Reed v. Rhodes

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BATTISTI, Chief Judge.

During at least the last 20 years, patterns of racial isolation in the Cleveland public school system have become steadily more pronounced. This situation is illustrated by a review of the percentage of all students attending regular

1

Cleveland Public schools whose school was a one-race

2

school:

1940: 88.37%

1950: 74.09%

1955: 71.55%

1960: 79.09%

1970: 86.07%

1975: 88.21%

Looking only to the above statistics, one could reasonably conclude that the Cleveland school system was in essentially the same position with respect to racial integration in both 1940 and 1975. A single statistical measure seldom is a full representation of an actual situation. In trying to understand racial patterns in the recent history of the Cleveland public school system, another measure sheds additional light on the subject. Examining the percentage of black students attending regular schools which were one-race schools in various years indicates that from 1940 to 1974, there was a steady trend toward concentration of black students in segregated schools:

1940: 51.03%

1950: 58.08%

1955: 57.72%

1960: 76.03%

1970: 90.00%

1975: 91.75%

These figures show that with one exception, the proportion of black students in the Cleveland public schools who have been regularly receiving their education in an integrated setting has steadily diminished during the past 35 years.

These statistics and the underlying situation which they describe give rise to many troubling questions. Most of these questions however are beyond the purview of this court in resolving the issue now before it. In reviewing the above facts as well as all of the evidence included in the volumi

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nous record in this case, the court has sought an answer to a single question of constitutional law. To what extent, if any, are the defendants in this case, public officials and public agencies, responsible for creating or for maintaining or both the segregated situation in the Cleveland public schools?

The plaintiffs are certain named students in the Cleveland public school system and their parents and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. They are proceeding on behalf of all persons in the state of Ohio who are similarly situated to them. Their complaint alleges that the defendants, the Governor and Attorney General of Ohio, the State Board of Education, the Superintendent of Public Instruction of the Ohio Department of Education, the Cleveland Board and its individual members and the Superintendent of the Cleveland City Schools, under color of state law, have pursued policies, customs, practices or usages in operating the Cleveland public school system in a manner that had the “purpose and effect of perpetuating a segregated public school system.”

It is deceptively easy to state the three elements which the plaintiffs must prove to establish their case. The court has the guidance of many recent court opinions explicating what duties the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution imposes on public officials in operating programs, of public education. At the outset, it is useful to summarize the state of the law to focus the task of this court.

The Constitutional guarantees afforded under the. Fourteenth Amendment entered a new era in 1954 with the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in

Brown v. Board of Education,

347 U.S. 483 , 74 S.Ct. 686 , 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). That Case, which serves as the benchmark in the area of school desegregation, set forth. a holding, the simplicity and brevity of which belied its national import:

“in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated . . are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id.

at 495 , 74 S.Ct. at 692 .

In the wake of

Brown ,

trial and appellate courts sought to ascertain what school districts bore the brand of unconstitutional duality and how such districts should be dismantled and reconstructed in a unitary fashion. Initial efforts were in the south. Northern school desegregation cases constitute a relatively recent development.

3

As in so many areas of the law, the critical issue in school desegregation cases is intent. It is an amorphous term that can mean different things in different factual and legal contexts. Because intent is such a subjective element, existing in pure form only in the minds of individual people, courts have found it necessary to discern evidence of intent through an analysis of its objective manifestations.

4

This is admittedly an artificial mechanism, but one not

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unknown to other areas of the law,

5

and without which, courts would be hard put to protect individual rights.

At the outset it should be noted that the instant action does not involve a statutorily mandated dual school system that is segregated on the basis of race. Such systems were particularly prevalent in the south and were ultimately struck down in

Brown .

6

The segregation alleged in this case was not imposed by legislative fiat but rather is alleged to have been the result of purposeful action on the part of the defendants. This is to say that the segregation complained of is alleged to be

de jure

as opposed to

de facto.

The distinction transcends far more than semantics for the dichotomy between the two conditions appears to remain a very viable one.

7

What then, is the yardstick against which the conduct complained of will be measured? The applicable law in this regard was set forth perhaps more succinctly in

Oliver v. Michigan State Board of Education,

508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974). Therein the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:

“A finding of

de jure

segregation requires a showing of three elements: (1) action or inaction by public officials (2) with a segregative purpose (3) which actually results in increased or continued segregation in the public schools. A presumption of segregative purpose arises when plaintiffs establish that the natural, probable and foreseeable result of public officials’ action or inaction was an increase or perpetuation of public school segregation. The presumption becomes proof unless defendants affirmatively establish that their action or inaction was a consistent and resolute application of racially neutral policies.”

Id.

at 182 (footnote omitted).

In almost the same breath, the court went to great lengths to say that the inquiry does not go to individual motives or prejudices, but rather to the overall condition that has been brought about .as a result of official action.

“When constitutional rights are involved, the issue is seldom whether public officials have acted with evil motives or whether they have consciously plotted with bigotry in their hearts to deprive citizens of the equal protection of the laws. Rather, under the test for

de jure

segregation, the question is whether a purposeful pattern of segregation has manifested itself over time, despite the fact that individual official actions, considered alone, may not have been taken for segregative purposes and may not have been in themselves constitutionally invalid.”

Id.

at 182-83 .

It is thus clear that the necessary intent upon which a finding of

de jure

segregation is predicated, may be evidenced by the natural and foreseeable effects of the official practices and policies pursued,

Hart v. Community School Board of Education,

512 F.2d 37 , 50 (2d Cir. 1975). These condemning effects can be either the creation of a segregated condition or the continuation of an existing segregated condition that may have found its genesis in extrinsic forces,

Morgan v. Kerrigan,

509 F.2d 580, 585 (1st Cir. 1974).

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The underpinning of this approach in the area of school desegregation is the Supreme Court’s holding in

Keyes v. School District No. 1,

413 U.S. 189 , 93 S.Ct. 2686 , 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973). The precise holding of that case was:

“that a finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system, as in this case, creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious. It establishes, in other words, a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design on the part of school authorities, and shifts to those authorities the burden of proving that other segregated schools within the system are not also the result .of intentionally segregative actions.”

Id.

at 208 , 93 S.Ct. at 2697 .

Thus, courts have combined the test for

de jure

segregation with the holding of

Keyes

to articulate the applicable standard of liability in a school desegregation case:

“We hold that a presumption of segregative intent arises once it is established that school authorities have engaged in acts or omissions, the nature, probable and foreseeable consequence of which is to bring about or maintain segregation. When that presumption arises, the burden shifts to the defendants to establish that ‘segregative intent was not among the factors that motivated their actions.’ ”

United States v. School District of Omaha,

521 F.2d 530, 535-36 (8th Cir. 1974) (citing Keyes, footnote omitted).

Noteworthy, too, is the recent case of

Washington v. Davis,

426 U.S. 229 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 , (1976). While that case provides additional guidance in the area of racial discrimination and equal protection of the law, it does not minimize the role of effect in the formula for ascertaining intent.

Washington, supra,

involved a constitutional challenge to the testing procedures utilized by the District of Columbia in the recruitment of potential police officers. A literacy test was administered to all such applicants, regardless of race. The test was also commonly used for evaluating other job applicants throughout the federal government. It was revealed, however, that approximately four'times as many black applicants to the Metropolitan Police Force failed the test as did whites.

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The claim of a denial of due process and equal protection of the law was based solely on the racial disparity contained in the test results.

The court, in responding to plaintiffs’ due process claim stated:

“our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional

solely

because it. has a racially disproportionate impact.”

Id.

at 239 , 96 S.Ct. at 2047 .

Thus, it is clear that evidence of disparate racial impact, standing alone, is insufficient to sustain a cause of action based upon an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights. This is nothing more than a restatement of the widely accepted. proposition that the mere presence of racial imbalance, without more, will not support a claim of unconstitutional segregation.

See e. g. Hart v. Community School Board,

512 F.2d 37 , 45-46 (2d Cir. 1975).

It should be noted, however, that the decision in

Washington

is in no way a departure from the existing state of the law, particularly with regard to the inferring of intent from effect.

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“Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another . Nevertheless, we have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.”

Id.

at 242 , 96 S.Ct. at 2049 .

The holding in

Washington, supra,

is totally reconcilable with the test for

de jure

segregation articulated in

Oliver v. Michigan State Board of Education,

508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974) and

Berry v. Benton Harbor School District,

505 F.2d 238 (6th Cir. 1974). Those cases authorized a presumption of segregative purpose from, the fact of foreseeable segregative result.

Oliver, supra,

at 182 . That presumption could be overcome only by affirmative proof of “a consistent and resolute application of racially neutral policies.”

Id.

The policy complained of in

Washington, viz.

the administering of the literacy test, was unequivocally racially neutral even though the results of the test, and therefore its effect, were not. Under those circumstances, and in accordance with the precise terms of

Oliver ,

there could be no permissible presumption of segregative intent. Therefore, the only source of culpability in

Washington

was actual segregative purpose or motivation and it was this state of mind that was found lacking.

One additional comment is necessary. The evidence adduced at trial encompassed far more than mere segregative effect. Many of the incidents established at trial, such as intact busing and certain school construction, can be rationally attributed only to a deliberate and conscious desire to create or perpetuate a segregated condition. As to these incidents, therefore, there is no need to resort to the inferring of intent from effect, although such an inference would be entirely permissible. The requisite intent sufficient to find

de jure

segregation was clearly and independently established.

The plaintiffs are seeking relief from both local and state officials. Each set of defendants, the local school officials, the state school officials, the Governor and the Attorney General, are alleged to have caused or maintained the segregated nature of the Cleveland school system. It is therefore necessary to examine the nature of the authority vested in each set of defendants and the evidence as to how this authority was exercised. Absent a showing of a delegation of authority from one set of defendants to another, the liability of any of the defendants cannot be shown vicariously. At any particular time, however, the conduct of one set of defendants could give rise to an obligation of another set of defendants to take action. In determining whether any of the defendants denied the plaintiffs their constitutional rights, the derivative nature of their obligations must be kept in sight.

A detailed understanding of what was happening at the local level, therefore, is necessary before determining the nature of the liability of the various parties, if any, for the segregated conditions which all parties admit exist in the Cleveland system. In their arguments to the court, the plaintiffs characterized this case as consisting of literally hundreds of segregatory incidents. The evidence as to these incidents was submitted primarily in documentary form. The court has considered all of this material exhaustively and the conclusions of this analysis are set forth at length,

infra.

In interpreting the evidence in the record, the court has faced a number of recurring questions or problems. A general discussion of these issues and the approaches which were taken toward them will aid in the understanding of the court’s treatment of specific factual questions. First, while the evidence in this case is voluminous, one question which it does not answer directly is what the racial composi

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tion of any given residential area was at any specific time. This information is crucial in assessing the intent and effect of many of the local defendants’ actions. Given the period of time which the plaintiffs’ proofs span, it would be virtually an impossible task to produce direct evidence on this question for each area and each time period as to which the plaintiffs’ alleged incidents raise the question. Testimony about general patterns at trial from several witnesses who had first hand knowledge of the residential racial patterns in Cleveland during various parts of the period from 1940 to the present has been helpful to the court in tackling these individual factual questions. The plaintiffs also prepared maps showing residential racial information as shown by the decennial census from 1940 forward. In addition to these sources, whenever such a factual question has arisen, the court has looked at the percentage of black students enrolled in schools in the particular area under consideration for periods preceding and following an alleged segregatory action by the local school officials and inferred from that the probable racial composition of area affected in the specific time frame.

In terms of volume, the majority of the plaintiffs’ proofs focused on specific pupil assignment decisions made by local school officials over a 35 year period. These included boundary changes, creation of optional zones, use of rented facilities for classrooms, additions to existing schools of both permanent and temporary classrooms and other facilities, construction of new schools and closing of old schools. In analyzing these individual events, no easy formula emerged for judging when a specific incident had a segregatory effect. Actions which on their face might appear integrative on closer examination frequently were found to have enhanced emerging segregative patterns. For instance, the local defendants have suggested in some of their responses to these specific alleged incidents that where the sending school had a lower proportion of black students than the receiving school, the incident was prima facie integrative and bore no further scrutiny. In some instances where a reassignment was made to send students from a “whiter” to a “blacker” school, there was an integrative result, as suggested by the local defendants. However, on other occasions the reassignment decision appeared to have had the effect of drawing black students primarily from the “whiter” to the “blacker” school. Conversely, every reassignment decision in which the sending school had a higher proportion of black students than the receiving school did not necessarily have the effect of isolating black students. The court has examined each alleged incident to determine its effect and, if that effect was segregatory, whether such a result was foreseeable.

Much of the plaintiff’s case focuses on the use to which Cleveland school officials put their available facilities. Some incidents to which the plaintiffs call the court’s attention are situations where predominantly black schools appear to have been overcrowded, sometimes to the extent of requiring the use of portable classrooms or rented space or both and sometimes involving use of half-day sessions or “relay classes” in educational jargon. In these instances, the plaintiffs have indicated “nearby” majority white schools which appear to have had available space that might have been used to obviate resort to such educationally undesirable solutions to overcrowding. In other incidents on which the plaintiffs have focused, they allege that boundary changes or creation of optional zones were undertaken with the intent or effect or both of identifying one' of the two schools involved as the “black” or the “white” school. In several of these situations, the local defendants’ proffered explanation for the changes has been that they were necessary due to the overcrowding of one of the schools involved.

Against this background, the issue of the “capacity” of any given school became one of the most sharply disputed issues in the case, in presenting their case, the plaintiffs relied, where possible, on the capacity figures computed by the Cleveland Board’s own employees from 1952 to 1963 as represented in P.X. 74. The local defendants

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attacked the use of such figures, arguing that capacity was a variable figure, not an immutable figure which could be derived from application of any of several unchanging formulae. It was noted that a change in the average pupil-teacher ratio throughout the system could radically change any set of capacity figures. Other policy decisions, such as Superintendent Briggs’ program to have a library in every elementary school in the system and participation in school meal programs requiring space for food preparation and serving, also diminished the space available for basic classroom instruction. Further, various witnesses for the local defendants noted the varying impact which different types of classwork, e. g. typing, music, or science or language laboratory work, had on the basic capacity of a school. But beyond such general observations, the local defendants have not assisted the court in untangling what they insist is a very knotty problem. Given the wealth of information which local school officials have on year-to-year operations of the schools within their district, the court must note the failure of the local board to come forward with the specific data which it urged was necessary to the resolution of questions where capacity was a factor. (See transcript of closing arguments at 277 to 280).

In

Higgins v. Board of Education of Grand Rapids,

395 F.Supp. 444 (Mich.W.D.1973), the capacity of specific schools was also “hotly disputed by the parties.” Judge Engel characterized and framed the issue as follows:

“The issue assumes great importance in determining the motives and intent of Board action concerning attendance zones, additions to existing buildings, new construction, and feeder patterns. The facts were involved, but the question for the court’s consideration was relatively simple: how, under the circumstances at a given time, would a school board fairly and realistically employ its available classroom space, without any intent to discriminate?”

Id.

at 462 .

The utility in this formulation of the problem is that it recognizes that in assessing the evidence in school cases, basic capacity figures are not used for their intrinsic validity, but rather as a point of departure for comparison of school use at any given time.

Any difficulties which the court might have encountered in dealing with the collateral issue of capacity were significantly diminished by the fact that the issue generally arose in the context of elementary schools. In assessing the significance of enrollments which were either above or below the stated capacity, the court assumed that factors such as variations in curriculum from school to school were not nearly as significant at the elementary level as at the secondary level. In making such an assumption, the court was guided by statements in the local defendants’ publications on the meaning of capacity which distinguish between the problems in computing and interpreting capacity figures for secondary schools (P.X. 117 at 8-9) and elementary schools (P.X. 117 at 23-24.) At the elementary level, the court regarded the capacity figures as an indication of the relative potential for use of various schools. The court recognizes this to be a theoretical measure and has considered the various specific conditions, which the local defendants brought to the court’s attention, that would have lowered or raised such potential.

