Opinion

Johnson v. District of Columbia

  • 528 F.3d 969
  • 381 U.S. App. D.C. 351
  • 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 13289
  • 2008 WL 2467977
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Jun 20, 2008
Status
Published
Author
Griffith
On the bench
Ginsburg, Griffith, Silberman
Cited by
106 cases
Authority
More cited than 88.0%

holding that conflicting testimony about whether the plaintiffs body language was threatening or suggested his intent to escape — which the officer claimed justified his use of force — precluded a grant of summary judgment on the plaintiffs Section 1983 excessive force claim

How later courts described this case

  • holding that conflicting testimony about whether the plaintiffs body language was threatening or suggested his intent to escape — which the officer claimed justified his use of force — precluded a grant of summary judgment on the plaintiffs Section 1983 excessive force claim
  • holding that “[a]n officer’s act of violence violates 6 the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures if it furthers no governmental interest, such as apprehending a suspect or protecting an officer or the public”
  • determining that, where police ordered at gunpoint a suspect of unknown dangerousness to lie face-down and spread his arms and legs, a constitutional right was only violated when the suspect was repeatedly kicked in the groin
  • holding that “[s]ummary judgment was premature because there exists a- genuine issue of material fact” that could “only be resolved by evaluating the conflicting testimony of’ two people involved in an altercation

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 8, 2008 Decided June 20, 2008

No. 06-7136

JUAN JOHNSON,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLEE

______

CONSOLIDATED WITH 06-7180

______

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv01452)

Gregory L. Lattimer argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant.

William J. Earl, Senior Assistant Attorney General,

Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia,

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were

Linda J. Singer, Attorney General at the time the brief was

filed, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Donna M. Murasky,

Senior Assistant Attorney General. Edward E. Schwab,

Deputy Attorney General, entered an appearance.

2

Before: GINSBURG and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Juan Johnson is a police officer

whose off-duty act of kindness to a stranger in distress landed

him in the middle of a drug bust in which he was repeatedly

kicked in the groin by a police officer who mistook him for a

criminal. Johnson claims he was a victim of police brutality

and sues both the officer alleged to have kicked him and the

District of Columbia. We consider whether the accused

officer is entitled to qualified immunity, and whether a local

statute displaces Johnson’s common law claims against the

District.

I.

The following version of events, which we accept as true

for purposes of this appeal, is based on Johnson’s account. On

July 23, 2001, Johnson stepped outside his apartment building

in southeast Washington, D.C. to check the mail. Except for a

police identification badge worn around his neck, Johnson

was dressed in civilian clothes that gave no indication he was

an officer of the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”).

As Johnson was walking through the courtyard of his

building, a stranger named Andre Clinton approached him

and exclaimed that he was being chased by “stick-up boys.”

Johnson helped Clinton get away from his pursuers by leading

him through the locked back door of the apartment building.

Once inside, Johnson told Clinton to wait downstairs while he

went to his third-floor apartment to get him a glass of water.

When Johnson came out of his apartment a moment later, he

3

was surprised to see Clinton running up the stairs toward him

with police officers giving chase.

Clinton was not running from robbers but from the

police, and Johnson had unwittingly aided his flight. Moments

before, Clinton had sold drugs to an undercover officer and

was now attempting to evade arrest. Officers monitoring

Clinton’s escape mistook Johnson for an armed accomplice

and broadcast a police radio report saying so. The officers

rushing up the stairs had no idea that Johnson was an off-duty

police officer not involved in the crime. To them, he was a

potentially dangerous criminal.

Leading the chase was Jeffrey Bruce, an MPD narcotics

officer. Bruce and his colleagues entered the apartment

building through the unlocked front door, charged up the

stairs with guns drawn, and ordered Johnson and Clinton to

put up their hands. Johnson, who was standing just outside his

apartment, immediately complied and tried to signal to Bruce

that he was a fellow police officer. When his signals failed,

Johnson realized that he could not easily resolve this case of

mistaken identity and feared that Bruce might shoot him in

the face or chest. With his hands still raised, Johnson turned

away from the gun and fell through the open doorway of his

apartment, landing face-down on the floor. While Johnson

was prone on the floor with his arms and legs spread, Bruce

repeatedly kicked and stomped his groin and buttocks.

