Gray, William T. v. Poole, Theisha

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 7, 2001 Decided January 8, 2002

No. 01-7052

William T. Gray, III,

Appellant

v.

Theisha Poole,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv02233)

Brian A. Hill, appointed by the court, argued the cause as

amicus curiae on the side of appellant. With him on the

briefs were Alan I. Horowitz and John D. Bates.

William T. Gray, III, appearing pro se, was on the briefs

for appellant.

Mary L. Wilson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued

the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Robert R.

Rigsby, Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Depu-

ty Corporation Counsel.

Before: Edwards, Henderson, and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Circuit Judge: Appellant William T. Gray, III,

appeals the District Court's dismissal of his pro se lawsuit

against Theisha Poole, a District of Columbia social worker.

Poole investigated and helped initiate a child neglect action

filed in the District of Columbia Superior Court ("Superior

Court"), which ultimately resulted in the termination of

Gray's custody of his younger brother. Gray filed a com-

plaint in District Court, claiming that Poole and the two

attorneys responsible for the child neglect action had violated

42 U.S.C. s 1983 in investigating, initiating, and prosecuting

the matter. The District Court dismissed Gray's action,

holding that all three defendants were protected by absolute

immunity. This court summarily affirmed the dismissal as to

the two attorneys. See Gray v. Poole, 243 F.3d 572 (D.C. Cir.

2001) ("Gray I"). The only remaining issue before this court

is whether Poole is protected by absolute or qualified immuni-

ty.

Poole engaged in two distinct types of activities in connec-

tion with the child neglect matter. She first investigated the

case and recommended that a neglect action be brought.

Those activities were similar to actions taken by police offi-

cers prior to the commencement of a criminal prosecution

and, consequently, should be assessed in the same way.

Accordingly, Poole is entitled to only qualified, not absolute,

immunity for those functions. She also submitted a statement

to the court in connection with the neglect action. That

activity was "intimately associated" with the judicial process

and, therefore, Poole is entitled to absolute immunity from

suit for what she said in the statement. See Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).

We hereby affirm in part and reverse in part the District

Court's dismissal of Gray's claims and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

The underlying facts in this case are fully recounted in

Gray I. Therefore, we will only briefly summarize the events

relevant to Poole's appeal.

Appellant Gray lost custody of his minor brother and

guardianship of his brother's estate in a series of actions,

culminating in a neglect action brought by the District of

Columbia in 1999. The petition initiating the neglect action

was signed by the Corporation Counsel for the District of

Columbia and Poole, and the matter was heard in Superior

Court. Subsequent to the initiation of the neglect action,

Gray filed a pro se law suit against the attorney prosecuting

the neglect action, Corporation Counsel, and Poole, the social

worker assigned to the neglect case. In the original com-

plaint, Gray claimed, inter alia, that Poole violated 42 U.S.C.

s 1983 in negligently investigating the neglect case and then

filing an unfounded petition in support of the neglect case.

In a response to the defendants' motion to dismiss, Gray also

alleged that Poole made an ill-founded recommendation to

Corporation Counsel to bring the neglect action and autho-

rized or participated in an illegal entry of Gray's home.

The District Court dismissed Gray's law suit after finding

that, on the facts alleged, all three defendants were protected

by absolute immunity. See Gray v. Poole, Civ. Act. No.

99-2233, slip op. at 3, 5 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2000). In Gray I,

this court granted the motions for summary affirmance filed

by the two attorneys who brought and supervised the neglect

action, and "directed full briefing and argument for Gray's

appeal of Poole's dismissal." 243 F.3d at 575 n.3. The court

then appointed amicus curiae to present argument in support

of Gray.

II. Discussion

In reviewing the District Court's dismissal of Gray's law

suit, we must accept all of appellant's allegations as "entirely

true." Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 261 (1993).

And, because Gray is proceeding pro se, our review of his

pleadings is subject to "less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520 (1972). We must also examine other pleadings to

understand the nature and basis of Gray's pro se claims. See

Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir.

1999) (holding that District Court abused its discretion when

"failing to consider [pro se plaintiff's] complaint in light of his

reply to the motion to dismiss").

In reviewing Gray's claims, we must first consider whether

Poole is entitled to absolute immunity, as the District Court

held, or only qualified immunity, as Gray contends. The

Supreme Court has instructed the lower federal courts to

adhere to a "functional approach" in determining the applica-

bility of absolute versus qualified immunity:

[W]e have recognized two kinds of immunities under

s 1983. Most public officials are entitled only to quali-

fied immunity. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807

(1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978).

Under this form of immunity, government officials are

not subject to damages liability for the performance of

their discretionary functions when "their conduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 818. In most cases,

qualified immunity is sufficient to "protect officials who

are required to exercise their discretion and the related

public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of

official authority." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S., at 506.