The court relied heavily on P.X. 74 on the issue of capacity, but this exhibit had specific information only for the period from 1952 to 1963. The plaintiffs offered a document prepared by the Cleveland City Planning Commission in December 1971 which purported to give capacity figures for Cleveland schools as of that date, P.X. 223. Apparently capacity as reported in this document was computed by a different formula than that which the school employees used in P.X. 74. The court found that these estimates tended to be higher than capacities calculated on the assumptions used in P.X. 74. Accordingly, where possible, the court has calculated its own capacity estimate for schools not listed in P.X. 74 or for schools which have had additions since 1963. In doing so, the court assumed that a new

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classroom in an elementary school could accommodate 35 students, where enrollments were pressing, without being considered overcrowded. As with all capacity figures, these estimates were relied upon only for their relative value.

Much documentary evidence was submitted to the court concerning specific assignment decisions of the local defendants. This evidence has for the purpose of clarity been analyzed by geographical area and, within such analyses, generally in chronological order. Following this detailed examination the court has addressed the general issues of relay classes, intact busing, special transfers, faculty assignment, housing and neighborhood school policy.

CENTRAL AREA

In 1940, approximately 15 percent of the students in the Cleveland Public Schools were black. Slightly more than half of these students were enrolled in 10 regular schools which were plainly identifiable as black inasmuch as black students constituted 90 to 100 percent of the enrollments of those schools. Of course, the other obvious way of describing this situation, as the proverbial optimist might do, is to say that almost half of the black students in the system were being educated in situations with a significant number of white students. From the point of view of the present polarized conditions in the Cleveland system, such a situation is almost enviable. Some statistical measures of integrated or segregated conditions in the system, particularly the percentage of all students in essentially one race schools, are almost the same for the years 1940 (88.37%) and 1975 (88.21%). However, comparison of this measure with a statistic which focuses on the impact on black students in the system, the percent of black students in essentially one-race schools, 51.3% in 1940 and 91.75% in 1975, aids in understanding the basic issue in this case. At issue is whether black students in the Cleveland public schools have been denied equal access to the benefits which a unitary public educational system provides.

All of the defendants have maintained that the present situation in which over 90 percent of the black students in the system are attending one-race schools has evolved as a result of private actions over which they had no control and in which they had no involvement. The plaintiffs’ proofs essentially date from 1940, and the court has been asked to scrutinize many specific acts of the local school officials which occurred long before any of the present individual defendants had come to their present positions. Despite the apparently mooting effect of the passage of time as to many of these incidents, the court undertook such a detailed analysis. The overriding inquiry in the course of examining the older incidents in the record was to determine what factor the actions and policies of school officials had played in giving rise to the underlying residential segregation which the defendants now argue is a defense.

During the decade of 1940-50, the total enrollment in Cleveland public schools dropped significantly from 114,769 in 1940 to 94,186 in 1950. During this period there was a moderate rise in the number of black children enrolled in Cleveland public schools from 16,772 in 1940 to 24,849 in 1950. This indicates the effects of the economic depression of the 1930s and of World War II on the average size of families as well as the effect of suburban development attracting young white families outside the city limits. The increase in school age black children appears to have been in part the result of in-migration of black families drawn to Cleveland by the prospect of employment, particularly in the many industrial plants in this area. In 1940, the eight regular elementary schools in the system had black student enrollments in excess of 95 percent and all were in the Central Area, as designated by the local school authorities. At the same time, there were an additional 58 regular elementary schools which had some black students enrolled, although their percentage in the schools’ enrollment in most instances was relatively small. One may infer that as of 1940 the residential patterns which were to emerge

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as more black families moved to Cleveland was not predestined. Testimony at trial was to the effect that the real estate market in Cleveland was managed in such a way that black consumers were afforded the opportunity to bid for housing only in certain areas. In this respect, the concept of the neighborhood school was meaningful according to the plaintiffs as a signal to all concerned of who should expect to be able to make their home in any neighborhood at any particular time.' With this in mind, it is useful to examine in a chronological order the student assignment decisions which were being actively made during the 1940s and 1950s to see if such signals were being broadcast.

A number of the schools operating in the Central Area in the 1940s have since been closed. It is clear that boundary changes or other assignment decisions concerning these schools exclusively could have no continuing direct effect. (See, for instance, the alleged incidents discussed in the local defendants’ response documents E-l, E-2, and E-3.) Tracing the student assignment decisions which affected the enrollment at Rutherford B. Hayes Elementary School during the 1940s and 1950s, one detects a distinct pattern of color-conscious conduct on the part of school officials.

In 1940, overcrowding was plainly a problem at Case-Woodland (0.81%, 807/630)

9

and was also considered a problem at Burroughs (96.27%, 1154/1225). The next year the school officials by rescinding a 1933 boundary change which had transferred part of the Rutherford B. Hayes attendance area to Burrough and a 1935 boundary change transferring an additional portion of the Hayes attendance area to Case-Woodland, attempted to deal with those overcrowding situations. In 1941 it appears that Hayes (833/980) did have some available space which could be used to help alleviate overcrowding, but it does not appear that this would have been sufficient to thoroughly solve the overcrowding at one of the two sending schools, Case-Woodland (864/630). Adjacent to the Case-Woodland attendance area and sharing a long boundary with it was Mayflower (809/1085). There is no explanation as to why its available space was not used to help relieve overcrowding at Case-Woodland. One fact is known. Both Case-Woodland (’40: 77.57%; ’41: 94.91%; ’42: 95.9%) and Mayflower (’40: 79.35%; ’41: 87.76%; ’42: 85.6%) had experienced significant increases in the ration of black students in their enrollment. Mayflower which was on the periphery of what appear^ to have been the major overwhelmingly black residential area in the city did not have as high a black ratio in its enrollment as Case-Woodland. On the basis of this single incident and particularly in light of the relatively slight difference in proportional black enrollment at the two schools, it is difficult to draw any conclusions as to the practices or motivations of school officials which caused this omission. Subsequent events, however, may shed some additional light on the matter.

In 1943, Hayes which was 98% black appears to have become seriously overcrowded. Its enrollment was 1605, while its basic capacity as reported in 1952 was 980. There appear to have been no additions or closings of classrooms at the school between 1943 and 1952. Even allowing for the possibility of a higher acceptable teacher-pupil ratio in the 1940s than in the 1950s, the need for some remedy was and is clear. A portion of the Hayes attendance area was transferred to the Sterling Elementary

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School attendance zone in December 1943. The 1943 percentage of black students enrolled at Sterling was 78.5 and its 1952 capacity is shown as 630. Its 1943 enrollment was 675, but by 1943 standards arguably it might have had some available space. This boundary change appears to have been somewhat integrative. Further relief came with the conversion of Outhwaite (later Alfred Benesch) to a regular elementary school in the fall' of 1944. Outhwaite also drew students from two other overwhelmingly black schools, Case-Woodland and Gladstone. It opened 99.07% black. But to fully evaluate the significance of these boundary changes, it is necessary to determine whether they solved the underlying problem of overcrowding, and, if not, whether further remedial actions were rejected because of racial considerations.

The overcrowding problem at Hayes did not end. Its 1944 enrollment of 1159, while a considerable reduction from the 1943-fig-ure, would still overtax a structure with a theoretical capacity of approximately 980. Additional resources appear to have been available. A school with at least as much available capacity as Sterling was Marion with a 1943 enrollment of 557 of whom 49 percent were black. While its 1952 capacity is reported at 560, in 1942 when it had an enrollment of 553, it is reported to have had one closed classroom. Marion did not share a boundary with Hayes, but it was approximately the same distance from other portions of the Hayes attendance area as Sterling was from the area affected by this boundary change.

A school which did share an attendance boundary with Hayes was Waring Elementary School; which was also approximately the same distance from portions of the overcrowded Hayes attendance zone as Sterling was from the actually affected area. Waring clearly appears to have had available pupil stations in 1943. Its 1943 enrollment was 588, while its basic capacity in 1952 was 630. This capacity figure presumably incorporates an assumption of a lower acceptable student-teacher ratio than would be reflected by the 1943 average practice. Interestingly, in 1944 Waring’s enrollment dropped to 514. Black students constituted 4.4 and 7.0 percent of Waring’s enrollment in 1943 and 1944 respectively.

The resources of Marion and Waring were not marshalled to solve overcrowding at the overwhelmingly black Hayes despite their accessibility which appears nearly equal to that of Sterling. Safety factors do not appear to be a plausible explanation for these omissions. The Hayes, Sterling, Marion and Waring attendance areas were sliced by crosstown streets. However, a child living in the northern part of the Hayes attendance area would encounter no more traffic hazards going north to Waring than south to Hayes. Accordion-like boundary changes transferring part of the Sterling area to Marion and in turn more of the Hayes area to Sterling would have led to a fuller solution of the Hayes overcrowding problems. One common characteristic of both Marion and Waring was that less than half of their enrollment was black. One might infer that there was a reticence on the part of school officials to introduce more black students into these schools. Such an inference would be supported by evidence of other similar behavior by school authorities during this time period.

The opening of Outhwaite as an elementary school suggests an inclination of school planners to contain blacks. The attendance area of the new school was completely surrounded by schools which were in excess of 90 percent black, which conferred upon it the dubious distinction of becoming the second thoroughly impacted black school in the Cleveland public school system. An impacted school, as the term will be used in this opinion, is one which could not be integrated by a redrawing of boundaries with contiguous schools, all of which are in excess of 90 percent black. The first such school in the Cleveland system was Dike Elementary School. The court is aware that in opening Outhwaite as an elementary school, school officials were converting an existing board-owned facility to a new use. During a period of war, as this was, obvi

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ously new construction would have to be viewed as an unlikely alternative. The court is also equally aware of the fact that the concentration of black families with school age children which necessitated the opening of a new elementary school was not largely the result of the workings of the private real estate market. Rather the opening of Outhwaite as an elementary school coincided with the opening of Carver Park Housing Project, a public housing estate planned for occupancy by blacks. As discussed elsewhere in this opinion, the planning of public housing was coordinated with agencies providing public services, assurances that public services will be provided being a necessary prerequisite to the construction of the project. Thus school officials were involved in this public housing site decision and its foreseeable result of residential concentration by race. This concentration, in turn, resulted in an impacted black school.

Another measure allegedly aimed at relieving the overcrowding at Hayes (99.7%, 1159/980) in 1944 was the creation of an optional zone at the south end of the Hayes area allowing students from that zone to attend Case-Woodland (92.8%, 724/630). This approach is subject to two criticisms. First, in seeking to relieve overcrowding at one school, it exacerbated a similar problem at another school, when, as discussed above, this was not the only possible alternative. Second, there is no explanation as to why the school officials addressed the problem with optional zone, rather than a boundary change. While the relative disparity in the proportional black enrollment at the sending and receiving schools is not large in absolute terms, there is the possibility that the optional zone contributed to the loss of white students at Hayes from 1943 (98.0% black of 1605 or, conversely, approximately 30 non-black students) to 1944 (99.7% black of 1159 or, conversely, 3 or 4 non-black students).

The enrollment at Hayes continued to increase through the 1940s in spite of the assignment adjustments discussed above. In September 1948, the school officials again sought to ameliorate the problem at least partially with a boundary change assigning upper elementary students from a designated portion of the Hayes area to attend Sterling. Clearly Hayes which had an enrollment of 1262 in 1947 and 1352 in 1948 after this change and a theoretical capacity of only 980 was in need of relief. But the choice of Sterling as the source of that relief again strongly suggests that school officials were not neutrally considering all of the alternatives available to them. In 1947, the Sterling enrollment was 658, already 28 students over its theoretical capacity of 630, as shown in P.X. 74. In 1948, after this boundary change its enrollment had increased to 723. In ameliorating one problem of overcrowding, school officials were contributing to the creation of another. Again, if this were the only alternative available to school officials, it would be reasonable to more evenly distribute the pressures of overcrowding. It was not the only alternative. Waring was still operating with an enrollment, 548 in 1947 and 575 in 1948, which was less than its basic capacity of 630. Since the reassignment measure adopted at this time affected only older elementary students, students from the northern portion of the Hayes attendance area could have reasonably been assigned to Waring. The most apparent distinguishing characteristic between Sterling and Waring at this time was the proportion of black students in their enrollment, 88.8% and 4.0% respectively. Notable is the fact that Waring’s proportional black enrollment had in fact decreased from 7.0% in 1944. Given the nature of the remedial action taken in 1948, the court concludes that reasonable school officials acting in a color-blind fashion would have transferred some of the upper elementary students from the 98.7% black Hayes to the 4.0% black Waring.

There is one point about the court’s evaluation of various decisions by school officials which should be made clear. Clearly since the 1940s, there has been an enormous rethinking as to how public officials should treat racial issues. Indeed this process con

*722

tinues to this very moment. The court does not conclude that the school officials who engaged in the various conduct discussed here were necessarily acting with actual malice toward black students. In fact, the court assumes the contrary. The Court has undertaken this minute analysis not to cast aspersions upon particular individuals who were responding in all probability to the social and political pressures of the day. Throughout the school system, they were facing problems of mobility in the population and later of population explosion, the so-called postwar baby boom, of a magnitude that was difficult to predict. Clearly developments in the community called for responsive action from school officials. At the same time, constitutional principles required that those actions meet certain standards in affording all students in the Cleveland public schools an equal education. Even prior to

Brown v. Board of Education, supra,

it was understood that black children were entitled to educational programs and opportunities equal to those afforded their white counterparts.

In this spirit, the court must conclude that the various actions and inactions in dealing with overcrowding at Hayes during the 1940s, considered as a whole, are strong evidence of a pattern and practice at that time to contain black students in overwhelmingly black schools. This was done despite the fact that the crowded conditions in these black schools must be viewed as indicia of their inequality when compared with predominantly white schools.

On several occasions, the “solution” to overcrowding was to shift students to another predominantly black school which was already overcrowded itself, e. g. Sterling and Case-Woodland. At the same time, the resources of essentially white underenrolled schools, most notably Waring, were not used in resolving problems of over-crowding. It is fair to conclude that this conduct by school officials was interpreted as a signal to families in the real estate market that the Waring attendance area would remain a white “neighborhood.”

Another incident during this time period which suggests that, where ameliorative action was necessary, containment of black students in identifiably black schools was a practice, is the 1947 boundary change in which a southern portion of the Marion attendance area (64.3%, 644/560) was transferred to Mayflower (97.0%, 942/1085). The court assumes that the whites attending Marion lived primarily in the northern section of the schools attendance zone, that is in areas abutting the predominantly white neighborhoods which were in the St. Clair Elementary School attendance area. Conversely the court assumes that the children affected by this boundary change were primarily black children. Based on likely conditions, the record indicates that a less segregative alternative to Mayflower was Harmon (87.7%, 293/535). According to the School Housing Report for 1947, Harmon had six closed classrooms while Mayflower had one. As a single incident, the decision to send students, most or all of whom were presumably black, to a 97% black school rather than an 87% black school does not suggest the worst kind of manipulation. As part of a pattern, however, it cannot be ignored.

