Opinion

Town of Springfield v. Surface Transportation Board

  • 412 F.3d 187
  • 366 U.S. App. D.C. 405
  • 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12379
  • 2005 WL 1489865
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Jun 24, 2005
Status
Published
Author
Randolph
On the bench
Randolph, Garland, Roberts
Cited by
3 cases
Authority
More cited than 52.0%

holding that, “when a reopening petition rested on ‘material error,’ the court has no jurisdiction to review a denial of the petition”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that, “when a reopening petition rested on ‘material error,’ the court has no jurisdiction to review a denial of the petition”
  • holding that evidence that “could have been placed before the Board in the original proceeding” is not new evidence
  • "[W]hen a reopening petition rested on 'material error,' the court has no jurisdiction to review a denial of the petition."

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

________

Argued May 19, 2005 Decided June 24, 2005

No. 04-1280

TOWN OF SPRINGFIELD , NEW JERSEY, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD AND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

RESPONDENTS

UNION COUNTY, NEW JERSEY AND

MORRISTOWN AND ERIE RAILWAY, INC.,

INTERVENORS

________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Surface Transportation Board

________

Scott N. Stone argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioners.

Cecelia H. Cannizzaro, Attorney, Surface Transportation

Board, argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief

were Greer S. Goldman and Mark R. Haag, Attorneys, U.S.

Department of Justice, Ellen D. Hanson, General Counsel, and

Craig M. Keats, Deputy General Counsel.

2

John D. Heffner and John K. Fiorilla were on the brief for

intervenor Union County, New Jersey and Morristown and Erie

Railway, Inc. in support of respondents.

Before: RANDOLPH, GARLAND, and ROBERTS, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: In July 2002, the Surface

Transportation Board awarded the Morristown and Erie Railway

a modified certificate of public convenience and necessity to

operate two previously-abandoned railway lines in New Jersey.

67 Fed. Reg. 44,928 (July 5, 2002). Those lines, which are

located in Union County, pass through five municipalities: the

Township of Springfield, the City of Summit, and the Boroughs

of Kenilworth, Roselle, and Roselle Park. The State of New

Jersey owns the rail lines. The State vested Union County with

the authority to oversee the rehabilitation and future use of the

lines. Union County entered into a written agreement with the

Morristown and Erie Railway to perform the rehabilitation work

and operate the lines.

In January 2004, the five municipalities, concerned about

several environmental and safety issues, filed a petition asking

the Board to reopen its July 2002 decision granting the modified

certificate. The Board denied the petition, and the municipalities

sought judicial review.

Under the Board’s regulation, a petition to reopen “must

state in detail the respects in which the proceeding involves

material error, new evidence, or substantially changed

circumstances.” 49 C.F.R. § 1115.4. The municipalities say

they satisfied the reopening regulation because Union County

first passed a resolution stating that the final stages of the

3

railway rehabilitation would not occur without the

municipalities’ approval and then passed a second resolution

authorizing the Morristown and Erie Railway to complete the

rehabilitation even though the municipalities had not consented.

According to the municipalities, none of which participated in

the original certificate proceeding, the county’s original

resolution “lulled” them into inaction during the proceeding.

This will not wash. The Board proceedings ended in July 2002.

Union County adopted the first resolution in August 2002, more

than a month later. Before passing the resolution, Union County

sent the municipalities several letters indicating that work would

not proceed without their consent, but these letters also came

after the Board’s action. It is therefore impossible to see how a

resolution and letters, dated after the Board’s proceeding ended,

could have lulled the municipalities into not participating. To

state the matter differently, the municipalities cannot show -- as

they must -- that the resolution or the letters materially affected

the Board’s disposition. Cf. 49 C.F.R. § 1115.3(b)(1). For

obvious reasons, the Board did not rely on those items in

reaching its decision.

The municipalities also tell us that the Board committed

error when it failed to mention evidence indicating that

hazardous wastes are present on the railway lines. Brief of

Petitioners at 3-4. We may review the Board’s denial of a

reopening petition if the petition was based upon new evidence

or changed circumstances. But when a reopening petition rested

on “material error,” the court has no jurisdiction to review a

denial of the petition. ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482

U.S. 270, 280 (1987). Otherwise the time for petitioning for

judicial review of the original decision could, in effect, be

extended indefinitely -- a reopening petition may be filed at any

time.

4

The municipalities’ hazardous waste evidence is not new;

it could have been placed before the Board in the original

proceeding. Indeed, the municipalities’ contentions on this

subject relied almost entirely on the administrative record

compiled by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Board’s

predecessor, when it authorized abandonment of the lines in the

early 1990s. No circumstances changed between the time of the

Board’s decision and the filing of the reopening petition. Given

the absence of new evidence about, or changed circumstances

relating to, hazardous wastes, the municipalities’ reopening

petition amounted to nothing more than a claim that the Board

erred in its original decision. The Board’s refusal to reopen for

that reason is therefore not subject to judicial review. See

Entravision Holdings, LLC v. FCC, 202 F.3d 311, 313 (D.C.

Cir. 2000); see also Schoenbohm v. FCC, 204 F.3d 243, 250

(D.C. Cir. 2000).

Petition denied in part, dismissed in part.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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