Warren, William A. v. United States

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 15, 2000 Decided December 26, 2000

No. 00-5130

William A. Warren,

Appellant

v.

United States of America, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv02415)

Gene A. Bechtel argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was Patrick C. Clary.

David J. Lazerwitz, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the

brief were Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, and

Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Sentelle and Henderson,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: William A. Warren appeals from

the District Court's dismissal of his suit to quiet title to

Navassa Island and its deposit of guano (bird droppings rich

in nitrogen and phosphate). The District Court held that the

12-year limitations period in the Quiet Title Act ("QTA"), 28

U.S.C. 2409a(g) (1994), barred Warren's claim because he and

his predecessors in interest knew, or should have known, of a

claim by the United States to the Island asserted more than

12 years before Warren brought his action in February 1997.

The District Court also found that, even if it had jurisdiction

over the action, Warren had failed to demonstrate a legally

cognizable interest in Navassa Island and its guano, because

Warren's predecessors in interest possessed merely a revoca-

ble license to mine guano that the United States terminated

as early as 1916.

We agree that Warren's action is barred. Numerous

events establish that, at least 12 years before Warren filed his

action, there was notice, both actual and constructive, of the

United States' claim of sole and exclusive ownership of the

Island and its mineral resources. None of Warren's prede-

cessors in interest challenged any of the Government's claims,

and there is no support for Warren's contention that the

Government abandoned its claim to the Island in 1996.

Even were jurisdiction proper over Warren's quiet-title

action, we agree with the District Court that neither Warren

nor his predecessors in interest possessed a legally cognizable

fee ownership interest in Navassa Island. Warren's prede-

cessors in interest possessed nothing more than a revocable

license to occupy the Island for the purpose of mining guano,

and the United States revoked that license in the early 1900s.

I. Background

Navassa Island is an island of less than three square miles,

located in the Caribbean Sea between Haiti and Jamaica,

approximately 100 miles south of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

See Office of the General Counsel, U.S. General Account-

ing Office, Pub. No. GAO/OGC-98-5, Report to House Comm.

on Resources, U.S. Insular Areas: Application of the U.S.

Constitution 47 (1997); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202,

205 (1890). Peter Duncan discovered the Island, and claimed

it for the United States on November 18, 1857, pursuant to

the Guano Islands Act of August 18, 1856, 48 U.S.C. ss 1411-

1419 (1994). See Jones, 137 U.S. at 204-06, 217.

The Guano Islands Act provides for islands, rocks, or keys,

not within the jurisdiction of any other government, to "be

considered as appertaining to the United States," if a United

States citizen discovers upon them a deposit of guano and

provides notice of discovery to the Department of State. 48

U.S.C. ss 1411, 1412. Upon giving the appropriate notice,

"[t]he discoverer, or his assigns ... may be allowed, at the

pleasure of Congress, the exclusive right of occupying such

island, rocks, or keys, for the purpose of obtaining guano, and

of selling and delivering the same to citizens of the United

States." 48 U.S.C. s 1414.

On December 8, 1859, then-Secretary of State, Lewis Cass,

issued a proclamation granting Edward Cooper, the assignee

of Peter Duncan, "all the privileges and advantages intended

by [the] act." Jones, 137 U.S. at 206. Cooper subsequently

assigned his interest to the Navassa Phosphate Company.

See Warren v. United States, Civ. No. 97-2415, Transcript of

Motions Hearing before the Honorable Paul L. Friedman

("Hearing Tr.") at 30 (Feb. 16, 2000).

In 1889, an employee of the Navassa Phosphate Company

was tried and convicted in the U.S. District Court for the

District of Maryland for the murder of his supervisor on

Navassa Island. See Jones, 137 U.S. at 203-04. The defen-

dant argued that a federal court in the United States did not

have the authority to try him because Navassa Island was not

within the jurisdiction of the United States. See id. at 209.

When the case reached the Supreme Court, the only issue

was the status of Navassa Island as a possession of the

United States. The Supreme Court ruled that the question

of the United States' sovereignty over Navassa Island was for

the political branches of government, the Congress and the

Executive, to determine. The opinion of the Court examined

in detail the history of the exercise of United States sover-

eignty over Navassa Island and concluded that "the Guano

Islands Act of August 18, 1856 ... is constitutional and valid;

... the Island of Navassa must be considered as appertaining

to the United States." Id. at 224.