At the end of the decade of the 1940s, the concentration of black residents continued to be most heavy in the Central area of the Cleveland School System. By 1950, there were 13 regular elementary schools which had proportional black enrollments in excess of 95 percent, as opposed to the 10 such schools in 1940. These schools formed a core. Four shared no boundaries with any school having a black enrollment of less than 90 percent. Six had enrollments substantially in excess of their capacity as calculated by school officials in 1952. Only one of these schools had any closed classrooms, Gladstone with four such rooms. A summary of relevant statistics for these predominantly black schools follows:

*723

proportion black enrollment/ capacity closed classrooms

Bolton 98.8% 829/1050 0

Burroughs 100.0% 1053/1225 0

Case-Woodland 99.5% 777/630 0

Giddings 99.7% 670/775 0

Gladstone 100.0% 500/735 4

Hayes 97.6% 1350/980 0

Irving 96.2% 707/600 0

Dike 100.0% 590/665 0

Kinsman 95.7% 1446/945 0

Mayflower 95.4% 802/1085 0

Outhwaite 98.0%

10

n/a/1155 0

Wooldridge 99.0% 792/700 0

Quincy 99.6% 750/665 0

In contrast, they were ringed by 12 schools, all but three of which had proportional black enrollments substantially below the percentage of black students in the Cleveland Public Schools at the time (26.7%). Eight of these schools had enrollments vhich were at least 200 students below their basic capacity as calculated in 1952. One school had an enrollment significantly over capacity, Hough. According to the 1950 School Housing Report, these schools had a combined total of 51 closed standard classrooms. For comparison, the same 1950 statistics listed for the core school are listed for the ring schools herewith:

proportion black enrollment/ capacity closed classrooms

Boulevard 7.34% 395/700 4

Dunham 17.66% 1138/1125 0

Harmon 87.81% 230/535 6

Hough 10.98% 1148/1015 0

Observation 81.67% 311/910 0

Mt. Auburn 0% 260/700 8

St. Clair 18.37% 283/490 6

Tod 30.15% 252/490 7

Waring 6.77% 576/630 '0

Warren 5.85% 259/770 9

Woodland 2.49% 562/595 0

Woodland Hills 4.22% 332/455 1

At the very least, the above figures indicate an uneven management of these various schools. The task before the court, however, is not to review generally the administration of the schools over the time period covered by the plaintiffs’ evidence in this case. Rather, as has been indicated before, the task brought to the court is to determine whether the Cleveland Public Schools were operated as a truly unitary system. On the facts above, the color-blindness of school officials during this period must be questioned.

Assuming that the practice in the early 1950s was to assign approximately 35 students to an elementary class — an assumption which plainly gives the local board the benefit of the doubt — the 51 unused classrooms in the “ring” schools could have accommodated 1785 students. School officials ought to have utilized such presently available facilities, if possible, before opening any additional schools. Step-by-step changes would have achieved the end of making the fullest use of these otherwise under utilized “ring” schools.

Instead in 1950, the school officials dealt with overcrowding in the core schools by converting part of the Longwood Vocational School for Girls into a primary (K-3) School. Longwood Primary School (100%, 371/? — dual use of school makes PX 74 ca

*724

pacity figure unreliable for this year) opened with a totally black enrollment which had been drawn from Mayflower (’49: 897/1085; ’50: 95.39%, 802/1085), Sterling (’49: 723/630; ’50: 89.49%, 674/630), Case-Woodland (’49: 797/630; ’50: 99.49%, 777/630), and Hayes (’49: 1409/980; ’50: 97.56%, 1350/980). As the 1949 enrollments at the latter three schools reveals, action to deal with overcrowding at the sending schools was plainly needed. The initial difficulty with the action taken by the school officials in partially converting Longwood is that the overcrowding in three of the four sending schools appears to have not been fully resolved. If all the schools within this area of the city were similarly overcrowded, this result would have had to be tolerated. There were, however, at least five schools which were reported to have unused standard classrooms that might have been incorporated in a plan of step-by-step boundary changes to relieve the overcrowding addressed by the opening of Longwood Primary School. These schools were:

closed classrooms proportion

Warren 9 5.85%

Tod 7 30.16%

Harmon 6 87.1 %

Gladstone 4 100.0 %

Marion 1_ 68.95%

Total 27

Utilization of these available classrooms theoretically would have created 945 pupil stations. The aggregate overenrollment at Sterling, Case-Woodland, and Hayes in 1950 (that is, enrollment minus capacity totalled for the three schools) was 561. While Gladstone and Harmon had black enrollments which were in the same range as the three overcrowded schools, the low ratio of black students at Warren and Tod is notable. The high number of available classrooms at these two schools strongly suggests that student assignment policies concerning this area of the school system were being managed to keep these schools as white as possible. Physical barriers which might otherwise define “neighborhoods” should not be taken as excusing unnecessary waste of available school resources with such a detrimental impact on a suspect class of students.

Indeed, to the extent that school attendance zones were supposed to reflect some underlying sociological structure, school officials apparently viewed such patterns as being more flexible in essentially all black residential areas than in other areas. In January 1951, a portion of the Longwood Primary School, (100%) attendance zone was transferred back to the Mayflower area (98.6%, 836/1085). The incident is a minor one, as certainly there was available space at Mayflower and it affected only one block. Moreover, whatever its original direct effect, it could not be continuing as both the sending and receiving schools have since been closed. The incident is instructive, however, because of the two changes which this area underwent (Mayflower to Longwood in September 1950 and Long-wood to Mayflower in January 1951) within a five month period.

The number of children attending Cleveland Public Schools increased dramatically during the decade of the 1950s, reflecting the so-called “baby-boom” following World War II as well as continued in-migration of new families to the city. By 1955, the total public school enrollment (113,067) was almost equal to the 1940 figure (115,769) and still growing rapidly. New school construction was plainly going to be needed. Various decisions made in the course of this new construction appear to have had foreseeable effects which bear close scrutiny.

In 1954, Longwood (100%, 810/770) was converted from a primary school to a regular elementary school. Students were assigned from areas formerly in the Sterling, Case-Woodland, Mayflower and Hayes attendance areas. The act of creating more room for elementary students is not itself subject to criticism. The problem is that the overcrowding in the sending schools which precipitated this conversion was not completely resolved, as the figures below indicate, and apparently more could have been done.

*725

'53 '54 enrollment/ '53 '54 enrollment capacity % black % black

Sterling 735 758/700 89.4% 63.1%

Case-Woodland 859 711/630 99.0% 99.4%

Mayflower 881 802/1085 98.8% 97.9%

Hayes 1473 1069/980 98.4% 98.9%

In responding to the plaintiffs’ description of the various boundary changes associated with the 1954 conversion of Longwood, the local defendants note that at least one step-by-step boundary change was made. That is, after some Sterling students were reassigned to Longwood, some Marion students were assigned to Sterling. It is notable that after these changes the proportion of black students at Sterling dropped from 89.4% in 1953 to 63.1% in 1954. Harmon at this time was substantially underenrolled (’53 : 89.9%, 307/535; ’54: 89.9% 307/535). If the objective of the school officials had been full utilization of available facilities, it would seem that further step-by-step boundary changes should have been made to involve Harmon in the plan to relieve overcrowding. The reasonable boundary adjustment would have been to assign students from the northwest panhandle of Marion (’53: 66.4%, 634/560; ’54: 67.2%, 568/560) to Harmon. See 1947 boundary map). The local defendants’ explanation for not involving Harmon in this redistricting plan is that access problems existed, citing the problem of walking under railroad bridges. Neither the 1947 nor the 1967 map of school attendance zones indicate any railroad lines in the area between Harmon and Marion.

In absence of a sufficient neutral explanation for the failure to involve Harmon in resolving overcrowding in the area at the time, the court finds it necessary to consider what racially motivated reasons might have accounted for this omission. As noted above, the one step-by-step boundary change which the school officials did undertake appears to have resulted in a substantial reduction of the proportion of black students enrolled at Sterling. The end of seeking to establish Sterling as a more integrated school would be laudable when considered in a vacuum. If this was at least one of the goals of this redrawing of boundary lines, however, its execution would be subject to several criticisms. First, the increase in integration at Sterling appears to have been at the expense of isolating black students formerly assigned to Sterling to the totally segregated Longwood. Second, the unwillingness to assign students from Marion to Harmon not only isolated the Harmon students, but wasted valuable and limited resources of the school system at a time and place where there was obvious need. Finally, the failure to use all of Harmon’s available space resulted from the school officials’ conscious unwillingness to assign white students from Marion (67.2%) to the significantly more black Harmon (89.9%), this undercuts the local defendants’ assertion that the neighborhood school policy has continuously been applied in a racially blind fashion. The various questions raised by the conversion of Longwood to a regular elementary school and the consequent boundary changes would not loom very large except for the pattern which emerges from several school openings at about the same time, in particular Chesnutt and Clara Tagg Brewer, discussed

infra.

In 1954, George Washington Carver (98.8%, 730/590) Elementary School also opened. Unlike Longwood, which was an existing board-owned facility, Carver was newly constructed. Thus, school officials had a full measure of control oversite selection. Its students were drawn from areas which, formerly had been part of the Hayes, Burroughs and Outhwaite attendance. In 1951, the initial planning year for Carver, these three sending schools had the respective proportional black enrollment as follows: 97.9%, 99.6% and 98.5%. It was clearly foreseeable that Carver would open a virtually all-black school. The only schools which might have presented integrative alternatives, assuming that children

*726

were to walk to school, were Sterling (’54: 63.3%, 758/630), Dunham (’54: 47.7%, 1638/1125) and Waring (’54: 8.3%, 576/630). Sterling and Dunham were both experiencing overenrollment, and the relatively small amount of available space at Waring could not absorb the burgeoning student population in the area ultimately served by Carver. The result of this school construction was plainly containment of blacks in an overwhelmingly black school.

Whether a different site selection for Carver might have been possibly less segregative in effect is a difficult question, given the commercial development to the north of the actual Carver site. The relevant observation, however, is that in 1954, ironically the year in which

Brown v. Board of Education

was decided, the Cleveland Board of Education opened the first newly constructed school which from its inception was essentially an all-black school. This event surely should have signaled school authorities that integrated education in Cleveland would be the exception and not the rule for both black and white students, unless the “neighborhood” school policy was tempered. Instead the policy appears to have been implemented in such a way as to contain blacks even where integration was not only feasible, but where the alternative resulted in gross disparities in utilization of adjacent “black” and “white” schools. This is illustrated by the events in the Kinsman area.

Kinsman was accommodating 500 students more than its basic capacity of 945, in other words, it was over enrolled by more than 50%. It shared boundaries with Boulevard (7.34%, 395/700, 4 closed standard classrooms), Mt. Auburn (0%, 260/700, 8 closed standard classrooms), Woodland (2.49%, 562/595, 0 closed standard classrooms), and Woodland Hills (4.22%, 332/445, 1 closed standard classroom). A double set of railroad lines did separate the Kinsman area from all of these schools. However, the distance and the safety factors which would have been involved in assigning upper elementary Kinsman students to Mt. Auburn and Boulevard do not appear to outweigh the benefit of relieving the gross overcrowding at Kinsman. Likewise, Tod shared the western boundary of Kinsman and had over two hundred theoretically available pupil stations. At this time, the Sidaway Bridge apparently provided access from the Kinsman area to Tod, as evidenced by its boundary at the time. The available space at Mt. Auburn, Boulevard and Tod was more than sufficient to solve the obvious overcrowding at Kinsman in 1940, and yet school officials allowed it to sit idle. This state of facts seems explicable only in terms of a deliberate effort on the part of school officials to preserve the identification of the “ring” schools as “white schools.” By their inaction, school officials joined in transmitting the message that blacks were not welcome in these neighborhoods. They contributed to effective designation of areas as white neighborhoods or black neighborhoods. Subsequent actions by school officials only bolster this conclusion.

As the local defendants acknowledge in their response E-168, crowded conditions existed at Kinsman from 1944 to 1959. School officials did undertake certain actions to alleviate this continuing problem. But in each instance, these remedial efforts contained blacks in overwhelmingly black schools. Thus some Kinsman students were assigned to Rawlings Junior High (’44: 84.1%, ’59: 100%) School from 1944 until 1959. During the 1950s, two schools were planned and constructed to draw students from Kinsman; Chesnutt (’55: 99.54%, 660/630) and Anton Grdina (’59: 97.6%, 687/665).

In reviewing the evidence, the student reassignment decisions made pursuant to the opening of Chesnutt in 1955 stand out as among the most blatant actions of school officials in deliberately separating students by race. In 1954, the year prior to the opening of Chesnutt, Kinsman (98.75%, 1771/945 had an enrollment which was 826 students above its theoretical capacity! While some Kinsman classes were being held at Rawlings Junior High School (’54: 99.65%, 1120/1567), even if all of the theoretically available space at Rawlings were

*727

marshalled for use for the overflow of Kinsman students, there would still have been an aggregate over enrollment at Kinsman of approximately 400 students. In 1954 in addition to drawing students from Kinsman the new Chesnutt also drew students from Wooldridge (99.8%, 787/700) and Tod (’53: 28.7%, 251/490; ’54: 6.38%, 188/490), which shared a long boundary with Kinsman. As a result of this latter change, Tod had a marked decrease in its total and its proportional black enrollment. Prior to the opening of Chesnutt, the walking distance from the western portion of the Kinsman attendance area to Tod was relatively short because of the existence of a footbridge, the Sidaway Bridge, which spanned Kingsbury Run. Prior to the opening of Chesnutt, the Tod attendance area included an area northeast of Kingsbury Run. Obviously, the Sidaway Bridge was part of the access route for the children from this area. When the Chesnutt boundaries were drawn, this area was included in its attendance zone. The apparent effect of this was to remove virtually all of the black students attending Tod to Chesnutt and to cause a substantial enrollment drop in the already drastically under utilized Tod. Consideration of the safety of elementary school children daily traversing a footbridge was clearly a matter which school officials could reasonably consider. But in the instant incident, the continuing severe over enrollment which plagued Kinsman until the opening of Anton Grdina in 1959 suggests strongly that the motive of the school officials was as much containment of racial minorities as it was safety considerations. Subsequent to the construction of Chesnutt, the Sidaway Bridge was not maintained. Although its framework still exists, it is now in an unusable state of disrepair and is closed. The physical separation which has since evolved between these two residential areas is such that, to reach one from the other, it is necessary to travel over a mile on surface streets through industrial areas. In seeking to justify the failure to utilize available space at Tod, the local defendants have relied on this distance as being prohibitively far for an elementary school child to walk.

The blind acceptance of this position would ignore the role of public agencies in creating or destroying connecting arteries between neighborhoods. In this particular instance, the local defendants stressed that Sidaway Bridge was no longer operative and a literal chasm existed between these two neighborhoods. But their description of the area stops again literally half-way. Kingsbury Run which creates the gulf between Tod and the present Chesnutt/Anton Grdina areas has been filled in to a point just several hundred feet southeast of Sidaway Bridge. This was done apparently to allow for the building of homes in the Garden Valley area. The families who came to occupy these homes were a major source of the increased enrollment in the Kinsman area in the 1950s. The filling of Kingsbury Run for this construction left only a small valley with sloping sides of perhaps 100 feet separating the Garden Valley residences from the Tod area. Yet no access was created between the neighborhoods, and, as discussed above, the one existing access route was permitted to fall into disrepair. This is an extremely unusual pattern. One reasonably might expect that at least one access route between these areas would have been developed by the city to facilitate public safety, i. e. access of fire and police vehicles. This did not occur.

Since the topographical modifications in this area, all that was necessary to allow school children to have access from one area to the other was the construction of a few hundred feet of sidewalk. The omission of the city in taking any actions to establish connections between these areas can reasonably be viewed as conduct by public officials aimed at fostering the virtual total racial segregation of both these neighborhoods. The court is not so naive as to believe that school officials could not have worked with city officials to have such a sidewalk constructed, if all of these public officials were not seeking to promote the separation of these neighborhoods. The

*728

1954 change in the Tod attendance area appears to have been a part of a pattern of public action directed at encouraging this separation. In fact, it appears to have been the

coupe de grace

which cleaved these two neighborhoods from one another. Under these circumstances, the court views any reliance by the local defendants on the existing physical isolation of the Tod area as a defense to the racial isolation .at Tod school as unacceptable in view of the role which their predecessors appear to have taken in bringing about this separation.

