Walker v. Martin

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2010 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

WALKER, WARDEN, ET AL. v. MARTIN

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 09–996. Argued November 29, 2010—Decided February 23, 2011

While most States set determinate time limits for collateral relief appli

cations, California courts “appl[y] a general ‘reasonableness’ stan

dard” to judge whether a habeas petition is timely filed, Carey v. Saf

fold, 536 U. S. 214, 222. Under that standard, “a [habeas] petition

should be filed as promptly as the circumstances allow . . . ,” In re

Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 765, n. 5, 855 P. 2d 729, 738, n. 5. Three deci

sions, Clark, In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 959 P. 2d 311, and In re

Gallego, 18 Cal. 4th 825, 959 P. 2d 290, describe California’s timeli

ness requirement. A prisoner must seek habeas relief without “sub

stantial delay,” e.g., Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th, at 780, 959 P. 3d, at 317, as

“measured from the time the petitioner or counsel knew, or reasona

bly should have known, of the information offered in support of the

claim and the legal basis of the claim,” id., at 787, 959 P. 2d, at 322.

All California courts have “original jurisdiction in habeas corpus pro

ceedings.” Cal. Const., Art. VI, §10. Because a habeas petitioner

may skip over the lower courts and file directly in the California Su

preme Court, that court rules on a staggering number of habeas peti

tions each year. A summary denial citing Clark and Robbins means

that the petition is rejected as untimely. California courts, however,

have discretion to bypass a timeliness issue and, instead, summarily

reject the petition for want of merit.

Respondent Martin was convicted of murder and robbery, and was

sentenced to life in prison without parole. After the California Su

preme Court denied Martin’s first state habeas petition, he filed a

federal habeas petition. The District Court ordered a stay to permit

Martin to return to state court to raise ineffective-assistance-of

counsel claims he had not previously aired. Martin raised those

claims in his second habeas petition in the California Supreme Court,

2 WALKER v. MARTIN

Syllabus

but gave no reason for his failure to assert the additional claims until

nearly five years after his sentence and conviction became final. The

California Supreme Court denied the petition, citing Clark and Rob

bins. Having exhausted his state-court remedies, Martin filed an

amended federal habeas petition. The District Court dismissed his

belatedly asserted claims as untimely under California law. The

Ninth Circuit vacated that order and directed the District Court to

determine the “adequacy” of the State’s time bar. Again rejecting

Martin’s petition, the District Court found California’s bar an ade

quate state ground for denying Martin’s new pleas. Concluding that

the time bar was not firmly defined or consistently applied, the Ninth

Circuit remanded for a determination of the merits of Martin’s

claims.

Held: California’s timeliness requirement qualifies as an independent

state ground adequate to bar habeas corpus relief in federal court.

Pp. 7–13.

(a) Absent showings of “cause” and “prejudice,” see Wainwright v.

Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 84–85, federal habeas relief will be unavailable

when (1) “a state court [has] declined to address a prisoner’s federal

claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural re

quirement,” and (2) “the state judgment rests on independent and

adequate state procedural grounds,” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S.

722, 729–730. P. 7.

(b) A “rule can be ‘firmly established’ and ‘regularly followed,’ ” and

therefore adequate, “even if the appropriate exercise of discretion

may permit consideration of a federal claim in some cases but not

others.” Beard v. Kindler, 558 U. S. ___, ___. California’s time rule,

although discretionary, meets this “firmly established” criterion. The

California Supreme Court framed the requirement in a trilogy of

cases, instructing habeas petitioners to “alleg[e] with specificity” the

absence of substantial delay, good cause for delay, or eligibility for

one of four exceptions to the time bar. Gallego, 18 Cal. 4th, at 838,

959 P. 2d, at 299. And California’s case law made it plain that Mar

tin’s nearly five-year delay was “substantial.” See, e.g., id., at 829–

831, 838, and n. 13, 959 P. 2d, at 293–294, 299, and n. 13. The Court

finds unpersuasive Martin’s argument that the terms “reasonable

time” period and “substantial delay” make California’s rule too vague

to be regarded as “firmly established.” While indeterminate language

is typical of discretionary rules, application of those rules in particu

lar circumstances can supply the requisite clarity. Congressional

statutes and this Court’s decisions have employed time limitations

that are not stated in precise, numerical terms. For example, current

federal habeas prescriptions limit the time for filing a petition to one

year. The clock runs from “the date on which the [supporting] facts

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011) 3

Syllabus

. . . could have been discovered through . . . due diligence.” 28

U. S. C. §2255(f)(4). Although “ ‘due diligence’ is an inexact measure

of how much delay is too much,” Johnson v. United States, 544 U. S.

