The opinion
Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-1799
MIGUEL PUNSODA-DÍAZ,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Justo Arenas, Chief U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Baldock * and Stahl, Senior Circuit Judges.
Jorge M. Suro-Ballester on brief for appellant.
Carlos A. Steffens, with whom Manuel A. Guzmán
was on brief, for appellee.
January 10, 2007
*
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
BALDOCK, Senior Circuit Judge. The overriding issue in
this diversity case governed by Puerto Rico law is whether
Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of a design
defect in his vehicle’s airbags in light of Defendant’s
admissions that (1) the airbags should not have deployed at
the time of the accident, and (2) such deployment was the
cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. The district court held that
Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case and granted
Defendant summary judgment. We exercise jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and summarily affirm.
The district court’s opinion sets forth the factual
details of this case and we need not repeat them here.
Punsoda-Díaz v. Ford Motor Co., Civil No. 02-2444 (SEC)
(JA), Opinion and Order, at 1-2 (D.P.R., filed April 4,
2006). To summarize, Plaintiff Miguel Punsoda-Díaz’s 1993
Lincoln Mercury Towncar struck a concrete median about
twelve inches high that separates traffic on a Puerto Rican
avenue. The vehicle was traveling at a fairly low rate of
speed as Plaintiff was making a left turn onto the avenue.
Plaintiff swerved to avoid a collision with another car and
hit the median. The vehicle’s airbags deployed, breaking
Plaintiff’s arm in two places.
In granting Defendant Ford Motor Company summary
judgment, the district court reasoned that, although the
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airbags had not operated as intended (a point which
Defendant concedes), Plaintiff failed to present any
evidence the vehicle’s airbag design was the proximate cause
of his injuries:
Plaintiff has failed to identify the actual defect
in the [airbag] design. Although . . . an injury
was suffered because of a defective product, in
this case plaintiff must prove that it was due to
a defect in the design of the product, and not
merely that the product suffered from a defect.
There is a difference between a defective product
that has been manufactured according to
specifications, and is defective because the defect
is in the design of the product, and a defective
product that has been manufactured defectively.
. . . [Under plaintiff’s design defect theory of
the case] it is important for plaintiff to first
establish that there is a specific feature in the
design of the product that supposedly caused him
damage. . . . While it is clear that the
plaintiff was injured due to the deployment of the
airbags, there are no facts that suggest the
airbags suffered from a defect in their design. To
the contrary, Dr. Galdos [i.e., Plaintiff’s expert]
determined that the airbag system did not operate
as designed because it deployed at a Delta V [i.e.,
velocity] of less than four miles per hour although
it is designed to be deployed at a Delta V of
eight miles per hour or higher. Ford agrees that
the air bag system was designed never to deploy
when the Delta V was less than eight miles per
hour. The mere allegation of the injury itself is
not sufficient to establish a defect in the design,
because if that were the case, whenever there is an
injury the burden would invariably shift [to the
manufacturer]. If plaintiff fails to introduce
evidence to prove the first element of his claim,
that is, the airbag system design proximately
caused his injury, then he is not able [under his
design defect theory of the case] to prove the
existence of the defect in the airbags and that
such defect caused him damages. . . . Whatever the
reason for the deployment of the airbags at a Delta
V of less than eight [miles per hour], there is no
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evidence pointing to a defective design of the
airbag system as the culprit.
Id. at 15-17 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
On appeal Plaintiff argues (as he did in the district court)
that to establish a prima facie case of a design defect he
need only submit enough evidence so that a reasonable juror
could find his vehicle’s airbags caused his injuries.
We have carefully reviewed the record and the parties’
briefs, and conclude the district court reached the correct
result under the applicable law. Under Puerto Rico law,
before Plaintiff may prevail on a claim of defective airbag
design, he must show “‘the product’s design proximately
caused his injury . . . .’” Rivera Santana v. Superior
Packaging, Inc., 132 D.P.R. 115, 129 (P.R. 1992) (emphasis
added) (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 456
(Cal. 1978)). 1 Plaintiff has made no such showing. We have
repeatedly opined that “‘when a lower court accurately takes
the measure of a case and articulates a cogent rationale, it
serves no useful purpose for a reviewing court to write at
length.’” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Zaldivar, 413 F.3d
119, 120 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Seaco Ins. Co. v. Davis-
1
The alternative consumer expectation test for defective
design claims enunciated in Barker, 453 P.2d at 455-56, is
inapplicable to claims of design defects in automobiles.
See Quintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 62, 77
(1st Cir. 2002) (applying Puerto Rico law).
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Irish, 300 F.3d 84, 86 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing cases)).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment for
substantially the reasons set forth at pages 15-17 of its
Opinion and Order dated April 4, 2006. 2
AFFIRMED.
2
We express no opinion on the district court’s discussion
of the risk-utility balancing test (based on its alternative
assumption that Plaintiff had established a prima facie case
of a design defect) found at pages 17-19 of its Opinion and
Order.
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