Johnson protested, “What are you kicking me for? I’m the

police. I’m the police. Why are you kicking me, why are you

stomping me?” When the MPD identification badge around

Johnson’s neck finally came into view, Bruce stopped kicking

him.

The next day, Johnson visited the Police and Fire Clinic

complaining that Bruce’s kicking had caused him to pass

4

blood in his urine. Johnson was placed on “Performance of

Duty” (“POD”) paid leave for his physical injuries under the

Police and Firefighters Retirement and Disability Act, D.C.

CODE § 5-701 et seq., from July 24, 2001 until the middle of

August of that year.1 Johnson briefly returned to work but

went back on paid leave when his psychological injuries from

the kicking were also classified as POD. Johnson remained on

paid leave until December 28, 2004, when MPD reclassified

his psychological injuries as non-POD. He has since resumed

working as an MPD officer.

Johnson filed two complaints in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia, which were consolidated

on July 20, 2005. In his complaint dated July 22, 2002,

Johnson sued the District of Columbia for police brutality,

assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress (collectively, the “common law claims”). In his

complaint dated June 8, 2004, Johnson sued Bruce in his

individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a

violation of his federal constitutional rights by use of

excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the

Fourth Amendment (“§ 1983 claim”).2 The district court had

federal-question jurisdiction over Johnson’s § 1983 claim, 28

U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over his

common law claims, id. § 1367.

In the course of discovery, Johnson and Bruce gave

conflicting accounts of what happened. Bruce testified at his

deposition that Johnson tried to escape by lunging into the

1

The parties agree that even though he was off-duty at the time of

the incident, Johnson was eligible for POD leave because an officer

is “always on duty, although periodically relieved from the routine

performance of it.” D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 6A, § 200.4.

2

Johnson raised additional claims in his complaints, but we discuss

only those before us on appeal.

5

apartment and trying to crawl away, keeping his hands close

to his body. Bruce claimed he then ran into the apartment

after Johnson, holstered his weapon, and reached for

Johnson’s arms, at which point Johnson produced his police

badge and Bruce let him go. Bruce denied ever having kicked

or stomped Johnson.

Bruce and the District moved for summary judgment,

which the district court granted as to all claims in a

memorandum opinion and order of August 10, 2006. Johnson

appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Arrington v.

United States, 473 F.3d 329, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

II.

Johnson sued Bruce under § 1983 for seizing him with

excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.3 See

U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure

in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures, shall

not be violated . . . .”). Such a claim is “properly analyzed

under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’

standard,” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989),

which tracks the constitutional text by asking “whether the

force applied was reasonable,” Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d

1297, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Bruce responds that he is

entitled to qualified immunity, a defense we evaluate under

3

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

6

the two-step analysis set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 200–02 (2001). Under Saucier, we ask first whether the

officer’s alleged conduct violated a constitutional right, the

same question we ask to test the merits of Johnson’s § 1983

claim. If the facts alleged do not establish a constitutional

violation, we end the inquiry and rule for the officer. Int’l

Action Ctr. v. United States, 365 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

(Roberts, J.). If the facts alleged do establish that a

constitutional right was violated, we go on to ask whether that

right was “clearly established.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

The district court entered summary judgment against

Johnson on his § 1983 claim after concluding that Bruce

enjoyed qualified immunity. In the district court’s analysis,

the seizure was objectively reasonable or, at worst, derogative

of rights not yet “clearly established.” We will affirm a grant

of summary judgment only if we are persuaded that “there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).

We look to the law that governs the claims asserted and the

defenses interposed to determine which of the disputed facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). We must view the alleged material facts in the

light most favorable to the party resisting summary judgment,

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398

U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970), and we cannot make credibility

determinations or weigh the evidence, Liberty Lobby, 477

U.S. at 249, 255.

Applying this standard, we reverse the judgment of the

district court. Bruce was not entitled to qualified immunity

against Johnson’s § 1983 claim at the summary judgment

stage because their conflicting deposition testimony gives rise

to genuine issues of fact material to both the § 1983 claim and

7

the qualified immunity defense. We look to Saucier to

determine the materiality of these factual issues.