The inaccessibility of the available space at Tod continued to be significant into the late 1960s in simple terms of efficient utilization of school facilities. For ease of reference, the enrollment and proportion of black students enrolled at Tod from 1953 through 1970 are listed below:

enrollment/capacity proportion black

1953 251/490 28.7 %

1954 188/490 6.38%

1955 174/490 1.15%

1956 197/490 2.54%

1957 200/490 2.50%

1958 202/490 1.49%

1959 100/490 1.00%

1960 169/490 .59%

1961 185/490 0%

1962 213/490 0%

1963 n/a n/a

1964 209/490 0%

1965 n/a n/a

1966 n/a n/a

1967 237/490 1.68%

1968 230/490 0%

1969 216/490 .92%

1970 206/490 1.78%

In 1959, an addition to Chesnutt (97.5%, 863) was built raising its capacity from 630 to 875. In the same year, the newly constructed Anton Grdina Elementary School (97.6%, 687/665) opened, providing further relief for the continued overcrowding at Kinsman (’58: 99.27%, 1361/980, ’59: 100%, 979/980). But for the five years prior to this construction, both Chesnutt and Kinsman had been seriously over enrolled, while the utilization rate at Tod was consistently under 50%. In the early 60s, for the most part the overcrowding at these schools appears to have been resolved, although sometimes enrollments slightly exceeded theoretical capacity.

Then in August 1967, Kinsman was razed by a fire, necessitating the emergency reassignment of its students by the opening of classes in the fall. (The last available figures for Kinsman are from 1964 and show the school to be 100% black and to have an enrollment of 941/945). Students were reassigned to Grdina (100%, 1049/1015),

11

Chesnutt (100%, 849/875), and Dike (100%, 638/805). Those assigned to Dike were taken to school by bus. Giving full consideration to the emergency conditions, the court is compelled to view at least the reassignment of students to Dike as deliberately segregative. Kinsman, as of the date of the last available figures had a totally black student population. After the fire its students were assigned to three likewise totally black schools. Two of these schools were apparently within walking distance of the Kinsman attendance area. To enable students to attend Dike, however, the school authorities provided bus transportation to Dike. Oddly, while the local defendants provided the court with measurements of the purported distances from Kinsman School to nine other schools in the general area, they overlooked the distance from Kinsman to Dike. The court’s measurement of this distance is 8,100 feet. Of

*729

course, when the decision was made to bus Kinsman students, walking distances were of little relevance. The decision to bus a group of all black students to an all-black school could only be viewed as not being evidence of intentional segregation, if it could be convincingly demonstrated that there were no available integrative alternatives.

Although Kinsman was a totally black school, its attendance area apparently bordered areas with substantial numbers of white residents whose children attended public schools. The plaintiffs have called attention to several schools which presented integrative opportunities and had 1967 enrollments which were less than their basic capacity:

1967 enrollment/capacity proportion black

Tod 237/490 1.68%

Union 408/490 0.98%

Wayne 453/665 36.42%

Rice 504/1120 50.59%

Mt. Auburn 379/700 53.56%

The only one of these schools for which the local defendants offer any explanation for not availing themselves of the integrative alternative is Tod. The school officials note that there was no furniture available for the use of Kinsman students at Tod. They fail to explain why classroom furniture could not have been transported to Tod. They also note that one or two of the Tod classrooms were in need of replastering. Such maintenance could have been accomplished within a month if school officials had any commitment to achieving integration where possible. Finally, the school authorities note that Tod is across Kingsbury Run from the Kinsman attendance area. As noted above, the decision to use bus transportation minimizes any dangers to the children’s safety. The local defendants’ explanations for rejecting Tod ás a location for reassigning Kinsman students are unconvincing. The court finds that Tod was not considered as a site for reassignment of Kinsman students because it would have been inconsistent with the Board’s practice of maintaining Tod as a white school. The Board’s intention to so operate Tod has been clear since 1954 when its enrollment dropped from 251 to 188 and the proportion of blacks enrolled dropped from 28.7% to 6.38% and then to 1.15% in 1955.

The court is compelled to note what it perceives as a lack of candor in the response E-19 by the local defendants. As noted previously, though the Board found walking distances to be relevant to its reply, it neglected to include the distance to Dike. More significantly, other measurements of distances appear to be significantly in error, including the following:

Court's measurement Board's figure

Union 11,900' 7,800'

Boulevard 7,900' 4,900'

Mt. Auburn 8,400' 6,100'

This appears to be one of the more blatant segregative incidents in the record of this case.

At the southeastern edge of the core of black schools, a series of student assignment decisions hint at the sensitivity of school officials to the race of students affected by changes. Thus in 1948, 'overcrowding at Quincy (99.9%, 748/665) was addressed by a boundary change assigning part of its attendance area to Irving (91.7%, 686/530). The following year, the Irving facilities were upgraded by the addition of an auditorium-gymnasium and two classrooms which raised its capacity to 600. Considering only these two schools, the result was to distribute fairly evenly the over enrollment burden between them. Sharing

*730

a long boundary with Irving was Woodland (’48: 0.85%, 586/595). In 1941 and again 1952, portions of the Irving area (’41: 67.1%, 641/530; ’52: 97.7%, 757/600) were made optional zones giving the children in the affected area the right to attend either Irving or Woodland (’41: 1.87%, 643/595; ’52: 8.1%, 614/595). The local defendants explain that these optional zones were created to relieve overcrowding at Irving. No explanation is given as to why optional zones were used rather than straight boundary changes. The enrollment and capacity figures for the years in which these options became effective indicate that the approach did not succeed in distributing over enrollment pressures nearly as successfully as had the 1948 boundary change between Quincy and Irving. Because of the extreme difference in proportional black enrollment in Irving and Woodland for the two years in which the optional zones were created, the suggestion is strong that a desire to provide some white students in the Irving attendance area the opportunity to attend the “white” Woodland was as much a motivation as the relief of overcrowding at Irving.

This suggestion is further supported by an examination of the available classroom space at other schools sharing boundaries with Woodland, i. e. Anthony Wayne (’41: 0.4%; ’48: 0%; ’52: 1.2%), Harvey Rice (’41: 0.5%; ’48: 2.0%; ’52: 2.4%), and Mt. Auburn (’41: 0%; ’48: ’52: 1.4%). These schools had varying numbers of unused classrooms, in the years under consideration, as indicated below:

141 148 * 52

Anthony Wayne 0 00

Harvey Rice 17 ® '

Mt. Auburn 4 88

If relief of overcrowding had been a primary objective, step-by-step boundary changes transferring the part of the Woodland attendance area east of Woodhill Avenue to Harvey Rice or Anthony Wayne would have freed additional space at Woodland to fully relieve overcrowding at Irving. Such an approach would have also resulted in significant integration at Woodland. That such an approach was feasible was at least suggested by the small optional zones created in the Woodland area to Wayne in 1941 and 1945. Its feasibility was ultimately borne out by boundary changes made by the authorities in the early 1960s.

In 1962, a portion of the Woodland area (61: 48.6%, 688/595; ’62: 49.7%, 608/595) was transferred to Wayne (’61: 4.8%, 420/665; ’62: 13.9%, 460/665). In 1964, an additional portion of the Woodland (53.9%, 705/595) area was transferred to Wayne (14.0%, 473/665) and a separate portion of the Woodland area was transferred to Rice (12.4%, 404/1120). The 1962 boundary change does appear to have had an integrative effect as witnessed by the relative stability of the proportional black enrollment at Woodland from 1961 to 1962 and the increase of such enrollment at Wayne. It is difficult to assess the racial impact of the 1964 changes because of the absence of data for the preceding and subsequent two years. In contrast to the 1962 changes, the 1964 changes did not fully resolve the overcrowding at Woodland. At the same time the receiving schools had an aggregate of 908 theoretically available pupil stations. Viewing the small increase in proportional black enrollment at the receiving schools from 1962 to 1964, Rice (11.49% to 12.4%) and Wayne (13.9% to 14.0%), it appears most likely that the affected areas were primarily white residential areas. The apparent effect was to siphon white children from the increasingly black Woodland to “white” schools. Thus it appears that even in the 1960s, when logical step-by-step boundary changes were made, two of the three changes in this area appear to have been less for the purpose of relieving overcrowding at the sending school than for the purpose of providing an escape valve for some white students from the increasingly black sending school.

Instead of utilizing such presently available space to integrative effect, the Board continued its patchwork approach to overcrowding in core “black” schools. In this particular area, there were several incidents in which additions were made to overcrowded schools which did not fully resolve the overcrowding. The first of these, as re-

*731

fleeted by the record in this case was the 1940 addition of two classrooms to Quincy (98.9%, 784). This addition increased the theoretical capacity of Quincy, as measured in 1952, to 665. Step-by-step boundary changes at this time might have resulted in the utilization of closed classrooms in Anthony Wayne (1), Harvey Rice (15), Mt. Auburn (3) and Woodland (1).

Again in 1956, portable classrooms were added to Quincy (100%, 941) to increase its capacity to 805. As of 1951, the annual School Housing Report prepared by Board employees ceased to include listings of closed classrooms by school names. However, an examination of the 1956 enrollment and capacity figures for schools in the general area indicates that school officials had no reason to accept the continued overcrowding at Quincy. Adjacent to Quincy was Burroughs (99.66%, 1171/1225), which has some theoretically available pupil stations. It appears that these might reasonably have been used to further resolve overcrowding at Quincy, perhaps by a boundary change involving only upper elementary students at Quincy. If, however, Burroughs did not in fact have available space in 1956, other schools in the general area did:

Anthony Wayne l.'83% 437/665

Harvey Rice 2.04% 476/1120

Mt. Auburn 2.38% 252/700

While these schools were plainly not adjacent to Quincy, accordion-like boundary changes affecting Quincy, Irving, Woodland and these three schools would have evidenced both a commitment to equal education and to non-segregated education.

The addition of eight classrooms at Washington Irving (100%, 1309) in 1961, raising its capacity to 980, was yet another instance where school authorities did take action to deal with overcrowding, but appear to have stopped short of doing everything feasible when the line of race was reached. Without further belaboring the point, as indicated in the above discussion of the 1962 and 1964 optional zones created in the Woodland attendance area, much space was sitting unused in Anthony Wayne, Harvey Rice and Mt. Auburn. These resources could have been tapped by step-by-step boundary changes. The failure to do so indicates a determination on the part of school authorities to keep these schools “white.”

Implementation of busing programs to relieve overcrowding at other schools in the system from 1961 to 1964 makes the failure to equalize enrollment pressures in this area even more inexplicable, if one excludes the possibility of racial motivation. Subsequent actions by school officials affecting this area further support the strong inference that strong efforts were made to maintain the “white” character of certain schools in this area. To understand these events, one must first be familiar with developments in the Beehive area.

Before shifting attention to the Beehive area and the corridor between Beehive and this Central area, a number of events affecting the western and northern part of this area remained to be examined. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, portions of the attendance areas of Harmon, Mayflower and Gladstone were selected by city officials as the object of urban renewal efforts. In the course of urban renewal in these areas, the three schools were closed, Harmon (’58: 99.9%, 205) in 1949, Mayflower (’61: 95.3%, 171) in 1961, and Gladstone (’64: 100%, 220) in 1964. Upon the closing of Harmon, its students were given the option of attending either Mayflower (98.6%) or Marion (64.3%, 526/560). When Mayflower closed, its students were reassigned to either Marion (38.4%, 369/560), Longwood (100%, 678/770), or Case-Woodland (99.7%, 672/630). When Gladstone closed, former Gladstone students were reassigned to Case-Woodland (99.8%, 642/630) or Benesch (100%, n.a./1155). The details of the urban renewal projects were not the subject of specific proof in this case. Obviously, such projects result in drastic changes in residential patterns and land use in the target areas. At trial, it was mentioned and the court is aware that much of this specific area is now the site of such institutions as the downtown campus of Cuyahoga Community College. What is nota

*732

ble about these events as pertains to the issues in this case, however, is that the net effect of this project was a significant drop in both the utilization and proportional black enrollment in the one integrated school in the vicinity of these urban renewal efforts. The court understands that none of the present defendants had control over site selection for urban renewal.

The net effect of the city’s urban renewal efforts in this area and the school officials’ reassignment decisions upon the closing of schools is similar to the earlier described situation which evolved between the Tod area and the Garden Valley area. School officials appear to have been willing partners in conduct which delineated neighborhoods along racial lines. The assignment decisions of the school officials were clearly one factor which contributed to such neighborhood definition.

At the northern edge of this area, the pattern of uneven use of facilities noted at the southeastern edge of this area, as discussed above, repeated on the northern edge, as evidenced by the situation at Carver in the late 1950s. In June, 1958, an addition was planned for Carver (100%, 813/590), which was completed in 1960. From 1957 to 1960, the overenrollment at Carver mandated that two Carver classes be housed at Central Junior High School. Where a school is overcrowded by more than 220 students, however, this measure must be viewed as providing partial relief only. Directly to the north of the Carver attendance area were Case (’58: 17.19%, 413/525) and Waring (’58: 14.35%, 525/630), which had a total of 213 theoretically available pupil stations. While school officials were willing to transfer Carver students to a junior high school pending a more permanent solution of the overcrowding at Carver, they allowed the resources of two nearby underenrolled elementary schools go unused. This clearly suggests an effort to keep students separated by race, where possible, in the face of pressing needs for unused facilities in “white” schools.

In 1966, school officials closed the overwhelmingly black Case-Woodland and assigned its students to Benesch (’64: 100%) and Longwood (’64: 100%). Step-by-step boundary changes involving Marion (’64: 35.2%, 423/560), Warren (’64: 12.0%, 636/770) and Sterling (’64: 69.1%, 481/630) appear to the court to have been an integrative alternative which school officials did not undertake.

In the late 1960s, a less predictable influence than urban renewal caused the closing of three schools in this area. Fires razed Kinsman and Giddings (99.6%) in the summer of 1967 and Hayes (’68: 100%, 749/980) in the summer of 1969. The arrangements which were made for Kinsman students have been discussed previously. Giddings students were reassigned to Burroughs (99.67%, 932/1225). To allow for the influx of Giddings students, the southern boundary of Burroughs was shifted to assign part of its attendance zone to Dike (100%, 638/805). Some of these changes were only temporary, however, as school officials decided to replace Giddings. This replacement school opened in 1970, and the former Giddings attendance area was reconstituted. Apparently the portion of Burroughs attendance area assigned to Dike stayed in the Dike attendance zone, where school officials opened a replacement school in 1971. The attendance area of the new Dike was also expanded to include a portion of the Quincy attendance area (’70: 100%, 895/805). All of the schools involved in these changes were racially impacted at the time of these changes; that is, they were surrounded by schools which were likewise overwhelmingly black. Considering the age of the schools in this immediate area, new construction was certainly justified in light of the new policy on financing construction. The construction of these two schools, however, was an affirmation of the neighborhood school policy in context where its segregatory effects were manifest.

The arrangements made following the destruction of Hayes were made in a different factual context than those for Giddings. First, the school officials did not determine to replace Hayes, although they did subsequently build a replacement school

*733

for the adjacent Sterling. Second, Hayes was not racially impaced, as was Giddings. Yet, the ultimate reassignment of Hayes students was to two overwhelmingly black schools: Longwood (’68: 99.6%, 504/770; ’69 : 99.8%, 635/770) and Carver (’68: 99.4%, 717/875; ’69 : 99.6%, 733/875). The initial reassignment was likewise to these two schools plus Dike and Jane Addams. For some reason, school officials chose not to use the resource of Sterling (79.56%, 416/700) or Waring (1.56%, 358/630) for the displaced students. No explanation is given for the failure to use the available space at Sterling. Safety considerations are cited as the reason for not using Waring. In reaching a conclusion with regard to the failure to use the resources of these schools, the court takes note of two facts. First, for a semester after the fire at Hayes, students were assigned to Jane Addams, a vocational school. The court understands that such an assignment decision reflects an undesirable departure from normal administrative practice of grouping students generally according to age. Second, both Waring and Sterling were replaced in the 1970s, Waring in conjunction with Case and Sterling in conjunction with Marion. The court assumes that these replacements were in the preliminary planning stage at this time. The details of these replacements are discussed elsewhere in the opinion, but at this point, it is appropriate to note that their planning resulted in maintaining existing patterns of racial isolation. In view of these facts, the court concludes that utilization of these schools, even on a temporary basis, was rejected because school officials chose not to assign students from an all black school to schools where there were significant white enrollments.