295, 309, n. 7, “use of an imprecise standard is no justification for de

priving [a rule’s] language of any meaning,” ibid. Nor is California’s

time rule vulnerable on the ground that it is not regularly followed.

Each year, the California State Supreme Court summarily denies

hundreds of habeas petitions by citing Clark and Robbins. Contrary

to Martin’s argument, California’s time bar is not infirm simply be

cause a court may opt to bypass the Clark/Robbins assessment and

summarily dismiss a petition on the merits, if that is the easier path.

Nor should a discretionary rule be disregarded automatically upon a

showing that outcomes under the rule vary from case to case. Discre

tion enables a court to home in on case-specific considerations and to

avoid the harsh results that may attend consistent application of an

unyielding rule. A state ground may be found inadequate when a

court has exercised its discretion in a surprising or unfair manner,

but Martin makes no such contention here. Pp. 7–12.

(c) This decision leaves unaltered the Court’s repeated recognition

that federal courts must carefully examine state procedural require

ments to ensure that they do not operate to discriminate against

claims of federal rights. See, e.g., Brown v. Western R. Co. of Ala.,

338 U. S. 294, 298–299. On the record here, however, there is no ba

sis for concluding that California’s rule operates in such a discrimina

tory manner. P. 13.

357 Fed. Appx. 793, reversed.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 09–996

_________________

JAMES WALKER, WARDEN, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v. CHARLES W. MARTIN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[February 23, 2011]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns California’s time limitation on appli

cations for postconviction (habeas corpus) relief. The

question presented: Does California’s timeliness require

ment qualify as an independent state ground adequate to

bar habeas corpus relief in federal court?

California does not employ fixed statutory deadlines to

determine the timeliness of a state prisoner’s petition for

habeas corpus. Instead, California directs petitioners to

file known claims “as promptly as the circumstances al

low.” In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 765, n. 5, 855 P. 2d 729,

738, n. 5 (1993). Petitioners are further instructed to state

when they first learned of the asserted claims and to

explain why they did not seek postconviction relief sooner.

In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780, 959 P. 2d 311, 317–

318 (1998). Claims substantially delayed without justifi

cation may be denied as untimely. Ibid.; Clark, 5 Cal. 4th,

at 765, n. 5, 855 P. 2d, at 738, n. 5.

California courts signal that a habeas petition is denied

as untimely by citing the controlling decisions, i.e., Clark

and Robbins. A spare order denying a petition without

2 WALKER v. MARTIN

Opinion of the Court

explanation or citation ordinarily ranks as a disposition on

the merits. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7; see Harrington v. Richter,

ante, at 9–10. California courts may elect to pretermit the

question whether a petition is timely and simply deny the

petition, thereby signaling that the petition lacks merit.

Petitioner below, respondent here, Charles W. Martin,

presented the claims at issue—all alleging ineffective

assistance of counsel—in a habeas petition filed in the

California Supreme Court nearly five years after his con

viction became final. He stated no reason for the long

delay. Citing Clark and Robbins, the court denied Mar

tin’s petition. In turn, the U. S. District Court for the

Eastern District of California dismissed Martin’s federal

habeas petition raising the same ineffective assistance

claims. Denial of Martin’s state-court petition as un

timely, the District Court held, rested on an adequate and

independent state ground, i.e., Martin’s failure to seek

relief in state court “without substantial delay.” See

Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th, at 787, 959 P. 2d, at 322.

The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re

versed the District Court’s decision. Contrasting the

precision of “fixed statutory deadlines” with California’s

proscription of “substantial delay,” the appeals court held

that California’s standard lacked the clarity and certainty

necessary to constitute an adequate state bar. 357 Fed.