A.

The first Saucier question asks, “Taken in the light most

favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged

show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”

533 U.S. at 201. As noted above, we apply a standard of

objective reasonableness to determine the constitutionality of

Bruce’s alleged kicking under the Fourth Amendment.

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. To assess the reasonableness of a

seizure, “[w]e must balance the nature and quality of the

intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests

against the importance of the governmental interests alleged

to justify the intrusion.” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,

703 (1983). In so doing, we must give “careful attention to the

facts and circumstances of [the] particular case, including the

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an

immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. As Judge Friendly

famously wrote, “Not every push or shove, even if it may

later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,

violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Johnson v. Glick,

481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973). Although Judge Friendly

was writing about the Due Process Clause, his reminder

carries equal force in the Fourth Amendment context.

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Judge Friendly’s Johnson

v. Glick opinion in a Fourth Amendment excessive force

case). We follow Judge Friendly’s lead in inquiring after

“such factors as the need for the application of force, the

relationship between the need and the amount of force that

was used, [and] the extent of injury inflicted.” Johnson v.

Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033.

8

And so now we must, in Justice Scalia’s words, “slosh

our way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’ ”

Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1778 (2007). Based on the

police radio broadcast describing how Clinton and Johnson

ran away from the police and into the apartment building,

Bruce had reason to fear that Johnson was an armed

accomplice to a fleeing drug dealer. Bruce gave chase,

eventually cornering Clinton and Johnson on the third-floor

landing of the apartment building. With gun drawn, Bruce

ordered the suspects to put up their hands. Both complied.

Johnson alleges that he raised his hands, turned toward the

open door of his apartment, fell face-first to the floor, and

spread his arms and legs in a manner announcing submission.

Accepting Johnson’s allegation that he meant to surrender

peacefully, we may assume for the purpose of deciding this

appeal that Johnson acted in a submissive fashion. Such was

the rapidly developing situation Bruce allegedly encountered:

a potentially armed suspect surrenders to an officer who is

pointing a gun at him, falls to the floor, and lies there on his

belly with arms and legs spread.

In this scenario, we are convinced that a reasonable

officer would not have repeatedly kicked the surrendering

suspect in the groin. We arrive at this conclusion by balancing

the intrusion on Johnson’s Fourth Amendment interests

against the governmental interests served by Bruce’s use of

force. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Place, 462 U.S. at

703). We consider first the severity of the intrusion on

Johnson’s “right . . . to be secure in [his] person[].” U.S.

CONST. amend. IV. Striking the groin is the classic example

of fighting dirty. From the schoolyard scrapper to the

champion prizefighter, no pugilist takes lightly the threat of a

hit below the belt. What’s more, Bruce supposedly kicked a

man while he was down, hard enough to produce bloody

9

urine. Although the constable surely has authority to use

physical force in effecting an arrest, there are gradations of

appropriate violence. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–

12 (1985) (holding deadly force to be a disproportionate and

unreasonable means of seizing a fleeing, non-dangerous

felon); Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 331–33

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding, in a case where suspect was

punched, beaten with a baton, pistol-whipped, and attacked by

a police dog, that such violence was “more force than was

reasonably necessary” if the suspect had already been

disarmed and handcuffed). A kick to the groin tends toward

the vicious end of that scale. We have no trouble finding that

Bruce’s repeated kicks to Johnson’s groin were a serious

intrusion on his Fourth Amendment interests.

Next, we consider the countervailing governmental

interests. An officer in Bruce’s position has a legitimate and

substantial interest in apprehending an armed suspect and

protecting himself and the public from possible harm.

Although these are weighty interests, it is not clear how

kicking Johnson in the groin furthered either of them. The

question is whether the specific police behavior at issue —

here, repeatedly kicking a surrendering suspect in the groin —

produces some law enforcement benefit that might outweigh

the serious harm it causes. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.

648, 659 (1979) (“The question remains, however, whether in

the service of these important ends the [method of seizure] is

a sufficiently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion

upon Fourth Amendment interests which such [seizures]

entail.”). At oral argument, counsel could not attest to the

usefulness of kicking Johnson in the groin. Neither can we.

