed

against Ogle in the circuit court based on the same allega-

tions of injuries to TM from the September 1, 2004, DCFS

hotline tip. In March 2005 the court entered a no

contact order under which Ogle was not to have any

contact with Plaintiff’s four children. The felony

domestic battery charge against Ogle was dismissed

in May 2005. Shortly afterward, the state filed a misde-

meanor domestic battery charge based on the same al-

legations. That charge was dismissed in August 2005 on

the state’s motion, and the no-contact order expired at

that time.

In June 2005 Defendant suggested to Plaintiff’s mother

Teresa Samsil that she and Plaintiff discuss trans-

ferring legal custody of the children to Teresa because

Defendant was concerned about Plaintiff’s stability,

poor relationship choices, failure to complete parenting

classes or counseling, and uncertain employment situa-

No. 09-2104 5

tion. Defendant believed Plaintiff’s mother’s home was

a more stable environment. Plaintiff claims she was

terrified that DCFS would take her children away if she

did not comply with Defendant.

Relations between Defendant and Plaintiff continued

to deteriorate in July 2005. Plaintiff and Ogle had fixed

up a trailer and the Defendant did not believe the

trailer had suitable living conditions for the children,

and thought it best that the children continue to

reside with Plaintiff’s mother. Plaintiff and Defendant

met and Defendant expressed her concerns. Defendant

told Plaintiff that if she attempted to take the children

from the Samsil house and did not sign over custody to

her mother, Defendant would go to court to file for cus-

tody.

On July 13, 2005, Defendant wrote Teresa Samsil a letter

summarizing her meeting with Plaintiff, and saying she

made it clear to Plaintiff that if Plaintiff took the kids

from the Samsil home, Defendant would go to the State’s

Attorney regarding guardianship. Defendant recom-

mended to Teresa that she not allow Plaintiff to take the

children from the Samsil home. A second letter to

Teresa on July 19, 2005, reiterated the point, that the

children should remain in Teresa’s “custody.” Teresa

understood this to mean that she did not have legal

custody of the children, but rather that they were to

remain living with her and Plaintiff was not to take the

children for private visits without supervision. Plaintiff

also understood that she remained physically and

legally the parent for her children, but felt that if she

6 No. 09-2104

did not comply, DCFS could come at any time and take

her children. Plaintiff claims that Defendant told her,

“on many occasions,” that Defendant, and not a court

or judge, would “come and take my children if I did not

obey orders.”

After receiving Defendant’s letters, Teresa told

Plaintiff that she could visit the children all she liked, but

the visits had to be supervised. Plaintiff contacted De-

fendant to ask why she could not take her children

with her and Defendant said it was because she did not

feel the children were safe with Plaintiff.

In March 2005 a second service plan was developed

containing identical provisions to the first. This was

done because charges were still pending against Ogle

and Plaintiff continued to maintain a relationship with

him. Plaintiff signed the second plan.

A third service plan was created on September 21, 2005,

but Plaintiff, on the advice of counsel, refused to sign,

as she felt the more she agreed to Defendant’s demands,

the more Defendant requested of her. Concurrently, on

September 18, 2005, the State’s Attorney of Clark County

filed a Petition for Adjudication of Wardship regarding

Plaintiff’s children. In an amended petition filed on

September 22, 2005, it was alleged that Plaintiff was

homeless and unwilling to provide supervision for her

four children, and that she failed to take appropriate

action to protect TM after he was a victim of physical

abuse. On May 5, 2006, the court found the state had

failed to prove neglect as to Plaintiff and denied the

petition. Three of Plaintiff’s children were returned to

her, but the oldest decided to remain with the Samsils.

No. 09-2104 7

Plaintiff filed suit in the district court pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of her due process

rights to her “freedom of choice and privacy concerning

the care, companionship, upbringing, and nurture of

her four minor children” all in violation of the First,

Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitu-

tion. On March 25, 2009, the district court granted De-

fendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied

the summary judgment motion of the Plaintiff. The

court concluded that Defendant’s actions did not

infringe on Plaintiff’s right to familial integrity and, even

it had found Defendant’s actions unconstitutional, the

doctrine of qualified immunity would apply to shield

Defendant from liability.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether

the district court misconstrued evidentiary facts,

resulting in an improper grant of summary judgment

in favor of Defendant; (2) whether there are material

facts in dispute regarding Defendant’s unlawful restric-

tions on Plaintiff’s relationship with her children, which

precluded summary judgment; and (3) whether Defen-

dant’s knowing violation of state law and DCFS regula-

tions resulted in a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights, precluding qualified immunity.