BEEHIVE

At the outset of the trial, plaintiffs indicated that their presentation and analysis would focus on certain illustrative areas of the Cleveland School District. These areas were believed to reflect evidence of the more egregious segregative conduct on the part of the defendants. One of these geographical sub-divisions, lying in the southeast corner of the city, was the so-called “Beehive” area. The elementary schools contained in that area are: Beehive, Gracemount, Williams, deSauze, Cranwood, and Moses Cleaveland.

Plaintiffs’ allegations with regard to the Beehive area date back to 1938. In that year, an optional zone was created whereby students who lived in a certain portion of the Miles (’40: 0.6%, 538/700) attendance area could attend Moses Cleaveland (’40: 7.4%, 1065/1120). This optional zone continued in existence until 1963. In 1962 Miles was 7.9% black and had a capacity of 614/700 while Moses Cleaveland was 79% black and 1047/1120.

The analysis of this incident is complicated by the fact that it pre-dates the racial percentage and enrollment figures provided the court. For instance, the local school board indicated that this optional zone was created for the purpose of relieving overcrowding at Miles in 1938, which the board states had an enrollment of 1048 in that year. The first year for which data is available is 1940, and in that year Miles’ enrollment was 538. No reason is given for this precipitous drop in enrollment during the intervening two-year period. In addition, the local board’s statement that the optional zone was terminated in 1963 appears to be contradicted by the 1967 school map which shows the area in question as an optional zone within the Cranwood attendance area. Cranwood, as of that time, had become a full K-6 school. The optional zone, as it appears on the 1967 school map, allows upper elementary school children living in this area the option of attending either Moses Cleaveland or Miles rather than their assigned school, Cranwood.

Aside from the factual discrepancies mentioned above, the dominant question raised by this incident is why the school authorities opted to remedy the overcrowding at Miles through the use of an optional zone rather than a boundary change. The school Board’s choice of an optional zone is made even more curious by the fact that its

*734

own figures indicate that Moses Cleaveland was twice as close to the affected area as was Miles. While the route to Moses Cleaveland was intersected by railroad tracks, these same tracks were crossed by children going to Beehive.

The question of why the local Board chose to relieve overcrowding through the vehicle of an optional zone rather than a boundary change was a recurring one throughout this litigation. Such optional zones are inherently suspect when, as here, there existed a notable difference in the percentage of black students enrolled in the sending and receiving schools. That disparity in racial composition existed with regard to this optional zone up until its purported termination in 1963.

The absence of pre-1940 data also hampers the analysis of the 1940 closing of Gracemount (’41: 0%, 78/ ?). The school remained closed for one year, and reopened in 1941 as a K-4 school, it is impossible to ascertain the relationship between the 1939 and 1940 enrollments and whether a significant reduction in enrollment precipitated the closing.

During the year that Gracemount was closed, its pupils were sent to Moses Cleave-land (’40: 7.4%, 1065/1120; ’41: 7.4%, 1012/1120). The question presented is why the children were sent instead to Beehive (’40: 23.0%, 406/1015) which was some 300 feet closer to Gracemount. Moreover, in order for a pupil to get to Moses Cleaveland from the Gracemount attendance area, both East 154th Street and Harvard must be crossed. To reach Beehive, however, children could travel side streets to Lee Road. Then children from only half of the attendance area would have to cross Lee Road. That presumably would be accomplished directly in front of the school where a crossing guard could be stationed. Although Gracemount was closed for but a single year, the ineluctable conclusion is that the local Board chose to reassign them to a considerably more identifiably “white” school which was further away, rather than to a more “black” school, that could be reached by a shorter, more direct and presumptively safer route.

In terms of racial consequence, in the period from 1940-41, Beehive’s black percentage rose from 23.02% to 30.03%. During that same period, Moses Cleaveland’s black percentage remained virtually unchanged (7.42%-7.41%). Had the 65 white pupils then attending Gracemount been introduced into the Beehive student population, its 1941 black percentage would have risen only to 25.5%, rather than 30.03%. Despite the fact that the local board chose to send the Gracemount pupils to what was perceived to be a “white” school rather than to the increasingly black Beehive, the continuing racial effect of this course of action appears to have long since dissipated.

The apparent attention to racial impact is also evident with regard to the creation in 1940, of an optional zone from Moses Cleaveland (’40: 7.4%, 1065/1120) to Corlett (’40: 3.1%, 524/630). While this optional zone is still in effect, its effect appears to have been to contribute somewhat to the racial isolation at the sending school, Moses Cleaveland, at least until 1961. During the 1940s, Moses Cleaveland was becoming increasingly more black while the receiving school, Corlett, was experiencing a very low, relatively stable black enrollment (’40: 3.05%, ’50: 2.7%). When Moses Cleaveland became majority black in 1959, Corlett had a black enrollment of only 14.8%.

While the safety considerations offered by the local Board in defense of the creation of the optional zone are not persuasive, the continuing racial effect of the zone on the sending and receiving schools is negligible. Neither school can be construed as a “white haven” since at least 1967 when Moses Cleaveland and Corlett were 97.9% and 99.25% black, respectively.

Another optional zone was created in 1942 from Cleaveland (’42: 9.5%) to Beehive (’42: 71.6%). According to the defendants’ local Board’s response, only seven houses were within the optional area. In addition, on its face, the optional zone appears to be integrative in effect. Of course, the issue is what the actual effect was. If most or all

*735

of the residences involved were occupied by black families, the effect would not have been integrative. But particularly at this small scale, neither the court nor the parties can determine the race of the public school children in the affected area.

In 1943 the board chose to add temporary classrooms at Gracemount (0%, 241/?). The board, in its response, indicates that these classrooms were added to accommodate the rising enrollment at Gracemount. As an abstract proposition, then, additional space was probably required. What is significant is that the board chose to construct at Gracemount (’43: 0%) rather than effect a simple boundary change with the adjacent Beehive (’43: 33.6%, 423/1015), Cleaveland (’43: 7.2%, 997/1190), or Rickoff (’43: 11.3%, 870/1155). P.X. 74 capacities are used for purposes of analysis since P.X. 223 reveals no construction at these schools between 1943 and 1951.

Since all of the above schools had plenty of available pupil stations, the only rationale for the addition of temporary classrooms at Gracemount was to increase its capability as a “white enclave” and eliminate the possibility of its white students having to be reassigned to “blacker” schools. In 1951, Gracemount was still 0% black while Beehive was 84.8%, Moses Cleaveland was 25.7%, and Rickoff was 29.9% black.

In July, 1944, the attendance area of Beehive was reduced because the area east of Ingleside Road and south of Garden Boulevard ceded from the City of Cleveland and annexed itself to the City of Warrensville Heights. Since the area annexed became part of the Warrensville Heights School District, the Beehive attendance area was contracted accordingly. The result was clearly a segregative one as Beehive went from 33.6% black in 1943 to 71.6% black in 1944. The role of the State in this matter will be discussed

infra.

In 1944, Cranwood (0%; 119/175) underwent a modification whereby two classrooms were turned into a gymnasium and, as a result, its capacity was diminished.

To evaluate the significance of this action, it is necessary to understand the enrollment situation in this area of the district and the apparent policies of the school officials at this time. In 1944, there were three elementary schools, Beehive, Moses Cleave-land and Miles, and two primary schools, Gracemount and Cranwood, enrolling students from the southeast corner of the city, ip that year., the record includes the following data on these schools:

Proportion black enrollment/capacity

Beehive 71.6% 730/1015

Cleaveland 9.5% 979/1120

Miles 0% 466/700

Cranwood 0% 119/7175

'Gracemount 0% 293/7

Total 2487/3010

Apparently because of the relatively large attendance zones in this section of the district the school officials decided to operate primary schools so that younger school children would not have to walk long distances. The court draws this conclusion because at least during the 1940s, the three elementary schools had sufficient capacity for the entire enrollment of the area.

The area is bisected by the Erie Railroad tracks, which form a boundary between the Cranwood miles and Moses Cleaveland attendance areas and which cut across the Beehive attendance zone and part of the regular Miles attendance zone. Beehive was located - north of these tracks -"hich meant that children from a large area sought of these tracks had to cross them on their route to school. During the course of the trial, the point was made many times that the school officials considered crossing railroad tracks to be highly undesirable for elementary children.

*736

In 1944, both the enrollment at Beehive and the percentage of black students in that enrollment jumped dramatically. The court understands the factors in this rise to have been the opening of a public housing estate in the southwest portion of the Beehive area. It was in this same year that Cranwood was remodeled resulting in a diminution of its capacity. One might reasonably wonder why measures were not taken to diminish the dangers to primary-age children in the southern section of the Beehive area by having them attend Cranwood which was not substantially further from the southwestern area of the Beehive area than Beehive itself and would have eliminated the danger of crossing railroad tracks. Instead of adopting such a course of action which would have also been integrative, the school authorities took positive action to make such a course of action less viable by decreasing the capacity of Cranwood.

In 1945,- an optional zone was created from Beehive (80.77%) to Moses Cleaveland (12.6%). While at first glance this would appear to be an integrative act, it most likely was not. It would seem that the affected area was a predominantly white residential area since it was contiguous with the Gracemount attendance area and Gracemount was 0% black. The local board attempts to explain this optional zone as necessary to relieve overcrowding. If such was the case, a boundary change would have been a far more efficacious method for solving the problem. Instead, the optional zone appears to be an “escape valve” whereby white students can choose to attend a predominantly white school rather than the predominantly black school to which they otherwise would have been assigned.

The school board effected two boundary changes and created an optional zone in 1947. The first boundary change was from Moses Cleaveland (’47: 19.0%, 914/1120) to Beehive (’47: 82.9%, 789/1015), and the second was from Beehive (82.9%) to Gracemount (0%). The optional zone ran from Beehive (82.9%) to either Moses Cleaveland (10.9%) or Gracemount (0.0%).

Although the school Board attempts to explain the creation of the optional zone as an attempt to deal with overcrowding at Beehive, such explanation is inconsistent with the facts. The boundary change from Moses Cleaveland to Beehive increased the allegedly already overcrowded Beehive area and is thus irreconcilable with the purported need for an optional zone. It is analogous to letting pupils out the front door while bringing them in through the back.

Although difficult to ascertain, one can only surmise that the area contained in the Beehive — Moses Cleaveland — Gracemount optional zone was racially transitional and the board was affording whites in the area an escape valve. The dual nature of the optional zone was necessitated by the fact that Gracemount was only a K-3 school. Moses Cleaveland was thus made available to accommodate white upper elementary pupils.

In 1949, an additional eight classrooms were added to Gracemount (0%, 849/840).

Perhaps the best introduction to the analysis of this incident is a statistical breakdown of the area before, during, and after the addition to Gracemount:

1948 % 1948 Utilization Bl. Rate % 1949 % 1950 Bl. Bl.

135.6% Gracemount 0% 814/600 0% 989/600 0% 1064/840

77.2% Beehive . 85% 784/1015 83.9% 856/1015 83.5% 265/1015

88.4% Cleaveland24.8% 991/1120 22.9% 896/1120 22.3% 786/1120

57.6% Rickoff 21.2% 666/1155 20% 666/1155 25.2% ......"" 589/1155

2441/3290 2418/3290 2240/3290 ¡

-849 -876 -1050

*737

Once again, as an abstract proposition, Gracemount was overcrowded and, theoretically, required an addition. A review of the surrounding schools however, reveals a large surplus of available pupil stations. Given the vast disparity in the racial percentages of Gracemount and the other three schools, it can only be concluded that the decision not to re-district so as to send some Gracemount children to these other schools was racially motivated.

The racial impact of the decision to build at Gracemount is readily apparent. It enabled that school to accommodate more students, all of whom were white, and thereby maintain its racial identifiability. Moreover, the failure of the Board to utilize the available pupil stations precluded the introduction of additional white pupils at Beehive (’48: 85%) which would have assisted in minimizing that school’s racial identifiability.

Thus, the construction of an addition at Gracemount had the natural, probable, foreseeable and actual effect of perpetrating the extremely segregated character of the southeast portion of the school district.

In 1949, yet another optional zone was created from Moses Cleaveland (22.9%, 896/1120) to Corlett (8.2%, 472/630). This optional zone is still in effect.

Once again we are dealing with an optional zone between two schools of widely disparate racial composition which raises the question of whether it was a vehicle for whites to escape attending what was perceived to be a black school.

The board offered two explanations for creating the option: pupil convenience and overcrowding at Moses Cleaveland. Corlett was clearly closer to the optional zone and therefore, presumably, more convenient. But if convenience was the objective, the board ought to have shifted the Corlett boundary so as to convenience all of the pupils in the optional zone rather than those choosing to utilize it.

Similarly, the optional zone cannot be explained by crowding at Moses Cleaveland since in 1947 it was 896/1120, or had 224 available pupil stations.

Between 1949, the year of the creation of the optional zone, and 1940, the black population at Corlett decreased from 3.18% to 2.74% while Moses Cleaveland decreased from 22.88% to 22.26%. The black percentage at Corlett, however, remained highly stable, not exceeding 15% until 1960. Moses Cleaveland, however, had a rapid increase in black population surpassing 15% in 1947 and reaching 64.7% in 1960. Thereafter, both schools became predominantly black.

As was made clear in the earlier discussion of the 1940 Moses Cleaveland — Corlett optional zone, at least until 1960, this optional zone ran from what was becoming an identifiably black school (Moses Cleaveland) to what was an identifiably white school (Corlett). The effect of the optional zone during this period was to provide an escape valve for whites and contribute to the racial segregation at the two schools.

The Edward M. Williams school opened as a K-4 school and 0% black in 1952. The opening of a new school necessitated the redrawing of school attendance areas so as to “carve out” an attendance area for Williams.

In order to accommodate Williams, the north and east boundaries of Beehive (87.3%) were contracted and the east boundary of Gracemount (0.4%) was also contracted. In addition, an option was created whereby 5th and 6th graders in the portion of the Beehive area assigned to Williams could instead attend Gracemount.

In 1954, the grade structure at Williams was changed from K-4 to K-6 and the east boundary of Gracemount was contracted'at the 5th and 6th grade levels.

While the boundaries of Williams were drawn to achieve an entirely white school, it should be noted that the black population in this part of the city appears to have been concentrated more in the south than in the east. This is evidenced by the significant drop in the black population at Beehive when Clara Tagg Brewer opened in 1954.

*738

Significant, too, is the factual context surrounding the 1952 option for 5th and 6th graders in the Beehive area to attend Gracemount. Given the fact that Beehive was under enrolled by 40 pupils in 1952 and Gracemount was over enrolled by 148 in that year, the only rational explanation for an optional zone that allowed student movement from the under enrolled to the over enrolled school is the providing of an escape valve for whites.

In anticipation of the 1954 transition of Williams from a K-4 to a K-6 school, the school board in 1953 constructed an additional eight classrooms at Williams (’53: 0%, 203/250).

As is shown below even before becoming K-6, Williams remained substantially under enrolled:

1953 0% 203/250

1954 0» 239/490

1955 0% 280/490

The construction of the additional classrooms at Williams enabled the upper elementary students residing in that area to return to Williams. These pupils must have all been white since Williams remained 0% black until 1960.