This tips the balance toward illegality. Bruce’s alleged kick to

the groin of a prone man, which caused great personal harm to

Johnson without any corresponding public benefit, violated

the Fourth Amendment.

10

B.

“[I]f a violation could be made out on a favorable view of

the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask

whether the [constitutional] right was clearly established.”

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. An officer is “shielded from liability

for civil damages insofar as [his] conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). We decide de novo whether

Johnson’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from Bruce’s

kicks to his groin was clearly established. Elder v. Holloway,

510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994).

We begin by establishing the appropriate level of

generality at which to analyze the right at issue. See, e.g.,

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999); Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639–40 (1987). It will not do to ask

whether Johnson had a right to be secure in his person against

unreasonable seizures. Instead, “[t]he relevant, dispositive

inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is

whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier,

533 U.S. at 202. On the facts as we have them on appeal, the

issue is whether a reasonable officer could have believed that

kicking Johnson in the groin after he had surrendered and

posed neither a risk of flight nor any danger was a lawful

means of effecting a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. If

Bruce’s use of force survives this test of “objective legal

reasonableness,” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819, then he is entitled

to qualified immunity. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,

341 (1986) (noting that “if officers of reasonable competence

could disagree on this issue, immunity should be

recognized”); Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 760

11

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he proper inquiry here is whether the

officers’ actions were so excessive that no reasonable officer

on the scene could have believed that they were lawful.”).

Coming as it does on the heels of our determination that

the alleged kicking was unreasonable, our inquiry into legal

reasonableness may seem redundant. Cf. Saucier, 533 U.S. at

209–17 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing

“the duplication inherent in [Saucier’s] two-step scheme”).

Despite the similarity of phrasing, the two Saucier

reasonableness questions are distinct though overlapping.

Accordingly, Part II.A of this opinion asks whether it was

reasonable for Bruce to kick Johnson’s groin, while Part II.B

asks whether it was reasonable for Bruce not to know that it

was unlawful to kick Johnson’s groin. Saucier, 533 U.S. at

203–07 (majority opinion); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.

ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND

THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1129–30 & n.10 (5th ed. 2003)

[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (explaining the distinction

between the “reasonableness” inquiries).

In determining whether officers strayed beyond clearly

established bounds of lawfulness, we look to cases from the

Supreme Court and this court, as well as to cases from other

courts exhibiting a consensus view. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617.

We need not identify cases with “materially similar” facts, but

have only to show that “the state of the law [at the time of the

incident] gave [the officer] fair warning that [his alleged

misconduct] . . . was unconstitutional.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536

U.S. 730, 741 (2002). Bruce is not entitled to qualified

immunity if the cases show that his kicking violated the

Fourth Amendment, because “a reasonably competent public

official should know the law governing his conduct.” Harlow,

457 U.S. at 819.

12

Our review of the cases convinces us that Bruce’s alleged

use of excessive force violated a clearly established rule: An

officer’s act of violence violates the Fourth Amendment’s

prohibition against unreasonable seizures if it furthers no

governmental interest, such as apprehending a suspect or

protecting an officer or the public. The cases show that

officers will not prevail if their use of force cannot be justified

under the circumstances. In Tennessee v. Garner, the

Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the

use of deadly force to seize a non-dangerous fleeing felon,

noting that such force is not “a sufficiently productive means

of accomplishing” law enforcement goals. 471 U.S. at 10. In

DeGraff v. District of Columbia, we reversed a summary

judgment grant for the police because it was unclear what

legitimate interest could have been served by carrying a

suspect horizontally through the air and handcuffing her to a

mailbox. 120 F.3d 298, 302 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Even in cases where officers have prevailed, we have

emphasized that the violence complained of was undertaken

in pursuit of a legitimate end. In Scott v. District of Columbia,

we found no Fourth Amendment violation where officers

struck a suspect once and pinned him to the ground, because

“[a]ll of the officers’ actions were reasonably calculated

toward the goal of securing [the suspect] and placing him in

handcuffs, while minimizing his opportunity to escape.