The removal of guano from Navassa Island continued until

1898 when, at the outset of the Spanish-American War,

President William McKinley ordered all inhabitants of Navas-

sa Island removed. See Hearing Tr. at 30. Thereafter, the

Navassa Phosphate Company was placed in receivership, and

its assets were sold at auction to pay creditors. See id. It is

not clear how the interests of the Navassa Phosphate Compa-

ny were ultimately divided. For purposes of the proceeding

before this court, the Government accepts Warren's chain of

title to the rights and interests of the Navassa Phosphate

Company. It is not disputed that all guano mining on

Navassa Island ended by 1901 and that the Navassa Phos-

phate Company was dissolved in 1924. See id.

By an Act of October 22, 1913, 38 Stat. 224 (1913), Con-

gress appropriated $125,000 "[f]or a light station on Navassa

Island, in the West Indies." Subsequently, by a Proclamation

of January 17, 1916, 39 Stat. 1763 (1916), President Woodrow

Wilson declared that the "Island of Navassa in the West

Indies be and the same is hereby reserved for lighthouse

purposes, such reservation being deemed necessary in the

public interests." In support of this reservation of Navassa

Island, the Proclamation recited the Guano Islands Act and

the 1913 congressional appropriation.

Construction of the lighthouse was completed on October

21, 1917. Though originally tended by keepers, the light-

house was eventually automated. The Coast Guard main-

tained lighthouse facilities on Navassa Island until September

1996, at which time the Coast Guard removed its equipment

and facilities from the property. See Hearing Tr. at 31.

On July 16, 1996, Warren requested permission from the

Coast Guard to land on Navassa Island to shoot a documenta-

ry. See Letter from Bill Warren, to Commander of the

Seventh U.S. Coast Guard District (July 16, 1996), reprinted

in Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 191, 470. He stated therein,

"[a]lthough Navassa is U.S. owned, we understand that even

U.S. Citizens such as ourselves are required to get your

permission to land there." Id. On September 11, 1996, the

United States granted Warren's request to visit the Island,

subject to his submission of a waiver of liability and accep-

tance of responsibility form prior to landing. See Letter from

B.W. Hadley, Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, to Bill Warren

(Sept. 11, 1996), reprinted in J.A. 192. The following day,

Warren submitted a letter providing "notice of his discovery,

occupation and possession of Navassa Island." See Letter

from Charles P. LeBeau, Esq., to Warren Christopher, Secre-

tary of State (Sept. 12, 1996), reprinted in J.A. 148-49. The

letter claimed that the Coast Guard had abandoned the

Island, and requested that the Department of State enter and

certify Warren's claim of discovery under the Guano Islands

Act. See id. at 149.

On January 7, 1997, the Department of State sent an

interim response to Warren, indicating that Navassa Island

was already under United States' jurisdiction and that the

matter had been taken under advisement. See Letter from

T. Michael Peay, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Depart-

ment of State, to Charles P. LeBeau, Esq. (Jan. 7, 1997),

reprinted in J.A. 194. On January 16, 1997, the Secretary of

the Interior issued Order No. 3205, placing the civil adminis-

tration of Navassa Island under the Director of the Office of

Insular Affairs. See Secretary's Order No. 3205, Department

of the Interior (Jan. 16, 1997), reprinted in J.A. 361; Secre-

tary's Order No. 3205, Amendment No. 1, Department of the

Interior (Jan. 14, 1998), reprinted in J.A. 363. Order No.

3205 was superseded by a Memorandum of Understanding

entered between the Office of Insular Affairs and the U.S.

Fish and Wildlife Service on April 22, 1999, pursuant to which

the Fish and Wildlife Service currently manages Navassa

Island as a National Wildlife Refuge. See Memorandum of

Understanding between the Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife

Service and the Director, Office of Insular Affairs (Apr. 22,

1999), reprinted in J.A. 388-90.

On February 13, 1997, Warren filed a pro se complaint in

the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California

seeking an injunction against an alleged sale of Navassa

Island and "full and complete title to the Island, buildings and

guano." Complaint, Warren v. United States, Civ. No. 97-

242-B (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 1997). Warren amended his com-

plaint two more times to include additional parties such as

Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt and Secretary of

State Madeleine Albright as defendants. See First Amended

Complaint, Warren v. United States, Civ. No. 97-242-B (S.D.

Cal. Aug. 26, 1997); Second Amended Complaint, Warren v.

United States, Civ. No. 97-2415 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 1998). In

October 1997, the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-

trict of California transferred the case to the U.S. District

Court for the District of Columbia. See Warren v. United

States, Civ. No. 97-242-B, (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9. 1997) (order

transferring venue).