Because we find qualified immunity to be dispositive,

we will address that issue first and need not address

the other issues raised in Plaintiff’s appeal.

8 No. 09-2104

An appellate court reviews a district court’s grant of

summary judgment de novo. Carmichael v. Village of

Palatine, Ill., 605 F.3d 451, 456 (7th Cir. 2010). The district

court must “grant summary judgment if the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” FED. R. C IV. P. 56(a). The facts are

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party and all reasonable inferences are drawn in her

favor. Carmichael, 605 F.3d at 456. However, “[i]n a § 1983

claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the

constitutional deprivation that underlies the claim, and

thus must come forward with sufficient evidence to

create genuine issues of material fact to avoid summary

judgment.” McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877, 881 (7th

Cir. 2010).

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects govern-

ment officials from liability for civil damages when their

conduct does not clearly violate established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” McAllister, 615 F.3d at 881, citing

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815, 172

L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). On a qualified immunity claim the

court confronts two questions: (1) whether the plain-

tiff’s allegations make out a deprivation of a constitu-

tional right; and (2) whether that right was clearly estab-

lished at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.

McAllister, 615 F.3d at 881. The court may address the

prongs in whichever order it believes best suited to the

circumstances of the particular case at hand. McAllister,

615 F.3d at 881.

No. 09-2104 9

Plaintiff argues the district court was in error in its

finding of qualified immunity, because earlier in the

opinion the court had written:

“Therefore, the court finds, technically, Defendant

had no legal authority as a DCFS caseworker to

require Plaintiff’s children to reside or remain

residing with the Samsils as a condition of the

service plans, because the children were not actually

‘placed’ by DCFS prior to the development of any

of the service plans. Nor does it appear that De-

fendant maintained legal authority to subsequently

require Plaintiff be allowed only supervised visita-

tion with her children.”

Plaintiff claims Defendant knew she was acting unlaw-

fully, but did it anyway, and violated state laws and

DCFS regulations, resulting in a constitutional depriva-

tion. We find Plaintiff’s argument unavailing because

we find qualified immunity shields Defendant from

liability for civil damages in this case.

In order to carry her burden of proving that the con-

stitutional right she claims Defendant violated was

clearly established, Plaintiff must either (1) present case

law that has articulated both the right at issue and

applied it to a factual circumstance similar to the one

at hand or (2) demonstrate that the “contours of the

right are so established as to make the unconstitu-

tionality obvious.” Boyd v. Owen, 481 F.3d 520, 526-27

(7th Cir. 2007).

Addressing the first prong, Plaintiff has not cited, and

the court has not found, any relevant case law from 2006

or earlier that articulates the right at issue of familial

10 No. 09-2104

integrity and applies it to factually similar circum-

stances. Rather, Plaintiff contends that an Illinois DCFS

caseworker in Defendant’s position should have known

she was violating Illinois law, which, Plaintiff argues, is

a violation of her clearly established rights to familial

association. However, the cases cited by Plaintiff simply

stand for the broad proposition that parents have con-

stitutional rights in family choice matters under the

Fourteenth Amendment and that interference with

those rights by the state must be governed by fair

judicial procedures. See In re J.J., 776 N.E.2d 138, 144 (Ill.

2002) (The case concerned whether the State provided

clear and convincing evidence of a parent’s habitual

drunkenness in the year prior to the filing of the termina-

tion petition. Plaintiff cited only to broad statements

about protection of parental rights in custody cases.).