Beehive, on the other hand, was predominantly black (82.4%) and had become over-enrolled (1101/1015) in 1953. The combination of Williams going K-6 and the opening of C. T. Brewer in 1954 relieved the overcrowding at Beehive (’54: 54.9%, 1173/1015; ’55: 53.9%, 604/1015). The whites went to Williams while the blacks went to Brewer which opened 99.1% black and 718/560.

It is clear that there existed clear racial identifiability between Gracemount, Williams, and Cranwood on the one hand, and Beehive, Brewer, and Moses Cleaveland on the other. This condition existed well into the 1960s when the board was well aware of the inherently suspect nature of black schools and white schools being maintained side by side.

1952 .4% 0% 0% 87.3%

12

n.o. 28.3%

1953 7.1% 0% 0% 82.4% n.o. 29.3%

1954 2.7% 0% 0% 54.9% 93.4% 30.1%

1955 5.8% 0% 0% 53.9% 99.1% 35.0%

1956 8.0% 0% .5% 60.7% 98.3% 39.8%

1957 11.8% 0% .5% 57.4% 100.0% 44.3%

1958 27.3% 0% .9% 53.4% 98.8% 47.6%

1959 46.6% 0% .5% 55.3% 98.3% 51.1%

¡1960 56.6% 0% 5.0% 61.7% 99.5% 64.7%

1961 74.6% .2% 9.8% 68.4% 99.5% 73.0%

1962 _87.4%_14.3% 15.7%_80.2% 99.6% 79.1%

1964 93.2% 39.4% 26.6% 85.9% 99.6% 85.8%

1967 9978% 9974% 64.8% 97.4% 100.0% 9775%

A review of the area reveals that the above condition did not occur adventitiously, but rather was the result of Board action.

The addition to Williams so as to convert it from K-4 to K-6 might have been explained as an effort to standardize the grade structure through the system. It should be noted, however, that Cranwood (K-3) was closed and the new Cranwood built in its place was kept a K-3 school from 1958 until 1968.

Under these circumstances, the 1953 addition to Williams can only be viewed as a means for whites to remain there and not have to attend the majority black Beehive. It is significant that the Board chose to commit building resources at Williams when there was a great deal of room at Beehive (’55: 604/1015; ’56: 741/1015) created by the opening of Brewer. (’55: 718/560, 99.1%). It would not have been unreasonable for 5th and 6th graders to

*739

walk approximately 5600' to Beehive. The obvious effect would have been integrative since the Williams area was all white and Beehive was majority black. The building resources could also have been put to better use elsewhere in the city where there was acute overcrowding (e. g. Hough), as such overcrowding was not present here.

In 1955, Clara Tagg Brewer opened 93.4% black. The Brewer attendance area was taken from the southwest portion of the Beehive area (’53: 82.4%; ’54: 54.9%).

Brewer was purportedly opened to relieve overcrowding at Beehive. The effect of its opening, however, was to drastically reduce the percentage of black at Beehive. That such might have been the primary objective of the board is indicated by the fact that Brewer opened 158 over capacity while Beehive suddenly became under enrolled by 411. Essentially, the board traded one over enrolled school for another.

Brewer continued to operate over capacity until 1957, when the Seville Homes housing project was closed. During this same period, Beehive continued to operate substantially under capacity. If, in fact, the board was genuinely concerned with overcrowding, readjustment of pupil assignment policy should have been effected so as to distribute students more equitably and utilize facilities more efficiently. If, instead, the goal of the board was the containment of blacks, the situation at Brewer reflected the substantial achievement of this objective.

The conclusion that the board was pursu - ing a policy of containment in the Beehive area is further supported by the situation at Gracemount. During this same period, that school was over capacity and overwhelmingly white (2.71%-7.96%). Yet the local Board made no effort to direct some of these students to Beehive (54.92%-60.71%) which had available pupil stations. In fact, the racial impaction was being encouraged by the Beehive to Gracemount optional zone. Consistent with this policy was the maintenance of tiny Cranwood at the periphery of the Beehive and Brewer zones. Cranwood had a capacity of only 175, and remained less than 1% black through 1959.

In 1957, the board terminated the optional zone from Moses Cleaveland (44.3%) to Beehive (57.39%) that had been created in 1954. At the same time, changes were effected in the already existing optional zone from Beehive (57.3%) to either Gracemount (11.84%) or Moses Cleaveland (44.3%). The western part of the option remained in effect, that is to say, pupils living there could continue to choose to attend either Gracemount or Moses Cleaveland. The eastern portion of the optional zone was reduced in the southwest and maintained in the east with the new option to attend Williams (0%) and not Gracemount or Moses Cleaveland. Finally, in 1966, the optional zone from Beehive (’64: 83.9%) to Williams (’64: 39.4%) was reduced.

The 1957 termination of the Moses Cleaveland to Beehive optional zone appears not to have had a negative racial impact on the area.

The continuation of the western part of the Beehive to Gracemount — Moses Cleave-land optional zone is difficult to justify on other than racial grounds since the sending school (Beehive) was under enrolled by 275 while one of the receiving schools (Gracemount) was over enrolled by 30 students. Moses Cleaveland was under enrolled by 392 pupils at the same time.

With regard to the change in the optional zone, from Beehive to Williams, both schools were under enrolled, but Beehive to a considerably greater degree. The defendants’ assertion that Beehive was overcrowded cannot be substantiated after the opening of Brewer in 1955 through 1964. Since Williams remained 0% black until 1961, the effect of the optional zone was clearly segregative. Any student who exercised his option to attend Williams from 1957-61 must have been white since Williams racial percentage remained unchanged at 0%. The clear effect of this option was to maintain or increase the racial impaction at both Beehive and Williams.

The reduction of the Beehive-Williams optional zone in 1966 may have been effect

*740

ed for legitimate administrative reasons or because the option had fulfilled its purpose as an escape valve for whites living in the Beehive area.

In 1958, the Cleaveland School Board constructed a permanent facility on the site for the Cranwood primary schools (’57: 0.49%, 212/175; ’58: 0.94%, 213/175).

In the words of the local defendants, Cranwood, which consisted solely of portable structures from 1927 to 1958, was “a neighborhood K-3 school of longstanding.” An examination of construction decisions for Cranwood may shed some light on the local defendants’ use of the term “neighborhood school.” To understand the significance of these decisions, it should be noted that Cranwood had shared boundaries with Moses Cleaveland and Beehive, both of which had significant black enrollments from at least 1940 forward. Its students, however, were assigned to the upper elementary grades at Miles school, which like Cranwood, did not have a significant number of black students enrolled until the early 1960s. Further, in the early 1950s, the school authorities decided to build a new elementary school in the southeast corner of the district. This school, Clara Tagg Brewer, opened 93.4% black. While Brewer and Cranwood do not in fact share a boundary, being separated by a small wedge of the Beehive attendance area, they may be thought of as essentially adjacent schools. It is painfully clear that at the time Brewer was being planned, school authorities were also aware of the fact that some permanent structure should be provided for the Cranwood students. The choice of a construction site near Seville between 143rd and 147th streets would have allowed for the construction of a single integrated school. Instead, school officials during the 1950s built two permanent structures in this area, one an extremely small, virtually all-white school with an abnormal grade structure and the other a virtually all-black school which three years after its opening was operating with 221 available pupil stations. This figure happens to be greater than the entire Cranwood enrollment in the year that school officials authorized the construction of the new permanent Cranwood.

As with the other construction in the southeast corner of the district in the 1950s, at least some of this construction seemed unnecessary to provide adequate space for the children attending school in the area. The over building seems to have been the result of an effort to provide “white” schools in an area where black and white neighborhoods would otherwise fall within the same attendance areas. Some part of the available capacity in this area can be attributed to the closing of a public housing estate in the Brewer attendance area, but plainly not all of it. At a time when other parts of the school system were experiencing woeful overcrowding, the following figures reveal an odd sense of priorities in committing additional construction resources to this area:

construction enrol./cap. % bl. enrol./cap. % bl. _date___

Beehive_1916_740/1015 57.4% 715/1015 53.36%

Brewer__1953_339/560 100.0% 342/568 98.8%

Cleaveland_1925_728/1120 44.3% 680/1120 47.6%

Cranwood_1957_212/175_0.47% 213/175 0.94%

Gracemount ? 870/840 11.84% 829/840 27.26%

Williams 1951 440/490 0% 494/490 0%

Total_3329/4200__3272/4200_

One thing should be made clear. The court is not suggesting that all construction activity in this area was inappropriate. It recognizes that this was an area where new homes were being constructed. Rather, the court concludes that less construction was required and could have resulted in more integration.

Plaintiffs allege that in 1958 an addition was constructed at Gracemount (27.3%, 829/840). In its response, the board states

*741

that the purpose was not to add new classroom space but rather to replace a temporary unit already existing at the school. P.X. 74 reveals that this construction, however the defendant might characterize it, resulted in an additional 105 pupil stations at Gracemount. Noteworthy, too, is the fact that the board, in its own response, states that the enrollment at Gracemount was steadily decreasing for the five year period immediately preceding the construction.

It is also significant that Gracemount, in 1958, was not overcrowded (830/840). Given the fact that schools in the Hough area were bursting at the seams in 1948, it is difficult to explain the decision to add unnecessary classroom space to a school that was not overcrowded and whose enrollment had been steadily decreasing.

An analysis of the surrounding schools, once again, is revealing:

_1958__1959

Rickoff_93.3% 970/1150__16.8% 993/1155

Cleaveland 47.6% 748/1120_51.7 % 1158/1120

Beehive 53.4% 668/1015 55.3% 754/1015

Williams 0% 468/490 0% 491/490

Since all of the above schools (with the marginal exception of Williams) were operating well below capacity, the only reason for construction at Gracemount would be to add capacity so as to foreclose the possibility of some of its students being re-assigned to Rickoff, Moses Cleaveland, or Beehive, all of which had substantially higher percentages of black students.

In 1962, a boundary change was effected whereby part of the Beehive (80.2%) attendance area was transferred to Brewer (99.6%). This process was repeated in 1964 when the racial percentages of the two schools were 83.9% and 99.6%, respectively.

These boundary changes appear to have had only a minimal impact on the racial isolation at Brewer and otherwise appear to reflect a reasonable utilization of the two schools involved. In addition, the boundary changes reduced the number of school children who had to cross the Erie Railroad tracks.

Noteworthy, though, is the School Board’s sense of priorities with regard to overcrowding in this general area during the time period involved. While slight overcrowding at Beehive precipitated these boundary changes, nothing was done to relieve serious overcrowding at Cranwood (’62: 15.7%; ’64: 26.6%). Cranwood had a capacity of only 175 and was overenrolled by 67 in 1962, and by 92 in 1964. Moses Cleaveland (’62: 79.1%; ’64: 85.8%) was under capacity in these same years by 73 students and 34 students. It would appear that the board was unwilling to adopt the boundary change approach so as to relieve the Cranwood overcrowding for fear that assigning pupils to an identifiably black school would contribute to the “tipping” of the neighborhood.

In 1967 the Emile B. deSauze school opened 93.4% black with an enrollment of 528 and a capacity of 840. Assuming deSauze was opened in 1966, it most probably was planned around 1964, or at the very least, using 1964 data. The following chart depicts the area-wide situation at that time.

1964 enrollment/capacity

Brewer 99.6% 482/560

1086/1120" Moses Cleaveland 85.8%

Gracemount 93.2% 610/945

Williams 39,. 4? 561/490

Beehive 83.9% 1048/1015

Cranwood 26.6% 267/175

4054/4305

*742

As the above chart shows, the area had approximately 251 pupil stations available in 1964 which might reasonably have been viewed as insufficient to accommodate growth in student population in the area. Thus, it was reasonable to construct an additional school in the area. The issue, however, is the site selection for the new school.

The board, in its response, states that deSauze was built to relieve overcrowding at Beehive, which, in 1964, was only marginally overcrowded. By placing deSauze in the extreme southeast corner of the city, its student population could come only from Beehive (’64: 83.9%) and Brewer (’64: 99.6%). Under these circumstances, deSauze was predestined to, and did in fact, open predominantly black (’67: 93.4%).

At the same time that Beehive went slightly overcapacity, the situation at Cranwood was much more severe (’64: 26.6%; 267/175). If deSauze had been placed in the vicinity of Oakdale and East 154th Streets, it could have absorbed the overcrowding at Beehive, as well as the excess students from Cranwood. The result would have been an integrated school, not a foreseeably and predominantly black school.

It should also be noted that Cranwood became a full K-6 school in 1968 and that this change necessitated an addition to the school. Yet another addition was built in 1969. It must be assumed that the decision to convert Cranwood to a K-6 school was made well in advance of its implementation. Had deSauze been constructed between Brewer and Cranwood, the need for the construction of additions at Cranwood could have been obviated.

The year 1967 was also marked by the construction of the Adlai E. Stevenson school (99.3%, 680/875). In order to create an attendance area for Stevenson, several boundary changes were effected. A portion of the Williams (99.4%, 354/560) was given to Stevenson as was part of the Gracemount (99.8%, 945/945) area. Both Moses Cleaveland (97.9%, 1174/1120) and Rickoff (99.8%, 1083/1155) contributed part of their attendance areas to Gracemount.

By this time, the affected area had become virtually all black so that these actions did not actively add to the racial impaction of the area. There simply were no integrative alternatives to be found, and the underlying problem of overcrowding was resolved by these actions. It is indeed ironic that the absence of integrative alternatives was in large measure due to the prior segregative acts of the Board, which refused to make step-by-step boundary changes while there remained a significant proportion of white students in the area schools.

Cranwood became a full K-6 school in 1968 when an addition consisting of 9 classrooms was opened. At that time, Cranwood was 82.5% black with an enrollment of 575. As a result of the change in grade structure, a boundary change was effected so that 4th-6th graders in the Cranwood attendance area could now attend Cranwood rather than Miles (51.58%, 747/700) and Moses Cleaveland (98.05%, 1177/1120).

It should also be noted that in 1967, prior to the addition at Cranwood, some Cranwood students were transported to deSauze (93.37%, 528/840). All of the above actions appear defensible, especially since the only integrative alternative would have been Miles (51.6%) which was overcrowded and, in fact, the school from which the Cranwood K-4-6’s were retrieved.

In 1968, some Cranwood (82.5%, 623/600) students were assigned to deSauze (99.05%, 317/840) where space was available. In 1969, an additional 12 classrooms were constructed at Cranwood, which in that year had an enrollment of 821. Given the enrollments of the surrounding schools, the addition appeared necessary, there being no viable integrative alternatives to the construction. Once again, these specific actions by the Board appear defensible.

Finally, in 1969, part of the attendance area for Beehive (98.6%, 888/1015) was transferred to deSauze (100%, 354/850).

This action by the Board points up the problems created by deSauze’s site selection which was alluded to in the analysis of that school’s construction.

*743

The board states that this action was taken to relieve overcrowding at Beehive and had the added advantage of allowing pupils in the affected area to attend school without having to cross the railroad tracks that bisect the Beehive attendance zone.

Whether Beehive was actually overcrowded in 1969 is questionable. According to PX 39, Beehive had 888 pupils while the board places the figure at 1006. Neither figure exceeds Beehive’s PX 74 capacity of 1015.

Although this action eliminated the need for some Beehive pupils to cross the railroad tracks, a large portion of the Beehive area was south of the tracks and children living there were not so fortunate. The placement of deSauze was in complete disregard for safety considerations which the board had stressed so strongly.

If deSauze had been constructed in the area of Oakdale and E. 154th Street, much would have been achieved.

First, the school would have drawn its student population from Beehive and Cranwood, and opened integrated. Second, the railroad tracks would have become a natural boundary and no student attending either Beehive or the relocated deSauze would have had to cross those tracks.