We have recognized, however, that some officials per-

form "special functions" which, because of their similarity

to functions that would have been immune when Con-

gress enacted s 1983, deserve absolute protection from

damages liability. Id., at 508. "[T]he official seeking

absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such

immunity is justified for the function in question."

Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. [478,] 486 [(1991)]; Antoine v.

Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432, and n.4

(1993). Even when we can identify a common-law tradi-

tion of absolute immunity for a given function, we have

considered "whether s 1983's history or purposes none-

theless counsel against recognizing the same immunity in

s 1983 actions." Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. [914,] 920

[(1984)]. Not surprisingly, we have been "quite sparing"

in recognizing absolute immunity for state actors in this

context. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).

In determining whether particular actions of govern-

ment officials fit within a common-law tradition of abso-

lute immunity, or only the more general standard of

qualified immunity, we have applied a "functional ap-

proach," see, e.g., Burns, 500 U.S., at 486, which looks to

"the nature of the function performed, not the identity of

the actor who performed it," Forrester v. White, 484

U.S., at 229.

Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268-69.

In Gray I, we examined the Supreme Court's application of

this functional approach in two cases - Imbler and Butz - and

held that "government attorneys who prosecute child neglect

actions perform 'functions analogous to those of a prosecutor

[and] should be able to claim absolute immunity with respect

to such acts.' " 243 F.3d at 577 (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at

515). Here, Poole urges us to extend this analogy so that she

is afforded absolute immunity for all of her actions. Amicus

for Gray, on the other hand, asserts that, because the statuto-

ry responsibility for initiating the neglect action did not lie

with Poole, any analogy to prosecutorial immunity is spurious.

Amicus suggests, instead, that we should adopt a rule that

provides absolute immunity only for in-court oral testimony,

which, in this case, would afford Poole only qualified immuni-

ty. In our view, neither Poole nor Gray has enunciated the

correct standard for the determination of the appropriate

level of official immunity to which Poole is entitled.

We begin our analysis by identifying the relevant functions

carried out by Poole that form the basis of Gray's complaint.

The actions at issue include two distinct and separate types of

activities. Some of Gray's charges involve Poole's functions

as an investigator and adviser to the Corporation Counsel,

while the remaining claims focus on the statement Poole

signed in the neglect action. These two groups of functions

fall neatly into two clear-cut categories, which we discuss in

turn.

Poole's actions as an investigator and adviser to the Corpo-

ration Counsel - i.e., relating to whether Corporation Counsel

should bring the neglect action - are analogous to actions

taken by police officers prior to the giving of testimony in a

criminal prosecution. Like a police officer, Poole tracked

down information, made professional judgments, and passed

on her findings to attorneys in the office of the Corporation

Counsel. These functions are subject to qualified, not abso-

lute, immunity.

In Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1986), the

Supreme Court made it clear that, in assessing the appropri-

ate level of official immunity, the function of a police officer

applying for a warrant is not equivalent to the function of a

prosecutor seeking an indictment:

We intend no disrespect to the officer applying for a

warrant by observing that his action, while a vital part of

the administration of criminal justice, is further removed

from the judicial phase of criminal proceedings than the

act of a prosecutor in seeking an indictment. Further-

more, ... the prosecutor's act in seeking an indictment is

but the first step in the process of seeking a convic-

tion.... Thus, we shield the prosecutor seeking an

indictment because any lesser immunity could impair the

performance of a central actor in the judicial process.

Id. at 342-43 (footnote omitted). The distinction drawn in

Malley is controlling here, for it confirms that a social worker

who functions as investigator and advisor has no legitimate

basis upon which to claim absolute immunity in actions

brought with respect to these functions.

The statement Poole signed in the child neglect action in

Superior Court is a different matter, however, because her

function in this connection was as a witness in a judicial

proceeding and hence was "intimately associated" with the

judicial process. Poole is therefore entitled to absolute im-

munity from suit for what she said in that statement. Under

the relevant District of Columbia statutes, Poole was not

required to play any role in the initiation of the neglect

proceeding. The Corporation Counsel, not the social worker,

must prepare every petition "after an inquiry into the facts

and a determination of the legal basis for the petition." D.C.

Code s 16-2305(c) (2001); see also In re: J.J.Z., 630 A.2d 186,

190 (D.C. 1993) (describing statutory framework). In this

case, however, Poole was much more than a bystander in the

Superior Court action. She signed a statement in the petition

setting forth the facts of the case and attesting, under oath,

that those facts were true. Thus, while Poole may not have

been required to sign the petition, she was not forbidden from

doing so. And when she did, she acted as a witness in a

judicial proceeding.

In Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326 (1983), the Court

held that government officials "are absolutely immune from

damages liability based on their testimony" in a judicial

proceeding. This same principle applies to Poole's partic-

ipation in the Superior Court action. It does not matter

whether Poole's sworn statement was given in oral or written

form; what matters is that her statement was the equivalent

of sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding.

Amicus for Gray argues that Poole's sworn statement is

not entitled to absolute immunity protection, because it was

not "intimately associated" with the Superior Court judicial

process. In other words, counsel appears to suggest that

Poole should only be protected by absolute immunity if she

appeared as a witness and offered her statement in the form

of oral testimony before the court. This argument does not

hold up, however, when viewed in the light of Briscoe. The

Court in Briscoe looked to English common law to determine

the bounds of absolute immunity for "parties and witnesses

from subsequent damages liability for their testimony in

judicial proceedings." 460 U.S. at 330-31 (footnote omitted).

None of the common law cases cited by the Court distin-

guished between in-court and out-of-court, or written and oral

statements. Indeed, in Henderson v. Broomhead, 157 Eng.

Rep. 964, 967 (Ex. Ch. 1859), one of the cases cited by the

Supreme Court, the English court considered "whether an

action will lie against a party who in the course of a cause

made an affidavit which contained matter scandalous to the

present plaintiff, and which was false and malicious" and held

that "[a]n action will not lie for defamatory words spoken in

the course of litigation which are relevant to that litigation."

The relevant variable in the court's analysis was the nature of

the connection between the disputed affidavit statement and

the judicial process, not the form of the testimony. Under

this standard, Poole's statement under oath that was given to

initiate the Superior Court action is protected by absolute

immunity.

The Supreme Court's recent discussion of absolute immuni-

ty in Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997), further supports

this conclusion. There, a prosecutor contemporaneously filed

three documents in a criminal prosecution - an information

charging respondent with burglary, a motion for an arrest

warrant, and an affidavit supporting the issuance of the

arrest warrant. Id. at 121. The Court granted absolute

immunity for the first two documents - the information and

the motion for an arrest warrant. The Court denied absolute

immunity for the affidavit that was given in support of the

arrest warrant, however, because the prosecutor was not

functioning as " 'an advocate for the State' " when she submit-

ted the affidavit. Id. at 126 (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at

273). Thus, Kalina confirms that officials who serve as

complaining witnesses receive qualified, not absolute, immuni-

ty. See also Malley, 475 U.S. at 340 (stating that "complain-

ing witnesses were not absolutely immune at common law").

In this case, Poole's statement under oath was not that of a

"complaining witness." Rather, the petition initiated the

neglect action in Superior Court, just as a complaint does in

federal district court, and Poole's sworn statement was thus

an undeniable part of the "judicial process." In Kalina and

Malley, by contrast, the sworn statements merely supported

warrant applications, filed as part of an ex parte process prior

to the indictment that begins the criminal case. Like the

trial testimony in Briscoe, Poole's statements are "intimately

associated" with the judicial process. See Malley, 475 U.S. at

342-43.

Poole makes three other arguments on appeal, all of which

are meritless and only one of which is even worthy of

discussion. Poole claims that, because Gray's claims are "inex-

tricably intertwined with the propriety of the Superior Court

neglect proceeding concerning his younger brother and could

have been litigated in that neglect proceeding," Br. for Thei-

sha Poole at 17, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes this

court from exercising jurisdiction. The Rooker-Feldman doc-

trine prevents lower federal courts from hearing cases that

amount to the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state

court. See Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413

(1923). Because 28 U.S.C. s 1257 requires that appeals from

state courts go exclusively to the Supreme Court, the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine ensures that the Supreme Court's appel-

late jurisdiction is exclusive. See Stanton v. Dist. of Colum-

bia Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In

this case, however, Rooker-Feldman does not come into play,

because Gray's federal claims are entirely separate and dis-

tinct from the result of the D.C. neglect action. The legality

of Poole's actions was not at issue in the neglect action and

the remedy for any illegal action in the s 1983 suit - money

damages - would not disturb the judgment of the state court

action - custody. See, e.g., Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of

Chester County, 108 F.3d 486, 491-92 (3d Cir. 1997) (declining

to invoke Rooker-Feldman doctrine under similar circum-

stances).

III. Conclusion

For the reasons given above, we affirm in part and reverse

in part the District Court's dismissal of Gray's claims against

Poole on absolute immunity grounds. Poole is entitled to

absolute immunity for any testimony that she gave to Superi-

or Court in the child neglect action, and only qualified immu-

nity for all other disputed actions at issue in this case. We

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.