Carter v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 11, 2007 Decided October 5, 2007

No. 06-7174

MARISSA L. CARTER,

APPELLANT

v.

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 05cv01970)

Ronald Dixon argued the cause for appellant. With him on

the brief was Kenneth D. Bynum.

Gerard J. Stief argued the cause for appellee. With him on

the brief was Mark F. Sullivan.

Before: HENDERSON, RANDOLPH and BROWN, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

BROWN, Circuit Judge: Marissa Carter appeals the district

court’s dismissal of her complaint, alleging unlawful discrimina-

2

tion by her employer, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit

Authority. Carter contends her completed, but inaccurate,

EEOC questionnaire constituted a timely filed charge of

discrimination. We conclude Carter’s charge was timely.

Therefore, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of her

complaint.

I

On July 6, 2004, Marissa Carter was allegedly sexually

assaulted by a co-worker while working as a subway station

manager for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Author-

ity (WMATA). Carter immediately reported the incident to her

supervisor. WMATA’s Office of Civil Rights conducted an

internal investigation and found insufficient evidence of sexual

harassment. An October 4, 2004 letter from WMATA to Carter

reported the results of the investigation and noted Carter’s right

to file a discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

On October 25, 2004, Carter went to the EEOC and asked

to file a charge of discrimination against WMATA. The EEOC

gave Carter a “Charge Questionnaire,” which she completed that

same day. The questionnaire states that “[w]hen this form

constitutes the only timely written statement of allegations of

employment discrimination, the Commission will . . . consider

it to be a sufficient charge of discrimination under the relevant

statute(s).” The questionnaire included Carter’s name and

contact information, identified WMATA as Carter’s employer,

contained Carter’s handwritten description of the alleged

incident, and noted that WMATA had conducted an investiga-

tion. On the questionnaire, Carter handwrote “4-6-04” and

“4-04” as the dates on which she sought and obtained

WMATA’s assistance in dealing with the assault. She also

3

handwrote “4-6-04” as the date on which the alleged incident

occurred.

During her October 25, 2004 visit, the EEOC told Carter to

return for a follow-up meeting on the next available date, which

was January 20, 2005. Carter claims she had no control over the

date of her follow-up meeting. She returned to the EEOC one

day early and filed a “Charge of Discrimination” on January 19,

2005. In contrast to the October questionnaire, the January 19,

2005 document correctly listed July 6, 2004 as the date of

alleged discrimination.

After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Carter

filed a complaint against WMATA in federal district court on

October 5, 2005. Her complaint contained a Title VII claim

alleging gender-based discrimination. On January 9, 2006,

WMATA moved to dismiss, arguing Carter had not filed a

charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of July

6, 2004, as required by Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-5(e)(1).1 In response, Carter contended her October 25,

2004 questionnaire should constitute a timely charge of discrim-

ination. The district court granted WMATA’s motion to dismiss

Carter’s complaint with prejudice. The district court reasoned

that Carter’s responses to the October 25, 2004 questionnaire

rendered the questionnaire untimely because she handwrote

April 6, 2004 as the date of the alleged discrimination, and April

6 falls more than 180 days prior to October 25. In addition, the

district court noted Carter’s January 19, 2005 charge fell more

than 180 days after the alleged discrimination. After the district

court dismissed the complaint, Carter filed a motion for recon-

sideration, which—for the first time—asserted that the equitable

1

Aside from the argument that Carter’s charge was untimely,

WMATA does not attack the sufficiency of the October 25, 2004

questionnaire.

4

tolling doctrine should excuse her potential untimeliness. The

district court denied Carter’s motion for reconsideration.

II

We review the district court’s order granting the motion to

dismiss de novo. King v. Jackson, 487 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir.

2007).

Title VII prohibits a variety of employment practices,

including gender-based discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

2(a). The statute’s enforcement scheme required Carter to file

a charge of discrimination with the EEOC “within one hundred

and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice

occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (emphasis added). See

generally Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S.

____, 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2170-71 (2007) (explaining that Congress

established this deadline to “encourage the prompt processing”

of charges and protect employers from having to defend stale

claims). This requirement essentially functions as a statute of

limitations for Title VII actions. See Zipes v. Trans World

Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (“[A] timely charge of

discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite

to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of

limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable toll-

ing.”). Most importantly for the purposes of this appeal, the

180-day filing period begins on the date “the alleged unlawful

practice occurred”—not the date listed in the charge itself. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

Both parties agree the alleged incident occurred on July 6,

2004. In fact, WMATA acknowledges Carter simply made a

5

mistake when she wrote “4-6-04” and “4-04” on the EEOC

questionnaire.2

Since the parties agree July 6, 2004 is the date “the alleged

unlawful practice occurred,” Title VII required Carter to file a

charge within 180 days of July 6, 2004. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

5(e)(1). This is, in fact, exactly what she did. Her completion

of an EEOC questionnaire on October 25, 2004 fell well within

the 180-day filing period that commenced on July 6, 2004.

Accordingly, the district court should not have granted

WMATA’s motion to dismiss.

We reach our holding by applying the plain language of

Title VII to the undisputed facts of this case, but our holding is

consistent with the statute’s spirit as well. WMATA had notice

of Carter’s allegation from the outset. A significant purpose of

Title VII’s charge requirement is to notify the employer of the

nature of the allegation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (estab-

lishing the 180-day filing period for charges and requiring that

2

Because the district court held Carter’s questionnaire was

untimely, Carter argued—as an apparent afterthought—that the

equitable tolling doctrine should excuse any untimeliness. We

conclude this argument was improperly raised because Carter first

raised it in her motion for reconsideration, despite the fact that

reconsideration is only appropriate when “the moving party shows

new facts or clear errors of law which compel the court to change its

prior position.” Nat’l Ctr. for Mfg. Sci. v. Dep’t of Def., 199 F.3d 507,

511 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v.

CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996)

(“Reconsideration is not an appropriate forum for rehashing

previously rejected arguments or arguing matters that could have been

heard during the pendency of the previous motion.”). Carter’s

equitable tolling argument demonstrated neither “new facts” nor “clear

errors of law.” Accordingly, she did not properly raise—and we do

not reach the merits of—this argument.

6

“notice of the charge . . . be served upon the person against

whom such charge is made”); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S.

54, 75 (1984) (explaining that providing an employer notice of

a charge “seems to have been designed to ensure that the

employer was given some idea of the nature of the charge”).

Carter immediately reported the incident to her supervisor;

WMATA began its investigation the same day and had com-

pleted its review by the time Carter filed her October 25, 2004

questionnaire. WMATA had immediate and adequate notice.

As the Supreme Court recently emphasized in Ledbetter,

Title VII’s procedural framework—including the 180-day

charging period—must be respected. 127 S. Ct. at 2170-72.

Indeed, “strict adherence to the procedural requirements

specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded

administration of the law.” Id. at 2171 (internal quotation marks

omitted). In this context, we note our decision does nothing to

undermine Congress’s careful calibration of Title VII’s proce-

dures.3 Carter’s October 25, 2004 questionnaire—along with the

undisputed fact that the alleged discrimination occurred on July

6, 2004—fulfills the requirement of a filing within 180 days of

the alleged discrimination. Accordingly, we reverse the district

court’s dismissal of Carter’s complaint.

III

We reverse the district court’s order granting WMATA’s

motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

3

Our holding does not rest on the relation-back doctrine

delineated in 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12, which applies in relatively narrow

circumstances.

7

So ordered.