It is difficult to understand how the reasonableness of the above analysis escaped the board, unless it was deliberately ignored. Students in the present deSauze area can walk to Brewer by using side streets to reach Tarkington, which dead ends at Brewer. Had deSauze been located as the court suggests, it would have eliminated the crossing of the railroad tracks and provided the board with an integrated school together with the potential to relieve overcrowding at several others.

SOUTHEAST CORRIDOR

For purposes of analysis, the court has focused the evidence by considering the conduct of school authorities as it related to discreet geographical areas of the school system. In developing a chronological understanding of how conditions evolved in each area, the court has then been able to compare what was happening in different areas at different times. Any method used to organize such a voluminous record at some point must be recognized to be somewhat arbitrary. The focus of activity with regard to student assignment decisions shifted gradually over the years. Thus, the next grouping of incidents to be considered is perhaps the most difficult to understand, as it involves a geographical area where the conduct examined did not radiate from a center, but rather involves incidents occurring along a corridor between the Central and Beehive areas, considered

supra.

The first incident in this area considered in the plaintiffs’ proofs was the creation in 1928 of two contiguous optional zones, one allowing students from Lafayette (’40: 38.4%) to attend Rice (’40: 0.77%), if they so chose, and the other allowing the reverse option. The data is not available to analyze the effect of these options when they were created. Their continuance from 1940 to at least 1964 appears to have had a foresee-ably segregative effect as Rice was less than 5 percent black through 1959 and only 12.4 percent black in 1964. Meanwhile Lafayette was more than 50 percent black from 1944 on and more than 90 percent black from 1954 on. Since the options created a situation where children exercising the option from each zone might literally cross each other’s path, there appears to be no convincing safety explanation for this zone. The explanation of local school authorities that it might have been the result of parental pressure to have children attend the older Rice school, which the parents might have attended as children themselves, is unconvincing since Lafayette had been open nine years at the time of the creation of the optional zone, according to P.X. 223.

In 1938 an optional zone was created allowing children from a portion of the Rick-off (’40: 8.9%) attendance area to go to Fulton (’40: 11.78%), if they so chose. Again there is no data which allows the court to assess the impact of this action at the time it was taken. However, in con

*744

trast to the dual optional zones just discussed, the creation of this particular zone appears to have been neutral in terms of racial effect. Both schools were experiencing a general gradual increase in the proportional black enrollment which was roughly parallel. It does not appear that the effect of the zone was to allow white students to attend a plainly identifiable white school nor to channel black students to an identifiably black school rather than the school to which they would normally be assigned. The termination of the zone in 1960 also appears justified, as the sending school was underenrolled while the receiving school was somewhat overenrolled. The pattern of allowing Rickoff students various other options, discussed below, however, does suggest that this action should not be judged separately, but as part of the series of decisions made with regard to Rickoff. This is done,

infra.

In 1940, three optional zones were created in this area, the effect of which was to contribute to the identification of the sending school as the “black” school and the receiving school as the “white” school in each instance. The first of these zones allowed children from an area of the Cleaveland (7.4%, 1065/1120) attendance area to go to Corlett (3.1%, 524/630). During the 20 year period from 1940 to 1960, this zone gave white children residing in the affected area the option of avoiding Cleave-land which was becoming progressively more black during the 1940s. That the zone did not operate in an integrative manner is evident from the fact that Corlett’s black enrollment remained very small during the 1940s and in fact dropped from 3.05 percent in 1940 to 2.7 percent in 1950. When Cleaveland became more than 50 percent black in 1949, Corlett had a black enrollment of only 14.8 percent. The argument of the local defendants that the zone was created because of safety considerations is unconvincing. Where safety is the true concern, the convincing response is a boundary change.

The second optional zone created in 1940 was from Rickoff (8.9%, 932/1155) to Dickens (5.5%, 636/1015). From the following enrollment figures, it is obvious that the zone operated as an escape valve for white students in the affected area until at least the late 1950s:

'40 '45 '50_V55_'_60_

Rickoff 8.9% 14.0% 25.1% 70.7% 97.5%

Dickens 5.5% 7.2% •8.6% 31.9% 88.2%

Again the proffered safety explanation of the local defendants is unconvincing, all the more so since the zone created the safety hazard of having to cross 140th Street, apparently at least a major local traffic artery, for the students exercising the option.

The third optional zone also involved Rickoff, allowing children from yet another part of the attendance area to go to Corlett (3.1%, 524/630), if they so chose. While it is true that the receiving school in this instance was closer to the affected area, the safety factors on which the Board relies are not persuasive. This is particularly so in view of the numerous options which were being created for various parts of the Rick-off area at this time. Again the suggestion that parental desire to have children attend the same elementary school which the parent might have attended does not seem persuasive when the sending school had been open for such a considerable period. Parental pressure may have been involved, but the generating circumstances appear to be other than those suggested by the local defendants. Since Corlett remained a predominantly white school until the 1950s, while Rickoff became increasingly black, the effect of the continuation of the zone was plainly segregative for a period of at least 20 years.

Four of the five optional zones considered thus far in regard to the corridor area appear to have been calculated to remove whites from schools which were becoming increasingly black. The absence of convine

*745

ing racially neutral explanations for the creation of these zones points strongly to the conclusion that this was not only the foreseeable effect, but the purpose of these actions. Such a conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that there is no suggestion that problems of overenrollment existed at any of the sending schools to explain the sudden interest in creating optional zones in this area. These four optional zones are apparently still in existence. Now all of the schools involved are overwhelmingly black, so the continuing direct effect of these zones as contributing factors to the present racial isolation existing in Cleveland schools must be viewed as

de minimis.

This does not undo, however, their indirect contribution to the current residential segregation. Had school authorities not acted so as in essence to direct white students away from certain schools, families with school age children might have made different decisions with respect to staying in the general area or moving into it. A notable characteristic of the corridor area, which the present discussion addresses, was that there were a number of schools in the area which had some degree of stable integration over significant time periods. This suggests that for some time the underlying residential patterns in this area were developing in a fairly integrated way. The actions of school authorities in channelling white students away from some schools in such circumstances must be viewed as contributing to the designation of certain residential areas as “black neighborhoods,” i. e. portions of the attendance area of schools such as Rickoff and Lafayette. Thus the actions of the school officials appear to have contributed to racial residential concentration, which might not otherwise have developed. This type of relationship between the actions of school officials and emerging residential patterns is discussed in greater detail,

infra.

In 1944, the Lafayette (53.5%, 583/1085) to Rice (0.9%, 532/1120) optional zone was expanded. That the intent in expanding this zone was not to promote integration at Rice by encouraging the transfer of some black students from Lafayette is clear from the fact Rice remained less than 50 percent black until 1967, 23 years after the creation of this option. The foreseeable effect was to give white students in the affected area an escape valve from the increasingly black Lafayette to the overwhelmingly white Rice. The only explanation offered by the local defendants was that Rice was the “parent” school, Lafayette having opened later, and that parents would want their children to attend the school which other members of the family had attended. This explanation is similar to that offered to explain the 1928 creation of the dual optional zones between Lafayette and Rice. Clearly the court must conclude that the local defendants were desperate in making such an argument. While school loyalties do develop, they are not so intense at the elementary school level in common experience to cause an otherwise unnecessary assignment decision 25 years after the “new” school had opened.

In 1941 yet another optional zone was created, allowing students in an additional portion of the Lafayette (38.4%, 593/1085) attendance area to go to Rice (2.0%, 565/1120). This time the local defendants indicate while the reason for creating the optional zone is unknown, it did permit children in the affected area to ride the 116th Street bus to Rice. They do not, however, attempt to explain why children would need to ride a bus to a school which was 3800 feet from the center of the affected area, when they lived approximately 1600 feet from the school to which they were originally assigned. The reason for the creation of this optional zone, as well as the three previous optional zones affecting these two schools is apparent when one reviews the proportional black enrollment at the two schools, as set forth below:

*746

Rice_Lafayette

1940 0.66% 38.40%

1941 O'. 55 40.84

1942 0.8 43.8

1943 0.9 48.8

1944 0.9 53.5

1945 ■ 1.13 58.46

1946 1.45 65.40

1947 1.03 69.06

1948 1.99 72.07

1949 1.23 74.51

1950 1.48 78.33

1951 2.0 78.4

1952 2.4 86.5

1953 2.3 89.4

1954 2.41 91.58

Plainly the racial isolation at these two neighboring schools did not just happen. It was the result of the manipulation of assignment patterns within a supposedly racially neutral neighborhood school program.

In 1951, an optional zone was created allowing students in a certain portion of the Fulton (’51: 38.8%, 518/700) attendance zone to go to Rickoff (’51: 29.9%, 625/1155).

Frankly, this action presents an analytical puzzle. If the local defendants’ description of the area affected by this boundary change is accurate, the affected area was not contiguous to the attendance area of the receiving school, according to the 1947 map showing attendance boundaries. No explanation for the creation of such an unusual option has been proffered by the local defendants. The sending school was plainly closer to the affected area than the receiving school. There was no problem of overcrowding at the sending school. Both schools appear to have been enrolling an increasing number of black students. The receiving school did have a smaller percentage of black students, however, and the reasonable conclusion appears to be that white students in the affected area were being afforded the opportunity to attend a “whiter” school, if they so chose. Because of the above noted peculiarities, however, the court reaches this conclusion with less certainty than it has in its analysis of other alleged incidents.

Students in a portion of the Mt. Auburn (1.4%, 289/700) attendance area were given the option of attending Woodland (8.1%, 614/595) from 1952 until 1967. (The plaintiffs indicated that the option ran in the opposite direction, but this is not in accord with the 1967 school boundary map.) The defendants argue that this zone had an integrative effect, inviting the assumption that the affected area was a predominantly white residential area. If this assumption is correct, so is the defendants’ argument.

Certainly the option seems justified in terms of distances, being approximately 2200 feet closer to the receiving school than to the sending school. On the other hand, the action seems odd in view of the fact that the sending school was operating at approximately 40 percent of its capacity, while the receiving school was slightly over-enrolled. Without information on the predominant racial composition of the affected area, which is not available to the court, it is not possible to determine whether this action was racially neutral, integrative, or segregative.

In 1954, students living in a specified part of the Lafayette (91.6%, 701/1085) area were given the option to attend Mt. Pleasant (19.5%, 559/665). In reviewing this zone, it should be noted that the explanation of the school authorities based on distances appears to be founded on faulty measurements. While the local defendants say that Lafayette was 3,000 feet from the middle of the affected area, the court measures the distance at roughly 2300 feet; similarly the distance to Mt. Pleasant was said to bb 1,600 feet, but the court measures that distance at a minimum of 1,700 feet from the affected area. While these figures would mean that Mt. Pleasant was approximately 600 feet closer to the center of the affected area, such a relatively short savings in walking distance surely could not justify having the children cross Kinsman, a major thoroughfare, if safety were the paramount consideration which the local defendants have steadfastly maintained it to be. Further, the optional zone can not be justified in terms of overenrollment. The only apparent explanation is the disparate proportion of black enrollment at the two

*747

schools. In 1954, Lafayette was 91.6% black. Although specific information on who lived in the affected area is not available, the court concludes that apparently when its black enrollment reached 90% plus at Lafayette, the school authorities decided to provide an escape valve to Mt. Pleasant for some of the white children.

In 1955, two optional zones were created giving students from specified portions of the Boulevard (8.2%, 462/700) and Revere (0%, 848/1015) attendance areas the choice of attending Mt. Pleasant (25%, 544/665). These two zones appear to have been justified, since the receiving school was considerably closer to the affected areas than either of the sending schools. Moreover, the fact that the options ran from less black to more black schools appears to refute any suggestion that these actions were taken to isolate blacks at the sending schools. The only possibly sinister view of these actions would arise from the possibility that they were taken in reaction to black families moving into the affected areas. There is little to support such an inference in the record, and the court will not indulge in such speculation.

The next incidents which involve this area included in the plaintiffs’ proofs deal with incidents which occurred in the 1960s. The first was a “step-by-step” boundary change in 1960. A portion of the Fulton (100%) attendance zone, which was 43 students over capacity was transferred to Rickoff (97.5%) which had some 71 available pupil stations. A portion of the Rickoff attendance area was then transferred to Cleaveland (64.77%), which was approximately 305 students under capacity.

This action by the board points up its willingness to engage in, or at least its awareness of, the step-by-step method of relieving overcrowding. Unfortunately, its decision to utilize this procedure was often selective and appeared based more on racial considerations than the efficient use of underenrolled schools.

With regard to the specific action taken, it would appear that there were more integrative alternatives that were equally convenient. As to the first boundary change, Dickens (88.2%) located southwest of Fulton, had 201 pupil stations available, while as to the second, Corlett (27.8%) located southwest of Rickoff, was 252 students under capacity. In 1962, a boundary change which shifted a portion of the Mt. Pleasant (’61: 91.1%, 740/665; ’62: 94.4%, 710/665) area to Revere (’61: 0.3%, 731/1015; ’62: 15.8%, 895/1015) was made. This change had an integrative effect and appears to represent a distinct change in the school authorities’ earlier pattern of being unwilling to relieve overcrowding of a predominantly black school through utilization of underenrolled white schools. While the school authorities appear to have done no more than was absolutely necessary to relieve overcrowding at Mt. Pleasant for that year, it was clearly a step in the right direction.

The forward thrust represented by the 1962 Mt. Pleasant-Revere boundary change was parried soon by the addition of seven classrooms and two kindergartens to Mt. Pleasant in 1964. As a result of the addition, a portion of the Revere (25.1%, 926/1015) attendance area was shifted back to Mt. Pleasant (96.9%, 770/910 — post addition capacity estimate). The addition was perhaps an effort to anticipate the probability of growing enrollments in this area, but immediately its effect was to produce two underenrolled, adjacent schools, one of which was plainly identifiable as a “black” school and the other as a “white” school. Since the addition would have been planned very shortly after the 1962 boundary change, a reasonable conclusion is that the addition was planned to forestall the necessity of transferring additional students living in the Mt. Pleasant attendance zone to Revere and to reverse the 1962 boundary change. Such a conclusion is supported by noting the more pressing need for additional classroom space in other parts of the school system at this time and the appar

*748

ently high priority which was given this addition in the construction program begun in the mid-1960s. To some extent, the segregative effect of 1964 Revere-Mt. Pleasant boundary change may have been mitigated by a second boundary change transferring part of the Corlett (76.0%, 663/630) attendance area to Revere. Assuming that it was not essentially a “white pocket” which was so transferred, this boundary change suggests an integrative effect may have been accomplished. In light of the other circumstances surrounding this series of boundary changes, however, the court can not easily make the assumption that white students were not being skimmed from the Corlett population. In view of the absence of data as to the racial composition of the affected residential area, the court refrains from drawing any conclusion as to this specific boundary change.

Another 1964 addition of 14 classrooms and one kindergarten was built at Fulton (99.7%, 738/1190 — post addition capacity estimate). This addition triggered a series of step-by-step boundary changes, including transferring portions of Rickoff (99.7%, 1229/1155) to Fulton, of Gracemount (93.2%, 1012/945) to Rickoff, of Cleaveland (85.8%, 1086/1120) to Rickoff, and of Gracemount to Cleaveland. At this point, the southern portion of the area under consideration, where these schools are located, had become predominantly black. This meant that there were no integrative alternatives to relieve the overcrowding which had developed at several of the schools. What is notable about the series of changes was the flexibility which school officials exhibited in making boundary changes once they no longer apparently had to consider whether the changes would result in moving black students into predominantly white schools. Such an approach to resolving overcrowding continued to be resisted and rejected by school officials where the areas involved included both overcrowded black schools and underenrolled white schools, as evidenced by the 1967 changes affecting Mt. Auburn.

An addition of eight classrooms was built at Revere (’67: 84.6%, 1302/1295 — post addition capacity estimate) in 1966. Clearly some action was necessary to deal with the growth in enrollment at Revere, and the schools to which plaintiffs suggest Revere students might have been transferred generally were operating very close to their capacities in 1964. Basically, this area had developed in such a way that by 1967, there were no integrative alternatives.