In 1998, Warren obtained a quit claim deed and assignment

of interest from heirs of two individuals--James A. Wood-

ward and George W. Grafflin--alleged assignees of the inter-

est of the Navassa Phosphate Company. On September 17,

1998, Warren filed a third amended complaint, adding claims

based on an unconstitutional taking of his property rights and

violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, and request-

ing the imposition of penalties against three members of

Congress and the President of the United States for failing to

represent adequately his interests. See Third Amended

Complaint, Warren v. United States, Civ. No. 97-2415

(D.D.C. Sept. 17, 1998).

On November 25, 1998, the United States filed a motion to

dismiss, arguing that the District Court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over Warren's claims and, in the alternative,

moved for summary judgment. Warren filed a motion for

leave to file a fourth amended complaint that the District

Court subsequently granted. See Plaintiff's Motion for Leave

to File Amended and Supplemental Complaint, Civ. No.

97-2415 (D.D.C. Apr. 5, 1999). The complaint set forth four

claims based entirely on the quit claim deed and assignments

of interest. Claims one and two sought declaratory relief

establishing Warren's ownership and rights to Navassa Is-

land. See id. In claim three, Warren claimed that Order No.

3205, "violat[ed] the separation of powers between the execu-

tive and legislative branches of government as provided in the

Constitution of the United States," id., and sought an injunc-

tion against continuing "such wrongful and unlawful conduct."

Id. Claim four stated the takings claim. Id.

On February 16, 2000, the District Court held a hearing

and dismissed Warren's claims for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Hearing Tr. at 39-40. In the alternative, the

District Court rejected the claim of fee title ownership of

Navassa Island, finding that the Guano Islands Act conveyed

only a revocable license, and that the President possessed the

authority to reserve Navassa Island for navigational use,

thereby revoking such license, based on Congress's authoriza-

tion of funds for the lighthouse and the President's implied

power to reserve public lands. See id. The District Court

also dismissed the takings claim from which Warren does not

appeal.

II. Analysis

The Quiet Title Act ("QTA") is the "exclusive means by

which adverse claimants [may] challenge the United States'

title to real property." Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273,

286 (1983). The statute operates as a waiver of the United

States' sovereign immunity as to certain quiet title actions.

See 28 U.S.C. s 2409a(a). That waiver is limited in scope,

however, and the terms of the Act "define the extent of the

court's jurisdiction." United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834,

841 (1986); see also United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,

586 (1941). One limitation specified in the Act is the require-

ment that:

[a]ny civil action under this section, except for an action

brought by a State, shall be barred unless it is com-

menced within twelve years of the date upon which it

accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have accrued

on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest

knew or should have known of the claim of the United

States.

28 U.S.C. s 2409a(g).

A "test of reasonableness" applies to determine whether a

plaintiff, or his predecessors in interest, "knew or should have

known" of a federal claim of interest in property. See D.C.

Transit System, Inc. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1438, 1441

(D.C. Cir. 1983). "Knowledge of the claim's full contours is

not required. All that is necessary is a reasonable awareness

that the Government claims some interest adverse to the

plaintiff's." Knapp. v. United States, 636 F.2d 279, 283 (10th

Cir. 1980).

In this case, there is undisputed evidence in the record

demonstrating that Warren and his predecessors in interest

"knew or should have known" that the United States claimed

an interest in Navassa Island more than 12 years before

Warren filed his quiet title action. Actual notice of the

United States' adverse claim of title to Navassa Island was

given to Warren's predecessor in interest, James Woodward,

as early as 1915, in a letter from the Assistant Secretary of

the Department of Commerce. See Letter from E.S. Sweet,

Assistant Secretary, Department of Commerce, to James

Woodward (Apr. 14, 1915), reprinted in J.A. 315. In re-

sponse to a communication from Woodward to President

Wilson in which Woodward offered to sell Navassa Island to

the United States, Assistant Secretary Sweet informed Wood-

ward that "as the title to the island [of Navassa] is in the

United States it is considered unnecessary to take any mea-

sures looking to the purchase of land on the island in connec-

tion with the establishment of a lightstation thereon." Id.

Warren's predecessors in interest were also afforded con-

structive notice of the United States' claim to Navassa Island.