Appx. 793, 794 (2009) (relying on Townsend v. Knowles,

562 F. 3d 1200 (CA9 2009)).

In a recent decision, Beard v. Kindler, 558 U. S. ___

(2009), this Court clarified that a state procedural bar may

count as an adequate and independent ground for denying

a federal habeas petition even if the state court had dis

cretion to reach the merits despite the default. Guided by

that decision, we hold that California is not put to the

choice of imposing a specific deadline for habeas petitions

(which would almost certainly rule out Martin’s nearly

five-year delay) or preserving the flexibility of current

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011) 3

Opinion of the Court

practice, “but only at the cost of undermining the finality

of state court judgments.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 7). In so

ruling, we stress that Martin has not alleged that Califor

nia’s time bar, either by design or in operation, discrimi

nates against federal claims or claimants.

I

A

While most States set determinate time limits for collat

eral relief applications, in California, neither statute nor

rule of court does so. Instead, California courts “appl[y] a

general ‘reasonableness’ standard” to judge whether a

habeas petition is timely filed. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U. S.

214, 222 (2002). The basic instruction provided by the

California Supreme Court is simply that “a [habeas] peti

tion should be filed as promptly as the circumstances

allow . . . .” Clark, 5 Cal. 4th, at 765, n. 5, 855 P. 2d, at

738, n. 5.

Three leading decisions describe California’s timeliness

requirement: Robbins, Clark, and In re Gallego, 18 Cal.

4th 825, 959 P. 2d 290 (1998). A prisoner must seek ha

beas relief without “substantial delay,” Robbins, 18 Cal.

4th, at 780, 959 P. 2d, at 317; Gallego, 18 Cal. 4th, at 833,

959 P. 2d, at 296; Clark, 5 Cal. 4th, at 783, 855 P. 2d, at

750, as “measured from the time the petitioner or counsel

knew, or reasonably should have known, of the informa

tion offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for

the claim,” Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th, at 787, 959 P. 2d, at 322.

Petitioners in noncapital cases have “the burden of estab

lishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for

the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception

to the bar of untimeliness.” Id., at 780, 959 P. 2d, at 317.1

——————

1A petition for habeas relief in a capital case is “presumed to be filed

without substantial delay if it is filed within 180 days after the final

due date for the filing of [an] appellant’s reply brief on the direct appeal

. . . .” California Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising From

4 WALKER v. MARTIN

Opinion of the Court

California’s collateral review regime differs from that of

other States in a second notable respect: All California

courts “have original jurisdiction in habeas corpus pro

ceedings,” Cal. Const., Art. VI, §10, thus “no appeal lies

from the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus,”

Clark, 5 Cal. 4th, at 767, n. 7, 855 P. 2d, at 740, n. 7. “[A]

prisoner whose petition has been denied by the superior

court can obtain review of his claims only by the filing of a

new petition in the Court of Appeal.” Ibid. The new

petition, however, must be confined to claims raised in the

initial petition. See In re Martinez, 46 Cal. 4th 945, 956,

209 P. 3d 908, 915 (2009).

Because a habeas petitioner may skip over the lower

courts and file directly in the California Supreme Court,

In re Kler, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1399, 1403, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d

889, 891–892 (2010), that court rules on a staggering

number of habeas petitions each year.2 The court issues

generally unelaborated “summary denials” of petitions

that “d[o] not state a prima facie case for relief” or that

contain “claims [that] are all procedurally barred.” People

v. Romero, 8 Cal. 4th 728, 737, 883 P. 2d 388, 391 (1994)

(internal quotation marks omitted). A summary denial

citing Clark and Robbins means that the petition is re

jected as untimely. See, e.g., Brief for Habeas Corpus

Resource Center as Amicus Curiae 20, and n. 23. Califor

nia courts have discretion, however, to bypass a timeliness

issue and, instead, summarily reject the petition for want

——————

Judgments of Death, Policy 3, Standard 1–1.1 (2010).

2 In fiscal year 2008–2009, the California Supreme Court issued dis

positions in 3,258 original habeas actions. Judicial Council of Califor

nia, 2010 Court Statistics Report, Statewide Caseload Trends, 1999–

2000 Through 2008–2009, p. 6, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/

documents/csr2010.pdf (as visited Feb. 15, 2011, and in Clerk of Court’s

case file). During a similar time period, a total of 2,210 habeas cases

were on this Court’s docket. See October Term 2008 Filings by Case

Type (available in Clerk of Court’s case file).