Nothing in the record indicates that they used more force than

reasonably appeared necessary to achieve that goal.” 101 F.3d

748, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In Wardlaw v. Pickett, we ruled in

favor of a U.S. Marshal who punched a suspect in the face

and chest, because the Marshal had reason to fear an attack by

the suspect and stopped punching “[o]nce [the suspect] sat

down on the stairs and it became apparent that he was not

going to attack.” 1 F.3d at 1304. In Martin v. Malhoyt, we

ruled in favor of an officer who forced a driver to remain in

13

the driver’s seat and then closed the car door on the driver’s

leg, because we concluded that this rough treatment protected

the driver from oncoming traffic. 830 F.2d 237, 262 (D.C.

Cir. 1987) (R.B. Ginsburg, J.).

The cases add up to the sensible proposition that a police

officer must have some justification for the quantum of force

he uses. This is not to say that the judicial role in determining

what is “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment

transforms every judge into a police chief. “The

‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,

rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” Graham, 490

U.S. at 396, and we will “accord[] a measure of respect to the

officer’s judgment about the quantum of force called for in a

quickly developing situation,” Martin, 830 F.2d at 261. But as

the cases clearly establish, the state may not perpetrate

violence for its own sake. Force without reason is

unreasonable.4

4

That officers ought not to use more force than reasonably

necessary to advance a governmental interest was also evident from

local statutes and regulations. See D.C. CODE § 5-123.02 (“Any

officer who uses unnecessary and wanton severity in arresting or

imprisoning any person shall be deemed guilty of assault and

battery, and, upon conviction, punished therefor.”); D.C. MUN.

REGS. tit. 6A, § 207.1 (“It is the policy of the Metropolitan Police

Department that each member of the department shall in all cases

use only the minimum amount of force which is consistent with the

accomplishment of his or her mission . . . .”). While these materials

support our conclusion that Bruce’s use of force violated clearly

established law, we will not rely on them in light of conflicting

Supreme Court decisions concerning the use of state law to

determine what is clearly established law. See HART & WECHSLER,

supra, at 1131 n.11 (noting conflict). Compare Davis v. Scherer,

468 U.S. 183, 195–96 (1984) (rejecting suggestion that state

regulation demarcated clearly established law), with Hope, 536 U.S.

14

* * *

The district court erred in concluding that Bruce was

entitled to qualified immunity. Summary judgment was

premature because there exists a genuine issue of material

fact, namely, whether Johnson’s prone position was

threatening or suggested escape. That dispute can only be

resolved by evaluating the conflicting testimony of Johnson

and Bruce. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 209–17 (Ginsburg, J.,

concurring in the judgment) (“Of course, if an excessive force

claim turns on which of two conflicting stories best captures

what happened on the street, Graham will not permit

summary judgment in favor of the defendant official.”); cf.

Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L.

REV. 1897, 1907 n.57 (1998) (noting “the example that

Professor Arthur Miller is reported to have used regularly in

his 1-L Harvard Law School civil procedure class of an earlier

time, that if a dozen Jesuit priests proffer identical testimony

regarding a street fight they all observed, and one disreputable

inebriate proffers contrary testimony, summary judgment is

inappropriate”). We reverse the district court’s judgment as to

Johnson’s § 1983 claim and remand the case for trial.

Johnson is not home free. His victory on appeal comes

from our having viewed the facts most favorably to him. Seen

in that light, the facts are egregious. Once the finder of fact

has established what really happened during the tense

exchange between Bruce and Johnson, it will be possible to

judge whether Bruce’s conduct was actually unlawful under

the Fourth Amendment. If Johnson’s behavior was

at 743–44 (treating state regulations as probative of clearly

established law). The cases discussed in the text set forth a clear

standard. We need look no further.

15

threatening, then Bruce’s use of force may be regarded as a

reasonable means of protecting himself against a possible

attempt to retrieve a weapon. See Wardlaw, 1 F.3d at 1304. If

Johnson appeared to flee, then Bruce’s use of force as a

means of preventing escape may be regarded as reasonable in

light of his suspicion that Johnson was an armed felon. See

Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. These issues await resolution in the

trial court.

III.