The most significant instance of such notice arose in 1916,

when President Woodrow Wilson, pursuant to a congressional

authorization, issued a Proclamation declaring that all of

Navassa Island was unqualifiedly reserved for a lighthouse

base. The Proclamation stated that

the said Island of Navassa in the West Indies be and the

same is hereby reserved for lighthouse purposes, such

reservation being deemed necessary in the public inter-

ests, subject to such legislative action as the Congress of

the United States may take with respect thereto.

39 Stat. 1763 (1916) (emphasis added).

Warren contends that the presidential Proclamation was

not inconsistent with private ownership of the Island or the

right to occupy such lands to mine guano. He contends that

the lighthouse on Navassa takes up only a portion of the

Island, and refers to a lighthouse located on Fenwick Island,

Delaware, which allegedly operates in close proximity to

private ownership interests. Whether or not the situation of

Fenwick Island is as Warren asserts it to be, its status is

unquestionably inapposite. Here we have a presidential

Proclamation that clearly and lawfully reserved the entire

Island of Navassa for use by the United States Government.

The reservation of the Island served to terminate any con-

trary private interest in the land, if any existed at that point.

And nearly 50 years after the issuance of the 1916 Proclama-

tion, federal officials were still citing it as evidence of the

United States' claim. In 1962, for example, in response to an

inquiry regarding the status of Navassa Island, the Coast

Guard replied that

[t]his Island is under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction

of the United States pursuant to 48 U.S.C. 1411, and by

Proclamation of the President dated 17, January, 1916,

the entire Island was reserved for lighthouse purposes.

Therefore, it is unlike other possessions of the United

States in that the entire Island is a government (Coast

Guard) reservation.

Letter from D. McG. Morrison, Vice Admiral, U.S. Coast

Guard, Acting Commandant, to Francis K. Campbell (Oct. 11,

1962), reprinted in J.A. 423-24.

Warren questions the President's authority to revoke any

interest in Navassa Island. He notes that by the express

provisions of the Act, the rights accorded to private tenants

were terminable only "at the pleasure of Congress." See 48

U.S.C. s 1414 (emphasis added). But he ignores the impor-

tant sequence of events leading to the reservation of Navassa

Island as a navigational aid. In 1913, Congress sanctioned

the termination of guano mining interests on Navassa Island

by appropriating $125,000 for the construction of a lighthouse.

See 38 Stat. 224 (1913). Three years later, the President

formalized the revocation of guano mining interests in the

Proclamation which referred to the congressional appropria-

tion, and declared that it was "necessary" and in the "public

interest" to reserve the Island for lighthouse purposes. See

39 Stat. 1763 (1916).

Warren contends that, even if the United States expressed

an interest in Navassa Island sufficient to threaten claims of

fee simple ownership, the President's act and subsequent

Government acts of "ownership" did not provide constructive

notice that the Government's interest was adverse to pre-

existing mining rights, nor would, Warren asserts, the subse-

quent administration and maintenance of the Island by the

Coast Guard. See Michel v. United States, 65 F.3d 130, 132

(9th Cir. 1995) ("[W]hen the plaintiff claims a non-possessory

interest such as an easement, knowledge of a government

claim of ownership may be entirely consistent with a plain-

tiff's claim"). We find no merit in Warren's position.

"The sufficiency of actual and open possession of property

is to be judged in the light of its character and location."

United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256, 279 (1947). In

this case, Warren and his predecessors "knew or should have

known the government claimed the exclusive right" to use the

Island and to deny access to all others. Michel, 65 F.3d at

132 (emphasis added). Although the United States did not

avail itself of the opportunity to mine the guano itself, there

were significant acts, sufficient to place Warren's predeces-

sors in interest on notice that their mining rights were in

jeopardy. No private mining ventures operated on the Island

after 1901. Indeed, there is no evidence of sustained occu-

pancy on the Island by private parties after the early 1900s.

Beginning in 1963 and until at least 1967, the Island was

posted with signs prohibiting trespassing, and for many years

the Coast Guard denied access to the Island to all but federal

employees. From 1970 until 1996, the Coast Guard restricted

access to Navassa, and no person was able to enter Navassa

Island legally without the Coast Guard's express permission.

Since 1978 the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-

tration ("NOAA") of the U.S. Department of Commerce has

issued nautical charts clearly stating that

Navassa Island is a reservation administered through the

Commander, Seventh Coast Guard District. Landing or

entry on the island is prohibited, except under permit

signed by the Commander, 7th U.S. Coast Guard Dis-

trict.