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011) 5

Opinion of the Court

of merit. See Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th, at 778, n. 1, 959 P. 2d,

at 316, n. 1. See also Saffold, 536 U. S., at 225–226.

B

In December 1986, Charles Martin participated in a

robbery and murder in California. Martin fled the State,

but eight years later he was extradited to California to

stand trial. Convicted in state court of murder and rob

bery, Martin was sentenced to life in prison without the

possibility of parole. In 1997, the California Court of

Appeal affirmed his conviction and sentence, and the

California Supreme Court denied review.

Martin initiated his first round of state habeas proceed

ings in 1998, and the next year, the California Supreme

Court denied his petition. He then filed a habeas petition

in the appropriate U. S. District Court. Finding that

Martin’s federal petition included ineffective-assistance-of

counsel claims he had not aired in state court, the District

Court stayed the federal proceedings pending Martin’s

return to state court to exhaust his remedies there.3

In March 2002, Martin filed his second habeas petition

in the California Supreme Court, raising the federal in

effective assistance claims his earlier filing omitted. He

gave no reason for his failure to assert the additional

claims until nearly five years after his sentence and con

viction became final. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36, 39. In Septem

ber 2002, the California Supreme Court denied Martin’s

petition in an order typical of that court’s summary dispo

sitions for failure to file “as promptly as the circumstances

——————

3 Rather than dismiss a petition containing both exhausted and un

exhausted claims, “a district court might stay the petition and hold it in

abeyance while the petitioner returns to state court to exhaust his

previously unexhausted claims. Once the petitioner exhausts his state

remedies, the district court will lift the stay and allow the petitioner to

proceed in federal court.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U. S. 269, 275–276

(2005).

6 WALKER v. MARTIN

Opinion of the Court

allow.” Clark, 5 Cal. 4th, at 765, n. 5, 855 P. 2d, at 738,

n. 5. The order read in its entirety: “Petition for writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED. (See In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.

4th 750, In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780.).” See

App. to Pet. for Cert. 60.

Having exhausted state postconviction remedies, Martin

returned to federal court and filed an amended petition.

Based upon the California Supreme Court’s time-bar

disposition, the District Court dismissed Martin’s belat

edly asserted claims as procedurally precluded. Id., at 27,

57. The Ninth Circuit vacated the dismissal order and

remanded the case, directing the District Court to deter

mine the “adequacy” of the State’s time bar. Martin v.

Hubbard, 192 Fed. Appx. 616, 618 (2006). The District

Court again rejected Martin’s petition, stating that “[t]he

California timeliness bar as set forth in . . . Clark/Robbins

is clearly defined, well established and consistently ap

plied.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 4.

The Ninth Circuit again disagreed. Controlled by its

prior decision in Townsend, 562 F. 3d, at 1207–1208, the

Court of Appeals held that California’s time bar “has yet

to be firmly defined” and was not shown by the State to be

“consistently applied.” 357 Fed. Appx., at 794. The re

mand order directed the District Court to determine the

merits of the claims Martin asserted in his second petition

to the California Supreme Court.

We granted certiorari, 561 U. S. ___ (2010), to determine

the “adequacy” of California’s practice under which a

prisoner may be barred from collaterally attacking his

conviction when he has “substantially delayed” filing his

habeas petition. Martin does not here dispute that the

time limitation is an “independent” state ground. See

Brief in Opposition 5–6. See also Bennett v. Mueller, 322

F. 3d 573, 582–583 (CA9 2003). Nor does he contend that

he established “cause” and “prejudice,” i.e., cause for the

delay in asserting his claims and actual prejudice result

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011) 7

Opinion of the Court

ing from the State’s alleged violation of his constitutional

rights. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 87–91

(1977).

II

A

“A federal habeas court will not review a claim rejected

by a state court ‘if the decision of [the state] court rests on

a state law ground that is independent of the federal

question and adequate to support the judgment.’ ” Kind

ler, 558 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1) (quoting Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 729 (1991)). The state-law

ground may be a substantive rule dispositive of the case,

or a procedural barrier to adjudication of the claim on the

merits. See Sykes, 433 U. S., at 81–82, 90.