The absence of integrative alternatives is again brought to light by a 1967 boundary change transferring a portion of the Revere attendance area to Corlett (99.3%, 1070/ ?). This change appears to have been precipitated by the construction of an addition- at Coi’lett. However, since the court does not have information on the size of the addition, there is no way to estimate accurately the capacity of Revere. As a result, the court only can note that the theoretically available integrative alternatives were presented by Miles Park (4.9%, approximately 500/490), Woodland Hills (39.0%, 464/420) and Miles (39.2%, 791/700), all of which were themselves operating above capacity.

In 1967, two optional zones were terminated in the northern portion of this corridor, one between Irving (100%, 1055/980) and Woodland (80.0%, 616/595) and another between Mt. Auburn (53.6%, 379/700) and Woodland. The defendants’ explanation of these cancellations is based on the overcrowding at the receiving school, Woodland. This explanation assumes, however, that such overcrowding was a recent phenomenon. In fact, Woodland had been overcrowded since 1957, although not as seriously as it apparently was in 1966. But since the school authorities contend that they were acting to alleviate overcrowded conditions, it appears that a step-by-step boundary change should have been employed to use some of the available space at Mt. Auburn to alleviate the continued overcrowd

*749

ing at Irving. One possible explanation for not having so acted is that Woodland’s southern boundary was already very close to the school. But as noted above in reference to the boundary changes which occurred after the 1964 addition to Fulton, where the schools which potentially could be involved in step-by-step boundary changes were all clearly identifiable as “black” schools, the approach was employed liberally. The failure to use this technique appears to indicate an intention to maintain the “white” identification of Mt. Auburn, if at all possible.

The suspicious selectivity of school officials in sometimes dealing with overcrowding by building additional classrooms and sometimes choosing to change boundaries with a resulting isolation of white students from black students continues to be evident as late as 1969. In that year, school officials transferred part of the attendance area of Woodland Hills (’68: 49.5%, 473/420; ’69: 63.2%, 533/420) to Union (’68: 0%, 410/490; ’69: 0%, 438/490). Since Union had no black enrollment in the year which the change took effect, it must be concluded that the area affected by the boundary change was white. While it is true that increasing overcrowding at Woodland Hills justified some corrective action, it must be questioned whether the primary intent of the school officials was to deal with the overcrowding problem, which was not resolved, or to allow white children to attend a white school. If the object was to relieve overcrowding, surely school authorities would not have been content with a situation where Woodland Hills became increasingly overcrowded, while Union continued to be underutilized.

In 1971, the school officials undertook a series of boundary changes as a result of overcrowding at Boulevard, Revere and allegedly at Mt. Auburn. These changes included transferring portions of Mt. Auburn (’70: 92.04%, 578/700; ’71: 99.5%, 583/700 to Rice (’70: 80.25%, 623/1120; ’71: 86.2%, 636/1120) and to Boulevard (’70: 93.99%, 833/700; ’71: 95.7%, 721/700), portions of Boulevard to Mt. Pleasant (’70: 99.8%, 838/910 — post ’64 — addition capacity estimate; ’71: 99.4%, 1031/910), portions of Revere (’70: 97.4%, 1642/1295 — pre ’71 addition capacity estimate; ’71: 98.6%, 1527/1575 — post ’71: addition capacity estimate) to Mt. Pleasant, portions of Woodland Hills (’70: 75.25%, 578/ ?; ’71: 84.8%, 796/ ?) and a portion of Boulevard to Woodland Hills. These changes also were apparently related to the opening of additions to Revere and Miles in 1971. There is also some indication in P.X. 223 that an addition might have been made to Woodland Hills in 1970, although there is no other indication of such an addition in the record of this case. These changes were in response to changing enrollment patterns in the area and indicate a flexibility in adjusting boundaries which the school officials frequently seem to develop once an area has become largely black.

The fluidity of boundaries in this area after it had become predominantly black is underscored by yet another boundary change, which transferred a portion of Revere (99%, 1521/1575 — est.) to Corlett (99.7%, 916/1120), in 1972 just one year after the substantial redistricting described above. While clearly the change could have been of little consequence as far as racial impact, it is a notable example of the changed behavior of school officials toward boundary changes once an area has become predominantly black.

The final incident concerning this area with which the plaintiffs’ proofs dealt was the 1975 construction of a replacement for the Woodland school, which opened as the Buckeye-Woodland school. The predecessor school had been destroyed by fire in 1970, and for a period, its students had been assigned to Observation, which then became known as Woodland-Observation. The school opened overwhelmingly black. There appears to have been no potential site which would have produced a markedly more integrative result, as is indicated from the figures for the surrounding schools:

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Date Constructed black (1973) 1974 enroll/ Ex. 74 cap.

Irving 1883 99.37% 616/980

Wayne 1914 89.05% 638/665

Idee 1904 91.07% 838/1120

Mt. Auburn 1922 99.09% 650/700

While the schools listed above appear to have had sufficient theoretical capacity to accommodate the 350 students who were attending Woodland-Observation in 1974, the age of those buildings clearly supports the decision of school officials to go forward with new construction in this area. The only question which can be raised with regard to this incident is basically a paraphrase of the ultimate question in this case, whether any new school in Cleveland opening in 1975 should open with a student body which is more than 97 percent black.

HOUGH-DUNHAM AREA

The area on the east side of Cleveland bounded by E. 55th street on the east, E. 107th street on the west, Superior Avenue on the north, and Euclid Avenue on the south is commonly known as the Hough area. Up until the middle 1950s, the Hough neighborhood was a primarily white neighborhood that was characterized by large homes and little or no public housing. In the late 1950s, the combination of a rapidly increasing population and a concomitant housing shortage caused many of the large homes in Hough to be modified so as to become multiple family dwellings. The transition from single family homes to small apartment buildings was aided considerably by significant real estate speculation in the area, (see discussion of residential patterns,

infra.)

The schools in the Hough area at the present time can be divided into two distinct groups for the purposes of analysis. Each group consists of an older “core” school surrounded by four “satellite” schools. The first group is Hough, surrounded by Morgan, Orr, Martin, and Raper. The second is Dunham, surrounded by Wade Park, Attacks, Ireland and Rockefeller. Standing alone, but intimately involved in the Hough area, is the Bolton Elementary School. In recounting the relevant history of the Hough area, reference will necessarily be made to some schools not mentioned above.

Plaintiff’s first allegation with regard to the Hough area dates back to 1933 when an optional zone was created from Giddings (’39: 98.9%) to Dunham (’39: 1.2%). Because of the vastly disparate racial percentages of the two schools, this optional zone would ordinarily require close scrutiny. But the absence of any pre-1939 data makes both analysis of this incident as well as discernment of its continuing effect virtually impossible.

A similar problem arises with regard to the 1933 optional zone from Bolton to either Hough or Observation. Later incidents involving Bolton, however, can be analyzed. For instance, the 1941 optional zone from Observation (52.88%) to Bolton (99.02%) as well as the 1944 optional zone from Bolton (94.67%) to Orr (50.23%) appear to reflect the school board’s choice of the most integrative alternatives available. A similar comment is warranted with regard to the alteration of the Bolton-Hough-Observation optional zone in 1944. When Charles Orr opened in 1944 (as “Hough-Relief”) the eastern portion of the optional zone was altered to allow pupils to attend either Orr or Bolton. The western portion of the optional zone remained essentially unchanged in that children were allowed to attend Hough, but not Observation. This seems an entirely reasonable approach given the fact that both Bolton and Orr appear to have been under capacity in 1955.

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An optional zone was created in 1939 from Observation (50%) to Murray Hill. A second such option was created in 1952. The board’s safety explanation would dictate a boundary change rather than an optional zone. The racial percentages of the schools’ respective student bodies strongly suggest that these options were the result of the rising black enrollment at Observation.

In 1939, an addition was constructed at Dunham (’40: 1.2%). Six classrooms were added and in 1940, Dunham was still 297 pupils over capacity. Thus, the addition appears to have been totally justified. The alternative suggested by plaintiffs, Giddings (99.3%), could only have accommodated 39 additional pupils and the board’s safety arguments are well taken in not using Giddings to relieve the overcrowding at Dunham.

Another apparently racially neutral act by the Board was the 1940 addition to Wade Park (0.1%, 816/700). Wade Park was indeed overcrowded at that time and while Hodge (0%) and Sowinski (5.4%) were under enrolled by 213 and 284, respectively, they appear to have been dismissed as viable alternatives because of distance rather than racial considerations.

In 1940, an optional zone was created whereby students living in the Hough (4.8%, 1127/1015) attendance area could, instead, attend Wade Park (.1%, 816/700). The optional zone was purportedly created to relieve overcrowding but the receiving school was also overcrowded. It is thus possible that the option was intended to provide an escape valve for whites at Hough who would not tolerate the presence of any black students.

Plaintiffs are apparently arguing that Sowinski (4.74%) should have been utilized to relieve the overcrowding at Hough. Given the racial percentages of the schools involved, such a course of action would not have had a significantly more integrative racial effect. The other schools suggested by plaintiffs were too far away to be considered viable alternatives, despite their apparent under enrollment.

Similarly, there appeared to be no integrative alternatives in 1941, when a boundary change transferred part of the Quincy (99.5%, 736/665) attendance area to Giddings (99.7%, 721/775), or in 1951, when part of the Quincy (99.5%, 737/665) area was transferred to Bolton (98.0%, 925/1050).

In 1942, an optional zone was created from Quincy (98.9%, 751/665) to Bolton (99.4%, 982/1050). While the local board attempts to justify this optional zone on the grounds that it eliminated the need for children to cross Cedar Road, it appears that the exact opposite was true. It also appears that Irving (69.2%, 467/600) was closer to the affected area than either of the two schools involved and was therefore a viable integrative alternative that was either not considered, or considered and not chosen.

In the same year (1942) an optional zone was created from Sowinski (’42: 4.9%, 563/875; ’61: 59.6%, 988/875) to Hodge (’42:0%, 475/735; ’61: 34.9%, 680/735). This option was terminated in 1961.

According to the calculations of the local defendants, the sending school was closer to the affected area than was the receiving school. However, the local defendants explain that the optional zone was created to eliminate the necessity of having young children cross E. 79th Street. The affected area was the only part of the Sowinski attendance area located west of E. 79th St. Had this end been accomplished by a boundary change, the proffered safety rationale would be quite plausible. The use of an optional zone coupled with the rising proportion of black enrollment at Sowinski suggests that safety was not the sole consideration. It is possible that this option was created in response to pressure to allow the children in the affected area to attend the all-white Hodge.

The termination of the zone in 1961 was accomplished by transferring the affected area to the Hodge Attendance area. As noted above, safety considerations do support such a boundary change. As in 1942, Hodge, the receiving school, continued to be

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the more identifiably “white” school in 1961. However, both schools affected by the 1961 termination were statistically well integrated. Furthermore, the 1961 Sowinski enrollment exceeded the school’s capacity. The boundary change was, therefore, warranted as a way of evening enrollment pressure.

In 1943, an optional zone was created whereby students living in a very small part of the Doan (15.5%, 552/490) attendance area could instead attend Wade Park (0.4%). The explanation proffered by the board is one of safety, but such considerations seem equally pertinent to other parts of the Doan area not included in the optional zone. The percentage of black students at Doan had risen from 2.1% in 1940 to 15.5% in 1943 and this fairly rapid increase suggests that the parents of white pupils may have considered the neighborhood to be “tipping” and demanded a means of escape. This inference is not contra-indicated by the fact that the school board would create an optional zone for such a minute geographical area.

This option was terminated in 1958 when both schools were more than 90% black. According to the board, this was in keeping with their policy of terminating an optional zone when the receiving school became overcrowded.

In 1944, an optional zone was created from Hough (5.2%, 1049/1015) to Doan (23.1%, 502/490). The option continued in effect until the opening of Charles Orr School in 1959. At that time Hough was 87.9% (1346/1015)- and Doan was 98.1% (1185/805). Therefore, the option was from Orr to Doan.

Defendant school board is quick to point out that the option was from a predominantly white school to a predominantly black school. This fact, standing alone, is not dispositive of the effect of the optional zone or the foreseeability of such effect.

Shortly after the creation of this option zone, the black percentage at Hough dropped slightly to 6.0% in 1945, and 5.29% in 1946. During that same period, Doan’s black percentage rose steadily to 33.7% in 1945, and 37.7% in 1946. It is difficult to determine whether these variations in racial percentage were the direct or partial result of the optional zone in question. The local board disclaims any knowledge of the racial composition of the optional zone, or of those students who exercised the option.

One additional comment is here required. Optional zones could operate in a segregative manner in at least two ways. The first, obvious, and probably more common effect would be to provide an escape valve for whites to avoid attending what was perceived at a “blacker” school. The second, and perhaps more subtle, segregative effect would be to encourage those black students who were attending a predominantly white school to exercise the option in favor of a more identifiably black school. Thus, an optional zone from a “whiter” school to a “blacker” school, rather than being integrative, would instead increase the racial identity of the schools involved.

East Madison (5.7%, 458/250) elementary school was remodeled in 1948, resulting in the loss of two classrooms which became an auditorium. East Madison’s enrollment and racial percentages remained fairly stable after the renovation in question:

1949 7.6% 460/250

1950 7.7% 469/250

1951 6.7% 511/220

1952 7.4% 471/220

Thus the effect of this board action on both East Madison and the surrounding schools appears to have been racially neutral. Stanard (’48: 4.6%; 392/545; ’49: 4.2%, 381/545), Wade Park (’48: 1.9%, 701/700; ’49: 2.2%, 713/700), and Hodge (’48: 3.1%, 521/735, ’49: 2.2%, 508/735) all continued to experience stable racial and numerical enrollments.

The overcrowding experienced by the Hough area schools began to peak in the mid-1950s. In 1954, a boundary change was effected transferring a portion of the Hough (48.49%, 4-502) attendance area to Dunham (47.74%, 4-234) and Wade Park (41.2%, 4-506).

The purported justification for this boundary change was the undisputed over

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crowding at Hough. The “remedy” selected by the board was to distribute the excess pupils in two other, already overcrowded, schools. The obvious alternative was a step-by-step approach whereby available space could be created at Wade Park and Dunham by adjusting their northern boundaries with the nearby or adjacent Case (10.5%, -99), Stanard (10.3%, -199), East Madison (10.8%, -70), and Sowinski (8.2%, —456). The board argues that these schools were too far from the affected area but chooses to ignore the step-by-step boundary changes which it utilized when it suits their purpose.

By failing to so involve the predominantly “white” schools on the periphery of the Hough area, the board was “advertising” its intent to contain the burgeoning black population in overcrowded, and therefore, presumably sub-standard schools.

Because of the severe overcrowding in the Hough area, there was a flurry of board-initiated action between 1952 and 1957. In 1952, some classes at Hough (22.7%, + 299) were housed at Addison Junior High School. In 1953, portable classrooms were placed at Wade Park (26.6%, + 382). Also in that year, a boundary change was effected from Hough (36.4%, + 439) to Wade Park (26.6%, +382). An addition was built at Wade Park (41.2%, + 506) in 1954. At the same time, yet another boundary change was effected from Hough (48.5%, +502) to Wade Park (41.2%, + 506). In 1956, more portable classrooms were placed at Wade Park (70.3%, +407) and classroom space was rented in non-school owned facilities. Finally, in 1957 the sixth grade classes at Wade Park (85.2%, + 655) were sent to Addison Junior High (69.8%, -285).

What emerges from this pattern of activity is an implosion of black students into Hough and Wade Park. At least three elementary schools Hodge (4800'), East Madison (3800') and Sowinski (3800') were within a reasonable walking distance, particularly for upper elementary students. Th

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