Declaration of David B. MacFarland, Captain, NOAA, War-

ren v. United States, Civ. No. 97-2415 (May 18, 1999), re-

printed in J.A. 407-11 (emphasis added). The nautical charts

are significant, because there is no way to approach Navassa

Island except by sea. In addition, beginning in July 1984, the

NOAA has released a publication describing Navassa Island

as a federally restricted area and informing the public that

requests to visit Navassa should be made to the Commander,

Seventh District Coast Guard, Miami, Florida. It was pre-

sumably for this reason that Warren sought permission from

the Commander of the Seventh District Coast Guard in

Miami, Florida, to land on Navassa Island in July 1996.

The presidential Proclamation reserving Navassa Island for

lighthouse purposes, coupled with the Coast Guard's practice

of restricting access, and, for some years, denying access

altogether, to the Island, as well as the Government's consis-

tent claims of sole and exclusive ownership, reasonably and

clearly indicated that the United States had revoked any

outstanding rights or interests to "occupy" Navassa Island for

the purpose of mining guano. Warren's predecessors in

interest therefore had actual and constructive notice of the

United States' claims to Navassa Island and its resources

more than 12 years before Warren brought his suit to quiet

title to the Island in his favor.

Warren makes an alternative argument: that the Coast

Guard's removal of lighthouse equipment from Navassa Is-

land in August 1996 was a formal abandonment of the United

States' claim to the Island, and triggered a new statute of

limitations period. We reject this assertion. In the first

place, the Government cannot abandon property without con-

gressional authorization. See Royal Indem. Co. v. United

States, 313 U.S. 289, 294 (1941); see also United States v.

California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947). Moreover, the undisputed

facts do not support the abandonment claim. Before disman-

tling the lighthouse, the Coast Guard explained, in a 1995

communiquE to the American Embassy in Haiti, that "[t]he

discontinuation of the lighthouse operations is in no way

intended to affect U.S. possession of or jurisdiction over

Navassa Island." CommuniquE from Commandant Cogard,

to American Embassy, Port Au Prince, (Mar. 1995), reprinted

in J.A. 466. Indeed, following the Coast Guard's removal of

the lighthouse equipment, the United States continued to

assert its jurisdiction over the Island, and it has continued to

regulate and restrict access to the Island. In contrast, there

is no proof that any of Warren's predecessors in interest ever

set foot on the Island after 1901, or even inquired of the

continuing viability of their rights. There is, thus, no evidence

that the United States abandoned its claim to the Island, and

Warren's attempt to resurrect mining interests long since

terminated is based on a meritless claim. The District Court

correctly determined that it was without subject matter juris-

diction to hear Warren's claim.

Even if the Court had jurisdiction to hear the quiet title

action, it is abundantly clear that the Guano Islands Act did

not convey any fee ownership interest in the land or minerals

to a discoverer. As the Supreme Court explained in Duncan

v. Navassa Phosphate Co., 137 U.S. 647 (1891), the interest

conveyed under the Act was in the nature of a "usufruct" or

license to mine guano that was terminable "at the pleasure of

Congress." Id. at 652-53. "The whole right conferred upon

the discoverer and his assigns is a license to occupy the island

for the purpose of removing the guano." Id. at 651. The Act

conveyed only a license that was revocable at will by the

United States, and that revocation occurred when the Presi-

dent reserved Navassa Island for navigational purposes in

1916 pursuant to the 1913 congressional appropriation.

Warren's final argument is that this court should recognize

his fee title claim to Navassa based on a "federal common

law" ownership doctrine culled from the Supreme Court's

decision in United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256 (1947).

In Fullard-Leo, the Supreme Court recognized the interests

of private claimants (against the United States) in Palmyra

Island, a former possession of the Kingdom of Hawaii. See

id. Fullard-Leo does not, however, establish a "federal

common law" right of ownership in "remote islands." Indeed,

the Court expressly dismissed the possibility, stating that

"[w]e are not dealing with an explorer's claim of title to lands

of a savage tribe or that of a discoverer of a hitherto unknown

islet." Id. at 268. Rather, the Court considered the doctrine

of "lost grant," which, it observed, was an established doc-

trine in Hawaiian common law before its annexation by the

United States, and could therefore be applied against the

United States, as the successor to Hawaii. See id at 269-70.

The lost grant doctrine has no application in this case.

III. Conclusion

Warren's action is barred by the 12-year limitations period

in the Quiet Title Act. Even were Warren's claim timely, it

would fail for lack of merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the

District Court is affirmed.

So ordered.