Ordinarily, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief

must first “exhaus[t] the remedies available in the courts

of the State,” 28 U. S. C. §2254(b)(1)(A), thereby affording

those courts “the first opportunity to address and correct

alleged violations of [the] prisoner’s federal rights,” Cole

man, 501 U. S., at 731. The adequate and independent

state ground doctrine furthers that objective, for without

it, “habeas petitioners would be able to avoid the exhaus

tion requirement by defaulting their federal claims in

state court.” Id., at 732. Accordingly, absent showings of

“cause” and “prejudice,” see Sykes, 433 U. S., at 84–85,

federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) “a state

court [has] declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims

because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural

requirement,” and (2) “the state judgment rests on inde

pendent and adequate state procedural grounds.” Cole

man, 501 U. S., at 729–730.

B

To qualify as an “adequate” procedural ground, a state

rule must be “firmly established and regularly followed. ”

8 WALKER v. MARTIN

Opinion of the Court

Kindler, 558 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (internal quotation

marks omitted).4 “[A] discretionary state procedural rule,”

we held in Kindler, “can serve as an adequate ground to

bar federal habeas review.” Ibid. A “rule can be ‘firmly

established’ and ‘regularly followed,’ ” Kindler observed,

“even if the appropriate exercise of discretion may permit

consideration of a federal claim in some cases but not

others.” Ibid.

California’s time rule, although discretionary, meets the

“firmly established” criterion, as Kindler comprehended

that requirement. The California Supreme Court, as

earlier noted, framed the timeliness requirement for ha

beas petitioners in a trilogy of cases. See supra, at 3.

Those decisions instruct habeas petitioners to “alleg[e]

with specificity” the absence of substantial delay, good

cause for delay, or eligibility for one of four exceptions to

the time bar. Gallego, 18 Cal. 4th, at 838, 959 P. 2d, at

299; see Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th, at 780, 959 P. 2d, at 317.5

——————

4 Wehave also recognized a “limited category” of “exceptional cases in

which exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the state

ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question.” Lee v.

Kemna, 534 U. S. 362, 376 (2002). In Lee, for example, the defendant

unsuccessfully moved for a continuance when, for reasons unknown to

him, his alibi witnesses left the courthouse the day they were scheduled

to testify. This Court held inadequate to bar federal review a state

court’s persnickety application of a rule detailing formal requirements

for continuance motions. The defendant had substantially complied

with the rule’s key requirement and flawless compliance would have

been unavailing given the trial court’s reason for denying the motion.

See id., at 381–382. Martin does not suggest that the application of

California’s timeliness rule in his case falls within the exceptional

category Lee described and illustrated. See Brief for Respondent 28, 29,

54.

5 An untimely petition “will be entertained on the merits if the peti

tioner demonstrates (i) that error of constitutional magnitude led to a

trial that was so fundamentally unfair that absent the error no reason

able judge or jury would have convicted the petitioner; (ii) that the

petitioner is actually innocent of the crime or crimes of which he or she

was convicted; (iii) that the death penalty was imposed by a sentencing

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011) 9

Opinion of the Court

And California’s case law made it altogether plain that

Martin’s delay of nearly five years ranked as “substantial.”

See Gallego, 18 Cal. 4th, at 829–831, 838, and n. 13, 959

P. 2d, at 293–294, 299, and n. 13 (delay of four years

barred claim); In re Tsaturyan, No. B156012, 2002 WL

1614107, *3 (Cal. App., July 23, 2002) (delay of 16 months

barred claim). See also In re Miller, No. B186447, 2006

WL 1980385, *2–3 (Cal. App., July 17, 2006) (delay of two

years and six months barred claim).

Martin nevertheless urges that California’s rule is too

vague to be regarded as “firmly established.” “[R]eason

able time” period and “substantial delay,” he maintains,

are “meaningless terms.” Brief for Respondent 48 (inter

nal quotation marks omitted). We disagree. Indetermi

nate language is typical of discretionary rules. Applica

tion of those rules in particular circumstances, however,

can supply the requisite clarity.