Johnson also presses various common law claims against

the District of Columbia. The district court granted summary

judgment for the District on these claims, concluding that the

Police and Firefighters Retirement and Disability Act

(“PFRDA”) barred Johnson’s suit. On this point we affirm.

The PFRDA is the exclusive remedy against the District

for police officers injured while performing their duties.

Feirson v. District of Columbia, 506 F.3d 1063, 1068 (D.C.

Cir. 2007) (citing Lewis v. District of Columbia, 499 A.2d

911, 915 (D.C. 1985)). This should end the inquiry. Johnson

cannot pursue his common law claims against the District

because his having been kicked is covered by the PFRDA.

But Johnson makes two arguments for why the PFRDA does

not apply. We reject them both.

Johnson’s first argument proceeds in three steps. The

PFRDA is similar to a workers’ compensation statute. In

thirty-four states, the workers’ compensation statute is not the

exclusive remedy for intentional torts committed by a co-

worker. See 6 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

LAW § 111.03[1], at 111-8 (2002). Therefore, the PFRDA is

not the exclusive remedy in this intentional tort case.

Johnson’s argument breaks down once we look at the

16

District’s statutes. The Workers’ Compensation Act of 1979

(“WCA”), D.C. CODE § 32-1501 et seq., covers only

“accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of

employment . . . and . . . injury caused by the willful act of

third persons directed against an employee because of his

employment.” Id. § 32-1501(12) (emphases added). Thus the

statute excludes intentional torts of the employer, but the D.C.

Court of Appeals has explained that the WCA does cover

injuries intentionally caused by a co-worker: “From the

perspective of the employer” such an “injury is still

‘accidental’ and the employer is liable” under the WCA, but

not in tort, “so long as the injury arose out of and occurred in

the course of employment.” Grillo v. Nat’l Bank of Wash.,

540 A.2d 743, 748 (D.C. 1988); see also Tekle v. Foot Traffic,

Inc., 699 A.2d 410, 414 (D.C. 1997). Because the PFRDA

and the WCA are not identical, we doubt their coverage is.

See Ray v. District of Columbia, 535 A.2d 868, 870 (D.C.

1987) (noting that the PFRDA covers any injury incurred in

the performance of duty); Mayberry v. Dukes, 742 A.2d 448,

451 (D.C. 1999) (“[E]ven though the [PFRDA] and the WCA

serve similar purposes, we cannot just ignore differences in

the statutory language of the two acts.”). Even if their

coverage were identical, however, in light of Grillo, Johnson

could not sue the District for the intentional tort of one of its

employees. Nor does Johnson’s brief allege any intentional

wrongdoing by the District. Cf. Grillo, 540 A.2d at 748.

Consequently Johnson’s argument fails surely at the first step,

and almost surely at the second.

Johnson’s next argument, which is somewhat confusing,

tries to make much of a classification decision regarding

psychological injuries he claims to have suffered from the

kicking. MPD initially ruled these injuries POD and gave him

paid leave. But a new Stress Protocol, which defines the sorts

of psychological injuries covered under the PFRDA, led MPD

17

to reclassify the psychological injuries as non-POD. Johnson

argues that the incident and the injury are so intertwined that

reclassification of his psychological injuries as non-POD

somehow removed the kicking altogether from the PFRDA’s

coverage.

MPD reclassified Johnson’s psychological injuries as

non-POD under the Stress Protocol because they were not the

direct result of a uniquely stressful event — the kicking —

but were instead a consequence of stressors inherent to the

law enforcement profession. Simply put, the kicking and the

psychological injuries are not so intertwined as Johnson

argues. Johnson suffered his kicking in the performance of

duty and was compensated under the PFRDA for his resulting

injuries regardless of whether he was also compensated under

the PFRDA for job-related stress. Johnson cannot opt out of

the PFRDA regime and head to court just because he is

dissatisfied with the level of compensation provided. The

PFRDA was Johnson’s exclusive source of remedies against

the District, and the district court was correct to enter

summary judgment against his common law claims.

IV.

For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse the

district court’s judgment in favor of Bruce and remand for

trial of Johnson’s § 1983 claim, and affirm the judgment in

favor of the District as to Johnson’s common law claims.

So ordered.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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