Plaintiff also cites to In re C.L. and T.L. and In re M.K.

and K.K., but the portion of those cases Plaintiff cites

simply stand for the broad propositions that Illinois

courts must act with care when interfering with

parental rights and must have good cause to place

children with a third party. The actual factual circum-

stances of those cases were distinguishable from the

circumstances at issue here. See In re C.L. and T.L., 894

N.E.2d 949 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (Case concerned

whether the trial court erred by finding the mother

dispositionally unfit and granting guardianship to the

father after finding him fit.); In re M.K. and K.K., 694 N.E.2d

74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (Case concerned whether trial

court abused its discretion in finding abuse and neglect

and that it was in the best interests of the children to

terminate wardship proceedings.)

No. 09-2104 11

The cases Plaintiff has cited do not address circum-

stances similar to those at issue here and would not

have put Defendant on notice she was violating a

clearly established constitutional right when she ad-

vised Teresa Samsil not to let Plaintiff see her children

without supervision. It should also be remembered that,

as of July 2005, Plaintiff had already signed two

service plans with DCFS and agreed to let the children

reside physically with her mother. The Illinois cases

cited by Plaintiff, which stand for broad or “high level”

propositions concerning familial integrity, would not,

under the specific factual circumstances present here,

have put Defendant on notice that she was violating

any clearly established constitutional right of Plaintiff’s.

See Purvis v. Oest, 614 F.3d 713, 721 (7th Cir. 2010) (high-

level observations can be insufficiently precise for the

specific circumstances present in a qualified immunity

analysis).

Moreover, we agree with Defendant and the district

court that, even if Plaintiff could show that Defendant

violated Illinois law, failure to comply with state proce-

dures does not demonstrate the violation of Plaintiff’s

clearly established constitutional due process rights. See

Boyd, 481 F.3d at 524. In Boyd, a plaintiff sued a DCFS

investigator and supervisor under § 1983 for violating

his due process rights in finding an indication of abuse

against him. The district court refused to grant qualified

immunity to the defendants because defendants vio-

lated DCFS’s own rules and regulations. This court re-

versed, writing that “[t]he Supreme Court has made

clear the requirement of due process is not defined by

12 No. 09-2104

state rules and regulations, but is an independent deter-

mination. (Citations omitted.) Accordingly, the district

court erred in determining that the failure to comply

with DCFS regulations demonstrated a violation of a

clearly established constitutional right.” Boyd, 481 F.3d

at 524. Here, as in Boyd, Plaintiff has not shown that

a failure to comply with DCFS regulations has demon-

strated the violation of a clearly established constitu-

tional right.

We find that the rights at issue in this case were not

so clearly established as to make the “unconstitutional-

ity” of Defendant’s actions obvious. In summer 2005

Plaintiff was still in a relationship with Ogle and was

living in conditions Defendant believed to be substan-

dard. Based on the circumstances of Plaintiff’s living

arrangements, and Plaintiff’s assent to the first two

service plans, we do not find it objectively obvious for

Defendant to believe that her actions were unlawful

or unconstitutional.

Plaintiff cites to Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) and

Gregory v. City of Evanston, 2006 WL 3718044 (N.D. Ill.

2006) to support her argument that Defendant should

have known she was violating an established right.

Those cases are distinguishable. In Hope, prison guards

handcuffed an inmate to a hitching post for seven

hours without water or bathroom breaks. Hope, 536 U.S.

at 733-34. In Gregory, police officers arrested two minors

for disorderly conduct and took them to separate inter-

rogation rooms at the police station and refused to let

them see their parents, despite repeated requests from

No. 09-2104 13

both the minors and parents, until the parents signed

documents prohibiting their children from being in

downtown Evanston for seven days. Gregory, 2006 WL

3718044, at *1-2. In those cases the examples were of

particularly egregious and obvious violations of law and

authority. The rulings of those courts were limited to

the particularized facts of the case before them. Hope,

536 U.S. at 745 (the Supreme Court referred to the “obvious

cruelty” inherent in the defendants’ actions); Gregory,

2006 WL 3718044, at *6-7. Plaintiff’s cases represent ex-

treme situations that would put reasonable state actors

on obvious notice of a clearly established constitutional

right. The situation in the case at hand is not similar

and is clearly distinguishable.

Because we affirm the district court’s granting of sum-

mary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, we

need not address the other issues raised by Plaintiff on

appeal. Accordingly, the district court’s opinion granting

summary judgment for Defendant is affirmed.

A FFIRMED.

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