Congressional statutes and this Court’s decisions, we

note, have employed time limitations that are not stated

in precise, numerical terms. Former Federal Habeas

Corpus Rule 9(a), for example, set no fixed time limit on

submission of habeas petitions. The Rule permitted dis

missal of a state prisoner’s petition when it appeared that

delay in commencing litigation “prejudiced [the State] in

its ability to respond.” 28 U. S. C. §2254 Rule 9(a) (1994

ed.). To stave off dismissal, the petitioner had to show

that he could not earlier have known, “by the exercise of

reasonable diligence,” the grounds on which he based the

petition. Ibid. In Rhines v. Weber, 544 U. S. 269 (2005),

we instructed district courts, when employing stay and

abeyance procedure, see supra, at 5, n. 3, to “place reason

——————

authority that had such a grossly misleading profile of the petitioner

before it that, absent the trial error or omission, no reasonable judge or

jury would have imposed a sentence of death; or (iv) that the petitioner

was convicted or sentenced under an invalid statute.” In re Robbins, 18

Cal. 4th 770, 780–781, 959 P. 2d 311, 318 (1998).

10 WALKER v. MARTIN

Opinion of the Court

able time limits on a petitioner’s trip to state court and

back.” 544 U. S., at 278.

Current federal habeas prescriptions limit the time for

filing a petition to one year. The clock runs from “the date

on which the [supporting] facts . . . could have been dis

covered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U. S. C.

§2255(f)(4) (2006 ed., Supp. III) (applicable to federal

prisoners); see §2244(d)(1)(D) (2006 ed.) (similar provision

applicable to state prisoners). “[D]ue diligence,” we have

observed, “ is an inexact measure of how much delay is too

much.” Johnson v. United States, 544 U. S. 295, 309, n. 7

(2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). But “use of an

imprecise standard,” we immediately added, “is no justifi

cation for depriving [a rule’s] language of any meaning.”

Ibid. “[I]t would seem particularly strange to disregard

state procedural rules that are substantially similar to

those to which we give full force in our own courts.” Kind-

ler, 558 U. S., at __ (slip op., at 8).

Nor is California’s time rule vulnerable on the ground

that it is not regularly followed. Each year, the California

Supreme Court summarily denies hundreds of habeas

petitions by citing Clark and Robbins. Brief for Appellant

in No. 08–15752 (CA9), pp. 31–32. On the same day the

court denied Martin’s petition, it issued 21 other

Clark/Robbins summary denials. See Brief for Habeas

Corpus Resource Center as Amicus Curiae 20. In rea

soned opinions, too, California courts regularly invoke

Clark, Robbins, and Gallego to determine whether a ha

beas petition is time barred.6

Martin argued below that California’s time bar is not

regularly followed in this sense: Use of summary denials

——————

6 See, e.g., In re Sanders, 21 Cal. 4th 697, 703, 981 P. 2d 1038, 1042

(1999); In re Hamilton, 20 Cal. 4th 273, 283, n. 5, 975 P. 2d 600, 605,

n. 5 (1999); In re Watson, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 403, 407 (App. 2010) (offi

cially depublished); In re Nunez, 173 Cal. App. 4th 709, 723, 93 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 242, 252 (2009).

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011) 11

Opinion of the Court

makes it “impossible to tell” why the California Supreme

Court “decides some delayed petitions on the merits and

rejects others as untimely.” Brief for Appellant in No. 08–

15752 (CA9), pp. 37–38. We see no reason to reject Cali

fornia’s time bar simply because a court may opt to bypass

the Clark/Robbins assessment and summarily dismiss a

petition on the merits, if that is the easier path. See, e.g.,

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 697 (1984) (“[A]

court need not determine whether counsel’s performance

was deficient . . . [i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffec

tiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice

. . . .”); cf. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574,

585 (1999) (“It is hardly novel for a federal court to choose

among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case

on the merits.”).

The Ninth Circuit concluded that California’s time bar

is not consistently applied because outcomes under the

rule vary from case to case. See 357 Fed. Appx., at 794.

For example, in People v. Fairbanks, No. C047810, 2006

WL 950267, *2–*3 (Cal. App., Apr. 11, 2006), a one-year

delay was found substantial, while in In re Little, No.

