Opinion

Brown v. Apfel

Court
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Filed
Sep 29, 2000
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 99-2355

KEVIN C. BROWN,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER,

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge,

Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges.

Kelly McKenna Cournoyer and Green and Greenberg on brief for

appellant.

Margaret E. Curran, United States Attorney, and Robert M.

Peckrill, Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security

Administration, on brief for appellee.

September 28, 2000

Per Curiam. Kevin C. Brown appeals from a district court

opinion upholding the Commissioner's denial of social security

disability insurance benefits. Upon careful review of the

briefs and record, we affirm essentially for the reasons stated

in the district court's opinion. We add only the following

comments to address claimant's contention that the

Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") violated the regulations

regarding the weighting of evidence.

As an initial matter, claimant's suggestion that the

opinions of Dr. Earley, Dr. Ruggiano, and Dr. Stern are entitled

to controlling weight is frivolous. Of these three sources,

only Dr. Earley (claimant's primary care physician) is a

treating source.1 Dr. Earley's statement that claimant is

"psychologically incapacitated for work" is conclusory and

conflicts with other evidence in the record. More importantly,

the statement is an opinion on an issue reserved for the

Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e). Under the

circumstances, the ALJ was entitled to reject it.

1

The ALJ found that claimant never actually engaged in

treatment with Dr. Ruggiano, and this finding is supported by

the record. Dr. Stern was clearly just an examining source.

2

Moreover, the ALJ accepted the opinion of claimant's

examining sources that he has a severe personality disorder

separate and apart from his alcoholism. The question as to

whether this disorder meets or equals any Listing is an issue

reserved to the Commissioner.2 Id. Similarly, claimant's mental

residual functional capacity is an issue reserved to the

Commissioner. Id. On these latter issues, the regulations

specifically provide that the Commissioner will not give any

special significance to the source of the opinion. Id. Thus,

in reaching his conclusion as to claimant's residual limitations

stemming from his personality disorder, the ALJ was not required

to give any special weight to the examining sources' opinions.

Affirmed.

2

And, in any event, Dr. Ruggiano's testimony (in which he

orally completed a Psychiatric Review Technique Form) is fully

consistent with the ALJ's implicit finding that claimant's

personality disorder is not of Listing severity. Specifically,

the functional limitations stated by Dr. Ruggiano--slight

restriction of activities of daily living; moderate difficulties

in maintaining social functioning; often suffering from

deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace; and repeated

episodes of deterioration or decompensation in work or work-like

settings--satisfy only one out of the four Paragraph B criteria.

See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subp't P, App. 1, § 12.08(B)(1)-(4). To

satisfy the Listing for 12.08, at least three of the Paragraph

B criteria must be met. Id.

3

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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