D047468, 2008 WL 142832, *4, n. 6 (Cal. App., Jan. 16,

2008), a delay of 14 months was determined to be

insubstantial.

A discretionary rule ought not be disregarded automati

cally upon a showing of seeming inconsistencies.7 Discre

——————

7 Closerinspection may reveal that “seeming ‘inconsistencie[s]’ . . . are

not necessarily . . . arbitrar[y] or irrationa[l].” Thornburgh v. Abbott,

490 U. S. 401, 417, n. 15 (1989). Fairbanks and Little are illustrative.

In Fairbanks, the court found that petitioner did not act diligently

when she waited to withdraw her guilty plea until one year after

learning that revocation of her driver’s license was irreversible. 2006

WL 950267, *2–*3. In Little, a pro se prisoner claimed that his trial

counsel should have raised a posttraumatic stress disorder defense.

Although the filing delay was 14 months, the court entertained it on

the merits. 2008 WL 142832, *4, *14. Given the discrete context in

which each case arose, the two decisions present no square conflict.

12 WALKER v. MARTIN

Opinion of the Court

tion enables a court to home in on case-specific considera

tions and to avoid the harsh results that sometimes

attend consistent application of an unyielding rule. See

Prihoda v. McCaughtry, 910 F. 2d 1379, 1385 (CA7 1990)

(“Uncertainty is not enough to disqualify a state’s

procedural ground as one ‘adequate’ under federal law. If

it were, states would be induced to make their rules

draconian . . . .”).

A state ground, no doubt, may be found inadequate

when “discretion has been exercised to impose novel and

unforeseeable requirements without fair or substantial

support in prior state law . . . .” 16B C. Wright, A. Miller,

& E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4026, p. 386

(2d ed. 1996) (hereinafter Wright & Miller); see Prihoda,

910 F. 2d, at 1383 (state ground “applied infrequently,

unexpectedly, or freakishly” may “discriminat[e] against

the federal rights asserted” and therefore rank as “inade

quate”). Martin does not contend, however, that in his

case, the California Supreme Court exercised its discretion

in a surprising or unfair manner.

“[S]ound procedure often requires discretion to exact or

excuse compliance with strict rules,” 16B Wright & Miller

§4028, p. 403, and we have no cause to discourage stan

dards allowing courts to exercise such discretion. As this

Court observed in Kindler, if forced to choose between

mandatory rules certain to be found “adequate,” or more

supple prescriptions that federal courts may disregard as

“inadequate,” “many States [might] opt for mandatory

rules to avoid the high costs that come with plenary fed

eral review.” 558 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7). “Th[at]

result would be particularly unfortunate for [habeas peti

tioners], who would lose the opportunity to argue that a

procedural default should be excused through the exercise

of judicial discretion.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8).8

——————

8 See also 16B Wright & Miller §4026, pp. 385–386 (“Precisely defined

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2011)

13

Opinion of the Court

C

Today’s decision, trained on California’s timeliness rule

for habeas petitions, leaves unaltered this Court’s re

peated recognition that federal courts must carefully

examine state procedural requirements to ensure that

they do not operate to discriminate against claims of

federal rights. See Brown v. Western R. Co. of Ala., 338

U. S. 294, 298–299 (1949); Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U. S. 22,

24–25 (1923); 16B Wright & Miller §4026, p. 386 (noting

“risk that discretionary procedural sanctions may be

invoked more harshly against disfavored federal rights,

. . . deny[ing] [litigants] a fair opportunity to present

federal claims”). See also Kindler, 558 U. S., at ___

(KENNEDY, J., concurring) (slip op., at 3) (a state proce

dural ground would be inadequate if the challenger shows

a “purpose or pattern to evade constitutional guarantees”).

On the record before us, however, there is no basis for

concluding that California’s timeliness rule operates to the

particular disadvantage of petitioners asserting federal

rights.

* * *

For the reasons stated, we find no inadequacy in Cali

fornia’s timeliness rule generally or as applied in Martin’s

case. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit is therefore

Reversed.

——————

rules cannot take account of the gravity of a procedural failure, the

strength of the excuses offered, or the importance of the procedural and

substantive consequences of excusing or punishing the failure.”).